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DENNIS COULTER; J. LARRY HOOPER; L. C. DAIRY, INC.; AND WABASSO ROAD DAIRY, INC. vs ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 98-003052 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Jul. 14, 1998 Number: 98-003052 Latest Update: Jul. 12, 2004

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are Dennis Coulter; J. Larry Hooper; L.C. Dairy, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "L.C. Dairy"); and Wabasso Road Dairy, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Wabasso"). L.C. Dairy is a closely held Florida corporation. Mr. Coulter owns 50 percent of the stock of L.C. Dairy. Mr. Coulter also serves as L.C. Dairy's President. Wabasso is a closely held Florida corporation. Mr. Coulter and Mr. Hooper are officers and directors of Wabasso. Mr. Coulter and Mr. Hooper are, together, the majority stockholders of Wabasso. Between 1988 and 1997, Petitioners operated a dairy known as Willowbrook Farms Dairy, which consisted of approximately 2,000 cattle (hereinafter referred to as the "Dairy"). The Dairy was operated on property owned by Willowbrook Coal Company, d/b/a Willowbrook Farms (hereinafter referred to as "Willowbrook"). Willowbrook is a Pennsylvania general partnership. Mr. James Sartori is the general partner of Willowbrook. Willowbrook owned two adjacent parcels of property located in Brevard County, Florida. One parcel was used by Petitioners for the Dairy (hereinafter referred to as the "Dairy Parcel"). The other parcel, located to the west of the Dairy Parcel, was not directly used for grazing dairy cattle (hereinafter referred to as the "Non-Diary Parcel"). Respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "District"), is a public corporation with regulatory jurisdiction over the administration and enforcement of surface water management systems. On August 13, 1997, the District entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with Willowbrook whereby the District acquired a conservation easement over the Dairy Parcel and acquired the Non-Dairy Parcel in fee (hereinafter referred to as the "Sales Agreement"). The Sales Agreement specifically provided that all cattle on the Dairy Parcel and the Non-Dairy Parcel had to be removed prior to closing. The terms of the Diary Parcel conservation easement also provided that concentrated animal feeding operations, including dairy operations, were prohibited. The total agreed purchase price for the fee interest in the Non-Dairy Parcel and the easement over the Dairy Parcel was $11,500,000.00. While the Sales Agreement was being negotiated by the District, the District was also negotiating with the National Resource Conservation Service (hereinafter referred to as the "NRCS") of the United States Department of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as the "USDA") to sell a 30-year conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel to the USDA. USDA was interested in purchasing the easement as part of a federally funded program known as the Wetlands Reserve Program. The USDA ultimately agreed to purchase a conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel from the District for $4,200,000.00. This agreement was reached before closing on the Sales Agreement. No agreement was made between the District and the USDA specifying that the District would provide relocation assistance to any persons displaced as a result of the USDA's purchase of a conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel. The Sales Agreement contained the following contingency: (B) This Agreement is contingent on Buyer entering into an Agreement with the United States of America for funding of a portion of the purchase price of the Conservation Easement for the Restrictions Parcel [the Non-Dairy Parcel] through the Wetlands Reserve Program of the Commodity Credit Corporation. On March 26, 1998, the USDA wired $4,200,000.00 to the District's Land Acquisition Revenue Bonds Project Funds Account. These funds were intended to be used for USDA's purchase of the conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel. Closing on the Sales Agreement took place on March 30, 1998. Closing was initially held for the District's purchase of the fee interest in the Non-Dairy Parcel and the purchase of the conservation easement over the Dairy Parcel. Immediately after the completion of District's closing, a second closing was held on the purchase of the conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel by the USDA. Disbursement of all purchase funds, including the $4,200,000.00 remitted by the USDA to the District and $7,300,000.00 in District funds, took place on March 31, 1998. The net result of the closings on the Sales Agreement was that the District purchased a conservation easement over the Dairy Parcel and the underlying fee interest in the Non-Dairy Parcel for $7,300,000.00 and the USDA purchased a conservation easement over the Non-Dairy Parcel from the District for $4,200,000.00. Pursuant to the terms of the Sales Agreement Petitioners were required to relocate their dairy operations. They incurred substantial costs in doing so. On or about April 9, 1998, Petitioners requested relocation assistance under the "Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act" 42 U.S.C. Sections 4601 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Relocation Assistance Act"), and Section 421.55, Florida Statutes, from the District. By letter dated May 8, 1998, the District informed Petitioners that their request for relocation assistance was denied. On or about June 22, 1998, Petitioners filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the District challenging the denial of their request for relocation assistance. The Petition was filed by the District with the Division of Administrative Hearings by Notice filed July 14, 1998.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the St. Johns River Water Management District denying Petitioners request for relocation assistance pursuant to the Relocation Assistance Act and Section 421.55, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 John W. Williams, Esquire Stanley J. Niego, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Dykes C. Everett, Esquire Robert P. Major, Esquire Winderweedle, Haines, Ward and Woodman, P.A. 1500 NationsBank Center 390 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns Water River Management District Highway 100, West Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429

CFR (1) 7 CFR 1467 Florida Laws (2) 120.57421.55
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LOURDES GUZMAN vs CHARLES HARRIS, 02-004581 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 27, 2002 Number: 02-004581 Latest Update: Aug. 12, 2003

