The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a variance to permit an onsite treatment and disposal system should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The lot of land for which the Bank seeks a variance for an onsite sewage treatment and disposal system is located at 341 Compass Lake Drive in Jackson County, Florida. The lot is approximately 40 feet wide and 300 feet deep, with approximately 40 feet of frontage on Compass Lake. Prior to its severance in 2010, the lot was part of a larger parcel of land with an address of 343 Compass Drive in Jackson County. The larger parcel was owned by Charles Paulk and had substantial improvements consisting of a house, boathouse, and dock. In 2004, Mr. Paulk borrowed money from the Bank and gave the Bank a mortgage lien on the entire larger parcel to secure the loan. At some point, a survey was prepared which subdivided the larger parcel into two lots -- the first containing the substantial improvements, and the other consisting of the approximately 40-foot by 300-foot lot at issue, which is .28 acres in size, with no improvements. There is no indication that the survey was ever recorded in the public records. Later, in 2010, Mr. Paulk decided to sell the lot with the substantial improvements for $330,000. Because the Bank had a lien on the entire larger parcel, Mr. Paulk requested that the Bank release its lien on the lot with the substantial improvements. The Bank agreed to release its lien on the lot with substantial improvements and, after receiving what the Bank felt was a “sufficient pay-down” on the loan, shifted its lien to the smaller, unimproved lot that is at issue in this case. The sale and release of lien transaction “substantially reduced the loan versus the collateral value” that the Bank previously had. According to the Bank’s Senior Vice President, James Goodson, after the sale transaction, there was “not a lot of money left on the loan ” Mr. Goodson testified that, at the time that the Bank agreed to release its lien on the substantially improved lot and shift its lien to the remaining unimproved lot, it was unaware that a variance would be required for an onsite sewage treatment and disposal system (septic tank) on the unimproved lot. The facts as outlined above, however, demonstrate that the Bank was an active participant and beneficiary of the transaction that ultimately resulted in the creation of the two lots, one of which was the approximately 40-foot by 300-foot unimproved lot at issue in this case. In 2012, Mr. Paulk experienced financial problems and was having difficulty paying back the loan to the Bank secured by the unimproved lot. Because it was easier than foreclosure, the Bank agreed to take a deed to the unimproved lot in lieu of foreclosure.1/ At the time of the Bank’s release of lien in 2010, as well as at the time of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the 40- foot by 300-foot lot size of the unimproved lot was too small to meet the statutory requirements for a septic permit. Mr. Goodson testified that, at the time that the Bank accepted the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the Bank was aware that the lot was too small and would need a variance for a septic tank. He did not explain, however, why the Bank had earlier been unaware of the need for a variance when it agreed to release its lien on the substantially improved lot in 2010. After the Bank acquired title to the unimproved lot, a third party offered to purchase it on the condition that the Bank could obtain a permit. The Bank went to Jackson County to request a permit, knowing that its request would be denied because the lot size was insufficient for a septic tank without a variance. Nevertheless, the Bank believed that it would qualify for a variance on hardship grounds because it did not “intentionally” create the hardship. The Bank commenced the permitting process by submitting an application with the Jackson County Health Department on October 4, 2012. The County denied the application on the grounds that the lot was deficient in width and total area. Next, the Bank submitted a request to the Department for a variance. The request was considered by the Department’s Variance Review and Advisory Committee (Committee) on December 6, 2012. The Committee has only recommending authority to the State Health Officer. In a four to three vote, the Committee recommended approval of a variance. The members voting against a recommendation for approval were representatives of the State Health Office, the Department of Environmental Protection, and the County Health Department. Eight objections from adjacent property owners were provided to the Committee’s review and consideration. After considering the facts, including the decision of the County Health Department, objections filed by adjacent property owners, actions taken by the Bank, and the recommendations of all the members of the Committee, Gerald Briggs, Bureau Chief for Onsite Sewage Programs for the Department of Health, made the Department’s preliminary decision that the Bank’s variance request should be denied, concluding, among other things, that “[a]ny perceived hardship that [the Bank] might experience as a result of the obligation to meet established standards comes about as a direct result of your own proposed action.” Likewise, considering the facts and evidence as presented in this case, the undersigned finds, as a matter of fact, that the Bank intentionally participated in and benefitted from the transaction that resulted in the hardship posed by the small lot size that it now owns and for which it seeks a variance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a Final Order denying SunSouth Bank’s application for a variance. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2014.
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice contracting, license number CG C033931, based on the violations of Section 489.129(1), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following facts are found: Reeves is a Florida State certified general contractor, having been issued license number CG C033931 by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (CILB). Licensure status is "Active Issued." Reeves is registered or certified with the CILB as an individual. The Scope of the Project Sometime prior to October 1998, Beach retired, came to Florida, and needed a place to live, so she decided to ultimately reside in a trailer. Beach has health problems, which require special living accommodations and changes to the trailer she purchased, including ramps and a bathroom to facilitate the needs of a handicapped person. Beach was unfamiliar with trailer life and wanted to ensure that her trailer was "fastened securely to the ground." Based on suggestions made by three (3) different contractors, Beach decided to design a "roof over coming out eight feet on either side of the existing trailer and tying it to the ground securely so that the trailer was then encased in the roofing over." Beach developed the plans for the project, which were approved by the local planning and zoning department. After discussing the matter with Reeves, Beach also decided to have porches on both sides of the trailer, "taking advantage of the overhang that the roofing-over afforded." Beach and Reeves discussed other details, such as the need for a walk- in closet off of the bedroom, a whirlpool tub, replacement of the upper kitchen cupboards, improvement of the duct work in the kitchen and living areas, screening of the front porch and windows on the back porch (a sun room), enlargement of the bathroom and made "handicap-accessible," and replacement of the doors and ramps. The Written Proposal and "Extras" On or about November 2, 1998, Reeves entered into a written contractual agreement, i.e., the "Proposal" dated October 26, 1998, with Beach, to construct addition(s) and other items to her trailer-home located at 2170 Maryland Street, Lanark Village, Florida. The written Proposal states in material part: We will supply all labor and materials to complete the following at your residence: Build a new freestanding roof over existing trailer and extend roofline to cover front and back porches. Build a new front porch with approximately an 8' x 24' screen section and ramp on opposite end. Rebuild back porch to 8' x 24' and install windows. Enlarge bathroom and make a walk-in closet. Inspect and improve existing duct work for better air flow. Enclose gable ends of new roof and tie in to existing trailer. Install new upper cabinets in kitchen (allowance $500.00). WE WILL PERFORM THIS WORK FOR THE SUM OF $20,900.00) (TWENTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED DOLLARS). Beach agreed to make payments "as work progresses." The original contract price for the additions to the trailer was $20,900.00. The Proposal contained no language of access to the Construction Industry Licensing Fund. At the time of executing the Proposal, Reeves told Beach that a subcontractor was not necessary for the electrical and plumbing work. Reeves and Beach also discussed several "extras" which were added to the Proposal. Beach and Reeves made a verbal agreement for additions or extras to the original Proposal that included siding ($2,700.00), a fireplace, and an extension of one of the ramps, in exchange for not replacing the cabinets. These changes increased the total contract price to $24,200.00, which was paid by Beach. See Finding of Fact 33. Also in November 1998, and before she signed the Proposal, Beach prepared a list, in her handwriting, of plumbing and kitchen items she saw at Home Depot, which she needed for the job and she gave the list to Reeves. According to Beach, Reeves "followed through and got everything [on the list] except for the shower door." Reeves applied with the Franklin County Building and Zoning Department for permits to perform the work on the Beach trailer and the permits were issued. The Franklin County Building Code requires inspections, but does not state when they are to be