SCOTT W. SKAVDAHL, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Laramie County, Wayne Graves, Glenna Hansen and Russell Martens' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 92) and the Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 94). The Court, having considered the briefs and materials submitted in support of the motions and Plaintiffs' responses thereto, having heard oral argument of counsel and being otherwise fully advised, FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
In July 1999, at the request of then-Sheriff of Laramie County Roger Allsop following two incidents of suicide in the Spring of that year, Judith Cox conducted an independent review and critique of the suicide prevention practices at the Laramie County jail. (See "Cox Report" at 1, Pls.' Ex. 3-8, ECF No. 102-1.) The Cox Report set forth a number of recommendations, including:
Presently, the Laramie County Sheriff's Department ("LCSD") has a policy entitled "Medical Program Objectives" (Policy No. 08.18) which provides: "Inmates will not be denied necessary medical services for a serious medical need; medical, dental and mental health matters involving clinical judgments are the sole provinces of the jail physician, dentist and psychiatrist or qualified psychologist respectively." (Pls.' Ex. 3-5-B, ECF No. 101-8 at 27.) Further, LCSD has a written policy that covers suicide prevention, intervention, and behavior watch procedures, which was in effect in 2015. (Ind. Defs.' Ex. 1, ECF No. 95-1) ("Suicide Policy"). As the Suicide Policy states, all new inmates are to be screened at intake "for current suicidal ideations, a history of suicide attempts, and a history of mental health counseling." Id. at 1. Inmates who are actively having suicidal ideations are placed on a 15-minute watch in a central-booking cell. Id. at 1, 2. The inmate will be placed in a safety smock and a watch log will be initiated. Id. at 2. The jail's mental health staff will then be notified. Id. at 3. Only the mental health staff can end or modify a 15-minute watch. Id. at 5. When the mental health staff does so, the inmate will be placed on a 30-minute watch for at least 48 hours. Id. And only a member of the mental health staff can end or modify a 30-minute watch and allow the inmate's regular housing assignment. Id. at 6.
Laramie County Detention Center ("LCDC") staff receives a variety of training related to the Suicide Policy and mental health risks generally. The jail captain, Michael Sorenson, has attended formal trainings from national agencies regarding suicide prevention in jails and also receives and reviews monthly email updates from those agencies. (Sorenson Dep. 22:11-14, 23:14-21, 24:1-9, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 9.) All deputes upon hiring complete a three-and-a-half-week orientation program that includes classes on suicide prevention. Id. at 25:21-26:3. The new hires then complete an eight-week field training program, where a deputy who has already completed the training instructs the new hire by example, and this process covers the jail's Suicide Policy. Id. at 26:20-21, 27:12-28:1, 28:20-29:23. Additionally, all jail staff receives an annual training on mental health risks and suicide prevention. Id. at 30:14-25. This annual mental health training purposely occurs sometime in the fall, prior to the holidays, because that is a "high-stress" time for people, especially for those arrested and separated from families. Id. 59:13-21; H. Johnson Dep. 7:10-8:10, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 11.
There have been suicides in LCDC before; though, in the 16-plus years that Defendant Danny Glick has been Sheriff, there have been fewer than ten. (Glick Dep. 5:17, 46:6-14, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 10.) Five of those occurred in 2015 and 2016. Id. at 46:15-17. But, there have been many more attempted suicides that were successfully stopped through some form of prevention or intervention. See id. at 46:21-23, 54:4-15; Sorensen Dep. 22:5-10 (25 to 30 attempted suicides annually); H. Johnson Dep. 15:5-16:16; Weiland Dep. 16:22-18:12, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 12.
Defendant Wayne Graves is the Mental Health Services Coordinator for LCSD. His responsibilities are "to plan, direct, manage, and deliver psychological services with all components of Laramie County Government, but primarily with staff and Inmates of the Laramie County Sheriff's Department." (Pls.' Ex. 3-5-B, ECF No. 101-8.) His essential duties include coordination of psychological services to LCDC inmates with primary focus on providing mental health services to jail staff and inmates, providing psychological services to inmates, and assessment and management of inmates with active suicidal behaviors. Id. at 1.
