The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is entitled to relocate its employee, Perry Kirkland, from an assignment in Jacksonville, Florida, to an assignment in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Perry Kirkland, the Respondent, is employed as a beverage sergeant with the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. He has been employed with that division for sixteen years. Within that employment period, he has worked for one year in Orlando, two years in Miami, a period of time in Daytona Beach and then was assigned to Jacksonville, Florida, where he has remained as an employee with the exception of a period of time of 28 days beginning on September 19, 1977, when he was working for the same division in West Palm Beach, Florida. His service in the present type of classification began in 1968 when he was made an enforcement supervisor. His category was later changed to beverage sergeant in 1975. He is a permanent status employee. The underlying nature of the dispute between the Petitioner and Respondent concerns the Petitioner's effort to have the Respondent moved from Jacksonville, Florida, to West Palm Beach, Florida, on a permanent basis, as a condition of the Respondent's employment. The propriety or impropriety of such a requirement may be best understood by discussing the background facts which led to his proposed relocation. In the late fall or early winter of 1976, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Charles A. Nuzum, in conjunction with his subordinates, determined that it was necessary to transfer certain personnel from the Marianna office to the Panama City office. The purpose of such transfer was to promote more comprehensive enforcement in the Panama City area which was thought to be necessary, and had as its correlative purpose the removal of employees from the Marianna office, where the workload was not as substantial as that in Panama City. In essence, it has been decided that a full-fledged office would he opened in Panama City, in contrast to a sort of impromptu office that was in existence at the time. To make this change in personnel, it was necessary for the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco to get the approval of the Department of Administration, Division of Budget. Mr. Nuzum and his chief of law enforcement met with representatives of the Department of Administration, Division of Budget, to include Elton Revell, a senior budget analyst. The purpose of this meeting was to present the request for changes in the Marianna and Panama City Offices. Revell advised the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco that the Division of Budget could not go along with the "piecemeal" resolution of the problem of a disparity in the efforts of fulfilling the mission of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. It was Revell's position that it would be necessary to consider the entire state in evaluating such realignment, before any approval could be granted. As an example of his position, Revell specifically mentioned that he thought that Live Oak and Jacksonville were offices that were overstaffed. At the insistence of the Division of Budget, and in keeping with his own analysis of the needs of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Mr. Nuzum undertook the task of analyzing the assignment status of the manpower of the division statewide, in an effort to achieve the mandate of his division's function more uniformly. The director had the benefit of certain weekly and monthly reports filed by the field agents in the categories of the division's overall mission. He also had the benefit of an overview of the conditions in the district offices, having made personal visits to the offices around the state. However, it was determined that a more specific study was necessary to get a true picture of the conditions in the district and sub-district offices for purposes of presenting the proposed realignment of personnel to the Department of Administration, Division of Budget. The principal task of doing the study was assigned to John Berry, an auditor with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Berry performed a workload study for a period in 1976, which was designed to determine the time that the agents within the district offices were spending in the primary agency functions, which are licensing and enforcement. The result of this study may he found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Berry in compiling his study, examined the various functions being performed in the Jacksonville District Office and the West Palm Peach District Office, which are Districts III and X respectively. It was determined, per his workload study, that although Jacksonville and West Palm Beach had a comparable number of licenses in their district, the number of manhours being spent in the performance of the licensing and enforcement functions of the division were significantly disproportionate. This is borne out by an examination of the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which shows 2,067 licenses in Jacksonville and 2,015 licenses in West Palm Beach, for the various counties in the districts. Although this number is relatively close, manhours in the licensing function in Jacksonville was some 9,907 hours and the licensing manhours in West Palm Beach were 6,683. Likewise, the enforcement manhours in