The Issue Did Respondent violate the provisions of Section 817.567, Florida Statutes (2004), or any lesser included offenses, Section 943.1395(6) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b) and/or (c), by failing to maintain the qualifications established in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2004), requiring maintenance of good moral character?
Findings Of Fact Undisputed Facts: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on September 5, 1995, and was issued Correctional Certificate Number 157626. Additional Facts: Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A11 is a copy of an interoffice memorandum from Respondent to the "Personnel Dept." This reference to the personnel department is taken to refer to the Florida Department of Corrections, in view of other proof in this record. The interoffice memorandum goes on to describe as the subject "transcript and diploma." The interoffice memorandum says "I have enclosed a copy of my diploma and transcript. Please place these in my personnel file and update my records and incentive. Thank you, W.S.D." The exhibit reflects in a handwritten note of unknown origins, "This diploma & transcript are ineligible for CJIP because this is not an accredited college." Nothing else in this record describes the nature of the transcript and diploma referred to in the interoffice memorandum concerning the particulars of the transcript and diploma that was mentioned on January 31, 1999, nor can it be reasonably inferred. As evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15, Respondent prepared and signed an employment application with the Florida Department of Corrections for the position of Correctional Probation Officer on June 14, 2004. In the course of this application Respondent listed under the section related to college university or professional school "Southern Mississippi" at "Hattiesburg, Mississippi", which he allegedly attended from August 1996 through August 2003, participating in a course of study referred to as "Criminal Justice" at which, according to the application, he earned an M.S. degree. In fact Respondent had never attended the University of Southern Mississippi as explained in correspondence dated July 6, 2004, from Greg Pierce, University Registrar at the University of Southern Mississippi directed to Terry Foskey, a payroll specialist with the Department of Corrections, Region I Service Center, who had inquired of the University of Southern Mississippi concerning Respondent's status as a student. This correspondence is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A9. Moreover, a transcript, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3, which Mr. Foskey had supplied a verification specialist in the registrar's office at the University of Southern Mississippi, Trudy Stewart or Steward, was found not to resemble a transcript from that university, as explained by Mr. Pierce in his correspondence. The transcript, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3, had been received by Mr. Foskey on June 28, 2004. Mr. Foskey was uncertain of the information contained in the transcript. This led to his inquiry to the University of Southern Mississippi, with the determination being made that the transcript did not come from that university. While Mr. Foskey was attempting to clarify the status of the transcript with the University of Southern Mississippi, he was contacted by Respondent who asked if Mr. Foskey had received the transcript. Mr. Foskey replied that he had and asked what Respondent wanted done with that transcript. Respondent answered that he had pulled up information on a program known as ATMS, which the Florida Department of Law Enforcement uses to track certified officers, Respondent among them. As a result Respondent said that he needed this document, meaning the transcript, entered into the ATMS because he was transferring from his present position into another position he referred to as security. There was a series of e-mails as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A8 from Respondent to Mr. Foskey. The first was on July 1, 2004. It says "Per telephone call, please place information in ATMS 2 and in my personnel file Thanks." Then the name and position of Respondent as Classification Officer at Santa Rosa CI-119 is provided. On that same date another e-mail was dispatched from Mr. Foskey back to Respondent which said "Thank you for the follow-up." As reflected in the exhibit, on July 7, 2004, Respondent sent an e- mail to Mr. Foskey, with the subject line being "Re: Transcript," which said in its text, "Mr. Foskey, how long does it take for the information to be entered into ATMS 2?" The change in employment position by Respondent that was being described for Mr. Foskey related to the application, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15. Pertinent to this inquiry, the Correctional Probation Officer job being sought by Respondent required a bachelor's degree level of education as a prerequisite to filling the position. The reference made by Respondent to the M.S. degree from University of Southern Mississippi is perceived as Respondent's attempt to show that he had the necessary level of education to apply for the job. In relation to his pursuit of the Correctional Probation Officer position, on June 8, 2004, Respondent had filed a request for demotion with the Regional I Service Center Department of Corrections for personal reasons, requesting permission to move from his position of Senior Classification Officer to that of Correctional Probation Officer. This is reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15A. As a result of the incident concerning the purported transcript from the University of Southern Mississippi, the Department of Corrections, Office of the Inspector General investigated. That investigation was conducted by David Ellis. In a discussion between Mr. Ellis and Respondent concerning the subject transcript, Respondent acknowledged that he had the documentation sent to personnel, taken to mean the personnel office with the Department of Corrections. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he had requested that the transcript be sent to personnel and had supplied information to a company to have it sent. Respondent did not remember the name of the company, as he explained to Mr. Ellis. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he had read a personnel memorandum on the Department of Corrections website about a university in southern Florida that would accept life experience for college credits and that he, meaning Respondent, searched the web and found that the University of Southern Mississippi did likewise. The memorandum about the university in southern Florida, refers to Florida Southern College, and is found to be that as reflected in Respondent's Exhibit numbered A5. Respondent then sent an e-mail to the internet company requesting information about college degrees. The company sent him a package explaining the process and he sent something back about his life experiences, with a check of $800.00 and a list of other college credits earned elsewhere. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he then received the subject transcript at his home from the University of Southern Mississippi on a later date. This is found to be as arranged through the internet company. The transcript that he received at home, Respondent compared to the one that had been received by Mr. Foskey and Respondent told Mr. Ellis they were the same with the exception that his transcript copy had a seal in the middle. Respondent acknowledged to Mr. Ellis that he had not taken any of the courses on the transcript that has been described and had not earned any grades for any of those courses reflected on the transcript. When Mr. Ellis asked Respondent why he would send something to personnel that he had never officially done, Respondent replied because he thought it was all right. Mr. Ellis asked Respondent to give him information about the internet company that Respondent had referred to and any information regarding payment to that company by Respondent. Respondent called Mr. Ellis back and told him that the name of the company was CustomDegrees.com. It is found that Respondent's Exhibit numbered 4 is information from CustomDegrees.com that Respondent relied on. Nothing about this information from CustomDegrees.com provided to Respondent, and for which Respondent paid a service fee, could reasonably be interpreted to serve as the functional equivalent of having earned the degree from the University of Southern Mississippi for which Respondent intended to take credit. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3A constitutes a handwritten educational history which Respondent provided to CustomDegrees.com for them to provide the degree which was falsely portrayed as having been issued by the University of Southern Mississippi.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding violations of the Statutes and Rules referred to and suspending Respondent's Correctional Certificate Number 157626 for 60 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.A. 1308-B Dunmire Street Pensacola, Florida 32504 Michael Crews, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact On November 4, 1991, the Petitioner, David Lee Moore, filed a Petition for Administrative Determination. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rules 33-3.0082, 33-3.0083, 33-6.009, and 33-3.123, Florida Administrative Code, and P.P.D. 4.07.21. The Challenged Rules govern the following matters: Rule 33-3.0082, Florida Administrative Code, deals with "Protective Management" which is defined as "the removal of an inmate from the general population for the protection of the inmate." Rule 33-3.0082(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0083, Florida Administrative Code, deals with "Close Management" which is defined as "long-term single cell confinement of an inmate apart from the general population, where an inmate, through his own behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of other inmates or disturbing the security, order or operation of the institution." Rule 33-3.0082(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, was transferred to Rule 33- 6.0045, Florida Administrative Code, which deals with custody classification of inmates. Rule 33-3.123, Florida Administrative Code, according the Petitioner, deals with inmate telephone use. Apparently, the Petitioner is referring to Rule 33-3.0123, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Section 120.52(8)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the specific requirements or provisions of the Challenged Rules are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. The Petition includes the use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. Although the Petition contains some "legalese, it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. As an example, the Petitioner has alleged in paragraph 13 of the Petition the following: The Petitioner challenges the validity, legality, and constitutionality of the five (5) rules cited, supra; Petitioner submits that these challenged rules, on their face and as applied, are invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: The rules violate the Petitioner's Federal and State Constitutional rights to substantive and Procedural Due Process of law, as guaranteed by the 8th and 14th amendments; the [sic] also violates the Petitioner [sic], First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth, Constitutional Amendment [sic]. They are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority contrary to Chapter 120.52(8)(d) & (e), Fla. Statute in that: The rules are vague, fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and, they vest unbridied [sic] discretion in the Agency. The Rules are arbitrary and capricious. The only specific allegations concerning any of the Challenged Rules involve complaints about the Respondent's application of at least some of the Challenged Rules to the Petitioner. For example, in paragraph 29 of the Petition the Petitioner alleges that "33-3.0082 is defective for failure to utilize mandatory language to protect the Petitioner from punitive measures and the agency's actions deprives [sic] the Petitioner of the ability to clearly establish his due process liberty interest . . . ." See also paragraphs 5-8 and 12 of the Petition. The incidents complained of by the Petitioner have allegedly been the subject of unsuccessful grievance proceedings or other actions. In paragraph 12 of the Petition it is alleged "Petitioner contends that the action, acts, omissions, and practise [sic] complained of in the foregoing Petition has [sic] been complained of before . . . ." Having failed to obtain a favorable response to his grievances and other actions, the Petitioner is seeking through this process to have the incidents reviewed. The Petitioner's allegations concerning the alleged incidents are not merely allegations intended to prove the Petitioner's standing to institute this proceeding. The Petitioner is complaining about, and seeking review of, alleged actions of the Respondent. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rules are unconstitutional. The only allegation concerning Rule 33-3.0123, Florida Administrative Code, contained in the Petition is that this rule "is intentionally designed to cut off ALL inmates who cannot read or write from communicating with family members as well as friends." No facts to support his argument are alleged and, on the face of this rule, there is no basis for this allegation. On December 4, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. The Petitioner was informed that the Petition was being dismissed and he was given an opportunity to file an amended petition. The Petitioner did not file an amended petition.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Benny R. Hardy, is a licensed law enforcement officer in the State of Florida, holding License No. GF-7656. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the licensing of and the regulation and enforcing of licensure, practice and conduct standards for law enforcement officers. The Respondent was hired on the police force of the City of Umatilla, Florida, on September 16, 1975, rising to the position of Chief of Police. He served in that capacity until his termination of employment by his resignation on March 23, 1983. The Respondent resigned from his employment due to his having been charged with a felony, involving obtaining drugs with a forged prescription. He entered a plea of nolo contendere to that charge and an order was entered on March 25, 1983, placing the Respondent on probation for three years and withholding adjudication of guilt, it appearing to the satisfaction of the court that the Respondent was "not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct . . . ." Certain conditions were imposed upon Respondent's probationary status and the court reserved jurisdiction to adjudge the Respondent guilty and impose any legally appropriate sentence if the conditions of that probation are violated. There is no evidence that Respondent has ever been the subject of any disciplinary proceeding such as this in the past. His licensure status is presently "inactive." The Respondent, however, after due and proper notice of hearing, failed to appear at the hearing at the appointed date and time and had still not appeared at 10:40 a.m., when the hearing was adjourned.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the evidence and testimony of record, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission revoking Law Enforcement Certificate No. GF-7656 presently held by Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Benny R. Hardy Post Office Box 1014 Umatilla, Florida 32784 James W. York, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 G. Patrick Gallagher, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed the violation alleged in the corrected administrative complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles Harry Kent, is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, license no. ME 0037235. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and disciplining licensed physicians. In connection with a prior disciplinary case against this Respondent the Agency issued a final order placing the Respondent on two years probation and requiring Respondent to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00. Such fine was to be paid not later than March 5, 1995. As of March 28, 1996, the Respondent had not paid the administrative fine nor had he provided any explanation for the failure to timely remit payment. Efforts to notify the Respondent regarding the unpaid fine were unanswered by the Respondent. Ultimately, the administrative complaint in this case was filed against the Respondent and notice of the non-payment provided by way of allegations set forth in paragraphs 6 through 12. On October 3, 1995, the Respondent executed an election of rights which disputed the allegations and listed his address as 3605 Juan Ortiz Circle, Fort Pierce, Florida 34947. Attempts to personally contact this Respondent by an Agency investigator proved fruitless. Respondent has not responded to mail addressed to his address of record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine, enter a final order suspending Respondent's medical license until such time as the administrative fine at issue in this cause is paid in full; imposing an additional fine in the amount of $5,000.00; and extending Respondent's period of probation by an additional two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5535 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 10 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Peacock Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Charles Harry Kent, M.D. Post Office Box 2478 Fort Pierce, Florida 34947 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine Division of Medical Quality Assurance Boards 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0342
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a 47-year old resident of Hollywood, Florida. He is married and has a five-year old step-daughter. His wife's father is the minister of the First Methodist Church in Hollywood. Petitioner is an active member of his father-in-law's church. In recent years, he has volunteered a significant amount of his time to perform tasks on behalf of the church. Petitioner is now, and has been since June of 1997, employed as a salesperson by Rex Yacht Sales (Rex) in Fort Lauderdale. As a salesperson for Rex, he sells new boats and he also sells used boats that are 32 feet or less in length.3 Approximately, 75 percent of the sales he makes are of used boats. Petitioner specializes in the sale of sailboats. He possesses a considerable amount of knowledge concerning sailboats as a result of the years (since he was a young child) that he has devoted to sailing. Petitioner owned, lived aboard, and captained a sailboat named the "Wave Dancer" from 1975 until the late 1980's. He acquired the "Wave Dancer" in return for his participation in an illicit drug smuggling operation. In 1975, when he was still living in his hometown of Port Washington, New York, Petitioner was approached by a childhood friend, Dan Locastro. Locastro advised Petitioner that he (Locastro) and his associates wanted to buy a sailboat to use to transport marijuana from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands to the New England coast. Locastro promised Petitioner that, if Petitioner were able locate a sailboat for them to purchase and if he thereafter successfully captained the newly purchased sailboat on its journey to and from the Virgin Islands, Petitioner could keep the sailboat. Approximately a month later, Petitioner notified Locastro that he had located a sailboat for Locastro and his associates. The sailboat was the "Wave Dancer." Locastro and his associates subsequently purchased the "Wave Dancer." They purchased the boat in the name of Richard Harrison. Following the purchase of the "Wave Dancer," Petitioner, accompanied by Locastro, sailed the boat to an island near St. Thomas. There, 500 pounds of marijuana were loaded onto the "Wave Dancer." Petitioner then sailed the boat to the New England coast, where he delivered the marijuana. Petitioner participated in this illicit smuggling operation because he wanted his own sailboat. He was neither arrested, nor charged, for having participated in this operation. As promised, Petitioner was allowed by Locastro and his associates to keep the "Wave Dancer" after the conclusion of operation. The boat was subsequently titled in Petitioner's name. For approximately 12 or 13 years, Petitioner (who was then single) lived in the Caribbean aboard the "Wave Dancer." He earned a living by taking tourists (usually one couple at a time) out in the water on his boat. In the late 1980's, Petitioner decided to return to the United States to live with and care for his parents, who, because of their advanced age, required his assistance. Before moving back to the United States, Petitioner