The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of being unable to practice as a physician assistant with reasonable skill and safety due to illness or use of alcohol or drugs, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(s); inappropriately prescribing medicine to family members by using the name of his supervising physician, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(q); and engaging in fraud in the practice of medicine by obtaining controlled substances through fraudulent means, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(k). If so, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed as a physician assistant, holding license number PA 0002975. When applying for his license, Respondent supplied the Board of Medicine with certain information that resulted in a referral of Respondent to the Physician’s Recovery Network (PRN) for a psychiatric evaluation. The initial evaluation was completed on May 5, 1995. The evaluating psychiatrist determined that Respondent suffered from opiate dependency, probably as a result of some injuries that he had suffered years earlier. The psychiatrist concluded that Respondent could undergo outpatient treatment in an intensive program where he would be seen 3-5 times weekly. At the end of May, on the advice of the evaluating psychiatrist, Respondent entered a six-week intensive outpatient treatment in a chemical dependency program at Charter Glade Hospital. He also commenced attending meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous and undergoing random drug screens. For the summer of 1995, Respondent had drug-free urine and seemed to be doing well. The evaluating psychiatrist informed the PRN that Respondent could safely return to practice, and the Board of Medicine certified Respondent to practice as a physician assistant. By early summer, 1996, the evaluating psychiatrist, who had continued seeing Respondent, began to suspect that something was not quite right with him. Respondent had begun acting hypomanically, developing, for example, a get-rich-quick scheme that was not well-founded in reality. During the summer of 1996, Respondent began using the name of his supervising physician to call in prescriptions for Vicodin, Trimox, and Ultram in the name of Respondent’s wife. These were fraudulent acts to gain possession of these narcotics for use by Respondent. Respondent’s physician employer terminated Respondent’s employment in June 1996 following bizarre behavior on Respondent’s part in professional settings involving patients and prospective patients. Respondent resisted all efforts by his evaluating psychiatrist to undergo reevaluation and retreatment, if necessary. Instead, Respondent became highly suspicious and unstable. On October 4, 1996, Petitioner entered an order of emergency suspension of Respondent’s license.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order revoking Respondent’s certificate as a physician assistant. ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on June 4, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 4, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. Garwood Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Daniel Kulick 4641 Southwest Santa Barbara Place Cape Coral, Florida 33914 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jerome Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is required to repay $2,269.00 to the Respondent?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner entered into a "Noninstitutional Professional and Technical Medicaid Provider Agreement" (hereinafter referred to as the "Medicaid Provider Agreement") with the Respondent. Pursuant to the Medicaid Provider Agreement, the Petitioner agreed to participate in the Florida Medicaid Program. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Medicaid Provider Agreement, the Petitioner agreed to the following: The provider agrees to keep such records as are necessary to fully disclose the extent of services provided to individuals receiving assistance under the State Plan and agrees to furnish the State agency upon request such information regarding any payments claimed for providing these services. Access to these pertinent records and facilities by authorized Medicaid Program representatives will be permitted upon a reasonable request. The Petitioner also agreed in the Medicaid Provider Agreement to submit claims under the Medicaid Provider Agreement in accordance with the Florida Medicaid Program and applicable "Florida Administrative Rules, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations." Paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Medicaid Provider Agreement. Medicaid is essentially a mechanism by which the federal government provides funds for the payment of a part of certain medical service costs to the State of Florida. It is a federal grant under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. In Florida, community mental health services provided to persons eligible for Medicaid coverage can be paid for under the Medicaid program. Generally, the federal government provides 56 percent of the costs of Medicaid services and the State is responsible for 44 percent. As eligible services are rendered federal Medicaid funds are received and deposited in the Medical Care Trust Fund. In order for services to constitute "eligible services" they must have been rendered in compliance with Chapter 10C-7, Florida Administrative Code. If services are not "eligible services" (they do not comply with Chapter 10C-7), the State is not entitled to receive federal Medicaid funds. In order to insure that providers of Medicaid services are providing "eligible services" the Respondent conducts compliance audits. The purpose of compliance audits is to determine if federal Medicaid funds have been properly received. On June 27, 1985, the Respondent's Medicaid Program auditors conducted a compliance audit of the records of the Petitioner pertaining to Medicaid clients of the Petitioner's Bristol office. As a result of the June 27, 1985 audit, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner had improperly submitted claims for Medicaid care and that such claims had been improperly paid by the Respondent. The parties stipulated that the Petitioner was paid $2,269.00 for claims for which there was insufficient documentation to warrant payment under Chapter 10C-7, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner claimed $2,269.00 as an amount due for Medicaid "eligible services" and was so paid by the Respondent. In fact, however, the services were not Medicaid "eligible services." The State was not entitled to federal Medicaid funds for these services. The Petitioner improperly received the amount in controversy because the Petitioner did not comply with Chapter 10C-7, Florida Administrative Code, as it was required to do pursuant to the Medicaid Provider Agreement. On May 21, 1985, the Petitioner executed an "Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services Contract Between State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc." (hereinafter referred to as the "Provider Contract"). The Provider Contract was executed by the Respondent on June 11, 1985. Pursuant to the Provider Contract, the Petitioner agreed to provide alcohol, drug abuse and mental health services in eight designated counties. In paragraph IC4 of the Provider Contract, the Petitioner was required to comply with Chapters 394, 396 and 397, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 10E-13 and 10E-14, Florida Administrative Code, "as appropriate." 15. Paragraph IC5 of the Provider Contract also required the Petitioner to "comply with all other applicable state standards, provided they are specified in Florida Statutes or Administrative Rules established by the department or made known in writing to the contractor." Paragraph IE1 and 2 of the Provider Contract required that the Petitioner "participate in the Community Mental Health/Alcohol Services Program as defined in Section 10C-7.525, F.A.C." and that the Petitioner "pursue and submit vouchers on all Medicaid eligible clients for Medicaid eligible services." [Emphasis added]. Paragraph IG1 of the Provider Contract required the Petitioner to provide an annual audit report by an independent certified public accountant to the Respondent. Paragraph IH of the Provider Contract required the Petitioner to permit monitoring for compliance with state and federal rules and regulations. Paragraph IIA1 of the Provider Contract provided that the Respondent will pay up to 75 percent of approved costs as determined under Chapters 394 and 397, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10E-14, Florida Administrative Code, in an amount not to exceed $4,096,175.00. Paragraph IO of the Provider Contract required that the Petitioner secure "local match." Pursuant to the Provider Contract the Petitioner is entitled to receive payment for eligible expenditures" up to the amount of the Provider Contract and subject to the availability of funds. Services to be paid for pursuant to the Provider Contract include Medicaid eligible services and non-Medicaid services. Even though the Petitioner did not provide "eligible services" the amount in controversy may have been an "eligible expenditure" for which it may receive payment at a later date. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to payment of the amount in controversy will be determined at a later date as a result of the financial audit required by paragraph IGI of the Provider Agreement and will depend on the availability of funds and whether the Petitioner has already received the maximum amount specified in the Provider Contract. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to ultimate payment of the amount in controversy at a later date is governed by Chapters 394 and 397, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 10E-13 and 10E-14, Florida Administrative Code. A dispute arose between certain medical health providers and the Respondent over whether Medicaid funds are considered "state funds" for which local match is required pursuant to Chapter 394, Florida Statutes. The Department took the position that Medicaid funds are considered state funds and thus require local match and are subject to audit pursuant to Chapter 10E-13, Florida Administrative Code. When the dispute arose, the Respondent developed an "Issue Paper" (Petitioner's exhibit 2). The Respondent adopted one of the alternatives recommended in the Issue Paper to treat Medicaid funds as state funds for which local match is required. The Respondent also took the position that Medicaid eligible services were subject to the provisions of Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10E, Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent's decision to treat Medicaid funds as state funds subject to local match was challenged by the Florida Council for Community Mental Health, Inc. Florida Council for Community Mental Health, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 8 FALR 756 (Feb. 6, 1986). The issue in that case was whether the position of the Respondent taken in the Issue Paper was a rule.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner repay the Respondent $2,269.00 for services improperly billed. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1500 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1381 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been generally noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Proposed Finding RO Number of Acceptance of Fact Number or Reason for Rejection 1 RO 15-16. RO 17-19. The first and second sentences incorrectly refer to Paragraph I(C)(6) of the Medicaid Provider Agreement. The correct paragraphs are 1(0)4 (first sentence) and 1(0)5 (second sentence). The following portion of the second sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence: "or incorporated as part of the contract. The following portion of the third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence: "and HRS Manual 230-31. The first sentence is accepted in RO 28. The rest of this proposed finding of fact is generally accepted in RO 28. 4-5 These proposed findings of fact are too broad and are not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Too broad and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See RO 28. Too broad and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See RO 30. 9-17 These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. Additionally, the third and fourth sentences of paragraph 16 are not supported by the weight of the evidence. RO 6. RO 9. The last sentence is irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1 RO 1-3. 2 RO 10. 3 RO 11. 4 RO 12-13 5 Hereby accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire Brooks, LeBoeuf & LeBoeuf 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the Agency For Health Care Administration (the "Agency") concerning Certificate of Need ("CON") Application No. 10131 filed by The Shores Behavioral Hospital, LLC (hereinafter “The Shores”) to establish a 60-bed adult psychiatric hospital and CON Application No. 10132 The entity is a limited liability company according to the Division of Corporations. Filed March 14, 2012 2:40 PM Division of Administrative Hearings to establish a 12-bed substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds pursuant to CON application No. 10131. The Agency preliminarily approved CON Application No. 10131 and preliminarily denied CON Application No. 10132. South Broward Hospital District d/b/a Memorial Regional Hospital (hereinafter “Memorial”) thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary approval of CON 10131, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). The Shores thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to challenge the Agency’s preliminary denial of CON 10132, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (‘DOAH”). Upon receipt at DOAH, Memorial, CON 10131, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0424CON and The Shores, CON 10132, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0427CON. On February 16, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order of Consolidation consolidating both cases. On February 24, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based on _ the _ parties’ representation they had reached a settlement. . The parties have entered into the attached Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1). It is therefore ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Agency will approve and issue CON 10131 and CON 10132 with the conditions: a. Approval of CON Application 10131 to establish a Class III specialty hospital with 60 adult psychiatric beds is concurrent with approval of the co-batched CON Application 10132 to establish a 12-bed adult substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds in one single hospital facility. b. Concurrent to the licensure and certification of 60 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 12 adult substance abuse beds and 30 adolescent residential treatment (DCF) beds at The Shores, all 72 hospital beds and 30 adolescent residential beds at Atlantic Shores Hospital will be delicensed. c. The Shores will become a designated Baker Act receiving facility upon licensure and certification. d. The location of the hospital approved pursuant to CONs 10131 and 10132 will not be south of Los Olas Boulevard and The Shores agrees that it will not seek any modification of the CONs to locate the hospital farther south than Davie Boulevard (County Road 736). 3. Each party shall be responsible its own costs and fees. 4. The above-styled cases are hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this 2. day of Meaich~ , 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELIZABETH DEK, Secretary AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
Findings Of Fact In 1993, the US Health Care Financing Administration gave Respondent approval to design and implement a pilot program for the delivery of mental health services in part of Florida. The pilot program is limited to Medicaid Area 6, which consists of Hardee, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee, and Polk counties. The purpose of the pilot program is to change the way in which the State of Florida pays for mental health services under the Medicaid program. At present, the State makes "fee-for- service" payments based on predetermined fees for defined services. RFP, 1.1 KK. Under the new method, the State will make "capitation" payments consisting of a monthly fee paid in advance to the contractor for each enrolled Medicaid recipient, regardless whether the enrollee receives the services during the payment period. RFP, 1.1.H. On November 23, 1994, Respondent issued Request for Proposals 9501 (RFP). The purpose of RFP 9501 is to procure a contract with a "single, comprehensive mental health care provider on a prepaid, capitated basis, to provide mental health benefits to Medicaid recipients who are residents of Medicaid Area 6 . . .." RFP, 1.4. The second paragraph of RFP 1.4 identifies four goals of the procurement: that the procurement proceed in a timely manner, (2) that the . . . RFP . . . encourages free and open competition, (3) that the procurement effort and resulting new contract operations be completed in a timely manner without disruption of service to Medicaid clients, and (4) that the procure- ment result in a single contractor for Area 6 with sufficient resources to provide services to all AFDC related and SSI Without Medicare Medicaid eligibles in Area 6. Section 2.2 requires that the contractor provide "[i]npatient hospital care for psychiatric conditions," "[o]utpatient hospital care for psychiatric conditions," "[p]sychiatric physician services," "[c]ommunity mental health care," "Mental Health Targeted Case Management," and "Mental Health Intensive Case Management." Section 2.3 defines the six categories of services identified in the preceding paragraph. Referring to "Community mental health care" as "Community Mental Health Services," Section 2.3 states: Community Mental Health Services Community Mental Health Services are rehabil- itative services which are psychiatric in nature, rendered or recommended by a psychia- trist; or medical in nature, rendered or recommended by a psychiatrist or other physician. Such services must be provided in accordance with the policy and service provision specified in the Community Mental Health Services Provider Handbook. The term "Community Mental Health Services" is not intended to suggest that the following services must be provided by state funded "Community Mental Health Centers" or to preclude state funded "Community Mental Health Centers" from providing these services: There are eight categories of mental health care services provided under community mental health: Treatment planning and review; Evaluation and testing services; Counseling, therapy and treatment services provided by a psychiatrist or physician; Counseling, therapy and treatment services provided by a direct service mental health care provider; Rehabilitative services; Children's mental health services; Specialized therapeutic foster care, Level 1 and 2; and Day treatment programs. Community mental health services for children in specialized therapeutic foster care and resi- dential treatment will be provided by HRS District 6 Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office to the same degree as in the past. Services are limited to those covered services provided by or under the recommendation of a psychiatrist or physician and related to a plan of care provided or authorized by a psychiatrist or physician, as appropriate, based on the patient's diagnosis. Targeted Case Management The contractor shall adhere to the requirements of the Medicaid Case Management Services Provider Handbook, but will not be required to seek certifications from the HRS Districts' Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office in regard to clients, agency designation, or mental health care case manager qualifications. Case manager training materials will be made available through the agency for reproduction by the contractor. Intensive Case Management This is a new mandatory service which is intended to provide intensive, team case management to highly recidivistic persons who have severe and persistent mental illness. Section 2.5 requires that the contractor "adhere to the following minimum staffing, availability, and access standards": The contractor shall provide access to medically necessary mental health care (with the exceptions noted in section 2.4 B.) The contractor shall make available and accessible facilities, service locations, and service sites and personnel sufficient to provide the covered services (specifically, non-hospital outpatient, emergency and assessment services) throughout the geographic area, within thirty minutes typical travel time by public or private transportation of all enrolled recipients. (The typical travel time standard does not apply to waiting time for public transportation--it applies only to actual time in transit.) The contractor must allow enrollees to choose one of the capitated services, as provided in Section 5.1 F.1., when the plan offers another service, not reimbursed under the contract, as a downward substitution. The maximum amount of time between an enrollee's request for mental health services and the first point of service shall be as follows: For emergency mental health services as defined in section 1.1 BB., service shall be immediate. For persons initially perceived to need emergency mental health services, but upon assess- ment do not meet the criteria for emergency care, they are deemed to require crisis support and services must be provided within twenty-three hours. For routine outpatient intake, assessment shall be offered within seven calendar days. Follow-up service shall be offered within fourteen calendar days after assessment. Minimum staffing standards shall be as follows, and failure to adhere to these staffing standards, or the staffing standards indicated in the winning proposal, whichever are greater, may result in termination of the contract (if the contractor's "staff" person does not fill one of the "key staff" positions listed on page 81, the staff persons may be a subcontractor.): * * * The contractor's outpatient staff shall include at least one FTE direct service mental health care provider per 1,500 prepaid members. The Agency expects the contractor's staffing pattern for direct service providers to reflect the ethnic and racial composition of the community. The contractor's array of direct service mental health care providers for adults and children must include providers that are licensed or eligible for licensure, and demonstrate two years of clinical experience in the following specialty areas: Adoption, Separation and loss, Victims and perpetrators of sexual abuse, Victims and perpetrators of physical abuse, Court ordered evaluations, and Expert witness testimony. Mental health care case managers shall not be counted as direct service mental health care providers. The contractor shall provide Spanish speaking and Spanish literate direct service providers at each service location at which there are Spanish speaking enrollees. The contractor shall provide staff approp- riately trained and experienced to provide psychological testing. The contractor shall provide staff approp- riately trained and experienced to provide rehabilitation and support services to persons with severe and persistent mental illness. For all persons meeting the criteria for case management as specified in the Medicaid Case Management Provider Handbook, the contractor shall adhere to the staffing ratio of at least 1 FTE mental health care case manager per 20 children, and at least 1 FTE mental health care case manager per 40 adults. Direct service mental health care providers shall not be counted as mental health care case managers. * * * Section 2.10 provides, in part: The contractor shall be responsible for the coordination and management of mental health care and continuity of care for all enrolled Medicaid recipients through the following minimum functions: A. Minimizing disruption to the enrollee as a result of any change in service providers or mental health care case manager occurring as a result of the awarding of this contract. An offeror may not propose rates exceeding Medicaid's upper payment limit, which "is that amount which would have been paid, on an aggregate basis, by Medicaid under fee-for-service for the same services to a demographically similar population of recipients." 