GOLDEN, Justice.
[¶ 1] The Town of Jackson applied to the district court for an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) against Operation Save America (OSA), an anti-abortion protest group. The Town sought to restrict OSA's demonstration activities in and around the Jackson Town Square during the Boy Scouts' 2011 annual Elk Fest. The district court granted the ex parte TRO, which enjoined OSA "from assembling on the Jackson Town Square without a permit or holding posters/signs
[¶ 2] We find that the ex parte TRO was issued in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Rule 65 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and reverse.
[¶ 3] Both parties present numerous procedural and substantive issues for our review. Appellant, OSA, frames the issues as follows:
[¶ 4] Appellee, the Town of Jackson, presents the issues as follows:
[¶ 5] OSA is an anti-abortion organization incorporated under the laws of Texas. Approximately twenty of its members arrived in Jackson, Wyoming, on Wednesday, May 18, 2011. The group's purpose in coming to Jackson was to protest against Dr. Brent Blue and his clinic, which clinic OSA reported to be the only one in Wyoming performing abortions.
[¶ 6] At 7:00 on the morning of Wednesday, May 18th, OSA began its demonstrations by assembling at the Jackson Hole High School and Jackson Hole Middle School. The group handed out flyers calling Dr. Blue a "killer" and showing photographs of an aborted fetus. It also held up large photographs, approximately four-feet by four-feet, of disfigured and aborted fetus images. In one incident, an OSA member boarded an occupied school bus, showed the grade school age children the aborted fetus images and asked them if they knew that Dr. Blue is a "killer."
[¶ 7] Robert Gilliam, Operations Lieutenant for the Jackson Police Department, described the public response to the demonstrations and his interactions with OSA:
[¶ 8] During the same week that OSA was demonstrating in Jackson, the Boy Scouts of America were planning to hold their annual Elk Fest in the Jackson Town Square. The Boy Scouts had, on March 30, 2011, applied for and received a permit for the exclusive use of the Town Square for the event's festivities to be held on Saturday, May 21st. The planned activities were scheduled from 5:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. that day, and they included various booths for family activities, a Boy Scout Expo and Demonstrations, a Rotary Private Antler Sale, the Boy Scout Antler Auction, and a Jackson Youth Baseball food tent. Approximately two hundred Boy Scouts between the ages of seven and fourteen were expected to attend the event.
[¶ 9] At some point between Wednesday, May 18th, and Friday, May 20th, Lieutenant Gilliam asked Pastor Mark Hollick and Chet Gallagher of OSA to refrain from displaying the graphic photographs at the Boy Scout event. Pastor Hollick and Mr. Gallagher responded that OSA reserved its right to display the photographs in any public setting.
[¶ 10] On Friday, May 20, 2011, at 3:29 in the afternoon, the Town filed in district court a Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Temporary Injunction (Petition). The Petition requested an order restricting protestors and counter-protestors from protesting during the Elk Fest between 5:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 21, 2011, within two blocks in any direction from the Town Square. In support of the Petition, the Town stated, in part:
[¶ 11] The district court granted the Petition, and at 8:43 p.m. on Friday, May 20th, it issued an Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). In issuing the TRO, the court did not include counter-protestors in its coverage, noting:
[¶ 12] The district court found that the Town had made the requisite showing for the TRO to issue ex parte.
[¶ 13] After concluding it could issue the order ex parte, the district court then analyzed the proposed restriction under First Amendment constraints. The court did not explicitly find that the restriction was content-based and intended to restrict speech in a traditional public forum, but it nonetheless applied the strict scrutiny required for that type of restriction. It concluded:
[¶ 14] Based on its findings, the district court granted the TRO in the form that the Town requested. The TRO restricted OSA as follows:
[¶ 15] The Boy Scout event went forward as scheduled, and the TRO expired by its own terms at the conclusion of the event at
[¶ 16] Jurisdictional questions are legal issues that this Court reviews de novo. Dawes v. State, 2010 WY 113, ¶ 10, 236 P.3d 303, 306 (Wyo.2010) (subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law considered de novo, without regard to the district court determination); Meyer v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 14, 198 P.3d 552, 555 (Wyo.2008) ("The question of whether personal jurisdiction can properly be exercised in Wyoming is therefore a question of law to be reviewed de novo."); Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Park Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 2008 WY 88, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 260, 262 (Wyo.2008) (quoting Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. Gunter, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo.2007)) ("The existence of standing is a legal issue that we review de novo.").
[¶ 17] Constitutional challenges present issues of law that we likewise review de novo. Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, ¶ 31, 165 P.3d 83, 92 (Wyo.2007); Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 9, 100 P.3d 394, 400 (Wyo.2004).
