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ROSALIE KERR, O/B/O ROBERT KERR, DECEASED vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 05-004716 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Dec. 30, 2005 Number: 05-004716 Latest Update: Oct. 10, 2006

The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Retirement System's retirement benefit option selected by Petitioner's deceased son should be changed from Option 1 to Option 2.

Findings Of Fact Ms. Kerr is the mother of the late Mr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr was employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) from January 2, 1990 through September 28, 2004. Mr. Kerr was a detective, hereinafter referred to as Det. Kerr. As a result of being an employee of the BSO, Det. Kerr was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). During his employment, BSO, not Det. Kerr, made contributions to the FRS for his benefit. Retirement is the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS. In complying with its duties, FRS publishes and provides an informational handbook and forms regarding retirement issues to its FRS members. FRS' staff also provide counseling to FRS members who inquire about FRS issues. A website is also maintained by FRS for its members to inquire about FRS issues and obtain information about retirement. On July 29, 2004, Det. Kerr completed an Application for Disability Retirement (Application), which was signed and notarized. The Application indicated, among other things, that he was applying for regular disability benefits and that Dr. Garry Friedberg was one of his treating physicians. Det. Kerr designated Ms. Kerr as his primary beneficiary on the Application. On August 2, 2004, Retirement received the completed application. Det. Kerr had over 16 years of creditable service, and he was, therefore, vested as a Special Risk member of the FRS and eligible for retirement benefits. Retirement acknowledged receipt of the documents needed to make a determination on Det. Kerr's disability retirement application. Also, Retirement advised him that, if his disability retirement application was approved, further documents would be required before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. One of the additional documents requested by Retirement was Form FRS-11o, which was FRS' Option Selection Form for its members. FRS-11o must be completed before retirement benefits can be paid. FRS-11o notices the member of four different options for payment of retirement benefits and contains a narrative describing the effect of the selection of each of the four options. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years, but, if the retiree dies before the end of the 10 years, the benefit is paid to the surviving beneficiary for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary. Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetime of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3 percent upon the death of either. By letter dated August 19, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr that his application for disability retirement was approved. The letter further advised him, among other things, of other documents that he had to submit, including a completed FRS-11o, before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. By letter dated August 23, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr of his estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Option 1 ($2,364.84) and Option 2 ($2,189.13). Insufficient information was available to Retirement to calculate the estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Options 3 and 4, so none were provided. The letter further advised Det. Kerr as to what was required for Retirement to calculate monthly estimates for Options 3 and 4. Additionally, the August 23rd letter, enclosed a blank FRS-11o for Det. Kerr to complete and return. Furthermore, the letter included an informational document, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," regarding making his option selection. This informational document is a standard document included by Retirement, with Retirement's estimates of disability retirement benefits. As to changing an option choice, the document provides in pertinent part: Once you cash or deposit a benefit payment, or begin the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), your [option] selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before [your] decision. Regarding Option 2, the document provided in pertinent part: [T]his option would be particularly appropriate if you are in ill health and your future physical condition is uncertain at the time of retirement since independent children, other heirs, charities, organizations, or your estate or trust can be designated as beneficiaries for Option 2. The document invites FRS members to contact Retirement with any questions. No evidence was presented to demonstrate the Det. Kerr contacted Retirement regarding questions as to the options. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr completed and had notarized FRS-11o. FRS-11o reflected, among other things, the following: the selection of Option 1 by an "X" and being circled; and his marital status as being not married. The language describing Option 1 next to the selection was as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. Also, on FRS-11o was Option 2. The language describing Option 2 next to the selection was as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. On September 1, 2004, Retirement received Det. Kerr's FRS-11o, on which Option 1 was selected and which was properly completed, signed, and notarized. It is undisputed that Det. Kerr's FRS-11o met all requirements as to being in a status of completion. Typically, FRS-11o is the only indication as to a member's wishes regarding his or her option selection. According to Retirement, usually, the disability retirement application is completed prior to receiving an estimate of benefits, and, therefore, it is not uncommon for an FRS member to designate a primary beneficiary and later select Option 1 after reviewing his or her estimate of benefits. According to Retirement, only a member or someone acting on his or her behalf, such as a legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, can make a retirement option selection for the member. No evidence was presented that Det. Kerr, himself, requested a change to his selection of Option 1. On September 28, Det. Kerr resigned from the BSO. October 1, 2004, was established as Det. Kerr's effective disability retirement date. Det. Kerr died on October 20, 2004, less than a month after resigning, without receiving his first disability retirement benefit payment. At the time of his death, Det. Kerr was not married and had no children. Further, no parent was his legal guardian or dependent upon him for support. Det. Kerr's circumstances surrounding his option selection do not place his situation in the usual or typical category of FRS members referred to above by Retirement. Det. Kerr was suffering from AIDS. His symptoms first appeared in 1995. He was being treated by Garry Friedberg, M.D., a physician whose specialty was infectious diseases. As Det. Kerr's treating physician, on July 26, 2004, (approximately three months before Det. Kerr's death) Dr. Friedberg completed a "Disability Insurance - Attending Physician's Statement" form, regarding Det. Kerr's medical condition. The form contained several questions, including those as to diagnosis, prognosis, and mental and cognitive limitations. Dr. Friedberg diagnosed Det. Kerr with the end- stage of AIDS, which included wasting, assistance with activities of daily living, 12 to 15 loose stools per day, and pain in his stomach. Dr. Friedberg determined Det. Kerr's prognosis as terminal. Dr. Friedberg described Det. Kerr's mental and cognitive limitations as poor memory, difficulty concentrating, and inattentiveness. Question 5.c. of the form asked whether Det. Kerr was competent to endorse checks and direct the use of proceeds, to which Dr. Friedberg checked the yes box. It is undisputed that Det. Kerry had a close, loving- relationship with his mother and nephews. Det. Kerr's mother testified as to her son's desires and wishes for his retirement benefits. The undersigned finds her testimony credible. As her son's health deteriorated, Det. Kerr made her co-owner of his home in order for the home to become hers at his death. Det. Kerr had a loving relationship with his nephews and he wanted to make sure that their education would be paid-for through his retirement benefits. Det. Kerr informed his mother that he designated her as the beneficiary of his disability retirement plan so that she could keep his house and pay for the education of his nephews. In a letter dated May 18, 2005, Det. Kerr's healthcare providers gave insight into his medical condition and his intent regarding his disability benefits. The undersigned finds the letter persuasive. Among other things, they indicate that they were Det. Kerr's healthcare providers for several years and that, throughout 2004, Det. Kerr was administered opium to help control his chronic wasting diarrhea and administered opioid- based analgesics for chronic pain. Det. Kerr made it clear to his