performed. It is not unusual to perform more than one inspection at a time, especially where, like Franklin County, there is only one inspector for the entire County. Reeves did not ask for an inspection of the work done on the trailer. Work begins on the trailer and problems arise After the Proposal was signed and the verbal additional items agreed to, on November 4, 1998, Reeves commenced work on the project. At this time, Beach was living in a motor home. The roof line built by Reeves covered the back and front porches. Reeves built a new front porch with an approximately an eight foot by twenty-four foot screen porch and a ramp on the opposite end as required by the Proposal. He also added three other ramps, which are not mentioned in the Proposal. By letter dated April 15, 1999, Beach responded to an invoice submitted to her by Reeves. The record does not contain a copy of the invoice, which seems to have been dated March 31, 1999. However, Beach's letter indicates that Reeves submitted a bill for an additional $4,240.00 (which did not include $2,700.00 for siding), above the original Proposal price of $20,900.00. Beach says that only $975.00 are valid charges for "verbally agreed upon additions to the contract." (Beach says that she paid Reeves $600.00 for the extras which was included in her check of December 16, 1998, for $5,000.00.) Reeves' invoice was the first bill for any extras discussed by Beach and Reeves. According to Beach, they discussed the necessity of having additional ramps, and Reeves did not say there would be an additional charge, and it was discussed "as if it was part of the ongoing project." According to Beach, work progressed through November and slowed during Thanksgiving week. Into December, Beach says that Reeves came to the work site "less and less" and the workmen did not have either the necessary materials or equipment and also came "less and less." She tried to contact Reeves. According to Pendleton, who worked for Reeves on the Beach project, for the first three weeks to a month after commencing the project, Reeves was on-site every day. According to Pendleton, the job took longer than expected because of the many changes requested by Beach. For example, after the trailer was "roofed," Beach "wanted her outside ceiling closed into her trailer." They added "a furnace on the back porch," "put marble sills in her window of her trailer," and "furred out her whole wall to put paneling on the trailer." The original plans called for one ramp, but three were added. As work progressed, Beach expressed objections to Reeves regarding the workmanship on the screened-in porch and floorboards and the need to eliminate bugs from entry. They also discussed the build-up of heat in the roof because the roof was "trapping hot air in." Reeves treated the roof area, an extra, which Beach acknowledges. Beach reported other problems to Reeves, including but not limited to, a leak in the shower and an unsealed drain in the shower, which caused a flood in the bathroom, and "a two-foot hole cut in the floor around the plumbing that was left open to the outside." This was on the punch list she gave to Reeves. She pled with Reeves to finish the job, but he said that "[t]his w[ould] be the last day [he would] be coming" and that "he had other things he had to do." According to Beach, "things deteriorated," and she saw very little of Reeves into January and did not see much of him at all by the end of January. Beach was frightened and did not know what to do but "struggled along with [Reeves'] workmen," i.e., Richard Norman (Norman) and Pendleton, the main workmen, who did the plumbing for the shower. When Reeves was no longer on-site daily or all day, Norman and Pendleton were on-site. Another worker, Bob Lanceford quit because of the changes requested by Beach and her "flip- flopping." At some point in time after the trailer roof-over was completed and other work performed, including work on the back porch, Reeves and Beach discussed the punch lists written by both and that he had given the list to his workmen. Beach recalls the conversation and that Reeves said it was going to be his last day there. Beach recalls Norman staying to finish the skirting and Jody Fechera putting the siding on the inside of the sun porch, but that "the guys really didn't work on [the punch list] that much." Beach felt that she had to supervise Pendleton regarding hooking up the shower during this two-week period. Pendleton says that he and the others were working off of the list Reeves gave him during the last couple of weeks he was on the Beach job. Pendleton could not get the work done on the list because Beach "stood over [them] telling [them] to do other things and [they] never could get to that list." The list included adding hurricane clips and exterior work. None of these tasks were completed. Pendleton recalls Reeves telling him that he and "Rich" would have to leave the Beach site in a couple of days and to make Beach happy because they could not return until Edwards returned. Pendleton understood that they were to return to the Beach site and finish the job after Edwards finished the plumbing and electrical work. There is a dispute whether, during a two-week period after the punch lists were written, Beach was supervising Reeves' workmen including Pendleton. In or around the end of February 1999, Reeves advised Beach of problems he was having with the bathtub and needed Edwards "to do it." Reeves also needed Edwards, licensed to do plumbing and electrical work, to move the electrical panel box, which was accomplished. According to Beach, this was the first time Reeves advised Beach that he could not do plumbing or electrical work. Beach says that Reeves told her on the day they signed the Proposal that he would not have to subcontract for any of the plumbing and electrical work. Reeves admitted to doing plumbing and electrical work on this and other projects, although both of these types of work require specific licenses. Reeves recommended to Beach that Edwards perform these tasks. According to Pendleton, Edwards was "to come over and do all of the plumbing and wiring." It took Edwards quite a while to get to the Beach project. Edwards "pulled the permit for the electrical unit." He "made the old panel hot." He installed the breaker box and connected it to Beach's trailer. Edwards fixed the shower head and the drain plug, which was a major leak. He also fixed the plumbing. Edwards fixed some other problems he noticed, but he did not know whether these problems pre-dated Reeves' tenure on the project. In October 1998 and prior to Reeves' commencing work on the Proposal, Beach had a man drilling a well on her property. In February or March of 1999, Beach "got the idea of moving the tank back . . .." Edwards came to the Beach trailer on March 10, 1999, and installed the electrical panel and moved the tank at the same time. It took Edwards a few weeks to accomplish these tasks from the time Reeves and Beach discussed these items. Beach paid Edwards to move the electrical panel to the end of the house and move the water tank and installing it under the carport and some electrical and plumbing repairs. Beach paid Edwards $1,580.00, of which $700.00 of the bill, according to Beach, was for correcting plumbing and electrical errors made by Reeves or his workmen. In early March 1999, Ron Jackson (Jackson) advised Beach that Reeves had "run up a $9,435[.00] bill" at Ace Hardware in her name which remained unpaid and that a lien would be filed on her house. At this time, Beach filed a complaint with the local building department and hired an attorney to assist her with the lien. Apparently the lien was not timely filed and not successfully pursued. Beach also filed a complaint with the Department. Beach was unaware of any amount still owed on her job to others, which Reeves performed and did not pay. By letter dated March 30, 1999, Reeves apologized to Beach for not paying Jackson timely and told Beach he intended to pay Jackson, whether Beach paid him or not. On March 17, and April 21, 1999, a hearing was held before the Franklin County Construction Industry Licensing Board. This Board issued a verbal warning to Reeves "for operating outside his scope of work in the field of electrical and plumbing." Reeves advised the Board that he would not "do any electrical or plumbing until he is licensed to do the work or he will hire license[d] people." On April 7, 1999, Beach, having been living in a motor home during this time, decided to live in the trailer and discovered the flooding problems in the bathroom; everything in the kitchen leaked; and the commode was unsteady and leaked. Reeves returned to "stabilize it," but apparently Beach had to pay Edwards to repair the leaks in the bathroom. At some time after March, Reeves ceased performing on the project altogether. The project was not complete. Beach pays Reeves By check, Beach paid Reeves $4,000.00 on November 11, 1998, to get started; $10,000.00 on November 12, 1998; $2,500.00 on November 20, 1998; $5,000.00 (which included an estimated cost of $600.00 for extras according to Beach) on December 16, 1998; and $2,700.00 (for siding which was an agreed-upon extra) on January 28, 1999, for a total of $24,200.00. Beach had to estimate how much the extra work performed would cost based on the verbal price given by Reeves. The January check was the price for constructing a new one-sided exterior portion, along with the insulation, of the trailer. Beach paid out-of-pocket expenses on repairs and estimates for work which arguably should have been done pursuant to the Proposal and agreed-upon extras. These total approximately $2,560.29. See (Pet. Exh. 5- $990.29; Pet. Exh. 7- $120.00; Pet. Exh. 8- $750.00; and, Pet. Exh. 13- $700.00). Beach also paid for other estimates and repairs as noted herein which were not proven to be directly connected to work performed or not performed by Reeves. See, e.g., Findings of Fact 37-38. Problems identified with the condition of the trailer During the final