The Issue Whether Dionaris Cabrera, (hereinafter "Petitioner Cabrera") the sole stock holder of Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., a Dissolved Florida Corporation, was correctly assessed a penalty for violating the workers' compensation laws of Florida, during the period of 2006 through 2008. Whether Petitioner, Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., (hereinafter "the old corporation") is responsible for providing workers' compensation coverage for its alleged employees, and whether the old corporation was properly noticed of the violation. Whether Petitioners or either one of them, are in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act during the relevant time period due to the failure to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees. Whether Florida Sunset Shuttles and Charters, Inc., (hereinafter "the new corporation") is a successor entity of Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., or Dionaris Cabrera, d/b/a Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and/or Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69L-6. Whether the Stop-Work Orders and amended penalties issued to Petitioner Cabrera and the old corporation were properly applied to the new corporation. Whether the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (hereinafter "Respondent") is estopped from imposing a penalty on the new corporation due to a prior determination made by the investigator assigned to the file in 2006 and the detrimental reliance upon representations made to Ruben Cabrera and Jennifer Crain, who were representing the old corporation in the proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. PARTIES INVOLVED AND RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS Petitioner Cabrera is the sole owner and director of Petitioner Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., (the old corporation) a Florida Corporation. She founded the company in 2005. At the time of the hearing and at the time of the imposition of the Stop-Work Order, she was residing outside the United States, most likely in the Dominican Republic. At the time of the issuance of the first Stop-Work Order, the old corporation was administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. During the relevant time period, there is no evidence that Petitioner Cabrera was actively controlling day-to-day operations of either the old corporation or the new corporation. Ruben Cabrera and Jennifer Crain were employed by the old corporation, with Ruben Cabrera being the manager and Jennifer Crain being his assistant. Ruben Cabrera also held himself out as an officer of the old corporation. Ruben Cabrera and Jennifer Crain were not directors of the old corporation. Ruben Cabrera had managed the business operations of the old corporation since its creation in 2005. On November 13, 2007, Respondent's investigator, Lisette Sierra (Sierra), conducted a compliance check at the old corporation's worksite, located at 851 East Donegan Avenue, Kissimmee, Florida, to verify compliance with the workers' compensation statutes. Upon arrival at the worksite, Sierra observed that it consisted of a fenced lot with a trailer and several parked buses. At the worksite, Sierra personally spoke with Jennifer Crain and Ruben Cabrera. Petitioner Cabrera was not present. On and after November 13, 2007, Petitioner Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., did not carry workers' compensation for anyone associated with the corporation. On November 13, 2007, Respondent issued a Division of Workers' Compensation Request for Business Records to the old corporation. Although two documents were tendered, the records requested were not produced within the 5 business day time period specified in the request. On November 28, 2007, Respondent issued a second Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (hereinafter "Request") directed to Petitioners, Cabrera and Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc. The Request required Petitioners or either of them, to produce records related to bus drivers who performed services for the company during the specified period. On the same date, Respondent issued a "Stop-Work Order" to Petitioner Cabrera and the old corporation for failure to meet the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Insurance Code, ordering Petitioner Cabrera and the old corporation to cease all business operations and assessing a $1,000.00 daily penalty against Petitioner Cabrera and the old corporation, pursuant to Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes, for failure to comply. The Stop-Work Order and Request was posted on the work site on November 28, 2007. On November 30, 2007, Sierra was unable to serve the Stop-Work Order on the old corporation, via its registered agent or an officer. She served the Stop-Work Order and the Request by hand delivery on Jennifer Crain, Assistant Manager, at the company offices. On December 10, 2007, Respondent issued a subsequent Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment. It was served on a representative of counsel for all of the Petitioners. The parties named on the first and second Stop-Work Order were "Dionaris Cabrera, d/b/a Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., and Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., a Dissolved Florida Corporation." Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., was found to be an administratively dissolved corporation at the time the Stop-Work Orders were issued. The old corporation continued to operate its business in violation of both Stop-Work Orders issued by Respondent. On December 17, 2007, Respondent issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment directed to Petitioner Cabrera and the old corporation, amending the penalty assessed to $346,349.58, pursuant to the formula listed in Sections 440.107 and 440.10, Florida Statutes. Since no business records were received from either Petitioner in response to the Request, the penalty was calculated by imputing the old corporation's gross payroll. After unsuccessful attempts to serve either Petitioner Cabrera or the old corporation, Respondent served the Amended Order, dated December 17, 2007, on an alleged employee of Petitioner Cabrera and/or the old corporation, name unknown, at the company offices on January 3, 2008. Petitioner Cabrera is the mother of Ruben Cabrera, the company manager. She is the sole stockholder, corporate officer, and registered agent listed for Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., in the Florida Secretary of State's records. There has not been any contact with Petitioner Cabrera during the course of Respondent's investigation. It appears that Petitioner Cabrera does not live in or around Orlando, Florida. According to Ruben Cabrera, Petitioner Cabrera was living in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, during the entire course of their investigation and this proceeding. Ruben Cabrera was the manager who operated the old corporation from its company offices in Kissimmee. He entered into arrangements to provide shuttle bus services for guests to tourist destinations with several hotels in the Kissimmee/Orlando area. While negotiating and signing these contracts with hotels, he held himself out to be an officer of the old corporation. It was unclear from the evidence when the old corporation closed business operations, but it