DWANE L. TINSLEY, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before this Court is Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 12), Brief in Support of Defendant's Decision (ECF No. 15) and Plaintiff's Reply to Brief in Support of Defendant's Decision (ECF No. 16). This is an action seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Claimant's application for supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
Claimant, Shelly Mae Marie Smith, filed an application for SSI on November 7, 2012. Claimant alleged disability beginning January 1, 2005. The claim was denied initially on January 16, 2013, and upon reconsideration on May 15, 2013. Claimant filed a request for hearing on June 13, 2013. A video hearing was held on September 17, 2014. Claimant appeared in Parkersburg, West Virginia, and the Administrative Law Judge presided over the hearing from Charleston, West Virginia. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Claimant's applications on November 7, 2014. The Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review on January 31, 2016 (Tr. at 6-9). Subsequently, Claimant brought the present action seeking judicial review of the administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), a claimant for disability has the burden of proving a disability. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 774 (4th Cir. 1972). A disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Social Security Regulations establish a "sequential evaluation" for the adjudication of disability claims. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920 (2016). If an individual is found "not disabled" at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). The first inquiry under the sequence is whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. Id. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). If the claimant is not, the second inquiry is whether claimant suffers from a severe impairment. Id. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). If a severe impairment is present, the third inquiry is whether such impairment meets or equals any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Administrative Regulations No. 4. Id. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). If it does, the claimant is found disabled and awarded benefits. Id. If it does not, the fourth inquiry is whether the claimant's impairments prevent the performance of past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e). By satisfying inquiry four, the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability. Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner, McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983), and leads to the fifth and final inquiry: whether the claimant is able to perform other forms of substantial gainful activity, considering claimant's remaining physical and mental capacities and claimant's age, education and prior work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f) (2016). The Commissioner must show two things: (1) that the claimant, considering claimant's age, education, work experience, skills and physical shortcomings, has the capacity to perform an alternative job, and (2) that this specific job exists in the national economy. McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 572, 574 (4th Cir. 1976).
In this particular case, the ALJ determined that Claimant satisfied the first inquiry because she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 7, 2012, the application date (Tr. at 20). Under the second inquiry, the ALJ found that Claimant suffers from the severe impairments of degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees, status post total knee replacement of the bilateral knees, obesity, irritable bowel syndrome, cardiomegaly and major depressive disorder. (Id.) At the third inquiry, the ALJ concluded that Claimant's impairments do not meet or equal the level of severity of any listing in Appendix 1 (Tr. at 22). The ALJ then found that Claimant has a residual functional capacity for sedentary work
The sole issue before this court is whether the final decision of the Commissioner denying the claim is supported by substantial evidence. In Blalock v. Richardson, substantial evidence was defined as:
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1972) (quoting Laws v. Cellebreze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). Additionally, the Commissioner, not the court, is charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, the courts Amust not abdicate their traditional functions; they cannot escape their duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational.@ Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974).
A careful review of the record reveals the decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant was born on August 27, 1969, and was 43 years old on the date the application was filed. Claimant graduated from high school. Claimant lives with her daughter and her 4 year old grandson (Tr. at 43). On the date of the hearing, Claimant was 4'11" tall and weighed approximately 265 pounds (Tr. at 48).
The court has reviewed all evidence of record, including the medical evidence of record, and will discuss it further below as necessary.
Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record as to Claimant's impairments. Claimant avers that the ALJ's residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment and ultimate decision to deny Claimant's benefits were not supported by substantial evidence (ECF No. 12). Claimant asserts that the ALJ's step three analysis was incorrect and insufficient with regard to the evaluation of Claimant's degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees status post total knee replacement. In response, Defendant asserts that Claimant failed to demonstrate that she could not ambulate effectively (ECF No. 15). Defendant avers that the ALJ was not required to obtain medical expert testimony and that Claimant has failed to prove that she satisfies the listing criteria for an impairment.
In the decision, the ALJ allotted various weight to medical opinions in the record. The ALJ provided the following:
Social Security Ruling 96-6p provides that findings of fact made by state agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists regarding the nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s) must be treated as expert opinion evidence of non-examining sources at the ALJ and Appeals Council levels of administrative review. ALJs and the Appeals Council may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given to these opinions in their decisions. In the present matter, the ALJ did not state the names of the consultants even though the ALJ gave their opinion's great weight (Tr. at 27). Furthermore, The ALJ did not give any explanation of these consultants' assessments.
As explained by SSR 96-6p, the regulations provide "progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become weaker." For example, SSR 96-6p states that opinions of physicians or psychologists who do not have a treatment relationship with the individual are weighed by stricter standards, based to a greater degree on medical evidence, qualifications, and explanations for the opinions, than are required of treating sources.
Thus, SSR 96-6p concludes that the opinions of State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists can be given weight only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case record, considering such factors as (1) the supportability of the opinion in light of the evidence in the record; (2) consistency with the record, including other medical opinions; (3) and any explanation for the opinion. Id.
Social Security Ruling 96-7p confirms that ALJs and the Appeals Council are required to consider findings of fact by state agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists about the existence and severity of an individual's impairment(s), including the existence and severity of any symptoms. See 65 Fed. Reg. 11,866 (Mar. 7, 2000). While ALJs and the Appeals Council are not bound by any state agency findings, they may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight they give to the opinions in their decisions. Id
Further, "[u]nless the treating source's opinion is given controlling weight, the administrative law judge must explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of a State agency medical or psychological consultant or other program physician or psychologist, as the administrative law judge must do for any opinions from treating sources, non-treating sources, and other non-examining sources who do not work for us." (Id.) Examples of the kinds of factors that an administrative law judge must consider when evaluating the findings of State agency medical and psychological consultants are provided in paragraph (c)
The Fourth Circuit has held that "[a] necessary predicate to engaging in substantial evidence review is a record of the basis for the ALJ's ruling," including "a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence." Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013).
In the present case, the ALJ did not state what the State agency medical consultants reported in their physical assessments of Claimant. Likewise, the ALJ did not state what was found in the mental consultant's psychological assessment of Claimant. As the ALJ gave their opinions great weight, explanation of their content is necessary. The undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Judge find that the ALJ did not provide an explanation of the State agency medical and mental consultants' opinions to which he gave great weight. As such, the analysis is incomplete and precludes meaningful review.
For the reasons provided above, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Judge find that ALJ's lack of explanation for the weight afforded to the State agency medical and mental consultants' opinions renders the analysis incomplete and precludes meaningful review. Accordingly, the undersigned suggests that District Judge finds that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby respectfully
The parties are notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is hereby
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, Judge Copenhaver and this Magistrate Judge.
The Clerk is directed to file this Proposed Findings and Recommendation and to transmit a copy of the same to counsel of record.