The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 70-53, Pinellas County Code, by terminating Petitioner's employment allegedly because of her disability; and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Admitted Facts Per Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation Sure-Tek is an employer as defined by section 70-51, Pinellas County Code. Ms. Turner was employed by Sure-Tek on January 18, 2010. Her employment was terminated by Sure-Tek on February 22, 2010. Prior to her employment, Ms. Turner was diagnosed with diabetes insipidus. Ms. Turner's diabetes did not prevent her from performing the essential functions of her job, with reasonable accommodations. Lewis "Mitch" Currie is the owner of Sure-Tek, and he was Ms. Turner's direct supervisor. Mr. Currie made the decision to terminate Ms. Turner's employment. Additional Findings of Fact Based on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses and the greater weight of the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the following additional facts are found. Diabetes Insipidus Ms. Turner developed diabetes insipidus four years ago as a result of brain surgery to remove a tumor on her pituitary gland. She described the condition as a very rare form of diabetes that is a sodium/electrolyte disorder, instead of the more common forms of diabetes that are insulin/blood sugar disorders. She testified that her understanding of her condition is that it is essentially permanent--the underlying cause of her condition will never go away, and she will eventually need brain surgery again. Ms. Turner's condition requires constant monitoring, but instead of measuring blood sugar via blood tests, Ms. Turner's condition involves monitoring and maintaining a balance of hydration, electrolytes, and output (urination), while taking prescription medication to protect against extreme imbalance that could result in her urinating herself to death. The line where the balance should be drawn at any given point is variable and difficult to predict, so the monitoring and adjustment process is a matter of trial and error, to some degree. The balance that Ms. Turner's condition requires is thrown off by temperature extremes, so she cannot work or spend much recreational time outside when it is hot or cold. She can work in an indoor office setting, provided that she takes extra steps to regulate the temperature, such as using space heaters to warm up a cool space. Ms. Turner must also be permitted to have ready access to plenty of drinking water at all times, and she has gotten used to bringing bottled water with her to ensure an appropriate supply. Her condition can cause her to urinate frequently, and so she also must have ready access to a restroom. Ms. Turner also testified that her condition requires her to maintain a strict diet, because many foods and drinks will throw off the balance she must maintain. For example, Ms. Turner must avoid sodium, butter and certain other fats, meats, and other ingredients. Since some of the ingredients she must avoid, such as sodium, are difficult to control and monitor when eating out, she does not often go out to eat in restaurants and no longer goes out to dinner with friends. Ms. Turner has gotten very sick when she has unknowingly ingested too much sodium or when the ingredients she must avoid have secretly been in her food. Ms. Turner has learned the hard way about some of the things she cannot tolerate. For example, she learned that she cannot drink alcohol when, after the onset of her diabetes insipidus, she collapsed after drinking a small amount of alcohol at a party and had to be hospitalized. By sticking to a careful regimen of monitoring and adjustment, by adhering to all of the hydration and dietary restrictions she has learned are necessary from her experience, limiting her social activities (rarely eating out, limiting outdoor activities), controlling the temperature of her settings and ensuring constant access to water and bathrooms, Ms. Turner has been able to deal with her condition. In a lay person's sense, Ms. Turner does not really consider herself to be disabled, although she tends to think in comparative terms, noting that there are persons with severe debilitating conditions that are much worse off than she is. Ms. Turner testified that her diabetes disorder also has impaired her immunity system, making her more prone to sickness. No medical testimony was offered to verify this opinion. Somewhat inconsistently, Ms. Turner later testified that when she got sick with a cold, which evolved into bronchitis, that episode of sickness was unrelated to her diabetes condition. Indeed, Ms. Turner's opinion that her sickness was not related to her diabetes condition was confirmed by her testimony that she has gotten colds that turned into bronchitis every winter for many years, pre-dating the onset of her diabetes insipidus. Employment at Sure-Tek Sure-Tek is in the business of powder coating, which is an anti-corrosive industrial coating applied to metal and other objects. The building in which Sure-Tek carries out its business has two main areas: administrative office space and warehouse space. The powder coating is done in the warehouse part of the building, in a room with two ovens that operate at 400+ degrees. The room with the ovens is very hot, often 120 degrees or more. Ms. Turner was hired as a bookkeeper/receptionist/ office assistant, beginning on January 18, 2010. She was the only administrative/office worker at Sure-Tek. The other approximately 10 employees worked in the warehouse, carrying out the powder-coating business. Mr. Currie, the owner/president, spent about half of his time in his office and the other half in the warehouse. Ms. Turner had an office with a door that she often kept closed because of her sensitivity to hot and cold temperatures; it was easier to regulate the temperature of her office space if the door was closed. Ms. Turner found her office to be very cold, so she kept two space heaters going. She brought her own space heater to use at the office to accommodate her need to modify the temperature of her space. Brandon Bean, another employee at Sure-Tek, did not like having to go into Ms. Turner's office, finding it unpleasantly warm--he described it as quite "toasty." When Ms. Turner was hired, Mr. Bean had been working at Sure-Tek for about five months. Mr. Bean had been in jail before he was hired by Sure-Tek, having served a sentence for a felony conviction related to firearms. During the time that Ms. Turner was an employee at Sure-Tek, Mr. Bean's position was referred to as floor supervisor or warehouse foreman. Mr. Bean testified that he was promoted to general manager one year ago, which would have been a few months after Ms. Turner was fired, while the Pinellas OHR was conducting its investigation of Ms. Turner's discrimination complaint. Ms. Turner was expected to work 40 hours per week, and she testified that she did so, not missing a day of work. No evidence was presented that Ms. Turner did not work the hours she was expected to work each day and week of her employment (with the exception of leaving sick two hours early on the last Friday of her employment, discussed below). She rarely took lunch. She was expected to be available during business hours to answer the phones and was expected to take a portable phone with her when she stepped away from her desk, even when she went to the bathroom. When she went to the bathroom with a portable phone, she was expected to answer the phone, even then, if a call came in. At her interview, Ms. Turner told Mr. Currie that she had substantial bookkeeping experience and knew how to use QuickBooks software. No credible evidence was presented to prove that her representations were not true. When Ms. Turner began working for Sure-Tek, she received no training or orientation from someone who knew the office systems, protocols, or electronic files. Mr. Currie told Ms. Turner verbally what her duties were and how things were done, but he did not actually train her. For him, it was good enough that she said she knew QuickBooks. Besides, as