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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. JOEL Z. SPIKE, 80-001877 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001877 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1990

The Issue The issue posed herein is whether or not the Respondent's Osteopathic Physician License should be suspended, revoked or otherwise disciplined based on conduct, which will he set forth herein in detail, as set forth and defined in the administrative complaint filed herein on September 30, 1980.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, during times material, has been an Osteopathic Physician who has been issued License No. 0003850. On or about April 17, 1978, Respondent, Joel Z. Spike, entered into a Consent Agreement with the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, hereinafter referred to as the "Board", the terms of which provided that if the Respondent complied with certain conditions precedent and subsequent to the issuance of a license, that the Board would issue to Respondent a one-year probationary license to practice osteopathic medicine within the State of Florida. Under the terms of the Consent Agreement, Respondent's failure to satisfy any of the conditions subsequent to the issuance of the probationary license would result in an automatic suspension of such license. The Consent Agreement was entered as a final order of the Board. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Respondent satisfied the conditions precedent and the Board issued the Respondent a probationary license on April 27, 1978. 2/ On March 28, 1979, it is alleged that Respondent failed to satisfy one of the conditions subsequent to the Consent Agreement of April 17, 1978 by his (Respondent's) failure to make a required annual appearance before the Board to demonstrate his physical and mental condition and ability to practice osteopathic medicine with reasonable skill and certainty. It is thus alleged that pursuant to the terms of the Consent Agreement and order of April 17, 1978, Respondent's license was automatically suspended. 3/ On March 28, 1979, Respondent and the Board entered into a second Consent Agreement under the terms of which Respondent agreed to cease and desist from the practice of osteopathic medicine in this State until such time as the Respondent could make a personal appearance before the Board, such appearance being an unsatisfied condition subsequent or required by the first Consent Agreement entered by and between the parties dated April 17, 1978. Respondent signed the second Consent Agreement which was entered as a final order from the Board and became effective April 24, 1979. On July 18, 1979, August 1, 1979, September 19, 1979, September 25, 1979, July 24, 1979, October 8, 1979, November 5, 1979, October 31, 1979, and October 22, 1979, Respondent wrote prescriptions for Percodan tablets to one Eliot Schuler. Petitioner alleges that such conduct constituted the practice of osteopathic medicine as to Eliot Schuler, without an active license, and while Respondent's license was suspended in violation of Section 459.013(1)(a) and (b) Florida Statutes (1979), and the provisions of Section 459.015(1)(x), Florida Statutes (1979). 4/ Respondent disputes the allegations that he wrote prescriptions for Percodan tablets to Eliot Schuler without an active license to practice osteopathic medicine. On April 9, 1980, in the Circuit Court for the 11th Judicial Circuit, Respondent pled nolo contendere to all counts of an eight-count information alleging two counts of the unlawful practice of medicine and six counts of sale or delivery of a controlled substance. Respecting this plea, the court withheld adjudication and Respondent was placed on probation initially for a period of eighteen (18) months. Petitioner thus alleges that Respondent thereby violated Section 459.015(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1979). Respondent defends the complaint allegations on the basis that the Board did not automatically suspend his license since he provided the Board with ample notice and a justifiable reason for his failure to attend the required annual appearance as set forth in the April, 1978 Consent Agreement. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2). In this regard, it is undisputed that the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of the unlawful practice of medicine and six counts of the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in violation of Chapters 458.327, 459.013 and 893.13, Florida Statutes. Respondent was initially placed on probation for an eighteen month period and an order of modification was subsequently entered which changed his probation from reporting to non-reporting. (Petitioner's composite Exhibit 3). It is also undisputed that the Respondent was advised by Petitioner's Executive Director of the reporting requirements (annually) which was entered by Petitioner and Respondent on April 17, 1978. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). In this regard, Respondent's prior counsel, Phillip J. Mandina, requested a continuance of the Board's annual meeting to consider Respondent's probationary licensing due to his confinement in a hospital in Miami, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). Documentary evidence introduced and received herein reveals that Respondent was a patient at the emergency room at Biscayne Medical Center on January 26, 1979 with a diagnosis of multiple trauma as a result of an automobile accident. Emergency room record notations reveal that Respondent had taken 150 milligrams of Demerol earlier on the 26th of January, 1979 and he had in his possession one empty thirty cc vial of Demerol 50 milligrams/cc and one 20cc vial of Demerol 100 milligrams/cc of which there were approximately 9cc's remaining. A consulting psychologist and an orthopedic surgeon who attended Respondent during his visit at Biscayne Medical Center concluded that Respondent suffered from severe chronic drug addiction and should receive proper treatment for this disease prior to any resumption of treating of patients. (Petitioner's composite Exhibit 6). Respondent submitted a renewal fee of $85.00 for the renewal of his osteopathic medical examiner's license. By letter dated August 28, 1980, the Board's Executive Director, Dorothy Faircloth, notified the Administrator for the Office and Records Administration, Charles R. Beck, that Respondent should not have been allowed to renew his license under the terms of the subject Consent Orders and requested that Respondent return the license issued. It was also indicated that a $85.00 refund would be processed and forwarded to Respondent within approximately four weeks. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). Finally, Respondent contends that even though he was of the opinion that he possessed an active license, he would not actively engage in the practice of medicine. Respondent is presently involved in a marriage counseling practice and his ultimate goal is that of teaching and conducting therapy sessions. To support his position that he still possessed a license to practice medicine, Respondent pointed out that when he submitted his renewal fee, his license was issued and no action was taken by the Board to retrieve his license until approximately September 12, 1980. Respondent avers that that was his first notice that the Board considered his license suspended due to his failure to appear before the Board annually as per the April 17, 1978 Consent Agreement. Respondent urges that he felt that the request from his former counsel for an abatement of the annual review proceedings of his probationary status had been received and granted.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the date that the Board takes final agency action. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of March, 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1981.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57458.327459.013459.015893.13
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE vs ALEXANDRA KONOWAL, D.O., 01-002594PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jul. 02, 2001 Number: 01-002594PL Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent, Alexandra Konowal, D.O., violated Subsections 459.015(1)(x) and (o), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed osteopathic physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number OS 7169. Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine pursuant to Section 20.42, Florida Statutes. On July 20, 1998, Respondent first saw Patient B. M., a 75-year-old female, at Eye Health of Fort Myers, for a complaint of poor vision and cataracts. Respondent scheduled cataract surgery for July 30, 1998, at an outpatient surgery center. On Thursday, July 30, 1998, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Respondent performed the surgery, removing the lens of Patient B. M.‘s left eye and replacing it with an implant. Patient B. M. was discharged from the surgery center at 11:17 a.m., with instructions to go to Eye Health of Fort Myers for follow-up examination that afternoon. On Saturday, August 1, 1998, Patient B. M. telephoned Eye Health early in the morning complaining of inability to see from the left eye and severe pain in the left eye. At about 9:00 a.m., August 1, 1998, Patient B. M. was examined at Eye Health of Fort Myers by James Campbell, an optometrist with Eye Health. Dr. Campbell found residual cortex in the left eye, with corneal edema, but observed no pus in the eye. Dr. Campbell changed the antibiotic eye drops for the patient. At approximately 10:00 a.m., on August 1, 1998, Dr. Campbell had a telephone conference with Respondent and Dr. Franz to discuss the symptoms of Patient B. M. At approximately 4:45 p.m., on August 1, 1998, Patient B. M. again called Eye Health complaining of unbearable pain. Dr. Campbell, in turn, called Respondent at approximately 5:00 p.m. to advise her of Patient B. M.’s complaints. During the 5:00 p.m. telephone call from Dr. Campbell to Respondent, Dr. Campbell discussed the possible diagnosis of endophthalmitis. At 5:36 p.m., August 1, 1998, Respondent spoke with Patient B. M. on the telephone for nine minutes. During the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Patient B. M. reported shooting pains in her eye and that her vision was bad. During the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Respondent advised Patient B. M. that she needed to be evaluated. When Patient B. M. said she could not come in, Respondent advised of the possible risks including damage to the optic nerve from excessive pressure and infection. Respondent suggested going to the emergency room and offered to provide transportation, but Patient B. M. refused. During the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Respondent recommended that Patient B. M. take Percocet that the Patient already had for the pain; Respondent would call in a prescription for erythromycin ointment and told the patient to call back if the eye didn’t improve. Following the 5:36 p.m. telephone call, Respondent did phone in a prescription for