Jacksonville were 10,250, an even greater gap existed for enforcement in West Palm Beach in comparison to Jacksonville, in that the total manhours spent for that function in West Palm Beach was 3,355. These statistics were derived from an examination of the weekly and monthly reports from the personnel within the Jacksonville and Palm Beach offices. The statistics were also borne out by the testimony of the lieutenant in charge of the West Palm Beach office, who indicated that due to a shortage of manpower, the enforcement function in the West Palm Beach area was woefully inadequate. This discussion of the Jacksonville and West Palm Beach district offices leads to further consideration of the efforts made by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco to have their personnel realigned. After Director Nuzum had received the workload study, he had a further discussion of the authenticity of that study, with members of the staff, to include the district supervisors. His communication with the district supervisors had been by sending them a copy of the workload study to solicit their remarks. This study was forwarded to the district supervisors some time in March, 1977. After this discussion, the study was accepted. On June 7, 1977, the director forwarded the reorganization proposal to Mr. J. Jackson Walter, the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation, of which the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco is a part. This reorganization proposal was forwarded in conjunction with a request made by Mr. Walter. Again, the contents of this proposal are found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which includes the workload study and a specific indication of how many persons would be reassigned to the various offices. It also includes a copy of the then present manning chart and a copy of the proposed manning chart after the changes. At that point in time, the exact persons who would be moved had not been determined. Moreover, the criteria for moving individuals from one location to another was still under discussion. Finally, it was determined that the basis for movement would be on the grounds of seniority, should there be two possible candidates for relocation and a decision become necessary for selecting one of those two persons. Sergeant Kirkland was in that category, because within the Jacksonville district there were two beverage sergeants and the other beverage sergeant was a more senior member of the division. Therefore, Kirkland was chosen to be relocated from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach. The purpose of this relocation was primarily to promote a more consistent enforcement pattern in terms of hours spent in that function statewide and between Jacksonville and West Palm Beach. A related reason was to allow some assistance to the lieutenant in charge of the West Palm Beach office, in terms of supervision of the field beverage officers of basic rank. A letter was forwarded to the district supervisors and district auditors from Mr. Nuzum, indicating that the realignment of personnel assignments would be on the basis of seniority. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 submitted into evidence is a copy of that notification. After determining that seniority would be the criterion for the relocation of personnel involved, the Division Director submitted his proposals through the Department of Business Regulation for transmittal to the Department of Administration for their approval. The Department of Administration approved the reorganization and J. Revell of the Department of Administration informed Floyd L. Dorn of the Department of Business Regulation's personnel office, that this approval had been granted. This approval came about in August, 1977. After receiving the notification of approval, Director Nuzum then began to advise the personnel who were affected by the reorganization in terms of any relocation. As stated before, Sergeant Kirkland was a person involved in the relocation question. Assistant Chief of Enforcement, Ken Ball, on the basis of the seniority standard, determined that Sergeant Kirkland should be transferred from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach. This was approved by Director Nuzum and this particular change was indicated on the reorganization position chart, which was Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 submitted into evidence. His position number is 00092. The Respondent had filled the 00092 position while working in Jacksonville. His primary function was as supervisor of the enforcement section of the district, with the exception of the period of time in which he was acting in the dual capacity of enforcement supervisor and acting district supervisor. His duties during that latter period are described in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. This duty description was made by Sergeant Kirkland. When the present district supervisor, Captain Oganowski, took over the permanent job of district supervisor in Jacksonville, Sergeant Kirkland went back to filling the duties of enforcement supervisor. This function entailed the supervision of the enforcement division, as opposed to enforcement and licensing or licensing. Sergeant Kirkland continued to hold this position except for a short period of time in 1975 when he changed positions with the licensing supervisor. This