4.11. Section 1.1 TTT defines "Upper Payment Limit" similarly: "The maximum amount Medicaid will pay on a capitated basis for any group of services, based upon fee-for- service Medicaid expenditures for those same services." Section 4.11 sets the range of payment rates at 92-98 percent of the upper payment limit. Each offeror is required to propose a specific payment percentage within the range. Section 4.17 allows offerors to propose a risk corridor of up to 16 percentage points plus and minus the proposed range. The corridor must be equal above and below the capitation rate. The RFP illustrates the risk corridor by applying an 8 point corridor to a 95 percent capitation rate. In this case, the contractor absorbs any plan costs up to 4 percent over the actual payments made to the plan by Respondent or retains any excess plan payments up to 4 percent over the actual costs. Beyond the corridor, the contractor and Respondent share equally in the costs or savings, subject to Respondent's upper payment limit. In no event, however, shall the contractor be entitled to payment from Respondent for "start- up" or "phase-down" costs. Section 4.18 addresses subcontractors: The contractor is fully responsible for all work performed under the contract resulting from the RFP. The contractor may, with the consent of the agency, enter into written subcontract(s) for performance of certain of its functions under the contract. The contractor must have subcontracts with all administrative and service providers who are not salaried employees of the plan prior to the commencement of services under this contract. The contractor shall abide by the requirements of Section 1128A(b) of the Social Security Act prohibiting HMOs and other such providers from making payments directly or indirectly to a physician or other provider as an inducement to reduce or limit services provided to Medicaid enrollees. The contractor must submit signed subcontracts, for a complete provider network in order to obtain agency approval for operation in an area, within sixty days of the execution of this contract, for each proposed subcontracted service provider. Any additional subcontracts must be submitted to the agency twenty days prior to the subcontract effective date. Subcontracts must be approved in writing by the agency's Technical Project Manager prior to the effective date of any subcontract. No subcontract which the contractor enters into with respect to performance under the contract resulting from the RFP shall in any way relieve the contractor of any responsibility for performance of its duties. Amendments to subcontracts must be approved by the agency before taking effect. The contractor shall notify the agency in writing prior to termination of approved subcontracts. The contractor will agree to make payment to all subcontractors within 35 days of receipt of all invoices properly documented and submitted by the subcontractor to the plan. All subcontracts executed by the contractor under the resulting contract must meet the following requirements and be approved by the agency in advance of implementation. All subcontracts must adhere to the following requirements: Be in writing. Specify the functions of the subcontractor. Identify the population covered by the subcontract. Specify the amount, duration and scope of services to be provided by the subcontractor, including a requirement that the subcontractor continue to provide services through any post- insolvency period. Provide that the agency and DHHS may evaluate through inspection or other means the quality, appropriateness, and timeliness of services performed. Specify that the subcontractor has read and agreed to the subcontract and the service provision requirements under section 2 of RFP, for services to be provided under the subcontract, and to the contractor's admission and retention criteria for the services the subcontractor will provide as indicated in the subcontractor's response to section 5.1 F3.b,(5). Provide for inspections of any record pertinent to the contract by the agency and DHHS. Specify procedures and criteria for extension and renegotiation. Provide for prompt submission of information needed to make payment. Require an adequate record system be maintained for recording services, charges, dates and all other commonly accepted information elements for services rendered to recipients under the contract. Require that financial, administrative and medical records be maintained for a period of not less than five years from the close of the contract and retained further if the records are under review or audit until the review or audit is complete. Prior approval for the disposition of records must be requested and approved by the contractor if the subcontract is continuous. Require safeguarding of information about recipients according to 42 CFR, Part 431, Subpart F. Require an exculpatory clause, which survives the termination of the subcontract including breach of subcontract due to insolvency, that assures that recipients or the agency may not be held liable for any debts of the subcontractor. Provide for the monitoring of services rendered to recipients sponsored by the contractor. Specify the procedures, criteria and requirements for termination of the subcontract. Provide for the participation in any internal and external quality assurance, utilization review, peer review, and grievance procedures established by the contractor. Make full disclosure of the method and amount of compensation or other consideration to be received from the contractor. Provide for submission of all reports and clinical information required by the contractor. Make provisions for a waiver of terms of the subcontract, if appropriate. Contain no provision which provides incentive, monetary or otherwise, for the withholding of medically necessary care. Require adherence to the Medicaid policies expressed in applicable Medicaid provider handbooks. Require that the subcontractor secure and maintain during the life of the subcontract worker's compensation insurance for all of its employees connected with the work under this contract unless such employees are covered by the protection afforded by the provider. Such insurance shall comply with Florida's Workers' Compensation Law; and Contain a clause indemnifying, defending and holding the Agency and the plan members harmless from costs or expense, including court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the extent proximately caused by an negligent act or other wrongful conduct arising from the subcontract agreement. This clause must survive the termination of the subcontract, including breach due to insolvency. The contractor shall give the agency immediate notification in writing by certified mail of any action or suit filed and prompt notice of any claim made against the contractor by any subcontractor or vendor which in the opinion of the contractor may result in litigation related in any way to the contract with the agency. In the event of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against a principal subcontractor or the insolvency of said subcontractor, the contractor shall immediately advise the agency. The contractor shall assure that all tasks related to the subcontract are performed in accordance with the terms of the contract. The contractor shall identify any aspect of service that may be further subcontracted by the subcon- tractor. Subcontractors shall not be considered agents of the agency. For evaluation purposes, the RFP divides proposals into two parts: technical and rate, including any rate corridor. The six categories under the technical part, with point values in parentheses, are: Management Summary (0 points), Organization and Corporate Capabilities (100 points), Proposed Staffing Pattern and Licensure of Staff and Facilities (250 points), Operational Functions (400 points), Mental Health Care Service Delivery (400 points), and Transition Workplan (100 points). RFP, 6.1. Section 5.1.C describes the 100-point Organization and Corporate Capabilities as follows: The proposer shall provide in this tab a descrip- tion of its organizational and corporate capabi- lities. The purpose of this section is to provide the agency with a basis for determining the contractor's, and its subcontractors', financial and technical capability for undertaking a project of this size. For the purpose of this tab, the term proposer shall refer to both the contractor and its major subcontractors. It does not refer to the plan's "parent company" unless specifically indicated. Section 5.1 D states the elements of the 250-point Proposed Staffing Pattern and Licensure of Staff and Facilities. Section 5.1 D.3 requires the offeror to disclose "actual and proposed" FTE professionals, including psychiatrists, case managers, psychologists, nurses, and social workers. Section 5.1D.4 requires the offeror to explain how the plan will allocate staff to meet various demands, such as for adoption, sexual and physical abuse counseling, and psychological testing of children. Section 5.1 D.5 requires the proposal to: Describe how the plan will ensure that it has the staff resources appropriately trained and experienced to provide rehabilitative and support services to low income adults with severe and persistent mental illness and, under separate heading, to children with severe and persistent mental illness. Denote the number and percent of total FTEs which will be filled by persons with this type of experience and who will be providing these types of services. Explain the contractor's rationale for the staffing levels indicated and provide a brief, one or two line, description of the training and exper- ience of such persons who will provide these services under the plan. Section 5.1.E describes the elements of the 400-point Operational Functions, in part, as follows: Within this tab, the proposer shall explicitly address its operational capacity to serve Medicaid recipients, and its previous history serving the Medicaid and other low income populations. Separately, the proposer shall address the member services the plan will offer, grievance procedures, quality assurance procedures, the contractor's proposed reporting systems, and the contractor's proposed handling of subcontracts. Service Area of Proposed Plan 42 CFR 434.36 Describe, for each county, how the proposer will meet throughout the lifetime of the contract the 30 minute typical travel time requirement specified in section 2.5 A.1. Describe, for each county, how the proposer will meet throughout the lifetime of the contract the 30 minute typical travel time requirement for child psychiatrists specified in Section 2.5 B.2. Describe, for each county, how the proposer will meet throughout the lifetime of the contract the 30 minute typical travel time requirement for adult psychiatrists specified in Section 2.5 B.1. * * * Section 5.1.F describes the 400-point Mental Health Care Service Delivery category. Section 5.1 F states, in relevant part: This section shall include a detailed discussion of the proposer's approach to providing mental health care. The proposer must be able to document a demonstrated ability to provide a comprehensive range of appropriate services for both children and adults who experience impairments ranging from mild to severe and persistent mental illness. Plans must provide services up to the limits specified by the RFP. They are encouraged to exceed these limits. However, in no instance may any service's limitations be more restrictive than those specified in the Florida Medicaid fee- for-service program. The plan cannot require payments from recipients for any mandatory services provided under this contract. Summary of Services * * * The following is a summary list of the services which may be provided . . . * * * Optional Services Crisis Stabilization Unit * * * z. Other Services (List) * * * Care Coordination 42 CFR 434.52; 10C-7.0524(16), F.A.C. Attach the plan's written protocol describing the plan's care coordination system, which should include the plan's approach to care coordination, utilization review, and assuring continuity of care, such as, verifying medical necessity, service planning, channeling to appropriate levels of treatment, and develop- ment of treatment alternatives when effective, less intensive services are unavailable. The protocol should also address the following questions: * * * 3. Indicate how the contractor will establish services in such a way as to minimize disruption of services, particularly to high risk populations currently served by the department, for children and, separately, for adults. * * * Section 6.3 describes the criteria for evaluating proposals. For Proposed Staffing Pattern and Licensure of Staff and Facilities, the evaluation criteria include, at 6.3 B.3.c: The ability of the proposer to ensure it has, and will continue to have, the resources necessary to provide mental health rehabilitation and support to children who are in the care and custody of the state or who have special needs, such as children who have been adopted or have been physically or sexually abused. About a year ago, Respondent issued RFP 9405, which also sought to procure mental health services on a capitated basis for Medicaid Area 6. Respondent received four proposals, which contained numerous deficiencies. Respondent later withdrew RFP 9405 for revisions to encourage more competition. Concerns over competition involve the role of Community Mental Health Centers (CMHC) in the procurement. CMHCs are publicly funded, not-for-profit entities that traditionally have provided five types of services: emergency, outpatient, day/night, inpatient, and prevention education. CMHCs now also operate crisis stabilization units and supply case management services, as well as specialized children's services, services for aged persons with severe and persistent mental illness, and services for persons with alcohol or drug dependencies. The RFP calls for a wide range of mental health care services, only part of which are community mental health services or other services presently provided by CMHCs. However, CMHCs constitute the only available network of existing providers of community mental health services to Medicaid clients in Medicaid Area 6. Medicaid payments account for about 30 percent of the revenue of Area 6 CMHCs. In late 1992, six CMHCs in Area 6 formed Florida Behavioral Health, Inc. in response to competition from one or more other provider networks, such as Charter. The competitive network of six CMHCs consisted of Manatee Glens Corp., Mental Health Care, Inc., Northside Mental Health Hospital, Peace River Center for Personal Development, Inc., Winter Haven Hospital, and Mental Health Services. Although the six CMHCs are not all of the CMHCs in Area 6, they provide nearly all of the community mental health services to Medicaid clients in Area 6. By early 1993, Florida Behavioral Health, Inc. formed Florida Health Partnership with Options Mental Health, Inc., which is a managed-care provider owned by First Hospital Corporation--a behavioral health management company. With the assistance of Florida Health Partnership, Options Mental Health, Inc. submitted a proposal in response to RFP 9405. An oral or written agreement between Florida Behavioral Health, Inc. and Options Mental Health, Inc. prohibited the six CMHCs from assisting any entity but Options Mental Health, Inc. in responding to RFP 9405. This agreement continues to prohibit the six CMHCs from assisting any entity but Options Mental Health, Inc. in responding to the RFP. The six CMHCs have shared with Options Mental Health, Inc. cost and utilization information. The importance of the unpublished cost information is unclear, and Petitioner has not yet made a public records request to obtain this information. The same is true of unpublished utilization information, which includes information on waiting lists for community mental health services. Any delay in providing community mental health services would have a bearing on the projected demand and thus the cost of a capitated plan. After withdrawing RFP 9405, Respondent revisited the requirement that offerors propose an existing network of providers. In an effort to encourage competition, Respondent deleted a requirement in RFP 9405 that proposals contain existing provider networks. Respondent substituted a requirement that proposals describe provider networks generally, without necessarily including names of subcontractors. Petitioner did not prove any fraudulent, illegal, arbitrary, or dishonest act by Respondent. The main thrust of Petitioner's case is that the effect of the RFP is illegal or arbitrary. Petitioner asserts that the RFP requires a sole source provider or, at minimum, precludes free and open competition. Petitioner argues that the RFP illegally and arbitrarily favors offerors of CMHCs, in partnership with CMHCs, or with subcontracts with CMHCs. Through testimony and argument, Petitioner asserts that various provisions of the RFP either exacerbate or fail to ameliorate the advantages enjoyed by CMHCs, especially due to RFP requirements of implementation of the new provider network in 60 days and with minimal disruption to Medicaid clients. RFP 1.4(2) encourages open and free competition. RFP 2.3 D disclaims any intent that only CMHCs may supply community mental health services. Petitioner's chief witness, Dr. Ronald Mihalick, testified that RFP 2.3 D favors CMHCs because state regulations have designated them the sole provider of community mental health services and government grants have funded their capital expenditures. Neither Dr. Mihalick, Petitioner's other witness, nor Petitioner's counsel has suggested a practical means by which to eliminate this advantage of CMHCs, which cannot, by executive or legislative fiat, be stripped of their buildings, equipment, or experienced staffs, nor of the advantages that may accrue to them by virtue of such assets. It would be counterproductive to eliminate CMHCs from direct or indirect participation in the subject procurement. Nor is Respondent required, if it were legally able, to assign to CMHCs the status of universal providers in order to eliminate illegality or arbitrariness from the RFP. The RFP seeks a broad range of mental health services, of which a substantial part are community mental health services. RFP 2.3 D represents a simple description of community mental health services and expressly negates the inference that only CMHCs may provide such services. RFP 2.3 E and F describes two of the five categories of mental health services: targeted case management and intensive case management, respectively. Intensive case management is a new service, and nothing suggests that Area 6 CMHCs have any direct experience that would give them an advantage in providing this new service, Targeted case management is an existing service provided by CMHCs. There is some doubt whether the RFP provides detailed cost information, including information about targeted case management. However, Petitioner has never made a public records request for such information from any of the CMHCs or Respondent. In any event, Petitioner has hardly presented sufficient evidence regarding targeted case management that the inclusion of such a service in the RFP is arbitrary or illegal. RFP 2.5 prescribes standards for minimum staffing, availability, and access. The minimum staffing standards do not require that existing service providers supply the specified services. For instance, "direct service mental health care providers" must be "licensed or eligible for licensure," as provided in RFP 2.5 B.3.a. Petitioner's objection is that the RFP expresses staffing standards in accordance with Medicaid guidelines, under which the CMHCs are already operating. This objection is puzzling because the procurement is for Medicaid services. In any event, the presence of such a provision does not render the RFP illegal or arbitrary for the reasons already stated. RFP 2.5 B.4 requires staffing ratios of one fulltime equivalency (FTE) per 20 mental health care case managers for children and one FTE per 40 mental health care case managers for adults. Again, though, the RFP does not require that such case managers must be currently employed by a CMHC or even currently providing such services. Petitioner legitimately objects to specifications expressed in terms of FTEs when applied to non-administrative services. The use of FTEs applies to fulltime employees, not to individual therapists who may see Medicaid clients on an occasional basis. The requirement that non-administrative services be expressed in FTEs unduly emphasizes process over product or outcome and is inconsistent with the spirit of the RFP. However, the use of FTEs in RFP 2.5 B.4 does not rise to the level of arbitrariness or illegality. As Respondent's chief witness, Marilyn Reeves, testified, an offeror may convert individual therapists to FTEs, even though the contractor may bear the risk of a faulty conversion formula. RFP 2.10 requires that the contractor implement the new capitated plan with minimal disruption to Medicaid clients, whose mental conditions may worsen from such disruption. Petitioner does not challenge this sensible provision. Petitioner instead argues that other pro-CMHC provisions preclude the implementation of a new plan with minimal disruption. Petitioner has failed to prove that the pro-CMHC provisions, except for 4.18 as discussed below, necessitate more than minimal disruption during the transition. RFP 4.17 provides that Respondent shall not pay the contractor's start-up or phase-down costs. Petitioner's objection is that government grants have paid for the capital expenditures of the CMHCs. For the reasons discussed in connection with RFP 2.3 D, Petitioner has failed to prove how this provision is arbitrary or illegal. RFP 5.1 D