JOSEPH R. GOODWIN, District Judge.
Pending before the court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice or in the Alternative Motion for Show Cause Order for Failure to Serve a Plaintiff Fact Sheet [ECF No. 10] filed by C. R. Bard, Inc. ("Bard"). The plaintiff has responded to the Motion [ECF No. 13], and Bard has replied [ECF No. 16]. Thus, this matter is ripe for my review. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is
The case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat pelvic organ prolapse and stress urinary incontinence. In the six remaining active MDLs, there are nearly 17,000 cases currently pending, approximately 1600 of which are in the Bard MDL, MDL 2187.
In an effort to efficiently and effectively manage this MDL, the court decided to conduct pretrial discovery and motions practice on an individualized basis so that once a case is trial-ready (that is, after the court has ruled on all summary judgment motions, among other things), it can then be promptly transferred or remanded to the appropriate district for trial. To this end, the court placed this and other cases in Bard Wave 7. Pretrial Order ("PTO") # 275 [ECF No. 5124], In re: C. R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.2:10-md-02187, http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/MDL/2187/orders.html.
Managing multidistrict litigation requires the court to streamline certain litigation procedures in order to improve efficiency for the parties and the court. Some of these management techniques simplify the parties' discovery responsibilities. PTO # 275, for example, provides that each plaintiff in Wave 7 must submit a completed Plaintiff Fact Sheet ("PFS") to defendants by March 19, 2018. PTO # 275, at 2. The plaintiff, however, did not comply with PTO # 275 in that she failed to submit a completed PFS, and on this basis, Bard now seeks dismissal of her case with prejudice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) allows a court to sanction a party for failing to comply with discovery orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (stating that a court "may issue further just orders" when a party "fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery"). Before levying a harsh sanction under Rule 37, such as dismissal or default, a court must first consider the following four factors identified by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503-06 (4th Cir. 1977)).
In applying these factors to the case at bar, I must be particularly cognizant of the realities of multidistrict litigation and the unique problems an MDL judge faces. Specifically, when handling seven MDLs, containing thousands of individual cases in the aggregate, case management becomes of utmost importance. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing the "enormous" task of an MDL court in "figur[ing] out a way to move thousands of cases toward resolution on the merits while at the same time respecting their individuality"). I must define rules for discovery and then strictly adhere to those rules, with the purpose of ensuring that pretrial litigation flows as smoothly and efficiently as possible. See id. at 1232 ("[T]he district judge must establish schedules with firm cutoff dates if the coordinated cases are to move in a diligent fashion toward resolution by motion, settlement, or trial."); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").
In turn, counsel must collaborate with the court "in fashioning workable programmatic procedures" and cooperate with these procedures thereafter. In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1231-32. Pretrial orders—and the parties' compliance with those orders and the deadlines set forth therein—"are the engine that drives disposition on the merits." Id. at 1232. And a "willingness to resort to sanctions" in the event of noncompliance can ensure that the engine remains in tune, resulting in better administration of the vehicle of multidistrict litigation. Id.; see also Freeman v. Wyeth, 764 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2014) ("The MDL judge must be given `greater discretion' to create and enforce deadlines in order to administrate the litigation effectively. This necessarily includes the power to dismiss cases where litigants do not follow the court's orders.").
Pursuant to PTO # 275, each plaintiff in Wave 7 was ordered to complete and serve a PFS on defendants by March 19, 2018. PTO # 275, at 2. According to Bard, the plaintiff failed to submit a completed PFS within the court-ordered deadline. When Bard attempted to communicate with plaintiff's counsel about this failure, Bard received no response. Accordingly, pursuant to PTO # 275, Bard filed this Motion on May 3, 2018. In support of its Motion, Bard has attached numerous email communications from Bard's counsel to plaintiff's counsel. None of these communications indicate any response from plaintiff's counsel
In response, the plaintiff concedes that the PFS was not filed by the March 19 deadline. She states that this failure was due to "some confusion between Plaintiff's counsel, settlement counsel, and a dual representation firm that the case was settled; the settled case was actually a different Brandy Smith." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 1. The plaintiff does not cite to nor attach any support for this statement. The plaintiff also states that her PFS was served on Bard on May 29, 2018—more than two months after the court-ordered deadline. The plaintiff filed her PFS with the court on June 1, 2018.
In its reply, Bard disputes the plaintiff's excuse for failing to timely file her PFS, and notes plaintiff's counsel's failure to respond to Bard's attempts to resolve this issue prior to filing the motion to dismiss.
The circumstances of this case lead me to impose the sanction provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(C), which requires the disobeying party to pay "the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the [discovery] failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." The plaintiff has not provided substantial justification for her failure to timely submit to discovery. Furthermore, there are no circumstances that make this sanction unjust. Although the discovery violation has since been cured, it nevertheless resulted in litigation expenses for defendants. Applying Rule 37(b)(2)(C) ensures that the disobeying party, rather than the innocent party, bears those costs.
I find that $1000 is a minimally representative valuation of Bard's expenses. This number accounts for the time and money Bard spent identifying the plaintiff as one of the non-compliant plaintiffs; assessing the effect of her discovery violations; drafting a motion for sanctions; and serving the motion. All knowledgeable MDL counsel would consider these efforts, which would have been avoided had the plaintiff followed the court's order, to be worth $1000, at the least.
To the extent defendants seek dismissal of the plaintiff's case, its motion is
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice or in the Alternative Motion for Show Cause Order for Failure to Serve a Plaintiff Fact Sheet [ECF No. 10] is
The court