erythromycin to a Walgreens Pharmacy near Patient B. M.'s residence. It appears the patient did not pick up this prescription. The "standard of care" expert witness offered by Petitioner found it "difficult to answer" a hypothetical question directed to the "standard of care" of Respondent's care of Patient B. M., incorporating all relevant facts set forth hereinabove in these Findings of Facts and, essentially, failed to render an opinion incorporating all relevant facts; therefore, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to practice osteopathic medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances as alleged in this matter. Respondent prepared an office note dated August 1, 1998, 7:30 p.m., as a record of Respondent’s telephone call to Patient B. M. This note was, in fact, prepared on the morning of August 3, 1998. The note reads in its entirety: 8/1/98 7:30 PM Spoke with patient. States having pain in left eye. Recommended artificial tears for shooting pain, and continue using Ocuflox and Pred Forte. Patient states she has been taking Percocet every four hours with no relief, but she takes Percocet regularly for neuropathy. Told to use two every four hours and call if no improvement. While the August 1, 1998, office note records a great deal of relevant information, Respondent's testimony revealed it does not reflect Patient B. M.'s refusal to come in for evaluation, Respondent's warnings regarding the risks of not being evaluated, an offer of transportation to an emergency room, or a prescription order for Erythromycin. Petitioner's expert witness testified on deposition that, "I'm not sure what the standard of care is" for charting weekend telephone calls. When he receives a telephone call at home from a patient, he makes notes on "a scrap of paper" and later records the note in the patient's record. Respondent testified that she now keeps a book at home in which she records every conversation when patients call her at home; she then brings the book to her office for reference in recording the entire conversation in the patient's record. However, she does not believe that anyone in her practice does it the way she now does. There is no standard procedure in the practice of osteopathic medicine for memorializing conversations in the patient's record between a physician and patient which occur outside the office or hospital setting. On August 3, 1998, Patient B. M. returned to Respondent’s office complaining of no vision and sharp pain. Respondent’s examination revealed Patient B. M.’s left eye to be swollen and with hypopyon (internal pus). Respondent diagnosed endophthalmitis and immediately referred Patient B. M. to a retinal specialist. On August 3, 1998, Patient B. M. was seen by the retinal specialist who found near total hypopyon, so that neither the iris nor any posterior detail could be visualized. Ultrasound showed dense mobile vitreal opacities, primarily anteriorly. The specialist recommended a vitrectomy with injection of antibiotics, and discussed at length the possibility of loss of vision, loss of the eye and uncertainty of any visual benefit. He performed the surgery for Patient B. M. the night of August 3, 1998. Endophthalmitis is a recognized complication of cataract surgery that occurs in less than one percent of patients, but does not presumptively indicate a departure from the standard of care. The standard of care required Respondent see Patient B. M. and treat her for endophthalmitis on August 1, 1998, or to warn Patient B. M. on August 1, 1998, of the serious consequences of endophthalmitis if Patient B. M. did not have an examination. The evidence revealed that Respondent warned Patient B. M. of the serious consequences of her failure to go to the clinic or an emergency room for treatment.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED, that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathy, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Alexandra Konowal, D.O., is not guilty of violating Subsections 459.015(1)(x) and (o), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. Campbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 39A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Bruce M. Stanley, Jr., Esquire Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt 1715 Monroe Street Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0280 William H. Buckhalt, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C06 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (4) 120.5720.42456.073459.015
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC vs WILLIAM DANA HOLTON, JR, 90-003126 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 21, 1990 Number: 90-003126 Latest Update: May 02, 1991

The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice as an osteopathic physician's assistant and/or a physician's assistant, based on alleged violations of Section 459.015(1)(n), (x), and (cc) and 458.331(1)(s), (v), and (x), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, William Dana Holton, is a licensed osteopathic physician's assistant in Florida, holding license numbers OA 0000027 and OA 0000097. Additionally, Respondent is a licensed physician's assistant in Florida, holding license number PA 0001538. For several years, Respondent has been experiencing a great deal of chronic pain associated with his back. Because of this pain, Respondent obtained a number of prescriptions for pain killers and muscle relaxers from various physicians. From May, 1989, through October, 1989, Respondent obtained a variety of medicinal drugs, in various amounts and dosages from two different pharmacies. The majority of these prescriptions were for pain killers. The Respondent represented to each pharmacist that the prescriptions had been authorized by a certain physician. The type of drug, quantity obtained, dosage, date obtained, pharmacist involved, and physician represented as the prescribing physician are as follows: Substance Amount Dosage Date Pharmacist Physician Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 5-18-89 Lanier Velasco Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 5-29-89 Lanier Velasco Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 6-08-89 Lanier Velasco Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 6-13-89 Lanier Velasco Diazepam 20 5.0 mg 5-18-89 Lanier Velasco Diazepam 20 5.0 mg 5-29-89 Lanier Velasco Diazepam 20 5.0 mg 6-13-89 Lanier Velasco Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 6-27-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 7-05-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 7-14-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 7-24-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 7-31-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 8-07-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 8-14-89 Lanier Noblejas Donnatal Elixer 4 oz. 8-07-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 8-21-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 8-29-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 9-02-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 9-08-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 9-14-89 Lanier Noblejas Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 9-23-89 Lanier Noblejas Diazepam 20 5.0 mg 8-21-89 Lanier Velasco Diazepam 20 5.0 mg 9-02-89 Lanier Velasco Diazepam 20 5.0 mg 9-14-89 Lanier Velasco Diazepam 20 5.0 mg 9-23-89 Lanier Velasco Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 9-28-89 Lanier Levinson Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 10-05-89 Lanier Levinson Anexsia 50 7.5 mg 10-16-89 Lanier Levinson Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 12-28-89 Hill Serrebutra Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 01-12-89 Hill Serrebutra Anexsia 15 7.5 mg 03-01-90 Hill Serrebutra Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 03-09-90 Hill Velasco Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 03-29-90 Hill Velasco Diazepam 30 5.0 mg 03-29-90 Hill Velasco Zydone 30 7.5 mg 05-02-90 Hill Velasco Zydone 31 7.5 mg 05-31-90 Hill Velasco Anexsia 30 7.5 mg 06-06-90 Hill Velasco Zydone 31 7.5 mg 06-30-90 Hill Velasco Vicodin 50 5.0 mg 07-01-90 Hill Noblejas Anexsia is a pain killer. Diazepam is the generic name for Valium. Donnatal Elixer is a muscle relaxant. Zydone is chemically equivalent to Anexsia and is a pain killer. Vicodin is similar to Anexsia and is a pain killer. All of the drugs are controlled substances. Except for Dr. Levinson, the evidence demonstrated that the listed physicians prescribed the relevant medications to Respondent and that these prescriptions were filled pursuant to those physician's prescriptions. However, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Dr. Levinson did not authorize any of the prescriptions listed in paragraph 3. Respondent believed that Dr. Levinson had authorized the prescriptions listed by his name via a general protocol for such treatment. However, such a belief does not equal an express prescription of a controlled substance by a physician and should not have been used by Respondent to obtain the drugs listed above. In essence, Respondent was prescribing medications for himself in violation of Section 459.015(1)(cc) and Rule 21R- 6.005(b) Florida Administration Code, and Section 458.331(1)(v), Florida Statutes. Sometime between September 26, 1989, and October 19, 1989, Dr. Dana Levinson saw Respondent at the Wellsprings Clinic in Carrabelle, Florida. The visit occurred on a weekend after Respondent had seen several patients during the day. Dr. Levinson observed that Respondent's speech was slurred, his hands were trembling and his pupils were small. Dr. Levinson, an osteopathic physician was of the opinion that the Respondent was under the influence of a narcotic or depressant drug. On October 21, 1989, Respondent was unable to have his prescription for Anexsia from Dr. Velasco filled at the pharmacy which had the prescription on file. The pharmacy was closed for the evening. Because Respondent felt he needed the pain killer for his pain and was unable to think clearly because of the excessive amounts of medications he was taking, 1/ he devised a scheme for obtaining the drug from another pharmacy. On October 21, 1989, the Respondent phoned in a prescription for Anexsia in the name of Emily Dinkins to the Eckerds Pharmacy located at 2526 South Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The Respondent told the pharmacist that the prescription had been authorized by Dr. Levinson. Dr. Levinson had not authorized the prescription. The prescription was intended by Respondent to be for his own use. Respondent instructed Emily Dinkins to go into Eckerds and pick up the prescription that he had ordered. He did not tell her that the prescription was in her name. Respondent was arrested on October 21, 1989, at the pharmacy for fraudulently trying to obtain a prescription. The charges were later dismissed. The incident on October 21, 1989 and Dr. Levinson's observation of Respondent clearly demonstrate that Respondent was taking enough medication to impair his ability to practice his profession and think clearly. Because Respondent was