Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Albert E. Pastorini, is a registered real estate salesman and works out of the office of Elanor Hollis, a registered real estate broker trading under the name of Hollis Real Estate. Under the stationary of Hollis Real Estate, the Respondent Pastorini offered eleven separate parcels of realty to Palm Beach County as offerings under their $50 million parks and recreation land acquisition program. One of those parcels was designated, for purposes of this hearing, as the Schine property. Schine Enterprises, Inc. is a landowner in Palm Beach County with ocean front properties. Mr. Howard P. Miller is an employee of Schine Enterprises and is also a registered real estate broker. Mr. Miller testified that he has had contact with the Respondent, Pastorini, for quite some time and has on repeated occasions told him that the Schine property was not available for sale and that no listings were available. Mr. Miller testified he learned early in 1975 that the 27 acre Schine property had been offered to the county for consideration under the bond program. Miller testified that he learned this property had been offered by Pastorini but that he had never given Mr. Pastorini authorization to do so. Miller also testified that some time in April, 1975, Ms. Hollis and Mr. Pastorini came to his office at his request and he informed Mr. Pastorini in no uncertain terms that he had no authorization to list the property. Mr. Pastorini, according to Mr. Miller, stated that Mr. Miller had given him a verbal listing which Miller denied. When the county began reviewing the offerings of property, they became aware that some of these offerings had not been authorized by the owners and so they therefore by letter, requested all brokers and salesmen that had submitted offerings to demonstrate proper authorization from the owners or else the county would purge these offerings from their list of available properties. Of the eleven offerings that Pastorini submitted to the county, he was able only to produce two authorizations; one for thirty days and the other for an open listing. No evidence was presented regarding any activities on behalf of Elanor Hollis, the other Respondent.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioners are entitled to recover against the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund and, if so, the priority of payment to be applied to their claim. A secondary issue is whether claimants who gave notice prior to Petitioners are entitled to payment or whether they have waived or abandoned their claims.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations filed by the parties and the documentary evidence, I make the following findings of fact: The Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (the "fund") was created in 1977 to provide recovery for any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. The Department is charged to disburse the fund according to Section 494.044, Florida Statutes. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, (Supp.1986) provides: Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund if: The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction in any action wherein the cause of action was based on s. 494.042(2); The person has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment can be found or that the amount realized on the sale of the judgment debtor's property pursuant to such execution was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property of other assets subject to being sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and by his search he has discovered no property or assets or he has discovered property and assets and has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the application thereof to the judgment, but the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has applied any amounts recovered from the judgment debtor, or from any other source, to the damages awarded by the court. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause; and The act for which recovery is sought occurred on or after September 1, 1977. Recovery of the increased benefits allowable pursuant to the amendments to s. 494.044 which are effective October 1, 1985, shall be based on a cause of action which arose on or after that date. The requirements of paragraphs (1)(a),(b),(c),(d), and (e) are not applicable if the licensee or registrant upon which the claim is sought has filed for bankruptcy or has been adjudicated bankruptcy; however, in such event the claimant shall file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings and shall notify the department by certified mail of the claim by enclosing a copy of the proof of claim and all supporting documents. Pertinent to this case, Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1986) Provides: Any Person who meets all of the conditions Prescribed in s 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages. As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recovery from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate, in an amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages, with claims being paid in the order notice is received until the $100,000 aggregate has been fully disbursed. * * * (3) Payments for claims shall be limited in the aggregate to $100,000, regardless of the number of claimants involved, against any one mortgage broker or registrant. If the total claims exceed