The Issue The issue in this case is when the 97-day probationary employment period began to run for each of the Respondents, and whether their employment could be terminated without just cause.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the School Board of Polk County, the entity responsible for operating, monitoring, staffing, and maintaining the public schools of Polk County. The Board hired both Respondents, Diane O'Brien and Marcee Gunn, to fill positions within the Polk County School System. Prior to the 2003-2004 school year, Federal requirements under the "No Child Left Behind" ("NCLB") program mandated that by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, all teachers in core academic areas must be "highly qualified" as defined by Federal guidelines. The guidelines state that a teacher must possess a combination of both appropriate certification and documentation of subject area knowledge. The determination of whether a teacher had the requisite knowledge was done by way of a battery of tests in the subject areas. At the time the NCLB program was instituted, Polk County was experiencing a high level of growth and was hiring approximately 1,200 new teachers each year. The shortage of teachers who had obtained the highly qualified status resulted in the Board hiring a class of teachers who were not highly qualified, but under certain restrictions. These teachers were deemed D-1 provisional substitute teachers. The D-1 teachers were hired with the intention of allowing them to be employed as substitutes, pending their passage of the subject area tests. D-1 teachers were first hired by the Board to fill positions in the 2002-2004 school year. D-1 teachers were paid a daily rate of pay and received insurance and retirement benefits. If the teacher ultimately became highly qualified, they were to be given seniority consideration retroactive to the date of their hire.1 As substitutes, D-1 teachers were "at will" employees and were not contract employees. Their employment could be terminated with or without cause at any time. All D-1 positions were terminated at the end of the school year for which they were hired. If a teacher had not obtained highly qualified status, they could be hired as a D-1 teacher for the next school year. The D-1 program was eliminated, in whole, at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. Diane O'Brien Respondent, Diane O'Brien, worked as a para-educator for 15 years before earning a degree in special education from Nova Southeastern University in 2006. O'Brien was hired by the Board to be a D-1 substitute teacher for handicapped students at Haines City High School for the 2007-2008 school year. At the time of her hire, O'Brien signed a Conditional Employment Agreement that refers to her as "Teacher." The agreement does, however, set forth certain requirements for becoming a regular teacher. O'Brien was assigned a full-time para-educator to assist her and was given a classroom for purposes of fulfilling her position. At all times during the school year, O'Brien acted as and considered herself to be the official teacher for the class. O'Brien was evaluated during the school year by the principal and the assistant principal. O'Brien attended the IEP meetings and was responsible for writing IEPs for her students. O'Brien was never referred to by staff or other teachers as a "substitute" teacher during that school year. Nonetheless, O'Brien signed a document entitled, "Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year" when she was hired. The document clearly indicates the requirements for a regular teacher and states that until such requirements are met, the teacher is considered a provisional D-1 substitute. O'Brien does not specifically remember signing this particular document; she said she signed many documents when hired, and none of them were explained to her. O'Brien did not meet the requirements to be a regular teacher at that time. During the 2007-2008 school year, O'Brien was paid as a D-1 substitute teacher, i.e., $115 per day, plus benefits. As early as August 2007 (the month classes began), O'Brien contacted a Ms. Capoziello requesting that her salary be changed to full-time teacher salary. She was advised that she had not yet met the requirements for a full-time teacher, because she had not yet met the "Certified, Qualified and Highly Qualified" requirements set forth in the Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers. In December 2007, O'Brien indicated in an email that she was working hard to pass the necessary tests, but had not yet done so. In January 2008, O'Brien contacted the human resource officer to inquire as to when her status would change. In response, she received the following explanation: Please refer to the individualized Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year that you signed on August 8, 2007. During New Educator Orientation, you were provided with the requirements necessary to attain "highly qualified" status for your ESE assignment. You are fully certified in ESE, but according to federal legislation, you are not considered "highly qualified" as defined in the law, because you have not "demonstrated subject matter competence" to teach ESE academic subjects. [F]or your current assignment, you need to pass the Elementary Education K-6 subject area exam to be deemed "highly qualified." After you have completed this requirement that was provided to you on August 8, 2007, then you will be eligible to transfer to B1 status as a regular teacher. (Emphasis in original.) After the end of the 2007-2008 school year, O'Brien passed the subject area exam necessary to achieve "highly qualified" status. She was then hired in the 2008-2009 school year as a regular teacher by the Board. O'Brien commenced work under her first annual contract with the Board as a regular teacher on or about August 11, 2008. On November 11, 2008, a memorandum was issued to O'Brien by the Board entitled, "Dismissal of Instructional Employee During 97-Day Probationary Period." O'Brien signed the memorandum, acknowledging receipt. The memorandum identifies O'Brien as "an initial annual contract teacher." The effect of the memorandum was termination of O'Brien's employment by the Board. O'Brien maintains that her period of teaching during the 2007-2008 school year was as a regular teacher. If that is the case, then she could not be terminated within the 97-day probationary period without the establishment of just cause. Marcee Gunn Respondent, Marcee Gunn, received her education at the University of Missouri at St. Louis. Gunn received her Florida teaching certification and was, in August of 2007, a certified teacher. Gunn was hired by the Board as a pilot D-1 substitute teacher for the 2007-2008 school year. A pilot substitute teacher fills in for absent teachers at one particular school, rather than going to various schools. In February 2008, Gunn was transferred from a pilot substitute to a permanent position as a kindergarten teacher at the School. The previous teacher had moved to another position, and Gunn was asked to fill the position through the end of the current school year. The permanent position was also classified as D-1 substitute, because Gunn had not yet become highly qualified. Gunn acted as, and considered herself to be, the full-time kindergarten teacher. She organized the classroom, prepared all student assignments, issued a monthly newsletter, and attended IEP meetings. Gunn was evaluated in her position by the principal and assistant principal. While Gunn was a pilot D-1 substitute, she received pay of $115 per day, plus benefits. At the time she became the permanent kindergarten teacher she received the same pay, but believed she would be receiving regular teacher pay. However, upon taking the kindergarten teacher position, Gunn signed a document entitled, "Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year." The document clearly indicates that Gunn was being hired as a D-1 substitute and sets forth the requirements for becoming a regular teacher, i.e., passing a test in the subject area to be taught. Gunn also acknowledges signing the document, but does not have any specific recollection of having seen it. She did know that the document required her to pass the K-12 subject area exam in order to be reclassified as a regular teacher. Gunn's position was terminated at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. Gunn was re-hired by the Board for the 2008-2009 school year as a regular teacher for the same kindergarten class. (The evidence is not clear whether Gunn was hired in 2008-2009 as a D-1 substitute or a highly qualified teacher. The fact is not relevant, however, because even if she was a regular teacher, she would have been in her first year of an annual contract.) On November 14, 2008, a memorandum was issued to Gunn by the Board entitled, "Dismissal of Instructional Employee During 97-Day Probationary Period." Gunn signed the memorandum, acknowledging receipt. The memorandum identifies Gunn as "an initial annual contract teacher." The effect of the memorandum was termination of Gunn's employment by the Board. Gunn maintains that her period of teaching during the 2007-2008 school year (or at least a part of it) was as a regular teacher. If that is the case, then she could not be terminated within the 97-day probationary period without the establishment of just cause. There is no dispute by Respondents that the dismissal memoranda were issued within 97 days of their commencement of work during the 2008-2009 school year. Rather, each Respondent contends that their full-time, contracted employment with the Board commenced earlier than the 2008-2009 school year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Polk County School Board, terminating the employment of Respondents, Diane O'Brien and Marcee Gunn, effective as of the dates determined by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a maintenance technician employed by Petitioner, committed the offenses alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has been a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Article IX, Florida Constitution, and Section 230.03(1), Florida Statutes (2001). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a maintenance technician and was assigned to WLRN, the radio/television station operated by Petitioner. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Hernandez supervised a work crew consisting of Respondent and ten other maintenance technicians. At the time of the final hearing, Respondent, Mr. Hernandez, and several other members of the work crew had worked together since 1990. The work crew performed maintenance work at the radio/television station and at the various schools and other facilities that received signals from the radio/television station. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had his own truck that he used to travel to his various work assignments. Respondent is a frustrated employee who does not get along well with his co-workers or with Mr. Hernandez. Respondent believes himself to be more qualified than his supervisor and his co-workers, and he is ever vigilant for improperly performed work by the maintenance crew. Respondent keeps a copy of the job description for the position held by Mr. Hernandez, which he reviews on a regular basis to determine if Mr. Hernandez is fulfilling his responsibilities. Over the course of his employment with Petitioner, Respondent has had a history of threatening co-workers and other School Board employees. Prior to May 1, 2001, Respondent had threatened Mr. Hernandez with bodily harm on two occasions. As a result of his threats against Mr. Hernandez and other School Board employees, Respondent had been referred on more than one occasion to Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program. In 1995 Petitioner required Respondent to submit to a psychological evaluation 1/ to determine Respondent's fitness for work. For the two and a half weeks immediately preceding May 1, 2001, Respondent was off work. During that time Respondent's work truck was idle. On May 1, 2001, when Respondent returned to work, an incident occurred between Mr. Hernandez and Respondent that underpins this proceeding. 2/ While making the workday assignments on the morning of May 1, 2001, Mr. Hernandez informed Respondent that his work truck had been scheduled for routine maintenance that day. Respondent became upset because the truck had been idle for the previous two and a half weeks, and he believed that the maintenance should have been performed during that period. Mr. Hernandez assigned Respondent to work with Mr. Braddy, but Respondent refused that assignment. 3/ Respondent walked over to the maintenance garage with a tape recorder to have the mechanic state on tape when Respondent's truck would be ready. Respondent then returned to the area where Mr. Hernandez was still making assignments. Mr. Hernandez told Respondent to go work with Rafael Montesino, another member of the work crew. Respondent refused that assignment. When he heard the assignment and Respondent's refusal, Mr. Montesino told Mr. Hernandez he would not work with Respondent and that he would take the day off if he had to do so. By the time Mr. Hernandez began to leave the area to go to his own work assignment, the other members of the crew had left for their assignments. Respondent did not have an assignment and he remained in the area. As Mr. Hernandez was leaving the area, Respondent verbally assaulted Mr. Hernandez in a hostile, threatening manner. Respondent cursed Mr. Hernandez and threatened to kill him. Mr. Hernandez drove off from the confrontation. Mr. Hernandez filed a complaint with his supervisors regarding Respondent's behavior of May 1, 2001, by Memorandum dated May 2, 2001. Following an investigation Detective Mario Victores of Petitioner's school police prepared a report styled Preliminary Personnel Investigation (the report). The report substantiated two alleged violations of School Board rules by Respondent: Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, pertaining to responsibilities and duties of School Board employees and Rule 6Gx13-4.108, pertaining to violence in the workplace. Victoria Bradford held a conference-for-the-record with Respondent to discuss the incident of May 1, 2001. Based primarily on Ms. Bradford’s recommendation, 4/ Respondent was referred to Petitioner’s Employee Assistance Program and his employment was suspended without pay for a period of 30 days. Respondent is a non-probationary "educational support employee" within the meaning of Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: As used in this section: "Educational support employee" means any person employed by a district school system . . . who by virtue of his or her position of employment is not required to be certified by the Department of Education or district school board pursuant to s. 231.1725. . . . "Employee" means any person employed as an educational support employee. "Superintendent" means the superintendent of schools or his or her designee. (2)(a) Each educational support employee shall be employed on probationary status for a period to be determined through the appropriate collective bargaining agreement or by district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist. Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee's status shall continue from year to year unless the superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in the collective bargaining agreement, or in district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist . . . In the event a superintendent seeks termination of an employee, the district school board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined by the appropriate collective bargaining process or by district school board rule in the event there is no collective bargaining agreement. At the times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a member of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) collective bargaining unit. AFSCME and Petitioner have entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which in Article II, Section 3, provides that members of the bargaining unit may be disciplined for "just cause." The CBA does not define the term "just cause." Article XI, Section 1A of the CBA provides for progressive discipline as follows: . . . Whenever an employee . . . violates any rule, regulation, or policy, that employee shall be notified by his/her supervisor, as soon as possible, with the employee being informed of the . . . rule, regulation or policy violated. An informal discussion with the employee shall occur prior to the issuance of any written disciplinary action. Progressive discipline should be followed, however, in administering discipline, the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee's record. Therefore, disciplinary steps may include: verbal warning; written warning (acknowledged); Letter of reprimand; Suspension/demotion; and Dismissal. Article XI, Section 3 of the CBA provides as follows: 3. In those cases where any employee has not complied with the Board's policies and/or department regulations, but the infraction is not deemed serious enough to recommend dismissal, the department head may recommend suspension up to 30 days without pay. The Superintendent must approve all suspensions. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 states in pertinent part that: All persons employed by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08 provides as follows: Nothing is more important to Miami-Dade County Schools (DCPS) than protecting the safety and security of its students and employees and promoting a violence-free work environment. Threats, threatening behavior, or acts of violence against any students, employee, visitors, guests, or other individuals by anyone on DCPS property will not be tolerated. Violations of this policy may lead to disciplinary action which includes dismissal, arrest, and/or prosecution. Any person who makes substantial threats, exhibits threatening behavior, or engages in violent acts on DCPS property shall be removed from the premises as quickly as safety permits, and shall remain off DCPS premises pending the outcome of an investigation. DCPS will initiate an appropriate response. This response may include, but is not limited to, suspension and/or termination of any business relationship, reassignment of job duties, suspension or termination of employment, and/or criminal prosecution of the person or persons involved. Dade County Public School employees have a right to work in a safe environment. Violence or the threat of violence by or against students and employees will not be tolerated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order uphold the suspension of Respondent's employment for 30 days without pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2003.