assigns 250 points for the proposed staffing pattern and requires the offeror to disclose "actual and proposed" FTE professionals, such as psychiatrists, case managers, and social workers. An offeror that has already identified its personnel may be able to provide a more detailed description and earn more points than another offeror that has yet to find its subcontractors. Likewise, RFP 5.1 D.5 requires a discussion of FTEs, although an offeror with as yet unidentified subcontractors probably can satisfy this section with a more generic discussion and not lose points. In any event, to the extent that the specification in terms of FTEs favors CMHCs, such a provision is not so onerous or unnecessary as to be arbitrary or illegal, as discussed in connection with 2.5 B.4. RFP 5.1 E assigns 400 points for operational functions and requires the offeror to "explicitly address its operational capacity to serve Medicaid recipients, and its previous history serving the Medicaid and other low income populations." Unlike RFP 5.1 C, which requires a proposal to address the contractor and its "major subcontractors," 5.1 E does not mention subcontractors, so this provision favors CMHCs even less than the other provisions of 5 and 6. Perhaps for this reason, neither Petitioner's witnesses nor Petitioner's proposed recommended order addressed RFP 5.1 E. RFP 5.1 F requires an offeror to provide a "detailed discussion," in which it shall "document a demonstrated ability to provide a comprehensive range of appropriate services . . .." An offeror with as yet unidentified subcontractors will likely be unable to supply nearly as much detail as an offeror with subcontractors already in place, but this provision would, if challenged, not be deemed arbitrary or illegal. However, Petitioner challenges only RFP 5.1 F.1 (Optional Services) and 5.1 F.4.a.3. Section 5.1 F.4.a.3 reiterates the requirement that the new capitated plan be implemented so as to "minimize disruption of services." As noted above, Petitioner of course does not object to this requirement, but uses it to show how other provisions are arbitrary or illegal. Petitioner objects to the portion of 5.1 F.1 identifying crisis stabilization units as an Optional Service. Although only CMHCs are licensed to operate crisis stabilization units, the same services are available from other sources, although often not as economically. Moreover, the crisis stabilization unit is only an Optional Service, which Respondent mentioned only for illustrative purposes. The last-cited option, "Other Services (List)," encourages offerors to devise creative options that may not involve such traditional providers as crisis stabilization units. RFP 6.3 B.3.c requires the offeror to ensure that "it has, and will continue to have, the resources necessary to provide mental health rehabilitation and support . . .." Satisfaction of the criteria of 6.3 B, like 5.1 C, D, and F, is easier for CMHCs and harder for contractors with as yet unidentified subcontractors. However, the advantage conferred upon CMHCs is not so great as to render 6.3 B arbitrary or illegal. To varying degrees, RFP 5.1 D.5, E.1, and F.1 (Optional Services) and 6.3 B.3.c prefer CMHCs or offerors affiliated with CMHCs. These provisions potentially conflict with the RFP provisions encouraging free and open competition and prohibiting more than minimal disruptions in service. The potential conflicts are partially attenuated by the ability of an offeror, prior to submitting a proposal, to identify subcontractors that may provide similar services to non-Medicaid clients or provide similar services to Medicaid clients in other areas of Florida or other states. RFP 5.1 D.5, E.1, and F.1 (Optional Services) and 6.3B impose qualitative standards upon the contractor and any subcontractors, whose employees have direct contact with the Medicaid clients. Non-CMHC offerors may nonetheless be able to identify, at the proposal stage, their subcontractors so as to earn the maximum points in these categories. For instance, offerors may find non-CMHC subcontractors providing community mental health services to non- Medicaid clients or to Medicaid clients elsewhere in Florida or the United States. With greater difficulty, non-CMHC offerors with as yet unidentified subcontractors may be able to project, at the proposal stage, features of their subcontractors. They may not be able to score as well as CMHCs and other offerors with already identified networks of community mental health service providers. However, to the extent that non-CMHCs are disadvantaged by these provisions, Petitioner has not shown that the inclusion of these provisions is arbitrary or illegal. These provisions ensure the delivery of quality mental health services. As likely as not, Petitioner has included these provisions after careful consideration of the benefits of further competitiveness and the costs of further limitations upon the participation of CMHCs. The final provision challenged by Petitioner is RFP 4.18, which acknowledges that the contractor may not itself provide the mental health services, but may contract with subcontractors for the provision of these services. Requiring that the contractor have subcontracts prior to the commencement of services under the new capitated plan, Section 4.18 adds that the contractor must submit for Respondent's written approval: signed subcontracts, for a complete provider network in order to obtain agency approval for operation in an area, within sixty days of the execution of this contract, for each proposed subcontracted service provider. Petitioner's challenge to RFP 2.3 D, E, and F; 2.5 A and B.3 and 4; and 4.17 fails because these provisions confer upon CMHCs an insignificant advantage, an advantage upon that could not be removed without eliminating CMHCs from the procurement, or an advantage while specifying an important substantive requirement. Petitioner's challenge to RFP 5.1 D.5, 5.1 E.1, 5.1F.1, and 6.3 B.3.c fails because these provisions, even if conferring significant advantages upon CMHCs, impose important qualitative requirements upon the delivery of mental health services to Medicaid clients. However, RFP 4.18 is different from these other provisions. It does not involve the actual delivery of mental health services to Medicaid clients. Section 4.18 dictates only how long after signing the contract with Respondent the contractor has to implement the new capitation contract. The advantage conferred by 4.18 upon CMHCs is neither trivial nor necessary. The federal waiver runs two years from the actual start-up date of the new capitation plan. Obviously, an inordinate delay in implementation might suggest that the contractor is unable to do the job, but nothing in the record suggests that 60 days marks the beginning of an inordinate delay. Respondent understandably wants to get the pilot project started quickly, presumably in anticipation of important cost savings. But these considerations do not rise to the importance of other provisions involving the actual delivery of mental health services to Medicaid clients. Non-CMHCs, especially offerors with as yet unidentified subcontractors, face a considerable task in plan implementation. For this procurement, only one offeror will have the assistance of the CMHCs, which gives that offeror a clear advantage in at least the community mental health and targeted case management categories. There is no good reason to increase this advantage by imposing an unrealistically short implementation timeframe on contractors. On the other hand, there are two reasons why the 60-day implementation timeframe is arbitrary and illegal: it conflicts with RFP provisions encouraging open competition and it conflicts with RFP provisions prohibiting more than a minimal disruption to clients. The new capitation plan represents a marked departure from past practice. The successful contractor is assuming considerable financial risks when it sets its fees and risk corridor, if any. This risk is spread over a wide geographic area containing some of Florida's most densely populated areas. Anticipated cost savings to the State may result in narrowed profit margins before the contractor can safely realize savings from reductions in the cost of mental health services provided to Medicaid clients. The success of the capitation plan is jeopardized if the contractor underestimates the revenue needed for the successful operation of the plan. The offeror without subcontractors at the time of submitting a proposal needs time to enlist the cooperation of CMHCs or other subcontractors. A witness of Respondent described a possible scenario in which CMHCs declined to cooperate with the contractor and were forced to terminate employees. Although these employees would be available to the contractor, they would not likely be available in a 60-day timeframe. A multitude of tasks confront the non-CMHC contractor, especially if the contractor does not have a subcontractor network in place when submitting the proposal. Not surprisingly, Respondent's witnesses did not offer a spirited defense of the 60-day implementation timeframe, as is partly illustrated by the following testimony of Respondent's chief witness: Q: Is there a reason that the language on Page 61 says "must have signed subcontract within 60 days?" A: No. What it is trying to get at there is that if you are going to start being operational within 60 days, you got to know that you got to get those subcontracts approved by us prior to being able to do that. Respondent's witness readily testified that the deadline would not be enforced, if the enforcement jeopardized the welfare of the Medicaid clients. Of course, given the vulnerability of the clients, Respondent would not require the implementation of an unfinished plan at the end of the contractual implementation timeframe, regardless of the duration of the implementation timeframe. But a rational deadline for implementation would not so readily invite discussions of waivers and extensions. The presence of an impractical deadline misleads offerors. Some offerors may obtain an unfair advantage by structuring their proposals without regard to the implementation timeframe, secure in the knowledge that it will not be enforced. Other offerors may limit Optional Services or avoid more creative delivery or administrative programs in order to ensure that their plans can be implemented within the arbitrarily short implementation timeframe. To eliminate arbitrary and illegal conflicts with other RFP provisions encouraging open competition and prohibiting more than minimal disruptions in service, the implementation timeframe of 60 days must be extended to at least 120 days.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order amending RFP 4.18 by inserting "120" days for "60" days in the second paragraph and making any necessary conforming changes elsewhere in the RFP, and, after making these changes, proceed with the subject procurement. ENTERED on January 31, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 31, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4: (except that "poisonous" in paragraph 2 is rejected as melodramatic and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence): adopted or adopted in substance. 5: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, except for 4.18. 6-7: adopted or adopted in substance, except that Petitioner did not challenge 5.1 E at the hearing or in the proposed recommended order. 8: rejected as irrelevant. 9-13: adopted or adopted in substance. 14: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Petitioner did not prove that the actual information shared by the CMHCs was crucial--only that certain information could theoretically be crucial. 15: adopted or adopted in substance, although other CMHCs operate in Area 6, but do not possess much share of the community mental health services market. 16-17: rejected as irrelevant. 18: adopted or adopted in substance, except for the last sentence, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence (except for 4.18). 19-20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: rejected as repetitious. 22: adopted. 23-25: adopted or adopted in substance, except for last sentence of paragraph 25, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 26-27: adopted or adopted in substance. 28: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 29-33: adopted or adopted in substance, except for last sentence of paragraph 33, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 34: adopted or adopted in substance. 35-36: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 37-38: adopted or adopted in substance, although this was hypothetical testimony of one of Respondent's witness, not a formal statement of Respondent's "position." 39 (first sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 39 (second sentence): adopted. 40-44 (second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 44 (third sentence): rejected as recitation of evidence. 45: adopted. 46-47: adopted or adopted in substance. 48: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 49: rejected as irrelevant and, except for 4.18, unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6: adopted or adopted in substance, except for 4.18. 7: adopted or adopted in substance. 8: adopted or adopted in substance, at least to the extent that Petitioner failed to prove the contrary. 9 (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 9 (last sentence): rejected as speculative. 10-16: adopted or adopted in substance, although the extent of Petitioner's ability to respond satisfactorily is questionable, as is the rationale for the use of FTEs for non-administrative positions. Additionally, all proposed findings that RFP provisions do not place non-CMHCs at a disadvantage, when such proposed findings conflict with findings in the recommended order, are rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 Harold D. Lewis, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Seann M. Frazier Mark A. Emanuele Panza Maurer P.A. 3081 East Commercial Blvd. Suite 200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 Paul J. Martin William H. Roberts Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1997) (hereinafter, "Florida Statues"), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 59S- 8.005(1)(e)1 and 2, by diverting morphine during his care and treatment of two patients and failing to keep accurate nurse's notes. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of nursing. Respondent is licensed as a nurse pursuant to license number RN 2185632. Respondent admitted under oath at the hearing that he committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent did not overdose any patient, endanger, or neglect any patient. Respondent diverted morphine during his care and treatment of patients J.G. and R.B. at West Volusia Memorial Hospital on March 24 and 26, 1997. Respondent was addicted to morphine and diverted morphine from the two patients for self- administration. Respondent is guilty of negligent administration of morphine. Respondent self-administrated morphine that was not medically necessary. Respondent failed to keep accurate nurse's notes for patient J.G. Respondent inaccurately recorded the amount of morphine administered to patients J.G. and R.B. Respondent has voluntarily sought aggressive care and treatment for his drug addiction. Respondent is in three rehabilitation programs in Georgia. Respondent is in an intervention program for nurses ("IPN") approved by the State of Georgia pursuant to a prosecution conducted by the appropriate state agency in Georgia. He is also in a nurses anonymous program and a follow-up hospital program. Respondent is also under the regular care of a psychiatrist.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 464.018(1)(h) and Rules 59S-8.005(1)(e)1 and 2, suspending Respondent's license for two years from the date of this Recommended Order, and placing Respondent on probation for two years from the end of the suspension period. The terms of probation shall include a requirement that Respondent successfully complete the IPN program in Georgia and hospital follow-up program. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Marilyn Bloss, Executive Director Department of Health Board of Nursing 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Room 136 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1580 Waldo Palmer Lane Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-4229 Joseph Webb, pro se 2169 Turner Church Road McDonough, Georgia 30252
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Respondent was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME 0006795. Respondent has been a licensed physician since 1955. No evidence of any prior disciplinary action against Respondent was presented. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a Board Certified Urologist. He has been certified in that specialty by the American Board of Urology since 1971. The practice of urology is a specialty in the field of medicine focusing on the treatment of the urinary tract and diseases of the kidney, prostate, bladder and genitalia. On or about October 1985, the Respondent was practicing urology in Fort Lauderdale, Florida when he met D.D., a patient's girlfriend. Shortly thereafter, he hired D.D. to help in his office. D.D. worked at the Respondent's Fort Lauderdale office until late December 1985 when, as discussed in more detail below, the Respondent fired her. In October, 1985, D.D. was a 27 year-old female with a history of drug and alcohol abuse which began during her teenage years. From the outset of her employment with Respondent, D.D.'s relationship with Respondent was not a typical employer/employee or physician/patient association. While there is no evidence of any sexual relationship between D.D. and Respondent other than "some mild foreplay," the relationship was fraught with sexual overtones. Respondent prepared a typewritten summary of his version of the relationship which was accepted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. This "resume" details the unusual relationship that developed. As reflected in this "resume," Respondent loaned money to D.D. and brought her expensive Christmas presents. In addition, during the period from October 1985 through February 1986, Respondent and D.D. frequently dined together. On several occasions while they were together, D.D. became intoxicated and exhibited bizarre and troublesome behavior. On October 13, 1985, four days prior to starting work at the Respondent's office, D.D. presented at the Boca Raton Hospital Emergency Room (the "Boca Raton E.R.") for treatment of post-abortion complications. The hospital record of that visit indicates that D.D. had alcohol on her breath and had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. During that visit, D.D. was provided with Keflex (an antibiotic) and was given an intramuscular injection of 2 mgs. of Stadol, a controlled substance. Between the time of D.D.'s visit to the Boca Raton ER and the time she started working for Respondent, Respondent arranged to provide D.D. with Keflex samples which he had in his office. He provided the Keflex to her because she supposedly did not have enough money to fill her prescription. D.D. began working for Respondent on October 17, 1985. While D.D. was in his employ, Respondent entered into a physician-patient relationship with D.D. and began treating her for her post-abortion complications which he described as "pain in the lower left quadrant". Pain in the lower left quadrant resulting from post abortion complications is a medical condition which is normally treated by a physician in the specialty area of gynecology, not urology. Respondent contends that he undertook to treat D.D. because she had limited funds and he wanted to help insure that his employee was healthy. On October 18, 1985, the day after she began work, Respondent provided D.D. with one tablet of the legend drug Tylenol #3 for her pain prior to conducting a physical examination and without reviewing the chart from the Boca Raton ER or discussing the case with her prior physician. Between October 23 and November 20, 1985, Respondent conducted at least five separate pelvic examinations of D.D., reviewed her sonogram test results, had a pregnancy test performed on her and a culture taken. Respondent diagnosed D.D.'s condition as severe pain coming from residual-decidual fragments following her September 28, 1985 abortion. During this period, Respondent treated her continuing complaints of pain with Stadol because D.D. claimed Tylenol #3 had been ineffective. Respondent had some Stadol samples in his office which had been provided by the manufacturer's representative. During the period from October 21, 1985 through November 18, 1985, Respondent administered approximately 12 injections of Stadol to D.D. in response to her complaints of pain while at work. There is no evidence that more than one injection was ever given on any one day or that any injection exceeded 2 mgs. Tylenol #3 is a legend (prescription) painkilling drug and is a Schedule III controlled substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. It contains codeine and can produce psychic and physical dependence and should be prescribed and administered with caution. Stadol is a legend (prescription) drug which is a potent analgesic pain killer. Because of its antagonist properties, Stadol is not recommended for patients physically dependent on narcotics. Detoxification of narcotic dependent patients is strongly suggested prior to use. At all pertinent times, Stadol was not a scheduled drug. However, the Physician's Desk Reference ("PDR") recommends that special care be exercised in administering Stadol to emotionally unstable patients and to patients with a history of drug misuse. Tylenol #3 is indicated for the relief of mild to moderate pain and Stadol is used to relieve moderate to severe pain. The PDR indicates that the dosage of Tylenol should be adjusted according to the severity of pain and the response of the patient. Tylenol #3 is usually administered orally and one or two tablets may be given every four hours as required. Stadol is usually administered through intramuscular or intravenous injection. The usual recommended single dose for Stadol is 2 mgs. for intramuscular administration. The effective dosage range, depending on the severity of pain, is 1-4 mgs. repeated every three to four hours for intramuscular administration. Respondent contends that he only administered Stadol to D.D. after observing her in his office and listening to her complaints of severe pain while in the office. He claims that he inquired as to her prior medical history and was advised that she was not a drug user. D.D. also advised that the Tylenol #3 had been ineffectual. Following the onset of menses on approximately November 21, 1985, Respondent contends that D.D.'s complaints of pain diminished and she no longer sought pain medication from him. Respondent contends that, prior to administering any injections to D.D., he contacted the Boca Raton ER and obtained specific information regarding the tests that had been performed on D.D. at the hospital. While the Boca Raton ER records specifically mention D.D.'s history of substance abuse, Respondent denies seeing the actual hospital records and denies being told by the hospital staff that D.D. had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. In fact, Respondent denies having any knowledge that D.D. had problems with substance abuse until sometime after Thanksgiving in 1985. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute these claims and/or establish that Respondent saw the ER records in 1985. Petitioner contends that Respondent should have discovered that D.D. had a history of alcohol and drug abuse prior to administering Tylenol and Stadol to her during the October through November, 1985 period. This information could have been discovered from a review of the October 13, 1985 ER record. While D.D.'s sometimes bizarre behavior during this period should have made him more cautious, it cannot be concluded based upon the evidence presented that Respondent knew or should have known that D.D. had a serious drug problem until late November, 1985. Respondent admits to increasing concern or "second thoughts" in late November regarding D.D.'s possible drug use. Around November 19th or 20th, Respondent discovered two syringes and needles in the waste basket of his office which had not been used by him. This evidence suggested to him that D.D. may have been using drugs in the office. Around the same time, he had conversations with D.D.'s mother who confirmed that her daughter had a long history of drug and alcohol problems. Respondent hid the remaining Stadol in his desk. Based on subsequent conversations with D.D., Respondent now believes that she gained access to and used that Stadol while still in his employ. After Thanksgiving, Respondent noticed a marked change in D.D.'s disposition and behavior. Respondent discussed the situation with a psychiatrist friend of his and, based upon those conversations, began providing D.D. with Limbitrol, which is a combination of an antidepressant and Librium.4 Limbitrol is an antidepressant used in the treatment of psychotic patients who are having psychotic episodes or are going through alcohol or drug withdrawal. Respondent had received some samples from the manufacturer's representative and, at D.D.'s request, sought additional samples. During the month of December, 1985, Respondent and D.D. frequently dined together and, on occasions, went to bars or parties together. During this time, there were several incidents that indicated pretty clearly that D.D. was involved in illicit drug use. On December 23, 1985, Respondent monitored at least two phone conversations during which D.D. phoned in false prescriptions for Stadol using another physician's name and DEA number. During the latter part of December, Respondent became very concerned about some of D.D.'s friends and certain suspicious activities that he noted. Respondent became apprehensive that D.D. may be "setting him up" for some sort of drug transaction. He reported his concerns to the police. On December 30, 1985, Respondent advised D.D. that she was "fired" as of December 31, 1985. Respondent says he fired her because he suspected her of stealing from the office petty cash fund, using drugs in his office and using his office to order prescription drugs, i.e., Stadol, for herself. He notified the Pompano Police Department of her suspected activities. During January of 1986, Respondent was in frequent telephone contact with D.D. They had dinner at least one time during January. He also saw her on at least one other occasion when she came to his house. During this month, Respondent discovered that D.D. had removed the sample box of Limbitrol from his office. She refused to return it to him. Based upon his phone conversations and other interactions with D.D. during January, Respondent concluded that she was drinking excessively and/or taking drugs. Respondent contends that throughout the month he frequently cautioned her about the dangers of drugs and advised her of her need for treatment. Early on Saturday morning February 1, 1986, D.D. called Respondent claiming that she was in severe pain and needed to get to a hospital. At approximately 8:30 a.m., Respondent, accompanied by an off duty policeman, went to D.D.'s residence. At the residence, D.D. stated that she had been at a party the night before and had been raped by her boyfriend and his friends. She complained of severe pain in the left pelvis and in the lower abdomen. Respondent examined her, took her blood pressure and pulse and gave her a 2 mg. injection of Stadol. After approximately ten to twenty minutes, D.D.'s condition had not improved and she continued to complain of pain. D.D. was very unsteady on her feet, disoriented and, at times, speaking unintelligibly. Respondent and the off duty police officer proceeded to take her to the North Broward General Hospital Emergency Room. Respondent's name and signature appear on the ER record as the attending physician. That ER report listed D.D.'s chief complaint as pain in the lower left quadrant. Drug withdrawal was not mentioned on the ER record. While D.D. was in the Emergency Room, Respondent made rounds to visit his other patients in the hospital. He also contacted D.D.'s mother, B.D., who expressed a strong desire to have her daughter placed in a facility to treat her drug and alcohol problems. After speaking with Respondent on the morning of February 1, B.D. contacted the Coral Springs Care Unit, a drug and alcohol treatment center. B.D. spoke with Michael Halprin, the Emergency Director of the facility, who indicated that he was willing to go to the Emergency Room to evaluate D.D. for admission to the Care Unit and to assist in getting her there. B.D. contacted Respondent and advised him of her discussions with the Coral Springs Care Unit. Mr. Halprin made several calls to the Emergency Room and was told that D.D. was in an agitated state and was being cared for by Respondent. Subsequently, Mr. Halprin spoke with Respondent who questioned him regarding the detoxification of an individual who was chemically dependent. Mr. Halprin advised Respondent that the best place for such an individual would be in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation center under nursing care. Mr. Halprin told Respondent that he was willing to go to the ER, as he had done for other patients in the past, to evaluate D.D. for admission to the Care Unit and that he would assist in getting her there. Respondent contends that the Coral Springs Care Unit was not willing to pick up D.D. from the Emergency Room and/or treat her until they could confirm that she was able to pay for the necessary services. This contention is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. At approximately 9:30 or 10:00 that morning, Respondent ordered a 4 mg. injection of Stadol for D.D. which was given to her intramuscularly. In addition, Respondent ordered blood tests and laboratory tests and reexamined her. The Stadol appeared to alleviate some of D.D.'s pain, however, she was still somewhat agitated. The lab tests conducted on D.D. were normal. There was no indication that her temperature was high, her pulse, respiration and blood rate were relatively normal and she was not nauseous or otherwise exhibiting signs of acute drug withdrawal. During the course of the morning, D.D. became more agitated and indicated that she was still in pain and the Stadol was not providing her any relief. Respondent attempted to contact certain physicians that he knew who were familiar with treating patients undergoing drug withdrawal. Respondent also tried to contact a few hospitals and facilities that he knew provided treatment to such individuals. At some point, Respondent contacted Dr. de Eljalde, a board certified psychiatrist and neurologist, to determine whether he could treat the patient and/or the appropriate drugs to use for detoxifying D.D. Dr. de Eljalde indicated that he would be willing to treat D.D. when a bed became available at Imperial Point Hospital. In the meantime, Dr. de Eljalde advised Respondent to use Dilaudid and Talwin in decreasing dosages until she could be admitted. While Respondent now contends that his discussion with Dr. de Eljalde took place on the morning of February 1, 1986, his discussion with Dr. de Eljelade was not mentioned in the interview conducted on May 8, 1986 or in the "resume" which Respondent prepared prior to that interview. In view of the conclusions reached in this Recommended Order, it is not necessary to determine exactly when the contact with Dr. de Eljalde was actually made. However, the more persuasive evidence indicates that the contact was made sometime after D.D. left the ER. At approximately 12 noon, Respondent administered another injection of Stadol to D.D. At approximately 12:45 p.m., Respondent administered a 1cc. (2 mg.) injection of Dilaudid. Dilaudid is a hydrogenated ketone of morphine. It is a powerful narcotic analgesic, and a Schedule II controlled substance. Psychic dependence and/or physical dependence may develop upon repeated administration. The PDR provides that it is indicated for moderate to severe pain due to surgery, cancer, trauma, biliary colic, myocardial infarction, burns and renal colic. Within a very short time after the Dilaudid injection, D.D. showed significant improvement and expressed her desire to leave the hospital. In view of D.D.'s marked change following the administration of Dilaudid, Respondent concluded that D.D. was experiencing withdrawal from narcotics. D.D. would not disclose to Respondent the exact type or amount of drugs that she had been taking. As indicated above, several diagnostic tests were conducted, however, all test results were normal. Other than D.D.'s agitation and complaints of pain, there were no clinical or diagnostic indications of drug or alcohol withdrawal or any other emergency condition. After D.D.'s mental and physical condition improved following the injection of Dilaudid, Respondent decided to treat D.D. at his residence and had her discharged to his care. He took her to lunch and then brought her to his house. Based upon his knowledge and experience and the practices at the time, Mr. Halprin had the authority to involuntarily place patients in a facility for observation if necessary. Respondent took D.D. to his house despite Mr. Halprin's willingness to evaluate her at the Emergency Room for placement. Respondent did not contact B.D. or Mr. Halprin before leaving the hospital with D.D. Both Mr. Halprin and B.D. were very surprised when they learned that Respondent left the hospital with D.D. before Mr. Halprin had an opportunity to see her. Respondent claims that D.D. insisted that he treat her and that she adamantly refused to go to the Coral Springs Care Unit. Respondent contends that D.D. agreed to treatment at the Imperial Point Hospital Psychiatric Unit if a bed opened up on Monday. In the meantime, he claims that he was "maintaining" her until she could get treatment. D.D. remained at Respondent's residence from the afternoon of February 1, 1986 until the morning of February 3, 1986. Respondent admits to administering three additional 2 mg. injections of Dilaudid as follows: at approximately 6:30 p.m. on February 1, 1986; between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on February 2, 1986; and between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. on February 2, 1986. On the afternoon of February 2, 1986, Respondent administered a 1cc.(30mg.) injection of Talwin. Respondent felt the Talwin was "not working" and he noticed some changes in D.D.'s behavior. Therefore, he administered another 2 mg. injection of Dilaudid to D.D. at approximately midnight that evening. At 8:00 a.m. the next morning, February 3, 1986, Respondent administered another 30 mg. injection of Talwin to D.D. According to the PDR, the usual starting dose for Dilaudid is 1-2 mg. intramuscularly every four to six hours as necessary for pain control. The dose should be adjusted according to the severity of the pain. A gradual increase in the dose may be required if analgesia is inadequate, tolerance occurs or if pain severity increases. Talwin is a legend (prescription) drug and a Schedule IV controlled substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. It is a potent analgesic and 30 mg. of Talwin is usually as effective as 10 mg. of morphine. Talwin carries with it a special warning for prescribing this drug to emotionally unstable patients and patients with a history of drug abuse. For Talwin, the recommended single intramuscular dosage is 30 mg. which may be repeated every three to four hours. Respondent did not and does not hold any licenses, permits or authorizations from any federal or state agency to detoxify persons addicted to controlled substances. Under the federal regulations governing the dispensing of narcotic drugs for detoxification treatment or "maintenance treatment", any physician can administer narcotic drugs in certain instances. Physicians who are not specifically registered to conduct a narcotic treatment program are authorized to administer (but not prescribe) narcotic controlled substances to a person as part of "maintenance treatment" for the sole purpose of relieving acute withdrawal symptoms when necessary while arrangements are being made for referral for treatment. Not more than one day's medication may be administered to the person or for the person's use at one time. Such an emergency treatment may be carried out for not more than three days and may not be extended or renewed. Respondent argues that his conduct in this case falls within the allowed "maintenance treatment" of the federal regulations (which have been followed by the Board.) However, based upon all of the facts in this case, it is concluded that Respondent has not adequately demonstrated that the injections he administered were "necessary" or that appropriate efforts were being undertaken to arrange necessary treatment. In view of all the circumstances and evidence presented in this case, it is concluded that Respondent undertook to treat D.D. at his personal residence without fully and adequately exploring more appropriate treatment by better trained professionals at a more suitable facility. Respondent should not have undertaken the "detoxification" or "maintenance" of D.D. with such powerful narcotics without a better understanding of the patient's history and a better treatment plan than simply "maintaining" her with whatever dosage was necessary. Because Dilaudid is a very powerful drug with potential impacts on the respiratory center, heart rate and pulse rate as well as other possible complications, the frequent or large volume utilization of Dilaudid should only take place in a hospital or similar setting where the patient can be closely monitored and the resources are available to address potential problems. Conflicting testimony was presented as to whether Dilaudid is ever an appropriate drug to use for maintaining and/or detoxifying an addicted patient. That conflict need not be resolved in this case. Given all of the facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, Respondent's lack of knowledge as to the specific drugs that D.D. was taking, the absence of acute withdrawal symptoms, Respondent's knowledge that D.D. had been taking Limbitrol, the Respondent's lack of training, and the setting in which the drugs were administered, it is concluded that Respondent's administration of Dilaudid to D.D. during the weekend of February 1-3, 1986 was inappropriate and, therefore, was in violation of Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes. After leaving the ER, Respondent spoke with D.D.'s mother and told her that all of D.D.'s tests were normal and that D.D. was with him at his house and that he was going to "wean her off" drugs slowly. D.D.'s mother was upset with this arrangement and called the police. The police went to Respondent's house on February 2, 1986. Respondent only reluctantly allowed them to enter. The police officer noted that D.D. appeared to be under the influence of some intoxicant and was wearing only panties and a T-shirt. However, because the officer could not conclude that D.D. was being held against her will, no action was taken. During the visit, Respondent told the officer that he had overreacted in his prior police complaint that D.D. had placed false prescriptions. Respondent asked the police officer to delete this prior report. No cogent explanation has been given for this request and it tends to confirm that Respondent's motives during this period were not wholly alturistic. On the morning of February 3, 1986, Respondent left D.D. at his residence and went to make hospital rounds before going to his office for work. Respondent returned to his residence at approximately noon and let a friend of D.D. enter the house to stay with her. At approximately 2:00, he received a call from the friend who was leaving to go to work and said that D.D. was becoming very agitated and unruly. Respondent returned home and found D.D. in an extremely agitated and aggressive state. He called the police. When the police officers came to Respondent's house, D.D. was still clad only in panties and a T-shirt. She was extremely agitated and made a wide variety of accusations against Respondent. D.D. pointed to her buttocks where there were numerous injection marks, and screamed that Respondent had been "sticking me with drugs." D.D. had to be physically restrained and removed from Respondent's residence and taken to a hospital. Subsequently, after meeting with Michael Halprin, she was placed in the drug treatment program at the Coral Springs Care Unit. Respondent's treatment of D.D. during the period February 1-3, 1986 constituted practice below an acceptable standard of medical care. Respondent should not have taken a suspected drug addict from the ER to treat her with a powerful narcotic, Dilaudid, at his home. Even Respondent's own expert called it unwise to treat a patient with narcotics at a personal residence. After the injection of Dilaudid at the hospital, D.D. appeared fine. She was not screaming and there was no medical reason to take the patient from the ER to the Respondent's home. A review of her vital signs at the ER and the results of the diagnostic tests do not reflect any clinical indication associated with drug withdrawal. In addition, there are numerous complications that can occur as a result of using a powerful medication such as Dilaudid, including decreased respiration, slowing of the heart rate and pulse rate and a drop of the blood pressure. If Dilaudid was to be used, the patient should have been kept in a setting where her condition was closely monitored. There is a great deal of confusion regarding the Respondent's "medical records" of his treatment of D.D. When interviewed by Petitioner's Investigator on May 8, 1986, the Respondent was asked for a copy of his patient medical records regarding D.D. The Investigator served a Patient Release Form on Respondent which directed that he provide "full and complete medical records, medical reports, psychological, psychiatric reports, and information including reports or information prepared by other persons that may be in your possession and all financial records to the Florida Department of Professional Regulation or any official representative of the Department pursuant to Section 455.241, Florida Statutes." In response, the Respondent indicated that he had not really kept medical records, but he provided the Investigator with a copy of his "resume" regarding his dealings with D.D. This "resume" was clearly prepared after the described incidents took place and does not constitute a "medical record" for purposes of Section 458.331(1)(m). At Respondent's request, the Investigator returned to Respondent's office several days after the May 8, 1986 interview to pick up Petitioner's Exhibit 7, which were notes of Respondent's treatment of D.D. from October through December, 1985. At the hearing, Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 5 were produced for the first time. Respondent contends that these exhibits are the medical records of his treatment of D.D. for the October through December, 1985 period. As indicated in the Preliminary Statement, Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 5 were not accepted into evidence because they were not properly identified as required in the Prehearing Order. Respondent's claim that Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 5 were provided to the Investigator who allegedly lost them is rejected as not persuasive. In any event, after considering all of the evidence, it is concluded that Petitioner's Exhibit 7 and Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 5 were not contemporaneous records regarding Respondent's treatment of D.D., but, instead, were prepared after the fact 56. Accordingly, it is concluded that the Respondent failed to maintain adequate medical records to justify his treatment of D.D. at his office during the period October 1985-December 1985. In addition, Respondent did not keep adequate records of his treatment of D.D. while she was at his home from February 1-3, 1986. Respondent failed to keep adequate patient records by failing to record the drugs he prescribed and/or administered, the dosage amounts, and the patient's condition during this period.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(q), (m) and (t), Florida Statutes. As punishment therefore, Respondent should be (1) reprimanded, (2) fined $10,000, (3) suspended from the practice of medicine for six months, three months of which should be suspended if Respondent successfully completes board approved continuing Medical Education Courses, and (4) thereafter, Respondent should be placed on probation for a period of 3 years, the terms and conditions of which should be set by the Board of Medicine. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of June, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1992.
The Issue Whether the Department should issue certificate of need number 4502 to construct and operate a fifty-bed long-term psychiatric hospital in Leon County, Florida, to HCAC?