appears to have done so prior to January 1, 2008. On November 30, 2007, Ruben Cabrera incorporated the new corporation. He was named the sole owner, corporate officer, and registered agent. The principal place of business was the same as the worksite of the old corporation, and the addresses of the registered agent and corporation's sole officer were the same as well. On January 30, 2008, Respondent served a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (hereinafter "2nd Amended Order") directed to Petitioner Cabrera and the old corporation, on Jennifer Crain, Assistant Manager, at the company office, assessing a $406,349.58 penalty on these two Petitioners. The increase in penalty was due to the allegation that the old corporation continued to operate in violation of the Stop-Work Order. In addition, none of the parties listed on the Penalty Worksheet, attached to the 2nd Amended Order, had current, valid exemptions from workers' compensation coverage. An exemption from workers' compensation allows the exemption holder to be exempt from having to secure the payment of workers' compensation on behalf of himself or herself. None of the persons used to calculate the penalty had workers' compensation exemptions. The penalty period began on November 20, 2006, because a prior investigation by Respondent found the old corporation to be in compliance only up to that date. Utilizing the Scopes Manual published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance and adopted by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021, as guidance, Respondent determined that Petitioner Cabrera and/or the old corporation's activities involved clerical workers and bus drivers. Thus, she assigned the class codes 8810 and 7382, respectively, to the old corporation's activities. On January 30, 2008, Respondent also served an Order Applying Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Successor Corporation or Business Entity (hereinafter "Order Applying") on the new corporation. The Order Applying transferred the effect of the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order issued to the old corporation to the new corporation, based on the allegation that the new corporation was a successor corporation, pursuant to Subsection 440.107(7)(b), Florida Statutes. Ruben Cabrera, the owner/operator, transferred ownership and control of the new corporation to Jennifer Crain on January 9, 2008. Jennifer Crain became the registered agent, sole owner, and officer of the new corporation. It hired some of the drivers who previously worked for the old corporation and put them on salary under the new corporation. The new corporation leased new vehicles and served some of the same routes as the old corporation from the same company location. The new corporation properly carried workers' compensation insurance when served with the Order Applying. Therefore, the new corporation was in compliance with Subsection 440.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, at the time Jennifer Crain took over ownership and control of the new corporation. COMPANY OPERATIONS Drivers for the old corporation submitted applications for employment to the company, prior to being hired. However, drivers signed contracts with the old corporation which stated that they were independent contractors and not employees, and no deductions were taken out their pay. 1099 Forms were issued at the end of the year. Drivers for the old corporation did not pay insurance on the vehicles they used for business purposes. Drivers for the old corporation were not responsible for the expenditures associated with repair or maintenance of the vehicles used by the drivers for business purposes. The corporation paid for the insurance. Drivers for the old corporation did not pay any fees or charges to the company for use of the vehicles. Drivers for the old corporation paid their own admission fees for entry into amusement parks, or other incidental expenses. Drivers for the old corporation wore black pants and a white shirt as a standard uniform. Drivers for the old corporation were paid according to the length of time for which they worked each day. Drivers for the old corporation did not own the vehicles they used for business purposes. They did not pay the old corporation for use of the vehicles in carrying out the contracts of the old corporation. The vehicles were leased under contract by the old corporation. Drivers for the old corporation did not individually contract with hotels for services, but carried out the contracts entered into by the old corporation. The old corporation did not submit any invoices for services rendered by its drivers. There is no evidence that the drivers maintained separate businesses. Payments to drivers were made to individuals rather than to their "businesses." Drivers for the old corporation were paid by the full day or half day, according to the span of time they worked. Ruben Cabrera entered into contracts with clients of the old corporation. He signed the contracts as either manager or as president of the old corporation. Drivers for the old corporation regularly visited the old corporation's clients to pick-up or drop-off passengers in the course of their employment. The old corporation's contract with at least one hotel refers to the old corporation's drivers as "employees." On June 16, 2008, Respondent issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment directed to Petitioner Cabrera and the old corporation, reducing the fine assessed to them to $131,504.60. The penalty was reduced after Respondent received the old corporation's business records and was able to use them to calculate a penalty. The old corporation received payment for its services from multiple businesses in the Kissimmee/Orlando area. The old corporation's records do not specify who, if any, of the drivers paid by the old corporation are independent contractors. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served at the DOAH on counsel for the parties. Following a hearing, the Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment was granted by the undersigned ALJ, and this matter proceeded to final hearing. PRIOR INVESTIGATION BY RESPONDENT On September 12, 2006, Respondent initiated an investigation into the alleged violation of the workers' compensation laws of Florida by Petitioner, Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc. The investigating agent for Respondent, Ray Reynolds (Reynolds), issued a Stop-Work Order on September 15, 2006, for failure to obtain coverage for its employees. It is alleged that in a meeting with Ruben Cabrera, his attorney at the time, and Jennifer Crain, held on September 15, 2006, Reynolds reviewed the contracts with the drivers, and, apparently based on those facts alone, agreed that the bus drivers who worked for Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., were independent contractors. He advised the parties of such findings. However, on September 19, 2006, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued assessing the corporation a penalty of $2,084.09 for the violation. Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc. did not challenge the findings of Respondent that a violation had occurred, and voluntarily paid the fine for failing to provide coverage for those employees named. It also produced proof of workers' compensation coverage for nine employees, which included Ruben Cabrera and Jennifer Crain.