ORDER

LYNN ADELMAN, District Judge.

In the above-captioned lead paint cases, plaintiffs and one of the defendants, NL Industries, Inc. ("NL"), have reached a settlement and ask me to issue several rulings to effectuate their agreement. Before addressing their requests, I must resolve a jurisdictional issue. Previously, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead citizenship and also to establish complete diversity. To solve these problems, plaintiffs seek to file a second amended complaint adequately pleading citizenship and severing the non-diverse plaintiffs. All defendants agree to plaintiffs' request, and it will be granted.

With respect to the settlement, plaintiffs and NL have reached an aggregate settlement agreement pursuant to Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 82 (1963), which permits a plaintiff to settle with a defendant while reserving the right to pursue claims against other tortfeasors and agreeing to indemnify the settling defendant for any claims for contribution that the non-settling tortfeasors might bring. Bruner Corp. v. R.A. Bruner Co., 133 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1998). Under the agreement, NL will deposit into a qualified settlement fund a sum to be distributed to plaintiffs according to an agreed-upon formula.

The non-settling defendants do not object to the settlement but object to plaintiffs' request that I consolidate the cases for purposes of settlement. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), I may consolidate cases which involve a common question of law or fact and may issue any orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay. Consolidation "is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994). The non-settling defendants argue consolidation is inappropriate because one case, Gibson v. American Cyanamid, et al., is assigned to Judge Randa, who previously declined to reassign the case to me. There is, however, a common question which justifies consolidation. All plaintiffs have collectively settled with NL. Thus, any questions about the settlement agreement are, by definition, "common."1 Further, effectuating the agreement is complicated; the settlement involves cases in front of two federal judges and two state court judges, and it involves a complex distribution matrix requiring the creation of multiple funds. Consolidation for the limited purpose of resolving plaintiffs' settlement-related motions is efficient and will avoid unnecessary cost and delay. The Gibson case will remain before Judge Randa for all other purposes.2

The non-settling defendants also argue that I should require the settling parties to disclose to them the terms of the settlement by placing such terms in the record under a protective order. Generally, only documents which form the basis of the parties' dispute and the court's resolution of the dispute must be part of the record. Goesel v. Boley Int'l (H.K.) Ltd., 738 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2013). Settlement terms need only be disclosed if they require judicial approval, if they become an issue in a subsequent lawsuit, or if a party seeks enforcement. Id. at 834. Further, under Wisconsin law, parties are not required per se to disclose the terms of a Pierringer settlement. See, e.g., Olson v. Darlington Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Wis.2d 716, 720 n.3 (Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that the trial court erred in compelling disclosure of settlement terms and noting that "[f]orcing disclosure of the settlement amount . . . may work to impede future settlements").

Plaintiffs are not asking that I approve the terms of the settlement agreement with NL, and my approval is not required. Rather, plaintiffs ask me to authorize the creation of funds needed to effectuate the agreement and to authorize the guardian ad litem to settle the minor plaintiffs' claims. To decide these motions, I do not need to know the terms of the agreement, and such terms do not factor into my decision. Thus, at this time, I will not require plaintiffs to disclose the terms of their settlement agreement with NL. The non-settling defendants also argue that keeping the settlement terms confidential is improper because the Pierringer releases affect their rights to contribution from NL. However, nothing in this decision precludes the non-settling defendants from asking for disclosure of the settlement terms at a later date, for example, during or after trial, should such terms become relevant.

Finally, the non-settling defendants object to plaintiffs' characterization of Wisconsin's risk contribution rule and express concern that their failure to object might later be interpreted as acquiescence. Their objection is noted. I stress that in granting plaintiffs' settlement-related motions, I do not decide any issues relating to Wisconsin's risk contribution rule.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that in Allen v. American Cyanamid, Case No. 11-cv-055, plaintiffs' motions for leave to file a second amended complaint (ECF No. 39) and to sever (ECF No. 40) are GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Allen v. American Cyanamid, Case No. 11-cv-055, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all above-captioned cases:

(1) The joint motion to partially consolidate cases for purposes of settlement of all claims against NL Industries, Inc. is GRANTED. The above-captioned cases are partially consolidated for the limited purpose of settling all of the plaintiffs' claims against NL Industries, Inc., on a Pierringer basis.

(2) The joint motion to establish a qualified settlement fund and appoint trustee, and dismiss all claims of plaintiffs against NL Industries, Inc. is GRANTED.

(3) The joint motion for an order authorizing minor plaintiffs' guardian ad litem to settle all claims of minor plaintiffs against NL Industries, Inc., and an order authorizing the creation of special needs trusts is GRANTED.