LOUGHRY, Justice:
The Circuit Court of Monongalia County has certified six questions to this Court relating to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (hereinafter "the Act") codified in Chapter 36B of the West Virginia Code. The Act "governs the formation, management, and termination of a common interest community, whether the community is a condominium, planned community, or real estate cooperative." Foster v. Orchard Dev. Co., LLC, 227 W.Va. 119, 121 n. 2, 705 S.E.2d 816, 818 n. 2 (2010) (citation omitted). The questions certified to this Court are as follows:
Upon careful review and consideration of the parties' briefs, oral argument, and the pertinent authorities, we answer the first question affirmatively and find it unnecessary to address the remaining questions. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that this case should proceed in accordance with Rule 26 of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules.
The plaintiff below and the petitioner herein, University Commons Riverside Home Owners Association, Inc. (hereinafter "HOA"), is a condominium owners' association that brought suit on its own behalf and on behalf of its members against various individuals and corporations seeking damages arising from the alleged defective development, negligent construction, and misleading marketing of the University Commons Riverside Condominium Complex (hereinafter "the Complex") located in Star City, West Virginia. The defendants filed cross-claims for indemnity and contribution and filed third-party complaints against various subcontractors. All defendants and third-party defendants (hereinafter "respondents") have joined together before this Court, submitting a joint brief and argument.
The Complex consists of 84 individually-owned units that are currently owned by approximately 147 individuals and/or entities. These individuals and entities are the members of the HOA. The HOA filed this action on February 13, 2009, asserting claims for breach of express and implied warranty of quality, failure to comply with public offering statement requirements, material omission in promotional materials, failure to complete and restore, negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranties of merchantability, fitness and habitability. The individual unit owners were not named as individual plaintiffs in the complaint.
The parties engaged in discovery for nearly three years.
By motion dated November 17, 2010, some of the respondents
Thereafter, by order entered October 5, 2011, the circuit court granted the respondents' motion to join all unit owners, denied the HOA's motion for a protective order, and determined that the six questions set forth above should be certified to this Court. The order of certification was entered on November 18, 2011.
This Court has held that "[t]he appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo." Syl. Pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
The first question certified to this Court asks:
The circuit court answered this question in the negative, finding that the HOA has standing to bring an action on behalf of its members only as to matters affecting the "common interest community" but lacks the capacity to represent unit owners with respect to damages to individual units.
The HOA argues, however, that it has standing to assert claims pertaining to individual units pursuant to the plain language of the Act. In that regard, the HOA contends that the Act's broad definition of "common
In contrast, the respondents argue that damages affecting only individual units could not reasonably be included in "matters affecting the common interest community." Id. In support of their argument, the respondents point out the different obligations of the HOA and the unit owners as set forth in West Virginia Code § 36B-3-107(a) (2011), which provides that "the association is responsible for maintenance, repair, and replacement of common elements, and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair, and replacement of his unit." The respondents further contend that the HOA's broad definition of "matters affecting the common interest community" goes beyond the plain language of the statute. They assert that the word "affecting" requires that the litigation matter have an effect or influence on the common interest community. The respondents maintain that this clause contemplates a greater impact than damages to specific individual units.
In order to resolve the issue presented by this certified question, we must apply our rules of statutory interpretation and determine whether the "common interest community" includes individual units. Our rules of statutory interpretation are well established. "A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect." Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951). In other words, "[w]here the language of a statutory provision is plain, its terms should be applied as written and not construed." DeVane v. Kennedy, 205 W.Va. 519, 529, 519 S.E.2d 622, 632 (1999) (citations omitted); accord Syl. Pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959) ("When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute."). Further, "[s]tatutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments." Syl. Pt. 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975); accord Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W.Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958) ("Statutes in pari materia must be construed together and the legislative intention, as gathered from the whole of the enactments, must be given effect.").
Having carefully reviewed and considered the relevant statutory provisions, we find that the plain language of the Act supports the position advanced by the HOA. When the definitions of "common interest community," "condominium," "common elements," and "unit" set forth in West Virginia Code § 36B-1-103 are read and applied together with West Virginia Code 36B-3-102(a)(4), it is clear that the units are part of the common interest community. In that regard, as previously noted, the statute defines "common interest community" as "real estate with respect to which a person, by virtue of his ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance or improvement of other real estate described in a declaration[.]" W.Va.Code § 36B-1-103(7). Under the Act, a "condominium" is
W.Va.Code § 36B-1-103(8). Thus, a purchaser of a condominium unit owns his or her individual unit along with an undivided interest in the "common elements" defined as "all portions of the common interest community other than the units." W.Va.Code § 36B-1-103(4). Critically, the term "unit" is defined as "a physical portion of the common interest community designated for separate ownership or occupancy." W.Va.Code § 36B-1-103(33) (emphasis added).