[¶ 18] Actions for injunctive relief are by nature requests for equitable relief within the district court's discretion. CBM Geosolutions, Inc. v. Gas Sensing Tech. Corp., 2009 WY 113, ¶ 10, 215 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Wyo.2009); In re Kite Ranch, LLC v. Powell Family of Yakima, LLC, 2008 WY 39, ¶ 21, 181 P.3d 920, 926 (Wyo.2008). Because the district court's decision is discretionary, we review its decision for an abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that an injunction "is an extreme remedy and the court should `proceed with caution and deliberation before exercising the remedy.'" Kite Ranch, ¶ 21, 181 P.3d at 926 (quoting Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 332 (Wyo.1986)). "Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 2003 WY 126, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 412, 416 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 159, ¶ 11, 57 P.3d 324, 329 (Wyo.2002)).
[¶ 19] In evaluating a court's exercise of discretion in the grant or denial of injunctive relief, this Court has observed:
In re Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1266 (Wyo.1985).
[¶ 20] The Town contends that OSA's appeal should be dismissed as moot because the event in which OSA desired to demonstrate has already occurred and the TRO has expired. Thus, the Town reasons, a decision by this Court can have no effect on the controversy and the matter is moot. We disagree. Because the present controversy is one of great public importance and is capable of repetition yet evading review, we conclude that OSA's appeal is not moot.
MEO, ¶ 27, 138 P.3d at 1153-54 (quoting Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 978 P.2d at 1143); see also In re AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo.1987) ("Courts do not sit for the purpose of expounding the law upon abstract questions, but to determine the rights of litigants by the rendition of effective judgment.").
[¶ 22] The rule that a case must be dismissed when it becomes moot is not absolute. If a case presents an issue of great public importance or interest, we may rule on the issue even if the dispute is technically moot. Merchant v. Wyo. Dep't of Corrections, 2007 WY 159, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d 856, 863 (Wyo.2007); Bd. of Trustees of Fremont Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. BM, 2006 WY 23, ¶ 3, 129 P.3d 317, 319 (Wyo.2006); In re RM, 2004 WY 162, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d 868, 871 (Wyo.2004). Likewise, we have ruled on matters, otherwise moot, where we deemed it necessary to provide guidance to state agencies and to produce uniformity in the decisions of the district courts, pursuant to our "general superintending control" of all district courts. Morad v. Wyo. Highway Dep't, 66 Wyo. 12, 21, 203 P.2d 954, 957 (1949) (reviewing drivers license revocation after license reinstated); see also RM, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d at 871 ("[T]his action presents this court with the opportunity to consider the constitution in a manner not considered before and is of sufficient importance to warrant a full discussion."); Wyo. Dep't of Revenue & Taxation v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1245 (Wyo.1983) (reviewing moot drivers license suspension because it raised "a significant question of public interest and importance which could be of a continuing nature, and because of its importance with respect to the enforcement of this state's motor vehicle code"). We have stated:
Penny v. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 2005 WY 117, ¶¶ 3-4, 120 P.3d 152, 157 (Wyo.2005).
[¶ 23] An additional exception applies to disputes that by their nature may conclude before this Court has an opportunity to rule. If a case presents a "controversy capable of repetition yet evading review," we may rule on the matter despite its technical mootness. Merchant, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d at 863; MEO, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d at 1154; BM, ¶ 3, 129 P.3d at 319.
[¶ 24] Our mootness exceptions illustrate that Wyoming's mootness doctrine, like that of many other states, is prudential rather than constitutionally based. See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 562, 567 n. 14 (2009) ("State courts, whose jurisdiction is not, of course, governed by Article III, are similarly reluctant to hear moot cases, but generally treat their mootness doctrines as prudential, and will hear moot cases when the public interest warrants."); see also Robert B. Keiter, Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution: A Reference Guide 141 (2011) ("Significantly, this section [Article 5, Section 2 of the Wyoming Constitution]— unlike Article III in the U.S. Constitution— does not limit the Wyoming Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to `cases' or `controversies.'"). Consistent with the differences between federal court authority to decide matters and the authority of this Court, we have developed a body of case law governing justiciability that is independent of federal requirements. See William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, ¶ 12 n. 2, 206 P.3d 722, 727 n. 2 (Wyo.2009). Thus, while we may look to federal case law for guidance, and our law is similar to federal precedent in many respects, that federal case law is not binding on this Court. Id.
[¶ 25] Whether a case presents a question of great importance is a determination to be made by this Court. RM, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d at 871; Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 7, ¶ 10, 38 P.3d 1073, 1078 (Wyo.2002); Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo.1974). We have stated:
Jolley, ¶ 10, 38 P.3d at 1078 (quoting Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578).
[¶ 26] That the case before us is one that presents an issue of great public importance and interest is a determination readily made without reference to personal beliefs or philosophies. As a starting point, the case concerns a fundamental constitutional right, the First Amendment right to free speech. See RM, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d at 871 (addressing fundamental right to education as issue of great public importance in an otherwise moot student expulsion case); Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578 (addressing fundamental right to vote as issue of great public importance). Moreover, the constitutional issue is presented in the context of a topic that is of public interest and importance on both a national level and local level, that is, the topic of abortion rights.
[¶ 27] Among the issues in the United States today that are divisive and inflammatory, none is so hotly debated as that of abortion. On the national stage, the issue is front and center in the halls of Congress, on the political campaign trail, and in many state legislatures. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Democrats Attack Romney for Saying He Wanted to "Get Rid" of Planned Parenthood, CBS News Political Hotsheet (March 14, 2012); Lucy Madson, Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell Signs Virginia Ultrasound Bill, CBS News Political Hotsheet (March 7, 2012) (Virginia bill requiring women to undergo transvaginal ultrasound prior to having abortion "sparked national debate this month"); Stephanie Condon, Abortion Funding Showdown Escalates, CBS News Political Hotsheet (Feb. 8, 2011). On the Wyoming stage, the issue continues to attract attention in the state legislature and in the state capitol
[¶ 28] The issue of abortion has polarized mainstream political parties and energized all manner of public interest groups who align with pro-life advocates on the one side and pro-choice advocates on the other. Each side seeks to influence public opinion and to attain legal support for its position—in legislative halls and in the courts. The debate is ubiquitous and abundant. The topic of abortion incites like no other issue in this country today. It divides the nation, our religions, our families, our politics, and our society. The issue arouses deep passions that find full expression in open and public debate that gives all participants the satisfaction of a fair and full hearing.
[¶ 29] Without resort to personal beliefs or philosophies, the case presently before this Court presents issues of great public interest and importance. They are issues that deserve a ruling from this Court.
[¶ 30] In addition to finding this case reviewable under the foregoing exception to mootness, we also find this dispute to be one that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness, two requirements must be met: "First, the duration of the challenged action must be too short for completion of litigation prior to its cessation or expiration. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again." MEO, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d at 1154 (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir.1987)).
[¶ 31] In this case, there can be little question that the first requirement is met. The TRO expired within twenty-one hours of its issuance, and a temporary restraining order by rule must expire within ten days. See W.R.C.P. 65(b). As the Texas Supreme Court explained, temporary restraining orders that impose prior restraints on free speech at planned events are by nature short-lived and evade review. Iranian Muslim Org. v. City of San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex.1981). It is likely that if the controversy were to arise again, an order would issue, the event would pass, and the order would expire, again concluding the controversy before full litigation of the matter could run its course.
[¶ 32] The second prong of the test considers whether a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. The United States Supreme Court has in some circumstances held that the burden is on the party asserting mootness to "establish that there is no reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated." Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72, 104 S.Ct. 373, 375, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983); see also Wilkinson v. Forst, 591 F.Supp. 403, 410 (D.Conn.1984) (defendant failed to meet mootness burden in challenge to expired court order requiring weapons search of persons attending KKK rally where defendant failed to show no reasonable likelihood of additional rallies). In other cases, the Supreme Court has placed the burden on the party asserting a live controversy to make the required showing. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (plaintiff must show "he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality").
[¶ 33] In either allocation of the burden of proof, the Court's decisions have varied on what is required to show that a dispute is capable of repetition:
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 592, 602 n. 6, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988).
[¶ 34] Our Court has not assigned the burden of proof on this question or established a showing more stringent than the requirement that the record establish a "reasonable expectation" that the dispute is capable of repetition. See, e.g., MEO, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d at 1154 (recurrence of dispute "not outside the realm of reasonable possibility"); Penny, ¶ 3, 120 P.3d at 157 (issue that "may continue to arise"); Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs for Sublette Cty. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶ 18, 55 P.3d 714, 720 (Wyo.2002) (issue "likely to arise in other cases"); Andrews, 671 P.2d at 1245 (question "could be of a continuing nature"). We believe that in this case it would be particularly unfair to place the burden on OSA to make a record that the dispute is capable of repetition, given that the TRO was issued in this matter without notice to OSA or an opportunity for it to be heard. There was simply no point in these proceedings at which OSA could have submitted evidence on the likelihood that this dispute is capable of repetition.
[¶ 35] We are satisfied, based on the evidence in the limited record before this Court, that there is a reasonable expectation this dispute will recur. The affidavit supporting the Town's Petition for the TRO stated that OSA targeted Jackson, Wyoming, with a stated intention to "[s]hut down the last abortionist in Wyoming." The affidavit also reported incidents from which it may be inferred, and from which the Town has argued, that the group intentionally targets children as the audience for its graphic demonstrations. These facts, even without specifically identified OSA plans to again protest in Jackson, establish a reasonable expectation, beyond mere speculation, that OSA will continue its efforts and approach in Jackson, Wyoming. See Christian Knights of Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 370-71 (D.C.Cir. 1992) (finding it unnecessary to have evidence of definite Klan plans to march in the district—mootness exception does not require imminent repetition, and "[w]e are confident that eventually [the KKK] will make its way into the city again").
[¶ 36] On the question of how the Town might respond under the same or similar circumstances, we have no indication it would approach the situation differently. The record contains no evidence, and this Court has received no information, either at oral argument or through additional submissions, that the Town has taken formal steps to adopt measures which would address similar future
[¶ 37] The Supreme Court reasoned similarly in the First Amendment case of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). In that case, a Nebraska state trial judge, to protect a multiple-murder defendant's right to a fair trial, entered a restraining order barring news media from publishing or broadcasting alleged confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers or other third parties other than the news media itself. Id. at 542, 96 S.Ct. at 2795. By the time the First Amendment challenge to that order reached the Supreme Court, the defendant had been convicted and the order had expired. The Court nonetheless held that the case was not moot:
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 546-47, 96 S.Ct. at 2797; see also Iranian Muslim Org., 615 S.W.2d at 209 (because city policy on parade permits remains same and the Iranian protest issue continues, controversy remains viable notwithstanding fact that date and conditions for which parade permits were requested no longer exist).
[¶ 38] The decision in Nebraska Press Association demonstrates the Supreme Court's willingness to relax, or dispense with altogether, the requirement that the dispute capable of repetition must involve the same complaining party. As one commentator observed:
[¶ 39] Our Court likewise, in considering whether a dispute is likely to recur, has not strictly adhered to the requirement that it be the same complaining party who may be subjected to the same action again. See Merchant, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d at 863 (considering otherwise moot equal protection claim based on "significant potential for this controversy to arise again and affect other Wyoming prisoners"); Exxon Mobil, ¶ 18, 55 P.3d at 720 (central issue of administrative appeal by a county "likely to arise in other cases, and would evade review if we determined that the case was moot"). As noted above, we find the record supports a reasonable expectation that the dispute between OSA and the Town will be repeated. In the absence of the same dispute between the same parties, however, we nonetheless believe this is a dispute that will recur, and regardless of the parties to that dispute, it will present the same fundamental legal issues for review.
[¶ 40] This case presents not only a dispute that is capable of repetition and evading review, but also a question of great public importance. It concerns the constitutional right of free speech and presents itself in the context of a policy debate of significant and continuing public interest. Under these circumstances, we hold that the case is not moot and is one on which this Court has the power to rule and should rule. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 179, 89 S.Ct. 347, 350, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (case not mooted by expiration of ten-day order given that white supremacist protests continued and question persisted "whether, by what processes, and to what extent the authorities of the local governments may restrict petitioners in their rallies and public meetings").
[¶ 41] The Town argues as an additional basis to dispose of OSA's appeal that a temporary restraining order is not an appealable order. In support of this argument, it cites to a Colorado case reasoning that such orders are of "short duration and terminate with the ruling of the preliminary injunction so that an immediate appeal is not necessary to protect the rights of the parties." See O'Connell v. Colorado State Bank, 633 P.2d 511, 513 (Colo.App.1981). We find this rationale unpersuasive under the present facts and reject the Town's suggestion that the TRO is not an appealable order.
[¶ 42] Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure defines an appealable order as:
W.R.A.P. 1.05. Consistent with Rule 1.05, this Court has held that "[g]enerally a judgment or order which determines the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration is final and appealable." Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo.1980); see also Goodman v. Voss, 2011 WY 33, ¶ 22, 248 P.3d 1120, 1126 (Wyo.2011) (order final and appealable where merits of controversy determined).
[¶ 43] The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar circumstance when it was presented with an appeal from a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of a Roman Catholic mass during a municipal festival. Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.1990). The Seventh Circuit found the order appealable, explaining:
Id. at 1477.
[¶ 44] We understand that the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order may not be a final order in the context of on-going litigation. Under those circumstances, both parties would have a further opportunity to be heard at the preliminary injunction stage of proceedings, and the record would likely be better developed for review. In this case, however, there was no on-going litigation. This action began with the ex parte Petition and ended with the issuance of the ex parte TRO, and the TRO is therefore a final appealable order. See Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656, 661 n. 2 (10th Cir.1984) (temporary restraining order is appealable when acts as a final order).
[¶ 45] The remaining jurisdictional issues have been raised by OSA as challenges to the district court's original jurisdiction to issue the TRO. OSA contests the standing of the Town to seek a TRO, as well as the district court's subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
[¶ 46] OSA asserts that the Town did not have, or even allege, a tangible interest in this matter sufficient to confer standing to bring its Petition, and that the proper plaintiff in this action would have been a parent or guardian of one of the potentially impacted children. We disagree.
[¶ 47] "Standing is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy." In re Guardianship of Parkhurst, 2010 WY 155, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 961, 965 (Wyo.2010) (quoting In re Adoption of CF, 2005 WY 118, ¶ 39, 120 P.3d 992, 1004-05 (Wyo.2005)). This Court has described the standing doctrine and its requirements as follows:
Parkhurst, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d at 965 (quoting CF, ¶ 39, 120 P.3d at 1004-05).
[¶ 49] We conclude that the Town's asserted interest in protecting its youth gave it a sufficient stake in the outcome of these proceedings to allow it standing to bring its Petition.
[¶ 50] OSA contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the Petition because the Town did not file a complaint invoking the court's jurisdiction before it filed its Petition requesting the TRO. We conclude that the filing of a complaint is not an essential predicate to a petition or motion for a temporary restraining order and thus reject this jurisdictional challenge.
[¶ 51] The appropriate procedure for seeking a temporary restraining order has been described by one prominent authority as follows:
11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949 (2d ed. 2011) (footnotes omitted).
[¶ 52] We agree that while the better practice would be to have a complaint on file before a motion or petition for temporary restraining order is submitted, the lack of a complaint does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to act. See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2nd Cir.1966) (although it would have been better to file a complaint along with motion and affidavit, court could treat affidavit as complaint); Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 777 F.Supp. 1349, 1352 (N.D.Tex.1991) (exigent circumstances allow injunction to precede filing of suit); Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F.Supp. 945, 950 n. 5 (N.D.Cal.1985) ("Owing to the peculiar function of the preliminary injunction, it is not necessary that the pleadings be perfected, or even that a complaint be filed, before the order issues.").
[¶ 53] As its final jurisdictional argument, OSA asserts the TRO is void because the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over it. We find that OSA waived any objection to personal jurisdiction and therefore also reject this challenge to the district court's jurisdiction.
[¶ 54] This Court has held as follows concerning personal jurisdiction and its effect on a court's judgment:
JAG v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2002 WY 158, ¶ 13, 56 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo.2002); see also Walton v. State ex rel. Wood, 2002 WY 108, ¶ 10, 50 P.3d 693, 697 (Wyo.2002) (failure to question personal jurisdiction at earliest opportunity deemed a waiver); CRB v. State, 974 P.2d 931, 936 (Wyo.1999) (party must assert lack of personal jurisdiction by W.R.C.P. 12(b) motion or its equivalent).
[¶ 55] OSA did not file a motion to dismiss the Petition. Instead, it filed a Notice of Appeal and entered an appearance through its counsel. OSA then filed a brief with this Court, in which it requested a remand to district court for consideration of an affirmative award of damages against the Town. With these actions, OSA waived any objection to personal jurisdiction and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. See In re Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wyo.1998) ("When a defendant voluntarily appears without questioning the court's personal jurisdiction over him, his appearance is the equivalent of proper service of process."); Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo.1995) (defendant's filing of brief on appeal affirmatively invoked jurisdiction of court); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 977-78 (Wyo.1974) (defendant waived objection to personal jurisdiction when he sought damages as affirmative relief).
[¶ 56] We turn next to OSA's contention that the TRO violated its free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[¶ 57] The First Amendment "reflects a `profound national commitment' to the principle that `debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.'" Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1162, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). "[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." United States v. Stevens, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1707, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002)); see also Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011). Its general protections are not, however, absolute. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 573, 122 S.Ct. at 1707.
[¶ 58] Through its numerous decisions interpreting First Amendment protections, the United States Supreme Court has outlined the required considerations for determining whether a government restriction on speech is permissible. That determination turns on the type of restraint, the type of speech, the forum in which the speech is restrained, and the nature of the restriction, that is, whether
[¶ 59] These considerations dictate the level of scrutiny that must be used in determining whether a government restriction on speech is constitutional, and we thus consider each in turn as they apply to the TRO issued in this case.
[¶ 60] The term prior restraint is used to describe "administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur." Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 2771, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993) (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03 at 4-14 (1984)). A temporary restraining order is a classic example of a prior restraint. Id.
[¶ 61] The Supreme Court has described prior restraints on speech as "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 2803. Any prior restraint on expression bears "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); see also CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317, 114 S.Ct. 912, 914, 127 L.Ed.2d 358 (1994); Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130, 112 S.Ct. at 2401; Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 1161 n. 13, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980).
[¶ 62] The Supreme Court has explained the presumption against the validity of prior restraints, and the preference for other restrictions:
Vance, 445 U.S. at 316 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. at 1161 n. 13 (citations omitted). Along these lines, the Court has further commented:
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 2803 (footnote omitted); see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764, 114 S.Ct. at 2524 (injunctions carry greater risk of censorship and discrimination than do ordinances).
[¶ 63] The TRO issued in this case acted as a prior restraint on OSA's speech, and there is thus a heavy presumption against its constitutionality.
[¶ 64] The First Amendment does not offer all speech the same degree of protection. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444-45, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1973, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The degree of protection differs depending on whether the speech is political interest/public
[¶ 65] Speech on public issues or matters of public concern "are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment." Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 377, 117 S.Ct. 855, 867, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). The Supreme Court has consistently observed the central importance of protecting speech on public issues, which has led it to scrutinize carefully any restrictions on public issue picketing. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318, 108 S.Ct. at 1162; United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-81, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1708-09, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).
[¶ 66] Speech directed at abortion policy is public issue speech. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714-15, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2488-89, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377, 117 S.Ct. at 867; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762-64, 114 S.Ct. at 2523-25. "The fact that the messages conveyed by those communications may be offensive to their recipients does not deprive them of constitutional protection." Hill, 530 U.S. at 715, 120 S.Ct. at 2488-89. "As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide `adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'" Boos, 485 U.S. at 322, 108 S.Ct. at 1164 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56, 108 S.Ct. 876, 882, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988)).
