HILL, Justice.

[¶ 1] A jury convicted Appellant Shey Bruce of manslaughter and battery of a household member. Mr. Bruce appeals his manslaughter conviction, claiming that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal in relation to the charge of second degree murder and his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal in relation to the manslaughter conviction. He also alleges error in the district court's denial of his motion for new trial, its refusal to instruct the jury on his claim of self defense, and its admission of the deceased victim's 911 call. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Mr. Bruce states the issues on appeal as follows:

FACTS

[¶ 3] Charles Darrell Laster and Lavena Laster were originally married in 1996, divorced in 2004, remarried in 2007, and separated again, though not divorced, in 2010. In 2010, the Lasters were living in Shoshoni, Wyoming, and when they separated, Mrs. Laster moved to Mesa, Arizona. Mrs. Laster lived in Arizona until March 2013, when Mr. Laster bought her a bus ticket so she could return to Shoshoni. When Mrs. Laster returned to Shoshoni, she stayed with her daughter, Teri Hughes. Mr. and Mrs. Laster did not reunite, but they remained good friends.

[¶ 4] While living in Arizona, Mrs. Laster met and began dating Mr. Bruce. The two were still dating when Mrs. Laster returned to Shoshoni, and Mr. Bruce joined Mrs. Laster in Shoshoni about a month after her return. Mrs. Laster and Mr. Bruce initially stayed with Mrs. Laster's daughter, Teri Hughes, and then eventually moved into a one-bedroom home. Mrs. Laster and Mr. Bruce could not afford to rent the home, so Mrs. Laster asked Mr. Laster to rent the home for them, which he agreed to do. Mrs. Laster and Mr. Bruce did odd jobs around Mr. Laster's place to help work off the rent.

[¶ 5] On May 14, 2013, Mrs. Laster was at Mr. Laster's home drinking. She had been drinking for several days and described herself as a "blackout drinker." At about 9:00 or 9:30 that morning, Mr. Bruce had coffee at the home of Mr. Laster's next door neighbor, Norman Hughes, who is also the father-in-law of Teri Hughes. Mr. Hughes reported that Mr. Bruce was intoxicated, and angry and distraught, because Mr. Laster had put his hand on Mrs. Laster's leg. Mr. Bruce spent the day at Mr. Hughes' home and went back and forth between the homes of Mr. Laster and Mr. Hughes several times throughout the day.

[¶ 6] At one point, Mr. Bruce told Mr. Hughes that he was going to return to Arizona and he had a check that Mr. Laster had given him to pay for his return trip. Mr. Bruce left Mr. Hughes' home at about 5:00 or 6:00 on the evening of May 14th, and Mr. Hughes described his departure:

[¶ 7] At some point after Mr. Bruce left, Mrs. Laster looked outside Mr. Laster's home and saw that Mr. Laster's blue Mustang was gone. Mrs. Laster reported this to Mr. Laster, and in response, Mr. Laster loaded two rifles and two handguns. When Mrs. Laster asked Mr. Laster why he was preparing the firearms, Mr. Laster replied that he was "not going to take an ass whooping from a young man."1 The Lasters placed the firearms in Mr. Laster's truck and drove over to the home that Mrs. Laster and Mr. Bruce shared. Once there, Mrs. Laster saw that the keys were in the Mustang, so she did not go in the home and instead got in the car and followed Mr. Laster back to his home.

[¶ 8] Upon their return to Mr. Laster's home, the Lasters carried the firearms into the home and into the back bedroom. Mr. Laster unloaded the firearms, leaving the ammunition in a pile on the floor. At some point, while the Lasters were in the back bedroom, Mr. Bruce entered the home and came to the back bedroom. Mr. Bruce had a beer bottle in his hand, and he and Mr. Laster talked about something that Mrs. Laster could not recall. Mr. Bruce then struck Mrs. Laster on the left side of her head with the beer bottle, rendering her unconscious.

[¶ 9] When Mrs. Laster awoke, Mr. Laster was on the telephone speaking to a 911 dispatcher. During Mr. Laster's conversation with the 911 dispatcher he reported that he needed medical assistance for his wife. Mr. Laster also reported to the 911 dispatcher that he also was hit a couple of times on the head with a beer bottle, that "Shay something" was the person who assaulted him, and that the assailant was no longer in the home.

[¶ 10] EMTs and a deputy sheriff responded to the call for emergency assistance. The deputy reported that both the Lasters were intoxicated, with slurred speech, but Mr. Laster was not at a "high level" of intoxication for him. Mrs. Laster was unwilling to speak with the sheriff's deputy, and when the deputy began to interview Mr. Laster, she told him not to tell the deputy anything. The deputy separated the Lasters, and Mr. Laster then cooperated and answered the deputy's questions, speaking with him for about ten or fifteen minutes. Mrs. Laster initially refused any medical treatment, but then when the deputy threatened to take her into protective custody, she agreed to be examined by the EMTs but refused transport to the hospital.