he admitted at the hearing, he really did not know the computer systems himself; he "doesn't use the computer much." Ms. Turner discovered that there were two QuickBook systems, which were password-protected. Ms. Turner said that it took two days for her to track down the passwords. Then, she had quite the time sorting out the accounts set up in the two different systems--she described the state of the computer accounting as "a mess" when she started. She asked Mr. Currie if she could merge the two systems, and he told her to go ahead. At the hearing, Mr. Currie acknowledged that there were two QuickBook systems, an older version and a new 2010 version. He testified that his only office help after getting the updated QuickBooks software consisted of a series of three different temporary employees sent over by a "temp" agency. He said that these temporary employees were awful; nonetheless, he tasked them with setting up the new system with information brought over from the old system. It should come as no surprise, then, that Ms. Turner found many problems and errors, such as entries of very recent information in the old system that should have been in the new system. Ms. Turner testified that she discovered quite a few late and unpaid bills when she started. She would bring these items to Mr. Currie's attention, and he would tell her whether the bills could be paid or not. Mr. Currie's permission was required before Ms. Turner could pay any bills, and sometimes Mr. Currie would refuse to authorize payment for bills that were due or past due. Mr. Currie confirmed this at hearing; he testified that he "absolutely" had to refuse permission to pay bills at times, because there was not always enough money to pay all of the bills. At other times, he would tell Ms. Turner to just pay part of a bill that was due. Mr. Currie testified that for the first two weeks of Ms. Turner's employment at Sure-Tek, she seemed to be on track and was trying very hard. Ms. Turner noted that Mr. Currie praised her work during those first two weeks, and he did not deny this. However, according to Mr. Currie, after about two weeks, Ms. Turner's performance went "downhill." Mr. Currie did not present any credible evidence to prove this demarcation point. However, the evidence did establish that the two-week point was significant for a different reason. Mr. Currie had lunch with Ms. Turner after her first two weeks. In their lunchtime conversation, Mr. Currie told Ms. Turner that his wife suffered from a thyroid problem, which he said sometimes made her off-balance. Ms. Turner responded by telling Mr. Currie that she had diabetes insipidus. Mr. Currie had no apparent immediate reaction to this disclosure. However, at some point thereafter, Mr. Currie told Ms. Turner that he never would have hired her if he had known she had diabetes.1/ When Ms. Turner had a cold throughout the week of February 15, 2010, the two had an awkward encounter on Friday afternoon, February 19, 2010. As Ms. Turner described it, by mid-afternoon on Friday, after sticking it out at work all week while not feeling well, she asked Mr. Currie if she could go home two hours early, because she had finished her Friday task of getting the information in to the payroll service and thought it would be all right if she left for the day. Mr. Currie got very angry and said that her diabetes was always making her sick. She tried to tell him that she had a cold and was on antibiotics (to stop the apparent evolution of her cold to bronchitis), and it was unrelated to her diabetes. But Mr. Currie just waved his hands and yelled at her to "just go!" She thought he meant that she should go home as she had asked, although she knew he was not happy about it. So she left. Mr. Currie told a very different version of Friday, February 19, 2010. Mr. Currie denied making any statements about Ms. Turner's diabetes, then or ever. Mr. Currie also denied having any conversation with Ms. Turner that afternoon about whether Ms. Turner could go home two hours early because she had a cold. However, Mr. Currie testified that he noticed that Ms. Turner was sub-par that day. As Mr. Currie put it, that day Ms. Turner "seemed a little sicker than she appeared to be normally." Mr. Currie then testified that Mr. Bean was looking for Ms. Turner in the middle of the afternoon that Friday, February 19, 2010. He asked Mr. Currie where she was, and Mr. Currie said he did not know. Then, according to Mr. Currie, after they spent about 45 minutes looking for Ms. Turner, Mr. Currie decided that Ms. Turner must have quit, leaving without telling anyone, never to return. At that point, Mr. Currie instructed Mr. Bean to place an ad on Craigslist for a replacement for Ms. Turner. Mr. Currie's version of the events on Friday, February 19, 2010, is not credible, particularly when coupled with Mr. Currie's inconsistent version of the events on Monday, February 22, 2010; Ms. Turner's version is accepted as the more credible account of events. On Monday, February 22, 2010, Ms. Turner went to work that morning, only to find a number of telephone messages from applicants for the Craigslist ad and resumes submitted by individuals requesting an interview for the bookkeeper position. By mid-morning, Mr. Currie called Ms. Turner into his office. According to Ms. Turner, Mr. Currie said that it was not working out with her diabetes. When Ms. Turner tried again to tell him that her two-hour break Friday afternoon was because of a cold, and not diabetes, Mr. Currie then added that that was not the only reason he was letting her go--that she had bankrupted his company.2/ Then, according to Ms. Turner, Mr. Currie asked her to stay to train her replacement, which she refused to do. Mr. Currie does not deny that he told Ms. Turner she was terminated, but he denies any reference to her diabetes, claiming it was all because of her performance. Mr. Currie did not attempt to reconcile this version in which he admittedly intended to fire Ms. Turner, with his inconsistent description of the previous Friday, when he claimed that the only reason he placed the Craigslist ad was because he believed that Ms. Turner had voluntarily quit, and he had no choice but to start looking for a replacement. In an effort to show that he was thoughtful and accommodating of Ms. Turner's health condition and needs, Mr. Currie testified that a few days before Ms. Turner was fired, she had told him that she would be needing another surgery. His response was that he would hire a temporary employee to cover for her so she could have the time off for her surgery. But this testimony tends to underscore that as of just a few days before Ms. Turner was fired, Mr. Currie gave no signs to Ms. Turner that there were any performance-related issues that would put her job in jeopardy. Twisting back toward the different version of events that suggested there were mounting problems with Ms. Turner's performance, Mr. Currie claimed to have talked with Ms. Turner on several different occasions throughout her employment about her performance problems. As noted above, Ms. Turner testified, credibly, that for the first few weeks, Mr. Currie said she was doing a good job. After that, Ms. Turner acknowledged a single comment by Mr. Currie that she did not know how to run reports right. Ms. Turner also acknowledged that Mr. Bean called one meeting with Mr. Currie and Ms. Turner to complain that Ms. Turner was unfriendly to him and did not respond quickly enough to a request he made for information. Ms. Turner explained her run-in with Mr. Bean, stating that she was on the phone when he walked into her office and started talking to her as if she was not on the phone. She said that he got quite huffy when she asked him to wait a minute while she finished the call. Mr. Currie claimed that after the first few weeks, he started noticing that bills were going unpaid, and he talked to Ms. Turner about it. Ms. Turner's version, as noted above, was that there were overdue bills when she started, and she called them to Mr. Currie's attention; however, as Mr. Currie admitted, he sometimes refused permission