impaired, his continuing to practice during September and October, 1989, constituted a very serious violation of Section 459.015(1)(x), Florida Statutes, and Section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes. Additionally, there is no doubt that Respondent attempted to utilize a trick or scheme in the practice of his profession and in pursuit of that scheme, on October 21, 1989, made a false statement to the Eckerd's pharmacist. It is immaterial that the criminal charges were dismissed. Such activity on Respondent's part is a serious violation of Section 459.015(1)(n), Florida Statutes, and Section 458.331(1)(v) and (x), Florida Statutes. After his arrest on October 21, 1989, the Respondent entered an inpatient drug treatment program. Against medical advice, Respondent left the program after only four weeks. However, Respondent continued out patient drug treatment. The outpatient treatment was telephonically approved by Dr. Goetz, the physician who oversees the impaired practitioners program. Respondent has not since entered any other inpatient drug treatment program, but has ceased taking the medication referenced above. Respondent now controls his back pain with aspirin and appears to again be in control of his life. To practice as a physician's assistant a licensee is required to have a supervising physician or osteopathic physician. From August 1, 1988 to January 19, 1989, the Respondent's supervising physician was Dr. Chai Serrebutra, M.D.. Between April 20, 1989, and June, 1989, the Respondent's supervising physician was Dr. Maximo Velasco, M.D.. The evidence, and in particular the insurance claim forms, does not support Respondent's contention that Dr. Velasco began supervising Respondent earlier than April 20, 1989. Dr. Velasco signed these claim forms for the Wellsprings Clinic. The earliest signature date for Dr. Velasco was April 20, 1989. On that date, Dr. Velasco signed several forms for treatment which had been rendered to various patients prior to April 20, 1989. However, the treatment given these patients occurred during a time when Dr. Serrebutra was Respondent's supervising physician and in fact had both directly and indirectly supervised Respondent. Therefore, the evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent had treated any patients while he was unsupervised during this interim period. Between May 1, 1989 and May 12, 1989, Dr. Velasco was in Omaha, Nebraska. During the time that Dr. Velasco was in Omaha, Nebraska, Respondent treated several patients at the Wellsprings Clinic in Carrabelle, Florida. The patients and the dates they were treated by Respondent are as follows: Patient's Initials Date E.M. 5-2-89 J.S. 5-2-89 J.M. 5-2-89 J.E. 5-4-89 F.M. 5-4-89 S.B. 5-4-89 A.B. 5-4-89 N.N. 5-4-89 M.B. 5-4-89 L.M. 5-4-89 S.S. 5-4-89 A.J. 5-4-89 L.W. 5-4-89 L.W. 5-4-89 T.T. 5-5-89 D.B. 5-6-89 D.H. 5-6-89 W.B. 5-6-89 V.M. 5-6-89 P.W. 5-6-89 A.C. 5-8-89 L.L. 5-8-89 L.T. 5-8-89 W.J. 5-8-89 L.T. 5-8-89 J.T. 5-8-89 R.P. 5-8-89 E.H. 5-9-89 M.W. 5-9-89 D.T. 5-9-89 M.R. 5-11-89 T.T. 5-11-89 C.B. 5-11-89 G.E. 5-11-89 M.R. 5-11-89 M.W. 5-11-89 T.R. 5-11-89 R.H. 5-11-89 L.M. 5-11-89 J.J. 5-12-89 C.S. 5-12-89 R.M. 5-12-89 R.L. 5-12-89 T.R. 5-12-89 C.B. 5-12-89 C.J. 5-12-89 S.C. 5-12-89 W.J. 5-12-89 While Dr. Velasco was in Omaha, Nebraska, the Respondent talked to him for five minutes or less by telephone. The Respondent and Dr. Velasco did not discuss specific cases during this telephone conversation. In each case, a preliminary final diagnosis was made by Respondent. The diagnoses were made by the Respondent without direct supervision by Dr. Velasco, Respondent's supervising physician. The preliminary final diagnoses were made pursuant to general unwritten protocols established by Dr. Velasco and were well within Respondent's training, competence and skill. The evidence did not demonstrate tht any treatment of these patients required any direct intervention from the doctor or that such direct supervision was requried. To that extent the preliminary final diagnoses were made at the direction of Respondent's supervising physician and were within the parameters of Chapter 458 and 459, Florida Statutes and Rules 21M-17.001(6), 21M-17.012 and 21R-6, Florida Administrative Code. Between September 26, 1989, and October 19, 1989, Dr. Dana Levinson was the Respondent's supervising osteopathic physician. In early October, 1989, Respondent phoned K-Mart Pharmacy in Apalachicola and placed prescription orders for various medicinal drugs with the pharmacist, Beverly Kelley, for several different patients. The patients involved, drugs prescribed, and the dates of the prescriptions, were as follows: Patient's Initials Drug Date J.T. Tigan 10-11-89 J.T. Halcion 10-11-89 J.T. Anexsia 10-11-89 J.T. Valium 10-11-89 V.M. Flexeril 10-11-89 V.M. Anexsia 10-11-89 L.T. Halcion 10-11-89 L.T. Duricef 10-11-89 L.T. Valium 10-11-89 L.T. Phrenilin Forte 10-11-89 L.T. Nucofed 10-11-89 L.H. Valium 10-11-89 L.H. Ionamin 10-11-89 T.T. Valium 10-14-89 T.S. Valium 10-14-89 The Respondent represented to Kelley that these prescriptions were authorized by Dr. Levinson. Dr. Levinson did not expressly authorize any of the prescriptions listed above and did not directly oversee the treatment and diagnosis of the patients. Again, Respondent performed these patient services pursuant to unwritten general protocols everyone involved, including the supervising physician, seemed to take for granted that everybody had knowledge of. To Respondent's credit, neither Dr. Serrebutra, Velasco nor Levinson had problems with Respondent's treatment of any of the patients treated by Respondent and Respondent was generally viewed as a competent physician's assistant, able to handle routine matters through general protocols and without the immediate supervision or direction of a physician. The lack of immediate supervision or direction does not violate Chapter 458 or 459, Florida Statutes, or the rules promulgated thereto. What does constitute a violation of Chapter 458 and 459 is that, during Dr. Levinson's supervisory time period, Respondent's services included the prescription of controlled substances which had not been specifically ordered or requested by Dr. Levinson. Respondent's actions were due in part to the lack of any written protocols and a very vague and ill- defined understanding of Respondent's duties between Respondent and Dr. Levinson. 2/ Since a physician's assistant has no authority and is prohibited by Rule from prescribing medication to patients, Respondent's actions, violated Section 459.015(1)(cc), Florida Statutes and Section 458.331(1)(v) and (x), Florida Statutes. See Rule 21M-17.012(2)(a)(7)b., Florida Administrative Code and Rule 21R-6.010(7), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed four violations in regards to his physician's assistant license and the same four violations in regards to his osteopathic physician's assistant license. The evidence did not demonstrate that an aggravated penalty should be imposed for any one of the violations. However, because of the number of violations, one composite penalty should be imposed for all the violations for each license. The composite penalty should not exceed the highest penalty which could be imposed for the most seriously penalized infraction under each Board's rules.

Recommendation It is accordingly, recommended that the Board of Medicine and the Board of Osteopathic Medicine each enter a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(s), (v) and (x) and 459.015(1)(n), (x) and (cc), Florida Statutes and as punishment therefore: Respondent's license to practice as a physician's assistant in the State of Florida, number 0001538, should be suspended for two years beginning with the date of his temporary suspension on January 12, 1990, after which Respondent should be placed on a 2 year period of probation with direct supervision during which Respondent shall demonstrate to the Board his ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. Additionally, Respondent should be required to successfully complete coursework involving the scope and practice of his profession and be assessed a $1,000 fine to be paid over the course of his suspension and probation. Respondent's license to practice as an osteopathic physician's assistant in the State of Florida, numbered 0000027 and 0000097, should be suspended for 2 years beginning with the date of his temporary suspension on January 12, 1990, after which Respondent should be placed on a 2 year period of probation with direct supervision during which Respondent shall demonstrate to the Board his ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. Additionally, Respondent should be required to successfully complete coursework involving the scope and practice of his profession and be assessed a $1,000 fine against Respondent to be paid over the course of his suspension and probation. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1991.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68458.311458.313458.331459.015
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. BARBARA KRANTZ, 83-000203 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000203 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent was licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida under license numbered 0003783. On April 1, 1981, the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners (Board), through the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging several violations of Florida Statutes governing the practice of osteopathic medicine. In an effort to forestall an emergency suspension of her license as a result of these allegations, Respondent entered into a Stipulation with the Board whereby she agreed to cancel her certificate to prescribe Schedule II and III, Chapter 893, drugs; to remain enrolled in and comply with all terms of the Impaired Physicians Program; to submit blood and urine samples for drug screening upon request of DPR; and to obey all federal and state laws and regulations pertaining to the practice of osteopathic medicine. On June 10, 1982, the Board, after an informal hearing, entered an order finding that Respondent had violated the various provisions of the statutes as alleged and suspended her license for a period of six months. However, the Board considered and incorporated into its order the aforementioned Stipulation and stayed the suspension, placing Respondent on probation for three years. Sometime in January, 1983, the Secretary of DPR, being made aware of alleged violations of the terms of the probation, entered an order of emergency suspension of Respondent's license, alleging as reasons therefor: That on November 29, 1982, Respondent prescribed Demerol, a Schedule II controlled drug, for a patient, Ernestine Franklin; That on November 10, 1982, Respondent was found in an unconscious state at home. Taken to the hospital, when she regained consciousness, she was disoriented and incoherent; her speech was garbled, and she demonstrated erratic and violent behavior; That on or about December 7, 1982, Respondent prescribed Demerol for Maureen Lyewfong, the cost of which was charged to the Respondent; On December 17, 