THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 16]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
Plaintiff's Complaint, which was filed on December 10, 2012, alleges that his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment was violated by Defendant prison officials. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to serious security breaches, and failed to protect Plaintiff from a substantial risk of serious harm from another inmate who escaped from his segregation cell and attacked Plaintiff with a piece of metal while Plaintiff, who was unattended by staff, was chained to the wall to engage in a telephone call. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, at approximately 3:15 p.m. on September 27, 2012, while housed on the Quilliams II segregation unit at the Mount Olive Correctional Complex ("MOCC"), Plaintiff was escorted out of his cell by Sergeant Jeff Hilewitz and Corporal Daniel Hahn in order to make a telephone call. Plaintiff alleges that he was handcuffed, shackled, and then chained to the wall next to the telephone. The officers then left the pod. (ECF 1 at 9, ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff further alleges that, as soon as the officers left the pod, inmate Joe Howard began kicking and beating his cell door, and continued to do so for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. Although the beating caused loud, explosive sounds, no staff responded to investigate. (Id. at 9-10, ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff alleges that Howard's door then flew open, and Howard came out of his cell carrying the iron post from his cell stool, which he had somehow unbolted from the floor. (Id. at 10, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that staff had not searched Howard's cell for months. (Id. at 10, 14, ¶¶ 12, 34.)
Plaintiff further alleges that, although other inmates who witnessed Howard exit his cell with the post began to kick their doors and scream to get the attention of staff, no one came into the pod. (Id., ¶¶ 13, 15.) Plaintiff was beaten by Howard with the iron post, and alleges that he received injuries including head trauma, hearing loss in his left ear, a separated left shoulder, and injuries to his right arm and both hands. (Id., ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to reasonably respond to a danger which they knew of and disregarded. (Id., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff further alleges that:
(Id. at 12, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants' conduct was unreasonable and evinced deliberate indifference. (Id., ¶¶ 23, 26.)
Plaintiff further claims that Defendants had prior specific knowledge that an inmate could beat his door until it came open, because, approximately three months prior, on June 18, 2012, an inmate named Christopher Cox beat his door until it opened, and Cox exited his cell and assaulted a janitor who was cleaning the day room shower. (Id. at 12-13, ¶ 28.) Plaintiff also alleges that inmate Cox beat another inmate to death on the recreation yard of the segregation unit. (Id.) Significantly, however, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that, prior to this incident, he had advised staff of any problems between himself and inmate Howard.
Plaintiff claims that there is a clear pattern of reckless disregard for security on the MOCC segregation units, resulting in damage to cell doors and inmate assaults, and that Defendants have done nothing to prevent it from happening again. (Id. at 13, ¶¶ 30, 31.) Plaintiff further alleges that, despite having specific knowledge that prolonged beating on a cell door will result in the door opening, Defendants either have not implemented any procedures requiring a rapid response for investigation of unsecure doors, or failed to follow such policies or procedures on September 27, 2012. (Id., ¶¶ 32, 33.)
Plaintiff further alleges that he filed grievances concerning these issues, but they were denied by Captain Matheny, and those denials were upheld by Warden David Ballard and Commissioner Jim Rubenstein. Plaintiff has attached those grievances to his Complaint. (ECF No. 1, Exs. 1-4.)
Plaintiff's first grievance was filed on September 28, 2012, the day after this incident. The grievance claimed deliberate indifference to his safety and described the incident in a manner similar to the facts alleged in his Complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 15, ¶ 42 and Ex. 1.) Captain Matheny responded to Plaintiff's first grievance by stating "staff cannot be held responsible for cell doors being beat open. Also, the staff can enter the pod only when it is safe to do so. I cannot grant your grievance at this level." (Id. at 15, ¶ 43, and Ex. 1.) Captain Matheny's response was affirmed without comment by both Warden Ballard and Commissioner Rubenstein. (Id. at 15, ¶ 44 and Ex. 1.)
Plaintiff filed a second grievance concerning this incident on September 30, 2012, alleging that he had been denied recreation on the date of the incident following
On October 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed a third grievance concerning the staff's alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's safety by allowing inmate Howard to beat his door for ten to fifteen minutes without response, and failing to take any action when Howard's door became unsecure. (Id. at 16, ¶ 48 and Ex. 3.) Captain Matheny responded to this grievance by stating, "It has not been confirmed that he beat his door for 10-15 minutes. Also staff could have been busy dealing with someone else beating their door or some other type of emergency." (Id. at 16, ¶ 49 and Ex. 3.) As noted by Plaintiff, the denial of this grievance was also upheld on appeal without comment by Warden Ballard and Commissioner Rubenstein. (Id. at 16, ¶ 50 and Ex. 3.)
