Findings Of Fact The School Board of Pinellas County is a public employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). The Charging Party is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(10). During December, 1975, the Charging Party filed a representation petition with the Public Employees Relations Commission seeking to represent a unit of employees of the Public Employer. Proceedings were conducted in accordance with the petition, and on February 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission, through its chairman, issued a Direction Of Election. A copy of the Direction was received into evidence at the hearing in this case as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The appropriate collective bargaining unit is therein described as follows: "Included: All eligible employees of the Pinellas County School Board employed in the ground maintenance, transportation, plant operations, warehouse and food-service departments. Excluded: All other non-instructional, instructional, and clerical employees; and all managerial/confidential employees of the Pinellas County School Board. See Attachment A." The election as conducted on or about March 11, 1976, and a majority of the employees in the unit described in the Direction of Election voted in favor of representation by the Charging Party for purposes of collective bargaining. The Public Employer thereafter filed objections to the conduct of the election (Respondent's Exhibit 4). The chairman of the Public Employees Relations Commission entered a report on objections on March 31, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 5). The chairman dismissed the objections on the grounds that they were not timely filed. On May 12, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission certified the Charging Panty as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit of employees described in the Direction of Election and in the Erratum issued by the chairman of the Commission on February 26, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 3). The Public Employer filed a request for review of the chairman's dismissal of the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 6). By decision issued September 7, 1976, the Commission dismissed the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 7). The Public Employer thereafter filed a Petition For Re-Hearing. Further proceedings respecting certification of the bargaining unit were not made a part of the record in this case; however, it is assumed for the purposes of this Recommended Order that the Public Employer is in the process of appealing the Commission's decisions. Following the election, on April 2, 1976, the Charging Party wrote to the Public Employer requesting that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 1). The Public Employer responded by letter dated April 27, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibit 2), as follows: "As you know, the school board, through the superintendent and my office, has taken appropriate steps to appeal certain procedures relating to the election held in the above matter. Until that procedure has been finalized before the Commission, we will not be in a position to enter into negotiations. It is further noted that you have not received an official notice that you are now the bargaining agent on behalf of a segment of the supporting services of the school board. Until such time as all the proper procedures have been taken before the Commission and a final determination has been made by the courts of the State of Florida, and you have been recognized by the school board as the bargaining agent on behalf of the supporting services employees, we would respectfully deny your request at this time." Following its certification as the collective bargaining representative, by letter dated May 17, 1976, the Charging Party again requested that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 3). Further requests were made by letters dated August 5, 1976, and August 26, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibits 4, 5). The Public Employer has not responded either in writing or verbally to the requests to open negotiations, other than through its letter of April 27, 1976. The Public Employer has refused to enter into collective bargaining negotiations with the Charging Party, and continues to refuse to enter into negotiations until a final determination is made by the courts respecting the Charging Party's certification, and until the school board has recognized the Charging Party.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Public Employees Relations Commission enter an order requiring the School Board of Pinellas County to recognize the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221 as the exclusive bargaining agent of the unit of employees certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission; that the School Board of Pinellas County cease and desist from refusing to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; that the School Board of Pinellas County forthwith enter into good faith collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; and that the School Board of Pinellas County advise the Public Employees Relations Commission in writing of what steps it has taken to comply with the final order of the Public Employees Relations Commission between 30 and 45 days following entry of an order by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: B. Edwin Johnson, Esquire Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Austin Reed, Esquire Public Employee Relations Commission Suite 300 - 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward Draper 5400 West Waters Avenue Tampa, Florida
Findings Of Fact Jurisdiction: The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that the Respondent is a Public Employer with its principal place of business located in the City of Port St. Joe, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a city. Respondent is created directly by the Florida State Constitution and/or legislative body so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government as administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or to the general electorate. On the foregoing, I find that the Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Labor Organization Involved: On the basis of a prior administrative determination and in conjunction with an order of the Public Employees Relations Commission and its decision in case no. 8H-RC-7053-0053, 1 find that the Laborers International Union of North America, Local No. 1306, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices: A. introduction The complaint alleges, and the General Counsel and the Charging Party contend, that the Respondent, through its representative, Mr. Hadden, engaged in a systematic pattern of harassment directed against Mr. Burrows, the Charging Party, because of Mr. Burrows union activity. Based on this harassment, the complaint alleges that Mr. Burrows was forced to quit on February 10, 1976, and was therefore constructively discharged. Respondent's position is that assuming that the allegations of the complaint are true, it should be dismissed because the Public Employees Relations Commission, hereinafter PERC, previously determined that Hadden was a member of the bargaining unit and therefore Respondent can not be held responsible for unfair labor practices of an employee. Alternatively, the Respondent alleges that if it is determined that PERC's original decision was incorrect and Hadden is a managerial employee within the meaning of the Act, the actions of Hadden did not constitute harassment of Mr. Burrows. Furthermore, it is contended that Mr. Burrows was merely asked to perform various jobs which are performed by every other employee of the public works department. Respondent urges that its actions towards Burrows were in no way discriminatory nor did they constitute harassment. Contrawise, Respondent contends that there was no constructive discharge but rather Burrows voluntarily quit his job without notice. The Respondent, City of Port St. Joe, is managed by a five member City Commission. The City's operations are divided into three principle departments: Waste Water Treatment; Parks and Cemeteries, Water and Sewer; and Roads and Streets. About 40 employees work under manager R. F. Simon at the Waste Water Treatment Plant and Curtis Lane is Simon's assistant. The plant is located on the north side of the City. G. L. Scott supervises about 10 employees working in Parks and Cemeteries, Water and Sewer. Dorton Hadden supervises about 20 employees in the Road and Streets Department. Employees of Hadden and Scott work up town, which is approximately one mile away from Simon's Employees. R. F. Simon reports directly to the City Commissioners. According to his testimony, he, as directed by the City Commission, supervises Hadden and Scott concerning some of their duties, but that for other duties, Hadden and Scott report directly to the Commission. According to Brock, Hadden hires, fires and disciplines his employees and reports such activity to the City Commission. According to him, he knew of no instance where Hadden's decisions were questioned by the City. It is fair to state that Hadden was solely in charge of his employees and that