KITE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] The district court granted Angela S. Bagley (Wife) a divorce, divided the parties' property, determined child custody, and ordered Cameron Kdell Bagley (Husband) to pay child support. Both parties appealed. Wife claims the district court erred by refusing to award her child support for their adult disabled daughter because Wife was already receiving Social Security benefits for her. She also argues the district court erred in determining Husband's net income for the purposes of calculating child support for the parties' two minor children. Husband, on the other hand, contests the district court's division of the parties' property.
[¶ 2] We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
[¶ 3] Wife presents the following issues on appeal:
Husband asserts those aspects of the district court's rulings were correct, but queries:
Wife contends the district court's division of the marital property was correct.
[¶ 4] The parties have been married twice and this appeal results from the second divorce action. Over the course of their relationship, four children were born. At the time of the divorce trial, the two older children were adults; however, the parties' adult daughter was disabled. In a separate action, Wife was appointed the daughter's guardian and conservator, and she received $674 per month in Social Security benefits on behalf of the daughter. The other two children were sixteen and nine years old, respectively. The teenager had been splitting his time between his parents, and they agreed that arrangement should continue. Wife sought primary residential custody of the youngest child, while Husband sought a shared custody arrangement. There was also considerable disagreement between the parties as to the amount of Husband's net income for purposes of calculating child support and the value and proper distribution of marital property.
[¶ 5] After a trial, the district court ruled that no child support was necessary for the adult daughter because she received Social Security benefits; the parties' arrangement regarding the teenager should continue; Wife should have primary custody of the youngest child; Wife was entitled to a few items of property and $149,500 as payment for her share of the remainder of the marital property and Husband's child support obligation was $751.50 per month based upon a finding that Husband's monthly net income was $5,333. Both parties appealed. We will provide additional facts in the discussion of the various issues below.
[¶ 6] In general, determinations concerning child support are left to the district court's sound discretion. Verheydt v. Verheydt, 2013 WY 25, ¶ 19, 295 P.3d 1245, 1250 (Wyo.2013); Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, ¶ 13, 199 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Wyo. 2009). Consequently, we will not disturb the district court's decision unless it abused its discretion. "In determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred, our core inquiry is the reasonableness of the district court's decision." Verheydt, ¶ 19, 295 P.3d at 1250; Hanson v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98, ¶ 14, 280 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Wyo.2012).
[¶ 7] "We will not disturb a property division in a divorce case, except on clear grounds, as the trial court is usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge the parties' needs and the merits of their positions." Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 (Wyo.2003), citing Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo.1980); Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 526 (Wyo.1961). If our review requires an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision, "we afford to the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party." Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted). When interpretation of statutory language is required to resolve an issue, our standard of review is de novo. Egan v. Egan, 2010 WY 164, ¶ 7, 244 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo.2010); Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Assoc., 2010 WY 120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo.2010).
[¶ 8] The parties' daughter was nineteen years old at the time of the trial. She suffers from autism with mild mental retardation and is, therefore, incapable of
[¶ 9] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-101(a) (LexisNexis 2013) states: "Upon becoming eighteen (18) years of age, an individual reaches the age of majority and as an adult acquires all rights and responsibilities granted or imposed by statute or common law, except as otherwise provided by law." Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-313(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2013), a parent's child support obligation terminates when the child reaches the age of majority. However, we have applied Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204 (LexisNexis 2013) to order child support to continue after the age of majority in certain circumstances. Section 14-2-204 states in relevant part:
In Cossette v. Cossette, 2003 WY 107, ¶¶ 10-13, 76 P.3d 795, 797-98 (Wyo.2003), we ruled that § 14-2-204 gave the district court authority to order a divorced father to continue paying child support for an adult child who was still attending high school. Consistent with Cossette and § 14-2-204, parents are obligated to continue to support a disabled adult child in accordance with the child support guidelines. See also, Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48 (Wyo.1982) (applying an earlier statute, this Court confirmed a general legislative intent to provide support for adult disabled children).
[¶ 10] The parties' nineteen year old daughter was entitled to support because she was both disabled and still attending high school. The question is how the Social Security benefits should be addressed in calculating the support, if at all. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 (LexisNexis 2013) provides that the presumptive child support amount, as calculated under the child support guidelines in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 (LexisNexis 2013), should apply unless there is a valid basis for deviation. Wife claims the district court, therefore, erred by failing to determine the presumptive child support amount from the guidelines and make findings to justify a deviation if appropriate. We agree that the plain language of the statutes requires the child support be calculated under the guidelines. The district court erred by failing to follow the procedure set out in the statutes.
[¶ 11] Wife also asserts § 20-2-307(d) (LexisNexis 2013) prohibits a deviation from the presumptive child support amount on the basis that the daughter is receiving Social Security benefits. That section states in pertinent part:
Section 20-2-307(d). Wife argues "[i]t stands to reason that if the court is prohibited from approving a downward deviation from the presumed child support amounts by agreement, then surely the court is statutorily prohibited from making a downward deviation from the presumed child support amount in its own decree resulting from a contested case."
