The Issue Whether Respondent County is guilty of an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is female, and within a class protected by Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent County is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claimed that Respondent treated her disparately from male employees on the basis of her gender in the areas of pay during her probationary period, reprimands and discipline, provision of equipment, poor performance evaluations, and training. Petitioner's initial relationship with Respondent was as an independent contractor at Respondent's Sanitary Landfill under a written contract entered into on September 15, 1989. In this capacity, she acted as a "spotter." As an independent contractor, she received $250 per month and salvage rights to whatever material customers brought to the Respondent's Sanitary Landfill. Effective August 14, 1990, the State Division of Personnel and Retirement required Respondent to put all contractual people on the County payroll. Thereafter, Petitioner was paid $350 per month and continued to have salvage rights only at the sufferance of the Respondent. After that date, Petitioner earned retirement and social security benefits. Withholding of federal taxes and deduction of social security benefits were also provided.(P-12). The value of the salvage rights were never calculated by anyone. While she was employed as a "spotter," Petitioner was the only female "spotter." Petitioner was on probation as an employee from August to December 1990. Petitioner was paid $1.442 per hour from August 12, 1990 through October 1990, and $1.63 per hour from October 1990 through December 3, 1990. At that time, her rate of pay was raised to $3.85 per hour. The record contains no evidence of what was paid to any male employee similarly situated during this period. Without proof that similarly situated male spotters were consistently paid better, there is no proof of gender discrimination in pay during Petitioner's probationary period.3 Mark Hawes, a male, was hired as a spotter on June 1, 1993. He was paid $4.35 per hour while on probation. Willie George, also male, was hired as a spotter on October 1, 1993, and was paid $4.4805 per hour while on probation. There is no evidence of how much Petitioner was being paid during this period, so there is no means of assessing disparate treatment in pay, if any, during this period.4 During the period that Petitioner was employed as a "spotter," there was no statute or rule requiring that "spotters" receive formalized training or be certified in any field. During Petitioner's employment, no spotter were provided more than a printed Job Description and on-the-job oral instructions. They were expected to use courtesy and common sense in dealing with the public. Two employees (gender unspecified) who were not spotters were sent to train at a state "school" to become Certified Landfill Operators. A State Rule was enacted after Petitioner was terminated which required that all spotters must have eight hours of specialized training. Thereafter, the Respondent provided such training to spotters. At all times material to any Personnel Citations, Petitioner was a union member, and all benefits of her union's collective bargaining agreement with the Respondent accrued to her. No performance evaluations were submitted in evidence. With the exception of the events related within the following findings of fact, no witness found any fault with Petitioner in the performance of her job description as a "spotter" at Respondent's landfill. (P-1) Wayne Hardee, Director of the Landfill, issued a Personnel Citation against Petitioner early in her employment on the basis of lack of personal hygiene. The citation was later removed from Petitioner's personnel file as an act of good will. On or about January 16, 1994, Petitioner admitted to an immediate supervisor that her carelessness with a hand-held CB radio had resulted in loss of the radio. She offered to pay for the radio. Mr. Hardee did not require her to pay for the radio, but issued a written Personnel Citation to her on January 20, 1994 for her carelessness. This Personnel Citation simultaneously cited Petitioner because Mr. Hardee had received complaints that Petitioner was overly concerned about other spotters doing their jobs. In this Personnel Citation, Mr. Hardee warned Petitioner to do her job without complaining about other employees. Petitioner admitted that she signed this citation and that she did not grieve it through her union. The radio was later recovered, but the citation remained in Petitioner's personnel file. (P-2) On Saturday, July 9, 1994, Petitioner called her union's senior shop steward, Jessie Ellzey, to the landfill to complain about items left at her spotter station. Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner was accusing another employee of putting the items in the wrong place. Petitioner also told Mr. Ellzey that another employee had threatened her. After investigation and interviews the following week, Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Hardee determined that the items had been brought by a landfill customer to the landfill between shift changes. Mr. Hardee's and Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner had unfairly complained about another spotter, Willie George, not doing his job. At least three days and two meetings were involved in this investigation and counseling procedure. Mr. Hardee issued a written Personnel Citation against Petitioner for complaining about a co-employee. (P-3) Petitioner also was suspended without pay for one day and warned that if the problem was not corrected, further disciplinary action would be taken against her. Petitioner did not grieve this citation through her union. Based on all of Mr. Ellzey's credible testimony, due to reputation testimony about Mr. Ellzey's standard operating procedure, and because Petitioner was actually suspended for one day without pay, I reject as not credible Petitioner's testimony that she never knew of this citation in time to grieve it. On August 13, 1994, Ann Harrell, a landfill customer, filed a written complaint of rudeness against Petitioner. (P-9) A written complaint of rudeness by Petitioner was also filed by another customer, Mr. Richburg, at about the same time. Mr. Hardee considered courtesy to customers to be an unstated policy of County government and further perceived rudeness to customers to be an on-going problem in Petitioner's relationship with the public. Due to the foregoing written complaints and many similar oral complaints he had received, Mr. Hardee assigned Petitioner two days' suspension without pay by a written Personnel Citation issued August 15, 1994. The citation also warned Petitioner she would be terminated if there were another complaint about her. Petitioner refused to sign this citation. (P-4) On August 25, 1994, Petitioner grieved the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation through her union. (P-5) A hearing was held in response to Petitioner's grievance. All concerned agree that Mr. Ellzey, the union representative advocating Petitioner's position, and not a representative of management, kept Petitioner from testifying. Chester Humphries testified on Petitioner's behalf at the grievance hearing that he had been unable to hear what Mr. Richburg said but could hear what Petitioner said to Mr. Richburg. From this, Mr. Hardee inferred that Petitioner had raised her voice to Mr. Richburg. Mr. Hardee assessed Petitioner's character witnesses in Petitioner's favor but noted that they knew nothing about the specific incident between Petitioner and Mr. Richburg. Ultimately, Mr. Hardee relied on Mr. Richburg's testimony concerning the incident. (P-6) Mr. Hardee denied Petitioner's grievance and disciplined Petitioner in accord with