the City's prior consent is not required for him to exercise his powers as it relates to the hiring, firing and disciplining of employees in his department. Hadden also testified that he worked directly for the City Commission, and he has the power to hire, discipline and fire employees. He is not required to obtain permission to fire employees but he usually contacts the Mayor to explain the reasons why an employee is fired or otherwise disciplined. Hadden has rarely exercised this authority as most employees usually quit when they find better jobs. Hadden does not evaluate his employees and there is no senority system in his department since every employee, according to him, is a laborer and performs essentially the same work. Newly hired employees are placed on a three month probationary status after which they are placed on permanent status. According to him, the purpose of probationary is two fold: to determine whether or not an employee will stay on the job long enough such that processing of formal papers such as insurance and other necessary items will not be an exercise in futility and secondly an employee can decide whether he can perform the required "dirty work" during that period. He was unable to recall terminating any one during their probationary status, however, he did recall one employee who quit since the job required too much "dirty work". On January 27, 1976, Laborer's International Union of North America, Local No. 1306 filed a representation petition seeking a secret ballot election for a unit of blue collar employees of the City. On June 16, 1975, a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings conducted a public hearing on the appropriate unit question. Pursuant to the record developed in that case on December 23, 1975, the Public Employees Relations Commission determined the following appropriate bargaining unit. Included: All employees of the City. Excluded: All sworn police officers, fire fighters, hospital and medical care employees of the City. See PERC decision and order in case no. 8H-RC-753-0053, Charging Party's Exhibit 2b, received into evidence and made a part hereof by reference. PERC designated Brock and Simon managerial employees within the meaning of Section 447.203(4) of the Act. Hadden was included in the unit as a working foreman", the person who essentially "directs and assist the accomplishment of specific, tasks." The Commission found that Hadden's degree of supervision is not of such magnitude as to create an untenable conflict of interest between the lower level supervisors and other rank and file employees. See Exhibit 2(b) supra, at page 3. Thereafter an election was conducted by the Commission on February 4, 1976 and on February 18, 1976, the Union was certified as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the employees in the above referenced unit. William Edward Burrows was initially hired by the City on September 3, 1974. Burrows had worked for the City on two prior occasions, once in 1972 and a second time in 1973. He was hired by Hadden on each occasion. The record also reveals that Burrows was employed several times for the Comforter Funeral Home where he was employed by W. P. Comforter, Sr., the funeral director. Based on the testimony of W. P. Comforter, Jr., Burrows had little if any difficulty performing his work duties as required however, Comforter, Jr. testified that he doubted whether he would reemploy Burrows since he left their employment at least once without prior notice. Burrows testified that he initially left the City's employ due to marital problems. He quit the second time for a better job and the third time his separation resulted from his discharge which is here alleged as a constructive discharge. During September 1974, he was hired as a dog catcher for the City. At that time there was no dog pound however, there was a dog pound in operation during December 1974 to December 1975. Prior to the pound being built, Burrows performed odd jobs, such as cutting grass, truck driving, picking up trash and assisting summer school employees clean out drainage ditches. In early December 1975, Burrows drove a garbage truck. During the period of approximately three weeks preceding Christmas and approximately two to three weeks after New Years, he strung Christmas lights. During that period he also was assigned to drive the dump truck hauling dirt and assisting employees with the operation of the dragline and front-end loaders. During the week of January 19 - 23 and on January 26 and 27, Burrows substituted as janitor at City Hall for Joe Badger who was on a two week vacation. According to Burrows, Hadden assigned him to replace Badger for the entire two week period, January 19 - January 30. According to him, his working relationship with Hadden was good prior to his attendance of a union meeting held January 26, 1976, and that he enjoyed working for Hadden. Burrows attended his first union meeting on January 26, 1976, which was conducted by Roy Scherer, area business representative for LIUNA, and Charles Carrol, a union member at a local plant. Prior to departing, Burrows was asked to volunteer to be a poll watcher for the union in the forth coming election. Scherer selected Burrows for the job and Burrows agreed to do so. At least one other employee, Leonard Alexander, who was also present at the January 26, meeting testified that he and others had not volunteered since they were concerned about their job security and were afraid of losing their job if they did so. On January 27, 1976, at approximately 4:15 P.M., Hadden stopped by City Hall where Burrows was replacing janitor Joe Badger for two weeks. Hadden told Burrows he wanted to talk to him in private and at Hadden's request, they rode in Hadden's truck to a warehouse approximately 1 mile away, where Hadden stopped to speak briefly with Lincoln Griffin. They then returned to City Hall at approximately 4:45 P.M. According to Burrows, while in Hadden's vehicle on the way to the warehouse, he inquired if he went to union meetings; who was there; what he thought of the union and how he was going to vote. Burrows replied that he was not definite in his responses concerning how he would vote but Hadden nevertheless urged Burrows to change his mind about unionization. Hadden admitted that the conversation with Burrows included some talk about the union and whether Burrows liked it or not and if he thought it would be good. He asked Burrows what he thought about the union and the conversation lasted approximately 5 minutes while he drove to the warehouse. According to Hadden, Burrows' response was that he hadn't made up his mind what he was going to do about the union whereupon Hadden admitted that he could have told Burrows that he would appreciate it if Burrows would change his mind. According to Burrows, Hadden had never talked to him like that before and that the only purpose for him doing so was for him to inquire about him, about the activities above mentioned as Hadden had no work assignment for him at the warehouse. The following morning, Wednesday, January 28, 1976, Burrows reported to the warehouse at 7:00 A.M. as requested by Hadden. Burrows related that he found that Hadden and the rest of the employees were not as friendly as they usually were. According to him, they "stayed away from him". When work time commenced, Hadden directed Burrows to get a shovel and that he had a job for him. Hadden reassigned Cuz VanDavender to replace Joe Badger saying "...I'm going to have to send you up there, Cuz." Hadden then took Burrows out to a ditch on Long Avenue between 7th and 8th Streets and told him to clean it out. Burrows was given no explanation for the change in assignment. Burrows testified that this was the first occasion since he commenced employment with the City on September 3, 1974, that he was assigned to clean out a ditch alone although he had assisted school boys which he supervised in digging during the prior summer and in storm situations. He testified that during the course of his employment his assignment to dig or clean out ditches was infrequent and with the assistance of other employees. While in route to the work site, Hadden asked Burrows if he had changed his mind about the union and Burrows replied that he had not made up his mind. He replied that he would "appreciate it if he (Burrows) would change his mind in the way he would vote for the union." Burrows testified that normally it is the trash crews' responsibility to clean out the ditches on Wednesdays since there was no schedule for picking up trash one that day. Burrows testified that the ditches were usually dug out with a backhoe or a dragline, which machinery was available on that date. Burrows spent the morning of January 28, raking leaves and limbs and digging out the ditch. On that evening, he was assigned to get a crowbar, axe and hammer and directed to proceed to an abandoned school, Washington High, in north Port St. Joe to pull nails out of a pile of rafters that had been torn down. Burrows had previously been out to the school during the winter along with six or seven other employees. During that time, they used the dragline to partially demolish the building while Burrows pulled nails out of the torn down rafters. Burrows testified that the school grounds were littered with broken