healthcare providers that his intent was to provide financially for his family at the event of his death. Without question, they insist that the narcotic regimen in Det. Kerr's treatment, caused him to mistakenly mark Option 1, which was the opposite of and completely contrary to the whole intent of what he wanted to do with his disability benefits. Furthermore, they indicate that Det. Kerr intended to check Option 2 in that it would provide for Det. Kerr's family as Det. Kerr had intended. One of Dr. Friedberg's clerical employees, John Carriere, notarized the option selection form at Dr. Friedberg's office for Det. Kerr on August 27, 2004. At that time, the employee had known Det. Kerr for approximately five years and knew what Det. Kerr's intentions were towards his (Det. Kerr's) family, concurring that Det. Kerr wanted his disability retirement benefits to provide for his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews. The employee observed that on that day Det. Kerr had lost considerable weight, was sweating, and was not looking well. The undersigned finds the clerical employee's testimony persuasive. Det. Kerr was friends with Robert Brown for 16 years. Mr. Brown is a certified financial planner but was not Det. Kerr's financial planner. The undersigned finds Mr. Brown's testimony credible. Mr. Brown was well aware that Det. Kerr wanted to make sure that his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews were taken care of with his disability retirement benefits. Det. Kerr sought advice from his friend regarding the disability retirement benefits. Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr met with the BSO's human resource counselor to discuss the different options available. Det. Kerr knew that he was dying, and he decided upon Option 2 because only it provided the benefits that he wanted for his mother and nephews upon his death. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr was at Dr. Friedberg's office and was completing FRS-11o (the option selection form), and he called Mr. Brown, who was busy at work. Det. Kerr requested Mr. Brown to remind him which option number to select. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to call him after working-hours, but Det. Kerr insisted that Mr. Brown talk with him then and provide the requested information. Mr. Brown, not recalling the option number that had been previously determined to be selected but recalling only what the selection provided, informed Det. Kerr that the option decided upon was the one that left the money to his (Det. Kerr's) mother for ten years. Det. Kerr yelled back that he knew what the selection provided that he wanted, but now he only wanted the option number. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to wait a few hours and call him back; but Det. Kerr did not. Later, when Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr were together, Mr. Brown asked Det. Kerr whether he needed any assistance with the retirement paperwork. Det. Kerr responded in the negative, indicating that he had finished the paperwork by himself and convincingly stating that the family was protected. Mr. Brown asked to review the form, but Det. Kerr did not have the form with him. With Det. Kerr so convincingly expressing himself that the family was protected, Mr. Brown did not think of the retirement paperwork again. A finding of fact is made that Det. Kerr at all times had decided on Option 2 and at all times had intended to check Option 2. A finding of fact is made that the medical evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that, due to Det. Kerr's terminal illness and the medications given to him, his mental capacity to make an informed choice at the time that he selected Option 1 was affected; and that he mistakenly checked Option 1, whereas Option 2 would have protected his family as he had intended, which intent had never wavered or changed. By letter dated December 6, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr's family that his estate was entitled to the disability retirement benefits due for the month of October 2004. Additionally, included with the letter was a "Joint Annuitant Information" document, and the family was advised that, if Det. Kerr had a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant, a monthly benefit may be payable to such person. A joint annuitant was mentioned in several of the letters from Retirement to Det. Kerr, prior to his death, regarding his disability retirement. In a letter dated July 30, 2004, related to completing FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Application, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a letter dated August 10, 2004, again, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in two letters dated August 19, 2004, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Estimate of Retirement Benefit document, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as it relates to Options 3 and 4; in an Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits document, dated August 23, 2004, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a document provided to Det. Kerr by Retirement, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?" a joint annuitant is mentioned as it relates to all of the available options; in FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only for Options 3 and 4; and in a letter dated December 6, 2004, after Det. Kerr's death, Retirement refers to a joint annuitant and includes information regarding a joint annuitant. No information was received by Retirement as to a joint annuitant. Further, at hearing no assertion of Ms. Kerr being a joint annuitant was made. Ms. Kerr is the personal representative of her son’s, Det. Kerr's, estate. On September 26, 2005, Retirement received a letter from Ms. Kerr's counsel requesting Retirement to change Det. Kerr's option selection from Option 1 to Option 2, explaining, among other things, Det. Kerr's intent but that his medical condition prevented him from following through with his intent. No mention was made in the letter of a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant. Retirement contends that an option selection can only be changed in the event the designated beneficiary qualifies as a joint annuitant. On October 14, 2005, Retirement, by final agency action letter, denied the request to change Det. Kerr's option selection but erroneously cited Section 121.091(6)(h), Florida Statutes, as the statutory basis for the decision to deny the request, which stated as follows: (h) The option selected or determined for payment of benefits as provided in this section shall be final and irrevocable at the time a benefit payment is cashed or deposited or credited to the Deferred Retirement Option Program as provided in Subsection (13). Retirement admits that the basis for the denial stated in the final agency action letter is incorrect. No benefit payment had been issued, cashed or deposited. Retirement has never amended or sought to amend its denial-letter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order granting the request of Rosalie J. Kerr and changing the retirement option selection of her deceased son, Robert R. Kerr, from Option 1 to Option 2. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2006.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57121.021121.091
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IRENE LEONARD vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 11-001529 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Mar. 22, 2011 Number: 11-001529 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 2011

The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for retirement credit should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner previously worked for the Sheriff's Office for DeSoto County, Florida. It is undisputed that the Sheriff's Office is a qualified Florida Retirement System ("FRS") employer and that Petitioner was, during all times relevant hereto, an FRS eligible employee. In the instant case, it is undisputed that in October 2006, Petitioner sustained a work-related injury while in the course and scope of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner, from the time of her injury through approximately September 11, 2007, received temporary total disability workers' compensation benefits for her employment- related injuries. The precise dates when these benefits were received by Petitioner are not at issue in the instant dispute. On September 12, 2007, Petitioner returned to work at the Sheriff's Office with light-duty work limitations. Also on this date, Petitioner resumed receiving payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner continued to receive temporary partial disability wage payments through December 2008 and received workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010. When Petitioner returned to work on September 12, 2007, she was still receiving medical treatment from the workers' compensation physician and attended regular sessions with the physician throughout the duration of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. The visits to the workers' compensation physician often occurred during times when the Sheriff's Office scheduled Petitioner to work, thus, resulting