the aggregate limit of $100,000, the department shall prorate the payment based on the ratio that the person's claim bears to the total claims filed. The first notice received by the Department alleging a claim against Barry Koltun or Oakland Mortgage Company was filed on August 13, 1984. This notice was filed on behalf of John and Mary Ahern. The Department utilized this notice in computing the two-year period addressed in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes. For purposes of recovery from the fund, the individual mortgage broker (Koltun) and the company qualified by the broker (Oakland) are treated as one. Petitioners filed an initial notice of their claim against the fund on October 16, 1985. This claim was asserted against Oakland Mortgage Company, Barry Koltun and Robert Tamarro. On January 23, 1987, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Grant or Deny Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund Re Oakland Mortgage Company." This notice outlined the status of some thirteen claims which had given notice of their civil actions against the licensee within the two year period. Two claimants, Kusich and Szafran, had provided all documentation required by Section 494.043, Florida Statutes; consequently, they were approved for payment. The Petitioner's claim was denied because they had allegedly failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes and had failed to do so prior to August 12, 1986 (the end of the two year period). The Petitioners timely filed a petition for formal Chapter 120 proceedings challenging the Department's denial of their claim for payment. Subsequent to January 23, 1987, Petitioners completed the conditions precedent for recovery and submitted all documentation required to satisfy the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. On July 6, 1987, the Department received notice and a claim from the Intervenors. This claim satisfied the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. Of the thirteen original claims filed, only two claimants (Kusich and Szafran) completed all conditions of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, on or before August 12, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order finding the claims of Rusich and Szafran eligible for payment, and that the claim of Petitioners be evaluated as part of the second class established in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes, DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Zeigler, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. Suite 1010, Monroe Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance Suite 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Joseph Degance, Esquire 1995 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Jack F. Weins, Esquire Boca Bank Building Suite 200 855 South Federal Highway Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Morey Udine, Esquire 3111 University Drive Suite 425 Coral Springs, Florida 32065-6930 Hon. Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc. was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0218821 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate. Respondent Elliot Rosen held real estate broker's license number 0075258 issued by petitioner and was the qualifying officer of Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc. Respondents Stanleigh M. Franklin and Maria C. Franklin were licensed real estate salesmen in Rosen's office having been issued license numbers 0318042 and 0370308, respectively. The firm is located at 8120 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155. On an undisclosed date Robert W. and Carol A. Bush listed for sale with Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc., a residential property located at 8295 Southwest 153rd Street, Miami. The initial asking price was $119,000, but this was later reduced to $112,000. In April 1984, Joseph and Maria Yanes were in the process of selling their home and were consequently seeking to purchase a new residence. Both are educated persons, and Mr. Yanes has a college degree. Mr. Yanes read a real estate advertisement which advertised the Bush's property. They contacted Rosen Realty, Inc. and spoke with Maria Franklin. After inspecting the house with Maria, the Franklins met with the Yanes on April 15, 1985, for the purpose of preparing and executing an offer to purchase the house. Joseph Yanes made clear to Stanleigh Franklin that his primary concern was obtaining a mortgage with monthly payments that did not exceed $1000 per month. Otherwise, he would not be able to purchase the property. Stanleigh was familiar with a new mortgage loan program offered by a local lender (American International Mortgage Company) known as the "7.5 magnet mortgage" which offered a monthly payment for the first three years at a 7.5 percent interest rate. Stanleigh computed the principal and interest payments under this plan to be $711.55 per month. When estimated taxes and insurance were added in the total payment came to approximately $850 per month. He also advised that a mortgage insurance premium would be charged each month, which he estimated to be $50 to $60 per month. This still totaled less than the $960 or $970 which the Yanes stated their existing mortgage to be. The Yanes were told that because of the low interest rate (7.5 percent) during the first 36 months, there would be negative amortization during that period of time. In other