glass, nails and other debris. The building is located approximately one block from the nearest residence. Upon his arrival at the school, Burrows was unable to locate any rafters or anything knocked down and when Hadden stopped by later to check on Burrows, he told Hadden he could not find any rafters whereupon Hadden told him to "getup there and knock them down yourself". Burrows, pursuant to that directive, proceeded to a one story section of the building and began tearing down rafters. Hadden witnessed Burrows in and around the building tearing down some two-by-fours and getting what he could. While Burrows considered the job to be a dangerous one, he never voiced this complaint about his assignment to Hadden. Hadden stated that there was no urgency in sending Burrows out to the school, however, it was just another job that needed to be completed. Later in his testimony, he indicated that he had sent Burrows to the school since the lumber was being stolen band he felt that the job was urgent. On Thursday, February 5, Burrows reported to work as usual. He started to take the trash truck on the scheduled run because one employee, Messenger Cotton, who normally drives the truck, was on vacation and Hadden had previously informed him that he would be Cotton's replacement. When he got to the site, Hadden instructed him to get out because he had secured two men from Scott's Sewer and Parks Department to drive two of the trash trucks and had recruited another employee, Bailey, who works a few days a month to drive the third trash truck. According to Burrows, it was unusual for Hadden to use Scott's employees. Instead of driving the trash truck, Burrows was assigned to clean out ditches near Garrison Avenue. One assignment was to clean out a ditch behind the Union Hall on Garrison Avenue by deepening it about six inches. The ditch was approximately 40 feet long. According to Burrows, the ditch was wet, cold and had water in it but Hadden gave him no boots. Burrows worked on that ditch on February 5, the morning following the election, and was "assigned to all various little ditches the rest of the afternoon all over town." The following day, Burrows was assigned to dig out a ditch on Garrison Avenue. He finished the assigned job. When Burrows was assigned to dig out the Garrison Avenue ditch, three employees from the trash crew had been there the day prior but since the trash crew had not adequately completed it, Burrows was assigned to complete the task. The following Monday, February 9, 1976, Burrows was sick with the flu. His wife called to advise Hadden of her husband's illness and inability to work. Hadden thanked Mrs. Burrows and stated that he hoped Burrows would feel better soon. On Tuesday, February 10, the following day, Burrows reported to work at the warehouse before starting time. He testified that he still "felt pretty well down in the weather from the flu, but he could not afford to miss work and be docked for it." Hadden again assigned him to work in a ditch using a shovel. Burrows did not follow those instructions since, according to him, he was "half way sick and felt like Mr. Hadden was harassing him so he went home." Hadden testified that when he instructed Burrows to clean up the ditch between 7th and 8th streets, on January 28, the ditch was dry and it was not raining and had not rained for some time. He said that he gave Burrows a shovel because the ditch contained only straw and leaves and that was all that was necessary to clean it out. Employees Beard, Gaynor and several others who had been in the Respondent's employ testified that they had cleaned out ditches before, however, as they relate to employees Beard and Gaynor who operate a backhoe, contrary to Burrows testimony that normally a, backhoe is used to clean out ditches, they testified that backhoes have never been used to clean out ditches adjacent to streets during their approximately 13 years of employment. There was other evidence that the street employees are regularly assigned to collect garbage and they spend at least one day a week cleaning ditches. When Burrows was initially hired, the employees were working in a ditch that was filled with mud waist high. Hadden, when asked by Burrows if he could work, replied that the work was dirty and that if he did not like to perform dirty work, he should not take the job. Burrows took the job and in the undersigned's opinion was well aware that that kind of work was within the scope of the normal duties assigned to such employees. Testimony also further reveals that other employees were assigned to clean ditches and they did not envision such as a discriminatory assignment. The undersigned also considered it strange that while Burrows considered the assignment (cleaning ditches) discriminatory, :, did not voice any dislike for the assignment to those responsible including Hadden. Nor did the job assignment of pulling nails from two-by-fours considered to be dangerous since other employees had been assigned the same task. Attention must be given to the fact that Burrows never complained about these assignments. The mere fact that a job is unpleasant or undesirable to an employee does not render a transfer of duties a constructive discharge. See for example,. NLRB v. J. W. Mortell, 440 F.2d 455 (7th Circuit, 1971) and Montgomery Ward, 160 NLRB no. 137 (1966). Based on all the factors in this case including the fact that the job assignments were of the type performed by every employee in Mr. Hadden's crew as part of their job, the undersigned is unable to attach any discriminatory motive to the assignment to Mr. Hadden since it is regarded by the employer and the employee as one of the major responsibilities of the public works department. One fellow employee testified that he had recently used a shovel to clean trash out of a ditch (employee Beard). Beard, a backhoe operator, testified that he could not use it to clean shallow ditches and that during his approximately 13 years of employment, he had never used a backhoe to perform such tasks. I am thus compelled to conclude that Mr. Hadden did not act discriminatorily toward Mr. Burrows in the distribution of work or in the tools given him to accomplish his assignments. The only evidence, if it can be regarded as such, is Burrows allegations that he suspected that he was being singled out for union activity, however mere suspicions is no substitute for proof and do not provide ample basis to support an allegation of a discriminatory discharge. See for example, NLRB v. Mays, Inc., 366 F.2d 693 (2nd Circuit 1966). Moreover, it was noted that when Burrows was rehired the last time, Hadden instructed that should he again walk off the job, the City would not rehire him. Burrows indicated that he would not walk off the job again without giving notice and therefore Mr. Hadden rehired him. It thus appears that it was with some reluctance that the City rehired Mr. Burrows and was concerned about prior occasions when he left his employment without giving sufficient notice. This occurred approximately one year prior to the advent of the union and certainly no legitimate claim can be made that the understanding which Hadden and Burrows reached at that time, had any relationship whatsoever to any union animus or that it resulted based on any concern that Respondent had about Burrow's union involvement. This being the status of the record, the undersigned therefore concludes that Mr. Burrows quit his job rather than as alleged, that he was constructively discharged. The next issue raised is whether the Respondent unlawfully interrogated employee Willie Burrows by its representative Hadden, while enroute to the warehouse on January 27, 1976. While the complaint alleges that Dorton Hadden is not an agent and a representative of the Respondent, acting on its behalf during times material, Respondent denied that allegation and further made the point that it has previously been determined by the Public Employees Relations Commission in its decision that based on the authority given to Dorton Hadden, he was not a managerial employee and thus was included in the bargaining unit. The undersigned is of the opinion that since the Commission determined that Mr. Hadden should be included within the unit, the Respondent should not be held responsible for inquiries by him about Mr. Burrows' feelings about the union since the prior determination had been made that he was a bargaining unit employee. There was no evidence indicating that his job duties had changed or for a reconsideration of his unit placement. As the Respondent correctly points out, the employer would have violated the Act if it had instructed Mr. Hadden to refrain from attending union meetings and asking questions about employees union sentiments etc., since as a unit employee he had the right to do so. Nor is the undersigned aware of any provision in the Act which prevents an eligible employee from inquiring of other employees how they feel about the union and by such acts commit an unfair labor practice attributable to the Respondent. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint allegations that the Respondent or its agents unlawfully interrogated employee William E. Burrows on January 27, 1976 in a City vehicle concerning his union membership, activities, sympathies and desires. Based on the above findings and conclusions, I shall therefore recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions, I made the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The parties were properly noticed pursuant to Chapter 447.307(3) Florida Statutes. The Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of Chapter 447,002(2), Florida Statutes. The Laborer's Local Union #1306 is an employee organization within the meaning of Chapter 447.002(10), Florida Statutes. Respondent has not engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Recommendation Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, I hereby issue the following recommended:
