Findings Of Fact While working as a real estate salesman for Gus Galloway Realty, Inc., in Ocala, Florida, Respondent was responsible for collecting monthly rent from Rose Marie Schmidt and her husband. The Schmidts rented a house belonging to one Betts and managed by Gus Galloway Realty, Inc. Sometime before July of 1977, Mrs. Schmidt was on her way to pay her rent when she met Respondent in the parking lot of Gus Galloway Realty, Inc. Respondent accepted fifty dollars in cash from Mrs. Schmidt as that month's rent, but gave her no receipt for the money. More than a week later, Respondent brought fifty dollars to the office of Gus Galloway Realty, Inc.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner publicly reprimand Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Doherty, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Pierre R. Palpant c/o Fred D. Wright 236 S. W. 10th Street Ocala, Florida 32670
The Issue The issues in dispute in this matter are as follow: Was the Respondent, Wit Zajack, responsible for the acts of the Respondent, Home Hunters II, Inc., and its employees prior to July 7, 1981, when Zajack's registration as the corporate broker's active firm member became effective? Was Zajack relieved of responsibility for the acts of the corporate broker by appointing a manager and delegating duties to the manager? Did the Respondents use an advance fee rental contract containing information as required by Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code? Was the language used in said contract by the Respondents contrary to the intent of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and in violation of Section 475.453, Florida Statutes? Did the Respondents fail to refund advance fees upon demand in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.453(1), Florida Statutes? The proposed findings as submitted in this matter by the parties have been considered by the Hearing Officer. To the extent they have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Wit Zajack, is a licensed real estate broker holding License #0219881. The Respondent, Home Hunters II, Inc., was a corporate real estate broker holding License #0218141. At the time of the accounts described in the Administrative Complaint, Home Hunters was operating as a corporate real estate broker. Home Hunters was engaged in a rental service business and advertised rental property information or lists, collecting an advance fee from prospective lessees. Zajack was aware that Home Hunters was engaged in the advance fee rental business from the beginning of his association with the firm. Zajack applied for registration as the active firm member for Home Hunters on March 5, 1981. His application contained various discrepancies and was returned for correction on May 8, 1981. The application was corrected and returned after 20 days 1/ to the Board of Real Estate, whereupon Zajack was registered as the active firm member effective July 6, 1981. On or before May 6, 1981, Zajack was held out to the public as being affiliated with Home Hunters by a sign at Home Hunters' offices on Colonial Drive in Orlando, Florida. At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Zajack was an officer of Home Hunters. Home Hunters used the contract form exemplified in Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 11 from the start of its business activities until March of 1982. This form does not contain the language required by Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. At least as early as October of 1981, Zajack was aware of the fact that Home Hunters' contract did not meet the requirements of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. He directed Tom O'Toole, the manager of Home Hunters, to correct the forms around the first part of 1982, but the forms were not corrected. Zajack referred all calls and letters of complaint which he received regarding the failure of Home Hunters to make refunds to O'Toole. O'Toole was given the responsibility to deal with all disputes for Zajack. Zajack did not follow up on the complaints. During this time, Zajack resided in Fort Myers, Florida. O'Toole and Zajack's business partner, Ralph Snyder, Jr., organized and ran Home Hunters. Melissa Diehl entered into an advance fee rental contract with Home Hunters on July 1, 1981, paying Home Hunters $50 for this service Diehl did not receive information on apartments which was consistent with the specifications she had given Home Hunters, or which were available for rental. She called Home Hunters about apartments she saw listed in its advertisements in the newspaper and was advised they had been rented. Diehl located a rental on her own and requested a refund from Home Hunters. She made several demands for a refund but never received a refund. She specifically asked to speak with Zajack but was told he was not available. On June 16, 1981, Brenda Mosely entered into an advance fee rental contract with Home Hunters, paying Home Hunters $50 for its services. Mosely called Home Hunters as required by the contract but did not receive listing information which was consistent with the specifications she had stated in her contract. Mosely orally requested a refund of her money after the 21-day period. She was advised to put her request in writing, which she did. She was denied a refund by Home Hunters on the basis that she had not called for 21 days, because she had not called on weekends when Home Hunters was closed. Ralph Tropf contracted with Home Hunters on March 26, 1981, for rental information, paying a $50 fee to Home Hunters in advance for its services. None of the information he received was consistent with the specifications he had given to Home Hunters. Tropf called for the 21-day period required in the contract and found a rental on his own. On April 16, 1981, Tropf made a written request for a refund. He never received a reply from Home Hunters. Tropf reported the matter to the Better Business Bureau, which forwarded to him the reply of O'Toole which stated Tropf had not complied with the terms of the contract to call for 21 days. On April 27, 1981, O'Toole advised Tropf that Zajack was the person to whom Tropf should detail his complaints. In March of 1981, Mrs. Gwenda Eva Roe had a similar experience to those described above in attempting to obtain a refund of money paid by her minor daughter to Home Hunters for rental information services.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondents, Wit Zajack and Home Hunters II, Inc., are in violation of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and Sections 475.453 and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the license of Wit Zajack be suspended for one year. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Lowenthal as Trustee, trading as Cotton Apartments, is licensed by the Petitioner, the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, and is in business at 41 East Eighth Street in Hialeah, Florida. Robert Lowenthal is the owner and trustee of said business. A Notice to Show Cause was issued by Petitioner on September 1, 1978, notifying Respondent that certain evidence, which, if true, is good and sufficient cause pursuant to Section 509.261, Florida Statutes, to assess a civil penalty against the Respondent, or to suspend or revoke the license, for failure to return a security deposit of $215.00 to Juana Abijalil and failure to provide a written notice to tell said tenant how the security deposit was being held. The Notice to Show Cause indicated at that date five (5) percent interest, or a total of $44.70, was due. No answer was received by Petitioner, and an Administrative Hearing was requested. Juana Abijalil rented an apartment at Respondent Cotton Apartments on June 16, 1974, from the then manager of said apartments, Howard Jenkins. She rented apartment #17 and paid a rental of $165.00 for the month of June 16, 1974, to July 16, 1974. At the same time she paid $165.00 on her last month's rent. Ms. Abijalil lived in said apartment until May of 1978, when she moved. Prior to April 16, 1978, she told the then manager of said apartment and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Blanco, that she intended to move and wanted to use the last month's rent she had previously paid on June 16, 1974, for payment for the month of April 16, 1978, to May 16, 1978. She was assured that there would be no problem with a refund, and she then paid the regular monthly rental on April 16, 1978. Prior to her move, and prior to May 16, 1978, Ms. Abijalil again orally requested to be reimbursed in the amount she had prepaid in 1974. She was not paid, but she moved from the apartment owned by Respondent Lowenthal on May 15, 1978. She has made numerous oral demands upon Respondent to be reimbursed, but she has not been reimbursed for the amount she prepaid. The testimony of the witness as to the foregoing facts was unchallenged. Submitted into evidence without objection was a receipt for rental payments dated June 16, 1974, on which it was stated "Received from Juana Abijalil $165.00 for rent on last month's rent." Said receipt was signed by Howard Jenkins, who is now dead. It is obvious that said receipt was altered, and "$50.00 security" was written in, hence the demand for $215.00. The Petitioner Division submitted a memorandum of law. This instrument was considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed memorandum has not been adopted in, or is inconsistent with, factual findings in this order it has been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Respondent, Robert Lowenthal, be assessed a fine of $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Jo M. Gallay, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bernard F. Siegel, Esquire 370 Minorca Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issue is whether the Department of Transportation's calculation of Petitioner's replacement housing payment determination was correct.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for acquiring rights-of-way for highway construction and widening in the State of Florida. As part of a federally funded right-of-way acquisition project, the Department acquired the house that the Gheorghes were renting. The Gheorghes thus became eligible for relocation assistance under the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Public Law No. 100-17, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq. (Uniform Act).1/ Chris Scodius is a senior right-of-way specialist with American Acquisition Group, a consulting firm that provides acquisition, relocation, appraisal, cost estimating, and property management services. The firm provides these services to the Department pursuant to contract. In November 2011, Mr. Scodius was assigned the task of calculating a revised replacement housing estimate for the Gheorghes' relocation.2/ Mr. Scodius estimated that he has performed a similar function on over 50 relocation projects, including 25 projects involving the Department. Mr. Scodius gathered information on three comparables to the displaced dwelling and chose the one most comparable for the computation of the rental assistance payment. He selected the comparables by browsing websites such as Realtor.com and by visiting local realtors and property management companies to find dwellings that were functionally equivalent to the displaced dwelling. The dwelling from which the Gheorghes were displaced was at 1910 Southampton Road on the south side of Jacksonville, near Atlantic Boulevard and I-95. Mr. Scodius' report described it as follows: The single family house facing Southampton Road is a one-story, wood frame residence, built off-grade on a wood joist floor system with asbestos shingle siding and an asphalt shingle roof on a pitched rafter system, originally constructed 68 years ago in 1943. Interior floor coverings are hardwood and carpet, walls and ceilings are of plaster on lathe. A central system conditions air with heat and cooling. Two window air units supplement cooling capacity of the dwelling. The 1093 square foot conditioned portion of the house is divided into six rooms in addition to the single full bathroom. These six rooms include a living room and a dining room, a kitchen, a small office and three bedrooms. Attached to the front of this conditioned space is a small, covered entry stoop and steps with a small covered entry stoop at the rear behind the garage. There is a one-car enclosed garage attached to the west side of the house with doorway access only to the exterior of the house at the dirt driveway. The appraisal prepared for FDOT indicates that the house is of average quality construction and interior finish, is in average condition and indicates the building structure has a remaining economic life of about 35 years. The described home- site contains 4,495 square feet more or less. Ingress and egress frontage along Southampton Road is 50 feet. This dwelling is served by a public potable water supply and a public wastewater disposal system. The comparable dwellings were located at 7416 Silver Lake Terrace in Arlington; 2427 Sam Road, between University Boulevard and Dean Road; and 7913 Jasper Avenue in Arlington. None of the comparables was in the same neighborhood as the Southampton Road house, but none was more than 5.3 miles away and all were on the south side of Jacksonville in similar neighborhoods. Mr. Scodius chose the Silver Lake Terrace property as the most comparable and used it for the calculation.3/ This was a 1,549 square foot single family home consisting of three bedrooms and 1.5 bathrooms, built in 1980 with a recently renovated interior. Mr. Scodius described it as follows: Similar to the subject, this dwelling has one full bathroom and its conditioned space is further divided