in her absence from work on these days. The Sheriff's Office terminated Petitioner's employment on December 12, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner was on the Sheriff's Office payroll and received wages as follows: For the period September 23, 2007, through October 6, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days; For the period October 7, 2007, through October 20, 2007, she received payroll wages for five days; and For the period October 21, 2007, through December 12, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days. No evidence was presented at the hearing explaining Petitioner's work schedule for the period September 13, 2007, through October 5, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner worked and received payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office for a total of 34 days. Although the 34 days that Petitioner worked were dispersed throughout the months of September, October, November, and December, Petitioner, nevertheless, received a paycheck from the Sheriff's Office for wages for each pay period following her return to work. There was no testimony offered at the hearing as to the total number of days that Petitioner was scheduled to work between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007. However, Petitioner testified that any scheduled work days that she missed during this period occurred as a result of her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. Respondent offered no evidence to the contrary as to this point. Given the severity of Petitioner's work-related injury, which apparently resulted in her being away from work for nearly a year, coupled with the fact that she continued to receive workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010 (some four years after the date of her injury), the undersigned accepts as credible Petitioner's testimony that any scheduled work days that she missed between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, resulted from her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. On April 4, 2008, Petitioner submitted correspondence to the Division and stated therein the following: Sir, I am writing this email in regards to my retirement. Under the florida [sic] retirement system, a member is entitled to retirement credit for periods of eligible workman [sic] comp[ensation]. The member must return to FRS covered employment for one month. Creditable workman [sic] comp[ensation] includes all periods that workman [sic] comp[ensation] are made. FRS employers are required by Section 121.125, Florida Statutes, and Section 60S-2012, Florida Administrative Code, to report the period covered by workman [sic] comp[ensation] on the monthly retirement report. D.C.S.O. stated I worked intermittently but where is it written in the Florida State Statutes or Administrative Code, how many days during the month you are allowed to miss and it would not be credible service or considered a break in service. [sic] Sir, I was still active [sic] employed with D.C.S.O. upon returning to work on Sept[ember] 12, 2007. The days I missed was [sic] due to medical appointmentts [sic] for my workman's [sic] comp[ensation] injury I sustained at D.C.S.O. I always provided documentation from the physician. I was not terminated until December 13, 2007 when Capt. McClure of D.C.S.O. called me at 8:21 A.M. [sic] on my scheduled day off. The three months I was allowed to work and the period on workman [sic] comp[ensation] should be credible service towards retirement. Sir, my question is when the other employees at D.C.S.O. take off more than a couple of days, during the month, for various reasons, without medical documentation[,] do[es] it count for credible service towards retirement or is it a break in service. [sic] On April 7, 2008, Doug Cherry, on behalf of the Division, responded to Petitioner's inquiry of April 4, 2008, and stated the following: Ms. Leonard, as I explained in our phone conversation, for periods of workers' compensation (temporary partial or temporary total) to be eligible for retirement credit there must be a return to active employment for one complete calendar month. The attached letter from the Sheriff of DeSoto County shows that from your scheduled date of return in September 2007, your employment was not active for the required month. This letter states you worked intermittently until your termination of employment in December 2007. To satisfy the one calendar month of active work, you needed to be consistently working through October 31, 2007. You indicated in our conversation that the information from the Sheriff was incorrect. If so, you would need to contact that office to resolve any discrepancy. I [have] also attached the appropriate Florida Statute (121.125) and the Florida Administrative Code (60S-2.012) which states [sic] this requirement. The law does not provide for exceptions or a combination of active and non-active employment during the one calendar month. Regarding your question about active members taking off days during the month, the requirements for earning service credit are different than the eligibility requirement for periods of workers' [sic] compensation. In your own account, you did earn credit for the months of September, October, November and December 2007 for the time you did work and earn salary. However, as stated above, for the period of workers' compensation to be creditable for retirement, the requirement is active employment for the full calendar month, not to earn service credit after such period. You also indicated that you were going to provide your attorney with this information. If your attorney would like to give me a call (850-488-9623), I will be glad to discuss this issue with him or her. I hope this information will help clarify this issue for you. On January 7, 2011, Respondent wrote Petitioner and informed her of the following: Dear Ms. Leonard: This will respond to your request for retirement credit for the period of time you received Workers' Compensation (WC), that was submitted to the State Board of Administration (SBA). Because this is an issue of creditable service, the SBA forwarded the request to the Division of Retirement since the Division is the proper agency to address such an issue. Information you and your agency provided indicates that you were out on WC October 2006 through September 2007 at which time your employer, the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office, sent you a letter dated September 6, 2007 requiring you to return to work within two weeks or be terminated from employment. The Division has not received any documentation from the Workers' Compensation carrier to substantiate the actual periods of WC or the date maximum medical improvement was reached. Therefore, this letter cannot address periods of possible eligibility for retirement credit but will address whether your employment from September 2007 met the return to work requirement for such eligibility. The Sherriff's [sic] office provided us with documentation of your time worked in September, October, November, and December 2007. During these months, you worked intermittently and did not have a full calendar month of active employment before your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. * * * You did not consistently work during any of those calendar months until your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. Therefore, starting in September 2007, you did not meet the return to actively performing service requirement of the above provision to establish eligibility for possible retirement credit. Petitioner's failure to return to active employment status was the only reason given by the agency when denying Petitioner's claim. Andy Snuggs has worked as a benefits administrator for the Division for approximately the last 20 years. The Division offered, and the undersigned accepted, Mr. Snuggs as an expert in matters related to the Act. Mr. Snuggs testified that in the exercise of the agency's discretion, the agency defines the phrase "active employment," as it relates to section 121.125, to mean that an employee must work each scheduled work day in a regularly established position for at least one calendar month following the employee's return to work and that no allowances are made for any absences, excused or otherwise. Mr. Snuggs did not offer any testimony explaining why the Division selected the particular definition that it did for the term "active."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Irene Leonard, met the return-to-work requirements necessary to receive retirement credit for workers' compensation payment periods. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2011.

Florida Laws (9) 120.52120.569120.57120.68121.011121.021121.125121.1905440.02 Florida Administrative Code (3) 60S-2.01260S-4.00760S-6.001
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VERNON TAYLOR BELL vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 81-002499 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002499 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1982

The Issue May Petitioner make an application with Respondent for disability retirement benefits when he was already applied for and has received regular retirement payments?