Findings Of Fact On October 18, 1971, the Respondent through ordinance Number 201 (Respondent's Exhibit 1) established a civil service system. The ordinance in pertinent part provided that the civil service board shall "adopt, enact and amend a code of rules and regulations for each department covering, among other things, duties, hours of work, discipline and control, rules and regulations for appointment, employment, suspension and discharge of employees based on merit, efficiency, character and industry." Evidence reveals that the Civil Service Board took no action to "adopt, enact or amend a code" pursuant to Section 5 of ordinance Number 201 and, until the unilateral acts here complained of, Respondent had little in the way of written rules and regulations. However, within the Police Department there were "general rules of conduct" which had been promulgated by the Police Chief. (See G C Exhibit 8). Thereafter, the City Attorney drafted an ordinance amending ordinance Number 201 (see Respondent's Exhibit 8). Police Department representatives attended a meeting with the Mayor on June 15, 1975, for the purpose of discussing the proposed amendment to ordinance Number 201. After the meeting, George Slinkman, then President of the FOP, learned of its purpose and was given a rough draft of the proposed amendment. He was informed that the departmental representative had voiced objections to the Mayor concerning the amendment and on July 31, 1975, the proposed amendment came before the City Council at a workshop meeting. Present at that meeting was the President of the FOP who informed the council that the FOP was in favor of implementation of the original ordinance Number 201 rather than the proposed amendment to which the FOP objected. President Slinkman indicated that if the Respondent was proceeding with the new amendment as proposed, the FOP would like to provide some input into the proposal. No further action on the proposed amendment was taken by the City Council at that meeting nor did it appear on subsequent council agendas. On December 15, 1975, PERC certified the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative of Lauderhill Police Department Employees in the following unit. INCLUDED: Police Detectives, Officers and Sergeants. EXCLUDED: Police Lieutenants, Captains and the Chief. (See G.C. Ex. 7). Approximately two weeks later, the City Service Rules and Regulations, first part, through implementing resolution Number 511 (G.C. Ex.2) was presented to the City Council by the Mayor as an implementation of Civil Service Ordinance Number 201. The rules contained therein governed personnel recruitment and examinations for positions within the City. The Mayor informed the Council that there had been no employee input on such rules. While members of the Council received their copies approximately five days prior to the December 30th Council meeting, they were informed at the meeting that copies had not otherwise been distributed. City resolution no. 511 was passed by the City Council at the December 30, 1975, meeting and became effective immediately. Apart from the fact that witnesses George Slinkman, the former President of the FOP and President Elect Ralph Dean testified that Respondent failed to request input from the FOP on the rules as adopted, they also testified that no agent of the Fraternal Order of Police was made aware of the existence of the newly passed resolution until several days thereafter. (TR.401-402, 420-422). On or about April 22, 1976, Richard Witt, FOP State President, wrote to Mayor Cipolloni advising that he had been asked to represent the Charging Party in collective bargaining negotiations with the Respondent. Witt requested a meeting with the Mayor for the purpose of discussing negotiations. In response, the Mayor suggested the parties meet during the morning of April 28, in the Mayor's office. On Tuesday night, April 27, the Mayor introduced the City Service Rules and Regulations, second part, along with implementing resolution Number 571 to the City Council. This document contained numerous proposed changes in terms and conditions of bargaining unit employees including changes in appointments, lay-offs re-employment, evaluations, physical and mental exams, weight regulations, hours of work, vacations, holidays, sick leave, suspensions, demotions and grievance procedures. The Council was informed that employees had not provided input on the rules although the Mayor expressed his understanding gained from a recently attended labor relations seminar that Respondent needed a base for forthcoming negotiations with the Charging Party. When it was learned that the Civil Service Board had not been consulted with regard to the document, the resolution was tabled and Civil Service Board members were invited to be present the following evening when it would be brought up again, Richard Witt, the Mayor, and Police Chief Ramsdell met as scheduled on the morning of April 28, 1976. Witt requested that prior to collective bargaining the City furnish him with budget documents and other materials pertaining to police officers' health program, welfare and other employment working conditions. The Mayor responded, according to Witt, that it would take some time for him to assemble such but that the information would be forthcoming. That night, the City Council passed resolution no. 571, which adopted the City Service Rules and 7Regulations, save the sick leave policies which became effective January 1, 1977. (See G.C. Ex. 6). Ralph Dean, the President of the Charging Party testified that Respondent was not requesting input from the FOP on the rules and regulations, second part, nor had FOP representatives been furnished copies of the documents prior to their adoption. Additionally, he testified that the Charging Party was not notified of the pending adoption of the document and did not obtain a copy of such until after passage on April 28, 1976. Corroborative testimony on this point was given by Councilwoman Hatcher and employees Dean and Slinkman. The parties' first negotiation session was held on May 22, 1976 and at that time the Charging Party advised the Mayor and the City Attorney that in their opinion, some of their proposals were in violation of existing City ordinances, including the rules and regulations first and second parts. Two days thereafter, on May 24, 1976, the Charging Party filed with the Commission the instant unfair labor practice charges. The parties were again scheduled to meet on May 28, 1976. Upon receipt of the unfair labor charges, the City Council met with the Mayor in "executive session" and it was then decided that Respondent would "suspend bargaining" until the charges were disposed of. The Mayor arrived at the May 28th session and informed the Charging Party that Respondent would not return to the bargaining table until the pending charges had been resolved. A second charge was filed against the Respondent alleging essentially that the Respondent's suspension of bargaining constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith within the meaning of Section 447.501(a)(c) of the Act. The evidence also reveals that on approximately March 30, 1976, the Respondent adopted a pay plan for its police department employees who are in the bargaining unit in which the Charging Party was certified to represent. The pay plan, as adopted, represented a reduction in the existing pay plan. In adopting this plan, Frank C. Brown Associates, a management consulting firm, was commissioned to conduct a study to devise a pay plan for all city employees. The evidence reveals that the wage and job classification plan prepared by Frank C. Brown and Associates was not compiled based on any joint efforts by the Charging Party who had been certified to exclusively represent the police unit employees. Specifically, Ralph Dean objected to the new pay plan and in fact, Mayor Cipolloni testified that he gave no direction to Frank C. Brown and Associates to seek any input from the Charging Party and/or its agents. Based on the Charging Party's objections to the pay plan as submitted by Frank C. Brown on February 9, 1976, one pay grade was added to each of the ranks. The plan was submitted to the City Council on March 30, 1976 and was made effective immediately for all employees. Representatives of the Charging Party were present at this meeting and objected to the implementation thereof to no avail. Thereafter, and during the second negotiation session on May 28, 1976, the Respondent suspended negotiations with the Charging Party based on the fact that the Charging Party had filed unfair labor practice charges with the Commission.