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order dismissing the "Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment" directed to Dionaris Cabrera, d/b/a Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc.; The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order upholding the "Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment" and its successor orders directed against Petitioner Florida Sunset Shuttle, Inc., a dissolved Florida corporation; and that The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order upholding the "Order Applying Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Successor Corporation or Business Entity" against Florida Sunset Shuttles and Charters, Inc., and imposing a penalty of $131,604.60. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2008.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the statutory provisions referenced herein.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a prevailing small business party. In 2009, the Petitioner filed an application with the Respondent to transfer his Class B air conditioning contractor's license from one business entity to another. The application form required disclosure of an applicant's criminal history. The Petitioner responded to the inquiry with a cursory disclosure of prior criminal activity, indicating that he had been involved in such activity in the "late 1970's." As part of the application review process, the Respondent conducted a background investigation that revealed the Petitioner's criminal history had extended well beyond the 1970's. Rather than deny the Petitioner's transfer application, the Respondent issued a Notice that provided, in relevant part, as follows: NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPROVE WITH CONDITIONS You are hereby notified that the Construction Industry Licensing Board (Board) voted to permit, WITH CONDITIONS, your application for change of status from one business entity to another contractor's license. The Board reviewed and considered the application at a duly-noticed public meeting held on September 10, 2009 in Tampa, Florida. The Board determined that the application should be approved with conditions based on the following: The applicant failed to sufficiently demonstrate financial stability and responsibility, pursuant to section 489.115, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61G4-15.005, Florida Administrative Code. The Board had issues with applicant's moral character, pursuant to section 489.111, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to section 455.227(2)(f), Florida Statutes, Applicant shall hereby be placed on PROBATION for 6 years, with 12 satisfactory appearances, according to the following terms: Applicant shall be required to appear before the Probation Committee of the Board at such times as directed by the Board Office, approximately every six (6) months. Respondent's first probationary appearance requires a full day attendance at the Board meeting. In connection with each probation appearance, Applicant shall answer questions under oath. In addition, applicant shall provide such other information or documentation as is requested by the Department, the Board, or the Probation Committee. Applicant shall forward said documentation to the Board at least 30 days in advance of the probation appearance or as otherwise directed. The burden shall be solely upon Applicant to remember the requirement for said appearance and to take necessary steps in advance of said appearance to contact the Board office and ascertain the specific time, date, and place of said appearance. Applicant shall not rely on getting notice of said appearance from the Board or the Department. Should Applicant violate any condition of the probation, it shall be considered a violation of Section 489.129(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and shall result in further disciplinary action by the Board. Should Applicant fail to make a satisfactory appearance as determined by the Board, the term of the probationary period shall be automatically extended by six (6) months. If there occurs a second such failure then the term of the probationary period will be extended an additional year. Should the Board determine a third failure of Applicant to make a satisfactory appearance, the stay of suspension of the Applicant's license to practice contracting shall be lifted and the license shall remain in suspended status unless and until a further stay is granted by the Board. Should Applicant's license to practice contracting be suspended or otherwise placed on inactive status, the probation period shall be tolled and shall resume running at the time Applicant reactivates the license, and Applicant shall serve the time remaining in the term of probation. To ensure successful completion of probation, Applicant's license to practice contracting shall be suspended for the period of probation, with the suspension stayed for the period of probation. The time of the suspension and the stay shall run concurrently with the period of probation. If Applicant successfully completes probation, the suspension shall terminate. If Applicant fails to comply with the requirements set forth in the Final Order imposed in this case, or fails to make satisfactory appearances as determined by the Board, the stay shall be lifted. Once the stay is lifted, the license shall remain in suspended status unless and until a further stay is granted by the Board. The Petitioner challenged the imposition of the conditions in DOAH Case No. 10-9444. The Notice cited section 455.225, Florida Statutes, as providing authority for the imposition of the conditions to the Petitioner's license. The referenced statute identified the procedures through which the Respondent could commence a disciplinary action against a licensee. There was no evidence that the Respondent had commenced or concluded a disciplinary proceeding against the Petitioner prior to the proposed imposition of the license conditions. The Notice identified two reasons for the proposed imposition of license conditions. First, the Notice stated that the Respondent "had issues with the [Petitioner's] moral character." Second, the Notice stated that the Petitioner "failed to sufficiently demonstrate financial stability and responsibility pursuant to section 489.115, Florida Statutes and Rule 61G4-15.006, Florida Administrative Code." At the hearing on May 26, 2011, the Petitioner submitted evidence sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the cited provisions of statute and rule. A Recommended Order was issued on July 1, 2011, recommending that the Petitioner's application be approved. As set forth in the Recommended Order, the Administrative Law Judge had determined that the Respondent lacked authority to impose disciplinary conditions absent commencement of a disciplinary proceeding, and the Petitioner had complied with the requirements related to financial stability and responsibility at the hearing. By Final Order dated September 8, 2011, the Respondent granted the Petitioner's license transfer application. The Final Order adopted the Findings of Fact set forth in the Recommended Order. The Final Order rejected four paragraphs from the Conclusions of Law section of the Recommended Order that addressed the Respondent's authority to impose disciplinary conditions under the circumstances of this case. The remaining Conclusions of Law in the Recommended Order were accepted. The Petitioner is seeking an award of attorney's fees of $41,554.00 and costs of $1,702.96, for a total award of $43,256.96. The evidence fails to establish that the amount of the attorney's fees and costs sought by the Petitioner are reasonable, and there has been no stipulation by the parties thereto.