[¶ 67] OSA's speech is protected public issue speech, and based on these precedents, any restriction on that speech must be carefully scrutinized. We find that this level of protection must likewise be extended to the graphic photographs OSA chooses to use in its demonstrations. The Supreme Court has stated it will not expand the categories of speech that receive limited protection, such as obscenity, unless there is a demonstration of a longstanding American tradition forbidding such speech or expressive conduct. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1585. In Stevens, a 2010 decision, the Court declined to decrease the level of protection to be given depictions of animal cruelty. Id. Even more recently, in 2011, the Court rejected an argument for decreased protection of video games available commercially to young children that contain violent images, including sexual assault and murder. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2734. The Stevens Court explained:
Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
[¶ 68] Streets, sidewalks and parks have long been held to be the traditional fora for First Amendment protected speech, and government entities are strictly limited in their ability to restrict speech in those areas.
Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 469, 129 S.Ct. at 1132.
[¶ 69] The TRO in this case restricted OSA's speech in the Town Square—a park, and on the surrounding streets and sidewalks. The Town nonetheless contends that the TRO did not apply to a traditional public forum because it has enacted a resolution that allows it to issue permits regulating the Town Square's use for larger events. We disagree that the Town's regulation changed, or could change, the nature of the park as a traditional public forum. See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 278 n. 9 (3rd Cir.2010) ("The issuance of a permit to use a public forum does not transform its status as a public forum."); see also Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 1641, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998) ("[T]raditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government's intent.").
[¶ 70] The Town Square and the surrounding streets and sidewalk are traditional public fora, and the TRO's restrictions are therefore subject to the heightened scrutiny applicable to that fora.
[¶ 71] The final consideration in determining the level of scrutiny that must be used in determining the TRO's constitutionality is the nature of the TRO's restriction, that is, whether the TRO is content-neutral or content-based. Content-neutral restrictions are those that are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320, 108 S.Ct. at 1163. A restriction that seeks to protect or shield an audience from disturbing or distressing aspects of speech is content-based. Id. at 321, 108 S.Ct. at 1164; see also Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2733-34. Likewise, a restriction that is based on an audience's hostile response to the speech is content-based regulation. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134-35, 112 S.Ct. at 2403-04.
[¶ 72] The Town sought the TRO and the district court issued the TRO to protect children from the images contained in OSA's demonstration materials and to address the concern that there may be a hostile response to the OSA demonstrations. The restrictions were thus content-based.
[¶ 73] Because the TRO imposes content-based restrictions on OSA's speech in a traditional public forum, the TRO is subject to strict scrutiny.
Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2738.
[¶ 74] We understand the Town of Jackson faced a difficult situation with the
[¶ 75] The strict scrutiny level of analysis requires that the restriction on speech be justified by a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn to serve that interest. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2738; Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 358-59, 129 S.Ct. 1093, 1098, 172 L.Ed.2d 770 (2009); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2549-50, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). The government bears the burden of establishing its compelling government interest and that the interest cannot be served in a less restrictive manner. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428-29, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 1219, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). The Supreme Court has explained the government's burden as follows:
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816-17, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1888, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000).
[¶ 76] The Town cites the need to protect children attending the Boy Scout Elk Fest from disturbing images of aborted and dismembered fetuses as its compelling government interest in support of the TRO. It further asserts an interest in preserving the peace, order, safety and tranquility of the Boy Scout Elk Fest.
[¶ 77] The need to protect the psychological well being of children has been recognized as a compelling government interest. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638, 88 S.Ct. at 1280. The Supreme Court, however, has declared that that interest is not without boundary.
Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2735-36.
[¶ 78] Our concern in the present case is not with the general proposition that protecting youth is a compelling government interest, but is instead with the record. The record contains no evidence concerning the injury or potential injury to children from viewing the images displayed by OSA, and of particular importance in the context of the request for injunctive relief, evidence of irreparable harm to the children. The affidavit of Lt. Gilliam describes the contact OSA had with youth in the community and describes the materials OSA showed to the young audience, but it does not describe how those materials impacted them, or could impact them. In the absence of such evidence, the government has not made its required showing of an "actual problem" in need of solving. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2738; Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816, 120 S.Ct. at 1888.
[¶ 79] We turn then to the Town's concerns with a breach of the peace. While a government does have a recognized interest in maintaining peace in its community and at its events, the Supreme Court has held that this is not a basis to proscribe speech, unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2542, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). The Court has observed:
Texas, 491 U.S. at 408-09, 109 S.Ct. at 2542 (footnote omitted).
[¶ 80] The evidence the Town submitted concerning the potential for a breach of peace as a result of the OSA demonstrations was an incident in which a counter-protestor tried to run over an OSA member with his vehicle. Lt. Gilliam's affidavit reported that this individual was arrested and charged. The record contains no evidence that OSA engages in speech that is directed at inciting violence or is likely to produce imminent lawless action, and in the absence of such evidence, we conclude that prohibiting OSA's speech is not supported.