[¶ 11] Teri Hughes arrived at Mr. Laster's home about ten minutes after the sheriff's deputy. Ms. Hughes went to the home because she was worried about her mother (Mrs. Laster) and her stepfather (Mr. Laster). Ms. Hughes reported that she was worried because at about 10:30 that evening, Mr. Bruce had called her from the Fast Lane convenience store and asked her to pick him up. When Ms. Hughes arrived to pick up Mr. Bruce, he was upset, intoxicated, and had a beer in his hand. Mr. Bruce told Ms. Hughes that Mr. Laster hit him with a Maglite flashlight, and he had her feel the lump on the back of his head. Ms. Hughes testified:

[¶ 12] When Ms. Hughes arrived at Mr. Laster's home, she checked on both of her parents. Mrs. Laster would not let Ms. Hughes look closely at her, but she was able to closely check over Mr. Laster. She found no blood, no bruises, and no scratches, and she found that he looked and seemed fine. She then returned home.

[¶ 13] After the EMTs, the deputy sheriff, and Ms. Hughes left Mr. Laster's home, Mrs. Laster fell asleep on a futon in Mr. Laster's home. When she awoke in the morning, the morning of May 15, 2013, she found Mr. Laster face down on the floor and unresponsive. EMTs eventually arrived and confirmed that Mr. Laster was deceased. An autopsy revealed that Mr. Laster died of a right subdural hemorrhage caused by blunt force trauma.

[¶ 14] On May 16, 2013, the State filed a criminal information charging Mr. Bruce with second degree murder in the death of Mr. Laster and domestic violence battery for the injury to Mrs. Laster. Mr. Bruce was bound over to the district court, where he pled not guilty to both charges.

[¶ 15] On October 10, 2013, the State filed a motion requesting a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the 911 call Mr. Laster made on the evening of May 14, 2013. Mr. Bruce responded with a motion in limine to exclude the 911 call on the ground that admitting the evidence would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Following a hearing on the issue, the district court ruled that the 911 call was admissible hearsay and that admission of the call would not violate Mr. Bruce's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

[¶ 16] A jury trial was held on November 18-22, 2013. At the close of the State's case, Mr. Bruce made a motion for judgment of acquittal on the second degree murder charge, and the district court denied the motion. Mr. Bruce renewed his motion at the close of all evidence, and the court again denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Bruce not guilty on the second degree murder charge, guilty on the lesser included offense of manslaughter, and guilty on the domestic violence battery charge. On December 6, 2013, Mr. Bruce filed a written motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial based on the jury's exposure to inadmissible hearsay testimony and on the district court's failure to instruct the jury on self defense. The court denied Mr. Bruce's motion.

[¶ 17] On March 14, 2014, the district court entered its Judgment and Sentence. The court sentenced Mr. Bruce to a prison term of four to ten years on the manslaughter count and 180 days on the domestic violence battery count, both sentences to be served concurrently. Mr. Bruce thereafter timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 18] Mr. Bruce challenges his manslaughter conviction on several grounds: 1) the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the second degree murder charge; 2) sufficiency of the evidence to support his manslaughter conviction; 3) the district court's denial of his new trial motion based on the jury's exposure to inadmissible hearsay; 4) the district court's failure to give the jury a self defense instruction; and 5) the district court's admission of Mr. Laster's 911 call. Mr. Bruce presents the district court's ruling on the 911 call as his last assignment of error, but because our resolution of that issue may affect our consideration of the other alleged errors, we will address the ruling on the 911 call first and then turn to Mr. Bruce's remaining arguments.

A. Admissibility of 911 Call

[¶ 19] In arguing that the district court erred in admitting Mr. Laster's 911 call, Mr. Bruce contends that the evidence was admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and was inadmissible hearsay. Whether an evidentiary ruling violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Counts v. State, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 31, 277 P.3d 94, 104 (Wyo.2012); Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo.2004). We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion:

Ortiz v. State, 2014 WY 60, ¶ 67, 326 P.3d 883, 897 (Wyo.2014).

[¶ 20] While Mr. Bruce's arguments are directed at particular isolated statements within Mr. Laster's 911 call, the context of those statements is important in our consideration of both of Mr. Bruce's arguments. We therefore set forth the entire text of the call against which we will consider Mr. Bruce's confrontation clause and hearsay arguments.

RECORDING ENDS

1. Sixth Amendment Ruling

[¶ 21] The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him, and owing to that protection, testimonial statements of a witness absent from trial are admissible "only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); see also Anderson v. State, 2014 WY 13, ¶ 27, 317 P.3d 1108, 1118 (Wyo.2014); Rodriguez v. State, 2010 WY 170, ¶ 9, 245 P.3d 818, 823 (Wyo.2010); Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 16, 166 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo.2007). Stated as a three-part test, the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause bars the admission of an out-of-court statement if the statement is testimonial, the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant concerning the statement. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374; Szymanski, ¶ 16, 166 P.3d at 883.

