KITE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Max Maxfield, the Secretary of State for the State of Wyoming, filed a declaratory judgment action in district court challenging the constitutionality of Wyoming's term limit statute. The State responded, asserting among other claims, that Mr. Maxfield's complaint does not present a justiciable controversy and, in any event, the statute is constitutional. We accepted certification of the issues from the district court and hold that Mr. Maxfield has presented a justiciable controversy and the statute is unconstitutional.
[¶ 2] The district court certified the following questions to this Court:
[¶ 3] Article 4, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution states:
[¶ 4] Article 6 contains the following provisions pertaining to electors:
[¶ 5] In the general election in 1992, the voters approved Initiative Number 1, § 1 which limited the number of terms that could be served in public office by certain elected officials. As amended by the legislature, the initiative provided in relevant part as follows:
[¶ 6] In Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 88 P.3d 1050 (Wyo.2004), this Court found subsections (ii) and (iii) to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, in 2005 the legislature repealed those subsections and the provision now reads:
[¶ 7] Mr. Maxfield was first elected Secretary of State in 2006 and began serving his term in 2007. He was elected to serve a second term in 2010, and began serving that term in 2011. His current term ends in January 2015.
[¶ 8] In September of 2011, Mr. Maxfield filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in district court seeking to have Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103(a) (LexisNexis 2011) declared unconstitutional. He asserted that the statute prohibits him from running for another term even though he meets all the constitutional qualifications for holding the office of secretary of state. He argued the qualifications set forth in the constitution are exclusive, and in modifying and imposing qualifications for office beyond those contained in the constitution, the statute is unconstitutional. As support for his position, he relied heavily on this Court's holding in Cathcart that § 22-5-103(ii) and (iii), the provisions placing term limits on state legislators, were unconstitutional. He further asserted that he has a fundamental right to seek election to the office of secretary of state which the statute prevents him from exercising.
[¶ 9] In its answer to the complaint, the State asserted the qualifications set forth in the constitution are not exclusive and the electorate and legislature acted within their authority in imposing additional statutory qualifications. The State also asserted Mr. Maxfield's complaint did not present a justiciable controversy because he did not state that he actually intends to seek election to a third term; therefore, he had not shown that the statute affects an existing and genuine right. Arguing that Mr. Maxfield's claim is theoretical because the remedy he seeks is for a potential future harm that is not certain to occur, the State contended he did not have standing to pursue his claim.
[¶ 10] Subsequently, Mr. Maxfield and the State filed motions asking the district court to certify the issues to this Court. They also filed statements of fact and certified questions of law. Ultimately, they were able to reach an agreement as to the certified questions and filed a stipulated motion and proposed certification order. The district court signed the order certifying the questions to this Court. We accepted the certification.
[¶ 11] The State asserts Mr. Maxfield's complaint does not present a justiciable controversy. If the State is correct, the action must be dismissed. We begin our discussion, therefore, by considering whether Mr. Maxfield presents a justiciable controversy.
[¶ 12] Mr. Maxfield's argument that his complaint presents a justiciable controversy is twofold. First, he asserts his claim concerns a matter of great public importance and so it is exempt from the traditional justiciability analysis. Second, he argues that even if it is not a matter of great public importance, his complaint presents a justiciable controversy because he has an existing, actual constitutional right to seek public office and § 22-5-103 prevents him from exercising that right.
[¶ 13] Mr. Maxfield filed his complaint pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115 (LexisNexis 2011). Section 1-37-102 of the Act gives Wyoming courts the power to "declare rights, status and other legal relations." Section 1-37-103 provides:
Mr. Maxfield contends his right under the Wyoming Constitution to seek a third term as secretary of state is affected by § 22-5-103. His complaint, therefore, falls within
[¶ 14] We have said:
Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, ¶ 17, 273 P.3d 1065, 1071 (Wyo.2012). The elements necessary to establish a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act are:
Id.; Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo.1974).