words, the principal amount owed would actually increase rather than decrease during the first three years since interest on the note was accruing at a higher rate (13 percent). Finally, Franklin advised the Yanes that a 5 percent down payment was required with this type of mortgage and that their deposit should equal this amount to qualify for the loan. The Yanes did not indicate any dissatisfaction with this type of financing, or that they did not understand how the plan worked, particularly with respect to the negative amortization. They agreed to make an offer of $107,000 on the property, to give a $500 deposit that day, and an additional $4850 later on which equated to 5 percent of the purchase price. The contract itself made no reference to the 7.5 percent financing, but provided only that the buyers would obtain a new first mortgage for the balance owed on the $107,000 purchase price. Throughout these negotiations, there was no misrepresentation of facts by Franklin concerning the mortgage or amount of deposit required. The Yanes' offer was quickly presented by the Franklins to the sellers who accepted the offer within the next few days. The Yanes then gave an additional $4850 deposit around May 1 which was deposited in Rosen's escrow account. On May 7, they filed a loan application with American International Mortgage Company and gave a check in the amount of $185 to have an appraisal made and a credit report prepared. At that time, the loan officer explained to Joseph Yanes in detail how the magnet mortgage program worked and that there would be negative amortization under this plan. The meeting lasted for an hour and a half and Yanes did not express surprise at how the mortgage worked, or that he did not understand its concept. An appraisal was then made, and a credit check run on Mr. Yanes. However, the lender was unable to confirm any credit information on Mrs. Yanes because her employer refused to return the employment verification form. On June 20, 1984, the lender sent a denial notice to the Yanes because of its inability to obtain information regarding Mrs. Yanes. The Yanes made no other efforts to obtain financing on the property. After they executed the contract to purchase, the Yanes engaged counsel in early May to represent them at closing. Their attorney (Lisa Wilson) called all pertinent parties, including the Franklins and Rosen to learn the details of the mortgage. After having the details explained to them again, the Yanes advised counsel that they wished to cancel the contract. On May 23, 1984, Wilson sent a certified letter to Stanleigh Franklin advising that because the financing arrangements had been misrepresented to her clients they were cancelling the contract. She also demanded a return of their deposit plus interest. Just prior to the receipt of the certified letter, Joseph Yanes also telephoned Stanleigh Franklin and demanded a return of his deposit. This was the first time Franklin suspected the deal had gone awry. Shortly after this, the Yanes contacted petitioner to file a complaint against respondents. When Mr. Bush learned that the Yanes were not honoring the contract, upon advice of counsel, Bush made a claim on the $5,350 deposit for breach of contract. Faced with conflicting demands for the deposit, Rosen contacted petitioner to determine how the deposit should be disbursed. The matter was eventually referred by petitioner to its local office in Miami for investigation in October 1984. On November 27, 1984, counsel for petitioner advised Rosen that because of the pending complaint of the Yanes, petitioner could not issue an escrow disbursement order. However, he was told of the remaining two alternatives for resolving the dispute prescribed in Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. A complaint for interpleader was later filed in circuit court by agreement of counsel for the Yanes, Bush, and Rosen. That complaint is still pending. Rosen, as broker, was never personally involved in the transaction until a complaint with petitioner was filed. He stood to gain no commission on the sale since the Franklins were working on a "100 percent basis" and were to receive the entire commission. Rosen has been licensed for some thirty-one years and has had no prior disciplinary action in all that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1985.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Bangert was a licensed real estate salesman with State of Florida license number 0312002. On or about May 1, 1986, Cynthia Green (now Cynthia Tyson) listed her house at 408 Lakeview Drive, Altamonte Springs, Florida, under an exclusive right of sale contract with J. Scott Jones, a licensed real estate broker. Through his broker, Help U. Sell (Thomas Jafek and Thomas Jafek II), Bangert offered $64,900.00 to Ms. Tyson for the Lakeview house. The contract for sale offered a $1,000.00 deposit note, with two mortgages, including a balloon mortgage, payment of $3,000.00 fix-up costs by the seller, and cash to the seller at closing in the amount of $15,659.00 The offer was rejected by Ms. Tyson. J. Scott Jones negotiated over the telephone with Thomas Jafek II, and then with Bangert. The basic requirement of Ms. Tyson was that she wanted $50,000.00 net at closing. She also wanted a cash deposit, as she had a previous negative experience with a deposit note. J. Scott Jones does not recall that he told Bangert that a cash deposit was required, but he knows the