put the "Wave Runner" up for sale. He was unsuccessful in his efforts to sell the boat. He discussed with a friend of his, Ken Fish, the possibility of Fish purchasing the boat for $50,000.00, but no sale was consummated. Petitioner was still the owner the "Wave Runner" when he flew to the United States and moved in with his parents (in their home). He left the "Wave Runner" behind in the Virgin Islands in the care of his friend Fish. Approximately nine months after he left the Virgin Islands, Petitioner received a telephone call from Fish, who indicated that he was having financial difficulty and that he wanted to use the "Wave Runner" in a "marijuana scheme." Approximately six months later, Fish again telephoned Petitioner. This time he told Petitioner that he wanted "to do a cocaine smuggling venture with [the "Wave Runner]." At first, Petitioner told Fish that he (Fish) was "out of his mind." Later during the conversation, however, Petitioner relented and agreed to allow Fish to use the "Wave Runner" in the proposed "cocaine smuggling venture." Petitioner gave his permission without receiving any promise from Fish that he (Petitioner) would receive anything in return. The "cocaine smuggling venture" was unsuccessful. The "Wave Runner" was seized by authorities in Martinique. In the spring of 1991, in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR- HIGHSMITH, Petitioner was criminally charged by the United States government for his role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. Petitioner's role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" was limited to permitting Fish to use the "Wave Runner" to transport cocaine into the United States. After his arrest in May of 1991, Petitioner agreed to, and he subsequently did, cooperate with federal authorities by participating in federal undercover drug enforcement operations under the supervision of federal agents. At times during these operations, he was required to place himself in situations where his personal safety was compromised. In or around January of 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91- 349-CR-HIGHSMITH to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine. On January 30, 1995, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of said crime and, as punishment, placed on probation for five years and fined $17,500.00. Such punishment constituted a substantial downward departure from the range provided in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge explained that he was "constrained to substantially modify the sentence in this case downward" because of the risks Petitioner had taken to assist federal authorities in their drug-fighting efforts. Although under no legal obligation to do so, Petitioner continued to provide similar assistance to federal authorities (at a substantial personal risk) after his sentencing. In September of 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department an application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. Question 13 on the application form read as follows: CRIMINAL HISTORY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the law of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. Yes No The application form instructed those applicants whose answer to Question 13 was "Yes" to "attach [their] complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or [were] pending." On the application form that he submitted to the Department, Petitioner answered "Yes" to Question 13, but he did not attach the required signed statement. He merely appended to the application form a copy of the judgment entered in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On or about October 1, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioner: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Section of General Regulation is in receipt of your application for a yacht Salesman. A review of your application has disclosed the following deficiencies: You answered Yes to question 13 which asked "Have you been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" The paragraph under question 15 further states "If your answer to question 13, 14, 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." You will need to submit a signed statement of the charges and facts, within twenty-one (21) days to this office before your application can be checked for form. Should you have any questions, please contact me. After receiving the Department's October 1, 1996, letter, Petitioner telephonically requested additional time to respond. By letter dated December 13, 1996, Petitioner's attorney, John J. Lynch, Esquire, responded on Petitioner's behalf to the Department's October 1, 1996, letter. Lynch's letter, which was received by the Department on December 17, 1996, read as follows: I represent the Applicant, Richard E. Parker. In response to concerns raised by Richard Parker's application's disclosure of charges and crimes and the results thereof, please consider the following as part of the application process: The subject matter was limited to involvement in a conspiracy to import controlled substances. Mr. Parker voluntarily entered a guilty plea in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida, in an action entitled, "United States v. Richard Parker" Criminal No. 91-349-CR- Highsmith. Upon being aware of potential liability, he cooperated fully with the U.S. Government. During a four-year period, he provided extensive assistance to the U.S. Government in ongoing investigations and provided training and resources to special agents. Mr. Parker's participation as a Government agent put him at considerable risk. His case remains under court seal to protect information which may be used by the Government in future criminal prosecutions. I cannot provide a complete transcript of the court proceedings without jeopardizing Mr. Parker's safety. To appreciate Mr. Parker's significant assistance to the U.S. Government, a portion of the Honorable Judge Highsmith's sentencing comments has been enclosed. Pages 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the sentencing memorandum specify the efforts made by Mr. Parker, and recognized by the Court to rectify his prior conduct. (Note: All individuals, other than Mr. Parker, have been redacted to preserve a measure of safety since the matter remains under court seal). In recognition of [his] assistance, Mr. Parker was placed on probation for five years and fined on January 30, 1995. The fine was paid and probation has commenced. I trust this supplemental response answers concerns regarding this unfortunate episode in Mr. Parker's life. As his attorney asserted in the foregoing letter, as of the date of the letter, Petitioner had paid the $17,500.00 fine imposed in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On January 17, 1997, the Department issued its Notice of Intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure. On February 12, 1997, Petitioner requested a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the matter. On August 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH requesting that "his period of probation [be reduced] from a term of 60 months to a term of 32 months thereby terminating his probation on September 30, 1997." In support of his motion, he stated the following: On January 30, 1995, Richard Parker was sentenced by this Court to five years probation for his participation in a cocaine conspiracy. The Court imposed this lenient sentence because of the extraordinary cooperation Richard Parker had rendered (a transcript of the sentencing is attached hereto as Exhibit A). As part of his cooperation Parker had gone to Columbia in a sailboat, at great personal risk and with no protection from law enforcement, and developed a case involving significant arrests, convictions, and seizure of cocaine. Since sentencing Parker has remarried and complied with all terms of probation. Parker had promised the agents and the Court that his cooperation would continue regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. True to his word, following sentencing, at the request of the DEA, Richard Parker traveled alone to Columbia and negotiated the location in the Caribbean Sea for an air drop of 300 kilos of cocaine. Parker then captained a sailboat and traveled to Dominica and Barbados, St. Kitts and the British Virgin Islands with DEA agents on board and participated in the recovery of the 300 kilos of cocaine as it was dropped from a plane in 50 kilogram packages. Parker received no payment for this cooperation. Parker rendered substantial assistance to the Government after sentencing because of his moral commitment to cooperation as a form of restitution, because of his sense of obligation and gratitude, and because he had given his word to the Government and this Court. It is now over 2 1/2 years since Parker was sentenced. Parker has complied fully with all conditions of probation. Parker has committed himself to building a productive law-abiding life. The Count may well recall that Parker's marriage ended during his cooperation and sentence. Parker has recently married again becoming the father of a four-year old in the process. Parker has spent his life working on and sailing boats. Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a license to be a yacht salesman. The issuance of these licenses in Florida is regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). The DBPR has denied Parker's request for a license citing Parker's conviction as irrefutable proof of moral turpitude as a basis for denial. Parker has petitioned for review and a hearing before an administrative law judge is scheduled for October 14, 1997. Undersigned counsel has been advised that the hearing scheduled for October 14, 1997, will be the final hearing regarding Parker's petition for a license to sell boats in the State of Florida. Regarding this issue, undersigned counsel has become aware of an administrative decision where an application for a license as a yacht and ship salesman was granted by DBPR to an applicant who had been convicted of a drug felony, sentenced to probation and had been terminated from probation. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes v. Orr, Docket No. YS95025 (Final Order No. BPR-95-03991, 7/20/95). It is respectfully submitted that evidence of successful completion of probation by Parker prior to the time of final hearing on October 14, 1997, will either result in the DBPR rescinding their denial of Parker's application or a reversal of DBPR's denial by the administrative law judge. Assistant United States Attorney John Schlessinger has conferred with the United States Probation Officer Anthony Gagliardi regarding this motion and has authorized undersigned counsel to state that the United States has no objection to a reduction of probation from 60 months to 36 months. Richard Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a yacht salesman license so that he can support himself and his family. Richard Parker, through his cooperation, has rebutted any presumption of moral turpitude that attached to his conviction and has affirmatively and courageously demonstrated good moral character; Richard Parker has honored and will continue to honor his pledge to the United States and to this Honorable Court never to break the law again. . . . The Final Order in the Orr case, which was referenced in Petitioner's Motion to Modify Probation, contained the following "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law":
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1997.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, the spouse of an inmate of the Florida correctional system, has standing to challenge Florida Administrative Code Rule 23-21.0155, which provides that if the Commission declines to authorize the effective parole release date of an inmate referred for extraordinary review, the Commission must suspend the established presumptive parole release date until the inmate is found to be a good candidate for parole release.
Findings Of Fact On October 10, 1995, Petitioner married Anthony Ray Peek, an inmate housed in a Department of Corrections facility. Mr. Peek is serving a parole-eligible sentence pursuant to chapter 987, Florida Statutes. On September 1, 2010, Petitioner appeared and spoke at a Commission hearing convened to determine whether to authorize Mr. Peek?s presumptive parole date of September 29, 2010. By order dated September 2, 2010, the Commission decided not to authorize Mr. Peek?s presumptive parole date, and referred the case for extraordinary review pursuant to rule 23-21.0155. On November 9, 2010, the Commission entered an order by which it determined that it would not authorize an effective parole date for Mr. Peek, that his presumptive parole release date remained suspended, and established May, 2017, as the date for Mr. Peek?s next extraordinary review interview. The Commission?s action applied the standards for placing an inmate on parole established in section 947.18, Florida Statutes. In taking its action, the Commission utilized the procedures for extraordinary review established in rule 23-21.0155, which provides, in its entirety, that: 23-21.0155 Extraordinary Review Procedures. When an inmate?s case is referred for extraordinary review by the Commission, an order shall be prepared outlining the reason(s) for the Commission?s decision. The order shall be acted upon by the Commission within 60 days of the decision declining to authorize the effective parole release date. The Commission?s order shall specifically state the reasons for finding the inmate to be a poor candidate for parole release pursuant to Section 947.18, F.S., and shall identify the information relied upon in reaching this conclusion. Additionally, the order shall suspend the established presumptive parole release date until such time that the inmate is found to be a good candidate for parole release. The determination, on extraordinary review, that an inmate is not a good candidate for parole release shall have the effect of overriding his presumptive parole release date however, the inmate shall continue to receive extraordinary interviews, which shall be scheduled pursuant to Rule 23-21.013, F.A.C. If upon extraordinary review, a majority of the Commission finds the inmate to be a good candidate for parole release pursuant to Section 947.18, F.S., the Commission shall enter a written order authorizing the effective parole release date and outlining the term and conditions of parole. Specific Authority 947.002, 947.07 FS. Law Implemented 947.002, 947.07, 947.18 FS. History–New 8-1-83, Formerly 23-21.155, Amended 8-17-06. Had he been released from prison on parole, Mr. Peek would have had the opportunity to live with Petitioner. As a result of the Commission?s action, Petitioner is not able to live and cohabitate with Mr. Peek as a married couple.