Findings Of Fact HCAC is a corporation formed by Anthony Estevez for the purpose of developing and operating a long-term psychiatric facility in Leon County, Florida. The facility was to be known as HCAC psychiatric Hospital of Leon County. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of the stock of HCAC. The Department is the state agency in Florida authorized to issue certificates of need for long-term psychiatric facilities. TMRMC is a general acute care hospital located in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. TMRMC operates a free- standing short-term psychiatric facility in a two-story, approximately 45,000 square foot, structure located within a block and a half from the main hospital. TMRMC's psychiatric facility is licensed for sixty beds. At present, forty-five of its beds are actually open, with fifteen beds in each of three units. One unit is available for adult patients (including geriatric patients), one is available for adolescent patients and one is available for an open adult unit. The other fifteen beds are available but are not staffed because of a lack of patients. Apalachee is a private, non-profit corporation. Apalachee provides comprehensive community mental health services to Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties. Apalachee was established consistent with State and federal guidelines to provide a variety of mental health Services. On March 17, 1986, a Letter of Intent was filed with the Department notifying the Department of Mr. Estevez's intent to apply for a certificate of need in the March 16, 1986, batching cycle. This Letter of Intent was filed within the time requirements of Florida law. On April 15, 1986 Estevez filed an application for a certificate of need for a comprehensive, free-standing, ninety-bed long-term psychiatric facility to be located in Leon County, Florida. Leon County is located in the Department's District 2. District 2 is made up of Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gadsden, Gulf, Jackson, Jefferson, Holmes, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor, Wakulla and Washington Counties. Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties make up Subdistrict 2B. The other Counties make up Subdistrict 2A. HCAC's application was filed with the Department and the District 2 local health council. In a letter dated May 15, 1987, the Department requested additional information from HCAC. The information requested by the Department was provided by HCAC on or about June 19, 1986 and June 23, 1986. On September 23, 1986, the Department issued a State Agency Action Report partially approving HCAC's certificate of need application. HCAC was notified of the Department's decision and was issued certificate of need #4502 by letter dated September 30, 1986. HCAC had sought approval to construct a ninety-bed facility providing specialty long-term psychiatric services for the chronically mentally disturbed; patients with a ninety-day average length of stay. The facility was to provide care to adolescents, adults and geriatrics. Certificate of need #4502 authorized HCAC to construct a fifty-bed long-term adult, geriatric and adolescent psychiatric hospital in Leon County. The Department approved the facility because of its perception that there is no long-term psychiatric facility serving the geographic area proposed by HCAC to be served. By letter dated November 13, 1987, the Department issued an amended certificate of need #4502 to HCAC restricting the services to be provided to adult and geriatric long-term psychiatric services. HCAC intends on using thirty-six beds for adults and fourteen beds for geriatric patients. HCAC did not contest the Department's reduction in the size of the approved facility or the limitation of the scope of services to adult and geriatric patients. At the formal hearing HCAC presented evidence to Support the approved fifty-bed facility Serving only adults and geriatrics. HCAC has not contested the Department's decision to only partially approve HCAC's application. Supporting documentation took into account the smaller size of the approved facility. No substantial change in the scope or emphasis of the facility was made by HCAC other than the elimination of adolescent Services. HCAC has projected an average occupancy rate of 80 percent for the third year of operation. Because of the failure to prove that there is a need for an additional fifty long-term psychiatric beds for District 2, HCAC has failed to prove that this projection is reasonable. As of the date of the Department's initial decision and at the time of the formal hearing of these cases Rivendell Family Care Center (hereinafter referred to as "Rivendell") an eighty-bed long-term-psychiatric free-standing hospital located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida, had been open for approximately six weeks. Rivendell's occupancy rate at the time of the formal hearing was approximately twenty-four percent. Long-term psychiatric services mean hospital based inpatient services averaging a length of stay of ninety days. Long-term psychiatric services may be provided pursuant to the Department's rules in hospitals holding a general license or in a free-standing facility holding a specialty hospital license. Generally, the chronically mentally ill constitute an under-served group. In order to provide a complete continuum of care for the mentally ill, in-patient hospital treatment, including twenty-four hour medical care and nursing services and intensive resocialization or teaching of resocialization skills, should be provided. The Department has not established a standard method of quantifying need for long-term psychiatric beds in Florida. The Department's approval of the additional long- term psychiatric beds and facility at issue in this proceeding and the Department's and HCAC's position during the formal hearing that there is a need for HCAC's facility was based generally upon their conclusion that there is a "lack of such a facility to serve the geographic area." During the formal hearing, the Department further justified the need for the facility as follows: Basically it was felt that given the geographic distance or distances between this area, the eastern portion of District II, and the closest facilities, meaning licensed hospitals or facilities authorized by a Certificate of Need to offer long-term adult psychiatric services in a Chapter 395 licensed hospital, that there probably should be one here of a minimal size because we were not firm in, or in surety of the number of patients who might need the service in this area. But we thought that there should be at least a minimally sized long-term psychiatric hospital in this area to serve this area. HCAC and the Department failed to prove that there is a need for an additional fifty long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. At best, HCAC and the Department have relied upon speculation and assumptions to support approval of the proposed facility. In order to prove need, the characteristics of the population to be served by a proposed health service should be considered. A determination that there is a need for a health service should be based upon demographic data, including the population in the service area, referral sources and existing services. HCAC and the Department did not present such evidence sufficient enough to Support the additional fifty beds at issue in this proceeding. HCAC did not use any need methodology to quantify the gross need for long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Nor did HCAC or the Department present sufficient proof concerning existing services, the population to be served, the income or insurance coverage of the Service area population or actual service area referral patterns. In its application. HCAC premised its proposal, in part, on the assumption that "the Leon County area is an undeserved area with residents being referred to facilities long distances away." HCAC exhibit 2. The evidence does not support this assumption. HCAC also premised its proposal upon its conclusion that it would receive patient referrals from existing institutions. The evidence failed to support this conclusion. HCAC also premised its proposal upon the fact that long-term psychiatric services have been designated as a licensure category by the Department. This does not, however, create a presumption that there is a need for such services in a particular area. Based upon the evidence presented at the formal hearing concerning one methodology for quantifying the need for long-term psychiatric beds, there may already be a surplus of long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Such a surplus of beds may exist whether State hospital beds and ARTS and GRTS program beds are considered. The methodology is based upon national length of stay data for 1980 which was obtained from the National Institute of Mental Health. The methodology did not take into account more current data or Florida specific data. Therefore, use of the methodology did not prove the exact number of long- term psychiatric beds needed for District 2. Although the weight of the evidence concerning the use of the methodology failed to support a finding as to the exact number of long-term psychiatric beds needed in District 2, its use was sufficient to support a finding that there may be a surplus of beds already in existence. The methodology further supports the conclusion that HCAC and the Department have failed to meet their burden of proving that there is a need for the proposed facility. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether long-term inpatient psychiatric services, other than those provided at State hospitals, are "within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's [District 2] population." The closest long-term inpatient psychiatric facility [other than a State hospital], Rivendell, is located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida. This facility is located in Subdistrict 2A. There is no facility located in Subdistrict 2B. Rivendell is located on the western edge of Subdistrict 2B, however. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this facility is not within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of District 2's population. On page seven of the State Agency Action Report approving Rivendell, the Department indicated that "[t]he proposed location insures that 90 percent of the District I and District II population will have access within two hours travel time." This determination was made prior to the initial approval by the Department of HCAC's proposed facility. If the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee (hereinafter referred to as "Chattahoochee"), which is located in District 2, is taken into account, long-term psychiatric services are available within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for a least 90 percent of District 2's population. Chattahoochee provides long-term inpatient psychiatric hospital care to indigent and private pay patients. The quality of cafe at Chattahoochee is good and a full range of therapeutic modalities typically available at other psychiatric hospitals are available. HCAC and the Department have suggested that there is need for the additional fifty beds at is sue in these cases because of their conclusion that 90 percent of the population of District 2 is not within two hours under average travel conditions of long-term psychiatric services. The failure to prove this conclusion further detracts from their position as to the need for the proposed facility. HCAC exhibit 8 is a copy of the goals, objectives and recommended actions contained in the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan relating to mental health facilities. The evidence in this proceeding failed to support a finding that HCAC's proposed facility will enhance these goals, objectives and recommended actions. Goal 1 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[e]nsure the availability of mental health and substance abuse services to all Florida residents in a least restrictive setting." Objectives 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4, and the actions recommended to achieve these objectives are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. Objective 1.3 provides that additional long-term inpatient psychiatric beds should not be approved in any district which has "an average annual occupancy of at least 80 percent for all existing and approved long-term inpatient psychiatric beds." Goal 2 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[p]romote the development of a continuum of high quality, cost effective private sector mental health and substance abuse treatment and preventive services." The objectives and recommended actions to achieve this goal are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. Goal 3 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[d]evelope a complete range of essential public mental health services in each HRS district." The objectives and recommended actions to achieve this goal are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. The Florida State Plan for Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services does not specifically deal with private long-term psychiatric services. Instead, it relates specifically to treatment in the state mental health treatment facilities. The applicable district mental health plan does not specifically address long-term psychiatric services. The plan does, however, recommend that new facilities should indicate a commitment to serving the medically indigent. HCAC has agreed to provide 5.6 percent of its patient days for indigent care. HCAC's commitment to provide 5.6 percent of its patient days for indigent care is consistent with this objective. Mental Health District Boards have been abolished. The District 2 Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Planning Council, however, has published the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health 1986-89 Provisional District Plan. It is acknowledged in this Plan that deinstitutionalization and the provision of the least restrictive means of treatment should be promoted. The use of long- term psychiatric inpatient beds does not promote this philosophy. If a patient is not admitted as part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment of HCAC and cannot pay the $10,500.00 per month admission charges, HCAC will not admit the patient. Additionally, if a patient is admitted and runs out of funds to pay the daily charges and is not part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment, the patient will be transferred to another facility. HCAC's facility will be accessible to all residents who can pay for their services or who are part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment of HCAC. The provision of 5.6 percent indigent care is adequate. HCAC will provide non- discriminatory health care services, to those indigent patients who are covered by HCAC's 5.6 percent commitment. The Counties which make up Subdistrict 2B, other than Leon County, are below the average national and State poverty levels. In most of the Counties, twenty percent of the population have incomes below the poverty level. HCAC has not managed any type of psychiatric hospital and currently has no employees. The proposed facility is to be managed by Flowers Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Flowers"). Flowers is a psychiatric management company that has been in operation since 1984. Mr. Estevez owns fifty-one percent of the stock of Flowers and is the Chairman of the Board. Flowers is operating five Psychiatric/substance abuse facilities: three hospital based and two free-standing pychiatric/chemical dependency facilities. The staff and faculty of Flowers has a strong background in the management of psychiatric facilities. Flowers has no experience in the management of a long-term psychiatric facility. Mr. Nelson Elliot Rodney, Flowers' Regional Vice President, will be ultimately responsible for the management of the proposed facility. The administrator of the facility will report to Mr. Rodney. Mr. Rodney will seek to implement the goals outlined in HCAC's certificate of need application for the proposed facility. Mr. Rodney has not designed a psychiatric hospital. Nor has Mr. Rodney worked at or administered a long- term psychiatric hospital. The overall treatment plan as presented in HCAC's certificate of need application and as presented at the formal hearing lends itself to the development of a good program for long-term psychiatric care. HCAC has associated itself with experts in long-term psychiatric care in order to develop a detailed plan specifically addressing the treatment needs of long-term psychiatric patients. HCAC has the ability to, and will, provide good quality patient care. Apalachee provides certain programs in Subdistrict 2B which provide alternatives to long-term psychiatric hospitalization: the Geriatric Residential Treatment System (hereinafter referred to as "GRTS") and the Adult Residential Treatment System (hereinafter referred to as "ARTS"). Apalachee's GRTS program, which serves Individuals fifty-five years of age and older, contains a residential component with a total capacity of Seventy geriatric beds. A wide variety of services are provided as part of the GRTS program, including day treatment and case management components. When Apalachee's ARTS program is fully implemented there will be a total of one hundred sixty-three beds available for the care on long-term mentally ill adults and geriatrics within Subdistrict 2B. The ARTS program serves adults who are eighteen to fifty-four years of age. Apalachee's GRTS and ARTS programs do not provide the identical services provided in a free-standing long-term psychiatric hospital. The programs do provide some identical or similar services, and, to that extent, the programs complement the continuum of psychiatric care available. To the extent that they provide the same type of services, Apalachee's GRTS and ARTS programs serve as alternatives to HCAC's proposed facility. There is a national shortage of registered nurses. This shortage is particularly acute with regard to psychiatric nurses. TMRMC has a current shortage of three registered psychiatric nurses, three part-time psychiatric registered nurses, seven flex positions for psychiatric nurses, one full- time nurse technician position and one mental health worker. TMRMC has had difficulty, despite adequate efforts to recruit, recruiting for its psychiatric facility since it opened. It has never been fully staffed with psychiatric nurses. There is also a shortage of occupational therapists. TMRMC has had an occupational therapist vacancy for seven months. Mr. Rodney will be responsible for the recruitment of the necessary personnel for the proposed facility. Mr. Rodney indicated that he would utilize recruitment methods similar to those used by TMRMC. Mr. Rodney will also use his experience and contacts in the Dade County, Florida area. HCAC's salary package is reasonable and HCAC will provide adequate in- service training programs. Although HCAC will have difficulty in attracting qualified staff, just as TMRMC has had, it will be able to obtain adequate staff for the proposed facility. HCAC may do so, however, at the expense of existing health care providers. Apalachee provides the following programs in District 2: Wateroak--A sixteen-bed long-term psychiatric hospital for the treatment of children and adolescents. It is a licensed Specialty hospital; In November of 1987, Apalachee began construction of an acute care facility, which will provide inpatient short- term psychiatric services; Case Management Services--Case management services, which include supportive counseling, medication therapy, assistance with transportation and home visitation, are provided to the chronically mentally ill on an outpatient basis. The Services are to be provided where the patients reside; Hilltop--A sixteen-bed residential treatment center. Hilltop is a group home living facility for adults eighteen to fifty-four years of age; Chemical Dependency Program--Individual, group and family counseling and educational services on an outpatient basis for Individuals with suspected substance abuse problems; Emergency Services--Year-round, twenty-four hour a day telephone or face-to-face evaluations to persons with an acute disturbance or who are in need of evaluation for determination of the proper level of care; PATH--Positive Alternative to Hospitalization Program, a crises stabilization unit developed as an alternative to short-term psychiatric care; PPC--Primary Care Center, a nonhospital medical detoxification unit providing short-term detoxification care to alcohol abusers; Gerontological Programs--Made up of the GRTS program and an outpatient component. Through the outpatient component, Apalachee uses its outpatient clinics in each County in its service area to provide linkage for therapy and medication and supportive counseling to geriatrics; ARTS Program; and Designated Public Receiving Facility--Apalachee is the designated public receiving facility for Subdistrict 2B. It screens and evaluates every person admitted to Chattahoochee. Apalachee's adult mental health programs which are available to indigent patients, directly impact both long and short-term hospital utilization, lowering such utilization. For example, before establishing the services provided to suspected substance abusers, many patients were placed in long-term psychiatric hospitals. Referrals to TMRMC of patients under the Baker Act have been reduced from an average of fifteen to eighteen patients per day to an average of one-half to one person per day. There has also been a decrease in admissions to Chattahoochee since Apalachee established the GRTS and ARTS programs. At the time of the formal hearing of these cases TMRMC had a census of only twenty-eight adult patients in its short-term psychiatric facility. TMRMC's census has been low for the past two years. TMRMC's short-term psychiatric facility is operating at a loss. Any further loss of patients would have a serious impact on the facility. From October 1, 1986 to July 31, 1987, TMRMC lost $127,337.00 on its short-term psychiatric facility. For the twelve-month period from October 1, 1986 to October 1, 1987, it is reasonably estimated that TMRMC will lose $139,722.00. TMRMC would like to open the fifteen-bed unit (which is presently closed) of its short-term psychiatric facility. It must increase its census before it can do so. It has been attempting to increase its census by sending out mail-outs and newsletters, sponsoring educational programs advertising, inviting health care professionals to the facility and initiating clinical affiliations with university programs. Rivendell is an eighty-bed long-term psychiatric facility. Forty of its eighty beds are licensed for adults and geriatric patients. The other forty beds are licensed for children and adolescent patients. Rivendell's census at the time of the formal hearing of these cases was six to eight patients. Chattahoochee has a total of 823 long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics. There are no like and existing long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics located in Subdistrict 2B. The only like and existing long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics available to residents of District 2 are located in Subdistrict 2A at Rivendell. The proposed HCAC facility will result in increased competition in District 2. This increase in competition will have an adverse impact on suppliers of inpatient psychiatric services. Admissions to the proposed facility will likely include patients who would be more appropriately hospitalized in a short-term facility. Although HCAC has no plans to admit short-term patients and will attempt to prevent such admissions, mental health professionals cannot accurately predict the length of a patient's stay upon admission. The determination will often require an in- hospital evaluation of the patient. Therefore, patients more appropriately treated in a short-term facility such as TMRMC will end up spending some tide in HCAC's proposed facility. TMRMC will lose patient days if the HCAC facility is constructed. This will adversely affects TMRMC's occupancy rate, which