1982, an unidentified male brought Respondent to the hospital indicating she had snorted cocaine. She would not allow herself to be examined; That on December 24, 1982, Respondent was admitted to North Shore Hospital, Miami, claiming she had suffered an epileptic seizure. During the course of her workup, she indicated she was allergic to Demerol; and That by letter dated December 30, 1982, Dr. Morgan, head of the Impaired Physicians Program, informed DPR that Respondent had diverted for own use Demerol prescribed for her patients and that she had failed to keep appointments for treatment under the program. On January 18, 1983, sometime after the emergency suspension went into effect, the Board through the Department of Professional Regulation filed a seven-count Amended Administrative Complaint seeking to suspend, revoke, or otherwise discipline Respondent's license, listing as grounds for this action basically the same allegations as found in the emergency suspension order. On November 30, 1982, Respondent treated Ernestine Franklin for removal of a pilonidal cyst. Prior to the surgery, Respondent administered an injection of Demerol to the patient from a bottle for which she had written a prescription the previous day. This prescription had been filled at a pharmacy by Nurse Susan Dukes and charged to Respondent's account. When she brought the Demerol back to the office, Dukes placed it in the locked medicine cabinet and told Respondent where she had put it. When she went to set up for Ms. Franklin's surgery, the bottle of Demerol was not there. Dr. Krantz prepared the Demerol injection for the patient herself. The injection did not use up the entire amount on the prescription, and the unused portion was neither given to the patient nor seen in the office again. On December 7, 1982, Respondent wrote a prescription for Demerol for Maureen Lyewfong, the cost for which was charged to Dr. Krantz. Demerol is another name for meperidine hydrochloride, which is a Schedule II substance, as defined in Section 893.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). Respondent first entered the Impaired Physicians Program (IPP) under the supervision of Dr. Dolores Morgan in March, 1981,,because of her abuse of Demerol, Quaaludes, and cocaine. After a month in the hospital, she was released to an outpatient program which, because of her failure to progress properly, resulted in her going to the inpatient facility at Ridgeview, Georgia, where she spent several months. According to the terms of the IPP for Respondent, when she was discharged from the Ridgeview inpatient treatment center, she was to be in the program for two years. Since the IPP main office is in Miami and Respondent practices in West Palm Beach, she was placed under the supervision of a doctor in her area. From June, 1982, the date of the Stipulation, to December, 1982, Dr. Morgan heard nothing to indicate Respondent was not living up to the terms of the agreement. However, in December, 1982, Dr. Morgan was contacted by Dr. Joan Barice, local chairman of the IPP, who informed her that Dr. Krantz was missing required meetings of Narcotics Anonymous, as well as by the administrator of a local hospital, Mr. Steven Southerland, to the effect that Dr. Krantz was not performing properly. As a result, Dr. Morgan set up an appointment with Respondent for an interview on December 23, 1982, which Respondent did not keep. Another appointment was set up to discuss the matter, but before the date scheduled for the meeting, Dr. Morgan was advised Respondent was admitted to a hospital in Miami for drug detoxification. At this point, Dr. Morgan reported the latter to DPR. As will be seen in the succeeding paragraphs, this admission was not for drug detoxification, but for epileptic seizures. On December 17, 1982, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Respondent was taken by paramedics to the emergency room at Jupiter Hospital, Jupiter, Florida. At the time she was first seen by the paramedics, an empty vial of Demerol was found in her possession. When found, at her office, she was unconscious for five to ten minutes and, upon regaining consciousness, appeared drowsy. However, by the time she was seen by the emergency room nurse, Mr. Pollack, she appeared to be coherent. She indicated to him she was allergic to Demerol and had had a seizure earlier in the day because the level of Dilantin, a drug used to control epileptic seizures, in her blood was not high enough. In fact, on December 23, 1982, Respondent contacted Dr. Jack Kammerman, an internal medicine specialist on the staff at North Shore Hospital in Miami. She explained her symptoms, and Dr. Kammerman, who knew of Respondent's background through her mother, who had worked for him, suggested she immediately be hospitalized for tests. Dr. Krantz agreed, and the initial tests taken failed to reflect a reason for her seizures. A second CAT scan ruled out a tumor, so a neurologist was called in for consultation. This expert's initial and final diagnoses were "ideopathic epilepsy," the term "ideopathic" meaning "of unknown cause." At the time of admission, blood and urine samples were taken for use in tests. The first blood screen result showed traces of meperedine hydrochloride (Demerol) and Darvon, a pain reliever. A second screening of more blood taken from the same sample, but run later, reflected minute amounts of Demerol, which could indicate that the patient had taken the substance within the prior 72 hours. It was the pathologist's opinion that Demerol had been taken by Respondent. On the other hand, a false positive test result for Demerol in the blood is possible because many external factors, such as infection or the menstrual period (which Respondent was experiencing at the time), could affect it. I find, however, that based on the findings of the pathologist, an expert in his field, the substance in Respondent's blood was in fact Demerol. Respondent's seizures are now completely controlled through the use of the drugs Dilantin and phenobarbital. Dr. Kammerman is of the opinion that an osteopathic physician who suffers from controlled seizures can safely practice within the disciplines of family practice and internal medicine. Classically, seizure patients can predict the onset of a seizure due to the symptoms they experience before the seizure. Once the patient experiences the preseizure symptoms, he or she may prevent the seizure from occurring depending upon how fast the medicine can be gotten into the bloodstream in amounts sufficient to prevent it. Though Dr. Kammerman has never seen the Respondent go through a seizure and therefore does not know how she would react, he knows it is not uncommon for a patient who has just come out of the unconscious state of a seizure to be disoriented, confused, aggressive, and talkative, even to the extent of refusing help. Mr. Steven L. Southerland, Executive Director of Community Hospital of Palm Beach and one of the individuals who contacted Dr. Morgan regarding Respondent's aberrant behavior, knew her when she was on staff in the Department of Family Practice of that hospital. In the course of his official duties, information was brought to his attention that a patient admitted to the hospital by the Respondent was not seen by her afterwards for several days. This type of conduct was confirmed by Respondent's nurse, Ms. Dukes, who noticed a decided deterioration in Respondent evidenced by days of forgetfulness and confusion. On the other hand, two qualified osteopathic physicians who worked with Dr. Krantz on staff at Community Hospital and who have observed her in the practice of osteopathic medicine off and on for six or more years are satisfied that she is an extremely competent physician. She has assisted one, Dr. Michael A. Longo, in surgery, and he found her work to be excellent. He is aware of her epileptic-based seizures, and this does not change his high opinion of her competence. The other, Dr. Kirsch, who has also collaborated with her on the treatment of several patients, has never had the slightest problem with her, nor has he ever seen her in any way incapacitated.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: The Respondent be found subject to disciplinary action for a violation of Subsections 459.015(1)(1), (q), (r), (s), and (t), Florida Statutes; The license of the Respondent, Dr. Barbara Anne Krantz, to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida be revoked; The revocation be suspended for a period of three years and that she be limited to practice while under the supervision of a licensed osteopathic physician; and, with the further provision, The restrictions and limitations continue for such time and under such terms and conditions as the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners determines necessary to ensure protection of Respondent's patients and her ability to practice osteopathic medicine with reasonable skill and safety. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William H. Pruitt, Esquire Pruitt & Pruitt 501 South Flagler Drive Suite 501 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 455.225459.015893.03893.07
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. THEODORE S. BRANDWEIN, 77-001181 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001181 Latest Update: Apr. 22, 1981

Findings Of Fact At all times here relevant Theodore S. Brandwein, D.O., held License No. 3259 issued by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners. During the calendar year 1977 and for some period subsequent thereto Respondent maintained his office and practice at 18055 Franjo Road, Perrine, Florida under the name of Brandwein Medical Practice, P.A. The sign marking Respondent's office in 1977, when these charges were preferred, is the same sign depicted in Exhibit 6 which is a photograph taken in 1979. It is the sign for which Respondent registered with the Florida Secretary of State as a service mark. In his application (Exhibit 11) for this registration Respondent described this mark as "a stethoscope, binaural in design, lying horizontally on the paper, sign, building, item, or object on which it is emblazoned, the earpieces and connecting piece forming in script the letter 'D' and the tubing and chest piece convoluted to form the 'O'. Taken together, the stethoscope forms the letters 'D. O.'" The application further provided "applicant is the owner of the mark and no other person except a related company has the right to use such mark in Florida, whether in identical form thereof, or in such resemblance thereto as might be, calculated to deceive or confuse". The sign on Respondent's office in 1977 consisted of this mark depicting a convoluted stethoscope which forms the letters "D.O." only after the exercise of a vivid imagination and an appreciation of surrealistic art. In the yellow pages of the 1977 Miami telephone directory Respondent is listed under Physicians and Surgeons MD. (Exhibit 9). He is not listed under Physicians and "Surgeons - DO. (Exhibit 10). Brandwein Medical Practice, P.A., is the Theodore S. Brandwein who is Respondent in these proceedings. Respondent's Florida license is presently inactive.