is reflected in Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 shows the reassignment of Kirkland back to the job 00092, (enforcement supervisor) in Jacksonville. During his tenure with the division, Sergeant Kirkland has maintained a high standard of performance in his various assignments. The current description of duties and responsibilities which the Respondent is expected to assume in the West Palm Beach office may be found as a part of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. This function includes the supervision of both enforcement and licensing personnel. When it was determined that Sergeant Kirkland would be sent to West Palm Beach, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco telephonically communicated the notice of this transfer. It was followed by a letter indicating the transfer, a copy of which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. The date of the written notification is August 25, 1977. The official report of personnel action setting the effective date of the relocation was dated September 15, 1977, and made the effective date September 19, 1977. A copy of this report of personnel action is Respondent's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The type of action indicated on this form is original appointment, with the additional statement entered as "Continued." In fact, the relocation of Sergeant Kirkland is a reassignment within the meaning of Rule 22A-7.08, F.A.C. It is a reassignment because the appointment involved a move from one position in one class to a different position in the same class. The position move, is a move from the 00092 position in Jacksonville, which involves the supervision of enforcement personnel in Jacksonville, to the 00092 position in West Palm Beach, which involves the supervision of both enforcement and licensing personnel. Under the terms of Rule 22A-7.08, F.A.C., Kirkland may not appeal that reassignment. However, since it involves a geographic transfer of more than fifty miles the Respondent is entitled to appeal this decision to the Career Service Commission, in keeping with the authority of Rule 22A-7.09, F.A.C. The Respondent has challenged this relocation by his Career Service Appeal. That appeal has two principal contentions. The first contention concerns the assertion that the transfer does not fall within any of the types of enumerated appointments found in Rule 22A-7, F.A.C. As already shown, this position has been rejected, because the appointment has been determined to be a reassignment appointment. The second contention of the appeal is that any transfer from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach would cause irreparable financial harm and hardship on the Respondent and his wife. In connection with this assertion, Sergeant Kirkland produced evidence that the housing in the West Palm Beach area is more expensive than that in Jacksonville, and that, not withstanding the amount of equity which he might realize from the sale of his Jacksonville property, he still would incur approximately $15,000 additional cost for housing. This housing would not be comparable to his Jacksonville housing, due to the difference in the available amount of property and size of the home itself being smaller in West Palm Beach. The house that he is purchasing in Jacksonville is a four-bedroom, two-bath, two-carport home. The house being contemplated for purchase in West Palm Beach is a three-bedroom, two-bath home. Furthermore, the cost of the mortgage in Jacksonville is $165 and this cost would be exceeded in West Palm Beach even if the equity realized in the sale of Jacksonville home were put toward the down payment. It was also established that the restaurant cost in the West Palm Beach area is greater than that cost in Jacksonville. Sergeant Kirkland's wife testified that she is a hospital operating room nurse who has established a certain amount of seniority in her present employment. She is also only one year away from being able to retire with retirement benefits. If she is required to move, she would lose those benefits and also have to start at the bottom of the seniority list in any new employment in a hospital operating room in West Palm Beach. Finally, the Respondent demonstrated that to move from the Jacksonville community to West Palm Beach would cause him to lose church membership and other community activities in which he is involved. In spite of the degree of hardship which has been demonstrated by the Respondent in his presentation, a review of all the facts and circumstances would justify the Petitioner's action in its reassignment transfer of the Respondent. The action was not a punishment, it was a circumstance where the needs of the Petitioner in this instance, are more compelling than the hardship which will be caused Sergeant Kirkland and his family.
Recommendation It is recommended that the proposed reassignment appointment transfer of the Respondent from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach in the position 00092 he approved and that the appeal by the Respondent challenging this action by the Petitioner be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 30 day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Glickstein, Jr., Esquire 1205 Universal Marion Building Post Office Box 1086 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Francis Bailey, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32201 Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Division of Personnel and Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Orange Park Billiards and Sports Pub, Inc. (the “Bar”), should be reimbursed by Respondent, Department of Transportation (the “Department” or “DOT”), for costs associated with obtaining a new liquor license incident to its relocation as a displaced tenant pursuant to section 421.55, Florida Statutes (2012).