is already low, and cause further losses in revenue. Given the surplus of long-term psychiatric beds in District 2 and the low occupancy of short-term beds in Subdistrict 2B, it will difficult for HCAC to continue in existence without admitting short-term psychiatric patients. The operation of the proposed HCAC facility will also adversely affect the availability of nurses to staff Apalachee's acute care facility and other Apalachee operations and TMRMC's ability to staff its short-term psychiatric facility. Even the loss of one more full-time registered nurse at TMRMC could cause critical staffing problems. Because of the lack of need for fifty additional long-term psychiatric beds in District 2, HCAC's proposed facility would also have an adverse affect on Rivendell. The proposed facility will provide internships, field placements and semester rotations for psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses and counselors. The facility will work closely with community agencies and community personnel in developing, operating and providing resources for training for community groups, patient groups and personnel. In- service training will be open to selected professionals in the community. HCAC's proposed facility will have a positive effect on the clinical needs of health professional training programs and schools for health professions in District 2. The-total estimated cost of the proposed project approved by the Department is $4,108,000.00. HCAC plans on financing 100 percent of the cost of the project with a mortgage loan at 13 percent interest. Mr. Estevez has had experience in obtaining financing for health care and other commercial projects. In 1987 alone, Mr. Estevez was personally involved in over $20,000,000.00 of financing. Short-term financial feasibility means the ability to successfully fund a project to ensure that the project will succeed in the short-term. To achieve short-term financial feasibility, there must be sufficient funds to cover any losses incurred during the initial operating period and to cover any short fall in working capital necessary to fund the project. NCNB, a financial institution with which Mr. Estevez has had, and continues to have, a long and profitable association, has indicated interest in financing the proposed project. A financing letter to this effect has been provided. Although the letter does not specifically refer to the proposed project, the weight of the evidence supports a finding that NCNB would be willing to finance the project. In light of Mr. Estevez's experience in obtaining commercial financing and his relationship with NCNB, it is reasonable to conclude that 100 percent financing of the project can be obtained at 13 percent interest. The proposed project will have a negative cash balance at the end of its first and second year of operation. Given Mr. Estevez's commitment to the project, sufficient funds for capital and operating expenses will be available to cover these negative cash balances. Although Mr. Estevez did not provide a separate audited financial statement, the weight of the evidence proved that Mr. Estevez has the ability to provide the necessary capital. In the short-term, HCAC's proposal is financially feasible. HCAC has projected that it will operate at an average length of stay of ninety days. It will charge an all-inclusive $350.00 per day for its long- term psychiatric services, including all ancillary services. Initially, HCAC projected the following payor mix: Medicaid of 30 percent; Medicare of 20 percent; and insurance and private pay of 50 percent. HCAC was informed by the Department that Medicaid reimbursement was not available for psychiatric services in private free-standing psychiatric hospitals. Consequently, HCAC modified its payor mix by eliminating Medicaid from its payor mix. At the formal hearing of this case, HCAC projected the following payor mix: Medicare of 3.3 percent; indigent of 5.6 percent; and insurance and private pay of 91.1 percent. Medicare reimburses for psychiatric care in a limited fashion. That is why HCAC reduced its projected Medicare reimbursement to 3.3 percent of its total revenue. Medicare patients generally use the majority of their lifetime reserve Medicare reimbursable days for other types of care, including short-term psychiatric care and acute care. Persons in need of long-term psychiatric care generally have a poor work history because of their illness interferes with their ability to obtain and maintain employment. Patients have few economic resources of their own. A patients family structure is often disorganized as a result of the patient's episodes of illness. These episodes strain the family relationship. Persons in need of long-term psychiatric care are often unable to pay for needed services and their family members are either unable or unwilling to support the person. There is no facility in Florida with a payor mix of 91 percent insurance and private pay. HCAC's projection of 91.1 percent insurance and private pay is not a reasonable projection. This finding of fact is based upon the high poverty levels within Subdistrict 2B, the lack of need for additional long-term psychiatric beds and the failure to prove that insurance benefits for long-term care are available in District 2. The State of Florida, Employees Group Health Self-Insurance Plan does not provide coverage for specialty hospitals, such as HCAC's proposed facility. The State of Florida provides 42 percent of the employment in Leon County. Insurance provided by other employers in the area limits coverage for inpatient psychiatric care to thirty to thirty-one days. These benefits are often exhausted before long- term care becomes necessary. In order to achieve a 91.1 percent insurance and private pay payor mix, 80 percent to 100 percent will have to be private pay patients. Such a high percentage of private pay patients is not reasonable. The effective buying income in Leon County in 1986 was approximately $22,600.00. In District 2 it was $18,700.00. Madison County and Jefferson County are among the counties heading Florida's poverty rate. Taylor County is the ninth poorest county in the State. HCAC has projected a 95 percent occupancy rate for its proposed facility within six months of its opening. HCAC has failed to prove that this occupancy rate can be achieved. In light of the high poverty rate in the area, the lack of need for long-term psychiatric services and the inability of patients to pay for such services, this projected occupancy rate is not reasonable. In light of HCAC's failure to prove that there is a need for the proposed facility or that its payor mix is reasonable, HCAC has failed to demonstrate that its occupancy projection is achievable. HCAC has projected that 7.3 percent of its gross revenue will be deducted as revenue deductions. Included in this amount are contractual allowances, charity care and bad debts. Medicare reimburses hospitals for total costs rather than revenue or charges. HCAC, therefore, gas projected approximately $6,000.00 for the first year and $24,000.00 for second year as contractual allowances. HCAC's projection of deductions from revenue are not reasonable. Bad debt of 1.6 percent is unreasonable compared to the experience at other long- term psychiatric facilities in Florida. The $350.00 all-inclusive charge is not reasonable. This charge will not be sufficient to cover the proposed facility's costs. HCAC's projected costs for "Supplies and other" and for taxes are reasonable. HCAC has failed to prove that its proposed facility is financially feasible in the long-term. The projected and approved cost of construction is $3,965,456.00. HCAC has indicated that the facility will consist of two, one-story buildings connected by a hallway. The facility will have approximately 40,563 gross square footage. The actual site for the project has not been selected or purchased. The floor plan calls for twenty-five, semi-private rooms for patients. The patient-care building will contain four independent and secure living/program areas connecting to a central core which will contain an atrium open to the outdoors. There will be approximately 811 gross square feet per bed, which is adequate. The proposed design is reasonable. The projected completion forecast of HCAC is reasonable. The projected costs of completing the building are reasonable. The building will be built by Project Advisers Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "PAC"). PAC is a health care, commercial and residential construction company. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of PAC. Since 1978, PAC has been involved in the construction of St. John's Rehab Center and Nursing Home, South Dade Nursing Home, Hialeah Convalescent Center, South Dade Rehab Hospital and two psychiatric/chemical dependency hospitals for Glenbeigh Hospital. Generally, there are no differences in the construction requirements between short-term and long-term psychiatric facilities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Department enter a Final Order denying the application of HCAC for a certificate of need to construct and operated a fifty-bed long-term psychiatric facility in Leon County, Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4373 and 864374 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact it has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommend Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. HCAC's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 5-6. The third through fourth sentence are hereby accepted. 1 and 6. 3 1 and 39. 4 6 and 9 5 7. 6 8-10, 34 and 97. 7 11. 8 11, 14 and 76. The last Sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence 6. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10 10 and 69. 11 Hereby accepted. 12 39-40. 13 These proposed findings of fact are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. They deal with the weight to be given to other evidence. 14 42. 15-19 Although these proposed findings of fact- are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the-evidence. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are hereby accepted. Although the proposed finding of fact contained in the first sentence is generally true, it is cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The rest of the proposed findings of fact deal with the weight to be given to other evidence. These proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 23-26 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 27 Although this proposed finding of fact is generally true, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that HCAC will be able to achieve its plans. 28-33 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 34 43. 35 51. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 36 52. 37 53. 38 69-70. 39 72. 40 73. 41 74. 42 67. 43 68. 44 34 and 37. 45 104. 46. The first sentence is law. The last sentence is accepted in 105. 47 97 and 99-100. 48 101. 49 103. 50 102. 51 Hereby accepted. 52-53 These proposed findings of fact deal with the weight to be given other evidence. 54 78. 55 79-80. 56 79. 57-58 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings of fact do not support HCAC's projected utilization. Irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 65 92. 66 93. 67 94. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 68 95. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. HCAC's proposed facility and TMRMC are not comparable. 71-75 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 54 and 59. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first two sentences are hereby accepted. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 79-83 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 84-85 Statement of law. Hereby accepted. 6 and 25. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 88-90 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 91-92 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 93 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The last two sentences are conclusions of law. 94-95 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. The first sentence is a conclusion of law. The second sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is irrelevant. 13. The last two sentences are conclusions of law. Irrelevant. 100-102 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. 44. The last sentence is irrelevant. 47. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 16. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 108 15. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. See 23. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Conclusions of law. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 114 34. 115 29. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115a 30. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115b-e 30. The next to the last sentence of e is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115f Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 116-117 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 118 Hereby accepted. 119-120 35. 121 Irrelevant. 122 33. 123-124 Irrelevant. 125-129 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 130 3. 131 Hereby accepted. 132 64. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 133 See 49 and 65. 134 54. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Hereby accepted. 2-3 8-9. 4 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5 13 and 25. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Conclusion of law. 8 31. 9 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10-12 Irrelevant. 13 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 14-16 Conclusions of law. TMRMC's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1, 6 and 9-11. 2 See 6 and 9. 3 6-10. 4 76. 5 77-78. 6 79. 7 79-80. 8 Hereby accepted. 9 81. 10 82-83. 11 34 and 36. 12 36. 13 6. 14-15 39. 16 41-42. 17 2. 18 3. 19 4 and 6. 20-21 54. 22 Not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 23 54. 24 46 and 54. 25-26 54-55. 27-29 54. 30 54-55. 31 44-45, 47 and 54. 32 Hereby accepted. 33 54-55. 34 55. 35 Irrelevant. 36 56. 37 58. 38 49. 39 48. 40 50. 41-44 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 45-46 65. 47-48 57. 49 58. 50 63-64. 51 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 52 63-64. 53 63-64. 55 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 56 65. 57 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 58 25 and 59. 59 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 60-62 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 63 25 and 59. 64-68 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 69 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 70-71 27. Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 74 18 and 96. Irrelevant. Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 77-81 Although generally true, these proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this de novo proceeding. 82 Hereby accepted. 83 84. 84 Hereby accepted. 85-86 Irrelevant. 87 See 69 and 72. 88 94. 89 Hereby accepted. 90 74. 91 94. The last three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 92-93 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-96 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 97 19. 98-99 18. Hereby accepted. Irrelevant. Hereby accepted. 103 19. 104 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 105 20. 106 21. 107 Hereby accepted. 108-110 See 23. 111 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 112 85. 113 86. 114 88. 115 89. 116-118 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 119 91. 120 90. 121 96. 122-126 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 127 Hereby accepted. 128-129 Irrelevant. 130 22. 131 97-98. 132 99. 133-139 Not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 140 95. 141 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 142 97. 143-146 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Apalachee's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 6 and 8-9 2 4. 3(a)-(i)(1) 54. 3(i)(2) 44-45. 3(j) 44 and 54. 3(k) 54. 4 3. 5 1. 6 104. 7 39 and 41. 8 27 and 60. 9 25 and 59. 10(a) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10(b) 27. 10(c) 26. 10(d) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 11 13. 12(a) 81. 12(b) 82-83. 13 6 76 and 87. The second, third, fifth- eighth sentences, the Second Paragraph and the last Paragraph are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 71 and 74. Other than the first two Sentences of the first Paragraph and the first two sentences of the third Paragraph, these Proposed findings of fact are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 16(a) 90. The Second Paragraph is not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 16(b) 88. 16(c) 94. 16(d) 76 and 95. Other than the first three sentences of the first Paragraph and the last Paragraph, these Proposed findings of fact are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 17 48-49 and 65. The Sixth and eighth Sentences and the last Paragraph are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 44-47 and 54. The last Sentence of the first Paragraph and the last four Sentences of the last Paragraph are irrelevant. 19 62. 19(a) 3, 23, 56-57 and 64. The Second and third Paragraph are Cumulative and unnecessary. 19(b) 63. The Second Paragraph is Cumulative and unnecessary. 19(c) Cumulative and unnecessary, 19(d) 25, 59, 62 and 66. 19(e) 65. 20 Not Supported by the Weight of the evidence or Cumulative and unnecessary, 21 39 and 41. The last Paragraph is not Supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Laramore, Esquire Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire John Rodriguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Darrell White, Esquire Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
The Issue Whether a certificate of need to construct a 60-bed short-term inpatient psychiatric hospital should be granted to CPC and whether a certificate of need to construct a 24-bed short-term inpatient psychiatric hospital should be granted to Apalachee?
Findings Of Fact Introduction. CPC. Community Psychiatric Centers, Inc., a proprietary corporation, was formed in 1968 by the merger of 2 existing psychiatric hospitals. It now consists of 24 psychiatric hospitals, two of which are located in Florida, and two subsidiary corporations. On December 16, 1983, CPC submitted to the Department an application for a certificate of need to construct and operate a 60-bed inpatient psychiatric hospital. The 60-beds are to consist of 15 beds for adolescents, 20 beds for adults in an open unit, 10 beds for adults in an intensive care unit and 15 beds for geriatric patients. Apalachee. Apalachee is a not-for-profit corporation. It began approximately 30 years ago as a small clinic. It was incorporated as the Leon County Mental Health Clinic in the 1960's and later changed its name to Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc. Apalachee presently serves over 7,000 clients a year, has a $6,500,000.00 budget and 300 employees. It provides services to 8 north Florida counties: Gadsden, Liberty, Franklin, Leon, Wakulla, Madison, Jefferson and Taylor. Apalachee provides specialized continuums of care for substance abuse, children and geriatrics and basic generic services, including a 24-hour, 365 days-a-year emergency telephone and/or face-to-face evaluations. It also provides a full range of case management, day treatment and residential care primarily aimed at the acute and chronically mentally ill and specific programs for children, such as an adolescent day treatment program and an adolescent residential facility. Apalachee's residential programs include a program called Positive Alternatives to Hospitalization (hereinafter referred to as "PATH"). Apalachee also operates an 8-bed non-hospital medical detoxification program in conjunction with PATH. This program is operated in the same building as PATH. It also operates 3 group homes (an adult, an alcohol abuse and an adolescent half-way house) with 10 clients each (these houses will be expanded to 16 clients each), a geriatric residential facility with 60 to 70 beds and cater Oaks, a long-term residential treatment facility for adolescents. On November 15, 1983, Apalachee applied to the Department for a certificate of need for 24 short-term inpatient psychiatric beds. In its application filed during the final hearing of these cases, Apalachee proposed to construct a facility to house the 24-beds adjacent to its current "Eastside" facility. Its Eastside facility currently houses Emergency Services, PATH and its non-hospital medical detoxification programs. All adult mental health programs of Apalachee will also be located on the site in order to consolidate the full continuum of adult psychiatric care provided by Apalachee. Statutory Criteria. The following findings of fact are made as they pertain to the criteria included in Section 381.494(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1983), and Section 10-5.11(25), F.A.C. The Need for Psychiatric Services Florida State Health Plan and the District 2 Health Plan. General. The Florida State Health Plan is outdated and the District 2 Health Plan does not contain specific goals as to the need for short-term psychiatric care for District 2, the District the facilities would be constructed in. CPC and Apalachee did, however, address both plans, to the extent applicable, in their applications. The relationship of "need" to these plans, as agreed to by the Department, is not relevant to this proceeding, however. CPC also indicated that it evaluated local bed need by studying socioeconomic, population and employment data and by interviewing local practicing psychiatrists. CPC concluded that additional services were needed and filed its application. Although the Florida State Health Plan and the District 2 Health Plan do not address the question of need, need as determined under the Department's rules is crucial. Section 10-5.11(25), F.A.C., provides that a favorable need determination will "not normally" be given on applications for short-term psychiatric care facilities unless bed need exists under paragraph (25)(d). Under Section 10-5.11(25)(d)(3), F.A.C., bed need is to be determined 5 years into the future by subtracting the number of existing and approved beds in the District from the number of beds for the planning year based upon a ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected for the planning year. The population projection is to be based on the latest mid-range projections published by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. The Department has projected a need for 185 total short-term psychiatric beds for District 2 for 1989. There are 82 currently licensed and 35 approved short-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Therefore, for 1989 there is a net short-term psychiatric bed need projected of 68 beds. Based upon the projected population of District 2 for 1990 (537, 567), which is 5 years from 1985, the total bed need is 188 beds. The net bed need for 1990 is 71 beds (188 total beds less 117 licensed and approved beds). The Department did not use this figure because the calculation for bed need for 1990 will not