DAVIS, Justice:
In this action presenting a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, this Court is asked "whether a private party conducting inspections of a mine and mine operator for compliance with mine safety regulations is liable for the wrongful death of a miner resulting from the private party's negligent inspection?" After considering the parties' arguments and the relevant law, we answer this certified question affirmatively.
The event giving rise to the lawsuit underlying this certified question action occurred on January 19, 2006, when an over-accumulation of combustible coal dust caused a deadly fire in the Aracoma Coal Company's Alma Mine # 1 in Logan County, West Virginia. Twelve miners were trapped inside the mine by smoke and fire. Attempts to extinguish the fire and contain smoke resulting therefrom were inhibited by numerous inadequate safety measures. According to the Order of Certification issued in this matter by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the inadequate safety measures included:
The Fourth Circuit further noted that a personnel door was unmarked, and breathing devices known as Self-Contained Self-Rescuers were rendered useless to miners trapped by the smoke because the miners had not been trained to operate the devices. Ultimately, ten of the trapped miners managed to escape the mine, but Don Israel Bragg and Ellery Hatfield succumbed to carbon monoxide intoxication and died as a result thereof.
It was determined from a subsequent investigation by the Mine Safety & Health Administration (hereinafter "MSHA") that numerous violations of the Mine Safety and Health Act (hereinafter "Mine Act")
(Internal citations to joint appendix filed in the Fourth Circuit omitted).
The United States notes that, following the fire, Aracoma Coal and several Aracoma supervisors at the mine plead guilty to federal charges of criminal negligence. The company
The petitioners, Delorice Bragg (hereinafter "Mrs. Bragg") and Freda Hatfield (hereinafter "Mrs. Hatfield"), who are the widows of Don Israel Bragg and Ellery Hatfield, filed the underlying lawsuit against the United States. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Under the FTCA, the United States' sovereign immunity is waived for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1996) (2006 ed.).
The United States moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that a private party inspecting mines in "like circumstances" to those alleged in the complaint would not be held liable under West Virginia law. According to the Fourth Circuit, the District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
(Internal citations to joint appendix filed in the Fourth Circuit omitted).
Mrs. Bragg and Mrs. Hatfield appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Finding no clear controlling West Virginia precedent to guide its decision, the Fourth Circuit certified to this Court the following question:
This Court accepted the certified question by order entered July 19, 2012.
The instant matter is before this Court on certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. "This Court undertakes plenary review of legal issues presented by certified question from a federal district or appellate court." Syl. pt. 1, Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 206 W.Va. 133, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998) ("A de novo standard is applied by this Court in addressing the legal issues presented by a certified question from a federal district or appellate court."). Accordingly, we will fully consider the question herein certified.
The question certified to this Court seeks to aid the Fourth Circuit in determining whether the United States' sovereign immunity is waived with respect to the claims asserted by Mrs. Bragg and Mrs. Hatfield. As noted above, the instant matter was brought pursuant to the FTCA, under which the United States' sovereign immunity is waived for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
The United States Supreme Court addressed the language of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955). The Indian Towing plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. Coast Guard had negligently operated a lighthouse, which negligence led to a tug boat going aground and damaging the cargo on a barge being towed by the tug. A lawsuit under the FTCA was brought, and the United States argued that the imposition of liability "`in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances...' must be read as excluding liability in the performance of activities which private persons do not perform. Thus, there would be no liability for negligent performance of `uniquely governmental functions.'" Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64, 76 S.Ct. at 124, 100 L.Ed. 48. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and observed that "all Government activity is inescapably `uniquely governmental' in that it is performed by the Government." Id. at 67, 76 S.Ct. at 126, 100 L.Ed. 48. Recognizing its competing duties when interpreting a statute such as the FTCA, the Supreme Court commented further that: "Of course, when dealing with a statute subjecting the Government to liability for potentially great sums of money, this Court must not promote profligacy by careless construction. Neither should it as a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a statute designed to limit it." Id. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 126, 100 L.Ed. 48. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded:
Id. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 126-27, 100 L.Ed. 48.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the proper analysis to be applied in determining, for purposes of the FTCA, whether there exists under state law a private analogy to the factual circumstances presented in a given action in the case of United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005). The unanimous Olson Court explained that "the words `"like circumstances"' do not restrict a court's inquiry to the same circumstances, but require it to look further afield." 546 U.S. at 46, 126 S.Ct. at 511, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (first emphasis added) (quoting Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64, 76 S.Ct. at 124, 100 L.Ed. 48).