[¶ 22] In Crawford, the Supreme Court abandoned consideration of a statement's reliability in determining admissibility under the Sixth Amendment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-62, 124 S.Ct. at 1369-70; Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 77, 169 P.3d 512, 533-34 (Wyo.2007); Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶ 18, 98 P.3d 172, 177-78 (Wyo.2004). The Court explained that while the reliability of a statement may be a proper consideration in the application of hearsay rules, it is not a factor to be considered in determining the admissibility of a statement under the Sixth Amendment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-62, 124 S.Ct. at 1369-70. If the statement is testimonial, "the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Id., 541 U.S. at 69, 124 S.Ct. at 1374; see also Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 34, 193 P.3d 203, 211-12 (Wyo.2008); Teniente, ¶ 77, 169 P.3d at 535; Vigil, ¶ 18, 98 P.3d at 179.

[¶ 23] The Supreme Court did not in Crawford attempt to fully define the difference between a testimonial statement and a non-testimonial statement. The Court stated:

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374 (footnote omitted).

[¶ 24] A couple of years after Crawford, the Supreme Court did flesh out the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements:

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also Szymanski, ¶ 18, 166 P.3d at 884.

[¶ 25] In Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), the Supreme Court again addressed the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements. The Court did not expand the definition but provided guidance in making the determination, emphasizing in particular the objective nature of the inquiry:

Bryant, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1156 (footnote omitted).

[¶ 26] The Court explained why the existence of an ongoing emergency is an important factor in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation.

Bryant, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1157 (footnote and internal citations omitted).

[¶ 27] To summarize, the Sixth Amendment analysis requires an objective determination of an interrogation's "primary purpose" based on the circumstances in which the interrogation takes place as well as the statements and actions of both the interrogator and the declarant. Bryant, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1156. In particular, the inquiry must determine whether the interrogation's primary purpose was to enable assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, or whether it was "to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1165 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266); see also Bush, ¶ 39, 193 P.3d at 213; Szymanski, ¶ 16, 166 P.3d at 883.

[¶ 28] Against this backdrop, we review the district court's ruling on the admissibility of Mr. Laster's 911 call under the Sixth Amendment. In ruling that the 911 call was admissible, the court found that it was a non-testimonial statement. The court reasoned:

[¶ 29] Mr. Bruce takes issue with the district court's ruling, arguing there was no ongoing emergency because the call was made over twenty minutes after the assault, and that if there were an emergency, it was Mrs. Laster's emergency, not Mr. Laster's emergency. Mr. Bruce further argues the district court placed too much emphasis on the dispatcher's statements and too little on Mr. Laster's statements. We reject Mr. Bruce's arguments and agree with the district court that Mr. Laster's statements during the 911 call were non-testimonial.

[¶ 30] First, we reject Mr. Bruce's contention that there was not an on-going emergency. On the recording of the 911 call, Mrs. Laster can be heard, sometimes speaking to the dispatcher and sometimes in the background, repeatedly stating that her head hurts, crying ouch, moaning and making sounds of distress. For his part, Mr. Laster repeatedly expresses his concern with Mrs. Laster's severe headaches and expresses a concern that she may have blood clots in her head. While the assault itself had ended, the medical emergency clearly continued.

[¶ 31] We likewise find no merit in the assertion that the emergency should be rejected as a consideration in the Sixth Amendment analysis because the emergency was Mrs. Laster's and not Mr. Laster's. The focus of the "primary purpose" analysis is on the reason for the interrogation and the reason for the declarant's statements. While there may be instances where a declarant's relationship to an emergency may call into question the declarant's motives and whether the declarant's statements stemmed from a true concern regarding the emergency, the record does not support that suggestion in this case. Mrs. Laster testified that when she regained consciousness, Mr. Laster was already making the 911 call to get her help. Additionally, during the call, Mr. Laster tried to have Mrs. Laster provide information to the dispatcher, only to have Mrs. Laster persist in moaning and making other sounds of distress. Throughout the call, Mr. Laster spoke words of comfort to his wife and repeatedly expressed his concern with his wife's head injury and the need to get her medical help. Given the circumstances and Mr. Laster's focus on his wife's condition, we conclude that Mr. Laster made the 911 call because his wife was unable to make the call for herself, because he was concerned about his wife's head injury, and because he was seeking immediate medical assistance for his wife. The on-going emergency is thus properly considered in the Sixth Amendment analysis even though it was Mrs. Laster's injuries that created the emergency and Mr. Laster who made the 911 call.

[¶ 32] Finally, we address Mr. Bruce's contention that the district court placed too much emphasis on the dispatcher's questions and not enough emphasis on Mr. Laster's statements. In particular, Mr. Bruce argues that Mr. Laster's statements in which he reported he was "hit a couple times in the head with a beer bottle," and in which he identified his assailant as "Shay something," were testimonial statements and should have been redacted from the recording and transcript presented to the jury. We reject this argument because it fails to take into consideration the entirety of the circumstances in which the statements were made.

[¶ 33] In holding that the statements of both the interrogator and the declarant must be considered when conducting a Sixth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court did not suggest that the questions and statements of each participant be considered in isolation. The Court instead emphasized the need to consider the questions and statements together and in light of the circumstances.

Bryant, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1160-62 (footnote omitted).