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the governing body of the Jackson County School District, and maintains its office in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida., The Respondent is engaged in the business of operating a school system. The Respondent is a public employer. The JCEA is an employee organization. On or about June 16, 1975, the Public Employees Relations Commission, in Case No. 8H-RC-754-1084, certified the JCEA as the exclusive bargaining representative of certified instructional personnel who are employed halftime or more by the Respondent in specific job categories. After lengthy contract negotiations, which began in August of 1975, a collective bargaining agreement was executed by the School Board and the JCEA on February 2, 1976. A copy of the agreement was received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 1. On February 12, 1976& the JCEA filed an unfair labor practice charge against the School Board with the Public Employees Relations Commission. On February 20, 1976, the JCEA filed written grievances pursuant to Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The matters raised in the grievances are substantially the same as those raised in the unfair labor practice charge. In accordance with the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, implementation of the agreement was to be completed by February 16, 1976. During the period just prior to and just following February 16, the Respondent, through its agents, implemented numerous unilateral changes in policies. Prior to August, 1975, members of the collective bargaining unit at Marianna High School were not required to sign in at the beginning of the work day, or to sign out at the end of the work day. During August, 1976, new sign in and sign out procedures were implemented. The procedures applied only to members of the unit. On February 16, 1976, a time clock system was implemented at Marianna High. The system was implemented in accordance with "Memorandum #10", dated February 9, 1976. The memorandum was received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 2. Members of the bargaining unit were required under the new policy to "clock in" on the time clock at the beginning of the work day, and to "clock out" at the completion of the work day. It was announced that failure to clock in and out would constitute grounds for dismissal. The principal at Marianna High School testified that the Collective Bargaining Agreement required more accurate time records, and that the time clock system was instituted in order that more accurate records could be kept. Article IV, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Agreement were cited. Section 4.2 provides as follows: "The teacher's work day shall be seven (7) hours and fifty (50) minutes, during which each teacher shall be provided a duty-free lunch period on campus of not less than twenty-five (25) minutes. The principal of each school shall set the beginning and ending time of the work day. Teachers must have the prior approval of the principal or his designee before they leave school during working hours. Loss of time during the workday shall be covered by approved leave, loss of pay, or compensatory time." Section 4.3 provides as follows: "The principals may assign teachers extra duty which shall be restricted to supervising students on campus before and after school. The principal may also select from volunteers, teachers to supervise students at lunch. Compensatory time, equal to the extra duty time, shall be given teachers serving extra duty and lunch supervision, provided however, compensatory time shall not be given during the student day." Prior to the implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, employees within the bargaining unit were not paid extra duty time. The principal at Marianna High School testified that the precise delineation of the work day, and the entitlement to extra duty pay necessitated the more accurate record keeping. This explanation is inadequate. In the first place, in order to be entitled to extra duty compensation, the principal would have to assign the extra duty. The extra duties could include supervising students on campus before and after school, and during lunch. These sorts of extra duty are not such as would permit great variances in time. It is difficult to perceive why more accurate time keeping procedures were required. Indeed, as to extra duty during the lunch period, the time clock system would be of no assistance whatever. If more accurate time keeping was necessary at Marianna High School, it would have been just as necessary prior to implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Non-instructional employees of Marianna High School have not formed a collective bargaining unit. Any of these employees are compensated on an hourly basis, and are entitled to more or less compensation depending upon the hours they work. Accurate time records are as necessary for this group of employees as for employees within the bargaining unit; however, the time clock system applied only to employees within the bargaining unit. The time clock system was not the only new policy implemented at Marianna High School to coincide with implementation of the Collective bargaining Agreement. Teachers had been permitted prior to the adoption of the contract, to leave school early for doctors appointments, or to serve civic functions, without the necessity of taking any leave time. Subsequent to the adoption of the contract, if a teacher left more than ten minutes early, he or she would be required to take a minimum of one hour leave time. On or about February 16, 1976, teachers were instructed to stand outside of their classroom from 7:45 A.M. until 8:00 A.M. to supervise students coming into their classroom. Although teachers had previously been required to supervise students coming into their classroom, they were not required to stand outside of their classroom. Prior to implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement teachers were permitted to use the teacher's lounge for a planning period. As of February 16, teachers were not permitted to use the lounge for their planning period. The principal at Marianna High School testified that this was necessary in order that he would know where the teachers were since the planning period was to be used for parent consultations in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The testimony clearly revealed, however, that the planning period had been used for parent conferences prior to the adoption of the contract. Insofar as limiting the locations for the planning period was necessary, it was as necessary prior to adoption of the contract as subsequent to it. During the course of negotiations, the principal at Marianna High School had expressed a hostile attitude toward the collective bargaining process. None of the new policies set out above were discussed during the course of the negotiations. Each of the new policies was more restrictive than had been the case prior to collective bargaining. The timing of implementation of the policies to coincide with implementation of the agreement, the fact that the policies applied only to personnel within the bargaining unit, the fact that a hostile attitude toward collective bargaining had been expressed, and the lack of any other reasonable explanation for the policies lead inescapably to the conclusion that the new policies were implemented in order to dramatize to members of the collective bargaining unit that resort to the bargaining process would result in more restrictive supervision by the employer. The new policies were implemented for the purpose of discouraging membership in the JCEA, and to interfere with the employees' rights to engage in the collective bargaining process. Similar new and restrictive policies were implemented by the Respondent's agents at Malone High School, and at Golson Elementary School. The new policies at these schools were adopted to coincide with implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, applied only to personnel within the unit, and were implemented in asetting of hostility toward the collective bargaining process. Like the new policies at Marianna High, the new policies at Malone and at Golson were adopted to discourage membership in JCEA, and to interfere with employees in the exercise of their rights to engage in the collective bargaining process. At Malone High. School teachers were no longer permitted to use the teacher's lounge for their planning period as they had been prior to implementation of the contract. Prior to implementation of the contract teachers were permitted to eat lunch in the cafeteria, in the teacher's lounge, or in their own classrooms. Subsequent to the agreement, they were permitted to eat lunch only in the cafeteria, or in the Home Economics classroom, which was not available during all lunch periods. Nothing in the contract in any way necessitated these new policies. One of the top priorities of JCEA in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement was a "duty free" lunch period. JCEA was successful in this respect. The agreement provides for a "duty free" lunch period. Subsequent to adoption of the agreement at a faculty meeting the principal at Malone strongly advised members of the unit to eat with their classes, and in this regard made statements which could only have been perceived as threats. He stated for example that it might be necessary to trade the best player to make a better team. At Golson Elementary School, a "sign-in, sign-out" system was initiated just prior to February 16, 1976. The principal told members of the bargaining unit that he had treated them as professionals", but that now there was a collective bargaining agreement. He required that they sign in at 7:45 A.M. and he frequently reminded the teachers over the intercom system during morning announcements that they should sign in. Prior to implementation of the contract, teachers at Golson Elementary were permitted to leave the school grounds as much as twenty minutes early in order to attend classes, civic functions, or doctors appointments, without the necessity for using leave time. After the contract it was necessary to use one hour leave time in order to leave ten minutes early. Prior to implementation of the contract teachers were permitted to eat lunch in the teacher's lounge or in their own classrooms. Subsequent to the contract they were no longer permitted to do that. Prior to certification of the JCEA as the exclusive bargaining agent of instructional