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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. DONALD WEISS, 86-001731 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001731 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 1986

The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent has engaged in conduct, more particularly set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein, signed April 10, 1986, violative of Chapter 459, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, Donald J. Weiss, D.O., during times material herein, was licensed as an osteopathic physician in Florida and has been issued license number OS 0003459. The investigative report of Petitioner's investigator Mel Waxman, medical records and a consultant's report of Dr. Ralph Birzon, D.O., were received into evidence without objection except for certain unspecified prescriptions (by Respondent). During the time period 1980 through 1985, Respondent admitted to having treated patients R.N., H.M. and C.B. or C.P. Respondent admitted to the treatment of the above- referred patients with specific dates relating to prescriptions of Schedule II drugs for patients R.N. and H.M. (Request for Admissions dated June 2, 1986). A review of the medical records for patients R.N., H.M. and C.B. or C.P. reveals that Respondent failed to maintain appropriate medical records justifying his course of medical treatment for such patients. As example, during the period January 1984 and June 19, 1985, Respondent prescribed 1,970 4 mg. Dilaudid and 380 Seconal 100 mg. capsules for patient R.N. Also, during the same time period, Respondent prescribed 2,665 4 mg. tablets of Dilaudid for patient H.M. (Responses to Request for Admissions dated June 2, 1986). Respondent failed to take adequate physical exams, laboratory reports or other medical histories to justify the quantity of controlled substances prescribed for patients R.N and H.M. In his treatment of patient R.N., H.M. and C.B., each patient was addicted to the medication Dilaudid and Seconal, both Schedule II controlled substances as defined in Sections 893.03(2)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes. Respondent's treatment of patients R.N., H.M. and C.B. by prescribing Dilaudid, Seconal and Valium (also a Schedule II controlled substance) was not in their best interest as addicts. Based upon a review of the medical records for patients R.N., H.M. and C.B. or C.P., Respondent's prescriptions for Dilaudid, Seconal and Valium were excessive, inappropriate and unacceptable for an osteopathic physician. Respondent's treatment for patients R.N., H.M and C.B. or C.P. fell below the level of care, skill and treatment as recognized by a reasonable prudent similar osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. (Testimony of Ralph Birzon, D.O., TR 41-46). An examination of the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) reveals that Respondent, by prescribing Dilaudid and Seconal to patients R.N. and H.M. was inappropriate, and when taken together, exacerbated those patient's medical problems. Additionally, a review of the PDR indicates that Dilaudid cannot be safely prescribed for long periods of time. A long period of time is, based on the reference, a period in excess of three months. Respondent admits that he made a mistake in his treatment of the above-referred patients by prescribing Schedule II controlled substances. Respondent considered that he was "duped" and offered that this was his first contact with drug addicts. Respondent prays that his license not be revoked or suspended and offered to accept any lesser ordered penalty.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED THAT: Respondent's license be suspended for a period of six (6) months; Following the period of suspension, Respondent be placed on probation for a similar period of six (6) months; During the probationary period, Respondent be required to successfully complete eighty (80) hours of continuing education related to the physician and proper substance abuse prescribing procedures. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Preston T. Everett, Jr., Esquire Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Department of Professional Regulation Regulation 130 North Monroe Street 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald J. Weiss, D.O. Wings Benton, Esquire 145 River North Circle General Counsel Atlanta, Georgia 30328 Department of Professional Regulation Rod Presnell, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68459.015893.03
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. WARREN B. MULHOLLAN, 86-003518 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003518 Latest Update: Aug. 17, 1987

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Warren B. Mulhollan has been licensed as an osteopathic physician in Florida. His license number is OS 0000896. At some time in the recent past, respondent was placed on probation. One of the terms of his probation was that he acquire continuing education credits. The Order of probation was not offered into evidence. In April of 1985, respondent was working in a Chinese acupuncture clinic approximately two days a week performing physical examinations and preparing patient histories. He was not writing prescriptions. At the time of the hearing, he was not practicing osteopathic medicine and does not now desire to do so, though he does wish to maintain his license. The respondent is 77 years of age. The respondent did suffer a stroke and has had several transient ischemic attacks over the past few years. For a period of time, he was unable to concentrate and his attention span was limited. He communicated this fact to the Department and requested that he be excused from compliance with the continuing education requirements of the Board. Apparently, the Board never excused the respondent from such requirements. Respondent was examined by two psychiatric physicians in the latter months of 1985 and in April of 1986. It was their understanding from discussions with respondent that he did not desire to have the ability to maintain a practice in the traditional setting. Both physicians were of the opinion that if respondent is unable to pursue continuing education and stay current in his field, he should not practice osteopathic medicine. According to the respondent, his former lack of concentration was due to eye strain. He states that after getting a new pair of glasses, he has no trouble concentrating. He does not wish to maintain a practice of osteopathic medicine in a traditional setting. However, he does desire to retain his license because he takes pride in his past accomplishments in the community, and he enjoys lunching and associating with other doctors and attending lectures and seminars at the Suncoast Hospital. He is willing to maintain a probationary- type practice, file monthly affidavits with the Board and comply with continuing education requirements.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be placed on probation for a period of five (5) years, and that the conditions of probation include the requirements that he attend continuing education courses, that any type of practice in which he engages be performed in a supervised, clinical-type setting with other physicians in the immediate area and that he submit to the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners verified, monthly reports setting forth any hours of osteopathic practice engaged in by him, as well as the names of patients and treatment rendered. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Bryant, Esquire Alpert, Josey, Grilli & Paris, P.A. Ashley Tower, Suite 2000 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 Warren B. Mulhollan, D.O. 2458 Enterprise Road, Apt. 6 Clearwater, Florida 33515 Rod Presnell, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.68459.015
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE vs ADAM PATRICK HALL, D.O., 20-000971PL (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 20, 2020 Number: 20-000971PL Latest Update: Jul. 05, 2024

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent's license or authority to practice osteopathic medicine was acted against by the licensing authority of another jurisdiction, in violation of section 459.015(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016)1; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine and prosecuting disciplinary actions on the Board's behalf, pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 459, Florida Statutes. 2 Respondent's Exhibits A through D were also initially offered into evidence and admitted. However, during the hearing, the parties noted that Respondent's Exhibits A through D duplicated Petitioner's Exhibits A, B, J, and M, except that Petitioner's versions of these exhibits contained redactions. After the hearing, the parties filed a joint motion to allow Respondent to adopt Petitioner's Exhibits A, B, J, and M and withdraw Respondent's Exhibits A through D. The joint motion was granted. Accordingly, the record does not include Respondent's withdrawn Exhibits A through D. 3 By agreeing to an extended deadline of more than ten days after the filing of the transcript for filing PROs, the parties waived the 30-day time period for issuing the Recommended Order. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.216. Respondent is licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in Florida, having been issued license number OS 10315 on or about March 4, 2008. Although Respondent has been licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in Florida since 2008, including at all times relevant to the Complaint, he testified that he did not practice osteopathic medicine in Florida until sometime after December 14, 2016. Currently, Respondent does not hold any other active licenses to practice osteopathic medicine in other states. Previously, he held licenses in Ohio, Missouri, and Kansas. The factual allegation in the Complaint that is the predicate for the charge against Respondent is as follows: On or about December 14, 2016, the State Medical Board of Ohio issued an Entry of Order permanently revoking the license of Respondent to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in the State of Ohio. (Complaint at 2, ¶ 5). The parties stipulated that the Ohio Board is the licensing authority of the practice of osteopathic medicine in the state of Ohio. The parties also stipulated to the following: On December 14, 2016, in case number 16-CRF- 0055 and in accordance with chapter 119, Ohio Revised Code, the State Medical Board of Ohio entered an order which permanently revoked Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. (Amended Jt. Pre- hrg. Stip. Part E (Stipulated Facts), ¶ 10). Respondent disputed the Complaint's allegation quoted above, notwithstanding the stipulations, based on the argument that the word "license" in the Complaint is different from the word "certificate" in the stipulation. Respondent attempted to argue that the "certificate" that was permanently revoked was not a form of authority to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery. Respondent offered various possibilities, such as that the permanently revoked "certificate" must have been the "training certificate" that he believed he was given in 2004 to participate in a training program before licensure, or that it was some other kind of "certificate." Respondent's argument is not credible, is inconsistent with the words following "certificate"—"to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery"—and is wholly unsupported by the evidence. Ohio Licensure History In late December 2003, Respondent applied for osteopathic medical licensure in Ohio via an application for a Certificate to Practice Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery (Ohio Application) submitted to the Ohio Board.4 The application was not deemed officially received for processing until January 29, 2004, because Respondent's initial submission was not accompanied by the required $335.00 fee and he did not pay the fee until January 29, 2004. See Pet. Ex. 1, Bates p. 28, 3, and 18. The Ohio Application form asked whether the applicant was, or intended to be, in an accredited training program in Ohio. Respondent answered that he intended to be in an accredited training program. He identified the training program as Doctor's Hospital/Anesthesiology in Columbus, Ohio, with a planned start date of June 30, 2004. On January 30, 2004, the Ohio Board sent Respondent its "Acknowledgement of Application for Certificate to Practice Medicine and Surgery or Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery" (Acknowledgement), notifying Respondent that his application for a certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was received by the Board on January 29, 2004. The Acknowledgement also notified Respondent that he was authorized to 4 Respondent's entire licensure file, certified as complete by the Ohio Board, is in evidence, with Bates page numbers added in red. It is apparent that the