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that Petitioner issue a Final Order imposing a $100 fine for each of the class III violations which have been established, for a total fine of $1200, but that no additional fine be assessed for the unclassified violations. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Braynon, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Dorothy K. Emrick Oakland Park Retuirement Annex Ageing and Adult Service, Inc. 5605 N.W. 27th Court Lauderhill, FL 33313 John Marfilius Oakland Park Retirement Annex Ageing and Adult Services, Inc. 5605 N.W. 27th Court Lauderhill, FL 33313 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: As of the hearing date of March 15, 1982, the commission had not prepared subject-matter indices of its Orders entered after January 1, 1975 resulting from: petitions for rulemaking; hearings held pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. determinations relating to presumptive and effective parole release dated (parole grants) or parole revocations; petitions for a declaratory statement issued prior to approximately July of 1981, or other final orders not otherwise defined. Other than as referred to in paragraph 2 of these Findings of Fact, the Commission has not produced indices of its current 1981 orders. (TR. 9) Neither the Commission's General Counsel nor the Planning and Evaluation Director, both of whom receive their assignments of duties and responsibilities from the Commission, have been directed by the Commission to prepare a subject- matter index of final Commission orders issued pursuant to hearings held under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, or petitions for rulemaking. (TR. 34, 35, 37 & 104) The Commission's General Counsel and Planning and Evaluation Director would prepare such indices only if directed to do so by the Commission. (TR. 35 & 104) The General Counsel's office has been directed by the Commission to prepare an index of declaratory statements issued by the Commission. With the aid of an assistant counsel, the Commission's General Counsel has prepared a subject-matter index of declaratory statements purportedly issued as of September 30, 1981. (Appellant's Exhibit 3) This index utilizes key words or topics, without further citation to statutes or rules. It includes all declaratory statements issued by the Commission during the approximately ninety- day period prior to September 30, 1981. The General Counsel, who has been in that position since March of 1980, was aware of no other declaratory statements issued by the Commission or petitions for a declaratory statement submitted to the Commission. (TR. 108) A draft of an update to the subject-matter index for declaratory statements issued after September 30, 1981 has been prepared and was expected to be in final form within thirty days of March 15, 1982. The Office of General Counsel will prepare and produce an updated subject-matter index of declaratory statements on at least a quarterly basis. (TR. 101-103) As indicated by the opinions rendered in the case of Turner v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 379 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1980) aff'd, 389 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1980), and various issues of the Florida Administrative Weekly, 1/ petitions for a declaratory statement have been received and ruled upon by the Commission prior to July 1, 1981. As noted above, the witnesses presented by the Commission to testify in this proceeding had not been assigned the task of preparing subject-matter indices for orders on petitions for rulemaking, orders following hearings conducted pursuant to section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and other final agency decisions which are equivalent to "orders". Involved in the preparation such indices would be a review of the file and a development of a subject heading or headings for each such order. The Commission presented no further evidence regarding the practicability or cost of preparing such indices or any lack of public benefit to be derived from access to such indices. Absent such evidence, it is specifically found that it would not be impracticable, unduly time- consuming, or cost-prohibitive for the Commission to prepare or produce subject- matter indices of its Orders resulting from petitions for rulemaking, Section 120.57 hearings or other final agency decisions which are equivalent to "orders." Whatever inconvenience such indices cause the Commission in terms of time and costs of preparation are far outweighed by the public benefit to be derived from accessibility to the Commission's interpretations of the law and development of agency practice and incipient policy. The Commission has failed, without sufficient justification, to comply with the Court's mandate and Order dated September 3, 1981, to "forthwith prepare and report that it has prepared indices of its declaratory statements and of petitions to the Commission for rulemaking" and has further failed to comply with its own approved proposal to produce induced of current 1981 orders on or before November 30, 1981. Because of a change in the statutes effective January 1, 1979, with respect to the granting of parole and the establishment of presumptive and effective parole release dates, orders of the Commission entered prior to that date have no relationship to orders entered after that date. Therefore, the public would gain no present benefit from an index of parole granting orders entered prior to January 1, 1979. The appellant, Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. , has withdrawn its request to have the Commission index parole granting orders issued from January 1, 1975 through December 31, 1978. (TR. 12 & 13) As to the period between January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1980, it would be beneficial to the public to have access to an index of only those parole granting orders which contain a reference to a constitutional provision, statute or rule, since such orders may contain the agency's interpretation of the law or incipient policy. The parole revocation process has not changed since 1975. It would be beneficial to the public to have access to all those parole revocation orders of the Commission entered since 