the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation. Upon advice of her union steward, Petitioner did not appeal the grievance hearing result. It was further agreed that if Petitioner's behavior resulted in no more complaints against her for 30 working days, the August 15, 1994, citation would be removed from her personnel file. Petitioner met this requirement, and the citation was removed from her personnel file. (P-6; P-7). Petitioner's December 13, 1994, charge of discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations listed August 11, 1994, as the last date of alleged discrimination. No witness at formal hearing herein, including Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Humphries, both of whom also had been present at the grievance hearing, confirmed Petitioner's perception that her gender had affected the result of her grievance hearing. Another female employee (not a landfill spotter) currently works in Respondent's administrative offices. That female employee also has had employment disputes with Mr. Hardee which she attributes to his gender bias, but the type of dispute was not clearly specified on this record. Therefore, no similarity to Petitioner's situation can be discerned and no pattern of gender bias was proven on that basis. This female employee is still employed by Respondent. A different female employee (also not a spotter) employed by Respondent's Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was terminated by Mr. Bill Beddow, EMS Director, for failing to timely report (or complain about) her immediate supervisor for "doing something [Mr. Beddow] thought he shouldn't be doing with drugs." The male supervisor resigned for "personal reasons." The female employee was rehired by Mr. Beddow after intercession by her union. This means another female not similarly situated to Petitioner was terminated for not complaining about a male employee's job performance and was then hired back, whereas Petitioner was progressively disciplined with reprimands and suspensions for repetitive unsubstantiated complaints about male employees' job performances. Petitioner seeks to have the conclusion drawn that female employees were disciplined both for reporting and for not reporting male employees' misbehavior. However, the two isolated situations are so dissimilar as to develop no pattern recognizable at law. I accept as credible and unrefuted Petitioner's testimony that all of the complaints she initiated about other employees were oral. However, Petitioner's testimony that she did not complain about other employees' performance of, or failure to perform, their jobs and her assertion that her complaints were only motivated by the requirements of her Job Description to "inspect loads" and "report all problems" was not corroborated by any other witness. Petitioner's testimony that her concerns were directed not at individual employees but at addressing hazardous wastes also was not corroborated by any other witness.5 Petitioner's middle level supervisor acknowledged that Petitioner told him that other employees had improperly handled hazardous materials as well as non-hazardous materials but that he did not cite anyone as a result of Petitioner's complaints about hazardous wastes because it was impossible to prove who was responsible. He counseled all subordinates about each incident whenever he considered counseling appropriate. Otherwise, all witnesses with reason to know the situation generally acknowledged that Petitioner's oral complaints were recurring almost daily and were directed to other employees' job performances rather than hazardous materials. It is the repetitive and personal nature of Petitioner's complaints rather than their being oral that management found offensive. The evidence also generally shows that all employees orally complained about each other and that Petitioner's two immediate supervisors, Felippe McCelroy and Robert Murray, orally reprimanded everybody who complained or who was complained about as they each saw fit within their supervisory discretion on individual occasions. No gender pattern is to be discerned from the foregoing. Only on those occasions that either an oral or written complaint reached Mr. Hardee was anyone written up and/or disciplined. Petitioner complained about not being assigned or provided with one of Respondent employer's trucks when other male employees were provided trucks. With the exception of the following findings related to the Respondent's trucks, there is no relevant evidence in this record concerning employees' use of trucks. All employees were cautioned against carelessness. Tommy Dean, a male employee, dented one of Respondent's trucks. He was not disciplined for careless driving. There is no evidence the dent was caused by Mr. Dean's careless driving. In February 1995, Charles Kennedy, a male spotter, filed a written complaint or incident report. Therein, he claimed that Petitioner had attempted to prohibit his bulldozing landfill material out of the way because Petitioner was trying to remove salvageable items. He further alleged that Petitioner had thrown a jar of grease at him. Petitioner was requested to file a written account of the incident. In her written account, she basically admitted the incident but not any intent to hit Mr. Kennedy with the grease jar. Mr. Kennedy was not disciplined for filing the written complaint/report. Petitioner was not disciplined for the actions complained about by Mr. Kennedy. Instead, as of February 3, 1995, landfill spotters were prohibited from salvaging at the landfill. (P-13) Petitioner desires that the conclusion be drawn that male spotters who complained in writing about other employees were not disciplined for complaining but that Petitioner, a female, was disciplined for making oral complaints. However, it appears Respondent addressed Mr. Kennedy's written complaint in much the same way as it had addressed Petitioner's oral complaint against Willie George, by giving each participant in the dispute a chance to state his or her position, before management decided who should be disciplined. The difference was that Mr. Kennedy was not a chronic complainer and management's investigation revealed some fault on both sides, so a neutral solution was found rather than discipline being imposed. There is no evidence beyond Petitioner's assertion that she was ever asked to do more work or heavier work than male spotters. From this point on, the dates that events occurred or their chronology is not entirely clear from the record. However, approximately April 14, 1995, there was an occasion when Petitioner was asked to move metal pieces in a wheelbarrow-sized pile over a three-hour period. The largest piece weighed 21 pounds. The next day, Petitioner reported a workers' compensation back injury or aggravation. She was then off work until approximately May 11, 1995, when she returned to "light duty." She worked for awhile for only four hours per day. Respondent hired someone to help her. It is disputed whether Petitioner was reinjured or whether Mr. Hardee just sent her home. However, on or about July 8, 1995, Mr. Hardee discussed the situation with "the workers' compensation people," and it was agreed there was not enough light duty work for Petitioner. Three months later, Petitioner returned to full duty. Because a spotter had been hired to do her work, Petitioner was assigned to a variety of jobs. She worked at the dog pound, the recycling building, and even washed Mr. Hardee's truck.6 One day, Petitioner's immediate supervisor ordered her to cut out the top of a metal drum. At formal hearing, Petitioner asserted that this was heavier work than she should have been required to do on light duty, but there is no evidence the supervisor's order was motivated by gender bias. There also is no evidence a full-time male spotter