In December of 2015, LCDC mental health staff consisted of Glenna Hansen and Russ Martens, who Graves supervised. Graves has a Master of Social Work degree and is a Licensed Clinical Social Worker. (Graves Dep. 9:2-3, 11:21-12:7, County Ex. 13.) Martens has bachelor's degrees in psychology and sociology and a master's degree in clinical psychology. (Martens Dep. 7:9-22, County Ex. 12.) Prior to working at LCDC, Martens worked for ten years at the Arapahoe County Jail in Arapahoe County, Colorado as a classification officer and member of the mental health staff. Id. at 8:9-9:9. At the time relevant to these proceedings, Martens was working as a provisionally licensed professional counselor under the supervision of Graves and other private clinical supervisors. Id. at 11:7-25; Graves Dep. 28:16-32:16. Hansen has a master's degree in counselor education and is a licensed mental health counselor. (Hansen Dep. 9:2-6, Pls.' Ex. 10.)
On Friday, December 18, 2015, 19-year-old Hunter Johnson, believing he was going to start outpatient treatment for alcohol the following Monday, went out for a "last hurrah." (D. Johnson Dep. 59:17-60:10, County Ex. 1, ECF No. 93-1.) At approximately 1:23 a.m. on Saturday, December 19, 2015, Cheyenne Police Department ("CPD") officers JoAnne Young and Lisa Koeppel responded to a call at the Walmart in Cheyenne where an intoxicated Hunter was causing a disturbance. (Young Dep. 16:22-17:8, County Ex. 2; CPD Incident Report, County Ex. 3.) Hunter's parents, David and Brenda Johnson, were also present at the Walmart having been notified by a third party of Hunter's whereabouts. (D. Johnson Dep. 57:16-24.) Hunter's parents were observing Hunter, who was inside the Walmart, from the entrance vestibule, when Officers Young and Koeppel arrived. Id. at 57:25-59:11. David Johnson told the officers about Hunter's alcohol and depression issues and warned them they might need backup to arrest his son. Id. at 59:12-60:18.
When the officers made contact with Hunter inside the Walmart, he was informed he was under arrest, he resisted, and he was taken to the ground and handcuffed. (Young Dep. 17:7-18:5.) A bottle of beer was found in his coat pocket. (Young Dep. 18:6; County Ex. 3.) As the officers escorted Hunter from the Walmart, Hunter saw his parents and began to curse and yell at them. (Young Dep. 18:23-25; County Ex. 3.) Once outside, Hunter again began resisting and tried to get away from the officers, at which point he was taken to the ground a second time. (Young Dep. 18:25-19:15; County Ex. 3.) Hunter, again cursing and yelling at his parents, continued to resist the officers by kicking his legs violently. (Young Dep. 23:17-27:21; County Ex. 3.) At about this point during the altercation, Hunter indicated he was suicidal and demanded he be taken to the hospital. (Young Dep. 28:4-18.) Eventually, Hunter was restrained using a WRAP device and placed in a patrol car. Id. at 33:1-2. Hunter then forcefully banged his head against the door window of the patrol car two to four times so he was placed in a sparring helmet. Id. at 33:5-19, 37:13-38:13; County Ex. 3. Because Hunter continued to hit his now padded head against the window, he was removed from the patrol car for eventual transport to the LCDC by ambulance strapped to a gurney. (Young Dep. 33:17-24, 41:9-22; County Ex. 3.) While waiting for the ambulance, David Johnson informed the arresting officers his son had been subject to previous emergency detentions. (Young Dep. 28:25-30:22, 41:23-42:8, 43:7-19.) Hunter was charged with breach of the peace, interference with a peace officer, and being a minor under the influence of alcohol. (County Ex. 3.)
Hunter was booked into LCDC at approximately 2:30 a.m. December 19, 2015. (Laramie County Sheriff's Department Strip Search Report, County Ex. 5.) At that time, he signed a form authorizing the release of his health care information from Cheyenne Regional Medical Center. (Pls.' Ex. 3-4, ECF No. 101-6 at 212.) The arresting officer, Jo Young, completed the upper portion of LCDC's "Inmate Screening Form" indicating Hunter had made suicidal statements and informed the detention center booking officer, Deputy Kemp, of the same. (Young Dep. 56:24-59:8, 64:18-65:23; County Ex. 6.) Deputy Kemp placed Hunter in a safety suit, put him on a 15-minute close watch, and notified the mental health staff of the situation.