[¶ 34] As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the focus of the Sixth Amendment analysis is not on the statements in isolation but on the purpose of those statements as framed by their context. The fact then that Mr. Laster reported what happened to him and the identity of his assailant does not make those statements testimonial. The statements are testimonial only if the context in which they were made indicates that Mr. Laster's purpose in making the statements was to assist in a future prosecution, and in this case, we find nothing to suggest such a purpose.

[¶ 35] First, none of the dispatcher's questions were prosecution oriented. The dispatcher's questions were directed at determining the location of the emergency, the nature of the injury, and whether the assailant was still in the area. These are questions directed at enabling the dispatcher to send assistance efficiently and safely. As the district court observed, the dispatcher at no time asked for the identity of the assailant. Nor did the dispatcher ask questions concerning what happened during the altercation or why. Thus, none of the dispatcher's questions would have signaled Mr. Laster that he was providing information for a future prosecution.

[¶ 36] The remaining circumstances likewise weigh against finding any prosecutorial purpose in Mr. Laster's statements. Throughout most of the call, Mrs. Laster can be heard in the background yelling and moaning in pain. Mr. Laster himself was hard of hearing, intoxicated, and was dividing his attention between the dispatcher and his wife. For example, immediately after Mr. Laster told the dispatcher that he had been hit a couple of times with a beer bottle, he turned his attention to Mrs. Laster and told her he was trying to get her help as quick as he could. Likewise, shortly after identifying "Shay something" as his assailant, Mr. Laster again spoke to his wife, telling her that help was on the way.

[¶ 37] It is clear from the entirety of the 911 call, that Mr. Laster did not call 911 to report that a crime had been committed. He called to seek medical assistance for his wife. When Mr. Laster's statements concerning what happened to him and the identity of his assailant are considered in the context in which they were made, we cannot conclude that those statements changed the primary purpose of the call from seeking medical assistance to assisting in a future prosecution. Mr. Laster's focus throughout the call remained on his wife's injury, and to the extent he provided additional information, the circumstances indicate that the information was offered "reflexively," with no change in Mr. Laster's purpose for providing the information. See Bryant, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1161.

[¶ 38] The facts of this case are analogous to those addressed by the Supreme Court in Bryant. In Bryant, the victim suffered a mortal gunshot wound at one location and then drove to a gas station. Bryant, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1150. Police officers reported to the gas station and found the victim on the ground bleeding from the wound. Id. The officers asked the victim, "what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred." Id. The victim answered those questions, and the Court held the victim's statements were admissible because the purpose of the interrogation was to address an ongoing emergency. Id. The Court explained, in part:

Bryant, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1165-66 (footnotes and internal citations omitted).

[¶ 39] For the foregoing reasons, we find Mr. Laster's statements during the 911 call were non-testimonial and that the district court did not err in ruling that the statements were admissible under the Sixth Amendment. Having concluded that the district court did not err in its Sixth Amendment analysis, we next consider whether the court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Laster's statements over Mr. Bruce's hearsay objections. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 821, 126 S.Ct. at 2273 (though not barred by the confrontation clause, non-testimonial statement remains subject to traditional limitations on hearsay evidence); see also Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, ¶ 24, 252 P.3d 435, 441, n. 2 (Wyo.2011); Bush, ¶ 28, 193 P.3d at 210.

2. Hearsay Ruling

[¶ 40] Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." W.R.E. 801(c). "Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because they are made outside of court and, therefore, presumed to be unreliable." Moore v. State, 2013 WY 146, ¶ 11, 313 P.3d 505, 508 (Wyo.2013) (citing W.R.E. 802). A hearsay statement is admissible, however, if it fits a recognized exception to the hearsay rule making it sufficiently reliable. Moore, ¶ 11, 313 P.3d at 508 (citing Sanders v. State, 7 P.3d 891, 895 (Wyo.2000); Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358, 361-62 (Wyo.1996)).

[¶ 41] The State argued that Mr. Laster's statements were admissible under four hearsay exceptions: 1) as a present sense impression under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(1); 2) as an excited utterance under W.R.E. 803(2); 3) as a statement of then-existing mental, emotional or physical condition under W.R.E. 803(3); and 4), under the catchall provisions of W.R.E. 804(b)(6). The district court found the statements admissible "under a combination of the exceptions to the hearsay rule," and specifically referred to the exception for statements concerning then-existing mental and emotional condition and the Rule 804(b)(6) catchall. Though not specifically cited by the district court as an exception applicable to Mr. Laster's statements, the district court's analysis also incorporated a discussion of the present sense impression exception.

[¶ 42] We disagree with the district court's application of the exception for the declarant's then-existing mental, physical, or emotional condition. The testimony the State sought to rely upon related to a fact, that Mr. Laster had been hit by a beer bottle by a man named Shey. The rule specifically excludes a statement "of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed" unless the statement relates to the execution of a will. W.R.E. 803(3); 4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:70 (4th ed.2013).

[¶ 43] We also reject application of the Rule 803(1) present sense impression exception to Mr. Laster's statements. That rule requires that the statement describe or explain an event "while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." W.R.E. 803(1). We have explained:

Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, ¶ 23, 169 P.3d 81, 88 (Wyo.2007) (quoting 4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 434, at 384-85 (2d ed.1994)). In this case, Mr. Laster's statements were made twenty to twenty-five minutes earlier. This is not contemporaneous enough to fall within the Rule 803(1) exception.