was never required to do similarly heavy work. Petitioner advised her supervisor that she had hurt her arms and elbows and she went home on sick leave. Petitioner had complained over the term of her employment about not being provided one of Respondent's trucks so that she could conveniently get from her sector of the landfill to a restroom. After her workers' compensation injury, Respondent arranged for male employees to drive Petitioner to the restroom. Eventually, Respondent provided Petitioner with a portable toilet in her work sector. Mr. Hardee maintained that no spotter had ever been assigned a truck but that all spotters, including Petitioner, had access to one. There is evidence to show that male employees drove the trucks and Petitioner did not, but insufficient evidence to show this was an active management decision or that Mr. Hardee acquiesced in male employees preempting trucks as a result of any gender bias. On or about November 13, 1995, Petitioner informed Mr. Hardee that she was permanently physically disabled and would have to be on light duty indefinitely. After consultation with his "workers' compensation people," Mr. Hardee terminated Petitioner as of that date. 7 At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted Respondent was still paying her workers' compensation benefits and that her workers' compensation claim has not been settled.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1997.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a woman who suffered an aneurysm in 1987 which resulted in paralysis. Subsequently, she regained full use of her body except for her left hand. She possesses gross motor skills in her left hand but lacks fine motor skills. Respondent is a retail furniture store, which at times pertinent did about three million dollars in business annually. Respondent at times pertinent employed 23 to 26 full-time employees. Respondent went out of business on September 24, 2001. Petitioner interviewed with Doris Hudson and Cindy Gentry about three weeks prior to June 8, 2000. Petitioner was informed that she was hired and could begin work on June 8, 2000. The position she was hired for was accounts payable clerk. During the interview, the matter of the facility of Petitioner's left hand was not noted or discussed. Petitioner believed that the job consisted of mostly working on a keypad with numbers, in the accounts payable section of the bookkeeping office. Petitioner reported for work on June 8, 2000. Doris Hudson, Respondent's Comptroller, an employee of Respondent for over 41 years, provided her with a tour of the premises. Petitioner's first assignment was to type checks. She did this slowly because she could type only with her right hand. Typing checks is an important function of the accounts payable clerk. Most vendors were paid by checks which were prepared by data processing equipment but it was necessary to prepare many checks for local vendors on a typewriter. During the hour and a-half Petitioner worked at the typewriter, she correctly prepared three checks. Ms. Hudson expected an accounts payable clerk to prepare 25 to 35 checks in an hour and a-half. An accounts payable clerk, according to Ms. Hudson, should be able to type 55 words per minute; Petitioner could type only 30 words per minute on a good day. An accounts payable clerk's daily activities included kneeling on the floor and opening a large safe; swinging open a heavy door which has to be unlocked with two keys simultaneously; counting 30 to 50 checks per day and counting currency and coins; and printing out reports which were inserted in a large binder. A substantial part of the duties of the accounts payable clerk required excellent typing and data input skills. The accounts payable clerk was required to reload the printers and this required the coordination of two hands. The accounts payable clerk was required to prepare deposits which required that the employee flip each individual check with one hand and operate a calculator with the other. Ms. Hudson did not discover the deficiencies with regard to Petitioner's left hand until she made inquiry after noting the small number of checks which Petitioner prepared. Ms. Hudson could not use an employee who could not do the activities described in paragraph eight and nine, above. Ms. Hudson could not call others in the office away from their jobs to help a person who had limited use of one hand. She did not have enough employees. When Ms. Hudson's office was fully staffed there were many times when it was difficult to accomplish all necessary duties in an eight-hour day. It was Ms. Hudson's opinion that Petitioner could not perform the duties of accounts payable clerk and that it was impossible to accommodate her deficiencies without disrupting the orderly functioning of her office. After considering Petitioner's capabilities and the requirements of the accounts payable clerk, Ms. Hudson decided that Petitioner was not suitable for employment as an accounts payable clerk and as a result, discharged her. Petitioner was paid $22.61 for 2.66 hours of work. This reflected an hourly wage of $8.50. Petitioner worked as an administrative assistant at Century Boats in Panama City prior to obtaining the job with Respondent. She lost that job in February of 2000, due to a reduction in workforce. After Petitioner left Respondent's place of business she went to work at a clinic run by Bay Medical. She began working there on August 28, 2000, as an insurance coder and biller and was paid $8.00 per hour. She lost that job on February 28, 2001, when the facility closed. She was offered a job in the radiology section but it paid less so she elected to remain essentially unemployed for a year. She did work a one- week job with Cardiology Associates and worked for C-1 Medical Clinic for a month and a-half during that period. Petitioner, at the time of the hearing, was employed by Nextel Communications as a customer care representative and was paid $9.50 per hour. She started February 18, 2002. Petitioner has a hard time buttoning clothes but she can drive an automobile. She testified she could do, ". . . everything pretty much what everybody does." She can't throw a ball up with her left hand or play tennis anymore. She can lift heavy objects up to at least 75 pounds. She has no medical restrictions placed on the use of her left hand.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Amended Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Chesser 6802 Penny Road Panama City, Florida 32404 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4019 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On October 23, 1978, Petitioner was hired as secretary to W. J. Crist, president of Hygroponics, Inc. On February 26, 1979, W. J. Crist evaluated Petitioner's overall job performance as "good." With respect to cooperation, the Petitioner was rated in the category of "cooperates very well," the highest rating possible for that category of performance. With respect to job knowledge, she was rated as showing "unusual capacity," also the highest rating possible for that category of performance. On March 5, 1979, Petitioner received an increase in salary from $4.18 per hour to $4.51 per hour, based in part upon her increased responsibilities and in part upon demonstrated merit. Following is Hygroponics, Inc.'s office staff organization chart dated May 2, 1979: HYGROPONICS, INC. OFFICE STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART | President | /| W. J. Crist |\ / | | \ / | \ \ \ | Purch. Agent | | Controller | \ | Technical Service | | Dick Destival | | James Jobe |" \ | Dick Jeffery | | | | | "" \ | | " / | | " "\ | " / | | " \" | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | "\ "| | Marsha | | Liz | | Nell | | Arlene | | Carolyn | | Betsy | | | | | | | | | | | | | /|\ Direct lines