Findings Of Fact The Bar was a billiards and sports pub located in Clay County, Florida. It was, at all times relevant hereto, located within the Comfort Inn, a hotel situated on US Highway 17 in Clay County. US 17 is called Park Avenue in Clay County, but becomes Roosevelt Boulevard when it crosses into Duval County. The Clay -- Duval county line is just north of the Comfort Inn site. The Bar was formerly owned by Terry Harper, who had purchased “State of Florida Quota Alcoholic Beverage License No. 20-01226, a 3PS series License for use in Clay County, Florida” in June 2009. The Bar was purchased from Harper by Steve Chelgren on or about January 1, 2010. The purchase was made by way of a promissory note, and Chelgren made timely payments on the note for the first couple of years. There is a dog racetrack located next door to the Bar. The racetrack also has a poker room. Pari-mutuel gambling is allowed on the dog races and the poker games. The Bar receives a lot of business from the patrons of the dog track, as much as 25 percent of the Bar’s total business. The Jacksonville Naval Air Station is located adjacent to Roosevelt Boulevard just across the Duval County line. Many Bar patrons are sailors and employees of the Naval Air Station. There are approximately 69,500 cars passing the Bar site each day. The Bar is in a good area for attracting customers. In 2012, the Department acquired the Comfort Inn property as part of a state and federal road project. By way of a letter dated May 8, 2012, the Department notified Chelgren that the Comfort Inn property was being acquired. The letter gave Chelgren “at least 90 days” to relocate his business to another site. Chelgren was also advised about “advisory services and payments under the Relocation Assistance program,” which he may be eligible to receive as a result of the displacement. The program provided money for moving expenses and other services. Chelgren immediately began looking for a place to relocate his business. In order to accommodate the same clientele and continue business as normal, Chelgren first considered the Roadway Inn located just across US 17/Park Avenue from his present location. The Roadway Inn site would be in close proximity to the dog track and the Naval Air Station. Unfortunately, his construction inspection experts told Chelgren that the Roadway Inn had too many problems and would be prohibitively expensive to renovate. Chelgren then began looking elsewhere for a suitable location to relocate the Bar. He did not find a viable option in Clay County, so he began looking in Duval County. Chelgren ultimately settled on a site in Jacksonville Beach, some 30 miles from the Bar’s location in Clay County. The Jacksonville Beach site reportedly had a comparable amount of traffic and was likely to produce customers similar in number to the Comfort Inn site in Clay County.1/ There was one major difference between the two sites: The liquor license purchased by Chelgren in Clay County costs about $59,000; a similar license in Jacksonville Beach would cost about $400,000. The license under which the Bar operated was a 4COP license, which allows for the sale of beer, wine, and liquor and does not require the establishment to sell a certain percentage of non-alcoholic products, i.e., food, clothing, etc. There was no testimony or evidence presented at final hearing as to how a 4COP license differs from the 3PS license held by Chelgren in Clay County (except that the number at the beginning of the license type designates the county in which it is located). It is presumed for purposes of this Recommended Order that the licenses are effectively the same. The City of Jacksonville Beach only allows 12 4COP (or “quota”) licenses within its city limits at any one time. While other cities may increase the number of quota licenses as the population grows, Jacksonville Beach decided to limit the number of licenses without regard to population increases. As a result, the Jacksonville Beach licenses increase in value beyond similar licenses in other locations. At some point after finding the Jacksonville Beach location, Chelgren contacted the Department about obtaining reimbursement for a new liquor license at a replacement location in Jacksonville Beach. The Department, by letter dated November 5, 2012, notified Chelgren that his request was denied. DOT would pay for the “remaining useful life of the existing license,” but nothing more. It cost $1,820 per year to renew the liquor license, so DOT said it would pay the pro rata share of that payment for the time remaining before the next renewal. The Department’s decision to deny Chelgren’s request for payment of the new 4COP license was then appealed. The appeal letter is dated January 3, 2013. By letter dated January 29, 2013, DOT notified Chelgren that his appeal was denied. He was given the right to appeal further by filing a request for formal