[¶ 44] In terms of the exceptions applied by the district court, that brings us to application of W.R.E. 804(b)(6), one of the "catchall" exceptions. This Court has, however, observed that the catchall exceptions, W.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6), are to be cautiously used only in exceptional cases, in the interest of justice. Williams v. Collins Communications, 720 P.2d 880, 888 (Wyo. 1986). The catchalls under both Rules 803 and 804 specifically say that they apply to statements "not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness...." The two rules, read together, suggest that the catchall exception is only to be used if there is no other well-established hearsay exception. One evidence treatise concludes that the placement of the catchall in the federal rules suggests that it was intended as a rule of last resort. 5 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:108 (4th ed.2013).2

[¶ 45] In a pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause case, the United States Supreme Court explained the reliability of traditional hearsay exceptions:

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147-48, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (some citations omitted).3

[¶ 46] Based on the foregoing, we believe that the catchall exceptions, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(6), should be rules of last resort, and that particularly in criminal cases, they should not be used if a traditional exception applies. In this case, we find a traditional exception in the Rule 803(2) excited utterance exception. Although the district court did not rely on this exception, we may affirm the court's decision on any basis appearing in the record. Leach v. State, 2013 WY 139, ¶ 19, 312 P.3d 795, 799 (Wyo.2013).

[¶ 47] An excited utterance is a "statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." W.R.E. 803(2). We have said:

Marquess v. State, 2011 WY 95, ¶ 17, 256 P.3d 506, 512 (Wyo.2011) (quoting Boykin v. State, 2005 WY 15, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 481, 483 (Wyo.2005)).

[¶ 48] This Court has identified five factors to be considered in applying the excited utterance exception: (1) the nature of the startling event; (2) the declarant's physical manifestation of excitement; (3) the declarant's age; (4) the lapse of time between the event and the hearsay statement; and (5) whether the statement was made in response to an inquiry. Marquess, ¶ 17, 256 P.3d at 512; Sanchez v. State, 2011 WY 77, ¶ 22, 253 P.3d 136, 143 (Wyo.2011). We have also observed that while these factors are helpful, the ultimate inquiry remains whether the "declarant's condition at the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and deliberation." Sanchez, ¶ 22, 253 P.3d at 143 (quoting Boykin, ¶ 8, 105 P.3d at 483); see also Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1021 (Wyo.1999).

[¶ 49] A review of the 911 call reveals that a reasonable judge could find that Mr. Laster's statements fit within the excited utterance exception. Seeing one's spouse struck by a beer bottle and being struck oneself is undoubtedly startling, and the statements at issue related to the startling event. The content of the call, and in particular Mrs. Laster's cries of pain and distress, and Mr. Laster's attempts to comfort her, establishes that Mr. Laster was still under the stress of excitement caused by the event. Although Mr. Laster's statements were made in response to an inquiry by the 911 dispatcher, we do not in this case find this fact sufficient to take the statements outside the excited utterance exception. Mr. Laster's statements were not responsive to the questions being asked, and in this type of circumstance, we have explained:

Boykin, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d at 484.

[¶ 50] As to the lapse of time between the startling event and the hearsay statements, the excited utterance exception, unlike the present sense impression exception, does not require immediacy.

4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, supra, § 8:684; see also Dike, 990 P.2d at 1021 (applying exception where statements were made thirty minutes after event); Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 927 (Wyo. 1999) (applying exception where statements were made forty-five minutes after event); James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 206 (Wyo.1994) (applying exception where statements were made fifteen to thirty minutes after event).

[¶ 51] In this case, the lapse of time between the startling event and Mr. Laster's 911 call was twenty to twenty-five minutes. Based on this time lapse and the other factors, we find that Mr. Laster's statements fall within the requirements of the "excited utterance" exception of W.R.E. 803(2). We therefore conclude that they were properly admitted into evidence.

B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Second Degree Murder Charge

[¶ 52] We next address Mr. Bruce's argument that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of second degree murder. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal using the following standard of review:

Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 543, 548 (Wyo.2005).

[¶ 53] At the close of the State's case, Mr. Bruce moved for a judgment of acquittal, and the district court denied that motion. Mr. Bruce then presented evidence, including the testimony of four defense witnesses. At the close of evidence, Mr. Bruce again moved for a judgment of acquittal, and the district court again denied the motion. The jury then returned a verdict finding Mr. Bruce not guilty of second degree murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Following the jury verdict, Mr. Bruce filed a written motion for judgment of acquittal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the manslaughter conviction.

[¶ 54] Based on the foregoing sequence of motions, Mr. Bruce argues that "[t]here is no issue of waiver" with respect to his request that this Court reverse the district court's rulings on his motions for judgment of acquittal on the charge of second degree murder. Based upon our precedent, however, we find this assertion to be overly broad.

