WILLIAM M. CONLEY, District Judge.
At the final pretrial conference in this case, defendants maintained and raised objections to this court's proposed jury instructions. In light of defendants' arguments and their subsequent submission proposing additional language for the introductory instructions (dkt. #149), the court issues the following opinion setting forth its reasons for overruling certain objections
First, defendants renewed their objection to the court's prior order allowing testimony and argument about plaintiff Jackie Carter's time in segregation in support of his claim for punitive damages. As the court explained in prior opinions, both defendants were sufficiently involved in the disciplinary proceedings that resulted in a segregation sentence to allow the jury to consider the sentence as part of their punitive damages determination. (10/30/14 Op. & Order (dkt. #93) 38-39; 9/18/15 Op. & Order (dkt. #110) 7-8; 1/12/16 Op. & Order (dkt. #134) 6; 2/5/16 Op. & Order (dkt. #143) 3.0 In particular, Dylon Radtke forwarded the letters underlying the conduct reports at issue in this case to Sergeant Bass, thus initiating the disciplinary proceedings, and defendant Janel Nickel screened those reports and classified the conduct. The court appreciates that Carter would have spent time in segregation anyway (though probably not as much time) and that other individuals were involved in adjudicating and sentencing Carter — and defendants may present evidence to that effect and make this argument
In addition to reiterating their prior objection, defendants directed the court to a recent Judge Crabb opinion, which they contend supports their argument for excluding Carter's time in segregation from the jury's deliberation. Ajala v. Swiekatowski, No. 13-cv-638-bbc (W.D. Wis. Aug. 19, 2015). Having now reviewed the opinion, the court can discern little relevance to plaintiff's punitive damages claim here. In Ajala, Judge Crabb excluded testimony and evidence about plaintiff's mental and emotional injuries caused by solitary confinement to support a compensatory damages award on the basis that plaintiff could prove no causal "physical injury," except one not reasonably foreseeable. Id., slip op. at 7-8. This is the same concern that this court voiced in required plaintiff to submit a proffer on his theory of compensatory damages based on pain and suffering caused by a denial of medical treatment. Here, however, plaintiff is no longer seeking compensatory damages based on his segregation sentence.
Second, defendants pressed for changes to the portion of the introductory instructions that seeks to explain to the jury the court's finding of liability on two claims. In particular, defendants seek an instruction the fact that statements in the censored letters were false and that the First Amendment does not normally provide protection for defamatory statements. (See Defs.' Resp. to Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict (dkt. #145) 2; id., Ex. 2 (dkt. #145-2) 1.) In the proposed instructions, the current description of the law surrounding the court's liability finding explains that in the outgoing mail setting, the First Amendment protects content that is "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or is defamatory." The instructions also explain that such content would not necessarily be protected if it were contained in incoming mail or other speech internal to the prison context.
The court continues to view these statements to be an accurate and sufficient description of the current law. To focus instead on the fact that at least some of the statements in the protected letter were false would unnecessarily and improperly stress a factor that was not relevant to the court's finding of liability. Of course, as the court emphasized during the final pretrial conference, defendants remain free to rely on the fact that the letters contained false statements to explain why punitive damages should not be awarded, but the court need not stress this fact in describing the liability finding.
In response to the court's invitation, defendants submitted further revised language to add to the introductory instructions. (Dkt. #149.) This language is more measured and tracks more closely the findings on liability, which the court has modified and adopted as reflected in the attached highlighting.
Members of the jury, we are about to begin the trial of this case. Before it begins, I will give you some basic instructions to help you understand how the trial will proceed, how you should evaluate the evidence, and how you should conduct yourselves during the trial.
The party who begins the lawsuit is called the plaintiff. Here, as you have already heard, the plaintiff is Jackie Carter. The parties against whom the suit is brought are called the defendants. Here, the defendants are Dylon Radtke and Janel Nickel.
As you heard during the voir dire, Mr. Carter is an inmate in the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. In 2010, he was incarcerated at Columbia Correctional Institution ("CCI") in Portage, Wisconsin, where defendants were employed. Prior to this trial, the court entered judgment in Mr. Carter's favor against defendant Dylon Radtke based on Captain Radtke's censoring of Carter's outgoing mail in violation of the First Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that outgoing mail of prisoners is deserving of greater protection than mail coming into the prison and other speech within the prison, even if the content of that outgoing mail expresses inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or is defamatory. In particular, prison officials may not censor outgoing inmate mail simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements about the prison or employees of the prison, unless likely to endanger an employee. The three letters at issue in this case contained broad statements about alleged inmate abuse by CCI staff, although Mr. Carter is unable to support these allegations. Nonetheless, the First Amendment protects such speech. The court has determined that Mr. Carter cannot proceed as to two of the letters because they arguably contained statements that could endanger an employee. As for the third letter, the court found that Captain Radtke violated Mr. Carter's rights when he prohibited its mailing. During this trial, the focus will be on the censoring of this third letter.
