BURKE, Justice.
[¶ 1] Appellants Ralph E. Platt and Ronald R. Platt challenge an order from the district court modifying a partition of land made by court-appointed commissioners. Appellants contend that the district court did not have authority to modify the partition. We affirm.
[¶ 2] Appellants present the following issue:
[¶ 3] Upon their father's death, Appellant Ralph E. Platt and Appellee Wayne W. Platt, together with their siblings, inherited the ranch near Encampment, Wyoming that is the subject of this dispute. As a result of subsequent transfers between the siblings, Ralph and Wayne jointly owned and operated one half of the ranch, and they eventually placed that land in the Platt Ranch Trust. Over time, disputes arose between the brothers as to the operation of the Trust and management of the property. These disputes led to the current litigation, which was initiated when Appellants filed suit against Appellees in district court, asserting a breach of trustee's duties, among other claims, and seeking a partition of the ranch. In this appeal, we are asked to address only that portion of the proceedings relating to the district court's order of partition.
[¶ 4] After finding that Appellants were entitled to part of the estate, the district court appointed three commissioners to make a partition of the property pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-104 (LexisNexis 2009). In June of 2009, the parties submitted proposed instructions to guide the commissioners in partitioning the property. After receiving and considering objections to the proposed instructions, the district court issued Instructions to Commissioners setting forth the duties of the commissioners and the general manner in which the property was to be divided. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-106 (LexisNexis 2009), the commissioners were instructed to "examine the property and set apart the same in such lots as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard for the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts." The instructions also permitted the commissioners to create easements for the benefit of any party.
[¶ 5] Following their inspection of the property, the commissioners submitted a report of their recommended partition. The commissioners generally divided the property into northern and southern parcels. Appellants were awarded the southern portion of the ranch, encompassing 2,213 acres, including 248 acres of irrigated lands, and valued at approximately $1,138,908.00. The lands awarded to Appellants incorporated in-holdings owned separately by Ralph and Ronald Platt. Appellants were also awarded 320 acres of a BLM grazing permit. Appellees were awarded the northern portion of the ranch, encompassing 1,772 acres, including 291 acres of irrigated lands, and valued at approximately $1,138,967.00. The lands awarded to Appellees incorporated an in-holding owned separately by Wayne W. Platt. In addition, Appellees were awarded 640 acres of the BLM grazing permit.
[¶ 6] The land awarded to Appellants also included a parcel known as the King Field, which was not contiguous with the bulk of their property. In conjunction with this award, the commissioners proposed to establish "Easement 3" across property set over to Appellees so that Appellants would have easier access to the King Field. Easement 3 ran along an existing road, which was described as "a little bit better than a two-track road, but not much." The King Field, however, could also be reached by means of a road providing access from the east side of the parcel, and by a county road providing access from the west. Nonetheless, the commissioners initially determined that Easement 3 was appropriate because it provided a much shorter route for access to the King Field than the county road. The commissioners also proposed to establish "Easement 2" for the benefit of Appellants, which crossed the corner of a parcel awarded to Appellees.
[¶ 7] Following the submission of the commissioners' report, both parties objected to the creation of Easement 3. Appellants objected on the grounds that the easement crossed property owned by the Harriet Platt Revocable Trust, which was not owned in common and was not subject to the partition. Appellants noted that "This creates title issues and access issues relative to Easement Access 3." Appellees, on the other hand, objected on the grounds that the easement was "largely unnecessary and impracticable" to Appellants' access and use of the property. They also claimed that "the use, maintenance, or improvement of the easement will
[¶ 8] The district court held a two-day hearing to consider the parties' objections to the partition. At the hearing, the commissioners acknowledged the likelihood of future disputes relating to the construction and maintenance of Easement 3. One of the commissioners stated "[T]hat is something we overlooked. We thought we were solving the problem by allowing access to go through there, but it has probably created a lot of problems on who is going to build it, who is going to maintain it, and who is going to— and that probably needs to be worked out, certainly, as part of it."
The other two commissioners, however, did not express an opinion on the solution proposed by Appellants, and no subsequent report was prepared by the commissioners.