administrative hearing, which precipitated the instant action. Pending resolution of the challenge to DOT’s decision, Chelgren, nonetheless, decided to make the move to the Jacksonville Beach location and to rename the business, “The Tavern on First Street.” He entered into a purchase and sale agreement dated January 16, 2013, agreeing to purchase a liquor license for the sum of $400,000 with $40,000 down and $1,500 due per month at 5 percent interest. No evidence was presented as to the volume of customers at the new location, as to the automobile traffic volume, or whether the site is indeed comparable to the location of the Bar in Clay County. No evidence was presented as to whether Chelgren sold his Clay County license in an effort to mitigate his damages, or whether such a sale was even possible. Chelgren now operates the Tavern at First Street under a 4COP license purchased for that purpose. He continues to seek reimbursement for the cost of that license. DOT maintains its denial of the request.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming its denial of Orange Park Billiards and Sports Pub, Inc.’s application for reimbursement of its cost for a new liquor license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (b) (1) (C) AND 9.110. . TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA09-GM-278 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by the manner indicated to each of the persons listed below on this 5 OM aay ° , 2009. Paula Ford Agency Clerk By U.S. Mail Honorable Donald R. Alexander Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Shannon K. Eller Deputy General Counsel City of Jacksonville 117 West Duval Street, Suite 480 Jacksonville, FL 32202 By Hand Delivery Lynette Norr Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs
The Issue This cause initially arose upon a complaint of unfair or discriminatory housing and may be resolved upon jurisdictional and procedural issues as more fully described below.
Findings Of Fact The procedural history of this cause requires dismissal due to Petitioner's abandonment of the claim of discrimination. Petitioner did not respond to the initial order entered herein. Therefore, the Notice of Hearing for final formal hearing on December 2, 1996 was entered without any input from the Petitioner. It was mailed to all parties on October 23, 1996. On or about November 19, 1996, the U.S. Postal Service returned Petitioner's copy of the Notice of Hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings bearing a new address for Petitioner. Petitioner had not seen fit to advise the Division of any change of address. The Notice of Hearing was remailed on or about November 20, 1996 to the new address for Petitioner. At formal hearing on December 2, 1996, both Respondents were present with their respective legal counsel and all their witnesses. Petitioner did not appear even though open video communication was maintained for one hour, with everyone except the Administrative Law Judge present at the Jacksonville location. Due to the possible "short notice" to Petitioner and in an abundance of caution because evidence and argument at that time suggested this case could be dismissed upon proper motion, no evidence on the merits was heard on December 2, 1996. After formal hearing was adjourned on December 2, 1996, the Notice of Hearing which had been remailed to Petitioner on November 20, 1996 was received back by the Division. The U.S. Postal Service had indicated that Petitioner was not at the new address either. Because the undersigned was without any means of locating Petitioner, an Order to Show Cause was entered on December 11, 1996. It provided, in pertinent part, 3. Petitioner is granted 20 days from the date of this order in which to show cause in writing, filed with the Division, why formal hearing should be rescheduled. If this instant order is returned by the post office as undeliverable, it may be presumed Petitioner has abandoned his claim by his failure to provide a current address during the time this case has been before the Division. If the order is not returned and Petitioner does not file anything, it will be presumed he has abandoned his claim and does not still seek a formal [sic hearing] in this cause. If Petitioner does show cause why this case should be rescheduled, this cause may be reset for formal hearing. The December 11, 1996 Order to Show Cause was served upon Petitioner at his last known address. Petitioner has not provided any other address during the time this cause has been before the Division. More than sixty (60) days have passed, and the Order to Show Cause has not been returned by the U.S. Postal Service. Petitioner has not filed any response so as to show cause why formal hearing on the merits should be rescheduled. Therefore, it is presumed that Petitioner has abandoned his claim and no longer seeks a formal hearing in this cause. The presumptions arising from the Williams/Higbee Motion to Dismiss require dismissal of Bessie Williams and Foland Higbee Realty, Inc. as Respondents Respondents Bessie Williams and Foland Higbee Realty, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 6, 1996. (Copy attached to aid the Florida Commission on Human Relations) Pursuant to Rule 60Q-2.016 Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner had seven days plus five days for mailing in which to file a response in opposition to this motion. Petitioner has filed no response. Therefore, all allegations in the motion with its attached supporting documentation may be taken as true and unopposed. Petitioner has executed a General Release which discharged Bessie Williams and Foland Higbee Realty, Inc. of any liability for all events up to and including June 15, 1995. Petitioner's original Housing Discrimination Complaint was filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) on or about February 1, 1995. (Copy of complaint attached to aid the Florida Commission on Human Relations) Accordingly, Petitioner cannot proceed in this cause against Bessie Williams and Foland Higbee Realty, Inc. because all issues between Petitioner and these Respondents that occurred up to and including the date of his initial complaint have been settled, waived and released by Petitioner. III The absence of jurisdiction over the Jacksonville Housing Authority requires dismissal of that Respondent as a party. From the materials provided as part of the Commission's referral of this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (Copies attached to aid the Florida Commission on Human Relations) it appears that: Petitioner did not name the Jacksonville Housing Authority in his original Housing Discrimination Complaint filed with the Commission on or about February 1, 1995. The Commission's July 16, 1996 "DETERMINATION OF NO REASONABLE CAUSE" to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred also did not name the Jacksonville Housing Authority as a party; and The Petition for Relief herein, filed with the Commission on or about August 5, 1996 also does not name the Jacksonville Housing Authority as a party. It appears that the only reason the Jacksonville Housing Authority was named in this action at all is because Commission staff inadvertently and incorrectly used a Transmittal of Petition form for Petitions for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice and a form for Notice to Respondent of Filing Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice naming the Jacksonville Housing Authority as Respondent. The only other possible reason for involving the Jacksonville Housing Authority in this case would be to allow it to conduct its own investigation and/or hearing pursuant to Section 760.34(3), Florida Statutes, in which case the Housing Authority still should not have been joined as a party Respondent. Pursuant to Section 760.34(2), Florida Statutes, a complaint of unfair or discriminatory housing must be filed within one year of the date the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred. The complaint and petition herein are not clear as to the alleged date of discrimination in housing, but since the complaint herein was filed February 1, 1995, it logically follows that the alleged discrimination had to have occurred before February 1, 1995. Therefore, it is clearly too late, pursuant to statute, for Petitioner to refile any housing discrimination complaint against the Jacksonville Housing Authority for that time period.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and underlying claims of unfair housing against all Respondents. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of February, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Marie LaManna, Esquire Luis Tous, Esquire Office of the General Counsel 600 City Hall 220 East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202 Jerome Reed, Jr. 1471 West 13th Street Jacksonville, FL 32209 H. Leon Holbrook, III, Esquire Independent Square 1 Independent Drive, Suite 2301 Jacksonville, FL 32202-5059 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for retirement contributions on compensation paid Thaddeus Kmiecik in his capacity as city dockmaster.
Findings Of Fact The City of Moore Haven is located west of Lake Okeechobee alongside a waterway that connects Stuart on the east coast with Ft. Myers on the west coast. Petitioner maintains docks that boaters may use overnight, provided they pay a docking fee. A dockmaster supervises the dock and collects the docking fee from boaters. Petitioner's first dockmaster served without compensation. Whenever he became ill or went out of town, he asked Petitioner to hire someone to replace him. Pursuant to Ordinance No. 156, which went into effect in 1982, Petitioner hired replacements for the first dockmaster. Ordinance No. 156 provides that specified docking fees shall be paid by all boats docking at the city docks between the hours of 6:00 pm and 8:00 am or at other times, if the boat remains docked over three hours. However, the ordinance allows the dockmaster to enter into special contracts with commercial users, subject to the approval of City Commission. Ordinance No. 156 states that the City Commission shall appoint one or more persons as dockmaster, who shall "check all boats at the City dock both evening and morning of each day." The ordinance requires the dockmaster to record all relevant information about the boat in a log. The ordinance states that the dockmaster is "responsible seven days a week for the collection of dockage fees, giv[ing] a receipt from a numbered book, and giv[ing] copies of all receipts to the City Clerk each working day." The dockmaster must also tell the City Clerk if the docks need repairs or maintenance. The dockmaster is also required to assume at least certain responsibilities of the City Manager if the position is vacant. The health of the original dockmaster deteriorated and it became necessary to hire someone else to collect the fees. By agreement between the original dockmaster and the person doing the collections, the dockmaster allowed the collector to retain a percentage of the docking fees collected. The remainder evidently was remitted to Petitioner. When the original dockmaster died, Petitioner hired Thaddeus Kmiecik as the new dockmaster. The agreement between Petitioner and Mr. Kmiecik requires that he answer directly to the City Commission. He is to ensure that the docking fees are collected and all money taken directly to City Hall. Boaters needing reservations call Mr. Kmiecik at home. Mr. Kmiecik is responsible for his own expenses, but he earns a commission, payable monthly, of 20 percent of the collected docking fees. From 1986 through 1993, Petitioner has filed IRS Forms 1099, showing that Mr. Kmiecik has received the following "nonemployee compensation": 1986--$1936.52; 1987-- $2324.83; 1988 1992--$3457.50; and 1993--$2621.08. The arrangement between Petitioner and Mr. Kmiecik is fairly loose. He has never received any training, except how to complete the receipt book, which is provided by Petitioner. He has never received any orders as to how to perform his job, except that he is to ensure that the docks are checked nightly for boats and that all docking fees are promptly remitted to Petitioner. Mr. Kmiecik does not check the docks in the morning, and the City Commission has never insisted that he do so, even though the ordinance so requires. Mr. Kmiecik has attended only one City Commission meeting and has never reported anything to the City Commission. He can hire anyone whom he chooses to help him or perform the services when he is out of town or otherwise unavailable. He may supplement his income from the docks by performing other services, such as taking boaters to the airport, and he retains all compensation for such additional services. Although not required to do so, Mr. Kmiecik sometimes wears a city uniform when he appears at the docks. But this is the uniform for his fulltime job at Petitioner's water plant. Other persons checking the boats at night do not have a uniform. Petitioner is a participating local agency in the State-Administered Retirement System. Petitioner makes retirement contributions on Mr. Kmiecik's pay for his work at the water plant in recognition of the fact that this position is a regularly established position under the State-Administered Retirement System. However, Petitioner has always treated Mr. Kmiecik as an independent contractor for his work as dockmaster and has thus made no retirement contributions for his dockmaster compensation. The record is silent as to when Mr. Kmiecik first became employed with Petitioner in the water plant and whether he has been continuously so employed. On June 3, 1993, Petitioner answered a questionnaire acknowledging that Mr. Kmiecik worked at the city water plant also. Based on the record, June 3, 1993, is the earliest date on which Mr. Kmiecik worked at the city water plant. By letter dated January 21, 1994, Respondent informed Petitioner that Mr. Kmiecik was an employee when performing dockmaster services and demanded retroactive retirement contributions from the unspecified date of his employment in that position. By letter dated January 25, 1994, Petitioner supplied additional information and requested further review of this decision. By letter dated March 7, 1994, Respondent advised Petitioner that Respondent had determined that Mr. Kmiecik was performing the services of dockmaster in an employer-employee relationship, rather than an independent contractor relationship. The letter adds that Mr. Kmiecik is filling a "regularly established position" as an operator of the water plant and is "performing additional duties" as the dockmaster. Petitioner requested a formal hearing on the issue. Based on the relevant law, Mr. Kmiecik is an independent contractor with respect to his dockmaster services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order requiring the City of Moore Haven to pay retirement contributions with respect to the compensation paid Mr. Kmiecik for services as a dockmaster, retroactive to June 3, 1993. ENTERED on July 21, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 21, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1: adopted or adopted in substance. 2-3: rejected as subordinate. 4-10: adopted or adopted in substance. 11: adopted or adopted in substance, but only to the minimal extent of the use of the receipt books. 