During this December 19th meeting with Martens, Hunter further denied ever telling the arresting officer he was suicidal and denied any history of suicidal ideations. (Martens' notes, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 5.) Hunter acknowledged his misbehavior during his arrest and asked how long he would have to be in jail, because he was scheduled to start rehab in a week. Id. Hunter also asked for normal clothes and a phone call. Id. Martens found Hunter to be "future oriented," polite, and cooperative. Id. Martens cleared Hunter from the 15-minute watch, placed him on a 30-minute follow-up watch, and approved him for regular clothes. Id. (See also Martens Dep. 22:2, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 15; Ind. Defs.' Ex. 4 at 11-16 (second watch log); Kemp Dep. 45:3-14, 46:10-15; Pls.' Ex. 31-13 at 40.)
Two days later, on December 21, 2015, at approximately 2:56 p.m., Glenna Hansen interviewed Hunter and removed him from the suicide watch. (Hansen's Progress Notes, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 6 at 3.) Hansen recorded the following from her interview:
Id. (emphasis added). Although Hunter had a history of mental health issues, Hansen testified an inmate's mental health history is not the decisive factor; the determination whether to end a mental health watch is based on the inmate's "current situation, current behavior, [and] current statements." (Hansen Dep. 79:10-11, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 16.) "We can't say . . . a person was suicidal last week, so we have to keep them on a watch[.]" Id. at 79:12-14. Given her meeting with Hunter, Hansen felt it was appropriate to end Hunter's 30-minute watch and allow him to be placed in a regular cell. (Hansen Dep. 65:13-66:19; Ind. Defs.' Ex. 4 at 11, 16.) However, while Hunter was taken off a 30minute mental health watch, the jail's medical staff had separately put Hunter on a 30-minute medical watch for alcohol withdrawal. (Stephens Dep. 60:13-16, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 17.)
The next day, December 22, 2015, Hunter appeared in Circuit Court for his initial hearing on the charges stemming from his December 19th arrest. (Davis Dep. 15:3-14, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 20.) Brian Davis and Jesse Ward were sheriff's deputies working court security that day. Id. Near the end of the hearing, Hunter told the judge he wanted to go home. (Ward Dep. 13:18-20, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 21.) He then turned away from the judge and began moving toward the door as if he was going to walk out of the courtroom, rather than go to the courtroom holding area that led back to the jail. (Ward Dep. 13:20-22; Davis Dep. 19:15-20:5.) Davis intercepted Hunter, put his hand on Hunter's arm, and escorted him back to the holding area. (Davis Dep. 20:6-17; Ward Dep. 14:3-7.) Hunter was "kind of pulling against" Davis as the two went back to the holding area. (Ward Dep. 14:8-9.) Ward followed them into the holding area to assist. Id. at 14:10. At that point, Hunter began wrestling with the officers. Id. at 15:22-16:11. After a struggle, the deputies were able to get Hunter on the ground and handcuffed. Id. at 16:11-21, 25:12-14. Hunter was helped to his feet but continued to pull away, so Davis employed a wristlock to gain compliance. Id. at 17:7-14. The deputies escorted Hunter back to the jail, to a holding cell in booking, and then returned to the courtroom. Id. at 17:19-18:8. Neither deputy considered Hunter's actions suicidal. (Davis Dep. 36:18-24; Ward Dep. 27:25-28:14.) Davis had put inmates on a suicide watch "easily . . . a couple hundred times." (Davis Dep. 36:6-12.) As Ward explained:
(Ward Dep. 28:4-12.)
Jennifer Stephens was the jail's shift supervisor on December 22, 2015 when Hunter returned from court. (Stephens Dep. 48:16, 51:18-21.) Davis "radioed ahead" to Stephens that he was bringing Hunter to B pod; Stephens responded the jail did not have room in B pod, so she advised Davis to take Hunter to booking until she could make some room in B pod. Id. at 51:22-52:3. When Hunter and the deputies arrived at booking, Davis explained Hunter had tried to walk out of court and resisted when the deputies tried to put him in handcuffs and escort him back to the jail. Id. at 52:5-8. B-pod contains the jail's single occupancy, segregation cells meant for inmates who present a safety and security risk or have attempted an escape. Id. at 47:7-12; Martens Dep. 38:18-20. Because there was not an open cell in B-pod when Hunter returned from court, Stephens placed him in a booking cell at approximately 11:01 a.m., until staff could relocate an inmate and open a space. (Stephens Dep. 54:23-24; County Ex. 22, Time Stamp 11:01 a.m.)