into 6 rooms. These rooms consist of a living room, dining room, kitchen and three bedrooms. Accessed from outside the interior space of the dwelling, but enclosed and under the carport roof is a small utility room equipped with connections for a washer and dryer. The general construction and material of the interior is similar to the subject, with hardwood, tile and carpeted floors and painted sheet-rock walls. This home is heated and cooled by an electric, central, ducted system. Potable water is from a public supply and wastewater disposal is by a private septic tank and drainfield system. Exterior features include a fenced back yard with wood storage building at the back property line. Before making his selection, Mr. Scodius visited the Southampton Road and Silver Lake Terrace properties to determine their comparability in person. He calculated that the Silver Lake Terrace property was 4.7 miles from the Southampton Road property and that the Silver Lake Terrace property was within two miles of a variety of shopping, restaurants, banks, schools and community services. He inspected the dwelling and determined that it met the standards of "Decent, Safe and Sanitary" (DS&S) prescribed by the Federal Highway Administration and the Uniform Act. Mr. Scodius concluded his report on the Silver Lake Terrace property as follows: This dwelling has been chosen as the number one comparable dwelling because of its distinct similarity to the subject in terms of overall room count, number of bedrooms, overall living area and close proximity to the subject neighborhood. Given its quiet, residential setting within easy access to shopping and being within 4 miles of the displacee's church of choice, this available rental dwelling appears to be the best suited of the three to this displaced family's particular needs and lifestyle. Mr. Scodius testified that he chose this house in the Arlington area because he believed it to be the most functionally equivalent comparable, and because it was actually superior to the Southampton Road property in which the Gheorghes were currently residing. Mr. Scodius explained that the number one comparable is used only as the basis for computing the amount of the rental assistance payment. Though the number one comparable must be available, the displaced persons are not required to move into it. They may take the rental assistance payment and move into a dwelling of their choosing. After choosing the number one comparable dwelling, Mr. Scodius prepared a computation of the rental assistance payment for the Gheorghes. To arrive at a final rental assistance payment number, the base rent for the current dwelling, including average utility payments over 12 months, is subtracted from the advertised monthly rental rate for the comparable, including information obtained from the Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA) as to average utility payments for a representative 12-month period. The resulting number is then multiplied by the 42 months for which payments are available in order to arrive at a final lump sum rental assistance payment. In this case, the advertised market rent of $950.00 plus average monthly utilities of $217.50 as provided by the JEA for the Silver Lake Terrace property totaled $1,167.50. The base rent for the Southampton Road property was the actual monthly rental of $525.00 plus average monthly utilities of $437.21 for a total of $962.21. The difference of $205.29 was multiplied by 42 to arrive at a rental assistance payment of $8,622.18. The federal relocation assistance regulations provide that the maximum payment for rental assistance is $5,250.00. 49 C.F.R. § 24.402(a). However, the regulations also provide for "replacement housing of last resort" in situations where replacement dwellings are not available within the prescribed monetary limits. 49 C.F.R. § 24.404. The Department determined that the Gheorghes were eligible for a last resort payment as "the best alternative allowable within the established procedure in order to relocate Mr. Gheorghe and his family into a decent, safe and sanitary replacement dwelling in a timely manner." Therefore, the Gheorghes were paid $8,622.18, plus a $1,500.00 moving assistance fee. At the hearing, the Gheorghes4/ voiced several criticisms of the Department's methodology in selecting the number one comparable and its calculation of the rental assistance payment. First, Ms. Gheorghe complained that the chosen comparables were all several miles from the Southampton Road house despite the fact that there were three available rental properties in her current neighborhood. However, no evidence beyond Ms. Gheorghe's bare assertion was provided as to the existence of these rental properties, and no particulars were offered as to their functional equivalence to the Gheorghes' Southampton Road dwelling. Next, the Gheorghes claimed that the basis for comparison was skewed because the rent they paid on the Southampton Road house was well below market value. In renewing the Gheorghes' lease in 2006, the landlord acknowledged they were good longtime tenants and therefore charged them only $525.00 per month. Mr. Scodius testified that the federal guidelines do not focus on price but on functional equivalence. The amount of rent currently being paid by the Gheorghes was an irrelevant factor in his selection of comparables. Further, if it is true that the Gheorghes' rent was artificially low, this factor worked in their favor by raising the amount of rental assistance to which they were entitled. Under the formula, the current rent is subtracted from the advertised rent of the number one comparable. The lower the current rent, the higher the resulting rental assistance calculation. This objection by the Gheorghes is not a ground for disturbing the calculation made by Mr. Scodius. The Gheorghes complained that the Silver Lake Terrace house could not be considered comparable to the Southampton Road house because the latter was connected to city water and sewage, whereas the former, despite the statement in Mr. Scodius' report that it received potable water "from a public supply," was actually serviced by a well and septic tank. Mr. Knight reasonably testified that a well and septic tank provide the same function as city water and city sewer. The well provides potable water to the dwelling and the septic tank provides a means to discharge the waste. While some people might prefer one to the other, the well and septic tank are functionally equivalent to city water and sewage and meet the DS&S standard.5/ The Gheorghes attacked the comparability of the JEA bills for the Southampton Road house and the Silver Lake Terrace house. They claimed that the latter was unoccupied for a period of the time considered by Mr. Scodius in his calculation, and therefore the utility bill for the house was artificially low. However, Mr. Scodius plausibly