[¶ 9] Considering the problems associated with the creation of Easement 3, counsel for Appellants repeatedly urged the court to make the suggested modification to the commissioners' report. During opening statements, Appellants' counsel stated that "what we are going to be proposing is that the Court make a modification to the proposed division by the commissioners that will include approximately 13.15 acres of property to be slivered off near the Easement 3, which would then put Easement 3 on property owned by the plaintiff so that the issues concerning the road would not be something that would be contentious between the parties." Counsel for Appellants also stated that "We will be asking the Court to make a decision that gratifies most of the commissioners' return with making one slight small deviation, possibly two deviations—one of them may not be very contested—and then enter that order directing that property be divided between the plaintiff and the defendant." As indicated by this statement, Appellants also requested "one small other revision" concerning Easement 2. Appellants'
[¶ 10] Counsel for Appellants again requested that the court modify the commissioners' report during closing arguments. Appellants' counsel stated that "We are here asking the Court to make an adjustment. And you heard from the commissioners how they feel about it. We are asking the Court to make an adjustment in their determination that would allow that 13.15 acres where that easement is to be controlled by the plaintiffs with the rights of the defendant and make sure that her rights were met with her ability to object if they wanted to." Further, Appellants' counsel stated that "The defendants want to come in and rip the guts out of that division that was made by the commissioners. We are asking for the Court to prevent that from happening, to uphold the commissioners' report, to confirm the division made by the commissioners with the reasonable modification that the commissioners said, in light of the controversy. Inserting this area is a reasonable modification to award the 13.15 acres to the plaintiff. We would ask the Court to do that and confirm the report and order that an order be prepared to carry that out."
[¶ 11] The district court issued its decision letter on May 5, 2010. With two exceptions, the district court affirmed the partition of the estate as recommended by the commissioners. First, the district court vacated Easement 3. The district court determined that vacating the easement was appropriate because improving the access route on Easement 3 would require a substantial amount of improvement and maintenance, including road "widening, drainage, foundation work, and surfacing." The court also determined that this work would interfere with the headgates and irrigation ditches on property owned by Appellees, which would likely result in future litigation. Further, the court noted the existence of two other access routes to King Field, which provide access from the east and west sides of the property. Second, the district court vacated Easement 2 and instead granted approximately 2.07 acres to Appellants, without encumbrance, in order to eliminate the need for multiple gates and cattle guards. The court determined that the extra value to Appellants would provide some compensation for the loss of Easement 3.
[¶ 12] Appellants subsequently filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and/or Motion for New Partition, arguing that the district court did not have the authority to modify the partition recommended by the commissioners. The court denied the motion, noting that "At trial, both sides proceeded upon the assumption that the court could modify the recommendations of the commissioners. Plaintiffs do not object to a modification that was made in their favor. Thus, plaintiffs are attempting to have it both ways and to argue an issue that was not raised at trial." The court determined that "Given that the issue is not addressed by the statutes, the better policy is to allow the court to modify the recommendations, particularly in a case where the commissioners made a mistake, the modification affected only one easement which is at issue, and both sides requested modifications."
[¶ 13] Appellants timely filed this appeal.
[¶ 14] Whether a district court has discretion to modify a partition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-101, et seq. is a question of law, which we review de novo. Smith v. Lewis Auto Body, 2011 WY 109, ¶ 8, 255 P.3d 935, 937 (Wyo.2011).
[¶ 15] Appellants argue that Wyoming's partition statutes do not permit the district court to modify a partition made by court-appointed commissioners. They contend that the district court's action was "a clear usurpation of the statutory authority conferred upon the commissioners to make a partition of the property," and direct our attention to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-32-104 and 1-32-106. Those statutes, and the portions emphasized by Appellants, provide as follows:
(Emphasis added.) Appellants assert that these statutes "fail to provide any means or confer any kind of authority upon a district court to make the partition," and mandate that "the partition is to be made solely by the commissioners."
[¶ 16] Appellees argue, however, that the partition statutes grant the district court ultimate authority to order partition of the property. They point to language from Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-32-105 and 1-32-109. Those statutes, and the portions emphasized by Appellees, provide as follows:
(LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added). Based on the language of these statutes, Appellees contend that, "While the commissioners are delegated the authority to recommend a partition of lands to the district court, in accordance with § 1-32-106, the commissioners' powers to evaluate the property and recommend physical partition always remain subject to the ultimate approval of the district court."
[¶ 17] We have not previously had an occasion to determine whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-104, et seq. confer authority upon a district court to modify a partition made by court-appointed commissioners. In Field v. Leiter, 16 Wyo. 1, 90 P. 378, 390 (1907), which constitutes this Court's most extensive examination of the law relating to partition, we stated that "The court does not make the partition, it only acts to approve or disapprove where partition is reported." However, the issue of whether a court has the power to modify a partition was not raised or addressed in that case. Rather, the pertinent issue was whether the commissioners' report must include facts concerning the character and situation of the land subject to partition or a specific statement that the partition was equitable and advantageous. Id. at 389-90. The Court held that such statements were not required to be included in the report. Id.
[¶ 18] Nonetheless, we are aided in our resolution of the issue in the present case by the discussion in Field v. Leiter of the general nature of the remedy of partition. The Court, describing the historic development of partition actions, explained as follows:
Id. at 386 (emphasis added). Although the Court noted that the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity had been abolished in Wyoming, the Court held that invocation of equitable principles would depend on the nature of the particular action:
Id. at 387 (emphasis added). From this discussion, it is apparent that the rules of equity have generally continued to supplement statutory procedures established in other jurisdictions, and Field v. Leiter stands for the proposition that this is true in Wyoming as well. See also Brogoitti v. Brown, 231 Or. 309, 372 P.2d 773, 776 (1962) ("The prevalence and detailed provisions of [partition] statutes might well have caused them to be regarded as constituting a complete and self-contained system, wholly supplanting the equity jurisdiction as to partition. This view has not prevailed." (quoting Restatement of Property, p. 654)). Considering that we have previously held that equitable principles continue to provide a viable source of relief in partition actions, we are mindful of the rule that "in equity, the court may alter or amend the [commissioners'] report in a proper case to comply with or obviate objections." 68 C.J.S. Partition § 153 (2011).
[¶ 19] Further, in light of the fact that Wyoming's partition statutes were modeled after Ohio's code, as noted in Field v. Leiter, we find authority from Ohio to be particularly helpful to our determination of whether a district court can modify a partition.
Id., 781 N.E.2d at 1027-28. The court went on to explain that, under the Ohio statutes, judges must be ultimately responsible for exercising the power of partition.
Id., 781 N.E.2d at 1029. In addition to Ohio, courts in other jurisdictions lacking statutory provisions expressly authorizing modification of a partition have also determined that a court can modify a partition made by court-appointed commissioners. See, e.g., Morris v. Daniel, 183 Ky. 780, 784, 210 S.W. 668, 670 (1919) ("A report of commissioners filed in a
[¶ 20] Although McCarthy and the other Ohio cases cited in that opinion, like Field v. Leiter, did not involve an actual modification of the commissioners' report, we are persuaded by the reasoning set forth in these cases. In providing that "The writ of partition ... shall ... setoff and divide to the plaintiff or each party in interest such part and proportion of the estate
[¶ 21] Finally, we note that, at the hearing on the parties' objections to the partition, Appellants repeatedly asked the district court to modify the commissioners' report. Appellants opened the hearing with a request that the Court "make a modification to the proposed division ..." and concluded their arguments with a plea that the Court "uphold the commissioners' report, to confirm the division made by the commissioners with the reasonable modification that the commissioners said, in light of the controversy." In light of Appellants' arguments below, we would be justified in concluding that Appellants complain of an error which they "induced or provoked the court" to commit. TF v. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re CF), 2005 WY 118, ¶ 27, 120 P.3d 992, 1002 (Wyo.2005). As we have previously stated, the doctrine of invited error dictates that "If a party requests or moves the court to make a ruling which is actually erroneous and the court does so, that party cannot take advantage of the error on appeal or review." Robbins v. Robbins, 2002 WY 80, ¶ 10, 46 P.3d 880, 883 (Wyo.2002).
[¶ 22] Affirmed.
Another commissioner stated that