Hunter received a sack lunch at about 11:06 a.m. (Pls.' Ex. 34, Holding Cell Video, Time Stamp 11:06 a.m.) At noon, Stephens looked into Hunter's cell and observed him standing on the toilet and putting something into the vent. Id. at 12:00:09 p.m. Stephens requested another deputy retrieve the keys and remove all trash from the cell, which was done. Id. at 12:00:39. Also at one point, Stephens noticed Hunter was sitting and crying, so she called mental health staff to check on him and "clear him to go to B pod." (Stephens Dep. 53:2-3, 56:3-5, 60:4-9.) Stephens did not put Hunter on a suicide watch herself because, although Hunter's behavior was concerning enough to involve the mental health staff, it did not necessarily indicate Hunter was suicidal. Id. at 61:2-62:6, 71:23-72:9. Stephens advised the mental health staff member who came to talk to Hunter, Russ Martens, that she was planning to put Hunter in B-pod and wanted to get mental health's clearance for that. Id. at 75:19-24; Martens Dep. 34:4-7.
Darci Flint-Baker was another deputy working the booking area on December 22, 2015. (Flint-Baker Dep. 7:9-12, 15:5, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 19.) Part of her job was to check on inmates in the booking cells at least twice per hour, but she tended to do her "watch rotations" every 12 to 13 minutes and recalls doing so that day. Id. at 16:10, 16:25-17:3, 18:5-6, 21:25-22:18. During those rounds, Deputy Flint-Baker spoke briefly with Hunter; he asked if he was going to court again and when he was going home, but she did not know. Id. at 42:7-16, 43:24-25, 44:11-12. Flint-Baker never saw Hunter crying, acting unusual, or appearing upset. Id. at 16:16-24, 43:16-18. She was aware Hunter had been on suicide watch earlier and then cleared. Id. at 19:14-19, 20:15-21. And she was aware of Hunter's outburst in court. Id. at 15:3. She also remembers contacting mental health staff to clear Hunter for B-pod. Id. at 25:14-18, 26:8-16, 27:16-19.
Just after noon, Hunter again met with mental health provider Russ Martens while still in a holding cell in the booking area of the jail. (Stephens Dep. 65:7-13; Martens Dep. 33:19-34:34:3.) Martens talked with Hunter for some 22 minutes. (See County Ex. 26, Time Stamp 12:03-12:25.) Regarding this meeting, Martens noted:
(Mental Health Progress Notes, Ind. Defs.' Ex. 5 at 12.)
(Martens Dep. 35:5-12.) Martens concluded Hunter did not need any additional suicide watch. (Martens Dep. 34:19-24.) Finding "no indication to believe . . . there was any reason to not put [Hunter] in B pod," Martens cleared Hunter for placement into B-pod. Id. at 36:24-37:1; Flint-Baker Dep. 28:10-11.
At some time later, Defendant Martens completed an Inmate Behavior Report concerning his December 22nd meeting with Johnson:
(Pls.' Ex. 31-13 at 31-33.)
Video footage later revealed Hunter exhibited suicidal behavior in his booking cell for ten or eleven minutes just before talking to Martens and again for around five to six minutes just before being taken to B-pod. That is, Hunter tied together several plastic baggies or wrappers from his sack lunch, checking a couple times whether he had sufficient length to go around his neck, then apparently tried attaching the string of plastic baggies to the ceiling vent. (Pls.' Ex. 34, Time Stamp 11:46 a.m.—11:48, 11:51-12:00 p.m.) However, when Deputy Stephens observed him putting something in the vent, he stopped the behavior and put the baggies into the brown paper lunch sack before handing the trash to Deputy Stephens through the cell door slot. Id. at 12:00:10-12:00:37. Then again, just before transferring to B-pod, Hunter took off his striped jail shirt, leaving on his black undershirt, and then sporadically tried hanging the shirt from fixtures in the holding cell and putting the shirt over his head, as if to test whether he could hang himself. (See Ind. Defs.' Ex. 8, Time Stamp 1:40-1:45:50.) Jail staff would only realize this later, in reviewing the circumstances surrounding Hunter's suicide, by viewing the video footage from Hunter's booking cell.