issue came up sometime during the telephone discussion. He did not speak to both Jafek and Bangert at the same time. A second contract offer was signed by Bangert and was accepted by Ms. Tyson on August 30, 1986. The purchase price and method of payment was set out as follows: PURCHASE PRICE $ 68,500.00 PAYMENT: Deposit(s) to be held in escrow by Help-U-Sell of College Park, upon acceptance in the amount of $ 1,000.00 Subject to AND [sic] assumption of Mortgage in good standing in favor of To Be Obtained having an approximate present principal balance of $ 40,000.00 Purchase money mortgage and note bearing interest at 9 percent on terms set forth herein below, in the principal amount of 360 payments of 189.10 to Balloon at 60th mo. $ 23,500.00 Other Purchase Money Mortgage @ 10 percent in a single payment at 60th mo. $ 5,000.00 Balance to close (U.S. cash, LOCALLY DRAWN certified or cashier's check), subject to adjustments and prorations $ 68,500.00 (Petitioner's Exhibit #4) The Contract also provided for the $50,000.00 net at closing to the seller. Bangert gave Thomas Jafek a deposit note in the amount of $1,000.00. Jafek did not know how to put a note in a trust or escrow account, so he held it in his files at Help U. Sell. Jafek had dealt with Bangert before in real estate transactions and had acted before as the escrow agent. In those dealings Bangert only put down notes, never cash. Jafek understood that Bangert's role was as a principal buyer and that Bangert intended to assign the contract for sale. The transaction was initially scheduled to close on September 26, 1987. On September 30, 1986, the parties agreed to extend the closing until October 10, 1986. When J. Scott Jones met with Bangert to get the extension signed, he learned that a note, rather than cash deposit had been made. The transaction never closed. For reasons that are not material to this proceeding, Bangert did not appear at the closing. Cynthia Tyson retained an attorney, Garrick N. Fox, who sent letters to Jafek and to Bangert on October 17, 1986. The letter to Jafek provides, in pertinent part: As per the contract for sale and purchase, your company holds one thousand dollars in escrow and we may [sic) hereby make demand that you remit to this law office the one thousand dollars held in escrow as partial damages for the default of the contract. (Petitioner's Exhibit #6) The letter to Bangert does not mention the deposit, but states that the contract is in default. The final paragraph states: It is my sincere desire that we can settle this matter amicably without the necessity of litigation. If you can close on this contract forthwith, all of these problems can be settled. If not I would appreciate it if you would have your attorney contact [sic] so that we can immediately take the proper steps to minimize Miss Green's damages. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7) The attorney never made an oral demand on Bangert for the $1000.00. Jafek did not consider his letter to be a present demand, but rather a statement of intent to make a demand in the future. Jafek did not tender the note and the $1000.00 was not paid. Bangert had no intent to make a cash deposit. He claims that he told "Tom Jr." " (Thomas Jafek II) to type "a deposit note" on the second contract offer, but that even without that language, a note, rather than cash, was not precluded by the contract terms. Bangert intended that the transaction take place and did not have an intent or motive to defraud the seller. If the transaction had closed, he claims he would have honored the note. As far as he knows, Jafek still has the note. Bangert claims also that it was an oversight that he did not reveal his real estate license status on the contract. The Jafeks knew he was a real estate salesman. Further, he and Scott Jones were teaching at the same real estate school and he felt that Jones should have known his status. He did not intend to hide the fact of his license from anyone. His business in the last three years has been actively serving as a principal buyer and seller for other parties. Bangert's liability on his note is not at issue. In the absence of clear evidence of his knowledge of the seller's conditions, I cannot find that he is guilty of fraud in putting a note cash on deposit. Nor did he deliberately misrepresent a material fact to the seller by failing to disclose that he was a licensed real estate salesman. Ms. Tyson never met Bangert. Both parties were dealing at arms length through their own brokers. Conclusions of Law The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. and Section 455.225(4) F.S. Section 475.25(1) F.S. provides that the Florida Real Estate Commission may impose discipline if it finds that a licensee, (b) Has been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction... DPR has the burden of proving the allegations of this complaint through evidence that is clear and convincing. Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2nd 292 (Fla. 1987). It is apparent now that Ms. Tyson wanted a cash deposit as one condition of accepting an offer to buy her property. It is not clear that the condition was communicated to Bangert by either his broker, Thomas Jafek, II, or by Ms. Tyson's broker, J. Scott Jones. Without this material evidence it cannot be established that Bangert deliberately engaged in a subterfuge. Without evidence of dishonest or illicit intent, there is no guilt under Section 475.25(1)(b), F.S. Morris v. Department of Professional Regulation 474 So.2nd 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). No rule nor provision of law has been cited to require a real estate licensee to reveal his status as such when engaging in the purchase and sale of property in his personal capacity. Nor was evidence produced that would establish and justify such a policy by the Board. In Santaniello v. Department of Professional Regulation 432 So.2nd 84 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983), the court upheld the Board's right to determine that a broker violated Section 475.25(1)(b) F.S. when he failed to reveal that a purchaser was his mother-in- law. In that case, the court observed that the broker owed his allegiance to the sellers and was obligated to inform them of anything which might influence their decision to sell. Because of that, the existence of the mother-in-law relationship was deemed a material fact. No such foundation for a duty to inform was established here, therefore there was no violation of section 475.25(1)(b) F.S.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against Larry G. Bangert be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3044 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Petitioner. Adopted in paragraph #1. Adopted in paragraph #2. Adopted in substance in paragraphs #3 and #4. Adopted in substance in paragraph #4. Evidence did not establish that Bangert was aware of the cash deposit condition by Ms. Tyson. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The face of the contract does not require cash. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in paragraph #8. Adopted in paragraph #6. Adopted in substance in paragraph #7. Adopted in paragraph #11. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in part in paragraph #10. Bangert contended that the contract did not specify cash. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in paragraph #9. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Copies furnished: DOAH Case No. 87-3044 James R. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32802 Larry G. Bangert 103 Cashew Court Longwood, Florida 32750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the licensure and real estate brokerage and sales practice standards embodied in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is a licensed real estate broker, licensed under that chapter. The Respondent, Keith Ellis, while engaged in the business of real estate development, entered into a contract whereby he would purchase a parcel of land adjacent to U.S. Highway 90, the "Scenic Highway," in Pensacola, Florida. That agreement was entered into in February, 1985, with the Respondent's purpose being to commence development of the property, consisting of eight residential lots, into a single-family residential subdivision. Mr. Ellis, in embarking upon his development plan, after entering into the contract for purchase of the subject lots, found that he lacked capital necessary to finance construction of certain infrastructure for the subdivision. He sought additional funding and ultimately was referred to Robert Tegenkamp as a potential investor. He entered into discussions with Mr. Tegenkamp and ultimately the two agreed that Tegenkamp would invest $25,000 in the project. In return, as consideration, Mr. Ellis agreed to repay the $25,000 investment to Tegenkamp within six months. He also agreed to pay Tegenkamp a $25,000 profit within twelve months. He prepared a written agreement to that effect, executed March 1, 1985. The Respondent also proposed to give Mr. Tegenkamp an option on one lot, Lot Number 8, in the planned subdivision, as further consideration for Tegenkamp investing the necessary capital. This option was executed February 28, 1985. The subdivision totaled eight lots, all of equal value, as established by the opinion of the Respondent himself, who is experienced in appraising real estate, and by M. Eugene Presley, a licensed M.A.I. appraiser. It was the intent of both Ellis and Tegenkamp, at the time of the signing of the agreement, that Ellis would seek to sell all the eight lots, including the lot on which Tegenkamp held an option. Both those parties also understood that Tegenkamp could not be repaid unless the lots were sold. Tegenkamp had no desire to take title to any lot in the subdivision and understood from the outset that he would be entitled to Lot 8, (or any lot), only if Ellis was otherwise unable to repay him. The Respondent arbitrarily chose to indicate Lot 8 on the option contract, but Tegenkamp had no special desire to acquire any interest in that particular lot. The true intent of the parties was simply that Tegenkamp have an option on a lot in the subdivision to secure him, in the event the debt was not repaid by Ellis. In view of the fact that the value of each lot was identical, it did not matter to Tegenkamp on which lot he had an "option," or other form of security interest. He never expected to get title to a lot and was never told that he would, by the Respondent or any other person. The Respondent has always acknowledged that he owes the money in question to Mr. Tegenkamp and that he was obligated under the "option" to convey one of the lots to Tegenkamp, if he could not repay him. Ellis borrowed the funds for acquisition of the property, and for coverage of most development costs, from the First National Bank of Escambia County. Before the agreements