employees of the School Board, the School Board utilized a "Calendar Committee" to assist it in promulgating a calendar for each school year. A representative would be chosen from each school, and the Committee would recommend a calendar for the school year. Among recommendations made by the Calendar Committee would be dates for holidays. During the course of negotiations leading to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the School Board asserted that the calendar would prohibit negotiations respecting vacation days. The JCEA requested that a Calendar Committee not be utilized for the 1976-77 school year. The School Board nonetheless opted to utilize the Calendar Committee. At Marianna High School Betty Duffee, the chairman of the JCEA's negotiating team was nominated at a faculty meeting to serve on the Calendar Committee. The principal at Marianna High School discouraged the faculty from selecting Ms. Duffee because JCEA would be otherwise represented on the Committee. Use of the Calendar Committee was not designed to frustrate collective bargaining. A Calendar Committee had been utilized prior to certification of the JCEA by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Use of the Calendar Committee to make recommendations respecting mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, such as vacation days, would, however, at this juncture circumvent the exclusivity of JCEA's representation. The fact that the principal at Marianna High School discouraged selection of a JCEA representative to the Calendar Committee indicates an intention to utilize the Committee to make decisions respecting mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, such as vacation days, without the JCEA participating in negotiations. Mary Jo Morton is a teacher employed at Marianna High School. She is active in the JCEA, and this fact is known to the principal at Marianna High School. Shortly after implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Ms. Morton was evaluated by her principal and received an unfavorable evaluation. It appears from the evidence that the evaluation was not conducted under the best circumstances. For example, Ms. Morton was criticized for not permitting sufficient classroom participation during one class while a test was being conducted. Insufficient evidence was offered, however, to establish that the unfavorable evaluations of Ms. Morton were motivated even in part by her participation in the JCEA.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED that an order be entered as follows: Finding the School Board of Jackson County guilty of committing unfair labor practices by implementing restrictive policy changes at Marianna High School, Malone High School, and Golson Elementary School in such a manner as to discourage membership in the Jackson County Education Association, and interfere with its employees in the exercise of their rights to engage in the collective bargaining process. Finding the School Board of Jackson County guilty of committing an unfair labor practice by utilizing the Calendar Committee for the 1976-77 school year. Requiring that the School Board of Jackson County cease and desist from continued enforcement of the policy changes, and from continued utilization of a calendar committee. Directing that the School Board of Jackson County conspicuously post a notice that it has committed unfair labor practices, that it has been directed to cease and desist from such activities, and that it will cease and desist from such activities. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of January, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Austin F. Reed, Esquire Public Employees Relations Commission - Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Frank, Esquire 341 Plant Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606 Joseph A. Sheffield, Esquire Post Office Box 854 Marianna, Florida 32446 John F. Dickinson, Esquire COFFMAN & JONES 2065 Herschel Street Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203
The Issue Whether the refusal by the Respondent District School Board of Madison County to sign a contract prepared by a representative of the Madison County Education Association after a meeting of the Parties held for the purpose of reaching a collective bargaining agreement on November 18, 1975 was an unfair labor practice.
Findings Of Fact The Madison County Education Association was recognized by the District School Board of Madison County as exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of instructional employees of Madison County Schools on April 1, 1975. Formal negotiations for the purpose of reaching a collective bargaining agreement commenced on or about July 3, 1975. An impasse was reached on or about August 1, 1975 and the controversy was submitted to a special master under Section 447.403, Florida Statutes. A Special Master, Marvin A. Griffin, was appointed by Curtis L. Mack, Chairman, Public Employees Relations Commission, "to investigate the disagreement between the Madison County School Board and the Madison County Teachers Association." After a hearing on August 29, 1975 and September 12, 1975, Mr. Griffin filed a report dated September 26, 1975. He then offered to write a synthesized agreement and presented a draft of an agreement (hereinafter designated Contract 1) entitled "Agreement between Madison County Education Association and District School Board of Madison County, Madison, Florida, October 1, 1975." The Superintendent of Public Instruction, Gene Stokes, formally rejected the Special Master's recommendations concerning a number of articles in the agreement and made recommendations on disputed items in the Special Master's report. The District School Board of Madison County met with the Madison County Education Association and the School superintendent on November 13, 1975, at which meeting the School superintendent and the Teachers Association explained their positions. No final action was taken, and the item was tabled until November 18, 1975. At the meeting on November 18, 1975, the proposed agreement of the Special Master was modified by the superintendent's recommendation and was further modified by a Motion of school board member Eugene P. Bowie to Article XVII. (TR. 44) The agreement as modified was not reduced to writing at the meeting on November 18, 1975. The President of the Teachers Association, Florise Whittemore, used the special Master's agreement and her notes and reduced the agreement to writing (hereinafter called Contract 2 ), as she had understood the agreement. After the agreement was typed, it was presented to the teachers on November 25, 1976 and ratified by them. The pertinent portion of the official minutes of District School Board of Madison County adopted at its regular meeting, December 1975, reads: "Article XVII, $500 increase in base pay for each teacher." An unsigned copy of the contract prepared by Mrs. Whittemore was delivered to school Board Member Pickles through his daughter. A copy was also delivered to Mr. Bowie in person. A signed copy was delivered in December to the Chairman of the School Board and the negotiator Lloyd Day. Upon presentation of the contract agreement as drafted by the Madison County Education Association, member Albert W. Waldrep refused to sign the contract contending that the interpretation as shown in the teachers contract of the Motion by School Board member Bowie was in error. Member Bowie meant by his Motion that the raise should be from June 30, 1975 and Member Albert W. Waldrep understood that Member Bowie's Motion meant from November 1, 1975. Respondent then instructed its attorney to redraft the provisions of the contract pertaining to salary and said redraft (hereinafter called Contract 3) was adopted by the Respondent and signed by Chairman C. W. Pickles and attested to by Gene Stokes, Superintendent. The Charging Party refused to accept Contract 3 as redrafted by Respondent. The Charging Party thereafter filed an unfair labor charge which resulted in a formal Complaint and Notice of Hearing being issued by Public Employees Relations Commission on April 21, 1976. The Hearing Officer further finds: The Motion by Member Bowie relative to the dispute in this cause was voice recorded "Here I recommend a $500 raise per year for each teacher." It was amended by Member Pickles and concurred in by Mr. Bowie to state "base pay" and then seconded by Mr. Pickles. There was no mention of what date the raise was to be effective. There was no discussion of "retroactive pay" or "bonus pay", although the pay increase as intended by Member Bowie would have involved an increase of $150 per month for each of the three months of July, August and September. Member Bowie, cognizant of Contract 1 and prior negotiations, meant the raise to begin June 30, 1975. His Motion was intended to encompass Contract 1 as submitted by the Special Master and recommended by Superintendent Stokes. Mr. Waldrep, cognizant of the prohibition against retroactive pay and the shortage of funds, believed that he voted for a raise beginning November 1, 1975. Teacher salary checks for July, August and September, 1975, had been cut prior to the November 1975 Meeting. The words of the Motion "Here I recommend $500 raise per year for each teacher" together with the amendment or clarification "base pay" does not speak to the point in controversy and is consistent with either an interpretation to mean "fiscal year" or "calendar year." The contract as rewritten, typed and submitted to the members of the School Board [designated Contract 2] was the understanding of the Madison County Education Association of an agreement reached by the Parties at the November 18, 1975 meeting. The contract as rewritten, typed and submitted to the teachers [designated Contract 3] was the understanding of a majority of the five-member District School Board of Madison County of an agreement reached by the Parties at the November 18, 1975 meeting. There was no final agreement between the Parties as to the disputed salary increase effective date. After the November 18, 1975 meeting, Contract 2 was written by the Charging Party without the aid of the Respondent. It reflected an interpretation of the Motion most favorable to Charging Party's financial interests. After the November 18, 1975 meeting, Contract 3 was written by the Respondent without the aid of the Charging Party. It reflected an interpretation of the Motion most favorable to Respondent's financial interests. The facts of the cause do not reflect an unfair labor practice under Section 447.501, F.S., for the reason that the refusal by the parties to sign either Contract II or Contract III was based on the fact that no final agreement had been reached on the disputed issues at the collective bargaining meeting of November 18, 1975.