Findings Of Fact Mr. Vernon Taylor Bell voluntarily terminated his employment with the Department of Legal Affairs on February 26, 1980. By that date he had accumulated 23.66 years of service for credit in the Florida Retirement System. After his termination Mr. Bell had a conference with a retirement benefits specialist, Ms. Taylor, who is an employee of Respondent. At Mr. Bell's request she gave him an estimate of his retirement benefits for a regular retirement. She did not discuss the benefits which a disabled retiree might receive. The testimony of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Bell is in conflict on whether or not she discussed disability retirement benefits with him. Ms. Taylor's testimony is accepted as being more credible because Mr. Bell was shown throughout his testimony to have a poor memory. Mr. Bell began to receive regular retirement benefits in the monthly amounts of $178.32 on May 30, 1980. Since that date he has continued to receive and accept regular retirement payments. Petitioner has cashed or deposited his first benefit check. If Mr. Bell were to be granted disability retirement benefits rather than regular retirement benefits, his monthly payment would be substantially increased. Petitioner did not present credible evidence that he was misinformed or mislead by Respondent about the relative advantages to him in electing to apply for regular retirement as opposed to applying for disability benefits. On August 26, 1980, Mr. Bell wrote a letter to Mr. Andrew M. McMullian III, who is the State Retirement Director. Mr. Bell stated that he had been given incorrect information about the disability benefits he might be eligible for. He requested that he be allowed to make an application as a disabled retiree. On October 1, 1980, Mr. McMullian responded to Mr. Bell in a letter which states in part: We have reviewed your retirement account and have determined the information provided to you by this office was correct regarding your retirement eligibility. We regret if there was any misunderstanding on your part re- garding disability retirement; however, we cannot honor your request to be retired with disability at this late date, because you applied for regular retirement which was approved for you effective April 1, 1980. Your initial monthly benefit was $178.32 and your July 1980 benefit payment contained a cost-of-living increase, thus your current monthly benefit is $179.73. The Florida Retirement System law requires certification by two licensed physicians in Florida that one is totally and permanently disabled and unable to render any useful and efficient work before this agency can approve an employee for retirement with disability. Apparently, you made no attempt to retire with disability, other than discussing the matter in general with us, and according to our records, you made no application for disability retirement. Further, a retiree is not allowed by law to change his type of re- tirement once he begins drawing monthly re- tirement benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State Retirement Director enter a Final Order authorizing Mr. Bell is submit an application for disability retirement benefits. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Department of Administration Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Silas R. Eubanks, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Post Office Box 4266 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
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GLADYS L. WHALEY vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 95-000059 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 09, 1995 Number: 95-000059 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1995

The Issue The central issue is whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact. Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Lamar W. Whaley, Jr., deceased. From 1972 to 1990, Mr. Whaley was employed by the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners (Board) and as such was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Whaley retired from his position as a minibus driver with the Board on June 29, 1990. In anticipation of his retirement, Mr. Whaley filed an FR-9 Form with the Division of Retirement (Division). The FR-9 Form, entitled "Request for Audit," was signed by Mr. Whaley and dated November 6, 1989. The FR-9 Form is used by members of the Florida Retirement System who want estimates of the monthly payments which they will receive after they retire. The FR-9 Form provided a space where Mr. Whaley could list the name and birthdate of a joint annuitant. On the FR-9 Form, Mr. Whaley named the Petitioner and the Petitioner's birthdate in these spaces. On the line immediately after the spaces provided for name and birthdate of the joint annuitant, the FR-9 expressly states that "This is not an official beneficiary designation." By listing a joint annuitant and that individual's birthday on the FR-9 Form, the Division is able to calculate the monthly benefits that would be payable to a member under each of the four retirement options available. In response to Mr. Whaley's audit request, the Division calculated the amount of the monthly payments he and/or his survivor would receive under the four retirement options available. On or about November 22, 1989, the Division sent Mr. Whaley information which reflected an estimate of the monthly benefits he and/or his survivor would receive under each of the four retirement options from which he was eligible to select. Included with the estimate of retirement benefits sent to Mr. Whaley, was a document entitled, "What Retirement Option Should I Choose?". This information sheet listed sent to Mr. Whaley listed and described the four different options. In 1990, members of the Retirement System contemplating retirement were provided a Division Form FR-11, Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement (Application). The application listed the four different options and provided a brief description of each. Next to Option 1 was the following: "Benefit for the Member Only." A further notation on the application read, "SEE THE REVERSE SIDE FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THESE OPTIONS." The Application adequately described the consequences of the election of each option. The explanation read as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary. Upon your death, the monthly benefit will stop and you beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions you paid which are in excess of the amount you received in benefits. If you wish to provide a beneficiary with a continued monthly benefit after your death, you should consider selecting one of the other three options. The option 1 benefit is the maximum form of lifetime payment and all other optional payments are derived by applying actuarial factors to the option 1 benefit. Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. If you die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, your designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving until the total monthly benefit payments to both you and your beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. Option 3: A reduced monthly benefit payable to you for your lifetime. Upon your death, your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent), if living, will receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as you were receiving. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. Option 4: An adjusted monthly benefit payable to you while both you and your joint annuitant (spouse or financial dependent) are living. Upon the death of either you or your joint annuitant, the monthly benefit payable to the survivor is reduced to two- thirds of the monthly benefit you were receiving when both were living. No further benefits are payable after both you and your joint annuitant are deceased. (Emphasis in original text.) On January 12, 1990, Mr. Whaley executed an Application. The Application listed the Petitioner as beneficiary and indicated that the retirement option selected was Option 1. In selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley rejected all other options. The fact that Petitioner was listed on the application as a beneficiary is of no consequence given that Mr. Whaley chose Option 1. An explanation on the back of the retirement application expressly states, "This option does not provide continuing benefit to a beneficiary." Because Mr. Whaley chose Option 1, Petitioner, as his beneficiary, would have been entitled only to a refund of Mr. Whaley's contributions in the event that Mr. Whaley's contribution exceeded the amount of monthly benefits paid to him before prior to his death. Petitioner did not assert, nor did the evidence establish that the refund provision in Option 1 applies in the instant case. Petitioner stated that Mr. Whaley could read and was not mentally impaired at the time he completed the retirement application, yet Petitioner testified that the agency did not explain to Mr. Whaley the benefits of the plan which he selected. According to the testimony of Stanley Colvin, administrator and supervisor of the Division's Survivor Benefits Section, staff members are available to provide counseling to members who come in or call with questions relative to their retirement. There is no record that Mr. Whaley ever contacted the Division with questions regarding the various options. The pastor of the church which Petitioner is a member testified that Mr. Whaley may have needed help to understand the ramifications of legal documents. Mr. Whaley's daughter also testified that her father may not have understood the retirement option he chose. Both the pastor and Mr. Whaley's daughter testified further that in conversations with Mr. Whaley, he had indicated to them that he had taken care of the legal work necessary to ensure that his was family was taken care of in the event of his death. Notwithstanding the testimony of Petitioner and others, there is no evidence that at the time Mr. Whaley selected Option 1 he did not fully understand the nature and effect of his selection. Neither does the evidence support the claim that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was inconsistent with his desire or intention at the time the choice was made. At the time of Mr. Whaley's retirement, he was in good health. Given this fact it is not unusual that he selected the option that would provide him with the maximum monthly benefit. Statements by Mr. Whaley that he had taken care of matters and that "things were in order" do not provide substantial evidence that the selection of Option 1 by Mr. Whaley was made only because he did not fully understand the consequences of his choice. The testimony revealed that upon Mr. Whaley's death, the Petitioner was the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and also the recipient of benefits under his social security. Under these circumstances, Mr. Whaley's selection of Option 1 was not necessarily inconsistent with his statement that things "were in order" or his listing Petitioner as beneficiary on the Application. On several documents provided to and/or completed by Mr. Whaley, it was clearly stated that once a member begins to receive his benefit, the option selection cannot be changed. The information sheet, "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," mailed to Mr. Whaley on or about November 22, 1989, contained the following provision: Option Choice Cannot Be Changed Once you begin to receive your benefit your option selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before making your decision . . . . The Application submitted to the Division by Mr. Whaley on or about January 25, 1990, contained a statement that "[o]nce you retire, you cannot add additional service nor change options." Finally, the Acknowledgment of Retirement Application sent to Mr. Whaley by the Division on or about February 8, 1990, provided in relevant part the following: ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT CHECK IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED! Mr. Whaley received his first retirement check on or about the last working day in July 1990. Petitioner testified that Mr. Whaley cashed this check in July or August of that same year. By cashing that check, Mr. Whaley was precluded from thereafter changing his retirement option. By selecting Option 1, Mr. Whaley received the maximum benefits payable to him during his lifetime. However, under the provisions of retirement Option 1, upon Mr. Whaley's death, his beneficiary, the Petitioner is not entitled to receive any benefits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying the request of Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by Mr. Whaley, the deceased husband of Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0059 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1a-1c. Rejected as not being supported by competent and substantial evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7-8. Accepted. 9-11. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Gladys Whaley 3807 East Norfolk Street Tampa, Florida 33604 Robert B.Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Legal Office Cedars Executive Center-Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 265 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57121.031121.091 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60S-4.00260S-4.010
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HERMAN H. WILLIAMS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 77-000982 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000982 Latest Update: Mar. 08, 1978

Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement will make no Findings of Fact relating to whether Petitioner's disability was in-line-of-duty. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned previously, all findings contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, of the recommended order are rejected. However, the Division accepts the remaining Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order. As taken from the order these findings are: Herman Williams was an employee of the Department of Transportation and a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Division of Retirement approved payment of regular disability benefits to Herman Williams. Herman Williams is currently receiving and accepting these benefits. Herman Williams is an illiterate Seminole Indian, 62 years of age. Williams' duties with the Department of Transportation were driving a mowing tractor and cleaning out roadside ditches. Williams worked for the Department of Transportation approximately 21 years 11 months prior to being placed on the retired roles [sic]. On May 1, 1975, Williams was driving his tractor in the course of his regular employment at the Department of Transportation when the power steering of the tractor malfunctioned causing the front wheels to swerve violently, wrenching the steering wheel in Williams' hands and nearly throwing him from the tractor. Repairs had to be made to Williams' tractor by a Department of Transportation mechanic because the tractor was inoperative. The mechanic discovered a loose nut in the power steering assembly when he exchanged the power steering unit in Williams' tractor with another from the maintenance yard. When the new unit was installed in Williams's tractor it functioned normally. When the power steering from Williams' tractor was installed in the other tractor, it also functioned normally. The mechanic stated that the loose nut which he had discovered could cause the tractor to swerve violently in the manner Williams' had described. On the afternoon of May 1, 1975, Williams reported this instant [sic] to his supervisor, David McQuaig. Mr. McQuaig inquired as to any injuries to Williams and the tractor. Williams reported to McQuaig that the tractor had not been harmed and that he was only sore and stiff. No report of injury was prepared by McQuaig whose duty it was to file such reports. Williams' condition did not materially improve after seeking medical treatment by Dr. Albritton. Williams remained on sick leave until August 11, 1975, when it was exhausted. Williams then took annual leave from August 12, 1975 until September 23, 19975, when his retirement became effective. When the Petitioner's sick leave was exhausted, he was contacted by his supervisor in the Department of Transportation. He suggested that Williams could retire on disability if two physicians would state that he was disabled. This letter was read to Williams by his son, Eddie, because Williams is illiterate. Retirement application forms were provided Williams by the Department of Transportation. The physician report forms were completed by Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wilkerson. The statement of disability by employer form was completed by Williams' supervisor, David A. Young, Maintenance Engineer, for the Department of Transportation. Young stated that he completed the Statement of Disability by Employer, indicating that the application was for regular disability benefits because he had determined that no workman's compensation claim had been made by Williams and because Dr. Wilkerson's medical report had stated that the injuries occurred at Williams's home. The determination that the application was for regular disability benefits was solely Young's. The Application for Disability Retirement signed by Williams was prepared by personnel at the Department of Transportation District Office. This form was signed by Herman Williams; however, this form does not make provision for the member to state the nature of the disability benefits sought. Eddie Williams, son of Herman Williams, took his father to sign the forms at the Department of Transportation office. These forms were not explained to Williams, nor did Eddie Williams read them. Herman Williams was also unaware that such a benefit existed. Herman Williams stated he sought disability benefits based upon his injury on the job. Disability retirement was not discussed between Herman Williams and David Young. Based upon the application submitted in his behalf, the Division of Retirement made a determination that Williams was entitled to regular disability benefits. Williams was unaware that he was not receiving the in-line-of-duty benefits until his son inquired as to how much money he was receiving. When he was advised, he told his father that it appeared to be too little money. At this point Eddie Williams discovered that the application had been for regular disability.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the administrator permit the applicant to file an amended application for disability in-line-of-duty retirement, and, further, that said application be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Chalkley, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1793 Ocala, Florida 32670 Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION HERMAN H. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-982 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / FINAL AGENCY ORDER A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Ocala, Florida, on September 15, 1977. The Petitioner requested relief from the Division's determination that Petitioner was not entitled to resubmit an application for disability retirement requesting in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits because he had previously applied for and accepted regular disability retirement. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the factual basis for Petitioner's claim that he should be allowed to apply for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. APPEARANCES AT THE HEARING: Eric E. Wagner, Esquire J. W. Chalkey, III, Esquire Law Offices of Eric E. Wagner, P.A. Post Office Box 1763 Ocala, Florida 32670 For the Petitioner E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For the Respondent The Hearing Officer entered his Recommended Order on December 8, 1977, in which he sustained Petitioner's assertion and concluded, on the basis of the findings made as a result of the hearing, that Petitioner should be entitled to resubmit his application and request in-line-of-duty disability benefits. In addition to this determination, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was in fact entitled to in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. In making this latter conclusion, both as a matter of fact and of law, the Hearing Officer went beyond his scope of authority. As will be developed more fully herein, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Petitioner was in fact entitled to the in-line-of-duty benefits. Therefore, so much of the recommended order as purports to address this issue is of no effect, being the result of a hearing that did not comply with the essential requirements of law.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.091121.23
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RENEE RADICELLA vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 11-005491 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 27, 2011 Number: 11-005491 Latest Update: Mar. 16, 2012