1975 which contain a reference to a constitutional provision, statute, or a rule. Jay D. Farris, the Commission's Planning and Evaluation Director, has been appointed by the Commission to be in charge of the indexing project as it relates to parole granting orders (which includes Commission determinations on presumptive and effective parole release dates) and parole revocation orders. This assignment is in addition to his other duties which include the drafting of all legislation for the Commission, lobbying, acting as a part-time clerk of the Commission, preparing complex case analysis for the Commission, the drafting of proposed rules, holding public hearings for proposed rules and training Commission hearing examiners when there are rule changes. Mr. Farris has only a secretary on his staff. (TR. 28, 29) Since the District Court entered its opinion on November 26, 1980 (petition for rehearing denied on January 8, 1981) reported at 391 So.2d 247, the Commission, through Mr. Farris, has conducted an investigation into the number of Commission actions which could possibly fall within the parameters of the Court's ruling regarding the prepartion of subject-matter indexing. It was determined that a minimum of 600 actions per week would fall under the purview of that decision. A private indexing firm would charge approximately $1.00 per action to review the data and produce an index. (Tr. 16) Determining that this cost would be prohibitive, Mr. Farris has been working with the Bureau of Management Information Systems (MIS) of the Department of corrections to prepare a computer program which would meet the Commission's indexing requirements. By statute, the department of Corrections maintains the sole offender-based information and records system for the joint use of the department of Corrections and the Commission. Section 20.315(20) Florida Statutes. The function of the Bureau of Management Information Systems of the Department of Corrections is the automation of departmental records for ease of retrieval and management information. To accomplish this function, the Department of Corrections shares a computer with the Supreme Court of Florida, with the Department owning 67 percent and the supreme Court owning 33 percent of the computer. The computer itself is located in the basement of the Supreme Court, but the Department of Corrections has approximately 40 terminals located in its headquarters in Tallahassee and in excess of 100 terminals located throughout the State. The computer maintains a complete offender record of each Florida inmate. This record includes the inmate's date of birth, race, sex, the offense for which he or she is incarcerated, other offenses, gain time accrued, presumptive, projected and current release dates and FDLE and FBI numbers. Without the prior preparation of a specific program by the Bureau of MIS, it is not possible to retrieve from the computer any generic information on Florida inmates. For example, while the computer presently has the ability to produce a screen view of the record of any particular inmate, it cannot search through its entire data base and produce screen printouts of the names of all those inmates meeting any particular criteria, such as those serving a mandatory 25-year capital life sentence. (TR. 91-94) The records of 53,700 offenders are presently contained in the computer's data base, with some 24,000 records being for active inmates. (TR. 93) In December of 1981, the Commission, through Mr. Farris, entered into discussions with Reynold L. Ferrari, the Chief of the Bureau of MIS for the Department of Corrections, and his staff regarding the subject of utilizing the computer system to produce and maintain a subject-matter index for Commission orders concerning the granting and/or revocation of parole. A basic technical problem presently exists in the computer program utilized by the Department of Corrections. The computer is only designed to handle single actions taken by the Commission on any particular day. Often, multiple separate actions by the Commission are taken in one day on a particular inmate, and the present computer programming does not allow multiple entries at one point in time. This problem is one of systems design and involves more than reprogramming. It involves a definition of a new data base that will have to be created for the Commission, and then programming it to provide the input capability to add additional data and defining the output reports that are required. (TR. 90) Once a systems design is accomplished and all the relevant data is in the computer, it will take about three weeks or less to produce a program that would result in a printout format similar to that developed and utilized by the Commission in its declaratory statement index. (Appellant's Exhibit 3, TR. 79, 84, 85) The Commission has not specifically or formally requested the Department of Corrections to resolve the multiple-action problem. It has simply asked the Department to look into the problem and estimate the length of time it would take to accomplish certain results. (Appellee's Exhibit 2) Mr. Ferrari has informed the Commission that he would need an exact and specific definition of the output required by the Commission and would work with the Commission and its staff in achieving the desired goals. (Appellee's Exhibit 3, TR. 89, 90) The answer to how long it would take to redesign the system is dependent upon a detailed definition of the information needed by the Commission. (TR. 98) A detailed statement of what is required by the Commission has not been provided to the Bureau of MIS. (TR. 99) The only evidence adduced by the Commission as to its time frame for providing the format the Commission requires was the statement of Mr. Farris that "I would like to have had it done some time ago, but just as soon as I possibly can. This has received a great deal of priority, I must say." (TR. 72) The Commission did make a budget request for two new positions--a data entry operator and a clerk typist III--in order to comply with indexing requirements and to augment their data input ability. (TR. 74, Appellee's Exhibit 4) Presently, the only information being provided by the Comission to the computer data base is current, single Commission action regarding presumptive parole release dates (PPRD) and the inmate's next interview date. Included within the PPRD information presently being put into the computer is a code which makes reference to aggravating factors contained in the Commission's rules. (TR. 69, 70) Prior Commission's actions regarding PPRDs have not been put into the computer data base. The manner in which this information will be retrieved or the printout format has not been developed yet. (TR. 52, 53) It is expected that the format will be similar to that developed for the index of declaratory statements. (Appellant's Exhibit 3). The Commission has not requested the department of Corrections to produce any particular format for a subject-matter index of parole granting or parole revocation orders (TR. 53, 54) and no evidence was