of authority. Answerable to this person at all times " Indirect lines of authority. Answerable for secondary duties and when direct lines are not available. The above organizational chart does not include the company's chief executive officer. On occasion, members of the company's secretarial staff went directly to the chief executive officer with employment-related problems. In September, 1979, after James Jobe, the controller referenced in the above chart, left the company's employ, W. J. Crist, the company president, advised Petitioner that she was to become office manager. After that time, Petitioner assumed many of the duties of office manager. Petitioner inquired when she would receive a raise commensurate with her increased responsibilities, and was advised that this would be accomplished after the company hired a new controller. Emmett Singleton was hired to fill the position of controller on October 29, 1979. On December 11, 1979, Petitioner formally became acting office manager. On that date Petitioner was evaluated by Emmett Singleton, who rated Petitioner highest in the areas of decision-making and ability to organize, and lowest in the areas of acceptability and responsibility. Specifically, Singleton made the following comments concerning Petitioner's job performance: "Has difficulty in establishing satisfactory relationships with people"; "Average leader, conventional in manner and enthusiasm, conveys ideas but does not motivate group"; "Has problem with admitting an error or fault"; "Reluctant to accept job responsibilities. Supervision and follow-up often required"; "Considers job an eight to five task with scheduled breaks reguardless [sic] of status of workload"; "Employee is preoccupied with the position rather than a concern for getting the job done"; and, "Employee resents being monitored or controlled. Sometimes uncooperative and slow to respond to direction." In addition, members of the company management group, other than Emmett Singleton, commented on this evaluation that Petitioner "alienates co-workers," "Has experienced confusion in the scheduling of grower school," and expressed concern with Petitioner's "attitude." The controller noted on the evaluation form that he planned ". . .to work closely with [Petitioner] for the next 60 days and make an assessment during this time as to whether on [sic] not suited for office manager." Finally, Mr. Singleton noted on Petitioner's performance review form that Petitioner ". . .is classified as Acting Office Manager and is on probation with reguard[sic] to classification. No change in rate of pay is being made at this time. Employee will be reevaluated in 60 days on or about 2/10/80." In order to improve her skills in the area of acceptability and responsibility, Petitioner requested that Mr. Singleton issue a memorandum clarifying the lines of her authority especially since her subordinates had not been advised that she had been given supervisory responsibility over them. Her request was denied at that time because Singleton wanted to first determine whether she could handle the position. On January 12, 1980, Singleton reevaluated Petitioner's job performance. According to Singleton's rating, Petitioner had improved in the areas of acceptability and responsibility, which had been her weak points in the evaluation performed one month earlier. On this same day, Petitioner was reclassified from acting office manager to office manager, and received an increase in pay to $821.60 per month, retroactive to November 1, 1979. Petitioner also assumed the duties of payroll clerk and accounts payable in addition to the duties of office manager. Shortly after receiving this promotion, Petitioner advised employees of Hygroponics, Inc., that she was pregnant. W. J. Crist and Emmett Singleton acknowledged her pregnancy, and the latter inquired concerning her intentions regarding her employment. Petitioner responded that she intended to continue working for the company, and to return to work after the birth of her child. Hygroponics, Inc., had no maternity leave policy. No other female employee had ever given notice of pregnancy and stated her intention to return to work following childbirth. However, at least two other employees had become pregnant during the term of their employment with Hygroponics, Inc. One of these employees, in fact, suffered two miscarriages during her term of employment, and continued working with the company. Another female worker became pregnant, gave birth to a child, and returned to work without ever advising the company or the company ever being aware that she had been pregnant until after she had returned to work. On January 30, 1980, Petitioner submitted a memorandum to Eugene Crist, the company's chief executive officer. The memorandum suggested changes regarding the responsibilities of certain of the office personnel under her supervision. Petitioner had previously discussed these suggested changes with Emmett Singleton, her immediate supervisor, who advised her that he thought her suggestions were a good idea. At the time the memorandum was submitted to the company's chief executive officer, W. J. Crist, the president of the company, was out of the state. On January 30, 1980, Eugene Crist showed the memorandum to Emmett Singleton. The memorandum was then returned to Petitioner by the company's chief executive officer with a notation that the matters contained in the memorandum should be handled through Singleton. Two days later, on February 1, 1980, Singleton asked Petitioner for the memorandum. When Petitioner could not locate the memorandum, and offered to discuss the details of it with Singleton, Singleton advised her that there was no basis for conversation if she could not produce the memorandum. As noted above, Singleton had seen and read the memorandum two days previously when it was shown to him by Eugene Crist. Upon W. J. Crist's return to Florida, Singleton advised him that Petitioner had submitted a memorandum directly to the company's chief executive officer, and that when Singleton asked Petitioner to see the memorandum, she advised him that she had misplaced it. On February 8, 1980, W. J. Crist circulated a memorandum to the Hygroponics, Inc., executive staff concerning Petitioner's ". . .insubordination, poor attitude [and] defiance of executive orders. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: It is my understanding that Carolyn recently drafted a memorandum on her proposed changes in office duties for many people, changes in accounting procedures, etc. I have been informed that she: "by-passed you, her immediate superior and by-passed me, her next-in-line superior." and delivered this memo directly to Gene, our CEO. Then when Gene informed her to "discuss the memo directly with you," she advised you "she did not even have the memo anymore." I find these actions, on Carolyn's part very distressing and feel we must take disciplinary actions with her. So - what are the problems. Her "uncooperative" and "attitude" problems outlined in your personnel evaluation of her on December 11, 1979 (which she acknowledged) when you put her "on probation," the first time, still persist. She demonstrated anything but teamwork in by-passing her two immediate superiors and going directly to our CEO. This is very bad for an employee to do but even worse for her since she is suppose [sic] to be a leader of our people in her slot as Office Manager. Her disregarding Gene's directive to discuss the memo with you was corrected only by your insistance[sic] that the two of you discuss it. Her statement to you that "she no longer had the memo" is also distressing. Has she destroyed it? This additional negative certainly weakens her argument that "she went directly to Gene because he was going out.