testified that he specifically asked JEA for an average utility bill for the last 12 months in which the property was occupied. To the best of his knowledge, JEA gave him information on an occupied dwelling. It is noted that the average monthly utility bill for the Gheorghes' home on Southampton Road was almost exactly double that of the Silver Lake Terrace house. It is also noted that the average utility bills for the comparable houses on Sam Road and Jasper Avenue were $211.25 and $228 respectively, far closer to the Silver Lake Terrace bill than to the Gheorghes' Southampton Road dwelling. Unless JEA provided Mr. Scodius with bad information as to all three comparable houses, it appears that the Gheorghes' utility bill is the outlier among these comparables.6/ Ms. Gheorghe argued that she should have been reimbursed for pet deposits at her new residence because the Department was well aware at the outset of negotiations that she had a dog and more than one cat. However, the Gheorghes could point to no provision of the Uniform Act or its implementing rules that authorize or require the agency to pay the relocation costs for pets. Mr. Knight affirmatively testified that the Department is not authorized to consider pet deposits as expenses eligible for reimbursement. At the hearing, the Department did not contest Ms. Gheorghe's testimony that some of its representatives dealt high-handedly with the Gheorghes during the relocation process. Much of Ms. Gheorghe's presentation had less to do with the financial data in question than with what she considered her family's poor treatment at the hands of certain Department personnel. Ms. Gheorghe's complaints were heartfelt and appeared legitimate. It is hoped that being forced to undertake the time and expense of litigating this matter has demonstrated to the Department that good will and civility are not only desirable qualities in a public agency but cost effective ones as well.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the petition of Stefan and Dana Gheorghe for an additional replacement housing payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2013.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the executive branch of the State of Florida. Mr. Crowell, prior to February, 1990, was employed as a career service employee of the Department for approximately 19 years. Mr. Crowell has worked for the State of Florida for approximately 24 years. Immediately prior to and during part of February, 1990, Mr. Crowell was employed as a Community Assistance Consultant with the Department's Community Development Block Grant Program (hereinafter referred to as the "Grant Program"). Wanda A. Jones, Planning Manager of the Grant Program, was Mr. Crowell's immediate supervisor at all times relevant to this proceeding. The Department has incorporated the provisions of Rule 22A-8.011, Florida Administrative Code, governing the use of leave, in the Department's Policies and Procedures No. 1109.01. Pursuant to Policies and Procedures No. 1109.01, Department employees are required to notify their supervisor of any illness and obtain approval of the use of annual leave. Mr. Crowell was counseled by Ms. Jones in January or February, 1989, concerning his failure to obtain authorization for use of sick leave each day that Mr. Crowell was sick. Ms. Jones also explained this requirement at two or three staff meetings. Mr. Crowell was aware of the Department's requirements concerning the use of leave. Mr. Crowell was required to travel as a part of his employment. Mr. Crowell traveled an average of two times per month. Mr. Crowell submitted an Authorization to Incur Travel Expense dated December 7, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "December 7, 1989, Request"), to the Department requesting authorization to travel on State business on December 13, 14 and 15, 1989. The December 7, 1989, Request was approved by the Department. Mr. Crowell indicated in the December 7, 1989, Request that "[p]ersonal car will be used for entire trip." Mr. Crowell did not own a motor vehicle during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Crowell intended to rent an automobile, pay the rental charges himself and claim reimbursement only for mileage incurred in travel on State business. Mr. Crowell had been issued a Budget Rent-A-Car (hereinafter referred to as "Budget"), credit card by the Department on October 6, 1989. Mr. Crowell signed a Department form at the time the Budget credit card was issued acknowledging the following: that on the date above I received the above-described credit card; that I, by my signature hereon have acknowledged that I understand all policies and procedures governing the use of said card; and that I have been advised that abuse of the use of this card may result in dismissal from employment with this Department and possible prosecution under the laws of Florida. On December 13, 1989, Mr. Crowell rented an automobile from Budget. Mr. Crowell was given a Lincoln Town Car (hereinafter referred to as the "Lincoln") because of the unavailability of a smaller automobile. Mr. Crowell signed a rental agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Rental Agreement") for the Lincoln indicating that the rental fees were to be charged to the Department through the Budget credit card issued by the Department to Mr. Crowell. Pursuant to the Rental Agreement, Mr. Crowell was to rent the Lincoln for approximately three weeks, turning it in on January 3, 1990. The Rental Agreement listed the costs of renting the Lincoln for an hour, a day, a week or a month. Mr. Crowell submitted a Voucher for Reimbursement of Traveling Expenses dated December 19, 1989, to the Department for authorized travel on December 12-15, 1989. Mr. Crowell indicated that a "[p]ersonal car was used for entire trip" and he claimed reimbursement of $107.00 for mileage driven. During early January, 1990, Mr. Crowell went to a Budget office with the intent of returning the Lincoln he had rented on December 13, 1989. Mr. Crowell was told that he owed close to $600.00. Mr. Crowell had thought that he would owe approximately $375.00 and, therefore, had not brought enough money to pay the total rental charge. Mr. Crowell left without paying the rental charge or returning the Lincoln. On December 28, 1990, Mr. Crowell submitted three separate Authorization to Incur Travel Expense forms to the Department seeking approval of travel for State business in January and February, 1990. On the three forms "pov" was noted. Mr. Crowell used "pov" as an abbreviation for "privately owned vehicle." Mr. Crowell submitted a Voucher for Reimbursement of Traveling Expenses to the Department for two authorized trips for January, 1990. Mr. Crowell indicated that a "pov was used" on one of the vouchers and he claimed reimbursement for mileage driven on both forms. Mr. Crowell used the Lincoln he