to pay those bills and sometimes told her to just pay part of the bills, because he did not have enough money. No credible evidence was presented that Ms. Turner was to blame for bills going unpaid, or only partially paid, during her time of employment. Instead, the evidence showed that before, during, and after Ms. Turner's employment, bills sometimes went unpaid or only partially paid, admittedly, at Mr. Currie's direction. While Mr. Currie denied that it made a difference to him when Ms. Turner told him about her diabetes at that two-week lunch, the more credible evidence is that Mr. Currie's attitude towards Ms. Turner as an employee changed at that two-week mark. The more credible evidence established that Mr. Currie had a knee-jerk reaction upon learning that Ms. Turner had "diabetes" to jump to the conclusion that she had a disability that rendered her substantially and significantly impaired in the major life activity of working. He decided, without any real basis, that she was incapable of working in the one type of job where she thought she would be able to function with the accommodations she herself supplied. The credible evidence establishes that Mr. Currie fired Ms. Turner because of his perception of her disability. Mr. Currie's testimony included the occasional revealing slips that were much more telling than his steadfast (but not credible) denial of any discrimination. As noted, Mr. Currie testified that he found Ms. Turner to be a good employee who was trying very hard for the first two weeks, but that her work slipped and went downhill after the first two weeks. Yet he presented no evidence to prove what he observed that showed such a downhill slip in her performance after two weeks. Instead, the evidence and testimony, considering the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, painted the picture that it was Ms. Turner's disclosure of having diabetes, and that alone, caused Ms. Turner's downhill plummet in Mr. Currie's eyes. That Mr. Currie perceived Petitioner to be disabled and perceived Petitioner's disability to substantially affect her ability to do her job, was evident from Mr. Currie's slip that on her last Friday of work, Petitioner seemed "sub-par," which he characterized as "a little sicker than she appeared to be normally." Thus, Mr. Currie perceived Petitioner as "normally" sick. That perception came despite the unrebutted testimony by Petitioner that she did not miss any work time based on illness or complication from her diabetes until she asked to leave two hours early on Friday, February 19, 2010. Ms. Turner's testimony regarding Mr. Currie's discriminatory comments was corroborated by the testimony of Tanya Rodriguez, who was hired in response to the Craigslist ad to replace Ms. Turner. Ms. Rodriguez did not know Ms. Turner until she met her, when Ms. Turner came in to Sure-Tek to pick up her last paycheck after she had been fired. Ms. Rodriguez provided information to the Pinellas OHR in its investigation of Ms. Turner's complaint when Ms. Rodriguez was still employed by SureTek. Ms. Rodriguez was then fired, allegedly for performance problems.3/ Ms. Rodriguez convincingly testified at the final hearing that when she was interviewed by Mr. Currie to replace Ms. Turner, Mr. Currie asked her, point-blank, whether she had diabetes. He told her that the last person he hired with diabetes was a good for nothing S.O.B; that he never would have hired her if he knew she had diabetes, because she was always sick; and that he would never hire another person with diabetes. Ms. Rodriguez told Mr. Currie that she did not have diabetes, even though she actually was diabetic.4/ After Mr. Currie asked his question about diabetes, he proceeded to ask Ms. Rodriguez whether she had thyroid problems (like his wife, whom he told Ms. Turner was sometimes off-balance as a result). Ms. Rodriguez also confirmed Ms. Turner's testimony that there were deep-seated problems remaining in the dual QuickBook systems. Although Respondent attempted to characterize this testimony as evidence of Ms. Turner's poor performance, Ms. Rodriguez made it very clear that the problems imbedded in the dual systems were from a much longer time span--up to one year--and could not have been the result of errors made in the one month preceding Ms. Rodriguez' employment at Sure-Tek. Instead, Ms. Rodriguez saw signs of efforts to merge the two systems, but noted that there would not have been enough time in one month to completely merge the systems and fix all of the imbedded problems. She testified that she also tried her best to make progress, but she was only at Sure-Tek for a few short weeks. Ms. Rodriguez' testimony was credible and is accepted.5/ Her testimony strongly corroborates Ms. Turner's testimony of Mr. Currie's direct discriminatory statements, including the first words out of his mouth when he fired her--that it was not going to work out, with her diabetes. At hearing, Respondent presented evidence offered in an attempt to demonstrate that Ms. Turner's job performance was not good and was the legitimate reason for her termination. Mr. Currie testified that a Progress Energy bill due on February 18, 2010, went unpaid. Mr. Currie blamed this on Ms. Turner forgetting to pay the bill, but that was not established. Ms. Turner and her successor, Ms. Rodriguez, both testified that as bookkeepers for Respondent, they did not have the authority to pay bills. Instead, they were required to review the bills with Mr. Currie, and each week he would tell them which bills could be paid, which bills should be partially paid, and which bills should be ignored. Mr. Currie corroborated this testimony, admitting that he "absolutely" had to refuse permission to pay bills sometimes. The short billing history Respondent put in evidence for Progress Energy showed, for example, that the month's charges due on June 18, 2009, went unpaid until the following month and that was well before Petitioner began her employment. Regardless of whether the Progress Energy bill due on February 18, 2010, was unpaid because of Ms. Turner's fault or Mr. Currie's instruction, the notification of this unpaid bill was first mailed out to Mr. Currie on Thursday, February 18, 2010. Thus, this could not have been an example of one of the bills allegedly going unpaid that Mr. Currie claimed to have begun noticing after Ms. Turner had been working at Sure-Tek for two weeks. Indeed, there is no evidence that Mr. Currie was even aware of this late notice, mailed on Thursday, by the next afternoon when he had an ad placed for Ms. Turner's replacement or by the following Monday morning, when he fired Ms. Turner. Mr. Currie also testified that Ms. Turner was to blame for an increase in his Progress Energy utility deposit from $800 to $2,500.00, but no evidence was presented to prove that there was an increase in SureTek's required utility deposit at all, or, if so, when any such increase occurred. To the contrary, the Progress Energy statement for February 2010, covering the billing period of January 27, 2010, through February 24, 2010 (very close to the time span of Ms. Turner's employment), shows that the deposit amount already being held for that account at that time was $2,680. Further, the Progress Energy billing history summary shows that the prior month's bill, due on January 21, 2010, had been paid. Thus, the evidence refutes Mr. Currie's suggestion that there was an increase in the deposit requirement because of Ms. Turner's failure to pay the bills. Instead, it appears that if the deposit requirement had been increased, the increase occurred before January 2010, based on billing history that predated Ms. Turner's employment. A similar story was told with respect to the City of Pinellas Park water bills. Mr. Currie blamed Ms. Turner for not paying a bill from January 15, 2010, even though that bill was transmitted online before Ms. Turner was hired. Both before and after Ms. Turner was employed, there was a billing history for the water bills that showed occasional missed payments and occasional partial payments of the total amount due, as well as the