[sic] (Original emphasis.) The above-referenced memorandum solicited the views of the company's executive staff as to whether to terminate Petitioner, discipline her in some fashion, or give her an opportunity to resign. The decision was unanimous among all five members of the executive staff to terminate Petitioner. No member of the executive staff questioned Petitioner before concurring in the decision to discharge her. Such a memorandum of concurrence was not the company's standard practice in discharging employees, which generally was for the discharge decision to be made by the employee's supervisor alone. Hygroponics, Inc., was, at all times material to this proceeding, a rather small organization, numbering at the most approximately fifty employees. As a result, many of the internal functions of the company were informal in nature. For example, there were no strict lines of authority for secretarial staff to air grievances or make suggestions. There was, however, a generalized procedure for employees to approach their immediate supervisor with any employment-related problems. There is no direct substantive evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because she was either female or pregnant. Further, whatever circumstantial evidence there is in this record to support such a contention is overcome by Respondent's demonstration that Petitioner was at best an employee of average ability who management viewed at times to be a problem employee. It appears, therefore, that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was an accumulation of events, culminating in her memorandum of January 30, 1980, being submitted to the company chief executive officer, and not for any reason relating to her sex.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the Petition for Relief, and denying the relief requested therein, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. White, Jr., Esquire 229 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 John F. Daniel, Esquire Post Office Box 2522 Panama City, Florida 32401 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard E. Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Ms. Otto began her employment with the Council on April 8, 1975, when she was hired as an Assistant Director. At that time she was one of two assistant directors and was immediately below the Executive Director in responsibility. After Monroe County was declared am area of Critical State Concern under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, Ms. Otto was directed to provide staff assistance to Monroe County to assist them in complying with that designation. After Mr. Barry Peterson, Executive Director, Ms. Otto was the lead staffer of the Regional Planning Council who had responsibility in this area. Mr. Peterson in his testimony related that towards the end of June of 1975 Ms. Otto was directed to attend a meeting of the Monroe County Commission to discuss aspects of complying with the designation of Monroe County as an area of Critical State Concern. Ms. Otto did attend this meeting and reported back to Mr. Peterson that the meeting had gone well. Subsequently, Mr. Peterson testified that he learned that the meeting had not gone well and furnished a news clipping which dealt with the meeting of the County Commission which article indicates that Ms. Otto had made several statements which offended the County Commissioners. Apparently, on the basis of the report, Mr. Peterson received concerning Ms. Otto's statements at the County Commissioners' meeting, her responsibilities were changed in the Regional Planning Council to give her less contact with the public. With regard to Ms. Otto's alleged behavior at the Monroe County Commissioners' meeting, it must be noted that no direct evidence was presented at this hearing which would substantiate a finding that she acted improperly before the Commissioners. No testimony was presented from any person who was at that meeting and this Hearing Officer cannot make any finding of fact based on pure hearsay alone [Sec.120.58(1)(a), F.S.]. Furthermore, it must be assumed Ms. Otto was authorized to speak as she thought proper at this meeting and should some County Commissioners have taken offense at her statements does not indicate that such statements were automatically improper. In any case, no evidence was presented regarding this meeting which substantiates a finding of fact relating to the specific acts of misconduct charged against Ms. Otto. Another incident which presumably reflected upon Ms. Otto's ability and personality involved an incident where she expressed displeasure with certain comments made by a chairman of a volunteer citizens group. Ms. Otto stated she was in favor of confronting that person and challenging him on what she considered to be "sexist" remarks; however, it was decided by others in the Council that this should not be done. Ms. Otto did not confront this individual on her own. This Hearing Officer is uncertain as to whether any conclusion can be drawn regarding this incident. It certainly does not lend credence to any of the specific charges or reasons stated by the Council for firing of the Petitioner. All that appears to have happened is that Ms. Otto expressed her opinion and others disagreed with her. She did not act on her own nor cause any unpleasantness between the individual who made these remarks and the South Florida Regional Planning Council. In any case, Ms. Otto was given new duties and titled "Program Director for Management Services". She was given a list of responsibilities by Mr. Peterson, the Executive Director. These responsibilities included writing grant applications, preparing drafts of a cash flow sheet, and various other incidental duties. According to Mr. Peterson, Ms. Otto in these new responsibilities required specific instructions from him for much of what she did. He stated she did not do grant applications until he told her to and the one cash flow sheet she prepared was incomplete. Much of the above testimony was vague in that it was uncertain as to whether Ms. Otto had sufficient information at her immediate disposal to prepare a complete cash flow sheet and nothing appears to be inherently wrong with an employee waiting to be told what to do. Certainly, Ms. Otto displayed a lack of initiative, but this could be due to a lack of training in these new areas of responsibility. The most empirical testimony presented regarding Ms. Otto was that of her attendance at the Regional Planning Council. A scheduled breakdown of her absences, both with permission, without permission and unexplained was presented at this hearing. A chart, plus leave records were admitted as Counsel's Exhibit No. 5, which broke down Ms. Otto's attendance between April 5 and May 14, 1976. This exhibit was prepared by compiling the leave records and other notes kept by the staff of the Council with regard to Ms. Otto's attendance at the Council office. A compilation of approved and unapporved leave slips was taken from the records of that Council which was noted on the first page of Exhibit No. 5. Also, records kept by the receptionist as to Ms. Otto's. attendance were used to determine her "hours out of office." The remainder of the time unaccounted for by approved or unapproved leave slips completed the category captioned "No leave slip" which appears on the first page of this exhibit. The policy of the Regional Planning Council was that employees were requested to advise the receptionist where they were going upon leaving the office during working hours or where they would be if they would be coming in late. In this fashion, employees' whereabouts could be accounted for. This policy was not in any written form, but was an "understanding among the employees." It was apparently a practice that was generally followed by all Council employees. Actually, therefore, the hours captioned "No leave slip" indicates