hearing, Beach identified several photographs, she took over a period of time-April through June, 1999-of her trailer from the inside and outside and identified various problems with the workmanship performed or not performed by Reeves. According to Beach, the photographs show the trailer "after Mr. Reeves finished the project, or Mr. Reeves worked on the house." These problems included an outside electrical switch installed with wires exposed; exposed receptacle outlet; unfinished bathroom trim, which was minor according to Beach; fan cover left hanging on the kitchen ceiling; exposed hole around light fixture in the closet, which Norman could not repair; a fan hanging down in the bathroom, with hole cut too large; water running out from the shower because of an improper drain installation; unsealed shower drain; shower door leak-not caulked; no cutoff valve on the toilet; unsteady commode; no insulation and unprotected plumbing coming up through a hole where the bath tub is located; marble skirt to whirlpool tub destroyed by Edwards' men who had to cut through the marble in order to access the tub; panel to tub which is open and allows air and bugs to enter; tub motor not plugged into a ground fault receptacle; drywall in the bedroom closet, which was new construction, which had to be torn out to repair; wet carpeting which had to be removed; leak in the shower caused by brass plug in plastic line; support posts under the roof not nailed and without hurricane clips (photographs taken in August 1999 after Summerhill and some of the neighbors told her there were no nails on that side of the house holding the roof down); and exposed rafters which allowed squirrels to run down the chimney. Beach asked Greg Mathis, a licensed (City of Tallahassee) plumber, to determine the extent of repairs which were required on her trailer. On or about November 18, 1999, Mathis examined the plumbing in the Beach trailer and gave Beach an estimate for the repairs and charged $135.00 for the estimate, which included his travel time to the Beach trailer in Carrabelle. Mathis charged Beach $670.00 for the repairs including $445.00 for labor and $225.00 for materials. The repairs included applying putty and installing a Delta repair kit on a new faucet in the kitchen; repair of a "fairly new drain" which was leaking in the lavatory; resetting of the toilet which was wobbling and application of caulk; replacement of the whirlpool stopper; repairing the "whole tub waste"; and connection of a drain to a bar sink, which had hot and cold water to it. Mathis also gave Beach an estimate of $185.29 to repair the shower drain and valve. Mathis was unaware who did the plumbing he saw. Brian Will has a State certified building license. Beach asked him to inspect her trailer and give her an estimate of the costs for repair. Will performed a site visit to Beach's trailer on November 22, 1999, and charged Beach $175.00, after a $175.00 Christmas discount, for the inspection and written report dated December 16, 1999. After inspecting the trailer, Will identified problems with the trailer, including a recommendation that Beach secure an engineering report on the foundation, roof framing and uplift connections; installation of a "properly ducted and vented (range termination kit) range hood" in the kitchen; insulate ceiling; improvement to the fireplace clearance; increase vent attic space; and other items. The fireplace issue and "wind loading connection" could be life safety issues. The estimated cost was $9,375.00, although Will stated he is "seldom the low bid guy." Will did not review the Proposal nor the plans and specifications. Will did not know what Reeves and his workmen did or did not do on the Beach trailer. He made no assumptions as to who did any of the work on the trailer. Beach told him that someone added some additional hurricane clips and installed a gable vent or fan. She did not comment to him whether Reeves finished the job. Will identified portions of the trailer that did not appear to him to be finished and that did not meet the building code. Robert J. Pietras, while not a licensed contractor, is a self-employed laborer and has experience in construction, "everything from footers on up to trim carpentry." In or around September 1999, Beach asked him to inspect the trailer and determine what was necessary to make the trailer stronger for hurricane resistance. He found eleven (11) hurricane clips missing and a support post holding up a carrying beam that was not nailed. Some hurricane clips had been placed and set right on the rafters, but the job was incomplete. There were no uplift straps on any of the exterior beams. However, he felt he needed to remove the paneling on the back porch to add the clips from the inside. Pietras could not say whether there were hurricane clips on the outside soffitt. He made the changes. Pietras was also told, by John Summerhill, there was insufficient ventilation in the attic or roof-over, so he added a commercial louver and also framed up to add a fan to draw excess heat. Pietras agreed that if the new enclosed roof-over, constructed by Reeves, had not been enclosed, there would not have been any ventilation problem. He was paid $30.00 for adding the hurricane clips and the tie-down straps. He was not paid approximately $90.00 for work done. Any additional work he recommended was put on hold. Summerhill has air conditioning and electrical licenses and has been in business in Franklin County since 1991. Beach asked him to inspect her trailer and identify electrical problems in or around September 1999. Summerhill did not see the Beach/Reeves Proposal and was unaware of the scope of Reeves' work, including what Reeves did or did not do regarding any electrical problems perceived by Summerhill. However, Beach told him that Reeves did all of the electrical and plumbing. He noticed the absence of hurricane clips on the outside and that a four-by-four post on the south corner did not have nails in the top. He charged Beach $150.00 to install an exhaust in the attic for ventilation which Beach paid. Summerhill also noticed other problems with, for example, waterproof covers needed for the receptacle and switch on the porch, need for ground fault receptacles, and other items. He quoted $600.00 for labor and materials to make these repairs and replace needed items. Summary of work left undone and repairs needed The Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Beach and Reeves agreed to the terms of the Proposal and several extras; that Beach paid Reeves $24,200.00, which exceeded the amount originally quoted in the Proposal, i.e., $20,900.00, and included payment for extras, including $2,700.00 for siding and $600.00/$5,000.00 for other extras; that the workmanship performed by Reeves, and others on his behalf, was incomplete and in some cases poorly done which required repairs by others; that Beach paid for repairs; that Reeves left the project with work outstanding; that Reeves, and or his workmen, performed electrical and plumbing services while not being licensed; and that Reeves did not refer to the Construction Industry Recovery Fund in the written Proposal. The Department also proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Beach trailer is in need of substantial repairs and further inspections. See, e.g., Findings of Fact 37-38. However, and in particular, Will, who performed a major inspection of the trailer, did not review the Proposal or the plans and specifications and did not know what Reeves and his workmen did nor did not do on the Beach trailer. Therefore, the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Reeves was responsible for the repairs suggested by Will. Mitigation Reeves has built several State Housing Initiative Partnership (SHIP) homes for the SHIP program in Franklin County to the satisfaction of the County's SHIP administrator, Ms. Shirley Walker. Ms. Walker was not aware of any complaints with Reeves' work over the past four (4) years. Probable Cause is found by the CILB On September 27, 2000, a two-member panel of the CILB found probable cause against Reeves. There was no finding of "no probable cause" by the CILB regarding the Reeves and Beach matter which is the subject of this proceeding. Reeves' prior disciplinary history Reeves has a prior disciplinary history with the CILB and the Department regarding his license. On October 8, 1992, in Case No. 91-11103, the CILB imposed an administrative fine of $1,700.00. On October 24, 1996, the CILB, in Case No. 95-07490, imposed an administrative fine of $2,000.00, restitution of $28,501.39 based on an unsatisfied civil judgment, $119.53 in costs, and two (2) years of probation. Both cases were resolved without a final evidentiary hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be rendered as follows: Suspending Reeves' licenses to practice contracting for six (6) months, requiring Reeves to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00, and requiring Reeves to complete continuing education, with the subjects and hours to be determined by the CILB. Assessing costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with an attorney’s time, in the amount of $1,302.91. Requiring Reeves to pay restitution to Beach in the amount of $2,560.29, representing the amounts paid by Beach for estimates and for work performed or ill-performed by Reeves which, on this record, are attributable to Reeves. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick Creehan, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Danny L. Reeves 267 Carroll Street Eastpoint, Florida 32328 Kathleen O'Dowd, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Bayhead Landings Property Owners Association, Inc.; Kimberly Lee, president; William Barthle, Architectural Review Committee (ARC) member; and Tony Kolka, ARC member, discriminated against John and Kimberly Whitt,1/ on the basis of Mr. Whitt's physical handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act), and, if so, the relief to which Petitioners are entitled.