[¶ 55] This Court has repeatedly held that a defendant's introduction of evidence following denial of a judgment of acquittal is a waiver of the appeal of that motion. Hawes v. State, 2014 WY 127, ¶ 8, 335 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo.2014); Granzer v. State, 2010 WY 130, ¶ 7, 239 P.3d 640, 643-44 (Wyo.2010); Butcher, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d at 548; Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000); Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo.1995). We have explained:

Butcher, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d at 548.

[¶ 56] Mr. Bruce's appeal from the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the second degree murder charge for which he was ultimately acquitted is similar to the appeal we addressed in Robinson. In Robinson, the defendant was acquitted of the charged offense of first degree murder and the lesser included offense of second degree murder but was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Robinson, 11 P.3d at 368. The defendant appealed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the first and second degree murder charges, and this Court addressed the appeal by limiting its review to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the manslaughter charge on which the defendant was convicted:

Robinson, 11 P.3d at 368.

[¶ 57] We again addressed a similar issue in Butcher, where the defendant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted on the lesser included offense of second degree murder. Butcher, ¶ 14, 123 P.3d at 548. In addressing the defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, we observed:

Butcher, ¶¶ 14-15, 123 P.3d at 548-49 (footnote omitted).

[¶ 58] Our decisions in Robinson and Butcher instruct that there is simply no basis for this Court to review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal where a jury has acquitted the defendant on the charge for which the motion was denied. Mr. Bruce attempts to distinguish Butcher by arguing the following prejudice from the denial of his motion at the close of evidence:

[¶ 59] We reject this alleged prejudice as a basis to revisit the district court's denial of Mr. Bruce's motion for judgment of acquittal on the second degree murder charge. First, the argument presumes that a not guilty verdict equates to error in the denial of the motion. This presumption ignores the standard a court must follow in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, which requires it to disregard the defendant's evidence, assume the prosecution's evidence is true, and give that evidence all logical and reasonable inferences. See Butcher, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d at 548. Obviously, a jury does not approach its task with the same constraints.

[¶ 60] Mr. Bruce's alleged prejudice also strays from the purpose to be served by a motion for judgment of acquittal, which has been described as follows:

2A Charles Alan Wright and Peter J. Henning, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 461, at 325 (4th ed.2009) (footnotes omitted). Here, because the jury acquitted Mr. Bruce of the second degree murder charge, the potential harm the motion was intended to guard against plainly did not come to pass.

[¶ 61] Finally, Mr. Bruce's argument implies that had the motion for judgment of acquittal been granted on the charged count of second degree murder, the lesser included offense would not have been submitted to the jury. Our decisions in Butcher and Robinson implicitly recognized that this is not the case. See Butcher, ¶ 15, 123 P.3d at 549 ("Even if the district court had granted the appellant's post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder, that would have had no effect upon the finding of guilt on the lesser-included offense."); Robinson, 11 P.3d at 368 (considering sufficiency of the evidence on lesser included offense with no consideration given to denied motion for judgment of acquittal on charged offense). We agree with the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals:

United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir.2000); see also People v. Scott, 10 P.3d 686, 688 (Colo.App.2000) (where trial court grants motion for judgment of acquittal on greater offense, it retains authority to submit lesser included offense to jury); State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 56 (N.D.1983) ("A trial court's granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the major offense charged does not preclude submission of the case to the jury on the basis of the lesser included offense instruction[.]").5

[¶ 62] For the foregoing reasons, we will not address the district court's denial of Mr. Bruce's motion for judgment of acquittal as it pertains to the second degree murder charge.

C. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Manslaughter Conviction

[¶ 63] We agree with Mr. Bruce that there is no question of waiver respecting his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his manslaughter conviction. We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim as follows:

Hawes, ¶ 8, 335 P.3d at 1076 (quoting Brown v. State, 2014 WY 104, ¶ 8, 332 P.3d 1168, 1171-72 (Wyo.2014)).

[¶ 64] Mr. Bruce was convicted of voluntary manslaughter pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i), which provides that a person is guilty of manslaughter "if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, ... [v]oluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion[.]" Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2013). The district court instructed the jury that "heat of passion" means:

[¶ 65] Mr. Bruce argues there was insufficient evidence to establish the statutory elements of manslaughter, insufficient evidence to establish his state of mind when he struck Mr. Laster, and "absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Bruce intended to kill Mr. Laster, or even, for that matter, that he was acting voluntarily as opposed to reflexively." Based on our review of the record, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict finding Mr. Bruce guilty of manslaughter.

[¶ 66] At the outset, we reject the assertions framing Mr. Bruce's state of mind and intent arguments. First, the argument that there is no evidence that Mr. Bruce intended to kill Mr. Laster is not relevant to our review because voluntary manslaughter is "a general intent crime that does not require a deliberate intent to kill." Noel v. State, 2014 WY 30, ¶ 35, 319 P.3d 134, 146 (Wyo.2014) (quoting State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138-39 (Wyo.1993)). Second, we disagree with Mr. Bruce's suggestion that evidence of his state of mind is necessarily insufficient unless it is direct evidence of state of mind at the moment he struck Mr. Laster. This Court has observed that "in all cases, civil or criminal, turning upon the state of an individual's mind, direct evidence may be rare; usually the trier of facts is required to draw inferences of the state of mind at issue from surrounding acts, utterances, writings, or other indicia." Benjamin v. State, 2011 WY 147, ¶ 46, 264 P.3d 1, 12 (Wyo.2011) (quoting MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 843 (Wyo. 1980)). Our consideration of the evidence may therefore include both direct and circumstantial evidence of the statutory elements and Mr. Bruce's state of mind.