Findings Of Fact Prior to February 25, 1986, the Petitioner, Tommie Miller, was employed by the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) at the Brevard Regional Juvenile Detention Center as a detention child care worker I. During the time relevant to this case, June and July, 1987, Ms. Miller's supervisor was Michele McKinley, detention center superintendent. On February 25, 1986, Ms. Miller injured her lower back, injuring two nerves. The injury was job connected, and Ms. Miller was eligible for and received workers compensation benefits. Ms. Miller was receiving workers compensation benefits during the period relevant to this case, July 10 through 27, 1987. With the exception of a brief time during the period of June 22 through 24, 1987, Ms. Miller was absent from work from February 1986 through August 10, 1987, and thereafter, for that matter. On June 24, 1987, she reinjured her back at work. During the months she was out of work, Ms. Miller was treated in various rehabilitation programs. In June and July, 1987, she was receiving treatment from Woods Rehabilitation Services, Inc., and the rehabilitation nurse assigned to her case was Joan Patterson. R. Ex. 5. Ms. Miller lives 25 miles from the detention center, and testified that in June and July of 1987, her back hurt too much to allow her to drive to work at the detention center. Ms. Miller had exhausted her sick leave by July 22, 1987. It is inferred that she was on approved leave without pay by July 22, 1987. This inference is based on the fact that nearly a year and a half had elapsed from the date of the injury, and normal sick, annual, and compensatory leave would have been exhausted. This inference is also based upon the rules concerning the proper way to characterize the absence of an employee due to a job connected disability discussed in the conclusions of law. It is inferred that on July 22, 1987, the period of approved leave without pay was indefinite. This inference is based on the findings of fact which follow and the lack of evidence of a definite period of approved leave without pay. On June 22, 1987, Dr. Stanley Kaplan provided a written statement excusing Ms. Miller from work. On June 29, 1987, Ms. Miller was again seen by Dr. Kaplan for evaluation. Dr. Kaplan performed the normal therapy he was then performing for Ms. Miller, but did not tell her she could return to work. This finding of fact is limited to what Ms. Miller in fact did not hear, and is not a finding concerning Dr. Kaplan's opinion on June 29, 1987. On July 17, 1987, Ms. Miller visited Dr. Stanley Kaplan for rehabilitative treatment. Dr. Kaplan did not tell Ms. Miller at that time that she could go back to work. This finding of fact is limited to what Ms. Miller in fact did not hear, and is not a finding concerning Dr. Kaplan's opinion on July 17, 1987. On July 22, 1987, Ms. McKinley wrote a certified letter to the Petitioner, Tommie Miller. R. Ex. I. The letter in its entirety stated: I've been informed by Ms. Patterson of Woods rehabilitation that Dr. Kaplan released you to return to work as of 7/10/87. She further reported that you stated you didn't understand that you could return to work. In addition, we have had no further contact from you since 6/24/87. I am now going to have to require you to report back to work on 7/27/87, by 9:00 a.m. If you do not report back to work on this date or provide the appropriate medical documentation as to your absence, we will have to assume that you have abandoned your position with HRS. Thus, the letter of July 22, 1987, explicitly gave Ms. Miller two options: report to work at 9:00 a.m. on July 27, 1987, or "provide the appropriate medical documentation as to your absence." From the contents of the letter, it is concluded that when the letter was written, Ms. McKinley thought that Dr. Kaplan had released Ms. Miller to return to work on July 10, 1987. It is also concluded from the contents of the letter and from R. Ex. 5, which Ms. McKinley testified she had in her possession and was aware of when she wrote the July 22, 1987, letter, that Ms. McKinley was aware on July 22, 1987, that Ms. Patterson had said that Ms. Miller had said that she (Ms. Miller) did not understand that Dr. Kaplan had said she could return to work. On July 22, 1987, Ms. Miller was examined by Richard P. Newman, M.D. On July 24, 1987, Ms. Miller received the letter of July 22, 1987. As soon as she received the letter, Ms. Miller called Ms. McKinley on the telephone. Ms. Miller told Ms. McKinley that her current medical problem was an inability to drive to work, but that she could work if she was able to travel to work. Ms. McKinley told Ms. Miller that she had not received a written report from a physician concerning Ms. Miller's condition since June 24, 1987. Ms. McKinley told Ms. Miller that she (Ms. McKinley) still needed medical documentation, and that she could not authorize leave based on her oral report without medical documentation. Ms. Miller then told Ms. McKinley that Ms. Patterson at the Woods Rehabilitation Services was supposed to send the doctor's report to Ms. McKinley. During the telephone call, Ms. McKinley did not ask her (Ms. Miller) to personally deliver the doctor's report, and did not tell Ms. Miller that reliance upon Ms. Patterson was inappropriate. Moreover, Ms. McKinley did not warn Ms. Miller that if Ms. Patterson fi1ed to deliver the report by July 27, 1987, that Ms. Miller would automatically forfeit her job. At the time of the phone call from Ms. Miller, Ms. McKinley was in possession of R. Ex. 5. The top of page two of that document advised Ms. McKinley that Ms. Miller was scheduled for an evaluation by Dr. Newman on July 22, 1987. In the fourth paragraph of page two of R. Ex. 5, Ms. McKinley was advised that Ms. Miller would attend the appointment with Dr. Newman. In the seventh paragraph of page two of R. Ex. 5, Ms. McKinley was advised that Nurse Patterson felt that Dr. Newman's evaluation was important to an assessment of the current status of Ms. Miller's medical condition. These findings are based upon what is in fact stated in R. Ex. 5 and known to Ms. McKinley as what Ms. Patterson had written. No finding is made as to whether what is stated in R. Ex. 5 is true. It is concluded that during the telephone conversation with Ms. Miller on July 24, 1987, Ms. McKinley knew that Ms. Miller was to have been evaluated by Dr. Newman on July 22, 1987. At the time of the phone call on June 24, 1987, Ms. McKinley did not ask Ms. Miller to tell her what Dr. Newman had determined concerning Ms. Miller's medical condition, and did not ask Ms. Miller about Dr. Newman's evaluation two days earlier. As a result, during the July 24, 1987, telephone conversation, inexplicably neither Ms. McKinley nor Ms. Miller mentioned anything about Dr. Newman's evaluation on July 22, 1987. R. Ex. 2A is the report of Dr. Newman with respect to the visit of July 22, 1987. The report indicates on its face that Woods Rehab Services and Ms. Tommie Miller are listed as recipients of the "cc." The report of Dr. Newman