imposition of a penalty charge for late payment. The January 15, 2010, bill that was not paid when due on February 10, 2010, resulted in a $34.10 penalty charge, which may have been Ms. Turner's fault. However, given Mr. Currie's admission that he controlled payment of bills and sometimes refused permission to pay bills when due, the evidence is insufficient to show that Ms. Turner was to blame for the bill not being paid while she was employed at Sure-Tek or for the late charge. Mr. Currie also presented evidence regarding PESCO gas bills. A summary of PESCO charges and payments was presented with a January charge highlighted. Next to the January charge was a handwritten note, "DID NOT PAY PESCO BILL." The only problem with this evidence is that the summary is for charges and payments in 2009, not 2010. Thus, whoever did not pay the PESCO bill in January 2009, it could not have been Ms. Turner. Mr. Currie also presented a separate PESCO invoice dated March 4, 2010, which showed that the balance due as of the prior month's bill, February 4, 2010, was $4,609.13. This balance was reduced by a $1,791.73 payment made February 10, 2010, presumably by Ms. Turner during her time of employment. Mr. Currie admitted at the final hearing that PESCO accepted partial payments at that time, and he admitted that he probably instructed Ms. Turner to pay only part of the February bill. It was not shown that there were any billing or payment problems with this account or that Ms. Turner's performance can be faulted at all. Next came the TECO People's Gas bill. On a statement dated February 12, 2010, a "previous balance" of $1,589.88 was carried forward from the prior month's bill. Sometime between the prior statement issued in mid-January 2010, and the February 12, 2010, statement, a partial payment was made and credited in the amount of $497.68, leaving $1,092.20 still due from the January bill. Because the remaining balance was considered "past due" on February 7, 2010, a late payment fee of $16.38 was added to the February statement. Mr. Currie acknowledged that the January 2010 bill was partially paid while Ms. Turner was employed at Sure-Tek. Once again, Mr. Currie admitted that it was "entirely possible" that he was the one who instructed Ms. Turner to pay what Respondent could afford to pay--the partial payment of $497.68--because he did not have the money to pay the entire bill. Mr. Currie's own testimony and the bill itself refute his claim that Ms. Turner overlooked or forgot to pay the January bill. In addition, Mr. Currie's testimony corroborated the testimony of Ms. Turner and Ms. Rodriguez regarding the tight control Mr. Currie kept on which bills were paid or partially paid. This evidence does not establish that Ms. Turner's performance can be faulted for the partial payment of the January TECO People's Gas bill or the late fee charged on the remainder that was not paid when due. TECO People's Gas also sent a "final notice" on February 11, 2010, informing Sure-Tek that it had to pay the remaining past due balance of $1,092.20 right away, or else its service would be terminated on February 19, 2010. A copy of the final notice in evidence has handwriting on it, indicating "pay" in one handwriting style and "paid" in a different handwriting style. Mr. Currie did not testify that his TECO People's Gas service was terminated. Thus, the reasonable inference is that Mr. Currie authorized Ms. Turner to pay the rest of the January balance upon receipt of the final notice, and she did so before February 19, 2010. Mr. Currie's final piece of documentary evidence to support his claim of mounting performance problems was a notice from the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, dated February 17, 2010 (the Wednesday of Ms. Turner's last week of employment). This notice informed Sure-Tek that its corporate annual report was due and should be filed with the filing fee by May 1, 2010, to avoid a late fee. A second notice dated June 16, 2010, imposed the late fee and notified Sure-Tek that the annual report, filing fee, and late fee had to be submitted by September 17, 2010, to avoid administrative dissolution. Despite the fact that Ms. Turner was fired a few days after the first notice and a late fee could have been avoided if the report and filing fee were submitted at any time in the approximately 70 days remaining after Ms. Turner was fired, Mr. Currie blamed the failure to meet the May 1, 2010, deadline on Ms. Turner. That attempted blame is not warranted and, instead, tends to suggest that Mr. Currie was looking to find things to blame on Ms. Turner after she was fired. Mr. Currie testified that he believed Ms. Turner did not know how to use QuickBooks, and, as a result, did not follow his instructions to enter bills into QuickBooks as soon as they were received. However, Mr. Currie offered no credible, competent evidence of this. Mr. Currie admitted that he had no personal knowledge regarding what was or was not entered into QuickBooks by Ms. Turner or how Ms. Turner performed using QuickBooks, and no other evidence was offered to prove Mr. Currie's unsubstantiated claim. Mr. Bean participated in the Pinellas OHR investigation and testified at the final hearing in support of Mr. Currie's position that Ms. Turner was fired because of her performance problems. Mr. Bean testified that Ms. Turner was fired because of a "lack of ability to do the job," and he referred to her not paying bills. Mr. Bean's testimony lacked credibility and probative value. He admitted that he had no personal knowledge of unpaid bills, no personal knowledge of Ms. Turner's interaction with vendors, and no personal knowledge of her QuickBooks work. Mr. Bean provided no competent, credible evidence of any problems with Ms. Turner's performance. The only testimony he provided that was based on personal knowledge was that he found her to be "unfriendly" to him. While Ms. Turner was employed at SureTek, Mr. Bean was not her supervisor; at the time, he supervised only the warehouse employees. Mr. Bean testified that he was promoted to general manager in early July 2010 (one year before the final hearing), having "worked [his] way up." This was a few months after Ms. Turner was fired, after Ms. Rodriguez was fired, and after Mr. Bean had provided support to Mr. Currie's position in the Pinellas OHR investigation. The credible evidence fails to support Mr. Currie's suggestion that Ms. Turner was not performing acceptably in her brief tenure and was fired for that legitimate reason. Instead, it appears that Mr. Currie went on an after-the-fact hunt for things he could blame on Ms. Turner that could not reasonably be blamed on her, nor were they shown to be reasons why Mr. Currie made the decision on February 19, 2011, to terminate Ms. Turner and advertise for her replacement. Indeed, Mr. Currie's own testimony shows the inconsistencies in his attempt to develop a legitimate rationale for letting Ms. Turner go. When Mr. Currie was explaining his recollection of the events of February 19, 2011, he testified that after just 45 minutes of looking for Ms. Turner, who he described as looking sub-par and sicker than she normally looked that day, he decided that she must have quit, and he instructed Mr. Bean to place an ad on Craigslist because Ms. Turner had apparently decided to quit. That is quite a bit different than coming to the studied view over a multi-week period of time and following several counseling sessions that Ms. Turner's job performance was unacceptable and that she should be fired for poor performance. Instead, the suggestion was that Mr. Currie would have been happy to keep Ms. Turner--even willing to get a temporary employee to accommodate Ms. Turner's need for another surgery in the future--but she was the one who chose to leave. Mr. Currie never attempted to reconcile these two very clearly different explanations of how Ms. Turner's employment at Sure-Tek ended. These inconsistencies undermine the credibility of his attempt to legitimize her termination. Appropriate Remedy Petitioner testified that she is seeking back pay only, through the date