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to change the type of her retirement benefits from early service retirement to disability retirement.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Nearly 1,000 public employers participate in the FRS, including state agencies, local governments, and district school boards. There are more than 600,000 individual active members in the FRS. Petitioner was an employee of the Pasco County School Board until she submitted her resignation on February 28, 2011, in order to retire. By reason of her employment with the Pasco County School Board, Petitioner is a member of the FRS. After Petitioner resigned, she met with Michael Hudson, the director of Employee Benefits for the Pasco County District School Board, on March 4, 2011, to complete the paperwork for her retirement. At the March 4, 2011, meeting, Petitioner completed and signed the form application for service retirement. The information filled out on the form in Petitioner's clear handwriting included her name, position, address, telephone number, social security number, birth date, and service termination date. The following statement appears on the application form immediately above Petitioner's notarized signature: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options, change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) or elect the Investment Plan once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. (Bold in original). Petitioner also filled out the payment option selection form, selecting Option 1 as the option for how her retirement benefits are to be paid out. Immediately above Petitioner's signature on the option selection form is this statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins. (Bold in original). Petitioner was aware that she could seek to qualify for disability retirement benefits, but that in order to apply for disability retirement, she would have to submit certifications by two doctors that she was totally and permanently disabled, meaning that she was unable to work. Petitioner also knew that she could apply for early service retirement, which would not require proof of total, permanent disability. However, because Petitioner would be retiring early, her benefits would be discounted, so she would receive less. Petitioner understood, when she completed the application on March 4, 2011, that the type of retirement for which she applied was early service retirement. At retirement, she was 52 years and nine months old. In Petitioner's view, she was "forced" to retire. Petitioner had been employed as an adult education-health instructor at Marchman Technical Education Center, which she described as a stressful job. In 2010, she had to undergo three major abdominal and pelvic reconstructive surgeries. As she dealt with the challenges of complications and slow recoveries, she developed psychological issues that caused her to seek treatment from a psychiatrist. She was depressed and cried a lot, felt anxious and stressed, and experienced panic attacks. Petitioner took medication prescribed by her psychiatrist for her panic attacks and depression. She testified that the medication helped and that when she took her medication, she no longer cried all the time. However, she experienced side effects, including some drowsiness and difficulty processing information. By early 2011, Petitioner felt unable to return to her stressful job and had been attempting, without success, to find an appropriate job that she thought she could do with her limitations. She was worried and felt pressure, as a single mother who was supporting herself and her 17-year-old son, who lived with her. She was particularly concerned about ensuring a stream of income to pay for health insurance. Before Petitioner met with Mr. Hudson to apply for early service retirement, she discussed the different types of retirement with her good friend, Pat Beals. Ms. Beals had worked at Marchman Technical Education Center with Ms. Radicella. Both Petitioner and Ms. Beals testified that in discussing the different types of retirement, Petitioner believed at the time that she would not qualify for disability retirement. At the time in early 2011, Petitioner's belief was that she would be unable to obtain letters from two doctors who would render the opinion that Petitioner was unable to work. Ms. Beals apparently did not disagree with that opinion. Ms. Beals noted that Petitioner had been trying to get another job that she would be able to handle with her limitations. Ms. Beals said only that she thought Petitioner had tried to go back to work too soon, before she was fully healed. Petitioner went alone to her meeting with Mr. Hudson and did not ask any of her close friends or advisors, such as Ms. Beals or her neighbor, Mr. Edelman, to go with her. Petitioner testified that she had taken her medication to control her depression and her panic attacks that day. Petitioner was in good enough shape, mentally and physically, to safely drive herself to and from the school district administrative offices. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hudson explained Petitioner's choices to apply for early service retirement or to apply for disability retirement. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hudson explained that if she applied for disability retirement, two doctors would have to say she could never work again. This led Petitioner to choose early service retirement because, as she had discussed with Ms. Beals previously, she did not think two doctors would give the opinion that she was unable to work again. Moreover, at the time, Petitioner did not want to say that she would never work again. Petitioner found the meeting with Mr. Hudson to be very sad and embarrassing; she found the prospect of retirement itself to be very embarrassing, as she had always been independent and had always taken care of herself. Petitioner attempted to blame Mr. Hudson for the pressure she was feeling to make a choice and sign the paperwork presented to her, but Petitioner did not prove that Mr. Hudson was to blame for any pressure she felt. Petitioner failed to identify anything specific that Mr. Hudson said or did to create pressure, such as if he had told Petitioner she had to sign all of the paperwork then and there. Indeed, when asked if she felt pressured by Mr. Hudson, Petitioner's response was that "it was strictly business." Petitioner explained that she just "shut down," letting him give her papers, and she just signed them. Petitioner did not claim to misunderstand the different types of retirement benefits--early service retirement versus disability retirement--and indeed, expressed a very clear rationale for making the choice that she did. Petitioner had expressed that same rationale in conversations before March 4, 2011, with Ms. Beals. Petitioner testified that she did not understand the paperwork that Mr. Hudson presented her to sign and that she did not understand that she could not change the type of retirement from early service to disability retirement at a later date. Inconsistently, she testified that she understood that she would not be able to change her payment options after she cashed her first benefit check. That is part of the warning message appearing right above her signature. Petitioner did not credibly explain how she was able to understand that part of the warning message, while not understanding the other part of the warning message that she also could not "change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early)" after cashing her first benefit check. The notice appeared on both forms she signed that day in plain, clear language. Petitioner did not testify that she was given any misinformation or that she asked for explanations that were not forthcoming. Petitioner did not testify that she asked to delay signing the paperwork presented to her at the March 4, 2011, meeting, until she had had a chance to review it with one of her friends and advisors. Instead, Petitioner did not want to wait; she was in a hurry to sign the paperwork because the sooner she signed the paperwork, the sooner the payments would start. Petitioner attempted to disavow her March 4, 2011, early service retirement application on the theory that she lacked the mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of her actions that day. Petitioner offered no competent medical opinion testimony or medical records to support her claim. Petitioner's two friends tried to support her theory, but they lacked the medical expertise to offer an opinion that Petitioner did not understand the nature or consequences of her actions that day. To the contrary, their testimony tended to confirm that Petitioner not only understood what she did on March 4, 2011, but that she acted as she did for a very rational, logical reason. The evidence did not establish that Petitioner was impaired to any great extent because of her physical or mental conditions or because of her medication taken to control her conditions. Petitioner may lack confidence and doubt herself; she may seek out opinions of her close friends when making important decisions because she did not trust her own ability to make decisions. However, as she acknowledged and certainly exhibited at the hearing, she is intelligent and capable. Petitioner was capable of functioning independently, living alone with her 17-year-old son and taking care of him. Petitioner was able to drive alone and did so. Petitioner took care of her own paperwork, writing out checks, and paying her own bills. Petitioner was not hospitalized or adjudicated incompetent because of her mental condition, nor was there any suggestion that her psychiatrist or good friends thought such steps were necessary for Petitioner's competency to manage her own affairs. After Petitioner returned from her meeting with Mr. Hudson on March 4, 2011, she called Ms. Beals to tell her about the paperwork she completed in her meeting with Mr. Hudson. Ms. Beals testified that she could tell Petitioner was anxious, because she was talking very fast. Nonetheless, Petitioner understood the nature and consequences of her actions on March 4, 2011, well enough to tell Ms. Beals that she had applied for early service retirement benefits. Ms. Beals was concerned and said that she may have made a mistake by not applying for disability retirement. While Ms. Beals expressed surprise that Petitioner did not ask her to go with her on March 4, 2011, she admitted that they had talked about the retirement issue