Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer would recommend that the agency head enter a final order permitting the voluntary removal of the advertising structure within 30 days of the date of the agency head's final order, and directing employees of the Department of Transportation to remove the structure after the 30-day period without compensation to the owner. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, FlorIda 32301 James P. Appleman, Esquire 206 Market Street Post Office Box 3115 Marianna, Florida 32446 Charles M. Wynn, Esquire 310 East Jackson Street Post Office Box 793 Marianna, Florida 32446
The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.
Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is in violation of Sections 479.07(1)(2)(3)(4) and (6), Florida Statutes; Sections 479.11(1)(2), Florida Statutes; and Section 479.02, Florida Statutes, which require a person to submit am application for a permit, pay permit fees, secure a permit before erecting any outdoor advertising sign. Such permit will not be granted if it is within the prohibited areas of Section 479.11, F.S., and are subject to removal under Section 479.02, F.S.; Section 479.17, F.S.; and Section 479.20, F.S.
Findings Of Fact No permit was applied for or secured for the following described signs: Copy: Chipley Motel Location: .15 miles east of State Road 273 (Orange Hill Highway) Highway: I-10 Copy: Chipley Motel Location: 3-9/10 miles east of State Road 77 Highway: U.S. 90 Copy: Chipley Motel Restaurant Location: 1-4/10 miles west of State Road 77, South side Highway: I-10 No permit was applied for before subject signs were erected and subject signs are nearer than 660 feet from the nearest edge of an interstate highway.
Recommendation Remove subject signs if they are not removed by the Respondent within ten days after the entry of a final order. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of May, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Bob Deal, Esquire Cole and Deal 204-A South Third Street Chipley, Florida 32428
Findings Of Fact The sign at issue in this case was the subject of an earlier administrative hearing conducted in DOAH Case Nos. 83-1180T and 83-1181T on November 8, 1984. That consolidated proceeding arose as a result of a notice of illegal sign issued by the Department against Herbert J. Shaw, Sr., and Donna Shaw, his wife, alleging they were the owners of a sign located on the State's right-of-way. The transcript of that formal hearing shows that the Department presented its case-in-chief and then rested. Those Respondents began presenting their evidence. A discussion was then held off the record, after which an announcement was made on the record that those Respondents had agreed with the Department's position, that they had withdrawn their request for an administrative hearing, and that the matter would be finally resolved in one of two ways: 1) those Respondents would purchase from the Department the amount of property required to eliminate any encroachment of the sign in question, or 2) the Department would remove the sign. The proceeding was then adjourned, and an Order Closing Files was entered by the assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. On December 13, 1984, a document entitled Final Order was entered by the Secretary of the Department that provided, in part, as follows: Because the formal requests for hearing made by the Respondents have been withdrawn, it is ordered that these cases be dismissed. It is further ordered that the outdoor advertising signs be removed pursuant to agreement of the parties (R-31) if within a reasonable amount of time an agreement between the parties cannot be reached as to a price and amount of property to be conveyed to the Respondents to eliminate the encroachment of the Respondent's signs on the Petitioner's right-of-way. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Shaw, Sr., and the Department did not pursue the purchase and sale of part of the right-of-way. Further, the Department did not remove the sign. It appears that none of the parties to that prior action treated the "Final Order" as a final order. Rather, 5 1/2 years later the Department issued a new Notice of Illegal Sign and advised Mr. and Mrs. Shaw, Sr., that they could request an administrative hearing to determine the merits of that Notice, which is the subject matter of this action. At the beginning of the April 25, 1991, final hearing, Respondents Shaw, Sr., moved to have the style of the case amended to substitute Herbert J. Shaw, Jr., Trustee, the successor property owner, as the Respondent. Upon correction of the style, the Department made an ore tenus motion to dismiss, asserting that the 1984 final order was dispositive of all issues in the current case. The hearing was adjourned to permit Respondent to investigate that assertion and file a memorandum in response to the motion. That motion was subsequently denied, and this cause was again noticed for final hearing. However, that hearing was cancelled to permit the parties to this cause to negotiate for the sale or lease of the Department's right-of-way to Respondent. Those negotiations proved unsuccessful, and the final hearing was re-scheduled for, and conducted on, December 23, 1992. The sign in question is located in front of a restaurant which is located on Respondent's property in Key Largo, adjacent to State Road 5 (SR-5), which is also known as U.S. Highway 1. SR-5 is a part of the State Highway System. The sign is within the Department's SR-5 right-of-way. The outdoor advertising sign