Conclusions The essence of the collective bargaining relationship between public employers and its employees in the State of Florida is outlined in Chapter 447.309(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The dictates there mandates a bilateral decision making process which becomes effective after an employee organization has been certified by the Commission. At that juncture, the public employer is no longer free to make unilateral determinations with respect to items which are considered "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment". See for example District School Board of Hillsborough County and Hillsborough C.T.A., PERC order no. 76U-1181 (October 4, 1976). The Charging Party and/or its agents objected to the City Service Rules and Regulations first and second parts each time they were brought up before the Council. Respondent at no time requested any input from the Charging Party's agents respecting its position in fulfilling its obligation to represent the unit employees it was certified to represent. The Respondent's affirmative defense that the Charging Party's members were advised and participated in the enactment of the City Service Rules and Regulations and the pay scale as it relates to unit employees was considered. However, when an examination of the positive duty placed on the Respondent as it relates to its duty to bargain with the certified representative, such a position fails to withstand scrutiny and amounts to conduct representing an abrogation of its duty to meet with and confer with the designated certified representative. Absent an impasse, necessity or an express or implied waiver (all of which are absent here), the employer was expressly obligated to refrain from taking the unilateral action which it took on December 30, 1975, on March 30, 1976 and on May 28, 1976. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any evidence which would permit the employer to unilaterally act as stated above, the conclusion is inescapable that the Respondent consciously abrogated its duty as set forth in Chapter 447.309(1), F.S., and engaged in conduct violative of the Act.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will bargain collectively, upon request, with the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit employees as stated above; that it will not make unilateral changes in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of said employees and that it will not suspend bargaining or fail to meet and bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative unless directed to do so by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Irving Weinsoff, Esquire Suite 804, Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Bruce A. Leinback, Staff Attorney for William E. Powers, Jr., General Counsel 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Anthony J. Titone, Esquire 6299 West Sunrise Boulevard Suite 205 Sunrise, Florida 33313
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Overall organization. The City of Tarpon Springs has a mayor and four commissioners and operates under a city manager form of government. Neither the commissioners nor the mayor play an active role in the day to day operation of the City. The City Manager has the responsibility of operating the day to day affairs for the City. Collective bargaining relationships exist between the City and unions representing the Police and Fire Departments. The City Manager negotiates for the City in these relationships. Other than the Police and Fire Departments, there are approximately fifteen or sixteen departments with over 100 employees within the City. The actual number of employees varies seasonally, with the City employing more in the winter. At this time, the City employs approximately seventeen persons under the CETA program. The Public Works Department consists of ten or eleven separate departments, each of which, is headed by a foreman, and the Public Works Director has overall responsibility for the entire Department. His position is primarily one of assistant city manager. Four or five times a year, the City has supervisory meetings attended by the City Manager, the Public Works Director and the foremen of the various departments. Discussed at such meetings, are problems involving personnel, discipline and scheduling. Uniforms are available to most City employees on a voluntary basis. If, an employee chooses to wear a uniform, the City pays half the price of the uniform for the employee, with the exception of school crossing guards for whom the City furnishes uniforms and CETA employees for whom uniforms are not available. Uniforms worn by foremen have the word "foreman" written on them. Foremen. Each department under the Public Works Department is headed by a single foreman, with the exception of the Parks and Cemeteries Department which has two foremen. These various departments each have between three and eighteen employees, and include the departments of streets, sewer, sanitation, water distribution, building and maintenance, meters, water pollution control, and general maintenance. The City generally does not hire persons for the various departments without the recommendation or approval of the foreman. Under normal conditions, the foremen make the decision as to overtime work and the transfer of employees from one department to another. Written and oral evaluations and recommendations for wage increases are made by the foreman to the Public Works Director, which recommendations are normally approved. If an employee were caught drinking on the job, a foreman may fire the employee and then tell either the City Manager or Public Works Director about it later. The City then conducts an investigation into the matter to avoid possible future problems, but normally the decision of the foreman is approved. With a less offensive problem, such as absenteeism, the foreman issues a warning in writing. After the second warning, the foreman informs the Director or Manager that he is dismissing that employee and the City then terminates employment. Foremen make the decision as to time off for personal problems or emergencies and also grant approvals for vacation times. If there are complaints or grievances within a department, the foreman of that department normally takes care of it, very seldom do grievances come to the Public Works Director. An employee may be transferred from one department to another through the agreement of the two foremen involved. The primary duty of the various foremen is to direct the employees and supervise the activities within their respective departments. During shortages of personnel, foremen participate in the same type of work as their employees. Supervisory authority is one of the basis, along with longevity, for the pay differentials between foremen and other employees. Foremen assist in the formulation of policies and work schedules within their respective departments and are consulted with respect to the preparation of the budget. There are no supervisory-type personnel between the foremen and the Director of Public Works. Foremen handle grievances and would thus have a role in the administration of collective bargaining agreements. CETA employees. CETA employees work along with other City employees and the City is reimbursed for their salaries by the federal government. While they may have the same rate of pay as another person in their classification and do receive overtime pay, they do not receive raises nor do they have the fringe benefits which other employees have, such as hospitalization, uniforms, paid holidays, vacation, and sick leave. The CETA program presently extends through September 30, 1976, and such employees are hired until that time. If the City had a vacancy in a regular, permanent position, it would fill that position with a good CETA employee rather than going out and hiring another employee. Part-time employees. The City employs a number of part-time employees to work as school crossing guards, to police the beach, to do summer work with recreation, to work in the library and to do clerical and custodial work. Certain of these part-time employees are seasonal. In order to receive hospitalization benefits, an employee must work thirty or more hours per week. The three school crossing guards work 25 hours per week and receive uniforms fully paid for by the City. They are supervised by the Chief of Police. Other part-time employees fall under the supervision of the foreman or director for the department for which they work. Vacation and sick leave, as well as holiday pay, are prorated for part-time employees based upon the number of hours that they work. Their rate of pay is based upon the federal minimum wage though some regular part-time employees receive merit pay increases. In accordance with F.S. Section 447.307(3)(a) and F.A.C. Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Curtis Mack Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida Mr. Edward R. Draper 5400 West Waters Avenue, B-4 Tampa, Florida 33614 Mr. Allen M. Blake, Esquire Marlow, Mitzel, Ortmayer & Shofi 607 South Magnolia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606
Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA
Findings Of Fact The petition herein was filed by the Petitioner with PERC on February 11, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The hearing in this case was scheduled by notice dated May 3, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2). The City of Boca Raton is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Section 447.002(2). (Stipulation, Transcript of Record */ , Page 6). The Petitioner is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Section 447.002(10). (Stipulation, TR 6, 7). The Petitioner has requested recognition as the bargaining agent of employees set out in the petition, and the Public Employer has denied the request. (Stipulation, TR 7). There is no contractual bar to holding an election in this case, and there is no pertinent collective bargaining history which affects the issues in this case. (Stipulation, TR 7, 8). PERC has previously determined that the Petitioner is a duly registered employee organization. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. PERC has previously determined that the Petitioner filed the requisite showing of interest with its petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. The Public Employer contends that the unit described in the petition is inappropriate, and that the Petitioner has made no appropriate showing of interest with respect to any appropriate collective bargaining unit. The Public Employer's Fire Department is divided into five divisions. The employees in the proposed collective bargaining unit all work under the Administrative Division, and are supervised by an assistant chief. The other divisions are the Training Division, Operations Division, Staff and Line Support Division, and Fire Prevention Division. The Public Employer operates four fire stations. Station No. One is the Department's headquarters. Fire fighters and emergency medical personnel are housed at headquarters as are all communications personnel, including the persons in the proposed collective bargaining unit. None of the persons in the proposed unit are stationed at the Public Employer's other fire stations. Dispatchers and Alarm Operators are supervised either by the Assistant Chief in charge of the Administrative Division, or by the company officer in- charge of the shift at the headquarters station. Dispatchers are not certified fire fighters, and they do not perform the duties of certified fire fighters. Fire fighters work what is called a twenty-four-hour-on, forty-eight-hour-off shift. Dispatchers work an eight-hour shift which revolves so that one or more dispatchers are continuously on duty. Dispatchers and fire fighters have a different pension plan, and different employee benefits. Fire fighters make a larger contribution to theirs pension plan than do dispatchers, and are covered by their plan from the first day of employment. Dispatchers are not covered until after the passage of six months. The City provides hazardous duty insurance for fire fighters, but not for dispatchers. Dispatchers have a six- months probationary period. Fire fighters have a one-year probationary period. Although dispatchers do not perform the work of fire fighters, fire fighters are trained to serve as dispatchers, and do frequently perform the dispatchers' functions. The dispatchers and fire fighters work closely together. There are occasional social functions attended by fire fighters and dispatchers which no other city employees attend. Dispatchers receive the same basic employment benefits that are received by clerical employees of the Public Employer. They have the same pension plan, vacation and sick leave policies, and they serve the same probationary period. Dispatchers and clerical employees receive similar salaries. The only promotions available to dispatchers within the City of Boca Raton would be to clerical positions with a higher pay grade. There are no promotions available within the Fire Department. Dispatchers do not perform typing, filing, and other general clerical duties. Their function is not, however, unique to the City. The Police Department also employs dispatchers, and police and fire dispatchers have the same job description. (Public Employer's Exhibit 7). The Public Employer is presently engaged in collective bargaining with three employee organizations representing three certified bargaining units. There is a unit of "blue collar" employees, a unit of sworn police officers, and a unit of certified fire fighters. ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Crossland, Esquire Muller & Mintz, P. A. Suite 600, One Hundred Biscayne Blvd. Miami, Florida 33132 Richard F. Krooss, President Fire Fighters of Boca Raton, No. 1560 Post Office Box 565 Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Curtis L. Mack, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 - 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
The Issue Whether there is just cause to terminate Respondent's employment with the Monroe County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity charged with the responsibility to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within Monroe County, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent as a non-probationary air-conditioning mechanic in the Upper Keys. As noted previously, Petitioner initiated the instant cause against Respondent on January 19, 2012. In a letter signed by the superintendent of schools on that date, Petitioner advised Respondent that it intended to terminate his employment: [F]or willful violation of school board policy, 4210(I), (L) and (Q), by theft of time, inappropriate use of a District owned vehicle, and by making fraudulent statements in required District paperwork, all of which are grounds for discipline up to and including termination. * * * This action is being taken in accordance with School Board Policies . . . and the Collective Bargaining Agreement. (emphasis added). The above-quoted language notwithstanding, Petitioner's Administrative Complaint ("Complaint"), filed contemporaneously with the superintendent's letter, does not purport to discipline Respondent in accordance the collective bargaining agreement,1/ the terms of which are neither referenced in the Complaint nor included in the instant record——a fatal error, as explained later. Instead, Petitioner seeks in its Complaint to terminate Respondent's employment based solely upon alleged violations of School Board Policy 4210 (specifically, subsections I, L, and Q), which provides, in relevant part: 4210 – Standard for Ethical Conduct An effective educational program requires the services of men and women of integrity, high ideals, and human understanding. The School Board expects all support staff members to maintain and promote these essentials. Furthermore, the School Board hereby establishes the following as the standards of ethical conduct for all support staff members in the District who have direct access to students: A support staff member with direct access to students shall: * * * not use institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage. * * * L. maintain honesty in all dealings. * * * Q. not submit fraudulent information on any document in connection with employment. (emphasis added). Significantly, the record is devoid of evidence that Respondent has direct access to students, and the nature of Respondent's position (an air-conditioning mechanic) does not permit the undersigned to infer as much; therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Respondent is subject to the proscriptions of School Board Policy 4210. In light of these unique circumstances——i.e., Petitioner has not proceeded against Respondent under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (as it should have), but rather, under a school board policy that applies only to employees that have direct access to students——it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the underlying allegations of misconduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Monroe County School Board enter a final order: dismissing the Administrative Complaint; and immediately reinstating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2012.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether or not Respondent: During the course of its negotiations for collective bargaining agreements for the above charging parties which are certified employee organizations representing various units of Respondent's employees, interfered with restrained or otherwise coerced employees in violation of Chapter 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes, (herein sometimes called the Act). Refused to bargain in good faith with the charging parties as certified bargaining agents of its employees, in violation of Chapter 447.501(1)(c) of the Act. Refused to discuss grievances in good faith pursuant to the terms of collective bargaining agreements in violation of Chapter 447.501(1)(f) of the Act. At the close of the testimony all parties waived oral argument, but briefs were filed by the General Counsel of the Public Employees Relations Commission (herein sometimes referred to as the Commission), Counsels for the International Association of Firefighters, Local number 747 (herein IAFF) and the Respondent which have been carefully considered by me in preparation of this recommended order which will be distributed to the parties in the usual course. Upon the entire record in this case, observation of witnesses on the stand, and consideration of arguments of counsel, I make the following:
Findings Of Fact The complaints allege, the parties admit and I find that the Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of Chapter 447. The complaints allege further, the parties admit and I find that the Charging Parties are certified employee organizations which represent various employees of the Respondent in units which will be set forth in detail hereinafter. During 1976, all three employee organizations were parties to collective bargaining agreements with the employer which expired on September 30, 1976. Respondent began negotiation with the Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association, PBA, herein, on March 10, 1976, with the IAFF on April 29, 1976 and with the International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1220 (IBF&O herein) on August 9, 1976. After numerous negotiation sessions, the statutory impasse procedures were invoked and hearings were held before a special master on September 27 and 28, 1976. However, subsequent to the invocation of the impasse procedures and prior to the special master hearings, the parties proceeded through mediation and continued bargaining sessions until or about September 16, 1976. On August 4, 1976, the City Council met in a "workshop session" and abolished the step-merit increase pay plan which had been in effect for several years. The step-merit increase pay plan had been a principle item of contention between the parties in bargaining and was one of the three issues submitted to the special master during hearings on September 27 and 28. Other issues of whether or not changes should be made in the pay plan provisions for firefighters and lieutenants and whether changes should be made in the acting officer pay policy provisions were also submitted to the special master. The following day, on August 5, the City's chief negotiator, Robert DuVernoy, was instructed by the City Manager that the City Council had directed the step-merit increase pay plan be abolished. On September 29, 1976, the Respondent, through its chief negotiator Robert E. DuVernoy, notified the presidents of all three Charging Parties that wages would be frozen at September 30th levels allegedly due to expiration of the various contracts. Additionally, on October 6, 1976, Respondent informed the IAFF that effective October 4, 1976, the following terms and conditions of employment would be unilaterally altered: increase in "checkoff" fee from $.04 per individual to $500.00 for processing all payroll deductions for fiscal year 1976-77; the employee organization grievance procedure, the sick leave provision for family illness, the "step- merit increase pay plan" and the withholding of increments arising under said plan, the acting officers program, insurance coverage for non-high risk on-duty injury and the physical exam program were all deleted. Respondent announced its plan to reduce from $5,000.00 to $2,000.00 its life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. All of these changes were in fact implemented as reported by Respondent. Subsequent to September 29, 1976, the Respondent refused to process grievances concerning nonpayment of step increments filed by employees represented by IBF&O stating that the subject matter