Findings Of Fact Bayhead Landings Subdivision (Bayhead) is a deed- restricted community for which the Bayhead Landings Property Owners Association, Inc., was organized to operate and administer. Deed restrictions have been in place since 1990 and will continue in place until at least January 2031.4/ It remains unclear how many Bayhead parcels front the lake in question. There are four to five existing docks in that lake; however, none of those existing docks extend more than 80 to 100 feet into the lake. The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Bayhead provide in pertinent part: 6.(a) For the purpose of further insuring the development of said land as a residential/agricultural area of highest quality and standard, and in order that all improvements on each lot shall present an attractive and pleasing appearance from all sides of view, there shall be a Committee consisting of no less than three (3) persons appointed to review plans and specifications, . . . . (b) The Committee reserves the exclusive power and discretion to control and approve all of the buildings, structures and other improvements on each lot or parcel in the manner and to the extent set forth herein. No residence, . . . or other structure or improvement, regardless of size or purpose . . . shall be commenced, placed, erected or allowed to remain on any lot or parcel, . . . unless and until building plans and specifications covering same showing the shape, height, size, location and orientation on the lot, floor plans, square footage, front, side and rear elevations, materials to be incorporated and exterior color schemes . . . have been submitted to and approved in writing by the Committee. * * * (d) As a prerequisite to consideration for approval, and prior to commencement of the contemplated work, a complete set of plans and specifications must be submitted to the Committee. . . . . The purpose of the ARC is to ensure that any development in Bayhead maintains the "community standards and deed restrictions" and is of the "highest quality and standard." To ensure that goal is met, the ARC is to receive a complete set of plans and specifications prior to the work starting. Mr. Whitt has a physical handicap as defined by the Act, section 760.22(7)(a). Mr. Whitt is confined to a wheelchair for mobility. The Whitts' backyard property has a significant slope downhill or drop-off towards the lake. The area between the house and the lake is muddy for a long distance, the terrain is uneven, and it is not suitable for a wheelchair to traverse. No evidence was received as to the actual distances between the house and either the drop-off area or where the terrain becomes uneven in the Whitts' backyard. The water level in the lake has been relatively low for some time; however, there is some water in it now. On September 7, 2010, Mr. Whitt submitted a proposed estimate and architectural review application to Respondents' ARC, seeking approval to construct a stationary dock on the Whitts' property (dock application). This dock application was the first received by the ARC in many years, and there is no evidence of any prior applications to build a stationary dock.5/ The dock application (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) included a three-page proposal (Proposal) from Coastal Construction; Gulfside Docks6/ that included the following "SPECIFICATIONS": Timber Piles 2.5CCA • Frame/Stringers/Caps 2" x 8" • Dock Lumber Pressure Treated .40 • Dock Bolts 5/8" HDG • SS Nails/Screws The Proposal also contained the following "STATIONARY DOCK" information: Construct new 300' x 5' dock with 20 x 16 head. We will add 2" x 2" lumber along perimeter of dock to act as bumper system Decking will be #1 pressure treated decking. Stainless Steel Screws will be used to secure deck boards The dock application did not contain any specific references to the dock being "wheelchair accessible"; however, it did contain information about a bumper system. The second proposal (Petitioners' Exhibit 10) contained the same "SPECIFICATIONS." The second proposal contained similar information regarding the "STATIONARY DOCK"; however, the language regarding the bumper system was altered to reflect "Install 2" x 2" wheel chair safety bumper around entire perimeter of dock - Approx. 663'LF. Stainless steel screws will be used as fasteners." On September 19, 2010, William Barthle, a member of the ARC, sent an e-mail to Mr. Whitt. The e-mail provided Mr. Whitt with a portion of Bayhead's deed restrictions and requested "WE NEED A DIAGRAM OF DOCKS [sic] PLACEMENT ON PROPERTY AS REFERENCED IN DOCS." On September 27, 2010, Mr. Whitt sent a plat map to the ARC with a hand-drawn dock sketched on it. The hand-drawing was not to scale and failed to provide detailed measurements of where the dock was to begin in relation to the residence or shed that were already on the property. Further, there was no rendering of what the dock itself would look like. On October 10, 2010, the ARC sent Mr. Whitt a letter requesting four specific items in order for the ARC to consider the dock application, including: Square footage of dock Height of dock The exact location of the dock on your property (distance from your house and distance from property line on each side, distance from any setback easement, or wetlands buffer boundary) A letter from Southwest Florida Water Management District approving the placement, length and location (starting/ending) of the dock Mr. Whitt's June 22, 2011, response letter (eight months later) to the request failed to provide the requested information. As of December 12, 2012, the Whitts had not provided the requested information. Mr. Barthle and Graeme Woodbrook both served on the ARC when the Whitts' dock application was submitted. Both gentlemen credibly testified that the Whitts' dock application failed to provide enough information to allow them to make a decision about it. Further, Mr. Woodbrook admitted he has some physical limitations and is sympathetic to people who have disabilities. While both men knew Mr. Whitt was confined to a wheelchair, neither knew why Mr. Whitt had to use it. Other ARC applications were admitted into evidence. These ARC applications involved: painting the exterior of a primary residence (two separate requests); landscaping in the front yard of a residence for a non-permanent 6' x 8' fish pond; replacing a playground set; resurfacing a pool deck, patio, and front porch entry; resurfacing a driveway; and extending a present screen porch. Of the three ARC applications that involved some type of new construction (fish pond, playground set, and porch extension), each contained pictures, dimensions, and/or diagrams sufficient for the reviewer to appreciate where the project was being constructed in relation to the house and property lines.7/ As of December 12, 2012, Respondent had neither approved nor rejected the Whitts' dock application. That application is simply not complete without the requested information. The dock application remains "pending," awaiting receipt of the requested information. The Whitts' position that they have provided everything that the builder has provided them is insufficient to provide the ARC with the requisite information to know where the dock will begin on the Whitts' property; how far out the dock will extend into the lake; and what the structure will look like.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Whitt. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2013.
The Issue The appellant contends that the Planning Commission "did not base its decision on specific standards or criteria [set forth in the zoning regulation] as required. Nor was there any competent substantial evidence presented that would support the Planning Commission's findings."
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence of record submitted with this appeal, the findings of fact of the Planning Commission are rejected and the following substituted: The proposed use constitutes a marina pursuant to section 9.5-4(M-5) of the Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations, and it must, therefore, be reviewed as a major conditional use. The proposed development complies with all applicable Monroe County land development regulations. The proposed development is limited to two fueling docks, one 9' x 16'4" and the other 13' x 12'8", and one fueling pump. The proposed development does not include provisions for boat storage, boat ramps, or liveaboard docking. The proposed development is not expected to generate additional vehicular traffic nor, as a result, demand additional on-site vehicular parking due to its exclusively water-oriented nature. The proposed development does not include provisions for additional outdoor lighting. The proposed development includes provisions for a five-year water quality monitoring program which contains adequate recommendations for spill containment, including provision of a containment kit and use of absorbent carpeting on the dock surface, as well as corrective measures to be undertaken by the applicant in the event of water quality deterioration. Coordination with the United States Environmental Protection Agency is necessary to insure that the proposed water quality monitoring program follows the guidelines of this agency. The proposed development is located in the vicinity of a designated critical habitat of the American crocodile, and the presence of the West Indian manatee in the area is documented. The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service have offered recommendations to mitigate the secondary impacts of the proposed development on these species of endangered wildlife, including the installation of an educational display and restrictions on the provision of additional marina facilities. Additional conditions and restrictions are appropriate and may be imposed pursuant to sections 9.5-61 and 9.5-63 of the Monroe County Code, Land Development Regulations. Limitations are particularly necessary to minimize the impacts of the proposed development upon neighboring residential uses and the canal, in consideration of the water-oriented nature of the use.