between Ellis and Tegenkamp were signed, he told Mr. Tegenkamp, who also did his banking business at the same bank, of the bank's involvement in financing the project. The Respondent suggested that Tegenkamp contact the loan officers involved to reveal his interest in the project. This Tegenkamp failed to do, nor did he ever record his option agreement. Consequently, the bank acquired a first priority lien on the eight lots by the execution and recording of the mortgage from Ellis to the bank, for financing the purchase, installation of the infrastructure and payment of other development costs. When Mr. Ellis obtained the $25,000 capital from Mr. Tegenkamp, he proceeded with his development plans. He negotiated a sale of all the lots in the subdivision to Ray Lemon, a general contractor. On May 10, 1985, he entered into a written sales contract with Mr. Lemon as to all eight lots. This contract required Ellis to proceed to complete all improvements, such as paving and drainage provisions, as well as to obtain approval of the plat of the subdivision by the City of Pensacola. Mr. Ellis informed Mr. Tegenkamp of this agreement with Mr. Lemon. Thereafter, on May 28, 1985, Mr. Ellis closed the loan with First National Bank of Escambia County, giving that bank a first priority mortgage lien on the entire subdivision. Shortly thereafter, the plat of the subdivision was accepted by the City of Pensacola. Most of the improvements installed by Ellis were complete by late July, 1985. Mr. Lemon then indicated to Ellis that he was having financial difficulties and needed to delay the closing of his purchase of the eight lots. If Lemon had been able to complete his planned purchase of all eight lots on time, Mr. Ellis could have paid Tegenkamp the agreed upon $50,000 and still netted about $10,000 profit himself. In any event, shortly after Ellis learned of the delayed Lemon closing, he was approached by Dr. and Mrs. Tousignant, who were interested in purchasing Lots 7 and 8. Dr. Tousignant owned a neighboring parcel of property and wanted to preserve his view of Escambia Bay by acquiring ownership of Lots 7 and 8. The Respondent obtained Mr. Lemon's approval to sell Lots 7 and 8 to the Tousignants and also informed Mr. Tegenkamp of the proposed sale to the Dr. and his wife, as Mr. Tegenkamp himself admitted. Mr. Tegenkamp approved of Ellis selling the lots in question, and on August 25, 1985, Ellis entered into a written agreement to sell Lots 7 and 8 to the Tousignants. The sale was closed on September 17, 1985, but did not produce enough money for Ellis to pay off Tegenkamp. Tegenkamp had not demanded payment at this time anyway and the final time limit for repayment had not elapsed. Thereafter, Ray Lemon encountered more financial problems and for several months was unable to close the planned purchase of the remaining six lots. Eventually, Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 were sold to Ray Lemon and K. C. Hembree. These closings took place between January and March, 1986. The sales did not produce enough funds to pay off Tegenkamp because of development expenses which had to be covered, mortgage release amounts and interest attributable to each lot, which had to be paid to the bank holding the first mortgage. The Respondent thus retained ownership of only Lots 1 and 2 by the end of March, 1986. His ownership of these two lots was subject to the first mortgage to the bank, the principal balance of which remained at approximately $20,600. That mortgage was subsequently assigned to Ray Lemon who had payed off the bank. Lemon now holds that mortgage. The Respondent has attempted, without success, to sell the remaining two lots. Because of economic conditions prevailing, the value of each of the two remaining lots declined from an estimated $59,000 in March, 1985, to about $50,000 by April, 1986. Because Ellis did not timely pay the $25,000 required by the original agreement, Mr. Tegenkamp retained an attorney to represent him in seeking repayment. Attorney Miles Davis entered into various discussions with Ellis from November, 1985 through April, 1986. In December, 1985, Ellis had proposed to Davis that he deliver to Tegenkamp a quit claim deed conveying his interest in Lot 1 to Tegenkamp. Ellis could not give a warranty deed because title was then encumbered by the above-mentioned mortgage held by Lemon, as assignee of the bank, and because of a potential claim of lien by the paving contractor for $7,000 to $8,000. The contractor since failed to pursue and perfect his claim of lien. In February, 1986, Attorney Davis wrote to Ellis expressing a willingness to accept a quit claim deed on behalf of Tegenkamp. In April, 1986, Ellis delivered the quit claim deed to Davis, conveying his interest in Lot 1 to Tegenkamp. It was recorded in the public records of Escambia County. Davis then filed a civil suit against Ellis in May, 1986, on behalf of Tegenkamp. The parties since arrived at a settlement of that litigation whereby Tegenkamp is to receive approximately $25,000 and Lot 1 will be re-conveyed to Ellis. Tegenkamp's attorney, Miles Davis, testified that Ellis never denied owing the money to his client and every indication was that the Respondent was trying to sell the property as soon as possible to pay his obligation to Tegenkamp. Mr. Tegenkamp himself testified and acknowledged that the Respondent was not trying to take advantage of him, but was simply "someone who had gotten himself into a bad deal."