NEUBAUER, P.J.

¶ 1 Ross Glove Company appeals a declaratory judgment granted in favor of its insurer, Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company. Ross Glove was the subject of trade dress infringement claims and requested that Acuity defend and indemnify it under the terms of its policy. Acuity was granted a declaratory judgment that its policy, specifically its "advertising injury" provision, does not afford coverage for the lawsuit brought against Ross Glove. We conclude that the circuit court erred. It is reasonable to infer that the complaint alleges injury arising from trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's advertisement. Acuity owes Ross Glove the duty to defend under its policy. Acuity's exclusion of coverage for knowing violations does not excuse that duty because the complaint seeks to hold Ross Glove liable for trade dress infringement without any showing of an intentional violation. We reverse the order for declaratory judgment and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Ross Glove is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in the manufacture of cold weather neck and face protectors. Ross Glove had a business relationship with Cabela's, Inc., a Delaware corporation. Cabela's offered for sale the products manufactured by Ross Glove. On May 13, 2009, Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California1 seeking damages from Cabela's and Ross Glove for alleged patent infringements and trade dress infringement based on four of the cold-weather headwear products. Seirus' amended complaint contains four claims for relief against Ross Glove, including three claims based on patent infringement and one claim based on unfair competition by trade dress infringement.2

¶ 3 The commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by Acuity to Ross Glove was in effect at the time of the alleged infringements. The policy provides coverage for any damages Ross Glove becomes legally obligated to pay due to advertising injury. In September 2009, Ross Glove notified Acuity of Seirus' claims and requested a defense and indemnity. Acuity accepted the tender of defense while reserving its right to dispute liability coverage.

¶ 4 In February 2010, Acuity filed a declaratory judgment complaint against Ross Glove, asserting that it had no obligation to defend, and therefore, no obligation to indemnify Ross Glove for Seirus' claims in the underlying action. According to Acuity, Seirus' complaint did not trigger an initial grant of coverage because the underlying claims did not allege that Ross Glove engaged in "advertising activity." Acuity further asserted that because the underlying claims alleged knowing, willful and intentional infringement, any arguable initial coverage would be excluded as a knowing violation of the rights of another. The court granted Acuity's motion for declaratory judgment on the grounds that the underlying complaint did not allege advertising by Ross Glove. Ross Glove appeals.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

¶ 5 This declaratory judgment action involves the interpretation of an insurance policy. The rules of interpretation applicable to our review are as follows: "Words and phrases in insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction that apply to contracts generally; the primary objective in interpreting and construing a contract is to ascertain and carry out the true intent of the parties." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶ 16, 261 Wis.2d 4, 660 N.W.2d 666. Where, as here, no extrinsic evidence is considered, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that we review de novo. Id., ¶ 17, 660 N.W.2d 666.

¶ 6 Acuity's duty to defend is governed by the terms of its insurance policy. The well-established standard applicable to the duty to defend is summarized in Fireman's Fund:

Id., ¶¶ 19-21 (citations and footnotes omitted).

¶ 7 At issue here is the "advertising injury" provision in Acuity's policy which provides:

Acuity contends that Seirus' claims do not fall under the "advertising injury" provisions of its policy.4

¶ 8 The allegations in Seirus' complaint relevant to Acuity's duty to defend are as follows:

Acuity argues that Seirus' complaint does not allege trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's advertising, but rather limits Ross Glove's infringement to manufacturing. Ross Glove maintains, as it did before the circuit court, that "[b]y packaging its products and promoting to and soliciting Cabela's to sell its products, Ross Glove [called] attention to its products" and engaged in "advertising." For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the complaint's allegations against Ross Glove give rise to a possibility of coverage and, thus, trigger Acuity's duty to defend.

Acuity's Policy Affords an Initial Grant of Coverage to Ross Glove under its Advertising Injury Provision.

¶ 9 In determining whether the allegations in the complaint give rise to the possibility of coverage under the advertising injury provision of the insurance policy, we make three inquiries: (1) Does Seirus' complaint state an offense covered under the advertising injury provision of Acuity's policy? (2) Does Seirus' complaint allege that Ross Glove engaged in advertising activity? (3) Does Seirus' complaint allege a causal connection between the injury alleged and Ross Glove's advertising activity? See Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis.2d 4, ¶ 26, 660 N.W.2d 666.