previously and that Petitioner's actions on March 4, 2011, were consistent with what they had previously discussed. Petitioner's neighbor, Alvin Ellenwood, also testified that Petitioner called him later on March 4, 2011, and reported to him that she had completed the paperwork for early service retirement benefits. Mr. Ellenwood testified that he, too, was concerned and told Ms. Radicella that she may have made a mistake by not applying for disability retirement. Despite the concerns of both Ms. Beals and Mr. Ellenwood, apparently no steps were taken in the days after March 4, 2011, to review the forms that Petitioner had signed or to seek out any information from the Division regarding whether Petitioner could try to change the type of retirement benefits from early service retirement to disability retirement. On March 9, 2011, the Division issued and transmitted to Petitioner the following documents related to her application: Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application (Acknowledgement); Estimate of Retirement Benefits (Estimate); an information sheet entitled, "What Retirement Option Should You Choose" (Option); and a FRS booklet published by the Division entitled, "Preparing to Retire" (Booklet). The Acknowledgement document confirmed receipt of Petitioner's service retirement application and repeated a similar warning as those appearing above Petitioner's signature on the forms she signed on March 4, 2011; this time, the notice was in all capital letters and in all bold print: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED." Detailed information was provided about FRS retirement in the 15-page Booklet. The Booklet's first four pages are devoted to information for contacting the Division, including how to access the Division's website, and how to contact individuals, via numerous toll-free telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, to ask questions. And yet another warning message appears on page 11 of the Booklet, set apart from the rest of the text by a bold text box: Remember, once you cash or deposit any benefit payment or after the first payment is credited during your DROP participation period, you cannot add service credit, change your retirement benefit option selection, change your type of retirement from early to normal or from service to disability retirement, transfer to the FRS Investment Plan or cancel your DROP participation. The two other documents sent on March 9, 2011, the Estimate and Option documents, specifically addressed the retirement payment option choice. These two documents warned that Petitioner had selected Option 1 and could not change that option after cashing or depositing her first benefit check. Petitioner did not say what she did upon receipt of March 9, 2011, package of materials, whether she reviewed the material or whether she asked her friends to review it. Had these documents been reviewed, it would have been clear that once Petitioner cashed or deposited the first benefit payment, she could no longer change the type of retirement from early service retirement to disability retirement.2/ At any point in time before Petitioner received and cashed or deposited her first retirement benefit check, she could have sought to change the type of retirement benefit from early service to disability retirement. However, no such steps were taken. As Petitioner testified and Ms. Beals acknowledged, Petitioner did not believe at that time that she would qualify for disability retirement. In any event, it would have taken longer to seek disability retirement benefits because of the need to obtain verification by two doctors that Petitioner was unable to work, and Petitioner did not want to wait. Petitioner received her first retirement benefit check at the end of March 2011, and the state warrant was paid (cashed or deposited) on April 8, 2011. As of the hearing date, Petitioner had received an additional nine monthly payments for her early service retirement benefit. For some reason, it was not until June 2011, after receiving and cashing or depositing three early service retirement benefit payments, that Petitioner decided to submit an application for disability retirement benefits. The parties stipulated that Petitioner's disability retirement application was mailed to the Division on June 14, 2011.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the request to change from early service retirement benefits to disability retirement benefits submitted by Petitioner, Reneé Radicella. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2012.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57120.68 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.217
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DORIS G. HUTCHINSON vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 91-003870 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 25, 1991 Number: 91-003870 Latest Update: Jan. 31, 1992

The Issue The general issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option by changing from "Option 1" to "Option 3". Embodied within that issue is the question of whether the Petitioner's deceased husband was competent to effect a change in his retirement option from service retirement "Option 3" to disability retirement "Option 1."

Findings Of Fact The decedent, Elijah B. Hutchinson, was a teacher of math and science for the Calhoun County school district for some 31 years. In the early 1980's, his health had deteriorated significantly due primarily to diabetes mellitus, which caused a number of associated complications necessitating several hospitalizations during the early 1980's. In consideration of his deteriorating health, the decedent elected to retire in the spring of 1983. He filed an application dated May 27, 1983, seeking regular retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System. See Exhibit 1 in evidence. In response to his application, the decedent received information from the Division advising him of his retirement benefits under the different retirement options he was entitled to select. On or about June 24, 1983, the decedent elected retirement Option 3. Option 3 retirement benefits include the retiree's entitlement to a reduced monthly retirement benefit during his lifetime with the same monthly retirement benefit being paid, after his death, to his "joint annuitant", in this case, his surviving spouse, the Petitioner. Thereafter, and before he received any benefit check from his initially-selected Option 3 retirement, the decedent appeared at the Division's offices and requested to change his type of retirement or option. On August 12, 1983, therefore, the decedent requested to change his type of retirement benefit from regular retirement to disability retirement. On that date, he requested to change his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. An explanation of the benefits to be provided and the differences in the two options as to his benefits was given to the decedent by an employee of the Division. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. The decedent thereupon changed his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. In 1983, a retirement system member receiving retirement benefits as the result of a disability could only receive benefits in accordance with either Option 1 or Option 2, if he chose to elect disability retirement. On September 16, 1983, the decedent was mailed a letter from the Division advising him that his application for disability retirement benefits had been approved by the State Retirement Director and acknowledging that he had elected Option 1 for disability retirement. Thereafter, the decedent received and cashed a number of State warrants representing payment of those retirement benefits under Option 1. See Exhibit 10 in evidence. The decedent died on March 8, 1991. The Petitioner had been unaware that he had changed from Option 3 benefits to Option 1 benefits, as delineated above. Upon learning of this, after the decedent's death, the Petitioner, on April 30, 1991, requested the Division to modify the benefits option selected by the decedent to Option 3 benefits. Her basis for requesting this change was that the decedent had not been mentally or physically competent to make an informed selection at the time he changed his Option 3 retirement benefits election to Option 1 and that, therefore, she should be allowed to modify and reinstitute his retirement election to Option 3 benefits, which would provide her the death benefits permitted under the Option 3 election. This request was denied by the Division by its "final agency action letter" dated May 21, 1991, by which the Division advised the Petitioner that based upon its records, the decedent, who had requested Option 1 retirement benefits, was added to the retirement payroll in that category for September, 1983 and that he had received benefit payments and negotiated the checks, so that, under the provisions of Rule 22B-4.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, the selection of the option could no longer be altered. The Petitioner's testimony and that of Phillip H. Hutchinson indicates that sometime in 1983, the decedent suffered a cerebral-vascular incident or "stroke". This testimony is borne out by the medical records in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which, however, does not indicate when the stroke occurred. The Petitioner and her son maintain in their testimony that the stroke resulted in a deterioration in the decedent's mental faculties such that he could no longer manage his business affairs, pay bills, and handle financial matters in general. They maintain that this was evidenced also by a marked personality change whereby the decedent became extravagant with money, as evidenced by impulsively ordering and purchasing items which he observed advertised on television, sending money to television evangelists, and otherwise being free with donations. This was entirely different from his character and personality before he suffered the stroke, whereby he was known to be miserly with the family funds and very careful about not spending money unnecessarily. As a result of his stroke, he was no longer able to handle his business affairs; and his spouse, the Petitioner, had to assume the duties of paying family bills and otherwise handling financial and business matters for the family. When the decedent first decided to retire, he had explained to the Petitioner that he would select a retirement option which would give her something after he "passed"; and he showed her the retirement system booklet of allowable retirement options in discussing the matter with her. He never mentioned to her that he decided to or did change his option to Option 1 disability retirement. Although the Petitioner may have established that due to the stroke he suffered, the decedent may have, indeed, had difficulty attending to financial matters and overseeing and managing the family finances, the Petitioner failed to establish that at the time he made the election to select Option 1 retirement benefit, he did not possess the mental capacity to make a knowing and intelligent selection of that option and to waive his previously-selected Option 3 benefits. The evidence shows that he appeared at the Division's offices and, after an explanation of the option he chose to select, he freely and voluntarily selected that option and signed the pertinent documents attesting to it. It has simply not been demonstrated by substantial evidence that at the time the decedent made the second retirement option election, he did not understand the nature and consequences of that election, especially since it was not established by the Petitioner when he actually suffered the stroke, other than that it occurred sometime in 1983. As found above, the decedent made the election to chose Option 1 retirement benefits in August, 1983. Consequently, due to insufficient evidence, it cannot be found that the Petitioner's decedent was incompetent to knowingly and intelligently elect to receive Option 1 retirement benefits at the time he made the election.