The plain language of West Virginia Code § 36B-3-102(a)(4) permits a unit owner's association to bring an action not only on its own behalf but on behalf of "two or more unit owners." The only limitation on that action is that it must be one that "affect[s] the common interest community." Id. Given the fact that a unit is a physical portion of the common interest community, it necessarily follows that damages only affecting individual units are nonetheless matters affecting the common interest community. Thus, the HOA may assert claims on behalf of two or more unit owners for damages specific to individual units.
Our conclusion that the HOA may pursue claims on behalf of two or more unit owners for matters affecting their individual units is supported by the commentary to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act which served as the model for our Act.
For example, in Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. A.C. Excavating, 94 P.3d 1177 (Colo.App.2003), the homeowners' association for a townhome complex brought suit against subcontractors alleging negligence resulting in construction defects to both the individual units and the common areas of the development. Like the respondents in the case sub judice, the subcontractors argued that the homeowners' association lacked standing to pursue claims for construction defect damages to the individual townhome units. The Colorado court concluded otherwise, explaining that "[u]nder the CCIOA [Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act], individual units are a part of the `common interest community.'" 94 P.3d at 1180. The Court stated:
Id. (citation omitted).
Similarly, in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 125 Nev. 449, 215 P.3d 697 (2009), a homeowners' association brought an action on behalf of itself and unit owners against the developer of the community alleging that both individual units and common areas had construction defects. The developer argued that the homeowners' association did not have standing to assert construction defect claims on behalf of its members because individual units were statutorily excluded from the definition of "common interest
215 P.3d at 702.
In summary, "`the national trend acknowledg[es] the representative capacity of the association ... enabl[ing] the association to represent more effectively its owners in such matters as construction defects ... avoid[ing] the necessity of assignment of claims, powers of attorney or class actions in many circumstances [and] thereby simplifying and making more practical the prompt action in the association's and owners' common interests.'" Yacht Club II, 94 P.3d at 1180 (citation omitted). Therefore, we now hold that West Virginia Code § 36B-3-102(a)(4), which authorizes a unit owners' association to institute litigation in its own name on behalf of itself or two or more unit owners on matters affecting the common interest community, confers standing on the unit owners' association to assert claims on behalf of two or more unit owners with respect to matters affecting their individual units. Accordingly, we answer the first certified question affirmatively.
Although we have determined that the HOA has the authority to pursue all of the claims at issue in this case pursuant to West Virginia Code § 36B-3-102(a)(4), the fact remains that the claims involve damages to both the common elements of the Complex and individual units. Moreover, having carefully reviewed all of the statutory provisions, this Court is cognizant of the fact that the Act provides no guidance or mechanism to handle these types of cases and, further, offers no procedure to be utilized to approve any type of settlement. Given these facts, this Court finds that the most prudent approach from this point forward is to proceed in accordance with Rule 26 of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules.
We are certainly mindful of the fact that "mass litigation" under Rule 26 contemplates "[t]wo (2) or more civil cases pending in one or more circuit courts," and that this case does not generally fit within that framework. W.Va. Tr. Ct. R. 26.04. However, while there is technically only one plaintiff in this
We recognized in Chemtall, that "`"[a] court `has inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.' 14 Am. Juris., Courts, section 171." Syllabus Point 3, Shields v. Romine, 122 W.Va. 639, 13 S.E.2d 16 (1940).' Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Rees v. Hatcher, 214 W.Va. 746, 591 S.E.2d 304 (2003)." Syl. Pt. 3, 217 W.Va. at 331, 617 S.E.2d at 878. We further stated that "the principle necessarily applies to this Court as the inherent power of the judiciary has been well recognized in this jurisdiction. See e.g., Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Haden, 157 W.Va. 298, 306, 200 S.E.2d 848, 853 (1973); Syllabus Point 2, Frazee Lumber Co. v. Haden, 156 W.Va. 844, 197 S.E.2d 634 (1973)." Chemtall, 217 W.Va. at 337, 617 S.E.2d at 884. Therefore, "it is our task to supervise the administration of justice in the circuit courts to ensure that fair standards of procedure are maintained." Id. We find that the only way to maintain fair standards of procedure in this instance is to transfer this case to the Mass Litigation Panel.
Having concluded that this case should proceed under Rule 26, we need not answer the remaining certified questions. To the extent necessary, the issues raised in those questions can be addressed by the Mass Litigation Panel. It is the Panel's duty to "develop and implement case management and trial methodologies to fairly and expeditiously resolve" the matters before it. W.Va. Tr. Ct. R. 26.05. Nonetheless, given that this case is not typical of the cases referred to the Mass Litigation Panel in that there are not multiple cases involved but, rather, one case involving multiple individuals and entities represented by one party, we believe that individual notice should be immediately given to all the members of the HOA to make them aware of the existence of this lawsuit and to advise them that they are currently represented by the HOA.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds it only necessary to answer the following certified question:
Because this case is before this Court upon questions certified from the circuit court, we
Certified question answered.