The facts presented in Olson were somewhat similar to those of the instant case: An injured miner sued MSHA under the FTCA alleging that negligence of federal mine inspectors helped bring about a serious accident at an Arizona mine.
546 U.S. at 44, 126 S.Ct. at 511-12, 163 L.Ed.2d 306. Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that a state law analogy of "like circumstances" must consider only causes of action against private, as opposed to government, parties. With respect to the term "like circumstances," the Supreme Court further explained that
Olson, 546 U.S. at 46-47, 126 S.Ct. at 513, 163 L.Ed.2d 306. Thus, it is not necessary for state tort law to provide a duplicate of the circumstances presented in a given case; it is sufficient if there is a "similar analogy." Olson, 546 U.S. at 47, 126 S.Ct. at 513, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (emphasis added). See also Carter v. United States, 982 F.2d 1141, 1144 (7th Cir.1992) ("The national government is never situated identically to private parties. Our task is to find a fitting analog under private law. Thus the United States may be liable for negligence in carrying out acts that no private person performs, because there are `like' circumstances that lead to private liability." (citation omitted)).
A "similar analogy" to holding an MSHA inspector liable to a third-party mine employee may be found in at least four cases in which this Court has held that a duty may be owed to a third party: Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W.Va. 585, 371 S.E.2d 82 (1988); Louk v. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 198 W.Va. 250, 479 S.E.2d 911 (1996); Eastern Steel Constructors v. Salem, 209 W.Va. 392, 549 S.E.2d 266 (2001); and Kizer v. Harper, 211 W.Va. 47, 561 S.E.2d 368 (2001) (per curiam).
In Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W.Va. 585, 371 S.E.2d 82, second purchasers of a home, who did not purchase the home from the builder, sued the builder for, inter alia, negligently designing and constructing the home insofar as the home was subject to
Sewell, 179 W.Va. at 588, 371 S.E.2d at 85. Based upon its analysis of the existence of a duty to a third party, the Sewell Court clarified that
Syl. pt. 3, Sewell, id. The Court then applied the foregoing principle to hold that
Syl. pt. 4, id.
A second example of this Court finding that a duty may be owed to a third party is found in the case of Louk v. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 198 W.Va. 250, 479 S.E.2d 911. The facts of Louk involved a fatal automobile accident that occurred when the decedent, Mrs. Louk, was exiting a Wal-Mart store parking lot via an access road to an abutting state highway. The access had been designed and constructed for Wal-Mart by Gray Engineering Consultants, Inc. (hereafter "Gray"). Mrs. Louk's estate subsequently filed suit against numerous parties including Gray. The estate alleged that Gray had negligently planned and designed the access. Gray asserted, inter alia, that it owed no duty to Mrs. Louk and that nothing it did or failed to do caused Mrs. Louk's collision. The circuit court granted a directed verdict in favor of Gray. On appeal, this Court adopted
Louk, 198 W.Va. at 260, 479 S.E.2d at 921. Accordingly, the Louk Court reversed the directed verdict and held that
Syl. pt. 5, Louk, 198 W.Va. 250, 479 S.E.2d 911.
The third case in which this Court has found the existence of a duty owed to a third party is Eastern Steel Constructors v. Salem, 209 W.Va. 392, 549 S.E.2d 266. Eastern Steel Constructors (hereafter "Eastern") was a contractor that had been hired by the City of Salem (hereafter "Salem") to construct a sewer line to a new sewer treatment plant. During construction, Eastern encountered subsurface rock and existing utility service lines that had not been disclosed in plans and specifications prepared by Kanakanui Associates (hereafter "Kanakanui"), the design professional hired by Salem for the sewer project. The undocumented subsurface conditions caused significant delays and, according to Eastern, caused it to incur substantial economic damages. Notwithstanding the fact that Eastern's agreement with Salem specified that Eastern was "`responsible for the installation of the facilities regardless of the type, nature, or quantity of subsurface conditions, including rock, on the Project,'" it sued the City of Salem and Kanakanui. Eastern Steel, 209 W.Va. at 395, 549 S.E.2d at 269. In granting summary judgment to Kanakanui, the circuit court concluded that "there is not a duty owed by the engineer/architect [i.e., design professional] to the building contractor regarding the plans, drawings and specifications, [and for] the adequacy or inadequacy of any or all of them." Eastern Steel, id.