Plaintiff further alleges that he has been denied appropriate medical treatment following this incident. However, Plaintiff has not specifically named any medical providers as Defendants herein. On October 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed a fourth grievance concerning his medical treatment following the September 27, 2012 incident. Plaintiff claimed that, although he was examined by Dr. Phillip Shoaf, he did nothing and said Plaintiff was fine. (Id. at 16-17, ¶ 51 and Ex. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered hearing loss in his left ear, and that "Dr. Shoaf was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's health." (Id.) As the unit manager, Captain Matheny signed off on this grievance, but he had Anna Kincaid, R.N., provide a written response. The response states, "10/9/12 — The physician will be seeing you for follow-up in a few weeks. At this time, his evaluation determined that you do not need a referral to a specialist at this time." (Id. at 17, ¶ 52 and Ex. 4.) Warden Ballard and Commissioner Rubenstein upheld this grievance without comment as well. (Id. at 17, ¶ 53 and Ex. 4.)
With his Complaint, Plaintiff also filed the affidavits of nine other inmates who were in Pod 5 of the Quilliams 2 unit at the time of inmate Howard's assault of Plaintiff. (Id., Exs. 5-13.) The Affidavit of Charles Lively indicates that, while Lively was working as a janitor in the pod, he noticed that the seat on the stool in inmate Howard's cell had been removed and was replaced with what appeared to be a folded up blanket. (ECF No. 1 at 14, ¶ 35 and Ex. 5.) Lively further indicates that only one bolt still held the stool to the floor, and that the stool had been in that condition for some time. (Id.) Lively further states that he told Howard that he would report the condition of the stool to the staff so that maintenance could fix it, but Howard told him that they already knew about it. (Id.) The other eight affidavits provide statements from other inmates in the pod who witnessed Howard beating his door, the attack on Plaintiff, and the conduct of Defendants during that time. (Id., Exs. 6-13.)
On April 18, 2013, subsequent to the filing of Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to supplement or amend his Complaint. (ECF No.
The amendments to the Complaint allege that Plaintiff had a verbal confrontation with Corporal Brian Fernandez approximately thirty minutes prior to Howard's attack on Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that the confrontation resulted in the denial of Plaintiff's usual one-hour recreation period. Fernandez, however, allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to use the telephone, which resulted in the attack. (ECF No. 22 at 3, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff's amendments further allege that Plaintiff had previously had numerous conflicts with Sergeant Jeff Hilewitz, including at least two occasions where Hilewitz pepper sprayed Plaintiff, and, in one of those instances, Hilewitz accidentally ingested a large amount of pepper spray. (Id., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends that his prior confrontations with these officers "provided motivation for their disregarding Plaintiff's need for emergency assistance while being attacked by inmate Howard." (Id., ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff's amendments to his Complaint also discuss more details of the prior incident in which inmate Christopher Cox kicked his door open and attacked another prisoner with a "homemade weapon broom/shank." Plaintiff alleges that, in that incident, correctional officers immediately entered the pod and subdued Cox. (Id., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that there were other similar prior incidents in which staff immediately investigated the source of the banging from inmates beating and kicking their doors and remedied those situations. (Id., ¶ 4.) Thus, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants should have similarly responded to assist Plaintiff on September 27, 2012.
Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss and a memorandum in support thereof (ECF No. 16, 17.) Defendants' motion asserts that Plaintiff's Complaint documents fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF 21.)
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court observed that a case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the complaint does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." While the complaint need not assert "detailed factual allegations," it must contain "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
The Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), a civil rights case. The Court wrote:
556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Defendants' motion will be reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Twombly/Iqbal standard.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot successfully assert that Defendants knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff was in any danger of being attacked by inmate Howard and, thus, cannot state a plausible claim of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff under the Eighth Amendment.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution "imposes duties on [prison] officials who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" The duty to guarantee an inmate's safety includes "a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show two things: (1) "the deprivation must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious;'" that is, "denial of `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities;'" and (2) the prison official had a "`sufficiently culpable state of mind;'" that is, "`deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. (Citations omitted.) The Supreme Court rejected an argument that an objective test of deliberate indifference be established.
Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
While deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials to a specific known risk of harm states a claim under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir.1987), prison officials cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment unless they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The negligent failure
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any of the named Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety. They argue:
(ECF No. 17 at 4.)
Defendants further contend that:
(Id. at 2.)