had rented on December 13, 1989, for the January, 1990, trips he was reimbursed for. Sometime during January, 1990, the Tallahassee branch manager of Budget, Russell Kennedy, became concerned that Mr. Crowell was late returning the Lincoln. Therefore, Mr. Kennedy contacted Mr. Crowell and inquired about when he intended to return the Lincoln. Mr. Crowell indicated that he would return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. On January 30, 1990, the Department's personnel director, Mark Helms, was informed by the Director of the Housing and Community Development Division, the Division in which Mr. Crowell was employed, that he had been notified that Mr. Crowell had rented the Lincoln with his Department-issued credit card and that the Lincoln had not been returned or paid for. Mr. Helms contacted Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy informed Mr. Helms that Budget considered the Department to be liable for the rental of the Lincoln. Mr. Kennedy indicated that Mr. Crowell had agreed to return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. Mr. Helms spoke with Mr. Kennedy on Monday, February 5, 1990, and was informed that Mr. Crowell had not returned the Lincoln. Mr. Helms informed the Division Director. On February 5, 1990, Ms. Jones was told by the Division Director to meet with Mr. Crowell and instruct him to resolve the problem he had created by renting the Lincoln with the Department-issued Budget credit card. Ms. Jones met with Mr. Crowell at approximately 3:00 p.m., Monday, February 5, 1990. Ms. Jones informed Mr. Crowell that the Department was concerned that he had rented the Lincoln using the Budget credit card issued to him by the Department because of the Department's potential liability for the rental. Ms. Jones informed Mr. Crowell that he had to resolve the problem he had created with Budget immediately. She suggested that, although she could not tell him how to use his leave time, he should consider taking time to take care of the matter. Mr. Crowell left the meeting and returned shortly thereafter with his time sheet. Mr. Crowell requested that Ms. Jones approve annual leave from 3:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., February 5, 1990, and all day Tuesday, February 6, 1990. Ms. Jones approved Mr. Crowell's request. Mr. Crowell left work at approximately 3:30 p.m., February 5, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not return to work on February 6, 1990. On Wednesday, February 7, 1990, and Thursday, February 8, 1990, Mr. Crowell spoke by telephone to an employee of the Department that worked in another section and got the employee to leave a "Post-It" note on his door both days indicating "O.C./SL". Mr. Crowell did not report to work on February 7 or 8, 1990. Ms. Jones treated Mr. Crowell as having used sick leave for these two days. On February 8, 1990, Ms. Jones sent a letter to Mr. Crowell informing him that his failure to resolve the matter with Budget was a serious disciplinary matter. Ms. Jones did not attempt to telephone Mr. Crowell because he did not have a telephone. Ms. Jones did, however, telephone Cheryl Jamison, whom Ms. Jones believed to be Mr. Crowell's daughter-in-law. Ms. Jones left a message on an answering machine to have Mr. Crowell call her immediately. On Friday, February 9, 1990, and Monday, February 12, 1990, through Thursday, February 15, 1990, Mr. Crowell did not come to work, call in sick or otherwise inform the Department of the reason for his absence or obtain approval for his absence. Mr. Crowell has not returned to work at the Department since February 5, 1990. At the formal hearing Mr. Crowell testified that he did not inform Ms. Jones that he would not be at work on February 9, 1990, or thereafter because she had instructed him to not come back until he resolved the problem with Budget over the rental of the Lincoln. This testimony is inconsistent with Ms. Jones' testimony and Mr. Crowell's actions on February 5, 1990, and February 7 and 8, 1990. If Mr. Crowell had in fact been instructed not to return until he resolved the Budget problem and that he did not have to worry about following established procedures for absences, Mr. Crowell would not have gotten approval for annual leave for February 5 and 6, 1990, or informed the Department that he would not be at work on February 7 and 8, 1990, because he was sick. On February 12, 1990, Ms. Jones telephoned and spoke with Nathan Crowell, Mr. Crowell's son. Ms. Jones indicated that she needed to speak with Mr. Crowell. She was told that Mr. Crowell had been told that she was trying to contact him. Mr. Crowell received the letter sent by Ms. Jones on February 8, 1990. Mr. Crowell was also aware that Ms. Jones had called his son's telephone number attempting to get in touch with him. Mr. Crowell made no effort, however, to respond to Ms. Jones. The Division Director was informed by Ms. Jones on February 15, 1990, that Mr. Crowell had been absent for five days without authorization. The same day Mr. Helms received a memorandum from the Division Director recommending that Mr. Crowell be treated as having abandoned his employment with the Department. Mr. Helms prepared a letter for the Secretary's signature informing Mr. Crowell that the Department was treating Mr. Crowell that he had abandoned his position. At the time that the Department decided to treat Mr. Crowell as having abandoned his position, the Department was aware of efforts by Budget to contact Mr. Crowell and obtain a return of the Lincoln. Budget had sent a certified letter to Mr. Crowell on February 7, 1990, informing Mr. Crowell that criminal charges would be brought against him if he did not return the Lincoln. The return receipt was returned on February 13, 1990, signed by Mr. Crowell. Mr. Crowell still did not return the Lincoln. Mr. Kennedy had also driven by Mr. Crowell's residence several times during early February, 1990, looking for the Lincoln. The Lincoln was not found. The letter from the Secretary was sent to Mr. Crowell by certified mail, return receipt requested, on February 15, 1990. Mr. Crowell received the letter on February 22, 1990. Mr. Crowell returned the Lincoln to Budget on Sunday, February 18, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not pay for the rental of the Lincoln at that time. On February 27, 1990, Mr. Crowell telephoned Mr. Helms. This was his first contact with the Department since February 5, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not indicate that he had not abandoned his position or offer any explanation. Mr. Crowell merely asked Mr. Helms about continued insurance coverage and the payment for his accrued sick and annual leave. Mr. Crowell sent a letter to the Department of Administration dated March 6, 1990, contesting the Department's determination that he had abandoned his employment. On March 7, 1990, Mr. Crowell met with