[¶ 15] Mr. Maxfield contends that his complaint is exempt from these requirements because it concerns issues of great public importance, i.e., his right to be a candidate for secretary of state and the right of Wyoming citizens to vote for him. Indeed, this Court has said "the right to seek election for a public office for which [one has] proper qualifications ... is a valuable and fundamental right" and "is certainly a matter of `great overriding public moment.'" Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578-79, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24. More recently we said the right is "so fundamental and of such great public interest and importance that the rule requiring the existence of a justiciable controversy should be relaxed or should not be followed." Cathcart, ¶ 27, 88 P.3d at 1062.
[¶ 16] While recognizing our precedent, the State maintains that whether or not the issue is one of great public importance Mr. Maxfield still must show the right he seeks to have declared is actual and existing as opposed to theoretical and uncertain. Absent a declaration by Mr. Maxfield that he intends to run for secretary of state in 2014, the State asserts this Court cannot decide the issue presented because we are without authority to determine future or contingent rights. The State cites White v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo.1979) and Anderson v. Wyo. Dev. Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 342 (1944) as support for its assertion.
[¶ 17] In White, the state land board issued a ruling that a private landowner who leased water rights on state school lands had a preferential right to purchase the lands at an upcoming public auction. The board later brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that its ruling was incorrect and the landowner did not have a preferential right. This Court held there was no justiciable controversy because the board was seeking an advisory opinion about the validity of its own ruling. The Court also found there was no justiciable controversy because the auction had not yet been held and thus it was not certain the landowner would attempt to exercise any preferential right he might have.
[¶ 18] No claim was made in White that the matter at issue in the declaratory judgment action was one of great public importance; therefore, the Court did not consider whether the rule requiring an actual existing harm should be relaxed in that context. Likewise, in Anderson, there was no discussion of the courts' power to decide issues of great public importance in cases where a
[¶ 19] The state motor vehicle division revoked Mr. Eastwood's driver's license after he was involved in a car crash. Id. at 819. He brought an action in district court to set aside the statute allowing revocation on the ground that it violated due process and other rights guaranteed by the state constitution. Id. at 818. The district court certified the question to this Court. By the time the question was before this Court, the revocation period had expired, making the question moot. Id. at 819. The Court concluded the question was of sufficient public interest and importance and answered the question anyway. Id.
[¶ 20] Subsequently, in Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578, this Court reiterated that the requirement of a justiciable controversy can be relaxed in cases involving matters of great public interest or importance. The attorney general's office had issued an opinion denying, or at least placing in question, the right of a sitting full term state senator to be a candidate for governor. Id. at 576. Finding that the attorney general opinion interfered "with the free and untrammeled choice of every elector in the State of Wyoming," the Court concluded the matter was of great public importance justifying relaxing the justiciable controversy requirement. Id. at 578. See also Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Langdon, 626 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Wyo.1981), reiterating that "a case may be decided absent a present factual controversy, where there is an ongoing dispute of great public importance" but concluding the issue presented there was not of sufficient public importance to justify considering it. Most recently, in Cathcart, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d at 1058, we reaffirmed that the justiciable controversy requirement can be relaxed where matters of great public interest or importance are involved.
[¶ 21] Given this precedent, we reject the State's argument that whether or not the issue is one of great public importance Mr. Maxfield still must show the right he seeks to have declared is actual and existing as opposed to theoretical and uncertain. Mr. Maxfield's claim that § 22-5-103 violates his right to be a candidate for secretary of state involves a matter of great public importance and the usual requirements for showing a justiciable controversy may be relaxed.
[¶ 22] Even without our conclusion that Mr. Maxfield's complaint involves a matter of great public importance, we would hold that the case presents a justiciable controversy. This Court recognized in Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578, and reiterated in Cathcart, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d at 1058, that qualified persons have a genuine and existing right to seek election for public office. Contrary to the State's assertion, the holding in those cases did not depend on the legislators having stated their intention to run. In Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 576, one of the senators alleged only that the attorney general opinion at issue cast doubt about whether he would be allowed to run. There was no suggestion by this Court that he had to allege that he actually intended to run in order to present a justiciable controversy. Similarly, the Court in Cathcart did not discuss in the context of determining whether a justiciable controversy existed any necessity of alleging an intention to run for public office. The actual and existing right recognized in those cases as presenting a justiciable controversy is the right of a qualified person to seek election to public office.