in question has been in the same location since 1973. Although it appears that a permit was obtained by Respondent or by his father from Monroe County, no permit for the sign was ever applied for or obtained from the Department. In 1972 or 1973, Respondent or his father presented to the Department a survey in conjunction with an application for driveway permits. Although that survey noted in some fashion the location of the sign in question, the location of the sign was not specifically brought to the attention of the Department's employees reviewing the application for driveway permits. Neither Respondent nor his father intentionally or knowingly placed the sign within the Department's right-of-way. It appears that the source of the error may have been a survey performed around 1972 which utilized a Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority plan sheet to determine the location of the Department's right-of-way. Those plan sheets have never been relied upon by the Department to show the location of its right-of-way, and no evidence was offered that the Department was the source of any erroneous information which may have been included on that plan sheet. The Department itself has made no representation which would have suggested to Respondent or to his father that the outdoor advertising sign was not located within the Department's right-of-way. On December 21, 1992, Petitioner filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Costs and Attorneys Fees. At the final hearing, the Department offered no evidence as to any costs or attorneys fees incurred by it, or the reasonableness thereof. Since the Department has thereby abandoned any claim to costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Rule 1.380(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, no findings regarding the entitlement thereto or the reasonableness thereof are made in this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent's outdoor advertising sign to be located within the Department's right-of-way and requiring its removal. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5260T Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5, 6, 10, 15, and 16 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 7-9 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 11-14 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 4, and 6-9 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 10, and 11 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Herbert J. Shaw, Jr. Post Office Box 507 Key Largo, Florida 33037 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor G. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact By notice of alleged violation dated January 19, 1979, the Department charged that the Respondent, Chevron, U.S.A., installed a sign on 1-4, 23.86 miles east of U.S. 301, without a permit in violation of Rule 14-10.04, Florida Administrative Code. The notice also alleged that the sign was too close to an off ramp of 1-4, in violation of Title 23, Section 13, U.S. Code Para. 2(B). The parties stipulated that the sign is located along 1-4, a part of the Federal Interstate Highway Systems which was open to vehicular traffic in 1959-1960 and that the sign is located in the unincorporated area of Polk County. On or about October 22, 1969, the Respondent contracted with Pickett and Associates, of Tampa1 Florida, a general contractor, to construct a complete operating service station at 1-4 and SR 35-A. Included in the contract price was the cost of constructing the sign in question. An engineer for Chevron, J. L. Edgar, requested on June 4, 1969, that Pickett and Associates proceed to obtain all permits prior to construction. Due to no direct fault of the Respondent, the necessary permits to install the sign were never obtained from the Department. This fact was discovered when a sign inspector noticed the sign to be in poor condition and in need of repair. The contractor who erected the sign was contacted regarding the permits but all records relating to this particular job have been discarded. Chevron was unaware that the sign was never permitted until the notice was issued by the Department. The sign is located within five hundred (500) feet of the exit ramp off 1-4 to Kathleen Road (SR 35-A) , as measured from the spot where the road widens to the exit. No evidence was submitted to show that the sign was on the same property of the station or within one hundred (100) feet thereof.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's sign be found in violation of Rule 14- 10.06(1)(b)(2)(b) , Florida Administrative Code and Section 479.07, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1980. in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. A. Scott Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 3908 10th Avenue Tampa, Florida 33605 Charles Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the sign owned by the Respondents situated on Interstate 95, 1.26 miles north of State Road 528, in Brevard County, Florida, be removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER ENTERED this 1st day of July, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Mr. Richard L. Schneible and Mrs. Mary Joan Schneible Post Office Box 727 Sharpes, Florida 32959 Hon. Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building - Room 562 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether a sign owned by Respondent and located on the southbound side of I- 95 north of Pembroke Road in Broward County, Florida, violates Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the notice dated August 8, 1991; and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Chapter 479 regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. Respondent is the owner of a sign located adjacent to the southbound side of Interstate 95 ("I-95") near Pembroke Road in Broward County, Florida. Respondent maintains the sign on the side of the trailer portion of a so-called 18 wheel tractor-trailer (an "18 wheeler") in a stationary position. No truck or tractor is affixed to the trailer. The sign and 18 wheeler were situated on property owned by Air Stern. Air Stern is an air conditioning company. Petitioner's Outdoor Advertising Inspector (the "inspector") first observed the sign in August, 1991. The sign consisted of a large advertisement affixed to the side of an 18- wheeler which was placed in a stationary location. The message in the advertisement consisted of the words "Father & Son Moving & Storage" and the company's telephone numbers in Broward and Dade counties. The advertising message was clearly visible from I-95. The advertising message was clearly visible from I- 95. A light facing the sign was affixed to the ground and positioned to illuminate the sign on the side of the 18 wheeler at night. An expired 1990 Florida license plate was affixed to the back of the trailer. Grass had grown up around the tires of the trailer and the trailer had been in its same position for several months. The inspector issued a Notice of Violation by physically attaching it to the trailer on August 8, 1991. The inspector determined that the printed advertisement on the trailer's side was an unpermitted sign that violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. The inspector based his determination upon his observation of the trailer on the premises, its position in relation to I- 95, and the type and content of the message printed on the side. Another copy of the Notice of Violation was mailed to Respondent. After more than 30 days had elapsed with no action by Respondent, Petitioner had the first sign removed by Sal's Towing on September 23, 1991. The sign was stored at Petitioner's maintenance facility in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On November 9, 1991, Respondent paid the towing charge for removal of the sign and then returned the sign to its original location adjacent to I-95 near Pembroke Road in Broward County, Florida. In addition to placing the sign in its original location, Respondent placed a second sign next to the first sign. The second sign was substantially similar to the first sign. The second sign consisted of a large advertisement affixed to the side of an 18- wheeler which was placed in a stationary position with no truck or tractor attached. The message in the advertisement consisted of the words "Father & Son Moving & Storage" and the company's telephone numbers in Broward and Dade counties. The advertising message was clearly visible from I-95. A sign permit has not been applied for by Respondent nor issued by the Department for either of the signs located adjacent to I-95.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that Respondent shall have ten days from the date of the Final Order to comply with Notice of Violation No. 4-369 by removing the sign or be subject to the cost of removal and imposition of an administrative fine. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of April 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, E. T. Legg and Company, owns the sign which is the subject of this proceeding, located on U.S. 441 or S.R. 7, approximately 1,117 feet north of Snake Creek Canal in Dade County, Florida. The sign faces north and south. The Department issued permits for a sign in 1979, one for the north face and one for the south face. These permits authorized a sign on U.S. 441 (State Road 7), approximately 550 feet north of Snake Creek Canal in Dade County, Florida. It is not clear from the record whether these permits were issued for the subject sign or for another sign but the permit tags issued for these permits were affixed to the subject sign until these tags were stolen. The Respondent's permit applications stated that the sign to be erected would be located 500 feet from the nearest existing sign. Subsequent to the Department's issuance of the permits for the subject sign, it determined that the Respondent's sign had been built closer than 500 feet from the nearest sign. The Respondent stipulated that there is less than 500 feet between the subject sign and the sign nearest to it. The sign nearest the subject sign is also owned by the Respondent. It is a two-faced permitted structure located south of the subject sign, and it was in place when the subject sign was erected. In 1981, the Respondent applied for tags to replace the permit tags the Department had issued pursuant to the 1979 application. These tags had been stolen. Replacement tags were not issued by the Department for the reason that it had determined the subject sign to be in violation of the spacing rule requiring 500 feet between signs. Permit fees had been paid by the Respondent through the year 1981. In October of 1981, the Department initiated this proceeding, charging the Respondent with violations of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes for not displaying permit tags on the subject sign, and for violating the spacing rule by locating this sign within 500 feet of an existing sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its Final Order dismissing these charges against the Respondent, E.T. Legg and Company, subject to payment by the Respondent of all permit fees due for the years 1982 through 1986. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 31st day of July, 1986 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Charles C. Papy III, Esquire 201 Alhambra Circle Suite 502 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla, Esquire General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Based on the record transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Petitioner, the following are found as the relevant facts: The Respondent, Hinson Oil Company, owns four outdoor advertising signs in Gadsden County, Florida, located on the south side of I-10, in the proximity of County Road 270-A. On October 3, 1984, the Department of Transportation notified the Respondent in writing that these signs violated Section 479.11, Florida Statutes, in that they were alleged to be located in an area which is not a zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial area. The return receipt was signed by E. W. Hinson, Jr., on October 9, 1984. Paragraph 2 of the notices of violation served on October 3 and received on October 9, 1984, sets forth the following procedural requirements: You must comply with the applicable provisions of said Statute(s) and Cede(s) within thirty (30) days from the date of this notice, . . . or in the alternative, an administrative hearing under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, must be requested by you within thirty (30) days of the date of this notice . . . E. W. Hinson, Jr., on behalf of the Respondent, requested an administrative hearing by letter dated November 16, 1984. This request was received by the Department of Transportation clerk on November 19, 1984.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order dismissing with prejudice the Respondent's request for an administrative hearing in each of these cases. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 24th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire and Maxine Fay Ferguson, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 E. W. Hinson, Jr. Hinson Oil Company P.O. Box 1168 Quincy, Florida 32351 John Curry, Esquire P.O. Drawer 391 Quincy, Florida 32351
The Issue Whether three signs of Respondent are in violation of the Federal and State laws, rules and regulations by violating the set-back requirements and the requirements for state permit.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was issued a thirty (30) day Violation Notice by Petitioner for a sign located .5 of a mile west of State Road 79 on the south side of I-10 approximately twenty (20) feet from the fence on the outer edge of the right-of- way of I-10. The sign advertised gas, oil, food, camping, road service, and CEO radio shop and is owned by Respondent Rich Oil Company, Bonifay, Florida, a business in operation about .9 of a Mile from the sign. The violations were listed as improper set-back and no permit. A thirty (30) day violation notice was issued to the Respondent by Petitioner on a sign located .6 of a mile east of State Road 79 on the north side of I-10 approximately twenty (20) feet from the fence located on the outer edge of the right-of-way. The products advertised were gas, oil, food, camping, road services, CB radio shop of the business operation of Respondent which business was located about .9 of a mile from the sign. The violations were listed as improper set-back and no permit. A thirty (30) day violation notice was issued to Respondent by Petitioner for a sign located on the southeast corner of St. Johns Road and State Road 79 located six (6) to twelve (12) feet from the outer edge of the right-of-way of State Road 79 advertising the products of Respondent: gas, oil, food, camping, road service, CB radio shop. The business was Operated about one hundred and eighty (180) feet from the sign. The violation was listed as improper set-back and no permit. No state permits were applied for or granted for any of the three subject signs. The signs were set back from the federal aid highway as indicated on the Violation Notices. The signs referred to in (1) and (2) above located east and west of the intersection of State Road 79 and I-10 were placed there by Respondent who stated that they were essential for his business and that the business would be diminished if the signs were removed. The sign described in (3) above on State Road 79 is shown by photograph to have a trailer nearby with a sign on it. Said sign on the trailer is not a subject of this hearing.
Recommendation Remove the signs that are located east and west of the intersection of State Road 79 along the right-of-way of I-10 and described in Findings of Fact (1) and (2) herein. Remove the sign located along State Road 79 described in Findings of Fact (3) herein unless the Respondent removes said sign and relocates it within fifteen (15) feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way after obtaining a state permit. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Russell A. Cole, Jr., Esquire 123 N. Oklahoma Street Bonifay, Florida 32425 John W. Scruggs, Esquire Department of Transportation Chipley, Florida 32425 George L. Waas, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Glen E. Rich Rich Oil Company Post Office Box 158 Bonifay, Florida 32425 Mr. J. E. Jordan District Sign Coordinator Department of Transportation Post Office Box 607 Chipley, Florida 32428 Mr. O. E. Black Administrator Outdoor Advertising Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Philip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1605T RICH OIL COMPANY, Respondent. /