Recommendation Dismiss the complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Leonard Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300, 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edwin B. Browning, Esquire Post Office Drawer 652 Madison, Florida 32340 R. T. Donelan, Jr., Esquire 2003 Apalachee Parkway Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rod W. Smith, Esquire 2003 Apalachee Parkway Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Florise Whittemore, President Madison County Education Association Madison, Florida Tobias Simon, Esquire and Elizabeth deFresne, Esquire 208 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue is whether respondent should be dismissed from his position as a physical education teacher aide for the reasons cited in petitioner's letter of March 12, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Wilson McKenzie, Jr., was employed as a physical education teacher aide at St. Petersburg Challenge (SPC) in St. Petersburg, Florida. The school is a part of the public school system operated by petitioner, School Board of Pinellas County (Board). Respondent's employment with the Board began on August 16, 1990, when he was assigned as a full time physical education teacher aide at Melrose Elementary School (MES). In early September McKenzie was reassigned to work at MES during the morning hours only and then during the afternoon hours at SPC, a drop-out prevention school for disadvantaged fourth and fifth graders. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Pinellas Educational Support Personnel Association and the Board, respondent served in a probationary status during his first six months of employment. Under the same agreement, he was continued in that status for an additional ninety days after his first evaluation. According to Article 9, Section 1 of the agreement, a probationary employee may be terminated "for any reason", and the Board's termination letter of March 12, 1991, relied upon that provision of the agreement as its authority for terminating McKenzie. Pending the outcome of this proceeding, McKenzie has remained in a suspended without pay status since March 28, 1991. The Board's Reasons for Termination Respondent's performance at MES during the morning hours was apparently satisfactory since petitioner, in its charging letter of March 12, 1991, chose not to rely upon any performance deficiencies at MES as a basis for termination. 1/ As the first ground for terminating respondent, petitioner alleged that respondent was deficient in the "area of relationships with students". To support this charge, petitioner presented the testimony of ten students, all fifth graders at SPC during school year 1990-91 and who came in contact with respondent. While some of the students gave conflicting versions of what transpired, and thus their complaints were questionable, it is found that, contrary to school policy and orders from his supervising teacher, respondent yelled at and argued with students during physical education class in an effort to enforce class discipline. In addition, he placed his hand on students' shoulders or backs and would pinch them despite their requests that he not do so, and twice called students insulting names (e.g., bitch) in the presence of other students. It was further established that on several occasions respondent went to the home of a student to discuss school problems instead of inviting the parent to come to the school. He also had difficulty in maintaining classroom discipline. Several of the students testified that respondent made them uncomfortable by "staring" at them during class or lunch period. Finally, respondent was observed by several students looking up the dress of a female student who sat on the floor with her legs spread apart. In fairness to respondent, however, it should be noted that in some instances the students were acting in an unruly fashion or were violating cafeteria rules by talking loudly and "trading" food, thus prompting respondent to yell at them. Even so, it is fair to say that respondent had numerous difficulties in his relationships with students and most of the students who testified disliked respondent and appeared to be afraid of him. In addition to the above ground, petitioner has cited respondent's failure to follow "directives from superiors" as a second reason for terminating his employment. This charge stems primarily from respondent's sponsorship of a dance program for students that he conducted after school hours. Respondent's group was known as the Very Important Kids Association and was made up of young, disadvantaged children from the south side of St. Petersburg. Respondent was told early on by various superiors, including the SPC principal, assistant principal and physical education teacher, that group activities should not be arranged during school hours, the group should not meet on school property and respondent should refrain from asking students to join his group during school hours. Despite having at least three formal conferences with SPC administrators concerning this matter, and receiving written memoranda with specific instructions, respondent continued to violate these instructions by asking students during school hours to join his group. By doing so, respondent failed to follow "directives from superiors" as alleged in the charging document. Respondent's Case Respondent, who is 27 years old, maintained at hearing that he was "set up" on these charges by unnamed individuals and that he gave his best effort at doing a good job. McKenzie pointed out that he had no problems at MES and that all problems were encountered at SPC. He stated he is sincerely interested in helping underprivileged children and offered a number of letters from third parties to corroborate this contention. Through cross-examination, respondent established that several complaints offered by the testifying students were caused by their own misbehavior and respondent's subsequent efforts to discipline them.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the allegations in the charging document and that he be terminated from his position as a teacher aide. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1991.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment on grounds alleged in the Civil Service Notice of Disciplinary Action of May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent in Petitioner's maintenance department as a Carpenter I. Respondent was a non-probationary educational support employee as defined in Section 1012.40, Florida Statutes (2003), which is substantially similar to Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes (2001), and its predecessors. In October 1995, Respondent's fishing boat collided with a commercial barge. As a result of the accident, Respondent's father and uncle were killed and Respondent's son suffered serious bodily injury. Respondent had a history of poor attendance at work. Sometime prior to October 1998, Respondent's supervisor counseled him and recommended discipline due to unexcused and excessive absences from work. Respondent was arrested in October 1998 as the result of the boating accident. Respondent initially was charged with one count each of vessel homicide, culpable negligence, and boating under the influence (BUI) severe bodily injury, and two counts of manslaughter. On April 28, 2000, a jury found Respondent guilty as charged. It is undisputed that Respondent was absent from work without authorization or approved leave from April 17, 2000 through May 17, 2000. Petitioner terminated his employment effective May 17, 2000. Respondent was sentenced on August 22, 2000, for the following offenses: causing serious bodily injury to another, culpable negligence in the death of another, vessel homicide, and two counts of BUI manslaughter. On appeal, some of Respondent's felony convictions were discharged. However, the Court affirmed Respondent's BUI manslaughter convictions. See Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The court in Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, 816 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), certified a question of great public importance involving a jury instruction to the Florida Supreme Court. See Ronald R. Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Florida, Case No. SC02-1264, Rev.gr. 832 So. 2d 103 (Table) (Fla. November 19, 2002). At the time of the hearing, the Florida Supreme Court continued to have jurisdiction over Respondent's criminal case. Therefore, Respondent's convictions for BUI manslaughter remain in effect. Petitioner's Rule 2.24 provides that personnel absent from work without approved leave shall forfeit compensation and be subject to discipline, including termination. Unavailability for work due to incarceration does not constitute a basis for approved leave and is an unauthorized absence.