of the final hearing, as damages. Petitioner quantified her back pay damages as 71.5 weeks of unemployment since her termination. She testified that her income at Sure-Tek was $540.00 per week ($13.50 per hour, times 40 hours per week). This evidence was not challenged by Respondent. Therefore, the total amount of back pay damages claimed before offsetting reductions is $38,610.00 Petitioner testified to her substantial efforts to obtain a job after she was fired by Respondent, and her testimony was corroborated by a tremendous amount of electronic mail inquiries and applications she submitted to follow up on job postings on Craigslist and other online job listings. Petitioner was hired shortly after she was let go by Mr. Currie at a company called Clear Tech, Inc. That job did not last long, however, because Ms. Turner was hired to work for the part of the company that was in the business of new pool construction and that part of the business was shut down soon after she started, due to the economic slow-down. Petitioner proved the amount of wages earned at Clear Tech: $1,632.00. In addition, Petitioner proved that she earned an additional $1,612.00 in unemployment compensation after she was fired from Sure-Tek. These two categories reduce the total amount of damages sought to $35,366.00. Petitioner testified that since she stopped working for Clear Tech, she has not earned wages. However, she testified that she has been helping out at Apple Homes, the company owned by her grandfather and father and has worked about ten hours per week. She is not on the payroll, because business is not good enough for her to be paid. However, both her grandfather and father help her out financially, helping to pay her rent and her bills. Although Ms. Turner testified that she plans to eventually pay back her father and grandfather for their financial help, she did not produce any evidence to substantiate that claim, such as an accounting maintained by her to tally the amounts of their assistance so she would know how much to repay them. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that her ten hours per week of work to "help" the company is being compensated by this indirect "help" to assist with her rent and bills. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has mitigated her damages to the extent of having similar work for which she is compensated for ten hours per week. Petitioner testified that she began working at Clear Tech in March 2010 and that she worked there for approximately 30 days. Therefore, the undersigned will assume that Petitioner worked at Clear Tech for the month of March 2010, and, thereafter, she worked at Apple Homes for ten hours a week. That equates to approximately 66 weeks, or 660 hours. In the absence of any other evidence showing how much Petitioner received as indirect compensation, it is reasonable to assume that her compensation would have approximated the hourly rate she earned from Respondent. Therefore, the undersigned will deduct $8,910 from the total back pay damages, representing estimated compensation of the value of her services of ten hours per week at Apple Homes for 66 weeks. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has incurred actual damages due to lost wages from her date of termination by Respondent through the date of the final hearing, reduced/offset by the items described above, of $26,456.00. Petitioner established her reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages, and she, in fact, mitigated her actual damages which have been reduced/offset as described above by a total of $12,154.00. Petitioner has hired an attorney who has represented her at the final hearing, in pre-hearing preparation, and in post-hearing proceedings. Petitioner has also incurred costs in connection with this litigation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: Finding that Respondent, Sure-Tek Powker Coating, Inc., violated section 70-53, Pinellas County Code; Ordering Respondent to pay Petitioner, Rebecca Turner, the sum of $26,456.00 and interest at the prevailing statutory rate; and Ordering Respondent to pay Ms. Turner reasonable costs and attorney's fees. Jurisdiction is retained to determine the amount of costs and attorney's fees, if the parties are unable to agree to the amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2011.
Findings Of Fact This Hearing Officer has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of this hearing. Proper notice was given to all parties and all parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard. An alleged violation of Chapter 479 was served on the Respondent, National Advertising Company, citing subject -- sign located on Interstate 95, 0.89 miles south of Bowden Road with copy "Valles" thereon by written notice dated September 2, 1976. The original part of the sign was erected within the city limits prior to 1970 and was not permitted by the Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation. The violation which is the subject of this hearing is that the sign has been added to by erecting forty feet of catwalk thereon and installing three lights. The monetary value was increased by approximately $1,084.00. The addition of catwalk and lights to the sign is not routine maintenance as defined in Section 479, Florida Statutes, and a permit was necessary for such additions to signs subsequent to January, 1971.
Recommendation Notify the Respondent that the subject sign will be removed if such is not removed within 30 days after entry of the final order. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George L. Waas, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. George E. Hollis National Advertising Company Post Office Box 23208 Tampa, Florida 33623 William Rowland, Esquire Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida F. S. Whitesell, District Sign Coordinator Department of Transportation South Marian Street Lake City, Florida 32055
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Linda Mae Krueger, a white female, became a manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview, Florida, store on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's first immediate supervisor was Mr. Tom McBeth, area supervisor for six stores. Mr. McBeth was replaced by Mr. John Richardson on January 26, 1987. Upon becoming area supervisor, Mr. Richardson implemented certain changes in the manner in which all store managers under his supervision were to perform their duties. Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Richardson's changes and failed to follow some of Mr. Richardson's instructions regarding these changes. Petitioner developed a great deal of hostility towards Mr. Richardson and refused to accept the fact that the changes in operation were within Mr. Richardson's managerial capacity. The basis of Petitioner's claim of discrimination was Mr. Richardson's attempt to implement operational changes which Petitioner disagreed with and which were clearly not sexually discriminatory in nature. At the hearing, Ms. Krueger testified that she felt like she was treated unfairly by Mr. Richardson, but admitted that Mr. Richardson placed the same requirements on all other store managers. Petitioner, in June of 1988, told Mr. Richardson that she was considering leaving employment during the beginning of July. Petitioner marked on her store's calendar that she was leaving employment on July 2, 1988. Petitioner, on August 12, 1988, again gave verbal notice to One Stop Oil that she was separating employment with the company on August 27, 1988. At the time the Petitioner gave One Stop Oil this verbal notice of separation, Petitioner was planning to move with her family to North Carolina. On August 17, 1988, Petitioner quit her position as store manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview store. She quit because of a pay dispute over the amount of her bonus check. Petitioner and her husband expected a larger check. When Petitioner's husband saw the actual amount of the check he called the Jacksonville office of Respondent and told them he was closing the store and they had "better get somebody down there." Petitioner and her husband then left the store. Respondent sent Mr. Richardson to the store. He called in Cheryl Chipman and began accounting for the store receipts. He discovered that $1,700 in deposits was missing. Petitioner had given the deposit money to her husband on the day the check dispute arose. Petitioner's husband could not adequately account for the missing money. 