[¶ 81] Assuming the Town had established a compelling interest in the protection of its youth and in maintaining the peace, we would nonetheless find the TRO unconstitutional. The Town has not met its burden of establishing that the TRO ban was necessary to serve the Town's interest and that less restrictive measures would not have been adequate.
[¶ 82] Our first concern is with the geographical scope of the TRO. It prohibited OSA from displaying its graphic posters not just in the Town Square, but also on the streets and sidewalks two blocks in each direction of the park. This is a broader "buffer zone" than the Supreme Court has approved even when the restriction creating the buffer zone is content-neutral and thus subjected to a less demanding level of scrutiny. See Sclienck, 519 U.S. 357, 117 S.Ct. 855 (upholding content-neutral buffer zone of fifteen feet from clinic entrance to allow patients to freely enter and exit clinic, but overturning floating fifteen-foot buffer zone around patients as too restrictive of free speech rights); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-75, 114 S.Ct. at 2527-30 (upholding 36-foot content-neutral buffer zone around clinic, but overturning 300-foot content-neutral buffer zone around staff residences as too broad even though targeted picketing of personal residences is less protected and the government's interest in protecting the privacy of a residence is an interest of the highest order).
[¶ 83] We find an Eighth Circuit decision holding unconstitutional a content-neutral ordinance that banned protesting within fifty feet of church property thirty minutes before or after scheduled services or events to be instructive. Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir.1999). In that case, the court reasoned as follows:
Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180-81.
[¶ 84] As in Olmer, the Town has not shown that the breadth of the TRO, prohibiting the displays by the OSA within two blocks in any direction from the Town Square, was necessary to serve the Town's interest of protecting its children from disturbing images. The same is true of the Town's interest in maintaining the peace. The Town has not shown that intervention by law enforcement, as was used in the one instance of violence cited by the Town, is not adequate to maintain the peace. See Grider v. Abramson, 994 F.Supp. 840, 845 (W.D.Ky. 1998) (employing police procedures to address concerns of violence between competing rallies).
[¶ 85] In the absence of this required showing, the Town has not met its burden under the strict scrutiny analysis.
[¶ 86] As a final matter, we address OSA's contentions that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the TRO without providing OSA notice and an opportunity to be heard, and without requiring a security bond.
[¶ 87] Rule 65(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure governs the issuance of temporary restraining orders. It allows the issuance of an order without notice to the adverse party under limited circumstances:
W.R.C.P. 65(b).
[¶ 88] The Supreme Court has condemned the issuance of ex parte orders restraining speech, stating:
Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180, 89 S.Ct. at 351. The Town contends that the present case and Carroll are wholly distinct from each other and Carroll should therefore not be controlling. In particular, the Town cites the greater amount of time the town in Carroll had to respond to the demonstration activities and the length of the injunction that issued. Because of these contentions, we find it helpful to set forth the facts of Carroll in some detail to determine whether the case's holding should be applied here.
[¶ 89] In Carroll, a white supremacist group held a rally near the courthouse steps in the town of Princess Anne, Maryland. 393 U.S. at 176, 89 S.Ct. at 349. The speeches were described as aggressively and militantly racist and "as both a provocation to the Negroes in the crowd and an incitement to the whites." Id. During the speeches, one speaker announced that the rally would continue the next evening, and he called for the audience to return:
Id. at 176 n. 1, 89 S.Ct. at 349 n. 1.
[¶ 90] That next day, town officials applied for and received an ex parte restraining order, with no effort to notify or informally communicate with the defendants. Id. at 177, 89 S.Ct. at 349. The order restrained the white supremacist group for ten days from holding rallies or meetings in the county "which will tend to disturb and endanger the citizens of the County." Id. As a result, the scheduled rally was not held. Id. After a trial, the injunction was extended for another ten months. Id. A state appellate court reversed the ten-month injunction and upheld the ten-day restraining order, which the group then appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 177, 89 S.Ct. at 350.
[¶ 91] In reversing entry of the ten-day order for failure to provide the required notice, the Supreme Court explained its concerns with ex parte orders restraining free speech.
Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183-84, 89 S.Ct. at 352-53 (footnotes omitted).
[¶ 92] In finding no factual basis to support the issuance of an ex parte restraining order, the Supreme Court in Carroll stated:
Id. at 182-83, 89 S.Ct. at 352 (footnote omitted).
[¶ 93] We are unable to discern any reason that the holding in Carroll should not apply to this case. The Town's suggestion that the town of Princess Anne had more time to react to the situation and thus provide notice to the defendants is not borne out by the facts of the case or the Supreme Court's analysis of those facts. Nor was the Court's analysis affected by the length of the restraining order. We thus conclude that the rule announced in Carroll does apply to this case. That is, a temporary restraining order that operates to restrict free speech rights may only issue ex parte where a "showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate." See Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180, 89 S.Ct. at 351.