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Cardenas Department of Corrections No. 202263 Reception and Medical Center Post Office Box 628 Lake Butler, Florida 32054 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons, Longoria & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 Jim Paul, Superintendent Escambia County School Board 215 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32502 Honorable Jim Horne Commissioner of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 323299-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent, Douglas Porter, should be terminated for his third absence without leave in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Petitioner, Seminole County School Board, and the non-instructional personnel of Seminole County.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing in this matter and the joint stipulation submitted April 24, 2007, the following Findings of Facts are made: Respondent, Douglas Porter, is, and has been, employed by the School Board of Seminole County since July 13, 1993. Paul Hagerty and William Vogel have been Superintendents of Public Schools for the School District of Seminole County, Florida, for all times material to the occurrences relevant to this case. Pursuant to Section 4, Article IX, Florida Constitution, and Sections 1001.30, 1001.31, 1001.32, 1001.33, 1001.41, and 1001.42, Florida Statutes (2006), the School Board of Seminole County, Florida, is the governing board of the School District of Seminole County, Florida. The relationship of the parties is controlled by Florida Statutes, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and School Board policies. Respondent is an employee of Petitioner's Grounds Maintenance Department, 100 Division ("maintenance department"). He began his employment in that division at the entry level position of Grounds Laborer I and worked his way up to Grounds Laborer II, prior to becoming a mechanic crew leader. As a mechanic crew leader, Respondent supervised three employees on his crew and interacted with principals and assistant principals to determine the landscaping needs of various schools. Respondent held the position of mechanic crew leader for approximately two years. Respondent has been employed by Petitioner for more than three years and is a "regular" employee and subject to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, copies of which he receives annually. Article VII, Section 15, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, provides, in pertinent part: Employees shall report absences and the reason for such absences prior to the start of their duty day in accordance with practices established at each cost center. An employee who has been determined to have been AWOL shall be subject to the following progressive discipline procedures: 1st Offense - Written reprimand and one day suspension without pay. 2nd Offense - Five day suspension without pay. 3rd Offense - Recommended for termination. Each day that an employee is AWOL shall be considered a separate offense. However, any documentation of offenses in this section shall be maintained in the employee's personnel file. Article VII, Section 15, has consistently been construed to apply to an employee's absence from his or her assigned duties for any portion of the day, as well as the entire day. An employee who is absent from his or her assigned work duties without the permission of the employee's supervisor is considered to be absent without leave. The Collective Bargaining Agreement requires that an employee call in before the start of the work day if he or she is going to be absent; historically, maintenance department employees are given a 15-minute grace period after the start of the work day to call in. Although not reduced to a written directive, this practice is well-known within the maintenance department. An employee in the maintenance department who calls in sick, is reported to the payroll clerk who checks the employee's timesheet; if the employee has time on the books, he or she is approved for pay for the sick time. If the employee does not have time on the books, he or she is charged with a sick day with no pay. An employee who fails to call in, or calls in late, is considered absent without leave if he or she does not physically report for work that day or for the portion of the day missed due to tardiness. If the employee reports for work, he or she is subject to discipline, but is paid for the hours worked. If the employee calls in during the 15-minute grace period and is late, he or she is not subject to discipline, but is paid only for the time worked. Respondent had used 13 days of annual leave, 16 days of sick and personal leave, and 27 days of unpaid leave in the 2000 school year. This prompted Respondent's supervisor to indicate that his attendance needed improvement in Respondent's annual evaluation. As reflected in each of Respondent's annual assessments during his employment, Respondent's absenteeism created a hardship on his department and his attendance needed improvement. Normally, an employee is not required to provide proof of illness. In instances where an employee has excessive sick days, validation of illness is required. Concern with Respondent's excessive sick days prompted his supervisor to require, by letter dated October 1, 2001, medical certification of future illness that required missing work. By October 1, 2001, for the 2001 school year, which began on July 1, 2001, Respondent had used six days of vacation, eight days of paid leave, and four and a-half days of leave without pay. This "abuse of sick leave" resulted in a letter of reprimand dated October 1, 2001, which was clearly intended to warn Respondent to improve his attendance and required validation of illness as referenced in the preceding paragraph. Respondent was absent on September 1, 2002. He did not provide a medical validation of the illness causing the absence and, as a result, the absence was treated as an absence without leave. On September 18, 2002, Respondent received a letter of reprimand and a one-day suspension without pay due to his failure to provide medical verification for this unpaid leave day. This invoked the first step of progressive discipline as contained in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On March 20, 2005, Respondent called in during the late evening and left a message on his supervisor's voicemail stating that he would not be at work the following day. The message was vulgar and unacceptable. Respondent did not report to work on March 21, 2005, and did not produce medical verification for his absence. On March 28, 2005, his supervisor recommended that he be suspended from work without pay for this absence without leave, his second offense in the progressive discipline system. On April 7, 2005, Respondent received a letter from the Superintendent notifying him that he would be following the supervisor's disciplinary recommendation for Respondent's absence without leave. The Superintendent's letter clearly references Respondent's failure to give appropriate prior notice of absences "in accordance with practices established at each cost center," and warns that future failure to comply "with procedures established at the Facilities Center to properly report and receive approval for future absences" would result in discipline in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On September 7, 2006, Respondent voluntarily entered South Seminole hospital, a psychiatric facility. He was discharged on or about September 25, 2006. Respondent's condition required that he again be hospitalized on October 31, 2006, for four days. Respondent was diagnosed as suffering from bipolar disorder. During his hospitalizations, Respondent was administered various medications to treat his condition. Following release from his second hospitalization, Respondent's prescriptions were changed due to adverse side effects he was experiencing. In addition to being diagnosed with bipolar disorder, Respondent also voluntarily sought treatment for substance abuse at the Grove Counseling Center through the outpatient drug/substance abuse program. Respondent returned to work in November 2006, but was still suffering from problems related to his medication. He was late on November 8, 2006, and absent on November 9, 2006. Respondent had a meeting with his supervisor on November 10, 2006; it was the supervisor's intention to recommend Respondent for termination for the tardiness of November 8, 2006, and absence of November 9, 2006. On November 10, 2006, Respondent advised his supervisor that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder in September 2006 and that he was having problems with his medication. As a result of this conversation, instead of being recommended for termination, Respondent was given time off to adjust his medications, and it was agreed that Respondent would return to work on January 2, 2007. On January 9, 2007, approximately a week after returning to work, Respondent called in at approximately 7:10 a.m., his work day begins at 6:30 a.m., to advise that he had overslept and would be late to work. Respondent arrived at work at 7:28 a.m., 58 minutes after the start of his work day. As a result of this tardiness, Respondent's supervisor recommended suspension and termination to the Superintendent for a third offense of being absent without leave.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent, Doug Porter, guilty of the allegations stated in the Petition for Termination and that his employment be terminated. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeanine Blomberg, Interim Commissioner Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Bill Vogel, Superintendent Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Pamela Hubbell Cazares, Esquire Chamblee, Johnson & Haynes, P.A. 510 Vonderburg Drive, Suite 200 Brandon, Florida 33511