[¶ 67] When we accept the State's evidence as true and give the State every favorable inference that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence, the evidence shows that Mr. Bruce entered Mr. Laster's home, proceeded to the back bedroom, struck Mrs. Laster in the temple with a beer bottle, and thereafter struck Mr. Laster a couple of times with the beer bottle, which blunt force trauma caused Mr. Laster's death from a subdural hematoma. As to Mr. Bruce's state of mind, the State's evidence showed that Mr. Bruce had been upset most of the day because of his concern that the Lasters might be reconciling. The State's evidence also showed that just after the assault, Mr. Bruce contacted Mrs. Laster's daughter, Teri Hughes, and was ranting and hollering. During that encounter, which occurred shortly after the assault, Mr. Bruce told Ms. Hughes: that he was angry when he went to Mr. Laster's home because Mrs. Laster was there; that when he went to the back bedroom in Mr. Laster's home he thought the Lasters were having sex; that he hurt the Lasters because they "fucked him;" and the Lasters got what they deserved.

[¶ 68] The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Bruce voluntarily struck Mr. Laster with a beer bottle, that he struck Mr. Laster in the heat of passion, and that in doing so, he unlawfully killed Mr. Laster. The district court therefore did not err in denying Mr. Laster's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of manslaughter.

D. Denial of Motion for New Trial based on Inadmissible Hearsay

[¶ 69] Before addressing the substance of Mr. Bruce's argument that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, we must determine the appropriate standard of review. Mr. Bruce filed his new trial motion based upon a prosecution witness' testimony, which the district court struck as inadmissible hearsay. When the offending testimony was given, defense counsel objected and asked that the testimony be stricken, but counsel did not object to the court's curative instruction or move for a mistrial. In moving for a new trial, Mr. Bruce did not assert any particular defect in the court's curative instruction or even reference the instruction and instead generally asserted a new trial was warranted because, although the inadmissible hearsay had been stricken, the damage had been done, and the bell could not be un-rung.

[¶ 70] In Mendoza v. State, 2013 WY 55, 300 P.3d 487 (Wyo.2013), this Court reviewed the denial of a new trial motion, which motion was based on what the defendant alleged to be an erroneous jury instruction. Because the defendant had not objected to the jury instruction, we held that the district court's denial of the new trial motion would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but the alleged underlying error in the jury instruction itself would be subject to our plain error standard of review. Id., ¶¶ 8-9, 300 P.3d at 489-90. Because Mr. Bruce likewise did not object to the district court's curative instruction, we will take the same approach. We shall review the denial of the new trial motion for an abuse of discretion and the adequacy of the district court's curative instruction for plain error.

[¶ 71] "A district court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did." Mendoza, ¶ 8, 300 P.3d at 489 (citing Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, ¶ 24, 252 P.3d 435, 441 (Wyo.2011)). Our plain error analysis requires that an appellant "establish, by reference to the record, a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way and that the violation adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice." Joreski v. State, 2012 WY 143, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 413, 416 (Wyo.2012) (quoting Jealous v. State, 2011 WY 171, ¶ 11, 267 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Wyo.2011)). Material prejudice means a reasonable probability exists that the result would have been more favorable in the absence of the alleged error. Id.

[¶ 72] The testimony that was the basis of Mr. Bruce's new trial motion was testimony given by Teri Hughes, daughter of Mrs. Laster and stepdaughter of Mr. Laster. The testimony, defense objection, and ruling on the defense objection went as follows:

[¶ 73] The district court thereafter explained the meaning of hearsay to the witness and cautioned her to refrain from providing such testimony and to answer only the question she is asked. The court then instructed the jury:

[¶ 74] Applying our plain error analysis, we find that the first element of the test is satisfied. Mr. Bruce alleges the district court's jury instruction was inadequate to cure the harm caused by the inadmissible hearsay. The record clearly depicts the hearsay testimony and the curative instruction.

[¶ 75] The second element of the plain error analysis requires that Mr. Bruce establish a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule, and that the violation be clear and obvious, not merely arguable. Mr. Bruce has not made this showing. "We have said many times that a trial error may be corrected by an appropriate curative instruction, and that we presume that jurors follow the court's instructions." Willoughby v. State, 2011 WY 92, ¶ 11, 253 P.3d 157, 161 (Wyo.2011) (citing Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 24, 178 P.3d 396, 405 (Wyo.2008); Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Wyo.1998); Rubio v. State, 939 P.2d 238, 243 (Wyo.1997); and Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo.1987)). Mr. Bruce has provided no basis to deviate from this approach. In particular, he has cited no authority that would establish that the curative instruction in this case was clearly inadequate, and our precedent is in fact to the contrary. See Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901 (Wyo.2000).