[¶ 12] Wife did not, however, develop this argument before the district court. There
[¶ 13] Wife provides no relevant authority that the actual benefits she receives on behalf of the daughter may not be taken into account in the child support calculation. In fact, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-201 (LexisNexis 2013) provides:
Although the daughter is not a minor and her income is not from property she owns but rather from benefits she receives, the clear intent of § 14-2-201 is to allow other sources of income available to a child to be used for her care. In addition, § 20-2-304(e)
[¶ 14] We, therefore, reverse and remand for the district court to determine the amount of support under the presumptive child support guidelines and consider whether or not a downward deviation under § 20-2-307 or a set off under another provision is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
[¶ 15] Under our guidelines, the presumptive child support amount is calculated using the parents' net income. Section 20-2-304.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2013). Income means:
Section 20-2-303(a)(ii). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308(b) (LexisNexis 2013) states that "[s]uitable documentation of current earnings includes but is not limited to pay stubs, employer statements, or receipts and expenses if self employed." (Emphasis added.)
[¶ 16] The evidence presented in this case regarding Husband's income and reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expenses was very confusing. Possibly because of the perplexing state of the evidence, the district court chose to determine Husband's net income by using the amount he tithed to his church, assuming it was ten percent of his net income. The district court's determination of Husband's net income stated:
[¶ 17] As the district court recognized, Husband did not provide typical documentation of his income or expenses, in part because he was self-employed. Husband was associated with at least two businesses, Bagley Construction LLC and Bagley Horseshoeing. From the record, it appears that he paid all of his expenses, personal and business, out of the business accounts. His bookkeeping was informal and provided little detail on the actual nature of the expenses. Husband was unable to justify some of his 2011 "business" expenses at trial. For instance, he did not classify any fuel expenses as "personal" until October of 2011. On cross examination, he conceded he had done some personal driving earlier in the year. Husband also classified a pay check to himself as a business expense but apparently did not otherwise declare it as income. In addition, Husband conceded other items which were classified as business were actually "part" personal.
[¶ 18] While we understand the district court's frustration with the state of the record, it was, nonetheless, obligated to determine Husband's net income using the statutory definitions of "income" and "net income" in § 20-2-303(a)(ii) and (iii), rather than the arbitrary number associated with the amount he tithed to his church. Because the district court did not follow the statutory requirements, we reverse and remand for a proper determination of Husband's net income. Starting with Father's gross income, which seems to be fairly clear from the record, the court will deduct all "reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expenses" in accordance with § 20-2-303(a)(ii). In determining which business expenses should be deducted from his gross income, the district court must keep in mind "[t]he burden of proving that an expense was a reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expense lies with the party seeking the deduction." Watson v. Watson, 2002 WY 180, ¶ 16, 60 P.3d 124, 128 (Wyo.2002). After calculating his income by subtracting the legitimate business expenses, other expenses identified in the definition of "net income" in § 20-2-303(a)(iii), such as personal income taxes, social security taxes, etc., may be deducted.
[¶ 19] The district court ordered Husband to pay Wife $149,500 for her share in their property, including $89,000 for her contribution to the family home, $5,000 for Bagley Construction, $20,000 for Bagley Horseshoeing and $25,500 for her share of their personal property. These amounts add up to $139,500 rather than the $149,500 awarded. We assume this is a simple mathematical error, and order that it be corrected. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114(a) (LexisNexis 2013) states the rule for disposing of a couple's marital property in a divorce:
[¶ 20] Husband claims the district court erred by ordering him to pay Wife $89,000 for her share of the family home, valued at $250,000, because they did not own the land on which the home was constructed. Husband, Wife, their children, and members of Husband's family built a log home on land held in Husband's grandmother's trust, which was administered by his father, Kdell Bagley (Kdell). Prior to moving into the home, Husband, Wife and the children had lived in a small trailer home and in Husband's parents' home while they were gone to China. Kdell borrowed $53,000 secured by the equity in his own home and used those funds to partially construct the parties' new home.
[¶ 21] In addition, Wife's parents sold Husband and his business associates some property at a discounted price which was resold at a profit and Husband's share of the proceeds was $89,000. Wife and her mother both testified that the purpose of the sale at the discounted price was to allow the parties to resell the property and use the proceeds to construct their new home. Husband, however, testified that the proceeds went to pay other bills, rather than to construct the home.