The Issue Whether Respondent's registered plumbing contractor's license should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Stanley Monds, held a registered plumbing contractor's license number RF 0037461 which had been placed on a delinquent status for non-renewal effective July 1, 1985 and was invalid during the 1987-89 licensing period. On June 19, 1987, Monds, doing business as Clay Well and Pump Service, contracted with Charles W. Plath to install a culvert for the sum of $341.25. The culvert was installed by Monds and Plath paid Monds in accordance with the contract. On July 10, 1987, Monds, doing business as Clay Well and Pump Service, contracted with Plath to: (a) install a 2- inch well and a 1-Horsepower Meyers pump; (b) supply fill for septic tank pad and a culvert; (c) install septic tank and culvert; (d) install a 200 amp electrical service for mobile home and pump and; (e) tie-in the water line and electricity to the mobile home and pump. The net contract price was $6,574.00 of which Plath paid $4,295.00 in advance, leaving a balance of $2,279.00. Plath's mobile home site is located in Whitehouse, Duval County, Florida. There was no written or verbal agreement between Plath and Monds concerning a completion date. However, Plath had told Monds that he needed to be in the mobile home by August, 1987. Plath understood that Monds had other jobs that he was currently working on but would get to Plath as soon as possible. Monds advised Plath that the necessary permits for the job would have to be applied for (pulled) by Plath. Plath did not object to this, and on June 19, 1987 applied for a mobile home move-on permit with the Duval County Building Department. The mobile home move-on permit was issued to Plath on July 6, 1987. An applicant for a mobile home move-on permit must show that a septic tank permit has been issued before a mobile home move-on permit will be issued. The septic tank permit is issued through the local health department. The Duval County Building Department requires the person who is issued the mobile home move-on permit to assume the responsibility for acquiring the necessary inspections, even though the work is being performed by someone other than the person to whom the permit was issued. It was Plath's responsibility to see that the necessary inspections were made, including the septic tank inspection. The well and pump were installed sometime around the last of July or the first of August, 1987. Monds subcontracted the drilling of the well. Although part of the work under the contract had been completed, such as the well and pump installation and part of the septic tank, Plath encountered difficulty in making contact with, and getting a response from, Monds concerning the progress of the job and a completion date. Therefore, in October, 1987 Plath decided to contract the work to someone else. On October 8, 1987, Plath contracted with Wilkins & Sons Electric (Wilkins) to install: (a) the 200 Amp mobile home service pole and connect to mobile home; (b) the 220 Volt, 20 Amp circuit and connect to pump and; (c) the 175 Watt mercury vapor light fixture. The total price of the contract was $850.00. However, $85.00 for a mercury vapor light fixture was not part of the original contract with Monds. Wilkins applied for and was issued the required electrical permit for the Plath job on October 6, 1987. The final electrical inspection was made on October 9, 1987. 13 On October 13, 1987, Plath contracted with AA Septic Tank Service, Inc. to finish the partially completed septic tank which Monds had failed to complete for $300.00. Although the septic tank permit was issued before the mobile home move-on permit was issued, there is no evidence that anyone made a septic tank inspection. Although Monds was hampered by the rain during the period of time Monds worked on the Plath site, there was insufficient evidence to show that Monds was prevented by the rain from completing the work under the contract before Plath decided to contract with someone else because of the delay or that Monds advised Plath of the reason for the delay. Plath did not prevent, or prohibit, Monds for completing the work under the contract. Monds failed to pay Tim Prep, Inc. for 15 loads of fill ordered and used by Monds on the Plath job. As a result of Monds failure to pay for the fill, Tim Prep, Inc. filed a Notice Of Intention To Claim A Lien in the amount $1,181.25 against Plath's property. Monds had not paid Tim Prep, Inc. for the fill at the time of the hearing. The work on the on the Plath job was completed in late October or early November, 1987. Monds was still working on the Plath job as late as September 1, 1987 when Tim Prep, Inc. delivered fill to the Plath site for Monds. Although Plath never paid Monds the $2,279.00 balance, Plath was required to pay other contractors $1,075.00 ($850.00 minus $85.00 plus $310.00) and will be required to pay $1,181.25 to Tim Prep, Inc. to remove the lien from his property which comes to a total of $2,256.25, leaving a balance of $22.75. This does not take into consideration any compensation for the delay suffered by Plath. Although probable cause was found against Monds by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (Board) on January 7, 1988 and a letter of guidance issued in apparently another matter, there was no evidence concerning the violations or the charges involved.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and Rule 21E- 17, Florida Administrative Code, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Stanley Monds guilty of violating Section 489.115(3)(a), Section 489.119(3), and Section 489.129(1)(j) and (m), Florida Statutes, and for such violation impose an administrative fine of $750.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that the charges alleged in the Administrative Complaint of violating Section 489.129(1)(d) and (k), Florida Statutes be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-0464 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner: Each of the following Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the Proposed Finding of Fact: 1 & 2(1); 3(2- 5); 4 & 5(3); 6(6); 7(9); 8(10); 9(9); 10(11); 11(13); 12(18); 13(17); 14(6 & 12); 15(6 & 8); 16(12); 17(16); 18(2 & 3); 19(1). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent: 1. Respondent did not submit and posthearing proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Kenneth Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Stanley Monds 326 West Macclenny Avenue Macclenny, Florida 32063 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has issued an agency statement defined as a rule which has not been adopted by rulemaking as required by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. (All statutory citations are to the 2000 codification of the Florida Statutes. All rule citations are to the current Florida Administrative Code.)
Findings Of Fact On April 20, 2001, DEP's Southwest District office issued an Intent to Issue with respect to Tampa Bay Desal's application for a NPDES permit for the construction and operation of a proposed desalination facility (DEP File No. FL0186813-001-IW1S). DEP's Intent to Issue for the Tampa Bay Desal NPDES permit provided in part: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's proposed permitting decision may petition for an administrative proceeding (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57 of the Florida Statutes. The Intent to Issue for the NPDES permit also specified the type of information that must be included in a petition filed under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. SOBAC timely challenged DEP's proposed agency action concerning the Tampa Bay Desal permit application. The challenge is currently pending as DOAH Case No. 01-1949. The Intent to Issue the Tampa Bay Desal permit also included the statement: "Mediation under section 120.573 of the Florida Statutes is not available for this proceeding." On June 7, 2001, SOBAC filed a Petition to Invalidate Agency Statement under Section 120.56(4). SOBAC alleged that the statement regarding mediation met the definitions of a rule but was not adopted by rulemaking as required by Section 120.54(1)(a). By correspondence dated June 13, 2001, DEP notified counsel for SOBAC of DEP's willingness to participate in mediation in an effort to resolve the issues underlying the administrative challenge. However, DEP's offer to participate in mediation was predicated, at least in part, on the following conditions: the parties would agree on the selection of the mediator; any discussions and documents introduced in the mediation would remain confidential; and notwithstanding the mediation, discovery in the administrative proceeding would continue, and the parties would be prepared to proceed to the final hearing as scheduled. On or about June 14, 2001, Tampa Bay Desal agreed, at least in principle, to participate in mediation with SOBAC under those conditions. There was no evidence that either DEP or Tampa Bay Desal ever agreed to toll the administrative proceeding (DOAH Case No. 01-1949) pending mediation. On or about June 15, 2001, counsel for SOBAC contacted DEP and accepted DEP's offer to participate in a mediation conference. On or about July 23, 2001, the Department, SOBAC and Tampa Bay Desal participated in a mediation conference in an effort to resolve the issues underlying SOBAC's challenge to Tampa Bay Desal's permit application. Mediation efforts failed. According to the evidence, SOBAC is an organization with an interest in various environmental permitting activities in and around Tampa Bay. SOBAC monitors local newspapers for DEP notices of intent to issue permits. Besides the Tampa Bay Desal permit, SOBAC has become aware of three other DEP notices of intent of interest to SOBAC. One was a notice of intent to issue a permit to Tampa Electric Company (TECO) for NPDES permit modifications relating to and for purposes of accommodating the Tampa Bay Desal project. This notice of intent also contained the statement: "Mediation under Section 120.573, Florida Statutes, is not available for this proceeding." SOBAC nonetheless requested mediation under Section 120.573. When the time to challenge the notice of intent was about to expire, SOBAC also filed an administrative challenge under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. The TECO challenge also was referred to DOAH, where it was given Case No. 01-2720 and consolidated with Case No. 01-1949. TECO never agreed to mediation, and DEP never responded to SOBAC's request for mediation. Another case involved a TECO air pollution permit unrelated to the desalination project. The notice of intent to issue stated: "Mediation is not available for this proceeding." The evidence did not indicate that SOBAC took any action with respect to this notice of intent to issue. The third case involved IMC Phosphates Company and a permit to operate a barge loading facility handling phosphate materials. The notice of intent to issue stated: "Mediation under Section 120.573, F.S. is not available in this proceeding." SOBAC filed an administrative challenge to this permit under Sections 120.569 and 120.57. IMC never agreed to mediation. The evidence was not clear whether SOBAC received a response to its request for mediation. After initiating the instant proceeding, SOBAC researched the Florida Administrative Weekly (FAW) from September 1999 through the date of final hearing and found 30 notices of intent, all of which stated essentially that mediation was not available for (or in) the proceeding, and one notice of intent. No further explanation was given. Of the 30, 24 were electric power plant siting cases, 4 were water quality exemptions, one involved a state revolving loan fund, and one was a joint coastal permit case with consent to use sovereign lands and requested variances. SOBAC presented no evidence as to DEP intents to issue not published in FAW. However, DEP entered into the record evidence of one other DEP notice, apparently not published in FAW, of intent to issue a coastal construction control line permit stating that mediation under Section 120.573 was available and describing procedures to be followed for mediation. SOBAC presented no other evidence to explain why mediation was not offered in the examples given or why it was offered on the one occasion. There also was no evidence as to whether any of the statements regarding availability of mediation reflected by the evidence were intended to mean that mediation was available in one type of case but not in another. Such an intent would have to be inferred. But the evidence was not sufficient to infer such an intent. SOBAC complains that the statements in DEP's notices of intent as to availability of mediation under Section 120.573 force SOBAC to either waive rights or timely initiate administrative challenges under Sections 120.569 and 120.57 and incur litigation costs which might be unnecessary if mediation were initiated. But there was no evidence of any case in which the parties agreed to mediation under Section 120.573. (The failed attempt at mediation in DOAH Case No. 01-1949 was not conducted under Section 120.573.) Second, even if the parties agreed to mediation under Section 120.573, the evidence did not prove the likelihood that mediation would be successful; if not, and if administrative litigation resumed, mediation would have added to the cost of litigation.