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to rent her an apartment because she is legally blind and relies upon a service dog to ambulate independently.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lourdes Guzman (“Guzman”) is legally blind and relies upon a service dog (also referred to as a guide dog or “seeing eye” dog) to ambulate independently. Respondent Charles Harris (“Harris”) owns an eight-unit apartment building (the “Property”) located in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Harris, who is retired, holds the Property for investment purposes and lives on the rental income it generates. In or around April of 2002, Harris placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking a tenant for one his rental units. Guzman saw this ad, was interested, and made an appointment to see the Property. A short time later, Guzman and her live-in boyfriend José Robert (“Robert”) met Harris and Paul Karolyi (“Karolyi”) late one afternoon at the Property. (Karolyi is a tenant of Harris’s who helps out at the Property; Guzman and Robert viewed him as the “building manager,” which was apparently a reasonable perception.) During their conversation, the prospective renters mentioned that they owned a dog. Upon hearing this, Harris explained that he had just finished renovating the advertised unit because the previous tenant’s dog had destroyed the rug and caused other damage to the premises. Thus, Harris told Guzman and Robert, he was not interested in renting this unit to someone with a dog. Robert then informed Harris that: (a) Guzman’s sight was impaired; (b) the dog in question was a service dog; and (c) Harris was legally obligated to let Guzman bring the dog into the unit, should she become Harris’s tenant, as a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. Once he understood the situation, Harris acknowledged that a service dog was different and stated that he would not refuse to rent the unit to someone with a service dog. Accordingly, Harris gave Guzman and Robert a rental application, which Guzman later completed and returned to Harris. After receiving Guzman’s application, Harris checked her references and discovered that Guzman’s two most recent landlords considered her to be a poor tenant. While Guzman disputes the veracity of some of the information that was provided to Harris, at hearing she admitted that much of what he learned was true. The following rental history is based on Guzman’s admissions. Town & Country Apartments. From October 2001 until January 24, 2002, Guzman lived at the Town & Country Apartments in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Her landlord was T & C Associates, Ltd. (“T & C”). At least six times during this 16-month period, Guzman failed to timely pay her rent and was required to pay a late fee. She also received at least five statutory “three-day notices” warning that her failure to pay the overdue monthly rent within 72 hours would trigger an eviction proceeding.1 T & C sued to evict Guzman after she failed to pay the rent due for December 2001. Consequently, when Guzman vacated the Town & Country Apartments on January 24, 2002, she did so pursuant to a writ of possession. Guzman claims that she chose to be evicted as an expedient means of breaking her lease with T & C. The Sahara. After being evicted from the Town & Country Apartments, Guzman moved into a unit at the “Sahara”—— which Guzman described at hearing as a “motel”——pursuant to a short-term lease. Guzman’s landlord at the Sahara was Allen L. Kaul (“Kaul”). Guzman lived at the Sahara for about two months.2 Guzman had some sort of dispute with Kaul, and when she moved out of the Sahara she took the keys to the unit she was vacating and the remote control device that opened a gate to the premises; these items were never returned to Kaul. These facts convinced Harris that Guzman was not an acceptable risk. He notified Guzman that he would not rent to her due to her “poor credit history.” Ultimate Factual Determinations Harris rejected Guzman’s rental application, not because of her handicap or service dog, but because he discovered, through a reasonable process of checking references, that Guzman had recently been evicted from one apartment and vacated another under suspicious (or at least questionable) circumstances, taking with her some personal property of the landlord’s that she never returned. There is no credible, competent evidence that Harris rented his apartments to non-handicapped persons having rental histories similar to Guzman’s. Nor does the evidence support a finding that Harris invoked Guzman’s negative rental history (the material aspects of which were undisputed) as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Harris did not discriminate unlawfully against Guzman; rather, he rejected her rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Guzman’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2003.

Florida Laws (3) 760.20760.23760.37
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EMMA ALLEN vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 94-004899 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Aug. 31, 1994 Number: 94-004899 Latest Update: Jun. 14, 1996