of July 22, 1987, R. Ex. 2A, states in part: At this time, my feeling would be that the drive to and from Titusville is causing her more harm than good. Since she works for the state, it would be in the best interest of all parties concerned to move her to a position in the Rockledge area because she will be able to commute a very short drive and would be quite capable of performing this type of sedentary work. On July 24, 1987, Ms. Miller called Dr. Newman to get another written report, and asked Dr. Newman to send that report to Ms. Patterson at Woods Rehabilitation Center. R. Ex. 2B is that report. The report of July 24, 1987, shows that Woods Rehabilitation Services, Inc., but not Ms. Miller, was the recipient of a "cc." The report of July 24, 1987, R. Ex. 2A states in part: It is not the act of driving itself, but it is the riding in the car that is bothering her back and I do not think that she should be having to travel by car 25 miles in either direction to work when she could be doing a similar job virtually around the corner from her house. It is concluded that the report of Dr. Newman, in written form, supported Ms. Miller's oral statement to Ms. McKinley that she was physically unable to drive to the detention center due to the distance. These findings of fact are based upon what in fact is printed on the face of the reports, and is not a finding that the statements contained in the reports are true. Ms. Patterson told Ms. Miller that she would send the report to Ms. McKinley. Ms. Patterson told Ms. Miller that she did communicate with HRS. No finding is made as to the truth of Ms. Patterson's statement, but only that Ms. Miller in fact heard Ms. Patterson make this statement to her. Ms. Miller thought Ms. Patterson would and did send the medical report of July 22, 1987, to Ms. McKinley. Ms. Patterson did not send Dr. Newman's medical report to Ms. McKinley. There was a prior pattern of dealing between the parties such that Ms. Patterson, with reasonable frequency, though not routinely, communicated to Ms. McKinley concerning the current medical status of Ms. Miller with respect to her ability to resume her job with HRS. This finding of fact is based upon the testimony of Ms. Miller, who stated that she relied upon Ms. Patterson to keep Ms. McKinley informed, and the testimony of Ms. Miller that on July 24, 1987, she told Ms. McKinley by telephone that Ms. Patterson would send the medical documentation. It is also based upon the testimony of Ms. McKinley, who testified that Ms. Patterson did, from time to time discuss with her Ms. Miller's medical condition and job alternatives. But most important, this finding is based on the letter of July 22, 1987, itself. The first sentence of that letter stated: "I've been informed by Ms. Patterson of Woods rehabilitation that Dr. Kaplan released you to return to work as of 7/10/87." It is noted that R. Ex. 5, which Ms. McKinley testified was the only information she had on July 22, 1987, was an extensive report prepared by Nurse Patterson, and shows Michele McKinley in the "cc" list, from which it is inferred that Ms. Patterson routinely sent these medical evaluations to Ms. McKinley. In the year between August, 1986, and July, 1987, there is no evidence that Ms. Miller had failed to provide HRS with medical documentation concerning her injury as may have been required by HRS, or that HRS had not been satisfied with the reports received from Nurse Patterson and her predecessors. In particular, there is no evidence that during this twelve month period HRS had discussed with Ms. Miller any problem of receipt of medical documentation, or had occasion to warn her that it was her personal responsibility to provide medical documentation, and that her failure to do so would result in loss of her job. Such a warning, it is inferred, would have been appropriate if Nurse Patterson had failed to send medical documentation that had been previously demanded by HRS. In short, during the period from July, 1986, to July, 1987, it must be concluded that whatever system of medical documentation was then required by HRS, if any, was complied with satisfactorily. On July 28, 1986, Ms. Miller was warned by her supervisor that she had a personal responsibility to keep HRS informed concerning her medical condition. The warning on this date was prompted by the fact that HRS was then not receiving medical documentation that it needed. The relevance of this warning with respect to the period of June and July, 1987, is diminished for several reasons. First, this warning occurred a year before, and there is no evidence of any failure in the intervening 12 months by Ms. Miller to satisfy HRS's needs for medical documentation. Further, the July, 1986, incident occurred because Ms. Miller then did not have a rehabilitation nurse assigned to her case, and thus had no medical representative to send medical information to HRS for her. But more important, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, when Nurse Patterson and her predecessors were assigned to Ms. Miller, Ms. Miller relied upon them to send medical information. The system apparently worked, since there is no evidence of a dissatisfaction by HRS with medical documentation after July, 1986, until the letter of July 22, 1987. The medical documentation was still not received by Ms. McKinley on August 10, 1987. Ms. Miller did not report to work in the period from July 22, 1987, to August 10, 1987. On August 10, 1987, HRS by letter notified Ms. Miller that HRS concluded that Ms. Miller had abandoned her position. Ms. Miller did not learn that Ms. McKinley had not received the medical documentation until she received the letter of August 10, 1987. On August 18, 1987, Ms. Miller requested a formal administrative hearing concerning the conclusion that she had abandoned her position.
Recommendation It is therefore recommended that the Department of Administration enter its final order finding that the Petitioner, Tommie Miller, did not abandon her position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by being absent from her job for three consecutive workdays without authorized leave. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX To Recommended Order in Case No. 87-4136 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used designate the unnumbered paragraphs used by the Petitioner, in sequence. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: Fourth sentence, there is no transcript, and the Hearing Officer's notes do not record the testimony that the medical excuse "indicated that the estimated Date of Return to Duty as unknown." The Hearing Officer has no independent memory of such testimony sufficient to conclude that this proposed finding of fact is true. The same is true with respect to the sentence: "Ms. Miller advised McKinley that she had been to see Dr. Richard P. Newman, M.D. on July 22, 1987." If the record reflected that Ms. Miller so testified, the Hearing Officer would make this finding of fact, since there was no reason to disbelieve Ms. Miller's testimony, and Ms. McKinley testified that she could not remember. Ms. Miller's testimony, as well as Ms. McKinley's testimony, appeared to be honest and straightforward, testifying to the truth both remembered at the time of testifying. The last sentence is not relevant. The first and third sentences are rejected since no one from Woods Rehabilitation Services testified. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Patterson in writing told Ms. Miller that she advised Ms. McKinley of Ms. Miller's continued disability, and thus that portion of the sixth sentence is rejected. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: None. COPIES FURNISHED: Linoria Anthony AFSCME Council 79 345 South Magnolia Drive Suite F-21 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District VII Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At the times pertinent to this proceeding, the Dade County School Board (School Board) was a duly constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Dade County, Florida. By Memorandum dated August 27, 1976, the attorney for the School Board recommended that it approve a list of individuals to serve as "hearing examiners" in certain hearings pertaining to personnel matters as required by different collective bargaining contracts and as to student expulsion cases. The Memorandum thereafter listed the individuals who were recommended by the School Board attorney to serve as hearing examiners. On September 8, 1976, the School Board adopted the recommendation of its attorney. The minutes of the September 8, 1976, meeting of the School Board, reflect, in pertinent part, the following pertaining to this action: A memorandum was received from the Legal Department, advising that the collective bargaining agreements between the School Board and the unions provide that in various circumstances, including suspension, dismissal and reduction in grade, the employee has the right to a review of the action. Also, the Florida Administrative Procedure Act was amended to provide for informal hearings con- ducted by impartial hearing examiners in student expulsion cases. With a view toward obtaining unbiased hearing examiners who can expedite cases at a minimal cost to the Board, the Office of the School Board Attorney and the Division of Employee Relations have solicited the services of various members of the Florida Bar and persons with experience in labor arbitration. It is believed that the following list of examiners will meet the needs of the Board in this area. These individuals have agreed to serve at the rate of $40.00 per hour. The minutes of the September 8, 1976, meeting of the School Board reflect the names of seventeen individuals who were recommended to serve as impartial hearing examiners. The minutes of the September 8, 1976, meeting of the School Board reflect that the following motion was adopted: That the school Board approve the list of persons named above to act as impartial hearing examiners in appropriate proceedings involving personnel and pupils, the hearing examiners to be reimbursed at the rate of $40.00 per hour for their time and to be designated as needed by the Superintendent or his designee. That the Superintendent or his designee be authorized to strike from the list the name of any hearing examiner who does not submit his or her recommended order within the time prescribed. The list of individuals to serve as impartial hearing examiners (who were sometimes referred to as hearing officers) was revised by the School Board on June 27, 1990, and on September 20, 1995. Petitioner's daughter is a student at one of the schools under the authority of the School Board who receives services as a gifted student under the School Board's Exceptional Education Program. Local hearing officers do not conduct proceedings pertaining to students in the Exceptional Education Program. Petitioner has never requested a hearing before a hearing examiner (or hearing officer) appointed by the School Board pursuant to the School Board's action of September 8, 1976, or as subsequently revised, and he is not involved in any pending or threatened administrative proceeding that would require the appointment of a local hearing officer by the School Board. Petitioner's daughter has never requested a hearing before a hearing examiner (or hearing officer) appointed by the School Board pursuant to the School Board's action of September 8, 1976, or as subsequently revised, and she is not involved in any pending or threatened administrative proceeding that would require the appointment of a local hearing officer by the School Board. Petitioner has never applied for appointment as a local hearing officer. He is not a member of the Florida Bar and there was no evidence that he is experienced in labor arbitration. Petitioner is not employed by the School Board. Petitioner is not affected by who has or has not been approved by the School Board to serve as a local hearing officer.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Pinellas County School Board may terminate the employment of Minnie L. Moody as a school bus driver.
Findings Of Fact Since 1996, Petitioner has employed Respondent, initially in the Food Services Department and then as a "Plant Operator." Beginning on January 3, 2001, Respondent began working for Petitioner in the Transportation Department as a school bus driver. Respondent is represented by a collective bargaining unit of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) with whom Petitioner has entered into an agreement. Petitioner has adopted minimum qualifications an applicant must meet to become employed as a school bus driver. Although the job description has changed over a period of years, at all times material to this case Petitioner's minimum qualifications for employment as a school bus driver required as follows: "graduation from high school, possession of GED, or must obtain a GED within one year of being hired." A "GED" is a "general equivalency diploma" which can be earned by persons completing a prescribed course of study and passing a standard examination. The GED is generally regarded as the equivalent of a high school diploma. At the time Respondent began her employment as a school bus driver, she did not meet the minimum qualifications because she had not graduated from high school, did not possess a GED, and was not within one year of obtaining a GED. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and SEIU, a person not meeting the minimum requirements for employment may work in a position as an "intern" for a period of one year with a salary reduction of ten percent below the applicable minimum. An employee seeking employment as an intern enters into an "internship agreement" with Petitioner. The purpose of the internship mechanism is apparently to permit the employee an opportunity to complete certain job-related requirements within the first year of the employment. In January 2001, Respondent executed a one-year internship agreement with Petitioner. The agreement provided as follows: Internships are limited to one (1) year, however; [sic] in some circumstances, the Director of Personnel Relations, or designee, may grant an extension on a case- by-case basis. In June 2001, Respondent entered into an adult education course to prepare for enrollment in a GED program. Towards the end of 2001, Respondent sought and received an internship extension of three months. Because Respondent was attending educational classes, the request was approved, and Respondent continued bus driving through the end of the 2001-02 school year. In the summer of 2002, Respondent was enrolled in basic adult education classes. In August 2002, Respondent sought an additional internship extension. The request was approved, and Respondent drove a school bus for the 2002-03 