of such grievances was nongrievable and inappropriate. Pursuant to the step-merit increase pay plan contained in each of the parties' collective bargaining agreements, employees were eligible for an evaluation on their anniversary date and assuming that their evaluation was satisfactory, they were entitled to a step increase pursuant to a contractual salary schedule. Testimony reveals that these increases were granted almost automatically and that the plan had been operative since 1972. THE POSITION OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, in its answer and during the course of the hearing, denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Respondent urges that pursuant to its inherent managerial rights in the procedure delineated in the impasse resolution provisions of the statute, the legislative body through its political process determined the level of services to be offered to the City August 5, 1976, and the substantive conditions of employment for bargaining units when they took final contract action in "the public interest". Respondent alleges further that the executive branch geared to the legislative process, conducted meaningful negotiations at the table which continued through the special master's proceedings with the PBA and IAFF and that only when the opportunity to reach agreement at the table was exhausted, an agreement had to be reached and with the budget having been determined, the City had no alternative but to eliminate the merit step plan, the grievance procedure and checkoff fee once the contract expired. With respect to the other changes, Respondent insists that such changes amounted only to implementation of its last best offer at the bargaining table and was therefore legitimate and proper. As regards the IAFF, Respondent urges that it has no standing to now complain since it waived any rights it had under the expired 75-76 collective bargaining agreement. Respecting the allegations of the IBF&O, the Respondent alleges that that organization recognized the circumstantial dilemma that the City faced and hammered out a collective bargaining agreement through the negotiating sessions. All parties agreed that after invocation of the statutory impasse procedures, the parties continued to negotiate and in fact movement was made with respect to those issues pending. The parties recognized and agreed that based on the newness of the Florida Statute which regulates collective bargaining in the public sector i.e., Chapter 447, that lessons gained from other state boards and the federal sector are instructive and are useful in resolving similar issues arising in this state. Turning to such cases, the NLRB has long recognized that an employer's unilateral action with respect to a mandatory subject of bargaining is a per se violation of Section 8(a)5 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Section 151 et seq. Such a position was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). In Katz, the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether an employer could unilaterally change its sick leave plan and system of wage increase reached during negotiations between the employer and the bargaining agent. In reaching its decision, the court found that the employer was not at liberty to institute changes respecting mandatory subjects of bargaining during the course of negotiations. 369 U.S. at 737. The court disregarded the necessity of establishing whether or not the employer's conduct evidenced an absence of objective good faith and aid such conduct amounted to per se violations and was a circumvention of the duty to negotiate. Other states have reached a similar result in assessing whether or not such conduct amounted to a violation of the duty to bargain. The undersigned has considered the exceptions which have been recognized i.e., waiver, necessity and impasse, and concludes that they are not operative based on evidence adduced herein. Evidence reveals that while the changes were implemented herein, negotiations were ongoing and the Respondent admits that movement was in fact made while the negotiating process was occurring. It was also noted that the matters in which the Respondent unilaterally changed were principle subjects affecting the terms and conditions of employment of its employees. For example, the step-merit increase pay plan had been operative for at least 5 years and in view of the customary grant of the increase, the employees continued to expect such increases. Based thereon, and in view of the fact that negotiations were ongoing and no exceptions to the per se rule were established as being operative herein, I find that the employer's conduct in unilaterally implementing the changes except as noted hereinafter, amounted to a violation of its duty to bargain in good faith within the meaning of Chapter 447.501(1)(c) and derivatively a violation of Chapter 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Respecting the allegation that the Respondent refused to process a grievance which arose after the expiration of the parties' bargaining agreement, the undersigned is of the opinion that the employer was not obliged to continue to process grievances pursuant to the grievance arbitration machinery provision contained in an expired contract since such obligations have been universally recognized to be contractual in nature which may be terminated during the contract hiatus. (See for example Hilton Davis Chemical Co., Division of Sterling Drugs 185 NLRB No. 58.) Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, I hereby make the following:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law I shall therefore recommend that the Respondent: Make whole any affected employees by returning to them any and all benefits, financial or otherwise, lost as a result of its unilateral action which is or has not been presently restored. Post at its facilities in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice substantially providing: that it will not refuse to bargain in good faith by changing terms and conditions of employment and thereby altering the status quo during the period in which the collective bargaining process is continuing. In all other respects, I hereby recommend that the complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Staff Attorney for William E. Powers, Jr. General Counsel Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rod W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 John C. Wolfe, Esquire Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Donald D. Slesnick, II, Esquire 2540 N.W. 29th Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
Findings Of Fact The Business of Respondent The Respondent is a public employer with its principle place of business located in Orange County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a school system. Respondent is created directly by the Florida State Constitution or legislative body so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government and is administered by individuals who are responsible to the public officials or to the general electorate. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Employee Organization Involved The Orange County Classroom Teachers Association is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. Background During April, 1975, PERC certified the employee organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the following collective bargaining unit: INCLUDED: All certified non-administrative personnel including the following: teachers, teachers-countywide, teachers-exceptional, teachers-gifted, speech therapist, teachers- specific learning disabilities, teachers-adults full-time, guidance personnel, occupational specialist, teachers-adult basic education, librarians-media specialist, deans, department chairpersons, physical therapist. EXCLUDED: All other positions of the Orange County Public Schools. Soon thereafter, the CTA and the School Board began negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Each party submitted written proposals or counter proposals. (See Joint Exhibit #3 and #4, received in evidence). When negotiations began, teachers in the bargaining unit represented by the CTA were employed in one of the following categories: 10, 11, or 12-month contract. While most bargaining unit members were on 10-month contract status, some guidance counselors and approximately 90 teachers commonly referred to as vocational/technical teachers were on 12-month contract status. `These 90 vocational/technical teachers had been on 12-month contract status since at least 1970 and some since at least 1965. The negotiations resulted in a collective bargaining agreement which became effective on October 1, 1975. (Joint Exhibit #1). Neither the CTA's proposals nor the School Board's counter proposals for the 1975-76 contract contained a provision expressly granting the School Board the right to unilaterally change 12-month employees to 12 month status. Additionally, there was no specific discussion during negotiations regarding the alteration of the vocational/ technical teachers' 12-month contract status. During late spring, 1975, the Charging Party, and others similarly situated, were informed that during the 1975-76 fiscal year (which runs from July 1, 1975 through June 30, 1976) they would be employed for a full twelve months. They began their twelve month period of employment on July 1, 1975, prior to the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement-between the Board and the teachers' union. At that time there were approximately 200 teachers employed within the vocational/technical and adult education department. During the 1975-1976 school year, the school system with the exception of the post-secondary programs operated for two full semesters plus a summer school. Portions of the post-secondary programs, such as the vocational/technical and adult educational programs operated on a year-round basis. During the school year, the School Board decided to institute a system- wide program of year-round schools by adopting the quinmester system. Under the quinmester system the year is divided into five terms, each consisting of forty- five (45) days of student class time. Students can attend all five terms (or quins) thereby allowing them to graduate early, take extra courses or make up failed courses. Respondent takes the position that it was not possible to employ teachers on the 12-month basis as they would not be available for the required number of days. This is based on the fact that, as stated during the hearing under the 12-month system of employment, employees were only available for a total of 233 working days. Such a figure is derived by taking the number of days in a year, 365, and subtracting the number of Saturdays and Sundays, 104, which leaves 261 days. The School Board allows up to nineteen (19) days annual leave each year. Further, employees did not work on nine legal holidays on which the school system was