be made by the Department until July of 1985. Pursuant to Section 10-17.003, F.A.C., the total projected short-term psychiatric bed need for District 2 is allocated among 2 subdistricts. Subdistrict 2 consist of Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties. CPC's and Apalachee's proposed facility will be located in Subdistrict 2. Subdistrict 2 is the same area designated by CPC as its "primary" service area. This rule, which is to be "used in conjunction with Rule 10-5.11(25)(c)(d)(e)" allocates the 1988 short-term inpatient psychiatric and substance abuse projected bed need as follows: Subdistrict 1: 75 Subdistrict 2: 104 Total 179 Because the projected bed need for Subdistrict 2 under this rule is based upon 1988 projections, it is clearly in conflict with the requirement of Section 10-5.11(25)(d)(3), F.A.C., that bed need is to be projected 5 years into the future. The total bed need projected for the District for 1988 is 179 beds; for 1990, the total is 188 beds. Based upon the allocation of total bed need in Section 10- 17.003, F.A.C., the net bed need for Subdistrict 2 for 1988 is 44 beds: 104 total beds less 60 licensed and approved beds in Subdistrict 2. If it is assumed that the 9 additional total beds projected for 1990 should be allocated to Subdistrict 2, the net bed need for 1990 in Subdistrict 2 would be 53 beds (100 beds less 50 licensed and approved beds). No evidence was presented, however, to support the assumption that all 9 additional total beds will be allocated to Subdistrict 2. It is more likely that only 1 or 2 additional beds will be allocated to Subdistrict 2. Based upon the foregoing, the total net bed need for District 2 projected to 1990 is 71 beds and for Subdistrict 2 it is between 44 and 53 beds. CPC. CPC attempted at the hearing to show that its proposal is consistent with the bed need for District 2 as determined under Section 10-5.11(25)(d)(3), F.A.C. In the alternative, CPC has attempted to prove that there is a sufficient need in District 2 for additional short-term psychiatric beds based upon other methodologies and the state of psychiatric care currently being provided in Subdistrict 2. Sources of referral to the proposed CPC facility, according to Mr. John Mercer, will include physicians, the judiciary and legal system, the school system, employers and law enforcement. Referrals are inspected by Mr. Mercer based upon his conversations with physicians (Mr. Mercer did not interview persons from the other referral sources) , his personal experience and the fact that there will be a community relations or marketing position at the proposed facility. Local psychiatrists did testify that they would refer patients to CPC if its facility is approved. They did not, however, testify that they would refer all of their patients to CPC. They also testified that the CPC facility is needed. The local psychiatrists did not, however, indicate that they were aware of all of the facts as established during the proceeding. CPC, in its application, projected, based upon conversations with local physicians, that the facility will serve most of the area designated by the Department as District 2. District 2 is subdivided by CPC into a primary service area, consisting of Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties, and a secondary service area, consisting of Clay, Calhoun, Gulf and Jackson Counties in Florida and several counties located in extreme southwest Georgia. In Mr. Mercer's opinion, the proposed facility will serve persons from southwest Georgia; specifically, Brook, Decatur, Grady, Seminole and Thomas Counties. Mr. Mercer's opinion was based upon the availability of services in Georgia and conversations he had with Tallahassee physicians. Mr. Mercer's opinion, however, has been given little weight in determining the need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in District 2 based upon the testimony of Jay D. Cushman, an expert in health planning and development. Mr. Mercer's opinion that southwest Georgia residents will use the proposed CPC facility implies that there may be a need for additional short-term psychiatric beds. Mr. Mercer, however, failed to consider travel time and barriers to travel, patient origins or the effect, if any, of outmigration--the number of persons in District 2 who may leave the District for treatment outside the District. Although Mr. Mercer's conversations with local physicians are relevant and of some supportive weight, the local physicians' opinions should have been supported with other evidence. They were not. CPC, in its exhibit 3, projected a bed need of 14.67 beds attributable to southwest Georgia. This figure was arrived at by first assuming a bed need in the area of .35 beds per 1,000 population (119,051). This results in a gross bed need in southwest Georgia of 41.67 beds. From the gross number of beds, 27 existing beds were subtracted to arrive at a net bed need in District 2 attributable to southwest Georgia residents of 14.67 beds. No evidence supporting a conclusion that such a bed need exists in District 2 was presented at the hearing other than Mr. Mercer's opinion that the proposed facility will serve residents from southwest Georgia. It is therefore concluded that there is not a need for 14.67 beds in District 2 attributable to southwest Georgia residents. In its application, CPC projected a need for an additional 195 short- term psychiatric inpatient beds for District 2. This figure was based upon an average of bed need projected by using three different bed need methodologies. The three different methods resulted in a projected bed need of 64 beds, 266 beds and 255 beds. Application of the method which resulted in a bed need of 266 was modified during the hearing. The modification resulted in a bed need of 75.8 beds. Therefore, the bed need based upon the average of all 3 methodologies, as amended would be 131.6 beds. The three methods used by CPC in its application are different than the method used by the Department. None of the methods, based upon Mr. Cushman's testimony, are sound; they are structurally unsound, applied in an unsound manner or both. Under Method I, CPC starts with a projected short-term psychiatric bed need of 1988 of 44 beds, the net bed need as determined in Section 10-17.003, F.A.C. This figure is then increased by 9.44 beds for in-migration and 11 beds attributable to an adjustment for "desired occupancy level." As clearly established by Mr. Cushman's testimony, neither of the adjustments are sound. The projected bed need of 64 beds for 1988 pursuant to method I is therefore not a reliable figure. Pursuant to Method II, as modified during the hearing, CPC projected a bed need of 75.8 beds. Method III resulted in a projected net bed need of 255 beds. These projections are based upon a projected average length of stay of 30 days. No evidence was presented to support this projection; in fact, it is unrealistic when compared with the average length of stay of 16 days at similar facilities in Florida. CPC's Florida facilities have also not been able to achieve an average length of stay of 30 days. These formulas are also unrealistic because population figures used were for all of District 2. But existing beds taken into account only included the beds in Subdistrict 2. Finally, occupancy was not taken into account in either of the methods. CPC's Methods II and III are not sound, based upon the foregoing. Apalachee. Apalachee's application is for only 24 inpatient psychiatric beds, which is well below the bed need projected under the Department's methodologies for the District and the Subdistrict. Apalachee has projected that its proposed facilities will serve persons in the 8 counties it currently serves. These counties are the same counties which make up Subdistrict 2. Apalachee has not assumed that any patients will come from outside of the Subdistrict. Apalachee has shown that the patients who will use its facility are clients within its own present system, based upon historical data. This historical data establishes that an average of 10 to 12 Baker Act patients have been admitted to Tallahassee Memorial's psychiatric facility during past years. These persons would be admitted to Apalachee's new facility. Additional patients would consist of Apalachee clients which Tallahassee Memorial's facility will not admit and clients currently going into other Apalachee programs. Accessibility to Underserved Groups. CPC is willing to provide care for Baker Act patients. It has been projected that 5 percent of the proposed facility's patient days will be attributable to Baker Act patients. CPC is also willing to treat Medicaid patients and has again projected that 5 percent of the facility's days will be attributable to Medicaid patients. In addition, CPC has projected that 5 percent of its gross revenue will be set aside for the care of indigent patients which consist of those persons who are unable, at the time of admission, to pay all or a part of the charges attributable to their care. Indigent care may not be provided, however, if the facility is losing money. The provision of indigent care is based upon a CPC policy which was recently agreed upon and applies to new CPC facilities. The policy does not apply at the two existing CPC Florida psychiatric hospitals since they were established before the policy was adopted. Pursuant to the Florida Mental Health Act, Chapter 394, Part II, Florida Statutes, the Department's district administrator designates a facility in the district as the public receiving facility for Baker Act patients. In Subdistrict 2 of District 2, Apalachee has been designated as the public receiving facility. Apalachee is therefore responsible for ensuring that emergency care, temporary detention for diagnosis and evaluation and community inpatient care is available to Baker Act clients. As the public receiving facility in Subdistrict 2, Apalachee will clearly serve Baker Act patients. It has projected that in the first year of operation 40 percent (39.7 percent in the second year) of its patients at the new facility will be indigent and that the indigent patients will be primarily Baker Act patients. Seventy percent of Apalachee's clients are persons who need some type of financial assistance; Medicare, Medicaid and Baker Act. Apalachee has proposed to continue to serve these persons in the new facility. Apalachee's purpose in requesting a certificate of need is to allow Apalachee to provide a continuum of care for more Apalachee clients. In the past, Apalachee has experienced difficulty in obtaining inpatient care for certain Baker Act clients. Additionally, even though those problems have been minimal in the past year, there are some Baker Act clients who need inpatient care who are not appropriate patients for Tallahassee Memorial's psychiatric hospital. These patients are sometimes violent and "acting out." Although Tallahassee Memorial is providing adequate care for most Baker Act patients, some Baker Act patients are not admitted. Additionally, removal of Baker Act patients who are admitted by Tallahassee Memorial from Tallahassee Memorial's facility, as discussed infra, will improve the quality of care at Tallahassee Memorial. The cost of providing inpatient care to Baker Act patients will be less if Apalachee is granted a certificate of need for the requested 24 beds. At present, because of limited Baker Act funds, some Baker Act clients who need inpatient care are placed in other programs. With reduced cost for inpatient care, these clients will be able to receive the inpatient care they need. Additionally, Apalachee will serve forensic clients -- those mental health clients with criminal charges. A full-time forensic psychologist has been provided by Apalachee at the Leon County jail to facilitate this type service. The psychologist also evaluates for Baker Act qualification. According to the Director of the Leon County jail, persons in the jail with psychiatric problems are placed in a single "bull pen." Apalachee's work with forensics has been helpful. Like and Existing Psychiatric Services. The only "like and existing" psychiatric health care services in Subdistrict 2 are provided by Tallahassee Memorial. Tallahassee Memorial is a not-for-profit corporation. It currently owns an existing 60-bed short-term inpatient psychiatric facility located in Subdistrict 2. The facility is operated as a separate department of Tallahassee Memorial. Tallahassee Memorial's psychiatric facility has been continuously operated by or for Tallahassee Memorial since 1979. It was initially known as Goodwood Manor. In 1983, however, the management of the facility was taken over by, and its name was changed to, Behavioral Medical Care (Tallahassee Memorial's facility will be hereinafter referred to as "BMC"). From 1977 to 1979, the facility was owned and operated by Tallahassee Psychiatric Center, Inc., which failed for financial reasons. Prior to 1977 Tallahassee Memorial operated a small psychiatric unit as pert of its hospital. The occupancy rate at BMC for the 12-month period ending September, 1984, was 37 percent. The occupancy rate since 1979 has been consistently low and is low at the present time. There are a number of reasons for the low occupancy rate: a) The physical location and physical plant of BMC. BMC is located in a 2-story building near Tallahassee Memorial. BMC occupies the top floor of the building and a nursing home is located on the first floor. In order to get to BMC, it is necessary to travel through the nursing home. Also, the building is surrounded by a parking lot so there is inadequate outdoor and recreational space around the facility. The facility, which was originally designed as a nursing home, presently consists of one closed unit and one open unit. Patients of all ages and with various problems have to be housed in these 2 units together. Because of the physical plant, patients cannot be separated into adult, adolescent and geriatric units. There also is not enough space for therapy rooms and common areas. b) The reputation of the facility. The reputation in the community of Goodwood Manor has carried over to BMC. The facility is perceived by some as a "crazies place," a place "where violent people go." This reputation is partly attributable to the lack of credibility that psychiatry as a discipline enjoys. It is also partly attributable to the operation of BMC as Goodwood Manor prior to 1982 when Behavioral Medical Care took over management of BMC. c) The type of programs offered. To date, no program has been separately offered and provided or adolescents, children, substance, alcohol and drug abuse patients, or geriatrics. Basically only one structured program has been provided which has been more suited to adult psychotic patients. Closely related to this problem is the fact that BMC has had a poor patient mix. This has been caused in part by the physical plant and in part by the type of patients BMC has had to take in. Some of those patients have been suffering from problems other than psychiatric problems, i.e., persons suffering from DT's, which is a medical disorder, and persons suffering from organic problems which cause behavioral difficulties. d) Marketing. There has been a lack of an effort to market the availability of the facility. e) Training. The programs offered are not as advanced because of the lack of necessary training. f) Practice patterns. Practice patterns of psychiatrists in the community have contributed to the low occupancy. Because there are only a few psychiatrists in the area and the fact that the Tallahassee Memorial facility has primarily been involved in crisis intervention, the average length of stay (6 to 7 days) is much lower than the average length of stay in other parts of the country. This average length of stay has also, however, been caused by the shortage of Baker Act funds. Closely related to this problem is the fact that there are a large number of nonphysicians providing mental health services in Tallahassee who do not admit patients to the hospital and a large number of health maintenance organizations. g) Communication. The low occupancy rate has also been caused, at least in the minds of Drs. Speer, Sebastian and Moore, by the lack of solicitation of their input into the operation of the facility. At least partly because of the problems at BMC, a few patients have been referred to facilities outside of District 2 for care. Tallahassee Memorial has committed itself to eliminating the low occupancy rate at BMC. In 1982, the administration of Tallahassee Memorial felt it had to decide whether it was going to make a commitment to the facility or get out of psychiatric care. It opted for the former. After making the commitment, 2 primary actions were taken. One was to contract for the services of Behavioral Medical Care; the other was to apply for a certificate of need to replace its 60-bed facility with a new one. Behavioral Medical Care is a joint venture formed by 2 corporations, Comprehensive Health Corporation and Voluntary Health Enterprises. Comprehensive Health Corporation is the largest private provider of chemical dependency rehabilitation services in the country. Voluntary Health Enterprises is an affiliate of Voluntary Hospitals of America which services 70 of the nation's largest not-for-profit hospitals, including Tallahassee Memorial. Behavioral Medical Care was formed to provide the highest quality, lowest cost psychiatric and chemical dependency rehabilitation programs possible. Behavioral Medical Care provides consultation services and/or actually carries out programs and is now providing 20 different programs at 16 different facilities. Of these 20 programs, 5 to 8 are psychiatric programs. The first consultation concerning the psychiatric program at Tallahassee Memorial began in the late winter or early spring of 1983. This consultation was provided by Dr. Russell J. Ricci, now chairman of the board and medical director of Behavioral Medical Care. Dr. Ricci reviewed the status of Tallahassee Memorial's program at that time and recommended significant changes be made in 2 phases: one phase to begin immediately and the second to begin after construction of a new psychiatric hospital. Tallahassee Memorial agreed with Dr. Ricci's proposal and contracted with Behavioral Medical Care to carry out the proposal. Behavioral Medical Care began BMC with an orientation period during which time the existing staff was analyzed, new staff members were hired and the entire staff was trained to implement the new program. During this period, admitting physicians were invited to participate in the implementation program. A new inpatient psychiatric program at BMC was then begun. The program was established to achieve the following goals: to restore patients to their optimum mental health; to make patients as comfortable as possible; to maintain the patients' sense of dignity and self worth; to maintain modern and efficient treatment modalities through research and education; to provide maximum freedom of patients to interact with family and community; and to educate the community. The program was established along interdisciplinary lines and is basically an adult program. It includes individual and group therapy, lectures and seminars, social and nursing assessments, physical examination and psychological testing. The ultimate program provided for a patient, however, depends upon the treatment plan prescribed by the attending physician. The program is, however, limited because of the type of patients at BMC and especially because of the physical plant, which consists of only an open unit and a locked unit. Separation of patients for specialized treatment based upon other factors, such as age, is not achievable in the existing facility. The program at BMC is an adequate program but can be improved. The program is, however, intended only as an interim type program. Treatment of geriatrics and adolescents is available but specialized programs for these groups are not available. Dr. Sebastian agreed that since Behavioral Medical Care had begun managing BMC, the programs had improved. Dr. Moore testified that BMC had attempted to change. As part of the interim program, BMC has established more restrictive admission guidelines; not based upon ability to pay but upon clinical needs. Attempts have been made to eliminate psychotics, geriatrics and persons with significant medical problems. These restrictions on admission are designed to limit admission to persons who will benefit from the new program and are consistent with the existing physical plant. The existing staff, established by Behavioral Medical Care, is adequate. Training of the staff began during the orientation period at BMC and continues today. Educational activities have also been directed toward the medical profession in the community in order to gain more credibility for the discipline of psychiatry. Other steps to improve BMC which have been or will soon be taken include the reclassification of BMC as a department of Tallahassee Memorial and the initiation of a crisis intervention and liaison service in the emergency room of Tallahassee Memorial's main hospital. This new service in the emergency room is designed to identify persons being admitted to the hospital with a need for psychiatric services. As a department, BMC conducts formal monthly meetings of physicians at which input into the operation of BMC may be made. Input by psychiatrists is therefore possible at BMC. The second phase of the changes recommended by Dr. Ricci will begin after completion of the second action to be taken by Tallahassee Memorial as part of its commitment to a psychiatric program: the construction of a new 60- bed facility. Tallahassee Memorial filed an application to replace its present facility with a new 64-bed facility. That application was ultimately granted but for only 60 beds. An application to build another facility considered at the same time was denied. As a result of the issuance of the certificate of need to Tallahassee Memorial, construction of a new psychiatric facility has begun and should be completed in the summer of 1985. The total cost of this new facility is $7,225,000.00. This amount, plus the cost of new programs and staff, has been committed by Tallahassee Memorial to BMC. The facility, a two-level structure, is being constructed on a wooded, sloping site next to the present building BMC is located in. Each level will have 30 beds. It will be a state-of-the-art facility and was designed by architects who specialize in the design of psychiatric facilities. The building was designed with input from the medical staff and Behavioral Medical Care. It is being constructed to accommodate separate psychiatric programs and allows flexibility to accommodate changes in the type of programs offered. Once the new facility is completed, BMC will initiate the second phase of Dr. Ricci's proposal. This phase will consist of the implementation of separate specialized psychiatric programs not available at BMC today. Dr. Ricci has recommended the offering of adult, adolescent, geriatric and chemical dependency programs. Tallahassee Memorial has decided to add an adult program, an adolescent program and will probably add a geriatric program. Other