school year. In February 2004, Respondent was again enrolled in basic adult education classes, and sought an additional internship extension. The request was again approved, and Respondent drove a school bus for the remainder of the 2003-04 school year. Respondent suffered a family tragedy in April 2004 when her son passed away after a long illness. By letter dated July 30, 2004, Petitioner advised Respondent that her internship would expire on August 21, 2004, and that she needed to complete the GED requirement prior to that date. The letter also provided several options to pursue, including other employment prospects with Petitioner, if the GED was not obtained by the expiration of the agreement. The internship agreement between Petitioner and Respondent expired on August 21, 2004, without Respondent's obtaining the GED. By letter dated September 3, 2004, Petitioner advised Respondent that her employment was suspended for failing to meet the minimum qualifications of the position for which she was employed. Because Respondent's progress toward obtaining the GED has been minimal, Petitioner determined that the internship agreement would not again be extended. Petitioner has no written policy regarding how many times an internship agreement can be extended. The witness testifying at the hearing indicated that in determining whether to grant an internship extension to Respondent, Petitioner considered Respondent's progress towards completion of the academic goals as well as personal factors, including the family illness. Since June 2001, Respondent has worked towards, but has not yet obtained, the GED. In order to obtain a GED a student must complete basic education classes prior to entering into the GED course of study. Respondent has worked to improve her reading ability so as to provide skills sufficient to support entry into the GED program, but her reading skill level has shown no marked improvement, and Respondent has not yet begun the actual GED course of study. There is no evidence that Respondent has not performed her duties as a school bus driver in an acceptable manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment as a school bus driver. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 2005.
The Issue The following issues were presented by the Petitioner or arose at hearing: Was a proper investigation and showing of interest made in this Petition? Should Assistant Sorensen be included or excluded from the proposed unit? Whether the appropriate unit should be composed solely of personnel within the Road and Bridge Department.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment as an educational support employee based on the incident that occurred on May 16, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Julius Balogh, has been employed with Petitioner, Lee County School Board ("the District"), since October 17, 2002. He is currently assigned as a Bus Operator in the Transportation Department. Respondent's annual contract with Petitioner was renewed for each of the school years: 2003- 2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008. Since Respondent commenced working for Petitioner in October 2002, he has received five annual performance assessments. With the exception of Respondent's first year when he received three scores of "inconsistently practiced" out of 32 areas targeted for assessment, Respondent always scores at an "effective level of performance" in all areas targeted for assessment. The "comment" section for Petitioner's 06/07 performance assessment stated he was "a good worker, helpful, dependable and a joy to work with." On his 05/06 assessment, the assessor wrote in the "comments" section "Great job. Julius takes personal satisfaction in job and cares about his students. Continues to grow." During the five years Respondent has been employed with Petitioner, he has had a perfect attendance record. Aside from the present charges, he has never before been the subject of any disciplinary action. Respondent is an "educational support employee," as defined by Subsection 1012.40(1)(a), Florida Statues (2007), and is governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board and the Support Personnel Association of Lee County ("SPALC"). The standard for the discipline of support personnel is "just cause," pursuant to Article 7 of the SPALC Agreement. On May 16, 2007, Respondent reported for duty at 4:49 a.m. He completed his morning shift at 10:07 a.m. He was then required to submit to a random drug and alcohol screening, which he passed. After dropping-off all students at their bus stops, Respondent was returning to the bus compound while following his regularly-scheduled route. While on duty and in uniform, Respondent parked his bus in front and entered the San Carlos Package Store. Respondent's stated reason for entering the store was for the intended purpose of purchasing an herbal extract product called St. Hubertus for his wife. St. Hubertus is an herbal product that Respondent's wife administers to herself daily, in her evening cup of tea, to alleviate digestive problems and stomach pain resulting from various medications she is prescribed. St. Hubertus is 35 percent alcohol by volume. Respondent and his wife regularly purchase St. Hubertus while visiting their country of origin, Hungary. Edith Balogh returns there annually for medical treatment. Edith Balogh's Hungarian physician first recommended St. Hubertus for her some 10 to 15 years ago to relieve her stomach pain. Edith Balogh had exhausted her annual supply of St. Hubertus sometime prior to May 2007. Although she and Respondent were scheduled to fly to Hungary on May 21, 2007, she was experiencing severe stomach pain and related symptoms. She, therefore, had asked her husband to attempt to procure the product locally. Respondent unsuccessfully sought to obtain the product at several stores prior to May 16, 2007. Ultimately, Respondent was told by a pharmacist that he might be able to find the product at the San Carlos Package Store. Since the San Carlos Package Store was located on Respondent's direct route to the bus compound, and because the weather was intemperate, Respondent did not want to backtrack after concluding his shift. Respondent decided to stop at the San Carlos Package Store for the purpose of purchasing the St. Hubertus product. Before stopping at the package store that day, Respondent had not used either of his two 15 minute breaks. He stopped at the store at approximately 6:45 p.m., clocked out of work at 7:17 p.m., and drove the approximately four miles from the store to the compound before clocking out. Respondent thus did not exceed the personal time Petitioner otherwise allowed its employees for their daily breaks. When Respondent inquired about the availability of St. Hubertus, the sales clerk advised him that he would have to order it and it would take three to six weeks to receive it. Respondent explained the urgency of obtaining the product, and the clerk recommended a similar product called "Jagermeifter." Respondent purchased two 50 ml bottles of Jagermeifter. The label on the bottles of Jagermeifter were in German and English. Respondent speaks German. The label described the product in German as "noble herb tea extract." The label also stated, in English, that the product contained 35 percent alcohol by volume (70 Proof). Respondent purchased the two bottles of Jagermeifter, placed them in a ziplock