1/ Respondent obtained Petitioner's store keys from her without any discussion. The keys were voluntarily turned over by Petitioner. Petitioner never reported for work afterwards. Petitioner's position was filled by Ms. Cheryl Chipman, a white female.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the petition against Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1989. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1989.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether or not Petitioner is entitled to a refund of the bond it posted in lieu of confiscation of allegedly mislabelled gasoline products.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, AGI Service Corporation, owns and operates a Citgo service station located at 1599 West Flagler Street in Miami, Florida. The service station sells regular unleaded, unleaded plus and unleaded premium gasoline to the public. On February 18, 1991, James Carpinelli, the Respondent's inspector, visited the station to conduct an inspection and obtain samples of the gasoline Petitioner was offering for sale to the consuming public from its tanks and related gasoline pumps. Mr. Carpinelli took samples of all three types of gasoline offered for sale by Petitioner. The samples were forwarded to the Respondent's laboratory and were tested to determine whether they met Departmental standards for each type of gasoline. The Petitioner's "premium unleaded" pump indicated the octane or Anti Knock Index of the gasoline was 93. The "regular unleaded" pump indicated that the octane level was 87. The laboratory analysis of the samples revealed that the octane level of the gasoline taken from the "premium unleaded" pump was 87.4. The octane level of the gasoline taken from the "regular unleaded" pump was 93.0. Upon discovering the discrepancy in the octane levels, the Respondent seized the gasoline and immediately allowed the Petitioner to post a bond in the amount of $1,000. Upon the posting of the bond, the product was released back to the possession of the Petitioner and was allowed to be sold after the pumps were relabelled. Petitioner acquired ownership of the service station four days prior to the time of the inspection. At the time they opened the station, the new owners labelled the pumps based upon the information provided to them by the prior owners. The new owners had limited experience in the petroleum business and followed the guidance of the prior owners regarding labelling the pumps. It is clear that the pumps were inadvertently mislabelled based upon the information provided by the prior owners. The new owners sold "premium unleaded" at the price of "regular unleaded" and visa versa. Because more "premium unleaded" was sold at the price for regular, Petitioner lost money as a result of the mislabelling. The Department seeks to assess the full amount of the bond against the Petitioner in this proceeding. Respondent calculated the number of gallons of mislabelled gasoline that was sold based upon a delivery date of February 13, 1991. Those calculations indicate that 2,498 gallons were sold at a price of $1.259 per gallon. However, Respondent's calculations appear to begin at a time prior to Petitioner's ownership of the station. No evidence was presented as to how many gallons were sold while Petitioner owned the station. In addition, it is not clear when the mislabeling was done. Thus, no clear evidence was presented as to how many mislabeled gallons were sold by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order granting the request of the Respondent for a refund of the bond posted and that the Department rescind its assessment in this case. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: LOUIS PASCALI AND DONATO PASCALI QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVES AGI SERVICE CORPORATION 1599 WEST FLAGLER STREET MIAMI, FL 33147 JAMES R. KELLY, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES ROOM 514, MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800 HONORABLE BOB CRAWFORD COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES THE CAPITOL, PL-10 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0810 RICHARD TRITSCHLER, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 515 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800 BRENDA HYATT, CHIEF BUREAU OF LICENSING & BOND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 508 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 489.129(1)(e), (h)1., (l), (n), and (r), Florida Statutes (1995), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Luis Delgado (Delgado), was licensed by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department), as a certified roofing contractor and as qualifying agent for Strong Roof, Inc. (Strong), having been issued license number CCC057175. The Lago Plaza Shopping Center (Lago) is a 154,000 square foot multi-tenant shopping center located in Hialeah, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, it was owned by a New York real estate company named Emmes & Company through its subsidiary ABI Property Partners L.P. XIX (ABI). In 1996, the roof of Lago was in need of replacement. On February 5, 1996, ABI through its agent and property manager, Atlantic Western Asset Management (Atlantic Western), entered into a written contract with Strong to replace the roof for $185,000. On or about February 5, 1996, Strong provided Atlantic Western with a performance and payment bond for $185,000, as required by Article 21 of the contract between ABI and Strong. Unbeknownst to Atlantic Western at the time the bond was delivered, the performance and payment bond was not genuine, and Delgado knew that the bond was not genuine. The roof replacement work was completed by June 17, 1996. Unbeknownst to Atlantic Western, Delgado allowed Alberto Rodriguez (Rodiguez) and Galaxy Remodeling, Inc. (Galaxy) to use Delgado's contractor's license to obtain the building permit for the Lago project and to perform the work necessary to complete the project. At all times material to this proceeding, neither Rodriguez nor Galaxy was licensed to practice contracting in Florida, and Delgado knew they were not licensed. Pursuant to the contract, Atlantic Western made payments to Strong with seven checks payable to Strong in the total amount of the contract price of $185,000. The amounts and dates of the payments were as follows: $9,250 dated 2/14/96; $9,250 dated 3/13/96; $37,000 dated 4/2/96; $55,500 dated 4/11/96; $37,000 dated 4/27/96; $27,000 dated 6/13/96; and $10,000 dated 6/13/96. In exchange for each of the checks, Strong gave a signed release of lien representing that it had paid for all labor and materials used in the project Within 30 days after the last payment to Strong, Bradco Supply Corporation (Bradco), filed a claim of lien against Lago for $65,891.23 for roofing and/or siding materials ordered by "Galaxy Remodeling, Inc./Strong Rfg. Inc." On July 12, 1996, at the request of Atlantic Western, Delgado met at the shopping center with representatives of Atlantic Western and an attorney for the owner of the property to discuss the lien filed by Bradco. At the meeting, Delgado agreed to remove the lien, but he never did. Later Bradco sued to foreclose the lien, and the owner of Lago paid $60,000 to Bradco to have the lien removed. The owner unsuccessfully sought recourse against the payment bond, which turned out to be fraudulent. On or about June 17, 1996, when the work was completed, Strong gave a ten-year written warranty, which included correcting any leaks due to poor installation. Leaks were discovered, and Atlantic Western and the attorney for the owner reported the leaks to Strong, who failed to perform any correction work or otherwise investigate to determine whether its warranty would be applicable. Atlantic Western retained another roofing company to repair the leaks, at a cost of several hundred dollars. On or about September 27, 1996, the owner of Lago filed a lawsuit against Delgado, Strong, and others, alleging that the defendants breached the contract and committed various other civil wrongs related to the practice of contracting in reference to the roof replacement at Lago. On April 23, 1997, the lawsuit was mediated, resulting in a settlement agreement which was signed by Delgado individually and as president of Strong. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Delgado admitted most of the factual allegations in the civil complaint and agreed to the entry of a judgment in the amount of $73,755.25. The settlement agreement provided that Delgado, Strong, Rodriguez, and Galaxy were to pay the plaintiff $2,500.00 by April 25, 1997; $2,500.00 by July 25, 1997; and $20,000.00 by August 25, 1997. The settlement agreement further provided that if the payments were not made, the plaintiff could execute on the judgment. On May 15, 1997, an Agreed Final Judgment was entered in accordance with the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement. The first $2,500.00 payment was made but no further payments have been made. The plaintiff garnished two bank accounts, totaling $3,084.28. At the time of the final hearing, there have been no other payments or collections toward satisfying the judgment, and the judgment remains unsatisfied. The judgment was not appealed and has not been discharged in bankruptcy. A motion for relief from judgment was never filed, and there has not been an agreement to receive periodic payments, other than as stated in the settlement agreement. As of August 10, 1999, the Department's costs of investigation and prosecution of this case, other than costs associated with attorneys' fees, totaled $473.25.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order as follows: Finding that Luis Delgado violated Sections 489.129 (1)(e), (h)1., (l), (n), and (r), Florida Statutes (1995), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Imposing administrative fines for each count in the Administrative Complaint as follows: Count I $750 Count II $500 Count III $3,000 Count IV $500 Count V $250 Count VI $500 Assessing Luis Delgado $473.25 for the costs of the investigation and prosecution incurred in this case through August 10, 1999. Requiring Luis Delgado to make restitution to ABI Property Partners L.P. XIX in the amount of $68,170.97 or, in the alternative, provide proof of satisfaction of the May 15, 1997, Agreed Final Judgment in Case No. 96-19621 CA (06) in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. Revoking Luis Delgado's certified roofing contractor license number CCC057175. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Luis Delgado 344 Northwest 136th Place Miami, Florida 33182 Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Boulevard, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues to be decided in this case are those associated with the question of whether the Respondent is required to have a permit for the connection of his business property to State Road 206 or is exempt from that requirement. See Section 335.187, Florida Statutes. If he is required to have a permit the issue becomes the acceptability of his current drive, i.e., does it comply with the commercial use design criteria contemplated by Chapter 335, Florida Statutes, and further described in the Florida Department of Transportation "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System," February, 1985, which was recognized and incorporated by reference through Rule 14- 15.013, Florida Administrative Code. These issues are raised through an alleged violation of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code set out in the Notice to Show Cause which was forwarded to Respondent from Petitioner leading to the formal hearing. The date of that Notice to Show Cause was July 18, 1989. Within the statement of violations there were also allegations concerning irregular signs as alleged under Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, associated with the commercial activities by Respondent and the unauthorized parking on the right-of-way at State Road 206 in violation of Section 337.406, Florida Statutes. These latter allegations were conceded by the Respondent at hearing and are resolved through those concessions.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing Respondent operated a roadside fruit and vegetable stand at property adjacent to State Road 206 in St. Johns County, Florida. In addition to fruits and vegetables, by local ordinance of St. Johns County, Florida, he is allowed to sell poultry and fish. There is no indication that he has taken advantage of that opportunity other than to sell fresh shrimp from a cooler during 1989. In addition to these products he sells honeys, jellies, and jams. He also sells soft drinks from a dispensing machine. A mainstay in his business is peanuts which he sells fresh. Another product sold is pork skins. The drink machine that is described was added in March, 1989. Before that time he sold fountain drinks and cold drinks that were dispensed from a cooler. He has always had soft drinks available from the inception of his operation of the roadside stand. That began in March, 1985. At the time the Respondent purchased the property there was an operation ongoing whereby fruit was being sold on two tables. Respondent replaced those structures with a portable trailer which was anchored to the lot, and display and sell of fruit on a 16-foot table and use of an 8-foot table upon which tomatoes were displayed and sold. The trailer was used to store his products over night. The trailer described was a pop-up camper trailer. The principal products being dispensed at that time were peanuts, vegetables, and tomatoes. Through Ordinance No. 86-68, passed by St. Johns County, a copy of which may be seen as Respondent's exhibit No. 1, the property was recognized as C1, commercial intensive, with the conditions that the property would be limited to outdoor sale of produce, vegetables, fruit, poultry, and fish. It was also stated that there would be no access/egress to United States Highway 1, which is also known as State Road 5. This property is located at the intersection of State Road 5 and State Road 206. Present access/egress to the property is from State Road 206 and that has been the situation since Respondent purchased the property. The ordinance described dates from August 12, 1986. Over time Respondent has taken a number of steps to improve his business. In March, 1988, Respondent obtained permission from St. Johns County to place a storage shed on his property. In August of that year he obtained permission to install a metal awning or carport of dimension 18 feet by 45 feet which is anchored to the ground. At that same time he placed the body from an old milk truck on the property for purposes of cold storage. In March, 1988, he had received an electrical permit from St. Johns County. Prior to that time he did not have electricity. In the spring of 1989, a well was drilled to provide running water. Prior to that time Respondent used bottled water. Respondent's composite exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence describes various permits obtained from St. Johns County. If Respondent was required to remove the structures on his property it could be done in three days. This goes to identify the nature of the structures and to demonstrate that they are not permanent fixtures to the realty. According to Respondent, whose testimony is accepted, the business that he is experiencing at present has remained fairly constant in dollar amounts. He does not sell as many peanuts as he did before. Concerning traffic, Respondent indicates, and his testimony is accepted, that the number of cars that are located at his business would be a maximum of 12 on a busy Sunday afternoon and that at most times there are one or two cars. The hours