At approximately 1:45 p.m., Doug Sipes strip-searched Hunter and escorted him to B-pod.
Deputy Weiland was working B-pod that afternoon with a trainee, Landon Henrie. (Weiland Dep. 21:15-16, 23:1-5.) Within ten minutes of Hunter being placed in his B-pod cell, Deputy Weiland conducted an area check of the entire pod and observed Hunter making his bed. Id. at 34:15-17; County Ex. 28, Time Stamp 2:03:50. Weiland then "briefed" Deputy Henrie that Hunter had been moved in and that he was on a medical watch. (Weiland Dep. 35:19-21.) About ten minutes later, Hunter was visited by a fellow inmate, who communicated with him from outside the cell. Id. at 34:23-24; County Ex. 28 at 2:13:50-2:14:30. Approximately sixteen minutes later, Deputy Henrie, conducting an area check of B-pod, observed Hunter sitting on the floor next to the desk with a bed sheet wrapped around his neck. (County Ex. 28, Time Stamp 2:29:27 p.m.; Henrie Dep. 11:1-3, County Ex. 30; Ind. Defs.' Ex. 7 at 4.) Henrie called out for Deputy Weiland and radioed a "10-Medical" in B-pod. (Ind. Defs.' Ex. 7 at 4.) LCDC security and medical staff responded immediately and within minutes instigated first-aid and CPR. (See County Ex. 28, Time Stamp 2:29:35-2:39 p.m.) Hunter was ultimately transported from the detention center to Cheyenne Regional Medical Center where he later died.
On December 28, 2015, LCSD requested Hunter's medical records from Cheyenne Regional Medical Center. (Pls.' Ex. 3-4 at 91, 99-100.) The medical records show Hunter had been through Emergency Detention and Involuntary Hospitalization Proceedings related to suicide ideations in November of 2015, and the week prior to his arrest on December 19, 2015. Id. at 309-334. The LCSD was involved in the December 12, 2015 incident. See id. at 2. LCDC mental health staff was not aware of Hunter's history of suicidal ideation or prior involuntary hospitalizations at the time of their interviews with him during his December 19-22, 2015 incarceration. (See Hansen Dep. 57:7-25, Pls.' Ex. 10; Martens Dep. 28:22-29:1, 31:21-33:2.)
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on December 22, 2017, asserting three causes of action: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, inhumane conditions of confinement, and the County and Sheriff's failure to supervise healthcare providers, in violation of Hunter Johnson's substantive due process rights;
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "A dispute is genuine if there is sufficient evidence so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way. A fact is material if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Crowe v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 649 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "The district court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. . . . But an inference is unreasonable if it requires a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders [the factfinder's] findings a guess or mere possibility." Pioneer Centres Holding Co. Employee Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law," Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2001), and "public officials who act in good faith, on the basis of objectively reasonable understandings of the law at the time of their actions," Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008). Because the protection of qualified immunity gives officials an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, the Supreme Court has "stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009).
"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)) (internal quotations omitted). When a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense on summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) the defendant's conduct as alleged or shown makes out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (bold emphasis added).
Though the court must still view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the "record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied [t]his heavy two-part burden[.]" Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 877-78 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy either part of this burden, the court must grant the defendant qualified immunity. Holland, 268 F.3d at 1186.
Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2015). "Deliberate indifference has objective and subjective components." Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). The objective component requires the harm suffered be sufficiently serious — suicide qualifies. Id.; see also Cox, 800 F.3d at 1240 n.3. The subjective component requires a plaintiff to show the defendants "knew [the prisoner] faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Callahan, 471 F.3d at 1159 (internal quotation and citation omitted). This requires inquiry into the officials' particularized state of mind (Cox, 800 F.3d at 1249) — which must have been "sufficiently culpable" (Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Deliberate indifference entails a higher degree of culpability than negligence. Id. at 835.
Thus, to succeed on a jail suicide case such as this, the plaintiff must show jail officials were "deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of suicide." Cox, 800 F.3d at 1250 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added in Cox). To be liable, the officials must "both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . also draw the inference." Cox, 800 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A factfinder "may conclude that a prison official subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm by circumstantial evidence or `from the very fact that the risk was obvious.'" Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). "However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that an obvious risk cannot conclusively establish an inference that the official subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm, because `a prison official may show that the obvious escaped him.'" Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8). "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not" is insufficient to satisfy the test for deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
While not sufficient for the second prong of qualified immunity, these general contours of Hunter Johnson's right to be free from deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs inform the analysis of whether Plaintiffs have shown a violation of Hunter's constitutional right. As discussed below, however, none of the Defendants deliberately disregarded Hunter's risk of suicide, nor subjectively knew of that risk when Hunter was placed in B-pod.
The only fact Plaintiffs point to as establishing these Defendants' knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide is that Hunter made suicidal statements when he was arrested. However, in the three days that followed, Hunter had been on a 15-minute watch followed by a 30-minute watch and interviewed by mental health staff three separate times. The mental health staff members had cleared Hunter from the suicide watches and approved his placement in the segregation cell. Although Deputy Stephens was aware of Hunter's outburst in court and later saw him crying, such behavior is not so obviously indicative of suicidal ideations as to establish Stephens (or any of the other deputies) subjectively knew of a substantial risk of suicide. Moreover, Hunter was actively hiding his suicidal behavior from the deputies as he waited in his holding cell before going to B-pod.
As to Sheriff Glick, he was not working in the jail and had no interaction with Hunter leading up to his suicide. Plaintiffs contend Sheriff Glick violated Hunter's right to medical care by a "systemic failure" to make sure the jail's policies are followed and incorporate all the policies and practices recommended by the 1999 Cox Report for dealing with suicidal inmates.
In a § 1983 lawsuit,
Cox, 800 F.3d at 1248. The requisite showing of an "affirmative link" has three related prongs: "(1) personal involvement, (2) sufficient causal connection, and (3) culpable state of mind." Id.
Pursuant to LCSD policies, when jail staff learned Hunter had made a suicidal statement, they dressed him in a safety suit, put him on suicide watch, and relied on the mental health professionals to remove him from that watch and approve his placement in B-pod.
Plaintiffs argue Defendant Russ Martens knew Hunter faced a substantial risk of suicide and disregarded that risk by failing to take measures to abate it. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert Martens was aware of the following facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of suicide existed on December 22, 2015: Hunter had been diagnosed with ADHD, bi-polar disorder, and depression; Hunter had received "bad news" in court and was observed crying in his holding cell; Hunter was thinking illogically and wanted to go home. Plaintiffs contend Martens disregarded this risk by allowing Hunter to be placed in the B-pod segregation cell, and by failing to obtain any relevant medical records or documents or referring Hunter for psychiatric evaluation prior to making any decisions regarding Hunter.
The Court is not convinced a substantial risk of suicide could be reasonably inferred from the facts known to Martens. Hunter denied suicidal ideations in both of his interviews with Martens and appeared calm and relaxed during the December 22nd interview, which lasted more than 20 minutes. Even so, Martens must have not only been aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of suicide existed, but he must have also drawn the inference. There is no evidence Martens did so, and the facts known to him are not so obviously indicative of a suicide risk as to make Martens' action in clearing Hunter for B-pod placement deliberately indifferent. Where, as here, a qualified mental health professional assesses a detainee and finds no basis or cause to implement suicide prevention protocols, there can be no finding of deliberate indifference. See Cox, 800 F.3d at 1253 ("observable symptoms were susceptible to a number of interpretations; suicide may well have been one possibility, but the facts known to those with whom [inmate] interacted did not establish that is was a substantial one").
As with Sheriff Glick, supervisory liability against Defendant Wayne Graves must "be predicated on a violation traceable to [his] own individual actions." Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 suit against a defendant-supervisor by demonstrating: "(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation." Id. (quoting Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010)). See also Cox, 800 F.3d at 1248.
Graves had no personal interaction with Hunter or direct and contemporaneous knowledge of his treatment in December of 2015.
Even were there some question whether Defendants violated Hunter's constitutional right to medical care, the constitutional right was not "clearly established" in the context of the particular conduct at issue here. "A plaintiff may satisfy this standard by identifying an on-point Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit decision; alternatively, the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1005 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Plaintiffs frame the issue as follows: "when there is evidence that an inmate is suicidal, the failure to take basic steps (such as adequate monitoring) to prevent the suicide ordinarily constitutes a violation of a clearly established constitutional right." (Pls.' Opp'n to County Defs' Mot. for Summ. J. at 20-21.) Plaintiffs cite no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent in support of their proposition; instead, Plaintiffs suggest a number of cases from other circuits place the constitutional question beyond debate. See id. at 20 & n.15. While Plaintiffs are correct they need not cite a "perfectly on-point" case (Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1005), Plaintiffs "must demonstrate a substantial correspondence between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing that the defendant's actions were clearly prohibited," Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 761 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, do.
Plaintiffs merely offer a string cite of cases (all but one pre-dating 2015) without discussion of the particular facts of those cases. None of those cases are factually similar, however, and support Plaintiffs' case here only to the extent they acknowledge the general constitutional right to be free from deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of suicide. Tenth Circuit precedent teaches that merely asserting a clearly established "right to adequate medical care and to be free from deliberate indifference" does "virtually nothing to define the contours of the clearly-established-law question." Cox, 800 F.3d at 1245-46. Rather, mindful of the Supreme Court's repeated admonition "not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality," see supra, the Court must consider whether, under the facts presented here, "then-extant clearly established law would have given [Defendants] fair warning" that their conduct would violate Hunter Johnson's constitutional rights. Cox, 800 F.3d at 1245 n.6, 1247. The Court concludes the right Plaintiffs' claim implicates here — an inmate's right to adequate suicide prevention protocols — was not clearly established in December 2015. See id. at 1247.
Indeed, Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent issued earlier in 2015 supports the Court's finding and suggests such a right did not, and does not, exist. In addressing whether an inmate had a clearly established right "to the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols," the Supreme Court stated in June 2015: "No decision of this Court establishes a right to the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols[;] [n]o decision of this Court even discusses suicide screening or prevention protocols." Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
In Cox, the mother of a deceased jail inmate brought a § 1983 action against the county sheriff, relating to the inmate's suicide. 800 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 2015). The district court denied qualified immunity to the sheriff. On appeal, the sheriff contended that extant caselaw at the time of the inmate's suicide did not clearly establish he could be held liable as a supervisor under the circumstances presented — i.e., where inmate denied having a suicidal intent during booking and no jail staff members detected a basis for referring him for additional mental-health screening based on their interactions with the inmate. Id. at 1236. The appellate court concluded the right implicated by the plaintiff's claim was "an inmate's right to proper prison suicide screening procedures during booking." Id. at 1247. Reversing the denial of qualified immunity, the appellate court found the then-extant clearly established law would not have put a jail administrator "similarly situated" to the sheriff on notice that he could be held liable under § 1983 based on a prisoner's suicide where "neither he nor any identified staff member whom he supervised possessed knowledge that the particular inmate who committed suicide presented a substantial risk of taking his own life." Id. at 1246. As here, the plaintiff in Cox failed to identify any Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision indicating this right was clearly established at the time of the inmate's suicide, nor had she attempted to show a clearly established weight of authority from other courts. Id. at 1247.
In reviewing the relevant case law, the court cited Taylor v. Barkes and noted that, as of November 2004, "a jail's nonexistent or deficient suicide-screening measures would not have necessarily indicated that an individual's prisoner's suicide was the product of deliberate indifference. . . ." Id. at 1250. The court determined the contours of the law in 2009 had not changed. Id. Plaintiffs point to no other case post-2009 holding a jail's deficient suicide prevention protocols, similar to the deficiencies alleged here, constituted deliberate indifference. Nor does Cox clearly establish such a right as the court did not address whether the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right, instead focusing on the second prong of qualified immunity — whether the asserted right was clearly established. Id. at 1247. The Court concludes the clearly established law in December 2015 would not have put reasonable officials similarly situated to Defendants on notice that their conduct would violate Hunter's right to medical care. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy their burden on the clearly-established-law prong of the qualified immunity standard. Thus, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The supplemental jurisdiction statute sets forth four factors the Court should consider in determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: "(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, the Court has determined Defendants' are entitled to qualified immunity, so Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim must be dismissed. "When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims."
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' deliberate indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law negligence claims. THEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants Laramie County, Wayne Graves, Glenna Hansen and Russell Martens' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 92) and the Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 94) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim; and Plaintiffs' negligence claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 96) is DENIED.