programs, such as a chemical dependency program will be considered. The geriatric program will be added if there are a sufficient number of patients in need of such a program admitted to BMC. Based upon the testimony of Dr. Sebastian, there are a sufficient number of patients who need a geriatric program. Assuming that Dr. Sebastian is correct, a geriatric program should be added to BMC. Even if a separate program is not added, geriatric psychiatric services will be available at the new facility. The construction of the new facility will not eliminate all of the problems which have contributed to the low occupancy at BMC. Phase 2 of Dr. Ricci's proposal to Tallahassee Memorial and the other actions which Tallahassee Memorial has indicated they plan to take should, however, eliminate or at least reduce most of the problems. Dr. Sebastian testified that there will not be enough open space around the new facility The new facility will, however, have 2 open court yards, woods on 3 sides of the building and a greenhouse. The reputation of BMC as being a "crazies place" should be improved with the opening of the new facility and the providing of new, more advanced programs. Efforts to educate the medical community will also help. Also, if Apalachee is granted its certificate of need, the elimination of some of the Baker Act patients cared for by BMC who will be cared for by Apalachee should help improve the reputation of BMC. Finally, BMC has already taken some steps to improve its reputation by initiating an interim program, hiring new staff and limiting its admissions. Instituting specialized programs will also help alleviate the low occupancy problem at BMC. The new facility will allow BMC to establish programs which are needed by allowing the separation of patients which could not be accomplished in the existing facility. Again, eliminating some Baker Act patients will help reduce the problems created by the poor patient mix at BMC. Efforts are being made to market BMC's services. Establishing a liaison in Tallahassee Memorial's emergency room, which is planned, should contribute to increasing occupancy. Tallahassee Memorial projected that sizeable numbers of patients in the general hospital need psychiatric services. This program could reach those patients. BMC, however, needs to institute marketing efforts to reach the general public. Formal training of the staff at BMC was started with Behavioral Medical Care's orientation phase and has continued since that time. Not much can be done directly by BMC to improve the practice patterns of psychiatrists in the community. The new facility and improved programs may help. Transfering Baker Act patients to a new facility operated by Apalachee should allow for more economical treatment of those patients and thus allow for longer lengths of stay. Providing specialized programs also should promote longer lengths of stay. Converting BMC to department status and the holding of monthly meetings of admitting physicians has improved the ability of psychiatrists in the community to have a voice in the operation of BMC. Not enough of an effort is being made in this area, however. Three psychiatrists testified about the lack of solicitation of their input. They are obviously dissatisfied. Despite this fact, Dr. Brodsky, the Medical Director of BMC, testified that BMC was working cooperatively with psychiatrists in the community. In the undersigned's opinion, BMC, Tallahassee Memorial and the psychiatrists in the community need to continue to work toward resolving their differences and to work together to improve the occupancy and the psychiatric care provided at BMC. The perceived effect of CPC's proposal and Apalachee's proposal of the various witnesses was mixed. Drs. Speer, Sebastian and Moore all testified that they supported the CPC proposal. Dr. Speer indicated that she supported CPC's proposal over that of Apalachee and that she thought there was a need for CPC. Dr. Speer's opinion was based almost exclusively on a brochure provided to her by CPC. She did not have any familiarity with existing CPC hospitals. She also had only "some familiarity" with Apalachee's programs. The only reason Dr. Speer specifically gave for supporting CPC was the amount of effort CPC had exerted to solicit physician input and the need for cohesiveness among psychiatrists which she felt was promoted by support of the CPC proposal. Dr. Sebastian testified that he supported the CPC proposal because a new hospital would promote competition which would in turn improve the quality of care. Dr. Moore testified that he was familiar with CPC's and Apalachee's proposals and that he supported CPC's. He also stated that the addition of another psychiatric hospital would improve the availability of medical care because of competition. Dr. Moore also testified that a new facility was needed to provide care for the "private segment" which he described as "those people who choose not to go to the local mental health center for treatment, those people who choose to go to psychiatrists for treatment. " Dr. Brodsky testified that the addition of a new facility to the community might improve BMC because of the added competition. Mr. Honaman and Dr. Ricci both agreed that, if CPC's proposal was approved, a new facility could have an adverse impact on BMC which has been operating at a loss of $300,000.00 a year. Dr. Ricci explained that in order to have specialized programs a hospital must have a sufficient number of patients who need the specialized program. Because of the low occupancy rate at BMC, there is concern as to whether a sufficient number of patients will be available to warrant the specialized programs BMC plans to start if the CPC proposal is approved. Apalachee's proposal will not adversely effect BMC. In fact, Mr. Honaman and Ms. Pamela McDowell, both of whom testified on behalf of Tallahassee Memorial, indicated that if Apalachee's facility was approved BMC's ability to provide quality care would be enhanced. Tom Porter, testifying on behalf on the Department, indicated that CPC's and Apalachee's proposals should both be denied because of the low occupancy at BMC and the adverse effect approval of either proposal would have on BMC. Mr. Porter's opinion, however, was based only upon his review of the Petitioners' applications. Mr. Porter made no independent studies as to the impact of the proposals on BMC and was not aware of most of the evidence presented at the hearing. The Ability of the Applicant to Provide Quality of Care. CPC. The services to be available at or provided by the proposed CPC facility include psycho-physiological diagnosis and evaluation, emergency service, milieu therapy (immersion into the clinical environment for structured daily treatment), individual and group therapy, family therapy, occupational therapy, an adolescent school program, a partial hospitalization program, aftercare, community education and related medical services (which will be provided by contracting with other area health care providers). Actual programs to be provided at the facility are to be developed by the physicians who join the medical staff of the facility with the assistance of CPC which has developed model programs which may be used. The staffing projections for the facility are adequate. The manpower projected can provide quality of care and will comply with the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. CPC's experience in operating its 24 existing psychiatric facilities and its philosophy that it will provide quality of care support a finding that CPC does have the ability to provide quality of care. 1/ CPC's proposed physical facility is designed to provide quality of care. The facility will be located in northeast Tallahassee. It will be constructed on a little less than one acre of a 10-acre parcel of land which CPC has a contract to purchase for $400,000.00. Part of the remaining 9-plus acres will be used for parking and recreational space and a substantial portion will be left in its natural state as a buffer. The hospital building itself will consist of a one-story structure with a separate section for each category of proposed beds, a lobby, business and general offices and storage rooms. One section will be used as a 20-bed open adult unit. Another section will be used as a 10-bed adult intensive care unit. This section will be locked. A nursing station will separate the adult intensive care unit and the open adult unit and is designed for visibility down the halls of both units. Two seclusion rooms will be located at the nursing station also to allow for observation from the nursing station. The location of the nursing station will reduce staff responsibility thus reducing the cost of operating the facility. The other two units will consist of a 15-bed adolescent open unit and a 15-bed geriatric unit. These units will be separated by a nursing station designed in the same manner as the nursing station separating the adult units. These units will also be separated by a locked door. There will also be a support structure built next to the hospital which will contain a kitchen, dining hall for all patients, 4 classrooms, 4 multi-purpose rooms, an occupational therapy room and a half-court gymnasium. There is no covered access from the main building to the support structure. The floor plan for the facility is similar to the floor plans used for other CPC hospitals. Therefore, the design costs of the facility will be less than for a new one-of-a-kind facility. Apalachee. In order to ensure quality of care, Apalachee has established a Quality Assurance Committee. Additionally, Apalachee is inspected by the Department and is accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals. No evidence was submitted which raises any question as to Apalachee's ability to provide quality of care. The existing building to which Apalachee's proposed facility will be added is located at Apalachee's Eastside facility. Eastside is located on 10 acres of land in northeast Tallahassee. Eastside presently consists of a building in which PATH, the detoxification program and emergency services is located. The building has 12 semi-private rooms and 24 beds. The new facility will be added to the existing building. A total of 13,000 square feet will be added. It will consist of an 18-bed open unit and a 6-bed closed unit. Also to be located at the Eastside facility is a 16-bed long-term adolescent psychiatric hospital which the Department has indicated it will approve. If this facility and the proposed 24-bed facility are built, Apalachee will have a total of 96 beds providing a variety of services. The Availability and Adequacy of Other Psychiatric Services. Apalachee currently provides a wide range of psychiatric health services in Subdistrict 2, including a crisis stabilization unit and short-term residential treatment programs. These services have been used as an alternative to inpatient care in some cases. CPC gave no consideration to these programs in its application. Apalachee did consider these programs and showed that its proposal would compliment its existing programs. As suggested by CPC in its proposed recommended order, Apalachee's existing programs are not a substitute for acute inpatient psychiatric services. Joint, Cooperative and Shared Psychiatric Services. CPC. CPC's operation of 24 psychiatric hospitals provides the potential for joint, cooperative or shared health resources in the operation of its proposed facility. Very little evidence was presented, however, that such potential would be realized if CPC's proposed facility is approved. Evidence was presented that model programs will be "available" for use in developing programs for the proposed facility. CPC also showed that standardized equipment selection and purchasing, and standardized floor plans would be used in establishing the facility. This will effect the short-term financial feasibility of the proposal. Apalachee. By placing the facility at the same location of other Apalachee programs, Apalachee will be able to share some services among programs and thereby reduce costs. For example, kitchen and dining services, staffing, security, purchasing, and maintenance and administrative services will be shared. The integration of Apalachee's existing programs with the proposed facility will promote a continuum of care and thus improve the quality of care. The Need for Research and Education Facilities. 106. Apalachee currently provides training to practitioners pursuant to an agreement with the School of Social Welfare at Florida State University. It also provides internship programs for psychology majors at Florida State University and nursing students at Florida State University and Florida A&M University. It is probable, therefore, that the new facility will be available for training purposes. No proof was offered, however, that indicates there is a need for training programs not being currently met which will be met if either of the proposed facilities is approved. Availability of Resources. 107. Health manpower and management personnel are available to staff the CPC or the Apalachee proposal. CPC and Apalachee also have adequate funds to build the proposed facilities. The adequacy of funds to build and operate the facilities is discussed further, infra. The Immediate and Long-Term Financial Feasibility of the Proposal. CPC. The projected cost of CPC's facility was $5,086,000.00. This amount will be increased for inflation if the facility is delayed another year. CPC will contribute 20 percent of the projected cost of the facility in the form of cash and liquid assets CPC has on hand. Eighty percent of the projected cost will constitute debt of the facility to CPC payable at a 12 percent interest rate over a 20-year period. The immediate financial feasibility of CPC's proposal has clearly been shown. In its application, CPC projected that its facility would generate a net income after taxes in each of the first 2 years of its operation. In its proforma, patient revenues were based upon the following charges per patient day: Adolescent $225.00 Adult, I.C.U. 215.00 Adult Open Unit 210.00 Geriatric 200.00 These projected rates were based upon a 1985 opening date. The rates will therefore be higher if the facility opens in 1987, but, according to Mr. Mercer, the bottom line profitability of the facility will not change. The projected rates, according to Mr. Mercer, are based upon rates charged at other CPC hospitals in Atlanta, New Orleans, Jacksonville and Ft. Lauderdale and interviews with Tallahassee physicians. According to Alton Scott, an expert in health care finance and financial feasibility, the proposed rates are considerably lower than the average rate at CPC's Jacksonville and Ft. Lauderdale hospitals, which was $240.00 for their fiscal year ending in 1984. Mr. Scott did not indicate that he considered the rate at CPC's Atlanta or New Orleans facility, however, which Mr. Mercer also considered in projecting rates for the proposed facility. Mr. Scott's testimony, however, raises a question as to the reasonableness of the proposed facility's rates. CPC's projected gross patient revenue is based upon an occupancy rate of 53 percent in the first year of operation and 75 percent in the second year. CPC projects $2,476,160.00 of gross patient revenue in the first year (an average $212.00 per day rate x 11,680 patient days) and $3,597,075.00 of gross patient revenue in the second year (an average $219.00 per day rate x 16,425 patient days). CPC's average occupancy rates are directly related to the number of admissions and the average length of stay of a patient. In support of the number of admissions projected by CPC, CPC offered the 3 need methodologies discussed, supra. Those methodologies have, however, been rejected as unsound. CPC's admission rates are based only on an assumed census. The assumed census is based upon conversations with physicians and the corporate experience of CPC. Although conversations with physicians and the corporate experience of CPC should be considered, these factors should be considered as support for other evidence as to possible admissions which has not been presented by CPC. What physicians have told Mr. Mercer is not alone sufficient to support assumed admissions. There is no guarantee that local physicians will refer clients only to CPC's facility or that their case load will remain the same. CPC's corporate experience as to length of stay does not add much support since the overall corporate experience of CPC's facilities for the year ending November 20, 1983, shows that the overall occupancy (excluding its Valley Vista facility) was 56.3 percent. This rate of occupancy is well below CPC's projected second year occupancy rate for the Tallahassee facility. The occupancy rate of CPC's Ft. Lauderdale and Jacksonville hospitals was 50.6 percent and 60 percent respectively, which is low for the State. Of all of CPC's psychiatric hospitals only 1 has an occupancy rate over 80 percent. Another problem with CPC's projected occupancy rate is that CPC has projected that 5 percent of its patient days will be attributable to Baker Act patients and 5 percent will be attributable to Medicaid Patients. In order for the proposed facility to receive Baker Act patients it will be necessary that it enter into a contract with Apalachee. No evidence was presented that such a contract could be obtained from Apalachee. As to the percentage of Medicaid patients, it is clear that CPC would not be entitled to receive reimbursement from Medicaid for these patients since its facility will be a free-standing facility and Medicaid does not reimburse for inpatient psychiatric services at free-standing hospitals. Based upon these facts, it appears that the assumption of CPC that a total of 10 percent of its patient days will be attributable to Baker Act and Medicaid patients is of questionable validity. Mr. Mercer's testimony that, even without the Baker Act and Medicaid patients, the projected occupancy could be met is illogical. If the projected revenue attributable to Baker Act and Medicaid patients is eliminated along with the projected expenses attributable thereto, CPC still projected a net after tax profit for its first two years of operation. CPC offered no evidence, however, sufficient to conclude that its projections as to occupancy of other types of patients can be achieved. CPC's projected average length of stay of 30 days is also suspect. It is not consistent with the average length of stay locally, in Florida, nationwide or in CPC's experience. Based upon the foregoing, CPC's projected occupancy levels are not realistic. This directly effects the projected revenues for the proposed facility. Salary and other expenses projected for the facility are also questionable. Nonsalary expenses are significantly lower than CPC's existing Florida facilities which are the lowest in Florida. Salary expenses, projected 2 years in the future, are also lower than present salary levels at CPC's Florida facilities. Again, the salary levels at CPC's 2 Florida hospitals are among the lowest for the 10 Florida facilities providing similar services. These low salaries are also based upon projections for a project which will not open for 2 more years. Despite this fact, they are lower than current salaries at CPC's existing Florida facilities and salaries being paid locally. Apalachee. The projected cost of the addition of the 24-bed facility to Apalachee's existing PATH and detoxification facility is $1,114,339.00. Apalachee will provide $114,339.00 of the necessary funds from its operating fund and the remaining $1,000,000.00 will be obtained from the sale of industrial revenue bonds. The bonds will be 15-year bonds, with a 7 year balloon and were projected at a 10.75 percent annual interest rate (75 percent of the Chase Manhattan Bank prime interest rate). First National Bank has committed to purchase $3,000,000.00 of industrial revenue bonds, which includes the $1,000,000.00 for this project. The immediate financial feasibility of Apalachee's proposal has clearly been shown. In projecting its gross charges for the first 2 years of operation, Apalachee has predicted an occupancy rate of 62.5 percent in the first month of operation increasing to 87.4 percent in the last month of operation of the second year. Gross charges are projected at $1,557,940.00 the first year (6,385 patient days x $244.00 per day rate) and $1,883,648.00 the second year (7,358 patient days x $256.00 per day rate). Apalachee' s projections are reasonable. Although it will be a free-standing psychiatric facility, Apalachee will be able to receive some Medicaid funding under the Department's "centers and clinics" option. Apalachee's projections as to gross charges, deductions from gross charges, and operating expenses are reasonable. Based upon its projections, Apalachee will realize a profit from the new facility in each of its first 2 years of operation. Competition. CPC. The addition of CPC's facility will promote competition in Subdistrict 2, as testified to by Dr. Brodsky, the Medical Director of BMC, among others. Because of the low occupancy at BMC, however, such competition at this time would be harmful. Apalachee. Apalachee's proposed facility will not compete with BMC. Although Apalachee's facility will initially reduce BMC's occupancy, removing the patients Apalachee will serve from BMC will improve the quality of care provided at BMC. Construction. CPC Construction and related costs of the CPC facility will consist of the following: Parking $27,500.00 Project development costs 22,000.00 Architectural/engineering fees 135,000.00 Site survey and soil investigation report 25,000.00 Construction supervision 10,000.00 Construction manager 4,000.00 Site preparation 100,000.00 Construction 3,000,000.00 Contingency 100,000.00 Inflation 270,000.00 These costs are all adequate to cover the cost of these items. These amounts will also be adequate even if construction does not begin until the end of 1985. The projected cost of equipment and furnishings was $500,000.00. This amount is adequate to equip the facility properly. In fact, the projected cost is probably substantially overstated. 2/ Although CPC failed to list in its application all of the equipment and furnishings (only major movable equipment was listed) necessary to equip the facility, adequate equipment and furnishings will be provided. Apalachee. The projected cost of constructing Apalachee's facility consists of the following: Architectural/engineering fees Site survey and soil investigation $75,740.00 report 2,000.00 Construction 876,620.00 Contingency 43,831.00 Inflation 26,298.00 These amounts are sufficient to construct the facility. The cost per square foot of the construction will be $60.00. The cost of equipment needed to equip the new facility is projected at $53,850.00. This amount is adequate for the purchase of the equipment listed in Apalachee's application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the certificate of need application filed by CPC, case number 84-1614, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the certificate of need application, as amended, filed by Apalachee, case number 84-1820, be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1985.