On April 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 21.) There, Plaintiff emphasizes the fact that none of the correctional officers came to the pod "to investigate the loud banging" and, throughout the entire incident, Defendants stood outside the pod watching and doing nothing. (ECF No. 21 at 6.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants "made no attempt to aid Plaintiff or intervene on his behalf in any way, as inmate Howard pummeled Plaintiff with an iron post to the point that he was begging for his life." (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendants could have used a stun grenade, mace/pepper spray, or rubber bullets to incapacitate Howard without entering the pod. (Id. at 7 n. 4.) He alleged this in his Complaint as well, stating:
(ECF No. 1 at 12, ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff further contends that this incident was allowed to occur due to various other security lapses, such as the failure to routinely inspect segregation cells. (ECF No. 17 at 8.) Furthermore, based upon a prior incident on the same pod, Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants "had prior `specific knowledge' that repetitive and `prolonged beating on a cell door will result in the door coming open and the resident inmate exiting his cell.'" (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff loosely quotes Farmer v. Brennan, the seminal case on a prison official's duties under the Eighth Amendment, as follows:
511 U.S. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970 [internal citations omitted and other alterations from original made by Plaintiff]. (ECF No. 21 at 10.) Plaintiff asserts that he has clearly alleged facts sufficient to support a failure to protect claim and that he has "detailed a pattern of reckless behavior committed by Defendants" which is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. (Id.) Defendants did not file a Reply memorandum.
Defendants rely heavily on the fact that Plaintiff has not alleged that they had any specific knowledge that inmate Howard posed a threat to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has alleged, however, that there were prior incidents of inmates beating on their doors until they opened and that at least one inmate previously escaped from his cell and attacked another inmate, which Plaintiff asserts gave Defendants "prior specific knowledge" that an incident like that was likely if staff did not respond to the indicator that a door was unsecure.
In Farmer, the Supreme Court held:
Plaintiff's assertion that there was at least one prior incident where an inmate repeatedly beat on his door until it became unsecure and permitted the inmate to escape and assault another prisoner is not sufficient to permit the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for the fact that Plaintiff was attacked by Howard. Those allegations, even taken as true, do not give rise to a facially plausible claim that Defendants had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff and disregarded that risk.
Defendants' motion documents, however, do not address Plaintiff's allegations that the correctional officers who were present on the unit failed to intervene once Howard attacked Plaintiff, at which time there was an obvious threat to Plaintiff's safety. To establish a claim for failure to protect him from violence, an inmate must show: (1) "serious or significant physical or emotional injury;" and (2) that the prison officials had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970; De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.2003).
In Odom v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed that:
349 F.3d 765, 773 (4th Cir.2003).
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff, and failed to act to protect him. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hilewitz, Fernandez, Hahn and Bunch did nothing to intervene to stop the brutal attack on Plaintiff when they had the opportunity to do so. Plaintiff further alleges that all of Defendants were aware of prior incidents of inmates beating their doors open and attacking other inmates. Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, Plaintiff's Complaint states enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face concerning the failure of Defendants Hilewitz, Fernandez, Hahn and Bunch to intervene in the attack of Plaintiff by inmate Howard on September 27, 2012, and that dismissal of that claim is not presently warranted.
The claims against Defendants Matheny and Ballard, however, must be separately addressed. Plaintiff has not alleged that Matheny or Ballard were present at the time of, or in any way directly
Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Matheny and Ballard appear to be claims of supervisory liability premised on their failure to correct the alleged unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates. As noted in Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 660-61 (4th Cir.2012):
At bottom, the only specific allegations made by Plaintiff concerning the conduct of Defendants Matheny and Ballard are that they denied his administrative grievances filed after this incident. (ECF No. 1 at 15-16, ¶¶ 42-50.)
Although the Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, courts in other federal circuits have held that liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See, e.g., Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.1999); Harris v. Stoddard, 2013 WL 4829922 *6 (W.D.Mich., Sept. 10, 2013) (slip copy); Hopkins v. Bondiskey, 2013 WL 1144930 *14-*15 (D.N.J., Mar. 18, 2013) (unpublished).
Thus, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Matheny and Ballard do not state a facially plausible claim of supervisory liability, and that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Matheny and Ballard.
Although not addressed in Defendants' motion, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants must be dismissed to the extent that he is seeking monetary damages against them in their official capacities because they are immune from such liability under the Eleventh Amendment. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court stated:
Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the power of the federal judiciary does not extend to suits by a citizen of one state against another, or to suits by a citizen against his or her own state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars a suit in a federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability upon a State or State officials,
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to federal law, which is distinguishable from a retroactive monetary award paid from State funds. Id. at 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139. Moreover, a State is not a "person" for purposes of section 1983 litigation. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).
Thus, although Plaintiff may seek injunctive relief from Defendants in their official capacities, it is clear that Defendants are immune from liability for monetary damages in that capacity under the Eleventh Amendment. Consequently, these claims must also be dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court
The Court