Mr. Helms and Barbara Jo Finer, a Department Senior Attorney. Mr. Crowell discussed payment of the Budget rental charges he had incurred with the payment he was to receive for his unused annual leave as a result of his termination of employment. Budget was paid the rental charges incurred by Mr. Crowell for use of the Lincoln on April 16, 1990. Budget was paid $1,734.03 of Mr. Crowell's payment from the State of Florida for his unused leave. In addition to the inconsistencies in Mr. Crowell's testimony described in Finding of Fact 29, Mr. Crowell evidenced a lack of credibility while testifying on two other matters. First, Mr. Crowell testified at the formal hearing that he did not receive a telephone call from a representative of Budget. This testimony is contrary to Mr. Crowell's testimony during his deposition taken on June 18, 1990. Secondly, Mr. Crowell testified that he was not notified that his deposition was available to read until 5:00 p.m., Thursday, July 5, 1990. This testimony was contradicted by the office manager of Accurate Stenotype Reporters, the firm which had the deposition prepared.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order concluding that Oscar Crowell abandoned his position of employment with the Department and dismissing the petition in this case with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Crowell's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Page I: 1st Paragraph 32. 2nd Paragraph Hereby accepted. 3rd Paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page II: Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted. The rest of the paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted. The rest of the paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page III: 1st paragraph Hereby accepted. Although the Department did take the position that it was not liable for the total rental charge incurred by Mr. Crowell for use of the Lincoln, Budget was taking the position that the Department was liable. Therefore, there remained a potential liability which the Department was concerned with. 2nd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4th paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5th paragraph (including part of this paragraph which appears on page IV) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page IV: 1st full paragraph Not relevant to this proceeding and not supported by the weight of the evidence. 2nd paragraph The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Even if Ms. Jones had told Mr. Crowell to resolve the problem before returning to work, it was unreasonable for Mr. Crowell to not return to work for almost two weeks without obtaining authorization for such an extended absence. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not relevant or supported by the weight of the evidence. (including part of this paragraph which appears on page V) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page V: st paragraph Hereby accepted. nd paragraph The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Crowell was directed to leave and not return. The rest of this paragraph has been accepted in Finding of Fact 26. rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. th paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence and argument. Page VI: 1st paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 2nd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph The first sentence is hereby accepted. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4th paragraph 2. Except for the first sentence, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5th paragraph This paragraph is Mr. Crowell's recommendation and not a finding of fact. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2, 27 and 32. 2 1-2. 3 4. 4 3. 5 7. 6 Hereby accepted. 7 5. 8 6. 9 Hereby accepted. 10 12, 23-24. 11 24. 26. The last four sentences are not relevant to this proceeding. The Department treated Mr. Crowell as having taken sick leave on February 7 and 8, 1990. The Department did not treat Mr. Crowell as being absent without authorization on those days. Hereby accepted. 14-15 27. 16 30. 17-18 28. 19 31. 20 Hereby accepted. 21 36. 22 32 and 34. The first two sentences are hereby accepted. The rest of this proposed finding of fact is not relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Crowell requested a formal hearing to contest the Department's decision by letter dated March 6, 1990. His failure to discuss the matter after that date, therefore, does not support a conclusion that Mr. Crowell was abandoning his employment. 38. The last sentence is not relevant to this proceeding for the same reasons the last part of proposed finding of fact 23 is not relevant. See 29. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. It is not clear what Mr. Crowell meant. See 5. Hereby accepted. Subparagraph (b) does not support a conclusion that Mr. Crowell abandoned his position. 29 12. 30 20. 31 23. 32 33. 33-34 33. 35 12, 14, 17-18 and 35. 36 Hereby accepted. 37-44 and 47 Mr. Crowell did make the statements referred to in these proposed findings of fact and they are not consistent. As the trier of fact, I do not find that Mr. Crowell's credibility was called into question by these inconsistencies. 45-46 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Oscar Crowell 1038 Preston Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 G. Steven Pfeiffer General Counsel Barbara Jo Finer Senior Attorney Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Thomas G. Pelham, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to rent an apartment from the Respondents, and by being falsely informed of its non- availability, based upon her race.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an African-American female. In early January 2007, she learned of an apartment for rent, owned or managed by the Respondents. She called to inquire about the apartment and was told by the Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, that the rent would be $625.00 per month, with a one-month rent amount and security deposit due in advance. She was told that the Lessee of a neighboring apartment, Clint Cook, would have a key and would show her the apartment. She went to view the apartment, and decided that she wished to rent it. She then telephoned Ms. Lindsay, and Ms. Lindsey faxed an application to her to complete. In the conversation, she told Ms. Lindsay she would not have the required deposit money until Friday. This was on a Monday or Tuesday. Ms. Lindsay then told her securing the apartment was on a “first come-first-served” basis. The Petitioner never completed the application and never tendered the security deposit. Shortly after that telephone conversation, Ms. Lindsay was contacted by Stacey Edwards, while the apartment was still available for rent, concerning rental. Ms. Edwards, on behalf of herself and