closed which together with the 19 days annual leave made an additional 28 days that the employees would not be available for work in addition to the 104 Saturdays and Sundays. Thus when Saturdays, Sundays, Holidays and leave time are subtracted from the total 365 days, there are 233 available working days that employees working on a 12-month basis would be available. Therefore, the Board contended that in making its operational decision to change to a year-round school system, by adoption of the quinmester program, it needed employees to be available for 237 days if the teacher would be available to work all five quinmesters. Such a figure is derived by computing the number of days that the student will attend and the number of days that the teacher would therefore be required to be in attendance. Under the quinmester system, the student attends classes forty-five (45) days each quinmester, which means that the teacher needs to be present at least 225 days when the students are going to be present. Additionally, the Respondent urges that the collective bargaining agreement (Joint Exhibit #2) requires that teachers be on duty twelve (12) days when the students are not in attendance. These twelve days consist of five days of preplanning, five days of in-service training and two days of post-planning. With these figures, it is apparent that the teacher who is to work the entire year must be available the 225 days which the students are to be present together with the twelve days which the students are not present. Thus, wider this system, the teachers must be available 237 days during the school year. It is based on these figures that the Respondent contends that it made the operational decision to convert to a year-round school system, during the spring of 1976. In so doing, the Board advised its employees in the bargaining unit that they would be employed for an initial period of ten (10) months and given an extended contract for services rendered in programs extending beyond the regular school year. The regular school year comprises 196 days during a 10-month period of employment. Under the 10-month appointment, the teacher would be employed for an initial period of 196 days as provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and by statute. Out of the 196 days, the teacher earns 4 days leave which leaves available 192 work days in the initial employment period. The 192 work days include the 12 days that teachers are present and students are not. It also includes 180 days that the teacher is present with the students. This of course equals the first 4 quinmesters. The teacher employed to work year-round during the fifth quinmester would, under the operation of the quinmester system, be issued an extended contract to cover the additional 45 days of the fifth quinmester. By so doing, the 45 working days of the fifth quinmester with the 192 working days of the initial employment period provided for in the 10-month contracts provides the total 237 days needed to implement the year-round school system. It suffices to say that the neither the employee organization nor Respondent bargained about the implementation of the year-round school system. The teachers' union was not given advance notice of this action by the school board nor was there any attempt by the school board to bargain the impact of this decision with the teachers' union. During the course of the hearing, the Respondent introduced evidence to establish that the Charging Party and others similarly situated who are employed on a 10-month basis would receive a salary of $17,629.00 whereas the salary for the same services rendered under the 10-month plus extended contracts for the fifth quinmester would be $18,063.75. Respondent also introduced evidence establishing that the sick leave under either system was identical and that the Charging Party and others similarly situated are able to work 4 more work days under the 10-month plus extended contract than was available under the 12-month system. As stated, Respondent does not deny that it made its decision to employ vocational/technical teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis and that such was a departure of the contract status which said teachers had received in the past. In making its decision, Respondent contends that its acts were permissible under Chapter 447.209,F.S., since it is clothed with the statutory authority to unilaterally "determine the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organizations and operations It contends further that armed with this authority, it was not required to bargain concerning its management rights (which it contends that this was) in that here there is no violation of any contractual provision or of any other section of Chapter 447, Florida Statues, since Chapter 447 does not call for year-round bargaining. Chapter 447.309, F.S., provides in pertinent part that a certified employee organization and the public employer shall jointly bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. Respondent contends that since a collective bargaining agreement "shall contain all the terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining unit employees" and that since the current collective bargaining agreement does not provide in any part that bargaining unit employees are given a contractual right to a 12 month contract, there has been no violation of Chapter 447, F.S. While research reveals no reported decisions in Florida defining or otherwise interpreting terms and conditions of employment, other public employment relations boards aid state courts have determined that terms and conditions of employment means "salaries, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment". The length of the work year is a function of hours or work and thus has been determined to be a term of employment, and thus a public employer is required to negotiate with its employees concerning all terms and conditions unless a specific statutory provision prohibits negotiations on a particular item. See for example, Board of Education of Union Free School District #3 of the Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y. 2nd 122 at 129. First of all it is clear in this case that there has been no bargaining on this item and further that there has been no express waiver to bargain regarding the employment term. It is also clear that the employees in question had been granted 12 month contracts during previous years and that they were not advised of the alteration of the term of their contracts until Respondent had unilaterally made its decision to employ said teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis. Finally, there is no specific statutory provision which prohibits the parties from negotiating the term of the employment contract other than Section 447.209(5), F.S., which is inapplicable here. Based thereon, I find that the Respondent's actions in unilaterally adopting a year round instructional program by terminating the 12 month contract status of teachers-adult full-time and teachers-adult basic education by placing such teachers on 10 month plus extended contract status was a unilateral alteration of a term and condition of said employees' employment relationship in violation of Sections 447.501(1)(a) and (c) and is a derivative violation of Section 447.301(a) of the Act.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it: Bargain collectively upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above. Such duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including changes in the term of the contract year of said bargaining unit employees. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice substantially providing: that it will not refuse to bargain, upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association, as exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above; and that its duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including, but not limited to, any changes in the term of the employment contracts of bargaining unit employees. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rowland, Petruska, Bowen & McDonald by John W. Bowen, Esquire 308 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney for the Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John W. Palowitch, President Orange County Classroom Teachers Association 6990 Lake Ellenor Drive Orlando, Florida
The Issue Whether the Respondent’s Career Service Grievance Policy Statement #92/93-HR-2, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, based on an alleged conflict with Section 447.401, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Agency for Health Care Administration (Respondent) is a state agency and a public employer. The Respondent has adopted a grievance policy providing for the resolution of employment disputes within the agency. The policy provides that an aggrieved employee may have the grievance heard by a neutral committee. The committee makes a recommendation, which is subject to review first by a designee of the agency head, and then directly by the agency head. According to the policy at issue in this case, the agency head’s decision is generally the final step in the grievance process. Under some circumstances not found in this case, decisions may be appealed to the Public Employees Relations Commission. Another procedure permits some career service employees represented by a collective bargaining agent to utilize a grievance process set forth under the master contract between the state and the bargaining agent. The union grievance provides that the agency head’s decision is appealable to the state labor relations director who has final authority over the dispute. On December 30, 1997, Diane Gossett (Petitioner), a career service employee of the Respondent, received a written reprimand from her supervisor who alleged Ms. Gossett’s conduct was inappropriate. The details of the alleged conduct were not offered at hearing. Ms. Gossett is an "excluded employee" under the State Master Contract, and therefore is not entitled to use the union grievance procedure. As provided in the Respondent’s grievance policy at issue in this case, Ms. Gossett filed a grievance challenging the written reprimand, and seeking to have it removed from her personnel file. A neutral grievance committee was appointed which reviewed her grievance. The committee recommended that the reprimand be removed from the Petitioner’s personnel file. The agency head’s designee reviewed and rejected the committee recommendation. The agency head ratified the designee’s decision. The Petitioner then challenged the agency’s compliance with personnel rules by filing a request for review with the Department of Management Services. The Department found no deviation from agency rules and refused the Petitioner’s request for additional review. The Petitioner then filed her Petition to Invalidate an Existing Agency Rule with the Division of Administrative Hearings.