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0228 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of facts. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-41 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Danny L. Kepner SHELL, FLEMING, DAVIS & MENGE Seventh Floor, Seville Tower Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32598 Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Respondent is now and was at all times material to this action a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license number 0064475. Respondent operated his own real estate brokerage firm under his license. The firm was located in Niceville, Florida. In addition to his real estate brokerage business Respondent maintained and managed his personal real estate investments. Several of these personal investments included rental property which Respondent would later sell. One such piece of property was located at 104 Perdido Circle, Niceville, Florida, and is the property involved in this action. Prior to July 6, 1985, the Respondent, as seller and not as a broker, advertised for sale the Perdido property. Sometime around July 6, 1985, Robert L. Mitchell and June F. Mitchell looked at the Perdido property. Frank Ray, a salesman for John Brooks Realty, an unrelated real estate firm showed the property to the Mitchells. They liked the property and wanted to buy it. Frank Ray made arrangements for himself and the Mitchells to meet with Respondent in order to discuss the terms of the potential purchase contract. They met on July 6, 1985. The meeting lasted approximately an hour to an hour and a half. During the lengthy meeting Respondent went over the purchase terms contained in the contract of sale. The Mitchells main concern was to have immediate occupancy of the house. Special terms were developed for renting the property. At some point during the meeting the down payment came under discussion. Originally, the Mitchells had planned on a $1500 down payment which was acceptable to Respondent. However, as the meeting progressed the Mitchells decided they would like to reduce the amount of the down payment. Respondent informed the Mitchells that the only way he could decrease the $1500 down payment was to make the money a non-refundable option payment. Respondent then marked out the $1500 down payment figure contained in the purchase contract and inserted a $1200 figure. Respondent concurrently added the language "option payment" next to the $1200 figure. The remainder of the contract was discussed and the Mitchells signed the amended document. The Mitchells then wrote a check to Respondent, personally, in the amount of $1200. The note section of the check the Mitchells wrote contained the language "house down payment." The exact discussion on the down payment/option is not clear. What is clear from the evidence is that neither party had a meeting of the minds over what the $1200 check was. The Mitchells being very inexperienced in real estate thought it was a down payment. Although it is doubtful the Mitchells understood the legal meaning of the term "down payment." Respondent thought it was a non- refundable option payment. Absolutely no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Respondent was demonstrated. Likewise, there was no evidence that Respondent in any way used his knowledge or expertise in the real estate market improperly. The final result of the negotiations was that the Mitchells had entered into what on its face purports to be a rental contract with an option to buy. However, since there was no meeting of the minds over the option, the option was eventually unenforceable. Since there was no meeting of the minds regarding the $1200 the money was not properly escrowable property. In essence the $1200 was neither a down payment nor an option payment. This lack of escrowability is borne out by the sales contract which calls for another escrow agent. 1/ The Mitchells took possession of the property for approximately three months. The Mitchells failed to obtain financing. The contract was conditioned upon the Mitchells obtaining financing, and the transaction failed to close. A dispute arose between the parties concerning the down payment/option money. When the dispute could not be resolved by the parties, the Mitchells filed a lawsuit against Nevin H. Nordal demanding a refund of the $1200 "house down payment." As a result of the Mitchell's lawsuit the County Court, in Okaloosa County, Florida, Summary Claims Division, by Amended Final Judgment dated January 20, 1987, awarded the sum of $1,028,87. The judgment figure is the balance of the $1200 after deduction of a counterclaim of $171.13 for cleaning the house after the Mitchells evacuated the property. Additionally, the Respondent was required to pay costs in the sum of $57 for a total of $1,087.87 due the Mitchells. The judgment amount is bearing interest at a rate of 12 percent per annum. The County Court judgment contains no findings of fact as to the Judge's reasoning on the judgment award. The Mitchells have repeatedly demanded of the Respondent that he pay the judgment. He has repeatedly refused to pay the judgment. Respondent did account to the Mitchells for the money when he told them he had deposited the check and had spent the funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint failed against Respondent, Nevin H. Nordal, be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1989.