her boyfriend/husband, submitted an application to rent the apartment, together with the appropriate required deposit and rental amount on January 15, 2007. Ms. Lindsay leased the apartment to the couple. They had a planned move-in date of February 1, 2007. They are a mixed-race couple, and Ms. Lindsay was aware of that fact when renting to them. Sometime after January 15, 2007, the Petitioner called Ms. Lindsay a second time, and was told that the apartment had been rented (to the Edwards couple) and was no longer available. Testimony to this effect is corroborated by the Edwards rental application and deposit receipt, which are in evidence. The Edwards rental was documented on January 15, 2007. Later that month, the Petitioner noticed the “for rent" sign displayed, or displayed again, and she and/or her witness, Lynn Kliesch, called about the apartment’s availability. Ms. Lindsay again stated that it was rented. Indeed, it was, to the Edwards. The rental sign had been left up because the Edwards couple were not scheduled to move in until February 1, 2007. This communication between the parties occurred before Ms. Edwards informed Ms. Lindsay that they would not be moving in. Shortly before February 1,2007. Ms Edwards and her husband/boyfriend learned that his employment had ended (or he was transferred to another job location). They therefore informed Ms. Lindsay that they had to re-locate to South Florida and could not take the apartment. She charged them for the two weeks of rental, and refunded their deposit. She then placed the apartment back on the rental market. On January 31, 2007, Ms. Mari Ferguson inquired of Ms. Lindsay about the apartment’s availability. This was after Ms. Edwards had informed Ms. Lindsay that she would not be renting the apartment. Ms. Lindsay told Ms. Ferguson that the property was available and she rented it to Ms. Ferguson that same day. Ms. Ferguson and her boyfriend, who occupied the apartment with her, were also a mixed-race couple, with children. In fact, the boyfriend is the nephew of the Petitioner herein. Ms. Ferguson and family moved into the apartment. Some months later a hostile situation arose between the Respondents and Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Lindsay apparently received reports that “drug dealing” was occurring in the apartment. Ms. Ferguson and/or the other occupants were responsible for some damage, and Ms. Ferguson became several months behind on rental payments. The Respondents therefore, through legal process, had her evicted. The Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, through her firm, Elite Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., manages some 37 rental properties in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. She is the president and broker for the firm and has no employees or agents. Among the rental property owners she and her firm represent is her Co-Respondent, Michael Houser. Both Ms. Lindsay and Elite Properties, as well as Mr. Houser, have a significant number of minority tenants, both Hispanic and African-American. A substantial number of those, both historically, and at the time of the hearing are single, African-American females, as heads of households. There is no evidence, aside from the Petitioner’s unsubstantiated opinion, that either the Respondent has ever refused to rent to the Petitioner or anyone else, based upon race, nor that they have falsely denied availability of a dwelling for rent or sale for that reason. There is no evidence that they have refused or attempted to avoid holding out a property for rent or sale for reasons based on racial animus.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon the Petitioner's race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Mims 3382 Greenbriar Circle, Apt. B Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Beverly Lindsay 5252 Springdale Drive Milton, Florida 32570 Michael Houser 3533 Edinburgh Drive Pace, Florida 32571 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact During the audit period in question, i.e., December 1, 1975 through March 31, 1979, Petitioner Ormond Hotel Corporation operated the Ormond Hotel, Ormond Beach, Florida. It was licensed during the audit period by the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, and classified as a retirement establishment. (Interrogatories) The Ormond Hotel is an old wooden structure containing 350 rooms with 258 rooms available for rental. The remaining rooms are not in proper condition for rental. Most of the hotel guests are over 65 years of age and reside there either permanently or on a seasonal basis, usually from December through March of each year. A few married couples have accommodations at the hotel, but most of the residents are single individuals occupying one room. Prior to 1978, Petitioner advertised the hotel in a national magazine called "Retirement Living" and conducted advertising on billboards, brochures, and in the classified section of the local telephone book under the hearing "Retirement Homes." The latter advertisement states that the facility is "a residential hotel," but also includes the words "DAY-WK-MO-YR." Similarly, the hotel's brochure recites that accommodations are available by day, month, or year. All units are available for rental to permanent tenants, but short-term occupancy is accepted if there are available rooms. The hotel does not have a swimming pool, but does have restaurant facilities and recreation areas. The hotel does not primarily cater to transient guests. (Testimony of Salveson, interrogatories) Respondent's auditor conducted an audit of Petitioner's business operations for the period December 1, 1975, through March 31, 1979. In arriving at whether or not the Ormond Hotel was subject to tax imposed by Section 212.03, Florida Statutes, on its rentals, he examined the Petitioner's books to ascertain the number of total available rental units and the status of tenants at the hotel during the months of April, May, and June of each year. If he found that 50 percent or more of the total units had been rented to persons residing there continuously for the specific three-month period, those tenants were considered to be permanent rather than transient tenants and the hotel was deemed exempt from tax pursuant to Rule 12A-1.61(1), F.A.C. In arriving at his determination of exempt status, the auditor did not deduct unoccupied rooms from the total number of units in arriving at his "fifty percent" determination. Although the auditor analyzed the advertising brochures of Petitioner, and was aware that the hotel was listed in the telephone directory under retirement homes, and concluded that such advertising was directed primarily to the acquisition of permanent guests, he predicted his audit findings solely on the "fifty percent" test concerning occupancy of total units. In this manner, he determined that