more accurately time Ms. Otto spent out of the office which was not specifically accounted for. It is entirely conceivable for all of the 36 1/2 hours listed for her in this category that she was out of the office on official business and merely did not advise the receptionist where she was going. No affirmative evidence was presented that Ms. Otto actually did not spend any of this time in an official capacity. Furthermore, there was no question that Ms. Otto was a professional employee of the Council and it would be unrealistic to expect a professional employee of the Council to work a time clock type schedule, particularly in view of the evidence that Ms. Otto spent considerable amounts of time at home and after hours and on weekends devoted to Council work. It is true that Ms. Otto apparently took 17 1/2 hours leave which was not approved by Mr. Peterson, her supervisor. However, with regard to the practice of Mr. Peterson in approving and not approving leave, testimony was clear that he routinely approved requests by all employees. What the evidence against Ms. Otto in this regard boils down to is that she neglected to get advance approval for leave during this period of time, which approval would customarily had been given. Had the Council thought this to be a serious infraction at the time, it appears certain that Ms. Otto would have been confronted with questions about her attendance and leave and been advised that she must more strictly account for her time and follow customary procedures in taking leave. However, this was not done and apparently the first Ms. Otto heard that there were questions about her attendance was when he was given a statement from the Council advising her of the reasons she was fired. On Ms. Otto's behalf several former employees of the Council testified that they found her performance at the Regional Planning Council to be an inspiration and a model of efficiency and administration. Ms. Otto on several occasions worked long hours, weekends and evenings on particular projects she was assigned and apparently did an extremely satisfactory job. Several employees stated that she was extremely helpful to them, displayed initiative and a very cooperative attitude.
Recommendation It is the finding of this Hearing Officer that the Respondent, South Florida Regional Planning Council, has failed to present by clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner, Joan Otto, was fired for good cause. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that she be reinstated to her former position with back pay. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. KENNETH G. OERTEL, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Myron Gold, Esquire 4651 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Allan Milledge, Esquire Milledge, Horn & Hermelee 2699 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= SOUTH FLORIDA REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL IN RE: DISMISSAL OF JOAN OTTO, CASE NO. 76-1337 /
The Issue Whether Respondent has failed to maintain the qualifications of a law enforcement officer to have good moral character, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on March 14, 1988, as a law enforcement officer, Certification Number 55408, and at all times relevant, the certification was active. Between November of 1993 and March of 1994, the Respondent was employed as a police officer with the Orlando Police Department. During this time, the Respondent was assigned to the Southeast Patrol Division during the midnight shift. In August of 1993, Yvette Jolene Bevivino (Bevivino) became acquainted with the Respondent. At the time Bevivino was employed at Shoney's Restaurant on the 1700 block of South Semoran in the City of Orlando as a Dining Room Supervisor. The Respondent would stop by at the restaurant and talk to Bevivino after she got off at work. The Respondent would usually stop by sometime between midnight to 2:00 a.m. to see her. Usually when the Respondent came to visit he was in uniform. There were, however, times when Respondent told her that he was working undercover. There were other instances that while Respondent was talking to her, he received a radio dispatch, and he would have to leave. Between November of 1993 and March of 1994, Bevivino and the Respondent would leave the restaurant area, go to a secluded location, and engage in sexual conduct. Bevivino and the Respondent engaged in sexual intercourse on two or three occasions. Bevivino performed oral copulation on the Respondent on one occasion, and she observed the Respondent masturbate on one occasion. Usually the liaisons were initiated by the Respondent stopping by the restaurant when she was getting off work. Bevivino would then follow the Respondent to a wooded area behind Denny's on State Road 436 by the airport. The Respondent was dressed in his uniform on each occasion and was driving an Orlando Police Department vehicle. At least some, if not all, of the sexual encounters were interrupted by the Respondent receiving a radio dispatch. If that occurred, the Respondent and Bevivino would complete the act and the Respondent would leave. The sexual encounters with Bevivino would last from 15 minutes to one hour and 15 minutes. On or about July 25, 1994, Sgt. Paul Rooney was employed by the Orlando Police Department and assigned to the Internal Affairs Division. The Respondent stated to Sgt. Rooney on July 25, 1994, and again on August 8, 1994, that he had been having sexual relations with a female while he was on duty and in uniform. On August 8, 1994, Sgt. Rooney formally interviewed the Respondent, and the Respondent was placed under oath prior to his interview. It was the policy of the Orlando Police Department that officers are available at all times they are on duty, even for meal breaks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993), and that Respondent's certification be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1997. Paul D. Johnston, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Andrew J. Sanderson 946 Malden Court Longwood, Florida 32750 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The question presented here concerns the entitlement of the Petitioner, Theodore D. Walker to be approved to serve as Chief of Security, Palm Beach Jai Alai, Palm Beach County, Florida, in the face of the Director, Division of Pari- Mutuel Wagering's disapproval of that request.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this cause, Theodore D. Walker, has made application to serve as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., in its fronton known as Palm Beach Jai Alai, Palm Beach County, Florida, for the seasons 1980-81. This request has been denied by the Respondent in the person of the Director of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering. The justification for this denial is premised upon the alleged conflict of interest between the employment responsibilities of the Petitioner in his part- time employment as Chief of Security at the Palm Beach Fronton and his primary duty responsibilities as Lead Investigator in the State Attorney's office, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, which is the State Attorney's office with jurisdiction over the County in which the Palm Beach Jai Alai is located. As authority for his denial, the Director has referred to Rule Subsections, 7E-3.03(11) and (12), Florida Administrative Code. 1/ The Petitioner has held seasonal employment as a security officer with the Fronton, Inc. in its West Palm Beach facility from 1965 until the Director's denial of approval which occurred on August 26, 1988. Beginning in 1972, Petitioner had been approved as Chief of Security at the aforementioned fronton. Walker has worked as an investigator in the State Attorney's office, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, continuously