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following facts are found: The Largo Fire Department is comprised of approximately 70 employees and maintain three stations, with a fourth station apparently in the planning stage. The chief administrative officer in full command of the entire Department is the fire chief, who is directly responsible to the City Manager. In descending order of command are two assistant chiefs, three fire captains and twelve fire lieutenants. There are also two fire inspectors, forty-six fire fighters, three or four dispatchers and one secretary. (Exhibit No. 6). Assistant Fire Chiefs - Second in the line of command are the two assistant fire chiefs. They work a standard forty-hour week, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., five days a week. Their office is one half block away from the main fire station. If the chief is out of town or unavailable, one of the assistant chiefs assumes command. When the chief and both assistant chiefs are unavailable, either a captain or a lieutenant is designated to be in command. With regard to the personnel evaluations made by either captains or lieutenants, assistant chiefs normally accept the recommendations made by them. On occasion an assistant chief will attach an additional memo to a recommendation submitted by an inferior officer. Assistant chiefs have no authority to fire Department personnel or to prevent merit pay increases. Only the chief has these powers, subject to review by the City Manager. There was testimony that after an applicant goes through certain testing procedures with the City's personnel department, the chief and assistant chiefs make the ultimate decision as to who is hired. Assistant chiefs receive input from captains and lieutenants with regard to purchasing new equipment and personnel transfers. With regard to the budget, assistant chiefs may purchase items within the guidelines of the budget. They make recommendations respecting the formulation of the budget, but the chief makes the ultimate decision as to what will be submitted to the City for the budget. If everything is going well at a fire scene, assistant chiefs stand back and observe rather than assume control. Equipment placements and transfers are made by the assistant chiefs. With regard to collective bargaining, assistant chiefs would directly assisting administering the outcome of the negotiations. Fire Captains - Like fire fighters, captains work a 24-hour shift and then are off 48 hours. They wear the same work uniform as fire fighters, but their dress uniform includes a white, rather than a blue, shirt. The captains eat their meals with and sleep in the same quarters as fire fighters. Each captain is responsible for a third of the combat portion of the Fire and directs the operations of the officers and men on their particular shift. On the fire scene, captains are the working supervisor and perform the normal functions of search and rescue. Around the station, captains participate in the minimal domestic and maintenance duties and tasks as part of a team effort. In the event that both the chief and assistant chief are absent, a captain designated by the chief assumed the duties and responsibilities of an assistant chief. With regard to authority to transfer men, discipline men and make policy, there was testimony that such authority is solely in the form of making recommendations in those areas. A lower grade officer or fire fighter can also submit written reports or charges concerning disciplinary action. While the job description for captain's requires them to make thorough weekly inspections of each station, apparatus and personnel the chief has been personally making such inspections for the past several months. While captains are required to keep records of sick leave, the the administrative secretary actually handles all leave records. Captains do have the authority to visit persons on sick leave if there is reason to believe a sick leave is not legitimate. The job description requires captains to forward to headquarters every six months a written personnel evaluation report on all personnel under their command. This is done by a standardized form sent to the captains by City's personnel department. Captains also have the authority to give mutual aid assistance when requested by a neighboring unit by sending men and equipment. While captains have the authority to make changes within their subordinates' command, in emergency situations, most changes in command come out in the form of memos from the administrative chief. In the captain's absence, his duties are assumed by a lieutenant. If a lieutenant is not present the lieutenant's duties are assumed by what is known as a lead fire fighter - a senior fire fighter by virtue of tenure and training. Captains do not formulate policies applicable to the Fire Department nor do they prepare of administer the budget. They can make recommendations with regard to the budget, as can lieutenants and other officers. They cannot buy equipment, nor can they move equipment between stations without written permission. Changes in the organizational structure are not discussed with captains. Any type of procedural recommendation which is made is discussed among the three captains and is then presented to the assistant chiefs and chief for final action. It was opined by Captain Lambert that captains would have no duties or responsibilities to management with respect to collective bargaining and that, as a member of a union, there would be no conflict of interest between the performance of their duties and the possibility of grievances filed within the union. It was Captain Lambert's opinion that policy' decisions were implemented, rather than formulated, by him. Fire Lieutenants - There is one lieutenant assigned to work each of three shifts at each of the stations. Lieutenants report to and perform under the general direction of the captain, also known as the shift commander, who reviews the decisions of the lieutenants. In addition to the job description contained in Exhibit No. 6, there was testimony that lieutenants and fire fighters work on the same time schedule, sleep in the same quarters, eat at the same table, prepare meals jointly and perform fire fighting duties jointly. Lieutenants are in charge at the scene of a fire until a senior officer arrives. There was testimony that although lieutenants participate in the normal evaluation procedure which is used as a basis for merit pay increases and they supervise the duties of the men in the station to which they are assigned, their basic duties are fighting fires. Lieutenants do not have anything to do with preparing or administering the budget nor would they work in the City's behalf with regard to collective bargaining negotiations. They have no authority in actually formulating the policy of the Largo Fire Department. If a fire fighter wants to change his schedule or get time off, he would submit a request to a lieutenant or a captain, depending on who was on duty that day. If both were on duty, he would go to a lieutenant. Fire Inspectors - With respect to inspectors, the petitioner simply submitted the job classification contained in Exhibit No. 6 and suggested that none of the tasks enumerated therein meet the statutory criteria of management employees of F.S. Ch. 447. As noted above, it was the City's position that inspectors do not share a community of interest with line personnel that are responsible for fire suppression in that they do not work the same shift and their duties are primarily fire code enforcement rather than fire combat. Dispatchers - The primary duties of dispatchers are to receive and dispatch fire and emergency calls. They dispatch calls solely for the fire department and do not dispatch for the police department or any other city agency. Another of their duties is to maintain files on equipment usage. Dispatchers work eight-hour shifts and eat with the fire fighters when a meal is served during their eight-hour shift. Their uniform is the same as the fire fighters. When a dispatcher is absent from work, a fire fighter fills in for him; although a dispatcher would never fill in for a fire fighter. Dispatchers have nothing to do with formulating policies of the department nor with preparing or administering the budget. They would not assist management in collective bargaining negotiations. Dispatchers are immediately responsible to the lieutenant, then the captain and on up the line of command. One of the four dispatchers of the Largo Fire Department is presently a member of and is represented by the Largo Employees Association, which presently has a collective bargaining agreement with the City. (Exhibit No. 5) This agreement includes public safety dispatchers in the unit. At the time of the hearing the LEA had not yet been certified by PERC. The one dispatcher who testified would prefer to be represented by petitioner, rather than the LEA. Fire Fighters and Chief - As noted above in the introduction, the parties stipulated that fire fighters were properly included in the proposed unit and that the chief is properly excluded from the unit. Recognition history - In the first letter from petitioner's president to the City Manager, recognition was requested for a unit consisting of captains, lieutenants and fire fighters. After the petitioner first spoke to representatives of the City regarding the bargaining unit, the staff assistant to the City Manager first recommended to the Manager that a unit consisting of fire fighters and lieutenants be approved. The City Commission questioned the inclusion of lieutenants. At that point, communications apparently broke down and unfair labor practice charges were filed by both the petitioner and the City. Their charges were subsequently dismissed. After that the petitioner filed its petition for Certification of Representation requesting inclusion of assistant chiefs, captains, inspectors and dispatchers, in addition to lieutenants and fire fighters, since the issue would then be before PERC and PERC could then rule on everybody once and for all. Although petitioner's constitution and by-laws speaks of a unit consisting of the ranks of captain, lieutenant and fire fighter, the same is in the process of being amended. In accordance with F.S. Section 447.307(3)(a) and F.A.C. Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: G.R. McClelland, Esquire City Attorney City Hall Largo, Florida 33540 Mr. Robert Jewell City Hall Largo, Florida 33540 Terry A. Furnell 501 South Fort Harrison Clearwater, Florida 33516 Mr. Barry Burkhart 2320 East Bay Drive, No. 135 Clearwater, Florida 33516 Mrs. Lawrence C. Black 152 8th Avenue Southwest Largo, Florida 33540
