THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Time Limit for Service ("the Motion"). (ECF No. 21.) For the reasons discussed herein, that Motion is
The Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, on August 21, 2015. On September 28, 2015, Defendants filed a notice of removal with this Court. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's Motion was filed on December 22, 2015 and seeks an extension of time in which to serve Defendant Daniel Simons, a correctional officer at the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority. The Motion asserts that "Plaintiff has inadvertently failed to obtain service on Defendant Simons within 120 days of filing his action" and concedes that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate good cause justifying the failure of service. (ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 1-2.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides an outer limit for service upon defendants in federal proceedings. As relevant here, that rule states that:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1448 provides, in pertinent part, that:
Taken together, these two provisions of federal law combine to give a plaintiff "a 120 day period following filing of a notice of removal in which service may be completed or started anew." Lawrence v. Henson, 197 F.Supp.2d 533, 538 (W.D. Va. 2002). In a removed case, the notice of removal marks a clear delineation between state and federal jurisdiction. Id. at 539. Although state law governs the sufficiency of service of process prior to removal, service after removal is governed by federal law alone. See Eccles v. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp., 10 F.Supp.2d 514, 519 (D. Md. 1998) (noting that "state law governing service of process (and all other issues) applies before removal, and that federal law applies after removal"). Accordingly, with respect to a defendant in a removed case who was not served before removal, "Rule 4(m)'s 120-day period for service begins to run on the date of removal." Id. at 519 (citing Alber v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 786 F.Supp. 1340, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1992) and 14A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1137 at 83 & n.1.1 (Supp. 1998)); see also Randolph v. Hendry, 50 F.Supp.2d 572, 580 ("Ordinarily, Rule 4(m) would require the plaintiff to effect service within 120 days of the filing of the complaint, but in the context of removal, the federal court does not obtain an interest in the action—and cannot therefore dictate the terms of service—until the Notice of Removal is filed." (citing Alber, 786 F. Supp. at 1376)).
Thus, the appropriate time period for effecting service on Defendant Simons, who was not served in state proceedings prior to removal, is 120 days from September 28, 2015, the date on which a notice of removal was filed in this action, or January 26, 2016. Accordingly, at the time Plaintiff filed the Motion, he had more than a month of time available to effectuate service on Defendant Simons. More importantly, Plaintiff still has six days remaining from the entry date of this Order to achieve such service. Given Plaintiff's representation that he has knowledge of the identity of Defendant Simons' counsel, (ECF No. 21 ¶ 1), it does not appear that Plaintiff will have difficulty effectuating service before the Rule 4(m) time limit expires. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to extend the applicable time limit for service is
The Court