beginning in 1973, and at the time he was hired in his primary employment as investigator, he held the secondary employment as Chief of Security with the Palm Beach Fronton. The Honorable David Bludworth, State Attorney, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, knew of Mr. Walker's secondary employment as Chief of Security for the fronton when Walker was hired. Over the years, Walker has been promoted from the position of investigator to the position of Lead investigator. Presently his duties for the State Attorney's office involve assisting the attorneys in that office in the preparation of their cases for trial; original investigations that do not have their origins with other law enforcement agencies, in particular "white collar" crime, including public officials and law enforcement personnel and the primary responsibility to head up the "organized" crime unit of that State Attorney's office. In connection with his duties, the Petitioner is granted arrest powers and carries a weapon. As a full-time employee of the State, Walker is paid by the State of Florida. His salary is approximately $23,888 per year in contrast to his salary as a Chief of Security which has been in the amount of $14,888 for tax year, constituted of two meetings (seasons) at the fronton. (Pending the outcome of these matters, the Respondent's secondary employment with the Palm Beach Fronton, is that of floor supervisor at an undisclosed amount of compensation.) Walker's responsibilities as Chief of Security for the fronton include the hiring and supervising of security officers; the security of the physical plant at the fronton, to include the ejection of unruly patrons with the assistance of local law enforcement; initial contact with individuals over betting disputes which are ultimately referred to the Respondent; initial investigation of irregularities involving the computer system utilized by the fronton in running its facility; supervision of watchmen; initial investigation of matters involving betting on credit; investigation of shortages of money involving employees of the Fronton end prohibiting prostitutes and "book makers" from plying their trades on the fronton premises. In connection with his duties as Chief of Security, the Petitioner has no special expertise in the field of computers. When the Director of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering disapproved the Respondent's request to serve as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., he contended and continues to hold that belief, that the Petitioner's dual employment as Investigator for the State Attorney's office and as Chief of Security for the fronton, would serve to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the sport of jai alai and, therefore, was not in the best interest of the pari-mutuel industry. Consequently there was ample cause to reject Walker's request, according to the Director. In elaborating on his position, the Director expressed the opinion that law enforcement type officials should not be allowed to hold secondary employment in a fronton in a capacity as security official within the same geographical area in which the individual applicant has law enforcement responsibilities. To that end, six to eight other individuals, excluding the Petitioner, have also been disapproved as security officials at pari-mutuel wagering establishments, following the Walker disapproval. Gary Rutledge, Director of the Division of Pari- Mutuel Wagering in stating the reasons for denying Walker's request, goes on to say that the Chief of Security is a primary person responsible for detecting violations of law at the fronton and Rutledge has a concern that those matters might not be investigated by the Chief of Security or that the appearance might be created that the matters might not be investigated. Moreover, the Director worries about the potential flow of information from the State Attorney's office to the fronton, in particular, when there is, in his mind, the aura of "organized crime" which surrounds the pari- mutuel wagering industry. In response to concerns referred to above, neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent has shown any acts of impropriety on the part of Walker in serving in the capacity as Investigator for the State Attorney's office or in his part-time employment as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., or do they have any reason to suspect that Walker is less than a man of utmost integrity in his profession and in his private life. There was, however, one instance in 1978, in which a fire occurred at the Palm Beach Fronton and State Attorney Bludworth made the judgment not to allow Walker to serve as State Attorney Investigator on that case, in which arson was suspected. This decision on Bludworth's part was made to protect against the appearance that might be created that as investigator to the prosecutor, some special knowledge and advantage could possibly be afforded to Walker in his role as Chief of Security for the fronton. Although Walker was above reproach in this matter, the State Attorney lost the advantage of his services as investigator in a circumstance wherein other law enforcement officials felt that it would have been extremely helpful to have Walker serving in his primary duty as State Attorney Investigator in attempting to solve the arson case. This instance points up the viability of the Director's argument on the issue of public confidence in the industry, in particular, in avoiding the appearance of fraud or dishonesty in that industry, and it is no less valid in the face of Walker's insistence that he would step down in future cases such as the 1978 incident and the State Attorney's indication that he would give serious consideration to the role that Walker would play in investigations involving incidences at the fronton in West Palm Beach. As stated before, criminal acts have occurred at the fronton and it is a reasonable expectation those events shall take place in the future. Alleged conflict of interest is the only ground upon which the Petitioner has been denied his request to act as Chief of Security at the Palm Beach Fronton. There has been some suggestion concerning a rumor that the Director had denied the application based upon a lack of good moral character on the part of the Petitioner and the ensuing effect that this has had on the community, and in particular, the black community in Palm Beach County of which the Petitioner is a member; however, Director Rutledge has never offered lack of good moral character as a reason for denying the permit application, and his decision to deny Walker's application was not racially motivated.