bag, secured them in his briefcase, and returned to his bus. Respondent then drove directly to the bus compound. As Respondent was pulling into the compound he received a cell phone call from the afternoon supervisor, Robert Schwartz, advising him that he was observed purchasing liquor and that he was suspended from operating the bus. Respondent clocked out and went home. Joe Howard, another supervisor, checked Respondent's bus for open alcohol containers the following day and found no such evidence. As had previously been approved, Respondent did not return to work prior to his departure for Europe. Respondent took the Jagermeifter product home with him on May 16, 2007, and presented it to his wife. Edith Balogh used the Jagermeifter as a substitute for St. Hubertus, and while it was not as effective as St. Hubertus, the Jagermeifter product did help to alleviate her stomach pain. Respondent testified that he believed he was purchasing a medicinal product, not an alcoholic beverage, when he bought the two small bottles of Jagermeifter. Respondent credibly explained that the reason he purchased the product was not for personal consumption, but for his wife's medicinal use. Respondent testified that he no longer consumes alcohol. Edith Balogh, Respondent's wife of 54 years, confirmed that Respondent does not drink alcohol and has not consumed any for approximately 45 years. Joe Howard's (Howard) testimony relating to Respondent's alleged admission that he would often purchase a "medicinal" product for his and his wife's consumption is not reliable. He did not make notes of the conversation, which occurred some eight months before the hearing. He offered conflicting testimony about who was present when the conversation occurred and was imprecise about whether Respondent admitted to regularly consuming Jagermeifter or whether he merely was admitting to intending to consume one of the bottles of the product purchased on May 16, 2007. Howard also failed to mention the alleged admission in the course of Petitioner's investigation. The greater weight of the evidence supports the testimony of Respondent and his wife that Respondent does not consume alcohol. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to believe that Respondent intended to consume any of the Jagermeifter himself. Although Respondent's motive for purchasing the Jagermeifter product was for a medicinal purpose to alleviate his wife's chronic stomach pain, the product was not sold in a drug store as an over-the-counter medicinal product. The product was marketed and sold as an "alcoholic beverage" in a package store. The words on the label, "noble herb tea extract," were only written in German. Respondent parked the school bus in front of the package store, entered the package store while in uniform, purchased an alcoholic beverage, took it back to his bus, and returned to the bus compound, all while on duty. Respondent's stated reason that he did not first return the bus, clock out, and then return to the package store in his own vehicle was because it was raining and he was in a hurry to get the product home to his wife, is unsatisfactory. Respondent's effectiveness in the school system was impaired by purchasing the product while on duty and in uniform and returning with it on the bus to the compound. Respondent was in possession of alcohol under circumstances that would affect the efficient operation of the District's business or the safety of its employees and students or the public. Petitioner has adopted disciplinary guidelines for transportation employees. Under the facts of this case, the proper penalty for Respondent's misconduct in this case is disciplinary action up to and including termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that Petitioner, Lee County School Board enter a final order dismissing/terminating Respondent, Julius Balogh, from his position as an employee with the Lee County School District. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 2008.
The Issue Whether Relocation Assistance Appeal of Petitioner should be granted. Petitioner was not represented by legal counsel or other representative at the hearing. After an explanation of her rights in administrative hearings conducted under the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, Petitioner stated that she wished to proceed in her own behalf.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner moved into an apartment located at 1013 West Broward Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida on June 9, 1977. (Testimony of Petitioner, supplemented by Exhibit 2) On August 3, 1977, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a letter from Respondent which notified her that Respondent was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for a state road project located where she lived and that negotiations for the purchase of the property had begun on June 23, 1977. The letter enclosed an informational brochure entitled "YOUR RELOCATION" and expressed the desire of Respondent to assist in Petitioner's relocation necessitated by the property acquisition. (Exhibit 1) In late November or early December, 1977, Petitioner vacated her apartment upon the request of the landlord for non-payment of the rent. (Testimony of Petitioner, supplemented by Exhibit 2) Respondent purchased the property where Petitioner had resided from the West Broward Land Corporation on February 8, 1978. The purchase was accomplished pursuant to the Federal Highway Aid Program (PL 91-646) and involved the widening of Broward Boulevard (SR 842). Guidelines under the federally funded program are implemented by the Federal Aid Highway Program Manual and by Chapter 14-14.05, F.A.C., which incorporates by reference Respondent's Right-of-way Bureau Operating Procedures. These procedures include eligibility criteria for receipt of monetary payments by individuals who have been displaced from real property as a result of its acquisition by the state. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibit 3) On February 15, 1978, Petitioner was present at the residence of another tenant of the apartment building at the time Respondent's right-of-way agent was explaining relocation benefits to that individual. Petitioner asked the agent if she could return to her former apartment and resume occupancy, but he explained that he had no authority to grant such permission. Thereafter, Petitioner moved back into the apartment. She testified at the hearing that one of Respondent's employees named Bill Barnette had told her she could occupy the premises. This alleged authorization however, took place at the time Petitioner was given a check for $320 for moving expenses by Barnette sometime in March, 1978. (Testimony of Way, Petitioner, Crawford, Johnson, supplemented by Exhibits 2, 5) Thereafter, Petitioner made application with Respondent for rent supplement payments, but by letter of October 2, 1978, Respondent denied any such payment on the ground that Petitioner was not living on Broward Boulevard when the state obtained legal possession of the property. (Testimony of Moon, Case File)
Recommendation That Petitioner's appeal be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Sallie Mae Ray 429 1/2 North West 7th Terrace Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Also mailed to Ms. Ray at: Apartment 14 North West 10th Avenue and 7th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida