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, at times pertinent hereto, was a resident of Scott's Mobile Home Park (Park), located in Duval County, Florida. She lived in the Park with William Scott, the son of the Park owners, their child, and four other children who are Ms. Allen's natural children. The Petitioner, Mr. Scott, and the five children lived in a three-bedroom, double-wide mobile home, at the pertinent time in 1993. It had been provided by Mr. Scott's parents, the owners of the Park. The Department acquired certain property in Duval County, Florida, in 1993, as a result of an inverse condemnation action of which the property known as Scott's Mobile Home Park was a part. The Department, in due course, notified the Park residents that it would be closed and that efforts would be undertaken to relocate the residents. The Department staff obtained information from Ms. Allen and Mr. Scott, as well as from the other Park residents, in order to determine the amount of relocation assistance funds each displaced resident should receive, in accordance with the legal authority cited below. The Allen-Scott family were determined to be "90-day occupants" of the Park, as that term is used in applicable regulatory provisions. In calculating the relocation assistance amount to which the Petitioner may be entitled, the Department follows certain procedures set out in the Code of Federal Regulations, adopted by reference in its own rules and procedures. It must find replacement housing and then pay displaced residents a lump sum equal to 42 months of the difference between the new higher rent, if that be the case, and utility payments and what the displaced residents had been paying for rent and utilities prior to being displaced. The Department initially located replacement housing for the Allen- Scott family on Phillips Highway in Jacksonville, Florida. While the family had been living in a three-bedroom mobile home, the standards adopted by the Department for decent, safe, and sanitary housing for a family of seven required four bedrooms, which is the type residence the Department sought. The rent and utilities amount for the mobile home suitable to those standards, located on Phillips Highway, was $691.00 per month. The Allen-Scott family, however, desired a mobile home on the west side of Jacksonville, Florida. In order to calculate the amount due to the Petitioner, the Department had to subtract from the $691.00 per month figure for the property on Phillips Highway, the rent and utility total amount that the family had been paying at the Park. The evidence shows, however, that the living arrangements under which they occupied that dwelling in the Park were not the result of an arms-length transaction and that, in reality, the family was not paying any rent for the premises. Therefore, the Department had to impute a rental figure for them. Accordingly, Mr. William Kelbaugh, a Property Appraiser for the Department, made that imputed calculation, based upon the square footage of the Allen-Scott mobile home and the amount per square foot paid for other decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings in the same area, or comparable residences. After establishing that the average rent for mobile homes was approximately $.41 per square foot, Mr. Kelbaugh multiplied the square footage of the Allen-Scott family mobile home by that figure and, after making a deduction because of the condition of the Park, in terms of the actual rental value of the premises they had been living in, he arrived at a "market rental" of $375.00 per month. He then reduced the "market rental" figure by 15 percent based upon his observation of the premises, its condition, and his experience of 20 years or more in making such appraisals. The Department also had to include utility payments in its calculation. It received information from two utility companies about the family's utility bill over the prior 12-month period and computed an average monthly utility payment amount of $202.29. The Department also attempted to establish the family's income. It was required to do so because, in calculating the payment to be made for relocation assistance, the Department must subtract from the new rent and utility payment the smaller of the sums equal to the rent paid or, in the Petitioner's case, imputed, or 30 percent of gross monthly family income. In trying to determine their income amount, the Department asked the Petitioner and Mr. Scott to provide income information on its income certification form, which the Petitioner and Mr. Scott signed and dated March 10, 1993. The Petitioner represented that their income came from Aid to Families with Dependent Children and other welfare benefits, which are not considered income for purposes of the Department's calculation of relocation assistance. Mr. Scott represented that he earned $3,764.25 in income and $3,000.00 in "income from rental" for 1992, which is the year used in making the calculation. The Department asked repeatedly for verification of their income figures in the form of tax records, payroll stubs, or statements from employers. Mr. Scott, however, worked for his parents, the former owners of the Park. They were asked to provide pay stubs and other verification of his income but did not do so at any time during 1993. Relocating the family was a protracted affair because the family required a four-bedroom mobile home, and such dwellings for rental are scarce. On September 14, 1993, the Department delivered an updated income certification form, since the one that the Petitioner and Mr. Scott had signed in March 1993 had expired. The Petitioner signed that form on September 14, 1993, and Mr. Scott signed it on September 22, 1993. That form indicated that Mr. Scott's income was certified by him as gross wages and salaries equal to $3,764.25. No verification of this income had been provided, however, so the Department calculated the relocation assistance due the family by using the market rental figure of $375.00, plus $202.29 for utilities. The Petitioner and Mr. Scott refused to accept this figure and appealed the determination to the Department's "central office". While their appeal was pending in the Department's process, the Department, at the Petitioner's request, located another four-bedroom mobile home for rent on Beaver Road in Jacksonville, Florida. This was with the assistance of Robert Scott, Mr. William Scott's father. The Department re- calculated the Allen-Scott family relocation assistance eligibility supplement. The re-calculated amount was $6,161.82. That amount was presented to the Petitioner and Mr. Scott, but they refused to accept it. On December 7, 1993, Mr. Bud Eddleman, the Department's Administrator of Relocation Assistance, made his decision concerning the Petitioner's appeal and concluded that the $6,161.82 sum to be correct. On February 17, 1994, the Department received a handwritten note signed by Vivian Scott, William Scott's mother, stating that William Scott had been paid $842.25 in cash in 1992 and was furnished rent in lieu of salary equal to $3,000.00. (See Exhibit 8 in evidence). The Petitioner, thus, took the position that that was the totality of income of the family during the calculation period in question, as that relates to the calculation of the amount of relocation benefits they felt they should receive. The Department takes the position that this verification is not accurate and acceptable for a number of reasons. The Allen-Scott household had numerous possessions that suggested a lifestyle that could not be supported by a discretionary income of $842.25 annually. The family could apparently afford $202.79 per month as an average utility payment. Further, the family acquired a second car during the time period that Department employees were on the premises in the process of making its calculation and appraisal. The family had the funds to acquire and operate two cars, pay the utilities throughout 1993; and their personal property included certain items of antique furniture, at least four televisions, and three videocassette recorders. The Petitioner contended at hearing that Mr. Scott had no income because of the inverse condemnation proceedings because his work had been as a maintenance man for the operating Park. This is irrelevant in the context of relocation assistance, which concept is not designed to include considerations of whether the displacee is rendered unemployed by the taking of the property involved. It is also irrelevant factually because the year in question was 1992, and the relocation of people from the Park could not begin until 1993. Even then, Mr. Scott's maintenance duties would be needed for a certain period of time. Thirdly, there is also evidence that Mr. Scott worked on projects other than those located in the Park, for which he earned income. Mr. Scott did not provide tax returns, pay stubs, bank records, or a statement from his employer (his parents) despite numerous entreaties by the Department to do so. No more defining, verified evidence of the family income was offered at hearing. Accordingly, the income figures which the Petitioner provided are not credible. The family lifestyle and possessions evidence much more income than Mr. Scott would admit. The only evidence produced to verify Mr. Scott's income was sent from his mother some two months after the Department denied the "appeal". The statement is not credible, as Mrs. Scott alleged that in 1992, her son had been paid $842.25 for his work as a maintenance man. Mr. Scott's parents paid another resident of the Park $4,609.92 for performing the same type of work, at the same time. Further, the Petitioner testified inconsistently at hearing regarding income. She said on the one hand that Mr. Scott's parents "took the rent out of his paycheck", and on the other hand, said that he made approximately $127.00 per week as a maintenance man and Mrs. Scott "sometimes wrote him a check" and "would take out, you know, a little bit each week". This testimony demonstrates that, with the other evidence referenced above, the Allen-Scott family has not been forthcoming concerning its income. The totality of the evidence shows that Mr. Scott and his parents, as his employer, the source of the Petitioner's relevant income, had not been acting in good faith. Accordingly, it is reasonable to compute the relocation assistance payments by ignoring the 30 percent factor and instead merely subtracting the old rent and utilities from the new rent and utilities chargeable at the new premises occupied by the Allen- Scott family. The income figures presented by the Petitioner are simply unverified and are not credible. Another candidate for relocation assistance, Kirk Kostenko, a resident of the Park, refused to provide income verification. In his situation, as in that of the Allen-Scott family, represented by the Petitioner, the income figures presented by the Petitioner were not accepted by the Department. In the Kostenko situation, no relocation assistance was paid. While the Petitioner argued and made reference to other families allegedly receiving much larger sums for relocation assistance from the Park, the Petitioner produced no evidence that different standards or criteria were applied in those situations, as opposed to those applied to her family situation involved in the relocation assistance payment question. She adduced no evidence that would demonstrate that the Department had acted in a manner departing from the standards of its rules and procedures or in a manner aberrant from its normal policy in calculating the relocation assistance payments in the manner found above. The relocation assistance program is not a social welfare program based upon actual financial need of a family or based upon the number of dependents involved. Rather, it is a program to compensate persons forced to find replacement housing because the Department acquires their private property, either through eminent domain or inverse condemnation. The assistance is based upon what the family was paying for its rent and utilities and what it would have to pay for them after relocation. The final figure presented and supported by the Department in this proceeding was calculated by applying the regular, accepted criteria set out in the Department's rules, regulations and procedures.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the relocation assistance benefit, which the Department proposes to award the Petitioner in the amount of $6,161.82, is reasonable and should be awarded. The Petition should be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4899 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner presented no discreetly set forth proposed findings of fact. Rather, in essence, the Petitioner's post-hearing "pleading", in letter form, consists essentially of argument concerning the quantity and quality of evidence. Therefore, specific rulings on proposed findings of fact cannot be made. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbers 1-34 are accepted, to the extent consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer. Those proposed findings of fact which are not consistent with those made by the Hearing Officer are rejected as being either not supported by preponderant evidence of record, being irrelevant, immaterial or unnecessary to the resolution of the disputed issues. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Emma Allen 3523-1 Alcoy Road Jacksonville, FL 32221 Thomas H. Duffy, Esq. Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458

Florida Laws (3) 120.57334.044339.09
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs DEREK WELLING, 03-000053PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 08, 2003 Number: 03-000053PL Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue The issues in this matter are whether the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Petitioner) proved that Derek Welling (Respondent) is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and whether Petitioner proved that Respondent is guilty of failing to account and deliver funds in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes; and if so, what is the appropriate discipline?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a licensed realtor and has been at all times material hereto, having been issued license number 0582890 under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. In 1989, Respondent founded UK Realty, a real estate brokerage firm, with his son-in-law, Russell Christner. From 1989 thru the summer of 1996, Respondent primarily served as UK Realty's international sales representative while Mr. Christner served as its qualified broker. Respondent traveled to various trade shows primarily in Europe and encouraged customers to purchase rental properties in the central Florida area. In 1991, Respondent and Mr. Christner formed a short- term rental property management company known as Connoisseur Homes, Inc. (Connoisseur) to manage the rental properties of UK Realty's domestic and international clients. In 1993, Respondent and Christner sold a one-third interest in Connoisseur to Mr. Graham Greene, who immediately became president of Connoisseur and served as its day-to-day operations manager. Although Respondent maintained a one-third ownership in Connoisseur, he remained the company's international sales associate. Respondent was generally not involved in the day-to-day management and operations of Connoisseur and had little personal knowledge of the factual circumstances surrounding the client complaints that form the basis of Petitioner's allegations. Each of the allegations levied against Respondent in Petitioner's Amended Administrative Complaint involves complaints filed by property owners relating to contract services with Connoisseur. There is no evidence in the record that any of the property owners was dissatisfied with the services of Respondent or Connoisseur prior to the summer/fall of 1996. Hart Property In 1994, Michael Hart, a resident of England, engaged the services of UK Realty and purchased a rental home property in Davenport, Florida. Mr. Hart was referred to Mr. Richard Wilkes, a representative of Connoisseur, to manage his property. On May 17, 1995, Mr. Hart contracted with Connoisseur to provide rental management services. Mr. Hart placed an initial deposit with Connoisseur to purchase various items and maintained a $1000 balance in an escrow account to pay the annual taxes and monthly expenses associated with the management of the property. Pursuant to his contract with Connoisseur, Mr. Hart received periodic statements from Connoisseur detailing all moneys collected from tenants, escrow balances, and any other activity in his account. According to the statements Mr. Hart received, Connoisseur booked nine persons to stay in his property between October of 1996 and January of 1997. While Connoisseur received approximately $9,844.60 for these rentals, Mr. Hart received none of the rental proceeds. On or about January 3, 1997, Mr. Hart received notice from the Polk County tax collector indicating that the "tourist development tax" associated with his property was delinquent for the months of September, October, and November of 1996. In addition, the letter indicated that Connoisseur made a payment to Polk County for September 1996 that was returned for insufficient funds. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hart was advised that the cable and electricity to the property had been disconnected for non-payment. Glass Property In May 1993, Mr. Colin Glass purchased a rental home in Davenport, Florida, and contracted with Connoisseur to manage the property. Pursuant to the contract, Connoisseur agreed to advertise and list the property, manage the reservations and timely pay the rental property's expenses. Mr. Glass agreed to receive $500.00 for each week that the property was rented minus a cleaning fee. Pursuant to the contract, Mr. Glass placed a $1000 deposit with Connoisseur to pay the initial maintenance costs associated with the property. Thereafter, Mr. Glass received periodic statements from Connoisseur detailing the funds received, occupancy, and expenses paid to manage his property. The statement for the month ending November 30, 1996, indicates that Connoisseur collected $5,290.00 in rental proceeds from tenants who rented the property between August of 1996 and January of 1997 and paid $110 for cleaning services on November 8 and 21, 1996. In November, 1996, Mr. Glass requested a detailed accounting from Connoisseur regarding his property. On December 6, 1996, Mr. Glass received a written letter on Connoisseur stationary, signed by Kelleen Newman, a Connoisseur employee responsible for preparing accounting statements during the relevant period. The letter advised Mr. Glass that Connoisseur owed Mr. Glass approximately $1,750.00 for payments received pursuant to bookings under the names Beaumont and Tullet. To date, Mr. Glass has not received the rental proceeds. In addition, Connoisseur failed to pay the property tax bill associated with the Glass property as required by the management contract, and it became delinquent. Hamlyn Property On September 22, 1993, John Hamlyn purchased a home in Davenport, Florida. Five months later, on February 22, 1994, Mr. Hamlyn hired Connoisseur to manage his rental property. Pursuant to the contract, Connoisseur agreed to advertise and rent the property, manage the collections, and pay the operational expenses. Mr. Hamlyn placed a $500.00 deposit with Connoisseur to perform the contract and was required to maintain that balance in the account. In November of 1995, Respondent and Connoisseur increased the required escrow balance to $1000.00. In January of 1997, immediately following the demise of Connoisseur, Mr. Hamlyn maintained an escrow account with Connoisseur. Mr. Hamlyn did not receive an accounting of the escrowed funds or a refund of the balance. The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Hart, Mr. Glass, and Mr. Hamlyn each delivered funds in trust to Connoisseur which were not accounted for or returned. The evidence is undisputed that Connoisseur, in 1996, received rental proceeds as agents on behalf of Mr. Hart and Mr. Glass, which were not remitted to the owners. The evidence is undisputed that Connoisseur, in 1996, failed to pay certain utility bills and tax bills as required in its contracts with Mr. Hart and Mr. Glass. Connoisseur's Collapse Connoisseur's operational and financial failure surfaced on September 13, 1996, when Mr. Green, the company's co-owner and day-to-day operations manager, without notice, resigned as President of Connoisseur and formed a competing property management company. To make matters worse, within days, Mr. Green hired key staff away from Connoisseur including Richard Stanton, Connoisseur's office manager, accountant and licensed real estate broker, as well as Dyer Scott, the company's book-keeper. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Green's new company was operational and selectively securing new management agreements with Connoisseur's client list. In response, Respondent immediately evaluated Connoisseur's financial and operational status and attempted to manage its problems. Respondent advised all of Connoisseur's homeowners of the company's status, including the departure of the key operational owner and employees, but tried to assure them that the company was headed in the right direction. In fact, in a news update dated October 15, 1996, Respondent advised all of the clients, including Mr. Hart, Mr. Glass, and Mr. Hamlyn of the following: Upon investigation we were appalled to find that most of our homeowners are waiting on payments and upon further investigation we found that in many cases payment had never been collected from the tour operator. This situation is being corrected immediately and manual invoices are being prepared for collection . . . I'm happy to say that approximately $200,000 in back bookings will be properly allocated to our homeowners this month. Connoisseur did not recover. Within two months, 150 of Connoisseur's 270 homeowners cancelled their management contract with Connoisseur and on January 1, 1997, Respondent sold his interest in Connoisseur to Richard Wilkes and received a total of $15,000.00. Respondent experienced complete financial loss as a result of the demise of Connoisseur. His home was foreclosed and his vehicle was repossessed.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this matter be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Victor L. Chapman, Esquire Barrett, Chapman & Ruta, P.A. 18 Wall Street Post Office Box 3826 Orlando, Florida 32802-3826 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Hurston Building, North Tower 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N809 Orlando, Florida 32801 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Nancy P. Campiglia, Acting Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (8) 120.5720.165455.225475.01475.011475.25721.2095.11
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SADRUDIN AND NURY PREMJI vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 00-000211 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida Jan. 11, 2000 Number: 00-000211 Latest Update: Jan. 09, 2001

The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation, properly denied Petitioners, Sadrudin and Nury Premji, a replacement housing payment, pursuant to Chapter 14-66, Florida Administrative Code, and 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 24.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Transportation, is the state agency which constructs public roadways in the State of Florida. When Respondent acquires land for the construction of federally- assisted roadway projects and takes residential property, Respondent may be required to provide a replacement housing allowance as a part of relocation assistance dictated by state and federal law. Petitioners, Sadrudin and Nury Premji, were the owners of a motel known as the Garden Motor Lodge located in Polk County, Florida, which was condemned in order to construct a federally-assisted road project. The condemnation action resulted in a Stipulated Final Judgement. The Stipulated Final Judgement as to Defendant Karim Motels, Inc., a Florida Corporation d/b/a Garden Lodge Motel f/k/a Red Carpet Inn, entered in Polk County Circuit Court civil action no.: GC-G-98-109, State of Florida, Department of Transportation vs. Karim Motels, Inc., d/b/a Garden Lodge Motel, et al., states, in part: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant, Karim Motels, Inc., a Florida Corporation d/b/a Garden Lodge Motel f/k/a Red Carpet Inn, does have and recover of and from the Petitioner the sum of one million four hundred ninety-one thousand and no/100 dollars ($1,491,000.00) in full settlement of all claims whatsoever, including statutory interest, but excluding attorney's fees, cost and expenses; and it is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this settlement shall be without prejudice to the right of Defendant to claim any applicable benefits to which the Defendant may be entitled under the Petitioner's relocation assistance procedures, as governed by the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act. All relocation claims shall remain separate and apart from this eminent domain action. Defendant shall cooperate with employees and agents of Petitioner by allowing them immediate reasonable access to the property, during business hours, and to assist Petitioner in conducting an inventory of fixtures and personal property (emphasis added). Petitioners had occupied a "manager's residential apartment" in the motel subject to condemnation and met the criteria under Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-66.09 for "carve out" consideration to determine the value of the residential portion relative to the entire taking and relocation assistance eligibility, if appropriate. In December 1997, Respondent's right-of-way specialist, W.P. Kozsey, determined that Petitioners' manager's residential apartment occupied 1,803 square feet of a total of 16,075 of improvements and represented 11 percent of the total improvements. Respondent's initial appraisal for the motel was $740,000. Trade fixtures (value at $34,700) were excluded from the value of the land and improvements. Multiplying the result, $705,300 by 11 percent (residential portion), it was determined that the value of the portion of the motel used by Petitioners for residential purposes was $77,583.00. Respondent determined, through comparable appraisals, that the cost of "decent, safe and sanitary, fundamentally equivalent" "housing in the same geographic area" was $89,000. As a result, Petitioners were entitled to $12,317.00 in "purchase additive payment" (replacement housing payment). The procedure used by Respondent for "carving out" the residential portion of a joint residential/business use follows the methodology set forth in Rule 14.66.009(2)(d) and (e), Florida Administrative Code, and 49 Code of Federal Regulations Sections 24.2, 24.401, and 24.403. Petitioners refused to accept the $12,317.00 in purchase additive payments (replacement housing payment) and proceeded with litigation which resulted in a mediated settlement and the Stipulated Fund Judgement wherein they reserved "the rights to claim any applicable benefits to which the Defendant [Petitioners] may be entitled under Petitioner's [Respondent] relocation assistance procedures " The Stipulated Final Judgement did not allocate value to any elements of the total settlement award and, as a result, Respondent recalculated the residential portion of the total property value by multiplying 11 percent of $1,491,000.00 which gave the residential portion a value of $164,010.00. The new residential value ($164,010.00) exceeded the cost of "decent, safe and sanitary, fundamentally equivalent" housing of $89,000. As a result, the purchase addition payment (replacement housing payment) was reduced to $0.00. Respondent consistently applied this methodology of valuation to other motels with residential "carve outs" and reassessment of purchase additive payments after conclusion of litigation. Petitioners' expert witness, Donald Trask, testified to a valuation basis which, although it provides an enhanced valuation, does not appear to contemplate the methodology set forth in the Florida Administrative Code or the Code of Federal Regulations regarding assessment of the replacement housing cost and determining entitlement to purchase additive payments.

Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter its Final Order denying the claim of Sadrudin and Nury Premji for relocation housing payment and dismissing their claim for same. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFFREY B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Jon E. Tileston, Esquire Moran, Tileston and Simon, P.A. 4012 Gunn Highway, Suite 175 Tampa, Florida 33624 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ELLIOT PINKNEY vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 75-001607 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001607 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1977

Findings Of Fact Negotiations for the purchase of right-of-way property for construction of Interstate Highway 95 in Palm Beach County, Florida, began on May 1, 1973. On that date the Applicant lived in an apartment at 27 S.W. 15th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida with Ms. Willie Hendley, and seven children. The Applicant and Ms. Hendley began living together in approximately 1968. Ms. Hendley had five children at that time. The Applicant and Ms. Hendley had two more children between 1968 and 1973. This residence was located within the highway right-of- way. The Applicant was notified by the Agency that it would be necessary for them to relocate. The applicant, Ms. Hendley, and the seven children moved to a house at 230 N. W. 13th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida, in approximately August, 1973. The Agency found the new living quarters inadequate under the regulations of the Federal Department of Transportation, which require that replacement housing must be decent, safe, and sanitary. An agent of the Agency informed the Applicant that in order to receive relocation benefits, the new residence would need to be made decent, safe, and sanitary, or the family would have to move to a new location that would meet the requirements. Several months after they moved to the house on N.W. 13th Avenue, the Applicant and Willie Hendley separated. The Applicant moved out of the house, and found a home on N. E. 9th Avenue. He anticipated that Ms. Hendley and the children would move into this home, but they did not. The Applicant stayed at this address for approximately one month. He then moved into a room at his sister's home where he stayed until the end of 1975. After they separated, Ms. Hendley and the children moved into a residence at 917 S. W. 3rd Ct., Delray Beach, Florida. This residence met the requirements of the Department of Transportation, and Ms. Hendley received relocation assistance benefits. The Applicant and Ms. Hendley and the seven children were displaced from their residence at 27 S. W. 15th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida, as a result of the acquisition of right-of-way for Interstate Route 95. The Applicant was later displaced from the family household as a result of his separation from Ms. Hendley. There was no evidence offered at the hearing that the Applicant moved into living quarters that were comparable to the quarters at 27 S. W. 15th Avenue. That was a two bedroom apartment. The Applicant moved into a single room. The Applicant's displacement was in effect the result of his separation from Ms. Hendley, rather than the result of the acquisition of right-of-way.

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RICHARD E. KIMBALL vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 81-001162 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001162 Latest Update: May 03, 1982

Findings Of Fact On March 21, 1979, the Department of Transportation began negotiations to acquire real property in Dade County, Florida, for a right-of-way in connection with the expansion of I-95. In October of 1979, representatives of DOT found the Petitioner's trailer on land located on the right-of way. This trailer was not being used as a residence, but was used for storage of feed for horses being raised by the Petitioner. The Petitioner claimed to be occupying the property pursuant to a lease from the owner. The representatives of DOT advised the Petitioner that he must move the trailer off the property, but that he could file a claim for relocation benefits. Subsequently, the Petitioner presented DOT with a claim for the expenses of moving the trailer off the subject property. The Petitioner also submitted a lease dated May 1, 1979, from Henry Milander to the Petitioner, leasing the subject property for a term of two years, in support of his claim to be in lawful possession. This lease, however, was not executed by Henry Milander, but by Michael Manin, whose signature was neither witnessed nor notarized. The Petitioner subsequently submitted a power of attorney executed by Henry Milander to Michael Manin, dated approximately three years prior to the date of the Petitioner's lease. This power of attorney was witnessed, but was not notarized. Neither the lease nor the power of attorney had been recorded on the public records of Dade County. The DOT representatives conducted a title search, and found that the record owner of the subject property was Ruth Milander Tabrah, as trustee of a trust established by Henry Milander in 1955. This trust had not been terminated, and was in existence during the time periods relevant to this proceeding. Thereupon, the DOT advised the Petitioner that his claim for relocation benefits had been disallowed because his occupancy of the subject property was "inconsistent with the rights of the true owner". The Petitioner's request for a formal administrative hearing challenges the determination of DOT that he is not eligible for relocation benefits.

Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of Richard E. Kimball for relocation assistance payments be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 15th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Kimball 18930 S.W. 312 Street Homestead, Florida 33030 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 695.01695.03
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION vs MOUNIR ALBERT EL BEYROUTY, 13-000143PL (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Jan. 11, 2013 Number: 13-000143PL Latest Update: Nov. 25, 2013

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Real Estate Commission should discipline the Respondent, Mounir Albert El Beyrouty, on charges that he failed to deliver rental proceeds, was dishonest in his dealings regarding the rental property, failed to escrow rental deposits and proceeds, and failed to properly reconcile his escrow account.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mounir Albert El Beyrouty, is licensed as a real estate broker in Florida, having been issued license no. BK 596936. He is the qualifying broker for Intermab, Inc., d/b/a Byblos Beach Realty. Acting through the real estate brokerage he qualified, Intermab, Inc., the Respondent orally agreed with Virginia Covington to manage apartment Unit 1-E, Redington Tower 3, located at 17940 Gulf Boulevard in Redington Shores, Florida. Initially, Covington, who is a federal district judge, was the personal representative and sole beneficiary of her mother's estate, which owned the unit; after probate, Judge Covington became the owner of the unit. The Respondent and Judge Covington agreed orally that the Respondent would try to lease the apartment on an annual basis at a lease rate of $850 per month, less a 15 percent commission to the Respondent. Although the Respondent was unable to secure such a lease, he intentionally misled Judge Covington to think there was such a lease and, in January 2008, began paying her $722.50 per month by check drawn on his brokerage operating account. He did this because he wanted her to think highly of his abilities as a real estate broker in the hopes that she would retain him to list the property when she decided to sell. Not long after he began sending monthly checks, the Respondent told Judge Covington that a leak in the kitchen sink should be repaired and a stained mattress should be replaced. He got her permission, took care of both items, and was reimbursed. However, he perceived that Judge Covington did not want to put additional money into the apartment unnecessarily and decided to avoid these kinds of conversations and dealings with her. Instead, he began to expend his own funds to maintain and upgrade the property as he saw fit without telling her. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for six weeks during February and March 2008. He collected a $500 security deposit and $5,250 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. In April 2008, the Respondent allowed friends to stay in Judge Covington's apartment free of charge and without paying a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington, rationalizing that he was paying her the $722.50 per month she thought was her share of the annual lease payments. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for January, February, and March 2009. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for January, February and March 2010. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. In July 2010, the Respondent was able to lease the apartment for a year at a monthly rent of $1,300. He also collected a $1,000 security deposit. He deposited this money in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. In November 2010, Judge Covington told the Respondent to tell the tenant she wanted to increase the annual lease rate to $935 a month. The Respondent continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month and told her that he would advise the supposed tenant of the rent increase. Instead, he kept collecting $1,300 a month from the tenant and began paying Judge Covington $794.75 a month (the $935, less a 15 percent commission). He did not tell her there actually was an annual lease for $1,300 a month. The $1,300 annual lease was not renewed in July 2011. The Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $794.75 a month and to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $935 a month. In about June 2011, Judge Covington decided to sell her apartment. As the Respondent hoped and planned, she listed it with his brokerage. Judge Covington asked the Respondent to notify the supposed annual tenant, who she believed had been living in the apartment since December 2007, to make sure the tenant would be agreeable to a month-to-month lease during their efforts to sell. The Respondent continued to lead Judge Covington to believe there was such an annual tenant and assured her that he would be able to convince the tenant to cooperate with her plan to sell. From August 29 through October 5, 2011, the Respondent allowed friends to stay in Judge Covington's apartment free of charge and without paying a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington, rationalizing that he was paying her the $794.75 per month she thought was her share of the annual lease payments. In November and December 2011, the Respondent rented Judge Covington's apartment to the sister of the court clerk for $850 a month without requiring a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington about this rental. The Respondent secured paying tenants for the apartment for February, March and April 2012. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $794.75 a month and led her to believe there was an annual lease for $935 a month. Despite several price reductions, the Respondent was unable to sell the apartment, and Judge Covington decided to switch selling brokers. In February 2012, she signed a listing agreement with another real estate broker. Later in February 2012, a real estate salesperson showed Judge Covington's apartment to a prospective purchaser. Upon questioning, an older woman told the salesperson that they were paying $3,000 a month in rent. The Respondent told the salesperson to disregard the information because the woman was not thinking straight, or words to that effect, because her husband had been ill. He also told her that the woman's son was actually paying the rent. The salesperson related this information to Judge Covington and also told her that she noticed that the residents were not the same people she happened to see in the apartment on one occasion in February 2012. Upon receiving this information, Judge Covington became suspicious that the Respondent had been dishonest and misleading her. She contacted the State Attorney's Office and the Division regarding the process for filing a complaint against the Respondent. She also arranged for a meeting with the Respondent. When she met with the Respondent, she brought a forensic accountant to review the Respondent's records. The Respondent told them he was sorry that Judge Covington was upset with him, but that he did not owe her any money--to the contrary, that she owed him money. However, he told them he was being audited by the Division and was unable to provide supporting documentation. At the final hearing, the Respondent provided a ledger to support his position that all the rent he collected belonged to him alone because Judge Covington owed him money throughout his dealings with her due to his payments to her, regardless whether her apartment was rented, and the money he spent to maintain and improve the apartment. (This was an after-the-fact justification for his failure to deposit any security deposits or rental payments into his escrow account when, in fact, he did not do so because he did not know it was required.) There is reason to believe that the ledger is not entirely accurate. For example, the Respondent omitted rent collected from at least one occupant of the apartment. It also does not account for the times the Respondent allowed friends and relatives to stay there free of charge, essentially acting as if he owned the apartment. Although the Respondent's testimony regarding the money he paid to maintain and improve the apartment is accepted, his failure to timely apprise Judge Covington regarding those expenditures makes it difficult to be certain about it. Finally, even accepting the ledger at face value, it shows that there were times when the Respondent owed Judge Covington, and not vice-versa. The Division attempted to make a case that the Respondent intended to and attempted to steal rental proceeds. It is unlikely that the Respondent actually targeted a federal judge to victimize in that way. It is more likely that the Respondent was attempting to impress Judge Covington with his skill and expertise as a real estate broker and, ultimately, to be rewarded with the listing on the property when it was sold. In so doing, the Respondent flagrantly violated several laws and rules regarding his professional responsibilities as a licensed Florida real estate broker. Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker for many years and depends on his license to make a living to support himself and his family. He has no prior disciplinary record. However, it has become known in this case that, over the years, he consistently has failed to use his escrow account for rental deposits and proceeds because he did not know it was required.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty as charged; fining him $2,000; suspending his license for one year; and placing him on probation for a suitable period of time and upon suitable conditions. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 2013.

Florida Laws (2) 475.021475.25
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RICHARD S. AND JANE E. LIMEGROVER vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 76-000383 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000383 Latest Update: Oct. 20, 1976

The Issue Whether applicant is eligible for relocation assistance monetary benefits pursuant to Public Law 91-646 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Although notice of hearing was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Limegrover on March 26, 1976, they did not appear at the time of hearing. Upon telephonic inquiry on June 8th by a representative of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Limegrover advised that he had received the notice and although he had intended to call the Department of Transportation concerning the matter, he had forgotten to do so. He stated that he desired a continuance of the case. His request was objected to by counsel for the Department of Transportation. The request for continuance was denied as being untimely and good cause not having been shown therefor. The hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.

Findings Of Fact By letter of October 20, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Limegrover of Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park, Hialeah Gardens, Florida, were advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that it was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for State Road #25 (U.S. 27) in their area, and that the mobile home lot the Limegrovers occupied as tenants would be required for construction of the facility. The letter provided the Department's assurance that they would not be required to move until at least 90 days had elapsed from the date of receipt of the letter, and that they would receive a further notice specifying the actual date by which the property must be vacated at least 30 days prior to the date specified. The letter concluded by an expression of the Department's desire to assist in relocation and to answer any questions concerning such matters. On December 8, 1975, a further letter was sent to the Limegrovers by the Department of Transportation assuring the addressees that the prior letter had not been a notice to move and that no one at the Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park would be required to move until negotiations with the owner had been completed or monies placed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County by court order. It further stated that in the interim period relocatees living within Courtly Manors who were eligible and decided to move on their own initiative would be assisted by the Department in their relocation. Limegrover called Mr. Carl Moon, Right-of-Way Agent, Department of Transportation, Ft. Lauderdale, on December 11, requesting assistance in arrangements for moving his mobile home. Moon discovered that Limegrover wanted to move before January 1, 1976, as he had reserved a lot in another mobile home park. However, Limegrover told him that when he advised his current landlord on December 11 of the projected move on December 30, the landlord stated that in the absence of 30 days notice, Limegrover must forfeit his $90.00 security deposit. Limegrover told Moon that he felt the Department of Transportation should pay the $90.00 security deposit since he was being forced to move by that agency. Moon told him that he was not required to move that soon, but Limegrover was unwilling to wait, fearing that he would not be able to find a satisfactory place later on. Accordingly, Moon assisted him in his moving arrangements and Limegrover was paid for his moving expenses in the amount of $640.00 and smaller sums for reinstallation of his telephone and disconnection and reconnection of his gas equipment. Inasmuch as the Department of transportation declined to pay the $90.00 representing alleged forfeiture of the security deposit, Limegrover filed this relocation appeal. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibits 1 & 2).

Recommendation That the appeal of Richard and Jane Limegrover, in the amount of $90.00, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida Richard S. and Jane E. Limegrover Lot F4, Haven Lakes Mobile Home Park 11201 S.W. 55th Street Miramar, Florida 33025

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JOSEPH GRAINGER, SHELLY GRAINGER, AND CHRISTOPHER GRAINGER vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 90-005157RP (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 17, 1990 Number: 90-005157RP Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioners', Joseph and Shelly Grainger, are husband and wife. They have one five year old son, Christopher Grainger. Joseph Grainger is the primary wage-earner for the family. At present, Joseph Grainger is unemployed due to a back problem. His previous employment was with a parcel shipping company. Due to his unemployment, Mr.Grainger is receiving approximately $653.00 a month in unemployment benefits. He will receive unemployment benefits until December, 1990, when his unemployment benefits terminate. As a recipient of unemployment benefits, Mr. Grainger must actively seek employment and is considered to be employable by the State. Proposed Rule 10C-1.11 Florida Administrative Code, implements federal and State law requiring the Department to furnish Aid to Families with Dependent children to indigent families whose principal wage-earner is unemployed (AFDC- UP). The law and the proposed Rule require the principal wage-earner to participate in the Job opportunities and Basic Skills program (JOBS). Florida has mandated that the spouse of the principal wage-earner also participate in the JOBS program, if funds are available. For AFDC-UP purposes, the Graingers constitute a three person assistance group. The assistance group determines the amount of benefits an applicant1 may receive if the applicant qualifies under the myriad eligibility requirements of the AFDC-UP program. The assistance group also sets the amount of income an assistance group may not exceed and still qualify for AFDC-UP. In this case, the Graingers' income limit is $294.00. Clearly, because of the amount of unemployment benefits Mr. Grainger is receiving, the Graingers do not now qualify for AFDC benefits and are not now receiving AFDC benefits which will be impacted by the proposed Rule. Since the Graingers are not now qualified for the AFDC-UP program and Mr. Grainger is employable, they have not established that they will suffer an injury from the proposed Rule's implementation of sufficient immediacy to entitle them to a hearing under s 120.54, Florida Statutes. See Agrico Chemical v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045, (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerrv, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); and Village Park Mobile Home Association v. State Department of Business Regulation, 506 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Accordingly, the Graingers do not have standing to challenge the proposed rule. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions Of Law and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, IT IS ORDERED that the Petitions filed in Case Nos. 90-5157RP and 5158R are dismissed and the Division's files closed. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANA CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Cindy Huddleston Florida Legal Services, Inc. 2121 Delta Way Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Scott LaRue Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code The Capitol, Room 1802 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

Florida Laws (2) 120.54120.68
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