Conclusions The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that it is a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that the Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that on or about December 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a certification certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the public employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Patrolmen, Patrolmen 1st class, Master Patrolmen, Evidence Technician, and Traffic Enforcement officer. EXCLUDED: All other employees of the Ocala Police Department including Sergeants who are shift commanders. The pleadings establish that during 1972, the Respondent, by and through its City Council, promulgated a City Ordinance (Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code) which regulates labor relations for its employees. Chapter 13B has remained in full force and effect and has never been approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission pursuant to Section 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Among other things, the ordinance provides that: "Solicitation for membership in a labor organization or the collection of dues therefor, or other internal affairs of a labor organization shall not be con- ducted by employees on working time, or on city premises. Labor organization literature, pamphlets, handbills and the like shall not be distributed in the work areas of the city premises at any time." (See Section 13B-8.) A summary review of the parties' joint exhibits demonstrate that Chapter 13B attempts to regulate nearly all aspects of a collective bargaining relationship. In PERC v. The City of Naples, 327 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) the court determined that an entity may not assume jurisdiction of a public employee bargaining procedure until PERC has approved that procedure. In this case, no such approval has been granted by PERC as it is required pursuant to 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Further comparison of the provisions of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code and Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, lends support to the conclusion that Respondent's employees' collective bargaining rights are not on a parity with those rights guaranteed them by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. For example, 13B-1(c) of the ordinance defines "supervisor" and section 13B-1(b) defines "employee". Supervisors are excluded from the definition of employee and thereby from collective bargaining whereas Chapter 447 contains no definition of supervisor and the Commission consistently determines that supervisors are entitled to protections guaranteed by Chapter 447. See CWA and Hillsborough County Hospital and Welfare Board, case no. 8H- RC-752-0175, 2 FPER 46 (1976); Hillsborough County PBA and Florida State Lodge, FOP and City of Tampa, 2 FPER 72 (1976). Additional distinctions are found respecting the definition of confidential employees and the determination by despondent in its code of "bargainable" subjects. It was noted that Respondent does not consider itself required to negotiate with respect to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. See the May Department Stores Co., 191 NLRB 928 (1972). While Chapter 447 vests all authority respecting appropriate unit placement of employees with PERC, Chapter 13B-2(b)(1) authorized Respondent's City Manager to make such determinations. A further examination of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code reveals that it makes a striking distinction between the authority guaranteed employees respecting the proper bounds for solicitation-distribution rules. Chapter 447.509, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that during an employee's lunch hour, an employer may not restrict solicitation and distribution whereas Chapter 13B of the Respondent's Code restricts solicitation and distribution during working time and on the premises of the City, making no exception or distinction for lunch breaks and therefore Respondent's maintenance of such provisions amounts to unlawful interference, restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Although the Respondent defends in part on the fact that no employee had been disciplined for violating the above referenced rules, legions of cases have held that the maintenance, without enforcement of an overly broad solicitation-distribution rule constitutes an unfair labor practice. (See for example Essex International, Inc., 211 NLRB 934, 86 LRRM 1411; Dreis and Krump Manufacturing, Inc., 221 NLRB 309, 90 LRRM 1647 (1975).
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to: A. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them under the Florida Public Employees Relations Act; that it will upon request of the above-named employee organization, rescind the applicability of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code as it relates to the regulation of organizational rights of employees, without having been first approved by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Seymour H. Rowland, Jr., Esquire 105 Legal Center 19 N.W. Pine Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Jane Rigler, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald D. Slesnick, II, Esquire 2540 N.W. 29th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142
The Issue Whether the Respondent's suspension of Petitioner was in compliance with Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 22A-7 and 22A-10, Florida Administrative Code. Whether the Respondent's suspension of Petitioner should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact C. R. Dykes is a State Trooper employed by Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, in the Division of Florida Highway Patrol in Pensacola, Florida. By certified mail letter dated September 30, 1977, Trooper Dykes, the Petitioner, was notified that he was being suspended for twenty-four (24) hours (three work days) without pay by the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Florida Highway Patrol, for: Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee and Negligence of Duty, as a result of your failure to accept witness subpoenas, and your contact with civil deputies of Escambia County, Florida . . . (Y)ou failed to accept witness subpoenas and repeatedly used profanity when discussing these subpoenas with civil deputies of Escambia County. Trooper Dykes appealed this suspension. Petitioner presented testimony and documentary evidence that at least on one occasion the Respondent did not appear for a contested hearing before the County Court of Escambia County after a witness subpoena had been issued for him and the subpoena was served on Respondent by leaving it with Operator Wise at the distribution center at the Patrol Station. The subpoena was not picked up by the Respondent and the Respondent informed the court that he had not received the subpoena. On July 6, 1977, Trooper Dykes was served with a Grand Jury subpoena by Lieutenant G. C. Wiggins and Sergeant W. A. Clark who supervised Trooper Dykes and the other State Troopers in the Pensacola District. Personal service was deemed necessary. Testimony was entered that because of previous difficulty in serving subpoenas upon Trooper Dykes in the customary manner by having the Troopers pick up their subpoenas from the Radio/Teletype Operators of the Pensacola Florida Highway Patrol Station, Deputy D. L. Roland, Escambia County Sheriff's Office, served a witness subpoena upon Trooper Dykes by serving it at Trooper Dykes' home through his wife, Mrs. Dykes, who accepted service with no apparent objections at 1:30 p.m. on Friday, July 22, 1977. Trooper Dykes called Sergeant Vince Seely, now Lieutenant Seely, thereafter at 4:00 pm, on July 22, 1977, to complain about the witness subpoena served at his home address rather than at the Florida Highway Patrol Station. Lt. Seely testified that during the telephone conversation Trooper Dykes yelled into the telephone, cursed Lt. Seely and the Sheriff's Office, made unfounded accusations, and displayed unprofessional behavior, attitude, and lack of cooperation. The Respondent contended that the telephone conversation was strictly between Sergeant Seely and the Respondent; the service of the subpoena was not urgent; that 1:15 p.m. is not a reasonable time of day for a person working from midnight to 8 o'clock in the morning; that the birth of a child was imminent; and that the subpoena could have been left at the station rather than have been served at his home. There was some evidence presented that the Respondent "gave the dispatchers a hard time who informed him they had a subpoena for him."
Recommendation Sustain the agency action of suspension of Petitioner for the period of 24 hours without pay. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: C. R. Dykes 644 Timber Ridge Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