of the business are from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. in the winter time and somewhat longer in the summer time. The business is open seven days a week. A rough description of the nature of the property by design may be found in the documents contained in Respondent's exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The property is approximately 280 front feet and 280 feet at the rear with 41 feet on each side. The frontage runs approximately east-west on State Road 206 and one of the sides abuts State Road 5. The basic design of the driveway entrance from State Road 206 is also set out in those drawings. As Marshall W. Sander, engineer in the permit department for Petitioner in its St. Augustine, Florida, maintenance office, explains the driveway is an unimproved dirt shell connection. This is the same driveway that was there at the time that Respondent purchased the property and has remained in that state since that time. Notwithstanding Mr. Sanders' concern that the driveway is not up to current commercial business criteria for access/egress, there have been no accidents as a result of access/egress from the business. There are two turnouts or turn- ins into the property. Mr. Sander believes that at least one paved driveway is needed leading into the property. The dimensions of that drive would be 24-foot wide which allows a 12-foot wide lane in and a 12-foot wide lane out. This impression of Mr. Sander is drawn in the face of the Respondent's presenting himself at the office of Petitioner in St. Augustine, Florida, with an application and plan showing the intention to improve the property to include restrooms, a beer and wine cooler with parking on site. Under those circumstances Mr. Sander felt it necessary to improve the drive connection. At hearing there was no suggestion that restrooms are available on the premises or will be in the near future, nor was there any indication that a beer and wine cooler would be installed. Therefore it cannot be said that the basic nature of the business has changed from its inception to the present. Mr. Sander concedes that within the records of the Petitioner there are no indications that the business has increased by way of records concerning traffic flow or otherwise. His remarks about increased traffic at Dupont Center is not specific enough to gain a useful impression of that circumstance. Mr. Sander relies upon the observations of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the St. Johns County Public Health Unit as were testified to by George L. Sigman, Environmental Health Director II for that organization. He also spoke to certain records of the health unit which may be found as Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. Nothing about his testimony or that exhibit identifies a noteworthy change in the basic nature of the business from Respondent's establishment of the roadside stand in March, 1985 until the present. Throughout the existence of his business Respondent has operated without the benefit of a driveway permit issued by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and in view of the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: By way of disposition of the Notice to Show Cause, that a Final Order be entered which recognizes the concessions made by the Respondent concerning the sign in question, calling for its removal if still in existence and his acknowledgment of the problem of parking on the right-of-way and which absolves the Respondent of any necessity to obtain a driveway permit. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning proposed facts. Petitioner' s Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence in Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is contrary to facts found. The third sentence is subordinate to facts found. Sentences 4 and 5 depict testimony as opposed to suggesting fact finding. However, the last sentence in that paragraph is one upon which facts were found in the Recommended Order. Respondent' s Facts Paragraphs one and two pertain to withdrawal of the request for hearing concerning signs and parking and are not part of fact finding. The first sentence in paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The remaining sentence is legal argument, as are paragraphs 4 and 5. Paragraphs 6-11 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is not relevant. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Leo O. Myers, Esquire Post Office Box 1621 Jacksonville, FL 32201 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Subsections 760.02(6) and (10). Petitioner is a 41-year-old African-American male, who was terminated from his employment with Respondent on September 9, 2008. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Subsection 760.02(7). Respondent is a company engaged in the business, in relevant part, of distributing food from a warehouse in Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent employed Petitioner as a warehouse worker from some time in the fall of 2006 through September 9, 2008. On September 9, 2008, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment because of Petitioner's race. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment for non-discriminatory reasons. Petitioner worked the evening shift from 3:00 p.m. until some time between 10:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m., depending on the requirements for unloading trucks each day and manpower availability. Mr. Courtney Ward supervised the evening shift. All other supervisors left the warehouse by 6:00 p.m. each workday. In the fall of 2008, product shortages began to appear at the warehouse. Management investigated the shortages and focused the investigation on the evening shift because that shift was relatively under-supervised. During the investigation, corporate security officers interviewed all employees in the evening shift, including Petitioner; Mr. Ward; and warehouse workers, Mr. Don Kane and Mr. Mike Petersen. All of the named workers except Petitioner are Caucasian. On September 4, 2008, each warehouse worker submitted a written statement regarding the worker's knowledge or participation in product shortages. Petitioner admitted in his statement to taking product from the floor regularly and trading it once or twice for marijuana. Petitioner also admitted to drinking beer on the job. It is undisputed that Petitioner knew that taking product and drinking beer were offenses for which Petitioner could be terminated from his employment. The practice had been tolerated by a previous supervisor of Mr. Ward. However, the new supervisor had issued a memorandum advising employees to terminate the practice, but Petitioner continued the practice. On the same day that Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment, Respondent terminated the employment of Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward admitted in his statement to drinking beer on the job and to knowing that Petitioner consumed alcohol and used marijuana on the job. Even though Mr. Ward did not admit to taking product or using marijuana, Respondent held Mr. Ward to a "higher standard" because Mr. Ward was a supervisor. Respondent did not terminate either Mr. Kane or Mr. Petersen from employment. However, Respondent had valid, non-racial reasons for its action. Mr. Kane did not admit in his statement to taking product off the floor, and Respondent had no independent proof to dispute the denial. While Mr. Kane did admit to consuming alcohol on the job, there was no independent proof that Mr. Kane used marijuana on the job. Respondent placed Mr. Kane on "final warning" for one year. The final warning required Mr. Kane to submit to mandatory counseling in the company's Employee Assistance Program and to submit to random drug and alcohol testing. Mr. Petersen was "cleared from any involvement" in the product shortages during the investigation. He was also "cleared" of any allegations of drinking on the job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations against Respondent and dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2010.