pages representing Respondent's application for licensure to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery are not in order, perhaps because his initial submission in late December 2003 was incomplete and supplemented with various revised answers and additional documentation between 2004 and early 2005. participate in the training program identified in his application: "Please be advised that you are hereby authorized to begin participation in the training program to which you have been appointed … while your application is being processed." (Pet. Ex. 1, Bates p. 18). Respondent claimed that the Acknowledgement notified him that he was granted a "training certificate" so he could participate in the residency program while his application for a license to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was being processed. The Acknowledgement says no such thing. Respondent's argument to the contrary is rejected. No evidence was offered to prove that a training certificate was ever issued to Respondent. Respondent's "training certificate" argument was part of his broader attempt to argue that in Ohio, the terms "certificate" and "license" refer to distinct items, and that a "license" is the form of authority to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery. Here too, Respondent's argument is contradicted by the record evidence and by Ohio law. Beginning with Respondent's initial submission, date-stamped by the Ohio Board on December 23, 2003, it is clear that the specific phrase used to describe the form of authority to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio was a "certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery," although the umbrella term "license" was frequently used interchangeably with "certificate."5 The interchangeable use of "license" and "certificate," prefacing the phrase "to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery," is replete throughout Respondent's Ohio licensure file. The interchangeable use of these terms is evident perhaps nowhere more clearly than in the Ohio Board's form "Affidavit and Release of Applicant [-] Medicine or Osteopathic 5 Pursuant to the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, just as under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, "license" is an umbrella term defined to mean "any license, permit, certificate, commission, or charter issued by any agency." § 119.01(b), Ohio Rev. Code; compare § 120.52(10), Fla. Stat. (defining "license" as "a franchise, permit, certification, registration, charger, or similar form of authorization required by law[.]"). Medicine"6 executed by Respondent and submitted as part of the Ohio Application bearing the Ohio Board's "received" stamp dated December 26, 2003. By the executed affidavit, Respondent certified under oath: that I am the person named in this application for a license to practice medicine or osteopathic medicine in the State of Ohio … and that all documents, forms or copies thereof furnished or to be furnished with respect to my application are strictly true in every respect. … I further understand that the issuance of a certificate to practice medicine or osteopathic medicine in Ohio will be considered based on the truth of the statements and documents contained herein or to be furnished[.] (Pet. Ex. 1, Bates p. 26, emphasis added). Respondent's Ohio Application contained multiple deficiencies and required several rounds of requests for omitted information/documentation followed by submissions that attempted to respond to the requests. This process, documented in Respondent's complete Ohio licensure file in evidence, spanned from early 2004 through early 2005. On April 13, 2005, the Ohio Board gave Respondent notice that it intended to determine whether to refuse to grant his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery, for reasons set forth in a detailed three- page letter. The gist of the reasons was that Respondent allegedly made false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading statements to the Acting Director of Medical Education for Respondent's residency program in Missouri pertaining to Respondent's failure to appear or respond to pages when he was on call. Respondent was informed of his right to a hearing. Respondent requested a hearing, which was held before a hearing examiner for the Ohio Board on August 24, 2005. The hearing examiner's report and recommendation in evidence sets forth a summary of the evidence 6 The title of this form is on two lines: the first line is "Affidavit and Release of Applicant"; the second line, immediately below the first, is "Medicine or Osteopathic Medicine." The dash has been inserted to denote separation between the two lines of the title, for clarity. (including Respondent's testimony at the hearing), findings of fact, and conclusions of law. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 71-80). The findings were that Respondent had failed to report to work when he was scheduled to be the resident on call, and failed to respond to several pages from the emergency department. He met with the Acting Director, and after the meeting, a determination was made to terminate Respondent from the residency program for "grievous dereliction of duty and subsequent imminent risk to quality patient care." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 77). Respondent appealed the termination. Shortly thereafter, upon questioning by the Acting Director, Respondent falsely reported that he had been at the hospital, on duty that night, and received no pages. Respondent said that he had been in the hospital library and had used the computer. The Acting Director asked Respondent three times if he had used the computer at the library, and Respondent said yes. But the Acting Director verified with library staff that the computers had remained inactive during the time in question. Caught in the lie, Respondent ultimately admitted to the Acting Director that he had failed to report to duty. Instead, he had taken cold medicine and slept the entire night at home. Respondent "admitted that he had used very poor judgment and had been dishonest." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 77). Respondent's termination from the residency program was upheld on appeal. The hearing examiner concluded that Respondent's conduct violated section 4731.22(B)(5), Ohio Revised Code (making false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading statements in relation to the practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery), but did not demonstrate a current failure to prove good moral character. The hearing examiner elaborated on these conclusions: Dr. Hall issued a series of deceitful and self-serving misstatements during the course of his practice. Such conduct would justify permanent denial of his certificate to practice in this state. Nevertheless, Dr. Hall admitted his misconduct and deceit within a short time of their occurrence. Moreover, Dr. Hall was forthcoming in his application for licensure in Ohio. Therefore the evidence suggests that Dr. Hall has learned from his mistakes and will be more cautious and forthcoming in the future. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 78, emphasis added). Based on the hearing examiner's findings and conclusions, her proposed order was that Respondent's application "for a certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery" in Ohio be granted, "provided that he otherwise meets all statutory and regulatory requirements." If so, the "certificate" should be issued on the effective date of the order. However, the "certificate" should be immediately suspended for 30 days, then reinstated subject to a number of probationary terms for a period of at least two years. The hearing examiner's proposed order concluded with a provision addressing when the order would become effective: "This Order shall become effective thirty days after mailing of notification of approval by the Board." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 78-80, emphasis added). At a meeting of the Ohio Board on December 14, 2005, the hearing examiner's proposed findings of fact, conclusions, and order were approved. A letter dated December 14, 2005, notifying Respondent that the Ohio Board had approved the hearing examiner's recommendations, bears a notation that it was mailed December 16, 2005. Respondent was required to update certain components of his licensure application. By letter dated December 29, 2005, Respondent was given notice as "a follow-up to your application for Ohio licensure" that he had to update his resume of activities from July 2004 forward; update the listing of licensure activity in other states; and execute another notarized Affidavit and Release of Applicant. (Pet. Ex. A, Bates p. 89, emphasis added). Respondent executed another Affidavit and Release on January 13, 2006; the form appears unchanged from the one he signed in 2003, continuing to use the terms "certificate" and "license" to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery interchangeably (Pet. Ex. A, Bates p. 25). Other updates to his application also were submitted on or shortly after January 13, 2006, including a letter from Doctors Hospital verifying that Respondent was in the anesthesia residency program, having begun February 2, 2004, and was anticipated to complete the program February 1, 2007. The submission of the required update items on or shortly after January 13, 2006, resulted in Respondent's certificate (a/k/a license) to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery being issued on January 17, 2006, two days after it otherwise could have been consistent with the provisions of the hearing examiner's proposed order. Also in accordance with the hearing examiner's proposed order, approved by the Ohio Board, Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was immediately suspended for 30 days, which included the day that the certificate was issued. The 30-day suspension ran from January 17, 2006, through February 15, 2006. Respondent was permitted to practice osteopathic medicine pursuant to his certificate beginning February 16, 2006, subject to the terms of probation for at least two years. Less than six months after Respondent's first suspension was over, Respondent self-reported to the Ohio Board that he was terminated from the anesthesia residency program for diverting a drug he had prescribed to a patient for his own use. One month after the self-report, on August 30, 2006, Respondent signed a Step I Consent Agreement (Step I Agreement) with the Ohio Board. The Step I Agreement included the following stipulations and admissions: Dr. Hall admits that the Board ordered him to submit to a three-day examination at The Woods at Parkside [Parkside], a Board-approved treatment provider in Columbus Ohio, on or about July 31, 2006, based upon his self-report that he was terminated from his anesthesia residency program with Doctors Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, because he diverted for self-use Celestone, a corticosteroid, that he prescribed for a patient; and that he had diverted Kenalog, another corticosteroid, in the past. Dr. Hall further admits that during this examination, he was diagnosed with substance abuse and Bipolar Disorder with mixed anxiety and that he entered Parkside for further treatment, including 28-day residential treatment. Dr. Hall further admits that due to his substance abuse he currently is impaired in his ability to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care because of habitual or excessive use or abuse of drugs, alcohol, or other substances that impair ability to practice and an inability to practice according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care by reason of mental illness or physical illness, including, but not limited to, physical deterioration that adversely affects cognitive, motor, or perceptive skills, due to his Bipolar Disorder with mixed anxiety. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 57). The Step I Agreement provided that, based on the stipulations and admissions, Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was suspended indefinitely. A series of requirements and conditions were imposed, which had to be met before the Ohio Board would "consider reinstatement of Dr. Hall's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 60). The Step I Agreement took effect September 13, 2006, when signed on behalf of the Ohio Board. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 63). Six months later, on March 14, 2007, Respondent and the Ohio Board entered into the Step II Consent Agreement (Step II Agreement). Pursuant to the Step II Agreement, the indefinite suspension was lifted and Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was conditionally reinstated under new probationary terms set forth in the Step II Agreement. The Step II Agreement contained additional stipulations and admissions agreed to by Respondent, including: C. Dr. Hall is applying for reinstatement of his license to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in the state of Ohio, which was indefinitely suspended pursuant to the terms of the [Step I Agreement]. * * * E. Dr. Hall admits that he initially entered inpatient treatment for cortical steroid abuse, at the Woods at Parkside [Parkside], a Board- approved treatment provider in Columbus, Ohio, on or about July 31, 2006, that he transitioned to out- patient treatment on or about August 28, 2006, and that he was subsequently discharged, treatment complete, on or about September 5, 2006. Dr. Hall further admits that in addition to his abuse of corticosteroids, in the past he also self-medicated with Elavil and Ultram, and excessively consumed alcohol to the point of having blackout events. Dr. Hall further admits that during his treatment at Parkside, he received an additional diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder for which he was prescribed medication. * * * G. … Dr. Hall states … that Victoria Sanelli, M.D., a psychiatrist who was approved by the Board to provide an assessment of Dr. Hall, evaluated Dr. Hall and submitted a report to the Board … in which she stated that Dr. Hall's diagnoses include steroid dependence in early sustained remission, and that although Dr. Hall has been recently diagnosed with possible Bipolar Disorder, it was Dr. Sanelli's opinion as an addiction psychiatrist that it is extremely difficult to assign an Axis I diagnosis to someone who has recently been involved in substance abuse. … Dr. Sanelli further opined that Dr. Hall has a Mood Disorder, which may be depressed mood or Bipolar Disorder, and that Dr. Hall's ability to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery has been assessed, and he is capable of practicing according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care so long as certain treatment and monitoring requirements are in place. The Step II Agreement provided that reinstatement of Respondent's license would be subject to a probationary term of at least five years from March 14, 2007, with numerous conditions and limitations imposed, including the treatment and monitoring requirements deemed necessary to ensure Respondent remained capable of practicing according to acceptable standards of care. The terms of Respondent's probation included random drug and alcohol tests, evaluations, restrictions on travel outside the state, use of a monitoring physician to monitor Respondent's practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery, and submission of quarterly reports to the Ohio Board in which Respondent attested under oath to full compliance with all conditions of the Step II Agreement. Respondent testified that, at the beginning, he complied with the probationary terms he agreed to. For example, with regard to the travel restrictions, in 2007, when Respondent decided on the spur of the moment to travel to Alabama to visit a friend, he requested and obtained last-minute permission from the Ohio Board for the trip with the proviso that he continue to be subject to random screenings and go to meetings there. However, in or about September 2008, after the Step II Agreement had been in place for only a year and a half, Respondent decided he could no longer comply with the agreement he entered into. When his brothers, who lived in Florida, asked him to travel with them to Italy and Lebanon for a vacation, for which the brothers would pay, Respondent agreed. The brothers coordinated the travel dates to work with Respondent's schedule. Respondent testified that he could not recall how long the trip was, but it was more than one week and possibly less than two weeks. Even though this longer trip was planned, rather than spontaneous like the Alabama trip for which Respondent had obtained Ohio Board approval, this time Respondent did not request approval. This was no accident. Instead, Respondent schemed to leave "clean" urine samples and slips filled out to submit with the samples to the lab, and left them behind with an employee who kept the samples in a freezer and submitted one or more samples while Respondent was out of the country. Respondent devised this scheme to cover up his unauthorized travel, and to give the impression that the samples were being given contemporaneously with their submission to the lab. Instead, Respondent went unmonitored during his unauthorized trip abroad. This was a blatant and devious affront to the terms of the Step II Agreement Respondent promised to abide by. At the hearing, Respondent attempted to explain several different times why he carried out a scheme to circumvent the Step II Agreement's monitoring requirements and cover up his unauthorized travel: Because I had no control in my life. I was doing everything that the board had asked; I had gone to meetings, two, three, sometimes four times a week as required; I was doing random urine drug screens for almost two years; and I had done everything that was asked, and I felt I had no control of my life. I wasn't getting anywhere with this board program. I felt that they were completely inflexible and had a total lack of understanding. And I thought that the suspension—I'm sorry; the impairment diagnosis for basically prednisone, which is an anti-inflammatory drug, was cruel. … [W]hen the program in Ohio said that I had an [impairment], based on the use of drug that in literature is used for inflammatory conditions, it blew my mind. I was still being required to test like a drug addict for over two years and I was labeled a drug addict for two-plus years at that point, and the board didn't want to listen to my protest or my concerns. And there was just a total lack of understanding on the part of the board. And I—and I got—I got overwhelmed emotionally. And just said I had enough of being controlled by somebody who didn't—who didn't have any of my interests at heart. They only wanted to punish. (Tr. 135-136). * * * I was put in a vice like a grape and crushed. (Tr. 142). * * * I don't know that I thought it was okay [to circumvent the Step Two Agreement]. … At the time, like I said, I was under the impairment agreement; I was hoping there would be some benefits to asking for help for mental health issues, and like I said, rolling in the drug portion. But as time went on, there was no positive affect on my life. I couldn't travel to see family. Family is important. Family is who we turn to in times of stress. I couldn't see them without the board's approval. I couldn't find work because of the scarlet letter that was on me. I couldn't find work because I didn't finish the residency. You know, I think when we tell patients by the way, we have a treatment for your problem, but it's going to kill you, most people would say, well, screw that, I'm not going to do it. And you know, I don't think any of the downside was anticipated by me. (Tr. 144). I didn't foresee all of the negative repercussions that would come through in my life. And I was—I was adhering to everything they that they asked of me, meetings, urine drug screens. This—you know, when you have to do a urine drug screen, you have to basically strip for them and someone has to look at you. And it's intrusive. And I was doing that. I was more than willing to work within their system, and do back flips and front flips. If they said, you know, stand on one leg, I would have said yes, sir, for how long, sir? But at the same time, you could only get beaten and put into a corner for so long and say what in the hell is this program designed to do except excommunicate people from a profession? … And so I broke. After a certain amount of time, I broke. It was too much. I—I know I did something stupid. I know I did. And I regret it every day of my life. And I look at it and kick myself and wish I would have never done it. But all I can say is I'm sorry. … So, you know, that's all I can say. I know I screwed up and I took the punishment for it, and I'm here today to say, I am not that person from 12 years ago. (Tr. 145-146). * * * In 2008, like I said, I had been compliant with the board's ruling since '06, since August of '06. I think it was August of '06. And now we're looking at two years later and despite having done everything the board asked, I'm getting—I'm getting nowhere. I'm just feeling like I'm spinning my wheels and there's no end in sight to this—to this situation. And so I threw my hands up. (Tr. 149). No evidence was offered to substantiate Respondent's dramatic claims that the Ohio Board showed inflexibility, a lack of understanding, or an unwillingness to consider any protests or concerns submitted by Respondent. No evidence was offered to show that the Ohio Board ever denied a request by Respondent to travel; the only evidence was that Respondent's single last- minute request was granted and Respondent was allowed to meet his monitoring and treatment requirements while traveling. As Respondent acknowledged, the Step II Agreement that he signed was for a minimum of five years, beginning March 2007. Before March 2007, Respondent was subject to the Step I Agreement, which he also signed. These agreements included stipulations and admissions agreed to by Respondent, and imposed terms and conditions that he accepted. Respondent's characterization at the hearing of the terms he had agreed to as cruel, and his explanation at the hearing that he could not abide by the Step II Agreement because he decided he needed to take back control, after less than one-third of the five-year minimum term had passed, are very troubling current-day admissions. Respondent attempted to refute his admissions in the Step I and Step II Agreements, disputing the substance abuse characterizations and claiming that he admitted to them as a means to have his license reinstated. Without any evidentiary basis to contradict his own admissions in the Step I and Step II Agreements, it is sufficient for purposes of this proceeding to simply point out that Respondent's admissions speak for themselves, and Respondent is not painted in a favorable light, whether he admitted to facts he did not believe as a means to the end of having his suspended license reinstated or whether he admitted to facts that were true. Respondent's claims of oppression and torture (i.e., being put in a vice like a grape and crushed) to explain the backdrop to the Ohio Board's action permanently revoking his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine cause concern. Respondent overly dramatizes the simple fact that he chose to enter into the Step I and Step II Agreements, regardless of his rationalizations for having done so. Also of concern is that for all of his dramatic expressions at the hearing, Respondent ignored a troubling series of admissions. In the Step II Agreement, Respondent admitted to diverting the hospital's prescription medication that he had prescribed for a patient for his own use, and he also admitted to having diverted other medication for his own use in the past. His diversion of hospital medication that he prescribed for a patient for his own use instead was essentially theft, resulting in his termination from the hospital's residency program. Respondent admitted to drug diversion on more than one occasion, in addition to self-medicating, and those admissions were predicates for the conditions imposed by the Step II Agreement. At the hearing, Respondent never addressed this dishonest conduct. That makes Respondent's attempted explanation for why he could no longer abide by the Step II Agreement, with three and a half years left to the agreement he entered into, wholly unsatisfactory. Respondent seemingly has not recognized that these underlying dishonest dealings in medication played a part in his being "painted with a scarlet letter." Whether he recognized it or not, he certainly expressed no remorse. Respondent's scheme to violate the Step II Agreement and cover up his violation succeeded, initially, and for several years thereafter. Respondent made it to the end of his five-year probation, falsely representing under oath to the Ohio Board in quarterly reports that he complied with the terms the entire time. Respondent's probation was lifted under false presences, based on the false impression given by Respondent to the Ohio Board that as of March 14, 2012, he had complied with the Step II Agreement for the five-year probationary term. From then until April 1, 2013, Respondent's certificate to practice was active and unrestricted for the first time since it was issued. Respondent's scheme came to light after Respondent fired an employee and reported to police that the employee was discovered forging prescriptions to obtain prescription drugs. The employee reciprocated by reporting to the Ohio Board that Respondent had falsified his urine samples to cover up an unauthorized jaunt abroad, during which he evaded the required monitoring. Once again, Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio was immediately and indefinitely suspended by the Ohio Board on April 1, 2013. Criminal charges were brought against Respondent in the fall of 2014, based on his scheme to have an employee submit "clean" urine samples