DAVIS, Justice:
The petitioner herein and plaintiff below, Judith D. Ward ("Judith Ward"), appeals from an order entered January 29, 2015, by the Circuit Court of Hampshire County. By that order, the circuit court granted relief to Judith Ward upon her action for unlawful detainer against the respondent herein and defendant below, Susan K. Ward ("Susan Ward"). In granting such relief, the circuit court further ordered Judith Ward to pay Susan Ward $50,000 for the cost of the log cabin home that Susan Ward is required to vacate, and conditioned Judith's recovery of the subject real property upon her payment of this amount. On appeal to this Court, Judith Ward contends that the circuit court erred by finding that she would be unjustly enriched if she did not reimburse Susan Ward for the cost of the subject log cabin. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the record designated for appellate consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting Judith Ward relief for unlawful detainer while also requiring her to reimburse Susan Ward for the cost of the log home that has been constructed as an improvement upon Judith Ward's property with her knowledge and consent. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's ruling granting relief for unlawful detainer. However, the pleadings suggest that Susan Ward has incurred costs greater than $50,000 in the erection and maintenance of the subject log cabin home. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the circuit court's order valuing the log home at $50,000 and remand the case for further proceedings to determine the additional amount, above the $50,000 initial cost of the log home kit, by which Judith Ward's property has been improved and to which Susan Ward is entitled to recover from Judith Ward.
The facts giving rise to the instant proceeding are largely undisputed by the parties. In 1999, Judith Ward, who is the owner of record of Tract Number 24 Green Meadows Estates in Capon Bridge, West Virginia, ostensibly allowed her son, Gary Ward, and his wife, Susan Ward, to construct a log cabin home on a portion of her property. The parcel was not subdivided, and it does not appear that the parties entered any written agreement memorializing their arrangement. Gary and Susan Ward paid $50,000 for the subject log cabin home kit, and Judith Ward claims that she financed the site preparation and construction. Susan Ward asserts further that she and Gary Ward incurred additional expenses related to the building and maintenance of the log home.
Despite the property remaining as an undivided parcel, because it contained two distinct dwellings, two separate county property tax tickets were issued for Judith Ward's lot.
On February 28, 2014, Gary Ward, Judith Ward's son and Susan Ward's husband, died. Thereafter, on April 28, 2014, Judith Ward served a Notice to Quit upon Susan Ward and her two children
By order entered January 29, 2015, the circuit court granted Judith Ward's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that, pursuant to W. Va.Code § 37-6-19, as the property owner of record, Judith Ward is entitled to recover her property from Susan Ward, who has no ownership interest in the parcel. Nevertheless, the circuit court further determined that Judith Ward would be unjustly enriched by the addition of the log cabin home to her property and, thus, required her to pay Susan Ward $50,000, i.e., the cost of the log cabin home kit, for these improvements. Finally, the circuit court conditioned Judith Ward's recovery of the subject property upon her payment of this sum to Susan Ward, and ruled that Susan Ward is not required to vacate the premises until ten days after her receipt of these funds. From this adverse ruling, Judith Ward appeals to this Court.
The instant proceeding comes to this Court from the circuit court's order granting Judith Ward's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
From the record in the case sub judice, it is apparent that the circuit court considered only the pleadings and did not venture out-side the confines of those documents in rendering its ruling.
We previously have held that "[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings presents a challenge to the legal effect of given facts rather than on proof of the facts themselves." Syl. pt. 2, in part, Copley v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 195 W.Va. 480, 466 S.E.2d 139 (1995). In ruling upon such a motion, "[a] circuit court, viewing all the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings only if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim or defense." Syl. pt. 3, Copley, 195 W.Va. 480, 466 S.E.2d 139. Accord Brown v. Fluharty, 231 W.Va. 613, 615, 748 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2013) (per curiam) ("Inasmuch as this case was decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, ... we construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, and take the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true." (citations omitted)). Finally, "[a]ppellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is de novo." Syl. pt. 1, Copley, 195 W.Va. 480, 466 S.E.2d 139.
Mindful of this standard, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.
On appeal to this Court, Judith Ward assigns as error the circuit court's rulings that (1) she is required to pay Susan Ward
In support of her argument, Judith Ward contends that Susan Ward is not entitled to compensation for the log home because there was no reasonable mistake of fact and Susan did not have a reasonable belief that she owned the subject property when she built the log cabin on it. Because Susan knew that she did not own the property, Judith asserts that she is not required to compensate her for the value of such improvements insofar as this State's case law requiring such compensation for unjust enrichment is limited to cases wherein the tenant made improvements under the mistaken belief that he/she owned the property that he/she had improved. Citing Little v. Little, 184 W.Va. 360, 400 S.E.2d 604 (1990) (per curiam) (refusing to award damages for value of improvements made by life tenant when tenant knew she did not own the subject property but believed that it would be conveyed to her in the future).
Moreover, Judith Ward contends that Susan Ward has not established that she is entitled to compensation in the amount of $50,000 because this amount is based upon "mere speculation or conjecture." Quoting Little, 184 W.Va. at 363, 400 S.E.2d at 607 (citations omitted). In this regard, Judith contends that Susan, in her pro se answer to Judith's complaint, has not proven the amount of compensation to which she is entitled with certainty. Moreover, Judith argues that Susan lived on the subject property rent free for fifteen years and that she, Judith, was solely responsible for the taxes on such property as well as the construction and maintenance of the log home.
Finally, Judith Ward contends that the circuit court erred by allowing Susan Ward, who has no claim or title to the subject property, to retain possession of the log home until Judith pays her the $50,000 compensation therefor required by the circuit court's order. Given the circuit court's finding that Judith is the sole owner of the property, it was erroneous to require her to pay compensation to Susan for the log home constructed on her property before she could regain possession of her entire parcel. Unlike this Court's prior decision in Francis v. Bryson, 217 W.Va. 432, 618 S.E.2d 441 (2005) (per curiam), Judith argues that there was no underlying disagreement between the parties regarding the ownership of the property, nor did the tenant tender payments to the property owner believing them to be installment payments for its purchase. Finally, Judith claims that the circuit court's decision is inequitable insofar as it did not impose a corresponding duty upon Susan to pay rent, taxes, or maintenance costs for the log cabin pending her receipt of the $50,000 compensation from Judith.
In response, Susan Ward, pro se, contends that she has a right to the continued occupation of the log cabin home insofar as Judith Ward knew of and approved the home's construction and allowed Susan and her family to live on her property rent free for fifteen years. Susan also indicates that she believed the subject property had been given to her and her late husband, but that the property was not subdivided because the log cabin did not comply with the West Virginia building code. In this regard, Susan further states that Judith had had the property surveyed so that it could be subdivided once such building requirements were satisfied. Moreover, Susan contends that, in addition to the initial cost of the log home kit, she and her late husband paid Judith monies for the property's taxes, incurred maintenance costs on the home, and, for a period of eighteen months,
It is undisputed that the record evidence demonstrates that Judith Ward is the sole, fee simple owner of the subject parcel upon which Susan Ward and her late husband built their log cabin home, and that, despite any representations or understandings between the parties, the lot has not been subdivided to transfer an ownership interest in the property to Susan Ward. Nevertheless, it also is clear that Judith Ward permitted, and even encouraged, her late son and his wife Susan to build their log cabin home upon a portion of her property and that she consented to and acquiesced in this arrangement for nearly fifteen years until her son's death in February 2014. It also is undisputed that Susan Ward, and her late husband, expended their own funds to purchase the log home kit and expended additional monies to maintain the home as well as to provide for the payment of taxes on the entirety of the parcel while they lived in the log home on Judith's property. Additionally, it appears that Judith's son and his family also maintained the property upon which the log home was built and performed other household services for Judith in lieu of actual rental payments.