1. The Seirus Complaint States an Offense Covered under the "Advertising Injury" Provision of Acuity's Policy.

¶ 10 Trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's advertisement is a covered "advertising injury" under the terms of Acuity's policy. The definition of "advertising injury" in Acuity's policy identifies as an offense "[i]nfringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or slogan in your advertisement." In its fourth claim, Seirus alleges trade dress infringement by Ross Glove in violation of the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).6

¶ 11 Specifically, in paragraphs 13, 14 and 31, Seirus alleges the shape, form and appearance of its "PROTECTOR LINE" of products (all the identified products), as well as the packaging for the MASQUE™ line of products, have acquired a distinctiveness and meaning designating Seirus as the manufacturer and source of the products and packaging.7 In paragraph 32, Seirus alleges that Ross Glove and Cabela's created and packaged the infringing products, "all of which emulate[d], imitate[d], palm[ed] off as, pass[ed] off as and cop[ied]" the trade dress of all Seirus' products and the packaging of Seirus' MASQUE™ line of products. In doing so, Ross Glove and Cabela's emulated, imitated, palmed off as, and passed off the infringing products as those of Seirus. In paragraphs 33 and 34, Seirus alleges that the activities of Ross Glove in manufacturing and of Cabela's in advertising, selling and offering to sell the infringing products, "separately and together," likely caused "confusion, mistake, and deception as to the source and origin" of the products. Seirus alleges that Ross Glove and Cabela's unfairly competed and misrepresented their products to be those of Seirus in violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a). Seirus also alleges that the defendants palmed off and passed off, and misrepresented the source of the offending goods in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1). Seirus alleges it has suffered lost sales and, in turn, damages as a direct result of the unfair competition of Cabela's and Ross Glove. Thus, the complaint alleges trade dress infringement and, as discussed below, it alleges infringement in Ross Glove's advertisement.

2. The Seirus Complaint Alleges that Ross Glove Engaged in Advertising Activity.

¶ 12 Acuity's policy covers trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's advertisement. "Advertisement" is defined by the policy to include "a notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters." We must therefore determine whether the complaint alleges that Ross Glove engaged in advertising activity or, consistent with the policy language, whether the complaint alleges trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's advertisement of its products. We conclude that it does.

¶ 13 Seirus expressly identifies Ross Glove's product packaging as a source of infringing activity. It is well established that trade dress encompasses the packaging of a product. Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis.2d 4, ¶ 28, 660 N.W.2d 666.8 We first conclude that a reasonable insured would understand the undefined policy term "notice" to include the packaging. Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶¶ 22, 28, 338 Wis.2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 529 (we construe the undefined terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable person in the position of the insured). "Notice" is defined as "[a] written or printed announcement." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1238 (3d ed.1992); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED EDITION 1544 (1993). A common synonym of "notice" is "advertisement." See ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS 557.6 at 364 (1962); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 26 (defining "advertisement" as "[a] notice"). Seirus claims that the packaging of its products identifies it as the manufacturer. It is reasonable to infer that the complaint alleges that Ross Glove packaging, with its distinctive shape, form and appearance, is a "notice" that, for the purpose of attracting customers, misrepresents Ross Glove's packaged products as those of Seirus.

¶ 14 It is also reasonable to infer that Seirus alleges that the packaging was "published." The plain and ordinary meaning of "publish" as understood by a reasonable insured comports with nonlegal dictionary definitions. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1464 defines "publish" as "[t]o bring to the public attention; announce." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1837 defines "publish" as "to place before the public (as through a mass medium): DISSEMINATE." See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (8th ed.2004) ("publish" means "[t]o distribute copies (of a work) to the public").