[¶ 23] As further support for its assertion that Mr. Maxfield's claim is too theoretical and uncertain to establish a justiciable controversy the State cites William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, 206 P.3d 722 (Wyo.2009). There, private landowners brought a declaratory judgment action against the state engineer and state board of control, challenging their administration of underground water produced and stored as part of coal bed methane extraction. We held the controversy was not justiciable in part because,
Id., ¶ 2, 206 P.3d at 725.
[¶ 24] Unlike the landowners in West Ranch, Mr. Maxfield has alleged a connection between a specific statutory provision — § 22-5-103 — and the particular harm he will suffer — being precluded from seeking a third term as secretary of state. Under the four element test this Court adopted in Brimmer, Mr. Maxfield's complaint presents a justiciable controversy. He has served two terms as secretary of state for Wyoming and meets the qualifications contained in the state constitution for holding that office. That is, he has attained the age of twenty-five years, is a citizen of the United States and has the qualifications required of state electors. His right to seek a third term as secretary of state is impeded by § 22-5-103. A judgment declaring that § 22-5-103 is, or is not, constitutional will operate to determine whether he is entitled to seek a third term as secretary of state and will act as a final judgment upon his rights. The proceedings are genuinely adverse in character — Mr. Maxfield is prohibited by § 22-5-103 from seeking a third term. Mr. Maxfield's complaint satisfies the four elements necessary to establish a justiciable controversy. Brimmer, supra.
[¶ 25] Mr. Maxfield contends the qualifications for statewide elected officials found in the Wyoming Constitution are exclusive; therefore, § 22-5-103, which modifies and adds to those qualifications, is unconstitutional. He cites Cathcart as support for his assertion. The State maintains the statute is constitutional. It asserts Article 4 § 11 sets forth the minimum qualifications for statewide elected officials and nothing in its language suggests the framers intended those qualifications to be exclusive or to preclude the citizens or the legislature from imposing additional qualifications. The State submits that Cathcart was wrongly decided.
[¶ 26] Because Cathcart is at the heart of the present controversy, we begin our discussion there. In Cathcart, two incumbent state legislators and two electors challenged the constitutionality of § 22-5-103, arguing that it improperly added qualifications for holding legislative office to the qualifications found in art. 6, §§ 2 and 15, art. 3, § 2 and art. 4, §§ 2 and 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. Cathcart, ¶ 1, 88 P.3d at 1054. Countering those arguments, the State argued the rights reserved to the people in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 1 are superior to the rights enumerated in the constitution, meaning the people and their representatives have the authority to enact laws adding to or changing the rights set forth in the constitution. Id., ¶ 42, 88 P.3d at 1066. The State also asserted the qualifications for holding legislative office enumerated in the constitution were intended to be minimum rather than exclusive requirements which could be modified by legislative enactment.
[¶ 27] The Court concluded that while Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 1 recognizes the ultimate right of the people to "alter, reform or abolish" government, that right must be exercised in accordance with the constitution. Id., ¶ 44, 88 P.3d at 1067. Reading art. 1, § 1 in pari materia with other relevant constitutional provisions, we concluded the framers intended that laws altering the government would be adopted only through constitutionally established means. Id. The means agreed upon in the constitution is the amendment process. Id.
[¶ 28] We then considered the nature and extent of the legislature's authority under the Wyoming Constitution. Id., ¶ 45, 88 P.3d at 1067. We cited precedent establishing that rather than granting power, the constitution limits legislative power and authorizes the enactment of only such laws as are not expressly or inferentially prohibited by the constitution. Id. We then considered whether the provisions enumerating the qualifications for holding legislative office were ambiguous.
[¶ 29] In answering that question, we looked to Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 3 which states:
(Emphasis added.) We concluded the highlighted language "leaves no doubt that
[¶ 30] In Cathcart, the State argued the constitution was silent as to term limits; if the framers intended term limits to be the exclusive province of the constitution they would have said so; and interpreting the constitutional provisions as exclusive would be reading words into the constitution that were not there. We rejected those arguments in part because the constitution as originally written by the framers was not silent concerning term limits. As it appeared originally, Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 11 stated:
(Emphasis added.) Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 11 (1890) (amended 1982). Considering that provision as drafted by the framers, we said:
Cathcart, ¶ 58, 88 P.3d at 1072.