It goes without saying that, as the fee simple owner of record, Judith Ward has the right to possess and occupy her property, and to eject persons therefrom if she no longer consents to their occupancy. Pursuant to the unlawful detainer statute,
W. Va.Code § 37-6-19 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
We previously have interpreted this statute as permitting the ejectment of a tenant for no reason whatsoever, or for failure to pay rent even if the landowner has not previously requested the tenant to pay rent.
Syl. pt. 1, Kincaid v. Patterson, 129 W.Va. 234, 39 S.E.2d 920 (1946). Thus, it is apparent that W. Va.Code § 37-6-19 authorized Judith Ward to eject Susan Ward because Susan does not have an ownership interest in
However, it also is apparent that the construction of a log cabin home upon Judith Ward's property is a significant and valuable improvement thereto for which Judith has not paid. When an ejected tenant has made improvements to the owner's property, we have held that the owner is required to compensate the tenant for the value of such improvements to avoid the owner's unjust enrichment.
Syl. pt. 1, Hall v. Hall, 30 W.Va. 779, 5 S.E. 260 (1888).
Moreover, where, as here, the tenant is not a purchaser of the property but nevertheless believes that he/she had an ownership interest therein when he/she made the subject improvements, we have held that the owner must compensate the tenant for the value of such improvements if the owner was aware of the improvements and did not tell the tenant not to make them.
Syl. pt. 2, Hall, 30 W.Va. 779, 5 S.E. 260.
Finally, an ejected tenant who is entitled to recoup the value of the improvements he/she made upon property under a mistaken belief of ownership has a lien upon such property until the owner compensates the tenant for the value of such improvements.
Syl., Somerville v. Jacobs, 153 W.Va. 613, 170 S.E.2d 805 (1969).
In the case sub judice, it is apparent that Susan Ward had a mistaken belief that the property upon which she and her late husband built their log cabin home had been given to them by Judith Ward. During her argument to the Court, Susan explained that Judith had offered them the back portion of her property as a site upon which to build their log home and had ostensibly indicated that Susan and her late husband would eventually inherit the entire parcel and that she, Judith, was giving them that portion of the property early. Moreover, from 1999 until
Although the circuit court assigned a $50,000 valuation to the log cabin home built by Susan Ward and her late husband upon Judith Ward's property, we are not certain that this is a correct determination of the value of the subject improvement. Insofar as the instant proceeding is before the Court from a judgment on the pleadings, no record has been made as to the current value of the improvement to Judith Ward's property, i.e., the log cabin home; how much Susan Ward, and her late husband, have expended in building and maintaining the same through ordinary household repairs and upkeep; the amount of property taxes Susan and her family have paid for this portion of Judith's lot; the costs that Susan and her late husband have incurred in caring for the property upon which the log home is situate; or any other factors that are indicative of the log cabin's valuation. When, such as here, a record does not provide sufficient detail to permit this Court to make a determination of the proper measure of damages, we have remanded the case for further factual development:
Syl. pt. 3, Heydinger v. Adkins, 178 W.Va. 463, 360 S.E.2d 240 (1987). Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's $50,000 damages award and remand this case for further factual development to determine the value of the subject improvement and a corresponding award of such damages to Susan Ward. Finally, given that Susan Ward is entitled to assert a lien against Judith Ward's property for the value of the improvements that she is required to abandon, we do not find that the circuit court erred by requiring Judith to pay Susan the value of such improvements as a condition precedent to the restoration of Judith's property. See Syl., Somerville v. Jacobs, 153 W.Va. 613, 170 S.E.2d 805. Therefore, the portion of the circuit court's order imposing such a requirement is affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, the January 29, 2015, order of the Circuit Court of Hampshire County is hereby affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed, in part; Reversed, in part; and Remanded.