The court also entered judgment in Mr. Carter's favor against both Captain Radtke and Security Director Janel Nickel based on those defendants' initiating disciplinary actions in retaliation, at least in part, on his lying about staff in these outgoing letters. Because the content of Carter's outgoing mail is protected by the First Amendment, defendants violated his rights by initiating disciplinary proceedings because of the content of his letters.
Because of the nature of the constitutional violation here and the absence of a physical injury, more common, so-called compensatory damages — for example, for emotional distress — are not available to Mr. Carter under the law. For this reason, the court has already awarded Mr. Carter the nominal amount of $1 in compensatory damages. In this trial, you will determine whether to award Mr. Carter punitive damages for defendant's violations of the First Amendment, and if so, the amount of those damages.
The case will proceed as follows:
You have heard and will hear the term "burden of proof" used during this trial. In simple terms, the phrase "burden of proof" means that the party who makes a claim has the obligation of proving that claim. At the end of the trial, I will instruct you on the proper burden of proof to be applied in this case.
During breaks and recesses, as well as the end of each day, please keep in mind the following instructions:
In deciding the facts, you may have to decide which testimony to believe and which testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, part of it, or none of it. In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account many factors, including the witness's opportunity and ability to see or hear or know the things the witness testified about; the quality of the witness's memory; the witness's appearance and manner while testifying; the witness's interest in the outcome of the case; any bias or prejudice the witness may have; other evidence that may have contradicted the witness's testimony; and the reasonableness of the witness's testimony in light of all the evidence. The weight of the evidence does not necessarily depend upon the number of witnesses who testify.
During the trial, you will hear the lawyers make objections to certain questions or to certain answers of the witnesses. When they do so, it is because they believe the question or answer is legally improper and they want me to rule on it. Do not try to guess why the objection is being made or what the answer would have been if the witness had been allowed to answer it.
If I tell you not to consider a particular statement that has already been made, put that statement out of your mind and remember that you may not refer to it during your deliberations. Again, there are good reasons that certain evidence is excluded and it is important that you respect these rulings and directions.
During the trial, I may sometimes ask a witness questions. Please do not assume that I have any opinion about the subject matter of my questions.
If
If you want to take notes, there are notepads and pencils for taking notes next to the jury bench. This does not mean you
Although you can see that the trial is being reported, you should not expect to be able to use trial transcripts in your deliberations. You will have to rely on your own memories.
Evidence at a trial includes the sworn testimony of the witnesses, exhibits admitted into the record, facts judicially noticed, and facts stipulated by counsel. You may consider only evidence that is admitted into the record. Summaries and timelines used for convenience and to help explain the facts of the case are not themselves evidence or proof of any facts.
In deciding the facts of this case, you are not to consider the following as evidence: statements and arguments of the lawyers, questions and objections of the lawyers, testimony that I instruct you to disregard, and anything you may see or hear when the court is not in session even if what you see or hear is done or said by one of the parties or by one of the witnesses.
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as testimony by a witness about what the witness said or heard or did. Circumstantial evidence is proof of one or more facts from which you could find another fact. You should consider both kinds of evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. You are to decide how much weight to give any evidence.
A witness may be discredited by contradictory evidence or by evidence that at some other time the witness has said or done something, or has failed to say or do something, that is inconsistent with the witness's present testimony.
If you believe any witness has been discredited, it is up to you to decide how much of the testimony of that witness you believe.
If a witness is shown to have given false testimony knowingly, that is voluntarily and intentionally, about any important matter, you have a right to distrust the witness's testimony about other matters. You may reject all the testimony of that witness or you may choose to believe some or all of it.
The general rule is that if you find that a witness said something before the trial that is different from what the witness said at trial you are to consider the earlier statements only as an aid in evaluating the truthfulness of the witness's testimony at trial. You cannot consider as evidence in this trial what was said earlier before the trial began.
There are two exceptions to this general rule. The first is for witnesses who are the actual parties in the case. If you find that any of the parties made statements before the trial began that are different from the statements they made at trial, you may consider as evidence in the case whichever statement you find more believable. The second is for statements made in earlier depositions by witnesses who are now unavailable.
During the course of a trial, the lawyers will refer to and read from depositions. Depositions are transcripts of testimony taken from witnesses while the parties are preparing for trial. Deposition testimony is given under oath, just like the testimony at this trial. You should give it the same consideration you would had those witnesses testified here in court.
Similarly, lawyers may also refer to answers of one of the parties to interrogatories submitted by the other party. These answers were given in writing and under oath before this trial. You should give the answers the same consideration as if given by the party here in court.
You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But in your consideration of the evidence, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You are permitted to draw, from facts you find have been proved, such reasonable conclusions as seem justified in the light of your own experience and common sense.
I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and, ultimately, a gratifying experience.