[¶ 76] In Metzger, a witness testified to statements the victim made to her concerning the defendant's sexual abuse of the victim. Id., 4 P.3d at 907-08. The trial court sustained hearsay objections to the testimony, struck the testimony, and instructed the jury: "I'd ask the jury to disregard the hearsay statements." Id. On appeal, the defendant asserted the curative instruction was inadequate to remedy the harm caused by the testimony. Id. at 908. This Court disagreed, explaining:

Metzger, 4 P.3d at 908.

[¶ 77] Given this precedent, we cannot find plain error in the district court's response to the inadmissible hearsay and its curative instruction. Defense counsel agreed that the hearsay testimony given in this case was not deliberately drawn out by the prosecutor. Additionally, when the witness offered the offending testimony, the district court immediately intervened and then gave the jury a curative instruction that was much more detailed and comprehensive than the instruction upheld in Metzger. Because we find no plain error in the court's curative instruction, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of Mr. Bruce's motion for a new trial.

E. Failure to Instruct the Jury on Self Defense

[¶ 78] Mr. Bruce argues that self-defense was part of his defense theory and the district court erred in failing to give the jury a self-defense instruction. "The failure to give an instruction on the law related to a theory of defense is a due process issue, which this Court reviews de novo." Nelson v. State, 2010 WY 159, ¶ 13, 245 P.3d 282, 285 (Wyo.2010); Ewing v. State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 7, 157 P.3d 943, 945 (Wyo.2007).

[¶ 79] Wyoming law is well settled with respect to instructing a jury on a defendant's theory of the case:

Drennen v. State, 2013 WY 118, ¶ 20, 311 P.3d 116, 124 (Wyo.2013) (quoting Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 23, 124 P.3d 699, 707 (Wyo.2005)).

[¶ 80] We have also said:

Nelson, ¶ 14, 245 P.3d at 286 (quoting Iseli v. State, 2007 WY 102, ¶ 10, 160 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo.2007)). On the other hand, an instruction is properly refused if it invites the jury to engage in speculation or conjecture. Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 766 (Wyo.1993).

[¶ 81] Mr. Bruce cites the following as evidence that supported giving a self-defense instruction in this case:

[¶ 82] We disagree that the above-cited evidence was sufficient to warrant the giving of a self-defense instruction. This Court has held that a person who is the aggressor in an altercation has a duty to retreat before using deadly force:

Drennen, ¶ 24, 311 P.3d at 125-26 (quoting State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458, 462 (1929)).

[¶ 83] While it is true that the State carries the burden of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense, we have also held:

Brown v. State, 2014 WY 104, ¶ 16, 332 P.3d 1168, 1174 (Wyo.2014) (citing Drennen, ¶ 39, 311 P.3d at 129).

[¶ 84] There is no question that when the incident in Mr. Laster's home began, Mr. Bruce was the aggressor. While much of the evidence in this case was hearsay evidence, Mrs. Laster testified to the events she witnessed that initiated the violence at Mr. Laster's home. Mrs. Laster testified that Mr. Bruce entered Mr. Laster's home unbidden, came into to the back bedroom where Mr. and Mrs. Laster were located, talked to some extent with Mr. Laster, and then suddenly struck Mrs. Laster with a beer bottle hard enough to cause her to lose consciousness. Thereafter, the evidence shows that Mr. Bruce struck Mr. Laster a couple of times with a beer bottle, and accepting Mr. Bruce's evidence as true, Mr. Laster struck Mr. Bruce with a Maglite flashlight. As to how those events unfolded, we agree with defense counsel's observation during the instructions conference that "we're guessing about whatever happened in those moments."

[¶ 85] What is critical here is that the record is entirely devoid of evidence that Mr. Bruce stopped being the aggressor and that Mr. Laster became the aggressor. That is, Mr. Bruce presented no evidence that at some point during the altercation, he attempted to stop his own aggression and withdraw or retreat from the situation. None of the evidence cited by Mr. Bruce addresses this controlling question. Mr. Laster's possession of firearms is not relevant to the inquiry because Mr. Bruce presented no evidence that Mr. Laster threatened him with the weapons or that Mr. Bruce was even aware of the weapons. Likewise, Mr. Bruce's own injuries, the bloody knuckles and the bump on his head, and his statements that the Lasters "fucked him," reveal nothing concerning who acted as the aggressor during the continuing altercation. In the absence of evidence that Mr. Bruce stopped being the aggressor and Mr. Laster became the aggressor, Mr. Bruce failed to make a prima facie case that would have supported the giving of a self-defense instruction. The self-defense instruction requested by Mr. Bruce would have simply been an invitation to the jury to engage in speculation or conjecture, and the district court thus properly refused to give the instruction.

CONCLUSION

[¶ 86] We find no error in the district court's admission of the deceased victim's 911 call, its rulings on Mr. Bruce's motions for judgment of acquittal, its curative instruction regarding the inadmissible hearsay, or its refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense. Affirmed.