Findings Of Fact A letter of denial from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services upon the application of Petitioner, Bob Walker Trailer Park, for a trailer park permit filed by Bob Walker for the Bob Walker Trailer Park, a/k/a the Cherry Pocket Fish Camp was introduced into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 and stated in part: "1. That the Petitioner had not complied with Section 10D-26.05 F.A.C. which requires that a permit application should be on forms furnished by the Division of Health and should be submitted through the local health depart- ment. The Petitioner was in violation of Section 10D-26.07(3)(a) F.A.C. because the minimum square footage requirement of 2,400 square feet for each independent mobile home space is not being met at his trailer park. The Petitioner was in violation of Section 10D-26.08 F.A.C. in that he is not providing at his trailer park an accessible, adequate, safe and potable supply of water. Further, the water provided the residents of the trailer park is not in compliance with Section 17-22 F.A.C. in that the plan submitted by the Petitioner does not show or specify chlorination equipment as required by Section 17-22.11(2) F.A.C. because the well at the trailer park is in prohibited proximity to a septic tank for which the Peti- tioner has never received a permit as required by Chapter 10D-6 F.A.C. The water supply plan submitted by the Petitioner cam not be approved by the local health unit of the Department because the Petitioner has not indicated the physical and chemical parameters of the water as required by Section 17.22.03(7), (9), (11) F.A.C. The Petitioner was in violation of Section 10D-26.09 F.A.C. because he does not have at his trailer park an adequate and safe method of sewage collection, treatment and disposal in compliance with Chapter 17-6 F.A.C. or 10D-6 F.A.C. The septic tanks installed at the Petitioner's trailer park were installed in violation of 10D-6 F.A.C. without any permits having been secured. The Petitioner is required to have a central sewage system installed and in operation in his trailer park before a trailer park permit can be granted. Section 10-6.21(9) F.A.C. provides that total waste flow from any one establishment, whether a single structure or group of structures except residences shall be centrally collected for treatment and disposal in compliance with Chapter 17-6 F.A.C. when the established daily flow exceeds 2,000 gallons." Petitioner acknowledges the accuracy of the facts contained in the letter but contends: that the required forms were not sent him; that his trailer park had been in operation for a long period of time and he had always intended to comply with the numerous permits and regulations and felt that he had so complied; that the requirements of the Respondent particularly as to a central sewage system is unnecessary and confiscatory in effect. Respondent contends: that it had no alternative but to issue a letter of denial; that it followed the requirements of Chapter 381 and 514, Florida Statutes; and that the rules promulgated under those statutes and cited in its letter of denial are the requirements of the statutes and the rules, and it has no alternative but to enforce those provisions. Petitioner's proposed order was considered in the preparation of this order including the references to the current numbering of the applicable rules.
Recommendation Deny the application without prejudice to Petitioner to complete a study and arrive at a settlement satisfactory to the Respondent. Allow the Petitioner sixty (60) days from date hereof to re-submit an application for a trailer park permit. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Dell McPherson, Esquire Department of HRS Post Office Box 20007 St. Petersburg, Florida 33742 Andrew R. Reilly, Esquire Post Office Box 2039 Haines City, Florida 33844
Findings Of Fact Stella Neville, Inc. (Neville) is the owner of a 4.5 acre tract of land which abuts State Road (SR)905 on north Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. On June 21, 1985, Monroe County entered a development order approving Neville's amended permit application to excavate and mine coral rock from its property. The Department, pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, filed a timely appeal with the Adjudicatory Commission. The Subject Property: The Neville property is located in that portion of Monroe County designated as an area of critical state concern, Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes, and is part of a tropical hardwood hammock which extends several miles north and a substantial distance south on either side of SR 905. To the immediate east, south and west of the Neville property, however, there has been some man-induced alteration of the topography. The Neville site is bounded on the east by SR 905;2 on the southwest by a 9-acre tract owned by Keystone Products, Inc. (Keystone), which is currently being quarried for coral rock; and to the west by a 60-acre trace of land, known as the "West Cappeletti Pit", which contains a large abandoned borrow pit dug to depths of up to 60 feet. With the exception of the west Cappeletti Pit and the Keystone quarry, the area west of US 9052 stands predominately undisturbed by humans. About 1970, however, the Neville property was disturbed by fire. Consequently, the tropical hardwood hammock community is presently characteristic of a successional hammock, as opposed to a mature hammock, with a dense understory of immature trees3 On site vegetation includes: Jamica Dogwood, Gumbo Limbo, Poisonwood, Spanish Stomper, Wild Lime, Bamboo, Lancawood, Crabwood, and Mahogany. While the successional hammock, which occupies the Neville site, may not be considered as rare or unique because it has not yet reached maturity, it does provide needed habitat for the fauna of the area. The Key Largo Woodrat, an endangered species, inhabits the Neville site notwithstanding its preference for mature hardwood hammocks. Several active Key Largo Woodrat stick nests have been located on the site; with one located approximately 125 feet from the proposed quarry area. The site also provides habitat for the indigo snake, a threatened species, observed on site. The Neville Application: Neville's revised application, dated February 27, 1985, sought authorization from Monroe County to mine coral rock from the westerly 1.6 acres of its 4.5-acre tract to create a lake.4 Neville proposed to mine the rock to a depth of -10' MLW (mean low water) by use of a trenching machine capable of cutting block 3' square and 8' deep; no dynamiting would be necessary under Neville's proposal. At hearing, Neville agreed to limit the depth of its excavation to -8' MLW to ensure good sunlight penetration and, consequently, good water quality. The quarry proposed by Neville would measure 300' x 232'; contain a safety shelf 3' wide around the perimeter of the quarry at a depth of -1' MLW; and be bermed to a height of 1' above grade to prevent storm water runoff from entering the quarry's waters. Dug as proposed, the quarry would result in the removal of 39,000 cubic yards of coral rock. Neville does not, itself, propose to mine the property. Neville's application was filed by its ''agent" Keystone, which is currently mining the property which abuts Nevilles'. Keystone, as lessee, proposes to cut the blocks from the Neville site and truck them to its plant in Florida City where they would be custom cut to provide a coral rock veneer construction material. Monroe County's Approval: At a regular meeting of the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners on June 21, 1985, Monroe County approved Neville's revised application conditioned upon: . . . the full restoration of the property as outlined; that at the time of the restoration period, the County would be contacted and have the option of using this as a site for disposal of materials, that bonding of half the amount of the value of the fill that it would take to fill in the excavation site would be required, that the site would be mined in such a way that the second half of the proposed mine could not be mined until the first half was restored; that all endangered species taking permits or other State or Federal permits would be had before this was allowed to proceed, and that no more than three years after completion of the excavation, the site will be totally restored or the bond will be forfeited.5 Areas of Concern: The Department's appeal charged that the proposed project was a non-permitted use under Monroe County's GU-general use district, Section 19-180 Monroe County Code (MCC); that the permitting of the subject mine was contrary to Section 19-ill(b), MCC, Excavation and Mining Activities, because of the alteration of hydrologic regime, violation of water quality standards, destruction of tropical hardwood hammock, and disturbance of endangered species; that the proposed project was contrary to Sections 18-18, 18-19, 18-21, and 18-23, MCC, because no land clearing permit was received and the project would adversely impact natural resources, scenic amenities, water quality, and tropical hardwood hammock; and, that the proposed project was contrary to