[¶ 22] At the time of trial, the parties had constructed a $250,000 home on someone else's land, which was possibly subject to a $53,000 debt. Husband lived in the home and paid Kdell $500 per month toward the loan, although there was no evidence as to the current principal balance of the debt. Husband's position was that he owned no interest in the house because there was no guarantee that the land would ever be transferred to him. Kdell agreed with that assessment. He responded to the district judge's questions as follows:
Kdell testified, however, that two of his children (Husband's siblings) had already received gifts of land from the trust on which they had built houses. He explained:
Considering the testimony, the district court ruled:
[¶ 23] Husband claims the parties had no ownership in the land and, consequently, no ownership interest in the home. He argues, therefore, that the possibility that he would receive the land as a gift in the future was a "mere expectancy" that cannot be distributed in a divorce action. As we stated earlier, the court is statutorily obligated to dispose of the marital property "as appears just and equitable." "[W]hen a court divides property incidental to the granting of a divorce, [it] is limited by the amount of property in its hands for division and a mere expectancy is not subject to division." Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367, 370 (Wyo.1970). The Storm ruling was made in the context of an inheritance which the husband received after the divorce trial but before the final decree was entered. In that case, the inherited property was not part of the marital estate and the wife was not entitled to any part of it. Id.
[¶ 24] The case at bar is different from Storm. While Husband and Wife may have a "mere expectancy" of receiving title to the land upon which the house is built sometime in the future, they already invested other marital property in the house. The district court seemed to believe they might have some claim against the trust for the value of the improvement if the property is not deeded. We need not delve into any potential claims, however, as the district court's decision focused on the contribution to the marital residence which came through Wife's family.
[¶ 25] Section 20-2-114(a) allows the district court to take into consideration "the party through whom the property was acquired" and the condition each party will be left in after the divorce when making a just and equitable property distribution. Wife and her mother both testified that the purpose of the discounted sale of the property to Husband and his associates was to provide Husband and Wife with a means of earning money to finance their own home. In Walters v. Walters, 2011 WY 41, ¶ 10, 249 P.3d 214, 222 (Wyo.2011), we approved a property distribution which included an order that the wife was required to repay the husband for funds he expended from his own assets on marital property. Similarly, in this case, Wife is the party through whom the $89,000 was acquired, and the district court was justified in considering Wife's contribution in its property division.
[¶ 26] We agree with the district court's finding that it really makes no difference whether the $89,000 contribution from Wife's family was used directly to pay for the house construction or, as Husband testified, it was used for other needs, because that effectively freed other family income to be used on the house. The district court found that Wife cared for the children and home and "did not participate in the family business, so she knows little of the financial aspects of the family." This finding is amply supported by the record. Wife testified that Husband provided her with money from either the Bagley Construction or Bagley Horseshoeing account each month to pay their bills, but she had no actual control over any other aspect of the family's finances. With regard to the money from the sale of her parents' land, Wife believed the money would be deposited in an account belonging to her and Husband to be used to finish the house, but it was, instead, deposited in the Bagley Construction account, over which she had no control. Wife testified she believed the parties owned the house and the evidence demonstrated that it was insured in their names. She understood that the land would eventually be deeded to Husband as part of his inheritance. However, when she asked Husband about the details of the transaction she was told to mind her own business.
[¶ 28] Husband argues, nonetheless, that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay Wife for the contribution because there are no marital assets to use to make the payment. In other words, he claims the court "divided" property which did not exist. We have, in other cases, approved cash awards to spouses despite the fact that there was insufficient cash in the marital estate to cover the judgment.
[¶ 29] Finally, Husband argues the district court effectively granted Wife an improper award of alimony. In Muller v. Muller, 838 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo.1992), we recognized that although alimony or spousal support is statutorily authorized, it generally is not favored. Section 20-2-114. It is preferable to account for the relative equities of the parties in the property distribution. See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 334 (Wyo.1998); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo.1984). The district court in this case specifically stated it was not awarding alimony but adjusting the equities between the parties with a property settlement. There was nothing improper about its decision.
[¶ 30] Husband asserts the district court erred by valuing his horseshoeing business, Bagley Horseshoeing, at $40,000. The district court ruled:
[¶ 31] In accordance with our standard of review, Wife, as the prevailing party, is entitled to every favorable inference from the evidence and we do not give any consideration
[¶ 32] Husband claims the district court could not rely on Wife's speculation to value the business. In Walters, ¶ 25, 249 P.3d at 229-30, we reversed a district court's contempt award because the amount was not based on any evidence or measurable formula. This case is different. While Wife's "guess" is not overwhelming evidence, it was based upon some history and, more importantly, was not contradicted in any way at trial by Husband. In fact, he does not direct us to any evidence he offered as to the value of the horseshoeing business. On this dismal record, we must defer to the district court's findings.
[¶ 33] Husband claims the district court erred by failing to provide an appropriate schedule of payments for the money judgment awarded to Wife. He cites Bailey v. Bailey, 954 P.2d 962 (Wyo.1998), in support of his assertion. In Bailey, 954 P.2d at 966, this Court ruled the district court's order that a large cash award to wife had to be paid within 180 days from the date of the judgment was unfair and an abuse of discretion. The Bailey decision is inapposite. In that case, we were concerned about the short time period the husband had to pay the wife in full. Here, there is no time period imposed — only the provision that the judgment will bear interest at 10% per annum until satisfied. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
[¶ 34] Affirmed, as corrected, in part and reversed and remanded in part.