Eastern appealed, and this Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Eastern's claim of professional negligence against Kanakanui.
Eastern Steel, 209 W.Va. at 396-97, 549 S.E.2d at 270-71. The Eastern Steel Court further remarked that,
Eastern Steel, 209 W.Va. at 397, 549 S.E.2d at 271.
Because Eastern Steel involved purely economic damages, meaning there was no personal injury or property damage suffered by the plaintiff, the Eastern Steel Court went on to analyze the need for a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant in addition to analyzing the traditional factors for ascertaining the existence of a duty. This analysis was conducted to overcome the "general rule precluding economic damages in a cause of action ... where negligence is claimed in the absence of either physical injury, property damage or a contract."
The Eastern Steel Court ultimately found that the design professional owed a duty of care to the third-party contractor and would be liable for purely economic damages where a special relationship existed. See Syl. pt. 6, Eastern Steel, 209 W.Va. 392, 549 S.E.2d 266 ("A design professional (e.g. an architect or engineer) owes a duty of care to a contractor, who has been employed by the same project owner as the design professional and who has relied upon the design professional's work product in carrying out his or her obligations to the owner, notwithstanding the absence of privity of contract between the contractor and the design professional, due to the special relationship that exists between the two. Consequently, the contractor may, upon proper proof, recover purely economic damages in an action alleging professional negligence on the part of the design professional."). The Eastern Steel Court further held that
Syl. pt. 7, Eastern Steel, 209 W.Va. 392, 549 S.E.2d 266.
The final case we will discuss in which this Court found that a third party could be held liable is Kizer v. Harper, 211 W.Va. 47, 561 S.E.2d 368. The plaintiff in Kizer was an employee of a cable company who was injured when he fell from a utility pole located on private property. The fall was caused by the negligence of an electrician who had been hired by the property owner's son, Mr. Harper, to upgrade the electrical wiring to her home. Relevant to the instant matter, the cable company employee filed suit against Mr. Harper for the injuries he sustained as a result of the negligence of the electrician. Following a trial, the jury found Mr. Harper was liable. Mr. Harper's post-trial motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law was denied by the trial court and he appealed. This Court affirmed in a per curiam opinion, thereby concluding that Mr. Harper had been properly held liable to a third party.
The foregoing cases have found a duty owed to a third party based primarily upon the foreseeability that harm may result if care is not exercised.
Applying this holding to the question herein certified, i.e., "whether a private party conducting inspections of a mine and mine operator for compliance with mine safety regulations is liable for the wrongful death of a miner resulting from the private party's negligent inspection," leads us to answer the question in the affirmative.
For the reasons set out in the body of this Opinion, we answer the question certified to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the affirmative and conclude that a private party conducting inspections of a mine and mine operator for compliance with mine safety regulations is liable for the wrongful death of a miner resulting from the private party's negligent inspection.
Certified Question Answered.
Justice BENJAMIN, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate.
Judge PAUL T. FARRELL, sitting by temporary assignment.
Syl. pt. 6, id. The United States asserts that Mrs. Bragg and Mrs. Hatfield seek to hold mine inspectors liable for the criminal conduct of a third party — the mine operator. Thus, according to the United States, Mrs. Bragg and Mrs. Hatfield are required to establish that the mine inspectors "unreasonably created or increased the risk of injury" to their decedent husbands. Syl. pt. 6, in part, Miller v. Whitworth, 193 W.Va. 262, 455 S.E.2d 821. We disagree with this proposition. The Miller Court recognized that "[g]enerally, a person does not have a duty to protect others from the deliberate criminal conduct of third parties. 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 104 (1989). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. d (1965)." Miller, 193 W.Va. at 266, 455 S.E.2d at 825. In addition, the Miller Court explained that "a person usually has no duty to protect others from the criminal activity of a third party because the foreseeability of risk is slight, and because of the social and economic consequences of placing such a duty on a person." Miller v. Whitworth, id.
We find the circumstances presented in the context of a safety inspector are distinguishable from the circumstances discussed in Miller. In order to conduct an adequate safety inspection, a safety inspector necessarily must be familiar with laws applicable to the industry being inspected and be able to identify and report violations of the same. It follows, therefore, that such an inspector certainly would be able to foresee the harm that likely would result if unlawful conditions are not reasonably identified and appropriate action taken to remedy the same.