[¶ 94] In this case, that showing cannot be made. Based on the affidavit of Lieutenant Gilliam, it is apparent that he was in contact with and able to reach members of OSA when necessary. And the Town's Petition does not suggest otherwise. Counsel for the Town did not allege that it was impossible to serve or otherwise notify OSA of the Town's Petition. Instead, counsel stated that she made no attempt to notify OSA due to "the hostility of the current situation, contrary position of Defendant representatives and the immediate need for injunctive relief." We reject this as a basis to avoid the obligation to notify OSA. First, the record contains no evidence of hostility by OSA or its members. Indeed, Lt. Gilliam described the demeanor of OSA's representatives as cordial and matter-of-fact. Additionally, in every application for a temporary restraining order there is going to be a disagreement between the parties and a need for immediate relief. These facts, standing alone, cannot justify a failure to notify the adverse party.
[¶ 95] As we noted above, we are not unsympathetic to the Town's concerns or the limited time within which it had to address those concerns. The First Amendment, however, is fiercely protective of free speech rights and demands close adherence to its procedural safeguards when a government seeks to restrict those rights. In this case, the Town's efforts, while commendable in attempting to work cooperatively and courteously with OSA, fell short of the First Amendment's strict requirements.
[¶ 96] We thus hold that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the TRO without notice to OSA and an opportunity for OSA to be heard.
[¶ 97] OSA contends the district court also erred in failing to require that the Town post a security for any damages OSA might incur as a result of the TRO. The Town responds that Rule 65(c) should be read to require a bond only if the district court finds a likelihood of harm to the defendant.
[¶ 98] We agree with the Town that under Rule 65(c), if the district court finds no likelihood of harm to the defendant, no bond is necessary. We nonetheless find error because the rule requires that the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, expressly consider whether there is a likelihood of harm and whether security must be posted, and in this case, the district court did not give consideration to these matters. See Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern Pipeline Co., 825 F.2d 1461, 1462 (10th Cir.1987) (citing Reinders Bros. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44 (7th Cir.1980); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir.1978); System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1145-46 (3rd Cir.1977)) (court must consider whether bond is required and make findings otherwise order is "unsupportable"); see also Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir.1964) (if court finds no likelihood of harm to defendant, bond is not required).
[¶ 99] It is unlikely that OSA suffered damages as a result of the twelve-hour TRO issued by the district court, and during oral argument to this Court, OSA was unable to articulate any particular damage it may have suffered. The district court was nonetheless required to make findings as to the likelihood of harm to OSA, and it abused its discretion in issuing the TRO without those required findings.
[¶ 100] The district court issued a TRO that, however well-intentioned, violated the strict protections of the First Amendment and the requirements of Rule 65 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. We therefore must reverse the decision issuing the TRO.
GOLDEN, J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, C.J., files a dissenting opinion in which HILL, J., joins.
KITE, Chief Justice, dissenting, in which HILL, J., joins.
[¶ 101] I write separately because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that this case is not moot because it falls within the special category of disputes that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Were I writing the majority opinion, I would conclude that the case is moot because no showing was made that it falls within that special category.
[¶ 102] In Turner v. Rogers, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011), the Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether a right to counsel existed in civil contempt proceedings to enforce child support orders. The respondent, mother, asserted the case was moot because the petitioner, father, had completed his sentence for contempt prior to seeking the writ. The Supreme Court concluded the case was not moot because it fell within a special category of disputes that are "capable of repetition, while evading review." Id. at 2509. A dispute falls into this special category, the Court stated, and remains live if "(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again." Id., citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) (per curiam).
[¶ 103] Applying the first prong of this test, the Court concluded the challenged action, father's imprisonment, was in its duration too short to be fully litigated through the state courts and arrive in the United States Supreme Court before he had completed the
Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2515.
[¶ 104] Unlike Turner, where the Court had before it numerous facts showing that father would again be subjected to imprisonment for civil contempt, no showing was made here that it is reasonably likely Operation Save America will again be subjected to a court order restraining it from assembling or displaying posters in Jackson. "The capable-of repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality." L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), citing DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1707, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). For there to be a "reasonable expectation" that a party will be subjected to the same action again, that event must be a "demonstrated probability." Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982); Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149, 96 S.Ct. at 348. As the Court said in DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. at 1707 n. 5,
No evidence was presented in this case that Operation Save America will return to Jackson and attempt to assemble or display posters during another scheduled event such as the Boy Scouts expo and auction or, in the event it does, that the town will again file for a temporary restraining order without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. The capable of repetition prong necessary for a dispute to fall within the special category of cases has not been satisfied. I would conclude, therefore, that the case is moot.
We likewise agree with the Town that it has the right, through the use of content-neutral restrictions and subject to the reasonable time, manner and place requirement, to restrict speech in areas reserved for other uses. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649-52, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2565-66, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (state's interest in protecting the safety and convenience of persons using public forum and need to maintain orderly movement of crowd justified content-neutral, firstcome, first-serve process of allocating designated space and limiting dissemination of written materials to that area); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98, 92 S.Ct. at 2292 ("Conflicting demands on the same place may compel the State to make choices among potential users and uses."); Sanders v. United States, 518 F.Supp. 728, 730 (D.D.C.1981) (government may impose content-neutral restriction on speech in an area reserved for another use).