tendered as to when such a request would be made. Mr. Farris, the person responsible for such indices, could give no specific date for the production of such indices (TR. 38) While the Commission has not prepared a final proposed style of indexing for Commission actions regarding presumptive and effective parole release and parole revocations, it is expected that such indices would be broken down by topic similar to that prepared by the Commission for declaratory statements. It is not known whether such indices will include citations to constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. (TR. 64) According to Mr. Farris, "the specification of the nature of the index is yet to be determined." (TR. 66) RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COURT The undersigned, as the appointed commissioner of the Court, has been charged with the responsibility to take evidence and report recommendations to the Court with respect to a determination of the following issues: The practicability of the Commission preparing indices of its orders entered from 1975 through 1980; and The reasonableness of the schedule proposed by the Commission in light of the proposed contents of the indices, the cost of preparation, and the public benefit to be gained therefrom. Prior to addressing those issues, it must first be noted that, with the exception of preparing a subject-matter index for a portion of its declaratory statements, the evidence adduced at the hearing illustrates that the Commission has made absolutely no effort to produce indices of its current 1981 orders. This action is contrary to the Court' s original mandate as well as Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Court's Order entered on September 3, 1981. There has been absolutely no evidence adduced in the proceedings before the undersigned as to a legitimate reason or justification for such noncompliance with the Court's directives. Indeed, the evidence illustrates that the Commission has simply not directed its attention to this important matter. Any problems attendant to the computer system utilized by the Department of Corrections should have absolutely no effect upon the ability of the Commission to immediately prepare subject- matter indices for all its Orders resulting from petitions for a declaratory statement, hearings conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, petitions for rulemaking or other matters which result in the issuance of the functional equivalent of an "order" as it is defined in Section 120.52(9). Florida Statutes. Turning now to the issues addressed in Paragraph 3 of the Court's September 3, 1981 Order, it is concluded from the evidence adduced at the hearing that it would not be impracticable or cost-prohibitive for the Commission to immediately prepare indices, whether arranged by subject matter and/or citations to constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions, for its Orders entered from 1975 through 1980 in those matters arising from: petitions for a declaratory statement, proceedings conducted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, petitions for rulemaking, and cases, such as the instant proceeding, which result in the functional equivalent of an "order" as defined in Section 120.52(9), Florida Statutes. The public benefit to be gained from such indices is obvious since such Orders are indicative of an agency's interpretation of the laws under which it operates and can indicate incipient agency policy as developed on a case-by-case basis. The Commission has made no good-faith effort or diligent attempt to comply with its own schedule for the accomplishment of the preparation of indices for the Orders listed above and neither the contents, costs, or practicability of preparing such indices justify the time frame proposed. With respect to the remaining Orders issued by the Commission between 1975 and 19890--those involving parole grants and parole revocations--it is concluded that an index of Orders on parole grants entered prior to 1979 would not be beneficial to the public due to the drastic change in the law which became effective on January 1, 1979. It is further concluded that only those post-1974 Orders concerning parole parole grants which contain a reference or citation to a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision would contain information beneficial to the public. Therefore, an index limited to such Orders would satisfy the requirements of Section 120.53(2)(c), Florida Statutes. The Commission has failed to adduce evidence that the preparation of a subject-matter and/or citator index for its Orders entered after January 1, 1975 involving parole revocation and its Orders entered after January 1, 1979 involving parole grants would be either impracticable or cost-prohibitive. While the computer system will need to be redesigned to accomplish multiple- entries in cases where the Commission takes more than one action on the same date regarding a single inmate, it is possible to make this change. The Bureau of Management Information Systems stands ready and able to effectuate such a design change and is simply waiting for a specific and detailed definition of the information sought to be retrieved by the Commission. Again, from the evidence adduced at the hearing, it appears that the Commission has simply made no diligent or good-faith effort to determine the format of the required indices or the information it desires to accomplish the indexing task. In summary, it is concluded that the Commission, along with the joint assistance and efforts of the Department of Corrections, presently has or can quickly obtain the capability of preparing indices of all Orders entered from 1975 through the present date. The Commission presented no evidence that the preparation of such indices would be cost-prohibitive, or that, other than its lack of attention to the matter, the contents of the indices would make the task unduly time-consuming or would otherwise render the indexing requirement prohibitive. With the exception of pre-1979 parole granting Orders and Orders granting or revoking parole which contain no reference to a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, the public will benefit from an index of, and consequently access to, all Orders of the Commission. In order to accomplish the indexing task, the Commission need only render a determination of the format for each index and provide the staff to either review the files containing the Commission Orders or provide the necessary input to the computer system so that the required information can be retrieved from the computer. The evidence presented by the Commission illustrates that not only has the Commission failed to adhere to its own proposed schedule of compliance with the law, the schedule proposed is unreasonably lengthy in terms of the contents, cost and information presently available, as well as the public benefit to be derived from the production of the indices. Respectfully submitted and entered this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1982.