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Division denying the request of the Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by the decedent from Option 1 retirement benefits entitlement to Option 3 retirement benefits entitlement. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrativ Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-3870 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted, except that the evidence does not support that the stroke actually occurred in mid 1983. 3-4. Accepted. Rejected, as not being demonstrated by the preponderant evidence of record. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-14. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Phillip H. Hutchinson 4115 Tanglewood S., Apt. 570 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57121.091121.131
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JOYCE E. LAYTON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-000685 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Dade City, Florida Feb. 27, 2004 Number: 04-000685 Latest Update: Aug. 09, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for disability retirement benefits should be reinstated.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Joyce Layton is a member of the Florida Retirement System. In November 2002, Ms. Layton submitted an application for disability retirement benefits to the Division. The application was not notarized and was incomplete. Several documents were needed to process the application. By letter dated December 10, 2002, the Division wrote Ms. Layton acknowledging receipt of the disability application and requesting additional information. Enclosed with the letter were two blank FR-13b forms (Physician's Statement Forms), which were necessary to complete the application. Ms. Layton did not respond to the December 10, 2002, letter. The Division mailed another request on January 13, 2003, again, including two blank FR-13b forms with the letter. Ms. Layton did not respond to the January 13, 2003, letter. On February 17, 2003, the Division mailed a third request for information to Ms. Layton. Blank FR-13b forms were also included with this letter. Ms. Layton did not respond to the February 17, 2003, letter. The Division mailed a fourth request to Ms. Layton on March 24, 2003, again, requesting information necessary to complete her application for disability retirement benefits. After the Division did not receive a response to its previous letters, it sent a letter dated April 15, 2003, by certified mail, to Ms. Layton advising her that she had 21 days from the date of the letter to submit the necessary information or her application would be cancelled. Ms. Layton did not respond to this letter. Finally, the Division sent a letter dated June 3, 2003, by certified mail, to Ms. Layton notifying her that her disability application was cancelled and giving her 21 days to request a hearing. She did receive this letter, and this timely appeal followed. The applicant is responsible for ensuring the Division receives the information necessary to process an application for disability retirement benefits. Ms. Layton did not provide the necessary information.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, issue a final order denying the request of Petitioner, Joyce E. Layton, to reinstate her disability retirement application. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Joyce E. Layton 5980 Boyette Road Wesley Chapel, Florida 33544 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominquez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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SHEAH RARBACK vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 86-003653 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003653 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 1987

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witness and her demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Petitioner, Sheah Rarback is the daughter, and Petitioner Mae Rarback is the wife of Paul Rarback, deceased. Paul Rarback and Mae Rarback were married for over forty (40) years. Paul Rarback commenced employment in a permanent position with the Human Resources Department, Metropolitan Dade County, in December of 1973. Mr. Rarback was employed as a food services manager. On December 23, 1973, Paul Rarback enrolled with the Florida Retirement System and submitted a Personnel History Record Form FRS-MIO to the Division of Retirement. On the form, Paul Rarback listed his two grandsons, Hod and Caynon Rabino, as beneficiaries and Sheah Rarback as contingent beneficiary for the purpose of receiving benefits in the event of his death. On February 1, 1985, Paul Rarback requested an Application for Disability Retirement from his employer because of polymyositis (muscle atrophy). On February 23, 1985, Paul Rarback's employment with Metropolitan Dade County officially ended. Rarback's personnel file indicated that his employment was terminated with a code E/G, which is a retirement code. On March 18, 1985, Paul Rarback completed his "Application for Disability Retirement," Division of Retirement Form FR-13. Rarback listed his daughter Sheah Rarback as the beneficiary and chose "Option 1: Maximum Benefit." The FR-13 form listed four different options as follows: Option 1: Maximum Benefit Full benefit payable to the member for his lifetime. If death occurs before the total benefits paid to member equals the contributions made, the difference, if any, is refunded to beneficiary in a lump sum payment. Option 2: Ten Years Certain Lifetime benefit to member, but not less than 120 monthly payments to someone. A decreased retirement benefit payable to a member during his lifetime and, in the event of his death within a period of ten (10) years after his retirement, the same monthly amount shall be payable for the balance of such ten (10) year period to his beneficiary, or in case the beneficiary is deceased, in accordance with Section 121.091(8), Florida Statutes, as though no beneficiary has been named. Option 3: A reduced monthly benefit payable to the retired member for his lifetime and upon his death a monthly benefit in the same amount is payable to his joint annuitant (spouse or other dependent designated at retirement), if living, for the lifetime of that person. Option 4: A reduced monthly benefit payable to the retired member while he and his joint annuitant are both living. Upon the death of either the retired member or his joint annuitant, the monthly benefit payable to the survivor for the lifetime of that person is reduced to two-thirds of the original benefit even if it is the retired member who is the survivor. During the previous ten years, Mae Rarback had become increasingly senile, was unable to care for herself and had been placed in various nursing homes. Mae Rarback is presently in Douglas Gardens Nursing Home, Miami, Florida, where she has been for the past four years. By letter dated June 27, 1985, the Division of Retirement advised Paul Rarback that it intended to deny his request for disability retirement benefits because the medical documentation submitted did not support his claim of permanent and total disability. In addition, Rarback was advised that he could apply for early service retirement, with a reduction in benefits of 5 percent for each year under age 62 or in the alternative, he could request a refund of his retirement contributions and cancel his membership with the system. The last paragraph of the letter stated in part as follows: . . . before a final decision is made, the Director wants you to have the opportunity to submit additional medical evidence or a written statement, if you wish to challenge the grounds on which he intends to act. If you chose to submit additional evidence or written statement, it will be considered in making the final decision. On June 29, 1985, Paul Rarback died in Miami, Florida. By letter dated February 26, 1986, the Respondent advised Sheah Rarback, through her attorney, that according to their files, the primary beneficiary of Paul Rarback's account was Sheah Rarback, designated on March 28, 1985. On or about July 23, 1986, Petitioner Sheah Rarback received notification from the Division of Retirement that she would receive only the accumulated contribution of Paul Rarback to the retirement account in the amount of $887.67.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioners' request that the designation of beneficiary be reformed to allow Mae Rarback to receive the benefits from her deceased husband's retirement account as though she had originally been designated the beneficiary and joint annuitant be DENIED and the petition DISMISSED. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of June 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Stewart Marcus, Esquire 2251 S.W. 22nd Street Miami, Florida 33145 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Building C - Suite 207 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 121.091
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