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's employment by the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Respondent was employed by the Petitioner as a bus driver and was assigned to Central East Regional Transportation Center (Central East), which is within the school district of Miami-Dade County. The Respondent is a member of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) bargaining unit. At all times material, Randy Mazie (Mazie) was the Director of Central East. Juan Perez was the Coordinator of Central East (reporting to Mazie), and Frank Hernandez and Florence Birch were Administrative Assistants (reporting to Perez and Mazie). When a bus driver is absent without advance notice, it often has a substantial impact on the work site. Absenteeism of bus drivers causes delays on that particular route and typically puts stress on both students and school site employees. On a number of occasions, Mazie personally had conversations with the Respondent about her poor attendance record and the consequences of her absenteeism. In addition, employees, including the Respondent, received training about attendance policies and procedures. In March 2000, the Respondent was referred to the Employee Assistance Program. On April 28, 2000, the Petitioner received notification that the Respondent declined to participate in the Employee Assistance Program. The Petitioner accommodated the Respondent by approving leaves of absence for the Respondent during the following time- frames: January 21, 1998, through April 1, 1998; April 2, 1998, through April 1, 1999; November 29, 1999, through January 2, 2000; January 3, 2000, through January 31, 2000; and February 25, 2000, through March 3, 2000. On November 19, 1999, School Board administrators held a conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism. At the conference the Respondent was advised that she had been absent a total of 52.5 days since April 1999, including 18 days of unauthorized absences. In addition, the Respondent was advised that continued absenteeism would result in a second conference. At the conference, the Respondent was asked if there were any mitigating circumstances for her absences. The Respondent did not provide any explanation for her unauthorized absences. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the conference. On March 2, 2000, School Board administrators held a second conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s continued excessive absenteeism. At the conference, the Respondent was advised that she had been absent without authorization for 6.5 days since the first conference. In addition, the Respondent was advised that she had been absent a total of 74 days during the past 12-month period, including 24.5 days of unauthorized absences. The Respondent was instructed that continued absenteeism would result in a third and final conference, which could result in termination of her employment. At the second conference, the Respondent was asked if there were any mitigating circumstances for her absences. The Respondent did not provide any explanation for her unauthorized absences. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the second conference. On May 31, 2000, School Board administrators sent a memorandum to the Respondent regarding the Respondent’s continued absenteeism. In the memorandum, the Respondent was directed to report to duty daily, as all of her leave time had been exhausted. The Respondent refused to sign a copy of the memorandum. Notwithstanding the above directive, the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism continued. From November 30, 2000, to December 19, 2000, the Respondent was absent from work. On January 4, 2001, the Respondent presented the School Board Administrators with a medical document signed by the Respondent’s physician purporting to excuse the Respondent from work from November 27, 2000, through January 3, 2001. On January 6, 2001, the School Board Administrators discovered that the Respondent’s physician did not excuse the Respondent from work from November 27, 2000, through January 3, 2001, and that the medical document provided by the Respondent had been falsified. On January 22, 2001, School Board administrators held a third conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s continued excessive absenteeism and submission of fraudulent medical documentation. At the conference, the administrators advised the Respondent that she had been absent a total of 38 days during the past 12-month period. The Respondent was also informed that, since March 2000, she had been absent without authorization for 18 days. At the conference, the Respondent was afforded an opportunity to refute the charges that she had submitted fraudulent medical documentation. Despite this opportunity, the Respondent did not refute the charges or provide an explanation. Thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the conference; however, the Respondent refused to sign the summary. On February 22, 2001, the Office of Professional Standards held a conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism and submission of fraudulent medical documentation. At the conference, the Respondent was afforded an opportunity to refute the charges that she had submitted fraudulent medical documentation. Despite this opportunity, the Respondent did not refute the charges or provide an explanation. The Respondent received a written summary of the conference. During the hearing, the Respondent testified that she went to the emergency room (but was not admitted to the hospital) during the time-frame from November 30, 2000, through December 19, 2000. The emergency room personnel told her to follow up with her physician. Notwithstanding these directions, the Respondent admitted that she failed to follow up with her physician. During the time-frame from November 30, 2000, through December 19, 2000, School Board administrators directed the Respondent to submit documents indicating that she was under medical care. Thereafter, the Respondent falsified the medical note. The Respondent also generally testified during the hearing that she was undergoing counseling by a social worker for stress related to her personal life. However, the Respondent never offered as evidence any records from the social worker, and Mazie testified that she never had a conversation with him about meeting with a social worker. Moreover, the Respondent admitted that the School Board Administrators authorized absences related to her daughter’s pregnancy/illness, as well as housing problems she encountered during a storm. In addition, the Respondent conceded that the School Board never denied the Respondent a requested leave of absence. Between April 1, 1999, and November 19, 1999, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 20.5 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 20 days. Between November 19, 1999, and March 2, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 8.5 days. Between March 3, 1999, and March 2, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 28.5 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 51 days. Between January 23, 2000, and January 22, 2001, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 22 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 12 days. Between March 3, 2000, and March 3, 2001, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 21 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 8 days. Between November 30, 2000, and December 19, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 14 consecutive days. Based on the Respondent’s leave history records, she was absent without authorization, between March 3, 2000, and March 3, 2001, as follows: March 10, 2000 (½ day); April 10, 2000 (½ day); April 13, 2000 (½ day); May 30, 2000 (½ day); May 31, 2000 (½ day); June 2, 2000 (½ day); July 18, 2000 (½ day); July 21, 2000 (½ day); November 30, 2000 (1 day); December 1, 2000 (1 day); December 4, 2000 (1 day); December 5, 2000 (1 day); December 6, 2000 (1 day); December 7, 2000 (1 day); December 8, 2000 (1 day); December 11, 2000 (1 day); December 12, 2000 (1 day); December 13, 2000 (1 day); December 14, 2000 (1 day); December 15, 2000 (1 day); December 18, 2000 (1 day); December 19, 2000 (1 day); January 10, 2001 (½ day); January 11, 2001 (½ day); February 15, 2001 (1 day); February 22, 2001 (½ day); and February 27, 2001 (½ day). As a result of the Respondent's conduct, School Board administrators recommended dismissal of the Respondent. Thereafter, the Petitioner suspended the Respondent without pay and initiated these dismissal proceedings.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered terminating the Respondent's employment and denying all other relief sought by the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2002.