¶ 15 The complaint seeks to hold Ross Glove liable for injury arising from the misrepresentation of the source of Ross Glove's products, which, separately and together with the activities of Cabela's in advertising and selling the packaged product, has resulted in confusion, mistake and deception as to the source and origin of the infringing packaged products. Not only is the packaging an advertising instrument, it is a source of Seirus' alleged injury — consumer confusion and lost sales. Here, to have (or potentially cause) consumer confusion, the infringing packaging must be published, i.e., it must be brought to the public's attention; placed before, distributed, disseminated or announced to, the public.9 We think it clear that, under the policy definition of "advertisement," the complaint seeks to hold Ross Glove liable for infringement in its advertisement — a notice published to the general public about the product in an effort to attract customers.10

¶ 16 In so concluding, we reject Acuity's suggestion that Ross Glove, as the manufacturer of the infringing packaged products, could not also be engaged in advertising. This is so regardless of whether Cabela's was also engaged in advertising. Acuity's policy defines "advertisement" as a notice that "is published" to the general public about your goods. It does not require that Ross Glove be the publisher, much less that it be the first, last or only, entity to publish; it simply requires that Ross Glove's notice be published. Again, Seirus seeks to hold Ross Glove liable for consumer confusion and lost sales arising out of trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's published advertisement — its packaging. As to our second inquiry under Fireman's Fund, we conclude that Seirus' complaint alleges that Ross Glove engaged in advertising activity.11

3. The Seirus Complaint Alleges a Causal Connection between its Alleged Injury and Ross Glove's Advertising Activity.

¶ 17 Turning to the third inquiry under Fireman's Fund, we consider whether Seirus' complaint alleges a causal connection between its alleged injury and Ross Glove's advertising activity. See Fireman's Fund, 261 Wis.2d 4, ¶ 26, 660 N.W.2d 666. The supreme court defined this inquiry as "whether, based on the allegations in the complaint, [the insured's] advertising of products contributed to the alleged injury of consumer confusion suffered by [the complainant]." Id., ¶ 53. The advertisement does not need to be the only cause of the injury to trigger the duty to defend. Acuity's policy provides coverage for injury arising out of trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's advertisement.12 Seirus contends that Ross Glove created packaging for products that misled the public as to their source of origin. The packaging is an advertisement, and Seirus alleges that it is a cause of its injury — confusion on the part of buyers as to the packaged products' origin and the resulting loss of sales. Where, as here, it is reasonable to infer that the insured's advertising activity contributed to the alleged injury of consumer confusion, the causal connection requirement is met. Id.; R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 287 F.3d 242, 248 (2nd Cir.2002) (advertising that displays infringing packaging could contribute to the injury where the packaging causes consumer confusion).

¶ 18 In liberally construing Seirus' complaint and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom, we conclude it alleges both that Ross Glove engaged in activity covered under the advertising injury provision of the CGL insurance policy and that a causal connection exists between Ross Glove's activities and Seirus' alleged injuries. Therefore, we further conclude that Acuity has a duty to defend Ross Glove in the underlying lawsuit brought by Seirus.13

The "Knowing Violation" Exclusion in Acuity's Policy Does Not Preclude Coverage for the Allegations Related to Trade Dress Infringement.

¶ 19 Acuity's policy excludes coverage for advertising injury if it was "caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict personal and advertising injury." In support of its motion for declaratory judgment, Acuity points to paragraph 36, in which Seirus alleges that Ross Glove's trade dress infringements were willful and done with the intent to cause harm, and seeks to recover treble damages under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b). However, Acuity overlooks paragraph 35, in which Seirus alleges entitlement to damages, including lost profits, as a result of the nonintentional infringement under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a).14 Seirus does not allege any knowing violation as to either liability under the Lanham Act claims in paragraphs 31 through 34, or in seeking damages under § 1117(a). Indeed, intent is not a required element of trade dress infringement, but rather is required only to justify a request for enhanced damages or attorney fees. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1152 n. 6 (7th Cir.1992) (the Lanham Act is a strict liability statute — there need not be an allegation of willfulness in order to succeed on the issue of liability). If even one covered offense is alleged in the underlying complaint, the insurance company has a duty to defend. Here, Seirus seeks to hold Ross Glove liable for trade dress infringement without any allegation, much less any required showing, of a knowing violation. Thus, the exclusion does not preclude Acuity's duty to defend. See Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis.2d 277, 290-92, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998) (intentional act exclusion did not apply to negligent conduct).

CONCLUSION

¶ 20 We conclude that Seirus' complaint alleges trade dress infringement in Ross Glove's advertisement, which is a covered offense under Acuity's policy. We further conclude that the complaint seeks to hold Ross Glove liable for trade dress infringement without any allegation of a knowing and intentional violation and, therefore, the policy's knowing violation exclusion does not preclude coverage. Because Acuity has a duty to defend Ross Glove, we reverse the order for declaratory judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Order reversed and cause remanded.