that were kept in a freezer, with slips Respondent filled out ahead of time, to give the appearance that he was providing those samples while he was on his overseas trip. Respondent's Ohio certificate to practice osteopathic medicine was still under indefinite suspension when it came up for biennial renewal in 2014. Respondent chose not to renew the license, so the license became inactive on October 1, 2014, but remained under suspension. Respondent did not surrender his license/certificate to practice osteopathic medicine in 2014 or at any time thereafter. On March 2, 2016, Respondent pled guilty to, and was found guilty of, two felonies: attempted tampering with evidence, a fourth degree felony; and possession of criminal tools, a fifth degree felony. After the felony convictions, on April 13, 2016, the Ohio Board both vacated the summary suspension of his certificate and initiated the disciplinary action against Respondent's certificate, designated case number 16-CRF-0055, notwithstanding that Respondent's certificate was inactive. The notice mailed to Respondent on April 14, 2016, informed Respondent that the Ohio Board "intends to determine whether or not to limit, revoke, permanently revoke, suspend, refuse to register or reinstate your certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery, or to reprimand you or place you on probation" for reasons enumerated in the notice. The reasons included the two felony convictions, Respondent's falsification of his quarterly reports to the Ohio Board attesting to full compliance with the Step II Agreement, and Respondent's violations of the limits placed on his certificate to practice pursuant to the terms of the Step II Agreement. Respondent was informed of his right to a hearing. Respondent asked for a hearing regarding the proposed disciplinary action against his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. Respondent testified at the hearing in this case that he pursued a hearing before the Ohio Board in the hope that he and his attorneys could persuade the Ohio Board to reinstate his inactive license. In his view, he had been punished enough and deserved something less than the most draconian punishment of permanent revocation. He believed that reinstating his license, likely subject to more conditions, was a possible outcome of the proceeding. Instead, the decision following an evidentiary hearing was to permanently revoke Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. The written decision reflects that the basis for the permanent revocation was, in part, Respondent's lack of remorse, downplaying his past crimes for which he pled guilty, and dishonesty displayed at the hearing. After setting forth proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the hearing examiner provided a summary to explain why the proposed order recommended permanent revocation: Dr. Hall was dismissed from a residency program at the University of Health Sciences in Independence, Missouri, for sleeping through a shift, then lied about his whereabouts in an effort to regain his position. Before this Board, he testified that he learned his lesson and had come to understand the importance of telling the truth. Yet while working at Doctors Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, he created a false patient record in order to obtain corticosteroids to treat his own pain. Then, in 2008, Dr. Hall devised and employed a scheme to deceive the Board that he remained in Ohio when in fact he was abroad, because he feared his request to travel might be refused. He caused specimens, provided in different times than he had indicated, to be submitted for drug testing, as part of that scheme. He has been under Board supervision his entire tenure in Ohio, up to 2012. It is indeed true that several years have passed since the 2008 conduct at issue in this hearing, and that there have been no proven instances of misconduct or non-compliance with monitoring for the five years between 2008 and 2013, when Dr. Hall's license was summarily suspended, or since early 2016 when Dr. Hall resumed practice in Florida. But his career up to that point in 2008 had consisted of a nearly unbroken chain of deceitful conduct, and for four of the five following years, Dr. Hall had remained under Board supervision on pain of revocation of his license. So the question now is whether Dr. Hall's pattern of lying "under pressure" was situational, caused by pain, depression, and perhaps frustration, the causes of which are largely in his past, or whether this conduct reflects an ingrained character trait. Given his history, if Dr. Hall wished to regain the Board's "trust" and demonstrate a character trait for truthfulness, it was incumbent upon Dr. Hall to testify with complete candor in the proceedings before this Hearing Examiner. This Hearing Examiner did not, however, find Dr. Hall's testimony to be particularly credible as a general matter, based on his demeanor and testimony. Three factors stand out in particular: Dr. Hall attempted to minimize his deceit to [the Acting Director of his Missouri residency program] … . But the Board's prior finding was that Dr. Hall's lie was premeditated; … Dr. Hall repeatedly attempted to minimize the character of his scheme to conceal from the Board his travel outside Ohio, and to submit urine specimens not given at the times indicated … . … Dr. Hall repeatedly resorted to pat phrases to describe, and in all likelihood exaggerate, the level of discomfort he experienced … . The evidence that Dr. Hall's persistent lack of candor is merely a result of past causes, no longer at play in his life, is less than convincing. Accordingly, this Hearing Examiner does not believe that the record reflects mitigating circumstances sufficient to support providing a pathway for Dr. Hall to regain licensure by this Board.[7] (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 27-28). 7 The hearing examiner's observation regarding whether mitigating circumstances supported providing a pathway for Respondent to regain licensure confirms Respondent's testimony that the reason he invested time and resources in this hearing was in the hope that the Ohio Board would consider mitigating circumstances, with the possibility of having his license reinstated subject to conditions. This would have been similar to the approach of the Step I and Step II Agreements, whereby in Step I, Respondent's certificate to practice was suspended, and would be considered for reinstatement only after Respondent complied with a series of requirements, followed by Step II, which was treated as an application for reinstatement, and was granted subject to limitations and conditions. This time, Respondent failed to convince the hearing examiner or the Ohio Board to allow another similar pathway. The Ohio Board entered an Order on December 14, 2016, attaching and incorporating the hearing examiner's report and recommendation and ordering as follows: "The certificate of Adam Patrick Hall, D.O., to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in the State of Ohio shall be permanently revoked." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 3). Just as Respondent's candor was found lacking in the Ohio proceeding, so, too, at the hearing in this case, Respondent was not credible, based on his demeanor and testimony. Instead, he was evasive, dramatizing his personal tribulations to which he attributed his past mistakes, while downplaying the extent and significance of his past wrongdoing. Several months after the Ohio Board permanently revoked Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine, Respondent's counsel, who had represented him since the Ohio proceedings in 2016, and worked with local Ohio counsel in the 2016 disciplinary proceeding, wrote the following on his behalf as a "self-report" to the Department on April 3, 2017: Please be advised that Adam Hall is represented by Chapman Law Group before the Florida Department of Health ("Department") and Board of Osteopathic Medicine ("Board"). … In November 2016, Dr. Hall submitted his response to the Department's Administrative Complaint. Subsequently, the Ohio Board of Osteopathic Medicine took action against his license. To wit, on December 15, 2016, by an order of the Board, Dr. Halls' [sic] Osteopathic medical license was permanently revoked. Such an order was based on convictions in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Ohio in which Dr. Hall pled guilty to Attempted Tampering of Evidence, a fourth degree felony and Possession of Criminal Tools, a fifth degree felony. … Dr. Hall knows that pursuant to Florida Statute, his Ohio Board action constitutes grounds for disciplinary action, as specified in s. 456.072(2). To wit s. 456.015 [sic; 459.015(1)(b)] reads that: Having a license or the authority to practice osteopathic medicine revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against, including the denial of licensure, by the licensing authority of any jurisdiction, including its agencies or subdivisions. The licensing authority's acceptance of a physician's relinquishment of license, stipulation, consent order, or other settlement offered in response to or in anticipation of the filing of administrative charges against the physician shall be construed as action against the physician's license. Chapman Law Group respectfully submits that no action is needed on the part of either the Department or Board, because Dr. Hall reported this incident to the Department as required by law. (Pet. Ex. E, emphasis added). The letter was submitted on Respondent's behalf by attorneys Steven D. Brownlee and Ronald W. Chapman for the firm. Other Relevant Facts Respondent had a license to practice osteopathic medicine in Missouri at one time. He testified that "Missouri followed the action of Ohio, and I lost my license to practice in Missouri." (Tr. 148). Respondent did not provide specific details regarding the basis for the Missouri action to take away Respondent's license to practice in Missouri. Respondent had a license to practice osteopathic medicine in Kansas at one time. Respondent did not provide details regarding what happened to the Kansas license he held at one time. Respondent's Ohio licensure file contains a Kansas license verification form submitted as part of Respondent's application for a license (certificate) to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. The Kansas license verification form dated April 15, 2004, reports that Respondent's "original license date" was April 26, 2003; and the "expiration date" was September 30, 2003. The license status was reported as "cancelled." (Pet. Ex. A, Bates p. 31). No other evidence was offered regarding Respondent's Kansas licensure history, the reason for the short duration of his license, or why his license was "cancelled." As previously noted, Respondent has also been licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in Florida since 2008. However, he testified that he did not begin practicing in Florida until after the Ohio proceedings concluded with the Ohio Board's order of permanent revocation. There is no evidence of any blemishes on his track record practicing in Florida, but the tenure has been relatively short—three and a half years at the time of the hearing.8 Respondent is married, with three children. At the time of his hearing in Ohio that resulted in permanent revocation of his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine, his now-wife was his fiancée and they had a one- month-old child. Respondent testified that his wife is a lawyer. He credited her with coming up with the argument that the permanent revocation of his "certificate" to practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio was arguably something different than a permanent revocation of a "license" to practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio. Respondent noted that she raised this question before the Ohio disciplinary hearing, but the argument was not pursued there.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Adam Patrick Hall, D.O.'s, license to practice osteopathic medicine and assessing costs against him for the investigation and prosecution of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Jovane Williams, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Ronald W. Chapman, Esquire Chapman Law Group 6841 Energy Court Sarasota, Florida 34240 (eServed) Lauren Ashley Leikam, Esquire Chapman Law Group 6841 Energy Court Sarasota, Florida 34240 (eServed) Jamal Burk, Esquire Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Kama Monroe, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medicine Department of Health Bin C-06 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3257 (eServed) Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health Bin C-65 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed)

Florida Laws (8) 119.01120.52120.569120.5720.43456.015456.072459.015 Florida Administrative Code (4) 28-106.21328-106.21664B15-19.00264B15-19.003 DOAH Case (1) 20-0971PL
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