[¶ 31] The State concedes there is no meaningful distinction between the provisions we considered in Cathcart and those before us today and that it can succeed on its claim only if Cathcart is reversed. Urging such reversal, the State reiterates many of the same arguments it made in Cathcart. It argues, for example, that art. 4, § 11 sets out only minimum qualifications for holding one of the state-wide offices and is ambiguous about whether those qualifications are exclusive. It asserts that if the framers had intended the enumerated qualifications to be exclusive and to preclude the adoption of additional qualifications, they would have said so. It asserts the framers knew how to write exclusive provisions as shown in art. 6, § 2, which provides that everyone who satisfies the enumerated qualifications can vote and then expressly limits those who cannot
[¶ 32] The State submits the Court in Cathcart "did not fully account for the heart and spirit of our constitution" as stated in art. 1, § 1:
The State urges the Court to consider this provision in deciding whether the framers really intended to preclude the people from setting qualifications for office by limiting the qualifications exclusively to those enumerated in the constitution.
[¶ 33] Finally, the State asserts the Court in Cathcart did not consider the following introductory language of art. 1, § 3: "Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is made sure only through political equality...." The State submits this language makes clear the framers' intent to ensure equality in natural and civil rights by ensuring political equality. In ensuring equality, the State argues, the framers were focused on groups of citizens with certain immutable characteristics who needed protection. Thus, as reflected in art. 1 § 3, the framers sought to ensure that laws affecting political rights and privileges "shall be without distinction of race, color, sex...." The State argues the framers intended the provision to preclude laws depriving a person entirely from holding office for reasons like race, color, sex or other conditions relating to a person, not an office. Because § 22-5-103 precludes Mr. Maxfield only from holding the specific office of secretary of state, and not his general right to hold office, and because it does so based upon the fact that he has already served two terms as secretary of state and not on the basis of his race, color, sex or any other condition relating to his person, the State contends it does not violate the constitution.
[¶ 34] The express, unambiguous language of art. 1, § 3 convinces us otherwise. The words "or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual competency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction" could not be more clear. Together, art. 1, § 3 and art. 6, § 1 clearly provide that laws affecting the political rights and privileges of Wyoming citizens, such as the right to hold public office, may not be based upon race, color, sex or
[¶ 35] We conclude today, as we did in Cathcart, that art. 1, § 3 prohibits the passage of any law conditioning political rights and privileges upon a circumstance or condition other than those enumerated. One such political right is the right to hold office. Because § 22-5-103 conditions the right to hold the office of secretary of state on incumbency, which is not one of the circumstances or conditions enumerated, it is unconstitutional.
[¶ 36] We further conclude Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 11 is unambiguous. To be elected to serve as secretary of state, one must be at least twenty-five years old, a citizen of the United States and have the qualifications of state electors. The provisions setting forth the qualifications of state electors are equally unambiguous. Pursuant to art. 6, § 2, electors must be citizens of the United States, at least twenty-one years old, have resided in Wyoming for one year and have resided in the county of residence sixty days before the election. Art. 6, § 5 also provides that only United States citizens are qualified to be electors in Wyoming. Art. 6, § 19 prohibits those holding certain federal offices
[¶ 37] In Cathcart, we expressly did not address the constitutionality of the term limit statute as it affects the qualifications for secretary of state, auditor, treasurer and superintendent of public instruction found in Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 11, nor did we address the qualifications for governor found in Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 2. Citing the rule that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned only by a party whose rights are affected by it, and that a party cannot assert that a statute is unconstitutional as to other persons, we limited our holding to the provisions involving legislative qualifications. Cathcart, ¶ 37, 88 P.3d at 1064. Similarly, we limit our holding in the present case to the question of whether § 22-5-103 is unconstitutional as it relates to the qualifications found in Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 11. We decline Mr. Maxfield's invitation to address the qualifications for governor.
[¶ 38] Answering the first certified question, we hold that Mr. Maxfield has presented a justiciable controversy. Answering the second certified question, we hold that § 22-5-103(a)(i), the term limit law for statewide elected officials, is unconstitutional with respect to the offices of secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and superintendent of public instruction and the qualifications for those offices provided by the Wyoming Constitution are exclusive.