the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, Coastal Zone Protection and Conservation Element, Chapter 4, because it failed to minimize the destruction of natural vegetation or to demonstrate special protective efforts for endangered species. Notwithstanding the Department 's charges, no party offered any part of the Monroe County Code or the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan in evidence. Therefore, only those portions of the Monroe County Code contained in paragraphs 7-9 of the Department's petition, which were admitted by Neville, are a part of the record in this case. The Neville property is zoned GU-general use. Section 19-180, MCC, provides: No land, body of water and/or no structure shall be used or permitted to be used, . in any zone of classification GU- general, which is designated, arranged or intended to be used or occupied for any purpose, except for one or more of the following uses, unless otherwise provided: Single family dwellings with their customary accessory uses. Agriculture uses. Clubs, including country, golf, gun and fish clubs or similar enterprises, and ranges. (4) Athletic fields and stadiums. (5) Power plants and sub-stations, water pumping stations, television, and radio transmission towers. (6) Fishing camps on isolated islands. Churches (two (2) acres). Horses: Horses may be kept only id a GU zone, on a minimum of one (1) acre. The area must be fenced, property drained and if a stable or other structure exists on the property it must meet all the building and setback regulations of Monroe County. Cemeteries, including crematories and mausoleums on a minimum of five (5) acres. An area of land set apart for the sole purpose of the interment of the remains of deceased persons and for the erection of customary markets [markers], monuments, and mausoleums. Monuments recognizing persons or points of historical interest (two (2) acres). And, Section 19-109, MCC, Interpretation of Permitted Uses, provides: In the administration and enforcement of this ordinance all uses not expressly permitted in any district are otherwise prohibited. Neville argues that simply because its property is zoned GU does not preclude issuance of the subject permit because excavation and mining activities within Monroe County are not restricted by zoning classification. To support its position, Neville asserts that the provisions of the Monroe County Code which establish the criteria for evaluating applications for excavation and mining permits do not require any specific zoning category, and that Monroe County has interpreted its code to allow excavation and mining activities in all zoning classifications. The record does not support Neville's assertion. The only part of the Monroe County Code dealing with excavation and mining permits of record in this proceeding is the following portion of Section 19-111, MCC: (b) Excavation and Mining Activities * * * Upland permit application. Application for a permit to excavate within upland areas, as defined above, with a proposed volume greater than one thousand (1,000) cubic yards shall be approved or denied by the board of county commissioners . Consideration, will be given to the county staff's comments and reports which will account for the effects to the natural biological functions and communities within the proposed site, and to the physical aspects of drainage and water quality within the proposed area of excavation. Mining permit application. Applications for a permit to conduct mining operations within Monroe County shall adhere to the following: * * * (b) A topographic map of the area signed by a professional engineer or land surveyor shall be submitted. (Emphasis added) From the foregoing provision, the conclusion cannot be drawn that excavation and mining activities may be permitted without regard for the zoning classification of the property. The only evidence of record that Monroe County may interpret its code as permitting excavation and mining activities in a GU-zone is the fact that the properties encompassed by the West Cappeletti Pit and the Keystone quarry are currently zoned GU.6 There is no evidence, however, which would demonstrate when those activities were permitted and what zoning ordinances or classifications were in effect when permitted. Accordingly' the existence of such quarries does not support Neville's contention. With the exception of the matters discussed in paragraphs 14 and 15, supra, Neville presented no evidence that Monroe County permitted mining and excavation in any zoning category or that Monroe County interpreted its code to permit such activities. Based on the evidence presented, Neville has failed to establish that its proposed mining and excavation activity is consistent with the land development regulations applicable to this case. In light of the foregoing conclusion, it is unnecessary to pass upon the impacts of the proposed project on the area's hydrologic regime, water quality, tropical hardwood hammocks, endangered species, or to evaluate Neville's mitigation proposals.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated and retaliated against Petitioner because of her disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. More specifically, the issues raised in this case are (1) whether Petitioner’s dog was a “service animal” pursuant to section 413.08, Florida Statutes (2018)1/; (2) whether Respondents took adverse action against Petitioner because of her disability; and (3) whether Respondents retaliated against Petitioner by not renewing her lease after she filed a housing discrimination complaint.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated at the final hearing that Petitioner suffers from anxiety and neck issues; and she qualifies as a person who is disabled for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Parties and Property Respondent Pelican Bay is a residential community owned and operated by Sun Homes. Respondent Cheryl Merrifield is the manager of Pelican Bay and an employee of Sun Homes. On June 24, 2016, Petitioner entered into a Manufactured Home Option to Purchase Agreement with Sun Homes (Agreement). The Agreement gave Petitioner a two-year period to lease the manufactured home located on Lot 56 of the Pelican Bay residential community. The Agreement allows the purchase of the home, but not the Lot in Pelican Bay. The Agreement contained a “rent to own” component which also allowed Petitioner to be credited 50% of her first year’s lease payments, and 25% of her second year’s lease payments towards the purchase of the manufactured home. Under the terms of the Agreement, after the first two years, the Petitioner would not accrue any credits toward the purchase of the home. The Agreement clearly anticipated that if Petitioner was to exercise the option to purchase, she would do so within two years. The Agreement refers to separate “Home Lease” and “Site Lease” agreements, but neither was admitted into evidence. Petitioner moved into the property in July 2016 with her five-pound Chihuahua, Buttons. At the time she moved into Pelican Bay, Petitioner informed Respondents she suffered from anxiety and needed Buttons for psychological and emotional support. As a result Pelican Bay waived the pet deposit and fees for Button. Petitioner claims she was discriminated against because she had a service dog and cites the following incidents: (1) in July 2016, she was prohibited from bringing Buttons into the Pelican Bay Clubhouse (Clubhouse) during a Fourth of July neighborhood party; (2) in November 2016, she was told that Buttons could not be in the kitchen or on the furniture in the Clubhouse and must be on a leash and controlled at all times during a Thanksgiving event; and (3) she was harassed by her neighbors and Pelican Bay staff for having the dog in the pool area. Petitioner also alleges she was retaliated against for filing a housing discrimination complaint when Pelican Bay did not renew her lease in July 2018. Respondents dispute Petitioner’s version of the facts and deny that their actions were discriminatory. Buttons As an initial matter, there is a factual dispute as to whether Buttons is a “service animal” for the purposes of the Florida FHA. Although it is unclear when Buttons became her service animal, Petitioner had Buttons as a pet prior to being prescribed a service animal for her anxiety by her psychologist, Dr. Donna Marks. Dr. Marks is certified in addiction therapy, psychoanalysis, and Gestalt psychology. She has no training in orthopedics or treating back and neck injuries. Dr. Marks has been treating Petitioner for anxiety intermittently since 2009. In 2014, Petitioner began regular twice a week therapy sessions with Dr. Marks. Thereafter, Dr. Marks prescribed a “psychological service animal” for Petitioner’s anxiety disorder. In a letter dated January 21, 2016, to allow Buttons to ride on an airplane, Dr. Marks wrote: Ms. Taylor has been seen by me and I am familiar with her history and with function limitations and needs imposed by an anxiety order. In order to help alleviate these difficulties and to enhance her ability to function independently, I have prescribed Ms. Taylor to obtain a psychological service animal. The presence of this animal is necessary for her emotional health because it will mitigate the symptoms she experiences and a preferable alterative to medication. (emphasis added). Later, after Petitioner moved into Pelican Bay, Dr. Marks changed her prescription for Petitioner from a “psychological service animal” to a “service animal.” Although no written prescription of this change was admitted into evidence, Dr. Marks claimed she made this change due to Petitioner’s neck and back surgeries. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Marks admitted she altered the prescription for Petitioner’s convenience. Petitioner had reported to her that she was having difficulty at Pelican Bay and was not allowed to take Buttons to neighborhood events. Dr. Marks felt a “service animal” would have more access than an “emotional support animal.” When asked what service Buttons provides or tasks Buttons performs for Petitioner, both Petitioner and Dr. Marks testified Buttons calms Petitioner and keeps her from becoming anxious. In addition, Petitioner testified she has difficulty turning her neck and needs Buttons to warn Petitioner when people are approaching and warn people not to come to close to her. Buttons does this by barking. Buttons did not go through any professional training to learn to keep Petitioner calm or how to bark. Dr. Marks was not involved in training Buttons, made no recommendations on how Buttons should be trained, and did not know of a training protocol for teaching animals anxiety-reducing techniques or conduct. Petitioner claimed she trained Buttons by giving it treats when it behaved the way she wanted, but admits she did not follow any specialized training program. Buttons is registered with the United States Animal Registry (USAR) as an “Emotional Support Dog” and a “Service Dog.” Based on her USAR identification and letters from Dr. Marks, Buttons has been allowed to accompany Petitioner at restaurants, the hospital, and on airplanes. Petitioner, however, provided no evidence of the requirements for registering Buttons with the USAR registry. For example, there was no evidence of an USAR application or questionnaire; nor was there evidence Buttons had been evaluated or tested by USAR as part of the registration process.3/ As explained below, the undersigned finds Buttons is not a “service dog” for purposes of the Florida FHA. Fourth of July In early July 2016, a Fourth of July potluck celebration was held in the Clubhouse. When Petitioner arrived at the Clubhouse with her potluck contribution she was told by Reni Thompson that she could not bring Buttons into the area where the food was being served. Upon hearing this, Petitioner immediately left the Clubhouse and did not participate in the event. The uncontroverted evidence established the celebration was not sponsored by Pelican Bay, nor was staff in attendance. Instead it was arranged by the Pelican Bay Home Owner’s Association (HOA). Although Petitioner testified Ms. Thompson told her she was an HOA board member, Ms. Merrifield testified Ms. Thompson was not on the HOA board, nor was Ms. Thompson a Pelican Bay employee. Other than Petitioner’s hearsay there is no evidence that Ms. Thompson was a board member. Moreover, the HOA was not affiliated with or managed by Pelican Bay, nor were its board members employees of Pelican Bay. As such, any conduct by Ms. Thompson cannot be imputed onto Pelican Bay. Regardless, when Ms. Merrifield received Petitioner’s complaint about what had occurred at the Fourth of July incident, she immediately arranged a meeting with Petitioner. Ms. Merrifield also met separately with Ms. Thompson to inform Ms. Thompson that Petitioner should be allowed in the Clubhouse with Buttons. The undersigned finds Respondents are not liable for Ms. Thompson’s conduct, and took corrective measures once it learned of the incident. Thanksgiving Restrictions on Buttons On November 1, 2017, Ms. Merrifield sent an email titled “Thanksgiving Dinner Nov. 23” to the residents of Pelican Bay. That email stated as follows: Attached to this email is what Sandy Weidner is posting in the Clubhouse today. If anyone is interested please go and sign up. She also has a list of what will be needed if anyone wants to help with the side dishes. The email then listed the side dishes that were needed and contact information for Sandy Weidner for any questions. The evidence established the event was not sponsored by Pelican Bay (although it was contributing the turkey) and Ms. Weidner was not a Pelican Bay employee. Instead of contacting Ms. Weidner, Petitioner emailed Ms. Merrifield and asked, Cheryl, Is this an Event that Buttons, “My Service Dog” and I will be welcomed to without anyone rejecting us or harassment?” Ms. Merrifield replied, In response to your request we understand your dog is an emotional support animal. It may be with you in the clubhouse. It may not go in the kitchen, it may not be put on furniture. It must be on a leash and controlled at all times. It is unclear whether this response deterred Petitioner from attending the Thanksgiving event. Nonetheless, the undersigned finds Ms. Merrifield’s actions did not constitute a violation of the Florida FHA. Pool Incidents In July 2017, Pelican Bay staff received a complaint from residents that Buttons was in the community pool, in violation of the community pool rules. Later, Ms. Merrifield spoke to Petitioner who admitted she had taken Buttons in the pool. Ms. Merrifield told Petitioner Buttons was not allowed inside the pool and should not be left in the pool area unrestrained. Petitioner later researched the issue and agreed she would not take Buttons in the pool in the future. In August 2017, Josephine Hillier, a Sun Homes employee, received another complaint from residents that Buttons was in the pool. When Ms. Hillier investigated the complaint she did not see the dog in the pool, but did find Petitioner with Buttons in the pool area. At the time, Petitioner denied Buttons was in the pool and claimed Ms. Hillier’s questioning was harassment in violation of housing discrimination laws. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that after researching and learning Buttons could not be in the pool, she continued to sit in the pool with Buttons on her shoulder. Petitioner did not consider this to be a violation of the pool rules as long as Buttons was not in the water. She also allowed Buttons to sit on the pool furniture unrestrained while she was in the pool, because her veterinarian told her Buttons was too small for a leash. Regardless, Pelican Bay took no further action against Petitioner regarding Buttons being in the pool. Petitioner complains Respondents repeatedly questioned her about Buttons being in the pool. Ms. Merrifield testified she was aware of two complaints of Petitioner letting Buttons in the pool; Ms. Hillier testified she was aware of two complaints about Buttons being in the pool, one of which she investigated. The undersigned finds that although Petitioner may have been approached by residents with complaints about Buttons, Respondents only spoke with her about Buttons being in the pool twice. The undersigned finds Pelican Bay’s conduct in questioning Petitioner about Buttons being in the pool, and warning her Buttons must be restrained did not constitute harassment. As explained below, this was justified under the circumstances. Non-Renewal of Purchase Agreement On March 20, 2018, Sun Homes sent an unsigned form letter to Petitioner stating her lease would not be renewed and that she would be required to vacate the property on or before June 30, 2018. Petitioner believes she received this letter because she filed a complaint of housing discrimination. The Agreement allowing the option to purchase the home anticipates a lease period of two years, although a longer period is not prohibited. Respondents asked Petitioner after the first year if she was planning to exercise her option to buy the home. At that time, June 2017, she declined because she felt it was too expensive and did not make financial sense. Petitioner did not take any steps toward exercising her option to purchase the home at the end of the second year because she was recovering from neck and back surgeries, her son was living with her, and she was not financially able to purchase it. Ms. Merrifield testified that it was common business practice to not allow renters to remain in Pelican Bay for more than two years. Sun Homes’ business model was to sell the manufactured homes; it was not interested in long-term rental relationships. The evidence established Petitioner was not the only resident that received the form non-renewal letter. The renters in the homes on Lot 48 and Lot 30 also received similar letters. Ms. Merrifield was unaware of whether these other residents had disabilities, but neither had made any kind of housing complaints. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability or retaliated in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondents, Pelican Bay Communities, LLC, and Cheryl Merrifield, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Paula C. Taylor, and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2018.