12-18: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED Steven A. Ramunni Watkins & Ramunni, P.A. P.O. Box 250 LaBelle, FL 33935 Jodi B. Jennings Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg C 2639 North Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact On August 31, 1981, Petitioner issued to Respondent certificate number 02-29029, certifying Respondent as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. On March 4, 1987, Respondent, who was employed as a deputy sheriff by the Broward County Sheriff's Department, was on duty at Port Everglades in Broward County, Florida. At the time, Port Everglades was closed to the public between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. At approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 4, 1987, a car approached the front gate of the Port. Present in the guard house at the front gate at the time were Port security officers Joel Myers and William Updegraff, along with Respondent. Myers stepped out of the guard house and stopped the vehicle at the front gate. He asked the driver and passenger where they were going. The driver answered incoherently and appeared to be intoxicated. About that time Respondent and Updegraff came out of the guard house and approached the rear of the vehicle. Respondent instructed the driver to pull over as he was being stopped by a deputy of the Sheriff's office. The driver instead accelerated and drove into the Port. At no time was there any danger of the car hitting the Respondent, Myers, or Updegraff. Respondent got into his patrol car and began pursuing the vehicle. Myers and Updegraff remained at the guard house. A radio transmission was sent to other employees of the Port advising them that an unauthorized vehicle was in the Port. A few moments later, Donald Leake, a firefighter employed by the Port who had joined in the search, saw the vehicle heading toward the front gate in order to exit the Port. Leake drove his patrol unit beside the vehicle and motioned to the driver to pull over, which the driver did. The vehicle stopped approximately 100 yards from the guard house at the front gate. Leake sent a radio transmission that he had stopped the vehicle in question. He then approached the vehicle on foot and instructed the driver and passenger to place their hands on the steering wheel and the dash of their vehicle. The occupants followed Leake's instructions and offered no resistance to him. It appeared to Leake as though the driver was intoxicated. Leake walked to the rear of the vehicle and obtained the license tag number. He then approached the driver and asked for his driver's license and vehicle registration, which the driver provided to him. The driver's license identified the driver as Rodney Hensen. Myers and Updegraff had observed Leake stop the vehicle, and Updegraff left the guard house and walked to the vehicle in question in order to offer assistance to Leake if Leake needed any. After Updegraff had reachecd the vehicle, Respondent arrived at the scene, got out of his vehicle, approached Leake and Updegraff, handed them his night stick and radio, and opened the driver's door. After opening the door, Respondent began punching the driver in the chest and face, while chastising the driver for running from a Broward Sheriff's Office deputy. Respondent punched Hensen several times with closed fists for a period of approximately 30 seconds. The driver was offering no resistance or threat at the time of the incident and still had his hands on the dash when the punching began. Hensen began crying and kept asking Respondent why Respondent was doing that to him. As he was being punched, he leaned away from Respondent in a defensive position, trying to protect his face with his hands and arms. The passenger kept his hands on the dash while Respondent was punching Hensen, and he offered no resistance or threat to the Respondent. Neither the driver nor the passenger ever struck the Respondent or threatened to strike him. Both remained passive and in defensive positions, leaning away from Respondent. Both Leake and Updegraff repeatedly called out Respondent's name to get his attention and repeatedly told him to stop. Respondent then grabbed Hensen, and pulled him from the vehicle, pushed him up against the car, and handcuffed Hensen behind his back. Respondent then retrieved his night stick, placed it between Hensen's cuffed arms, twisted it, and caused Hensen to roll down the car and fall to the ground, hitting his head against the ground. Respondent then picked up Hensen and placed him in the back seat of Respondent's patrol car. Respondent then commented to Updegraff, "I thought you would have liked to get in on that." As Respondent was handcuffing Hensen, he instructed Leake to remove the passenger and place him face down on the ground. Leake did so, and the passenger was compliant. Respondent sent a radio transmission to the Broward County Sheriff's Office advising that he had made an arrest and had been involved in a fight in doing so. Almost momentarily, other law enforcement officers arrived at the scene. Respondent was not involved in a fight. He struck Hensen repeatedly without provocation, and it was not necessary for Respondent to strike Hensen to effectuate an arrest. During the ensuing investigation conducted by the Broward County Sheriff's Office, Respondent admitted striking Hensen.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his certification as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-6708 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-34 and 36 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 35 and 37 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 8 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 4-7, 9-14, 20 and 21 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony or argument. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 15-19 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Larson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Tavalario 270 Southeast Second Avenue Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, Esquire General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