Petitioner was exempt from taxation in 1975 based on the fact that for the April through June period for that year, 135 of the 264 total units had been occupied continuously by "permanent" tenants. In a similar manner he found that the hotel did not qualify for exemption during the succeeding years of the audit period. In this respect, he found that for 1976, there were only 119 such guests during the three-month period out of the 263 total units, which was less than 50 percent. In 1977, there were 102 such tenants out of 261 total units, which was less than 50 percent. In 1978, there were 98 such tenants and 259 total units, which was less than 50 percent. The auditor's worksheet reflects that there were 124 vacant rooms during the three-month period in 1975, 140 in 1976, 153 in 1977, and 153 in 1978. He concedes that if he had applied the "fifty percent" rule by comparing the number of three-month or "permanent" tenants with the number of occupied rooms for the three-month period each year, the number of rooms occupied by "permanent" guests would have been over fifty percent for each year of the audit period. (Testimony of Boerner, Exhibits 1-2, 4) Based on the audit, Respondent issued two separate "Second Revised Notices of Proposed Assessment" on January 15, 1980. The first assessment covered the period December 1, 1975 through November 30, 1978. It asserted tax due on room rentals in the amount of $21, 362.91 plus a delinquent penalty, and interest through January 15, 1980, for a total sum of $28,062.45. The assessment also asserted tax, penalty and interest for purchases unrelated to room rentals in the amount of $984.92, for a total assessment of $29,047.37. The assessment reflected that a partial payment had been made on October 2, 1979, in the amount of $2,590.62, leaving a balance due of $26,456.75. The other assessment showed tax on room rentals in the amount of $6,001.75, plus delinquent penalty of $300.10, and interest through January 15, 1980 in the amount of $611.76 for a total of $6,913.61. It also asserted tax, penalty, and interest on purchases in the amount of $23.39 for a total assessment of $6,937.00. This assessment also showed partial payment on October 2, 1979, in the amount of $132.08, leaving a balance due of $6,804.92. In a letter transmitting the assessments, dated January 16, 1980, Respondent advised Petitioner that the hotel did not qualify as an exempt facility under Rule 12A- 1.61(1)(a), F.A.C., during the audit period, because less than fifty percent of the facility's units were occupied by guests who had resided there three or more months as of July 1 each year. The letter further stated that "an analysis" of the rental of units submitted by Petitioner as to its exempt status did not conform to the requirements of the rule because the facility advertised to guests on a daily, weekly and monthly basis in addition to long-term leasing, the analysis used an annual rather than a three-month period prior to July as a basis, and the number of tenants at the facility rather than total units. (Exhibit 2) Petitioner's accountant prepared an analysis of the room status at the Ormond Hotel during the period July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978. It reflects that 165 rooms, or 64.5 percent of the total of 256 units rented during the year, were occupied by tenants for a continuous period of over three months. On March 31 of that year, 157 rooms, or 61 percent of the total of 258 room available for occupancy, were occupied by guests for more than three months. Sixty-nine of the rooms were occupied by transient tenants or those with less than three- months occupancy (17 percent) and 32 rooms were unoccupied (12 percent). As of June 30, 1978, the hotel had 110 guests who had resided there for more than three months, and 18 guests with residency of less than three months. (Testimony of Salveson, Exhibit 3)
Recommendation That the proposed tax assessments against Petitioner Ormond Hotel Corporation arising out of the rental of living accommodations at the Ormond Hotel during the period December 1, 1975 through March 1, 1979, be vacated, and that the remainder of the proposed assessments be enforced. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Lester Kaney, Esquire Post Office Box 191 Daytona Beach, Florida 32015 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities (Agency), had a reasonable basis in law and fact to initially deny Petitioner's application for a license to operate a group home, or whether other circumstances were present that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust within the meaning of section 57.111(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2015).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency that licenses group homes pursuant to section 393.067. On June 13, 2014, Petitioner's corporate agent, Lavonda Hargrove, filed with the Agency an application for licensure to operate a group home facility in Wesley Chapel, Florida. Relevant to this dispute is a requirement by the Agency that if the applicant does not own the property on which the facility will be located, it must submit a copy of a fully-executed landlord/tenant lease agreement with the application packet. Petitioner did not own the property on which the facility would be operated and was required to comply with this requirement. The initial application packet filed with the Agency was missing a number of required items and some questions on the application were left blank. However, as found by Judge Crapps, a copy of an undated and partially signed residential lease agreement was submitted with the application. As noted below, its whereabouts are unknown. On July 29, 2014, or more than 30 days after the application was filed,1/ Myra Leitold, a Residential Program Supervisor in Tampa who reviewed the application, emailed Hargrove and informed her that the application had "to be completed in its entirety" and described areas of the application that required additional information. Leitold also attached to the email a generic checklist of 36 required documents for an initial license application, one of which was a "Landlord Agreement/Lease." While she identified some, but not all, of the items on the checklist that were missing, she did not specifically mention that a landlord agreement/lease had not been filed. In response to the email, on September 12, 2014, Hargrove submitted a second application with the supplemental information requested in Leitold's email. Because a lease agreement had already been submitted with the first application, and no mention of one was made in Leitold's email, it is reasonable to assume that this was the reason why Hargrove did not submit another copy with her second application. To make sure that her application was complete, on September 17, 2014, Hargrove emailed Leitold and stated the following: This is a follow up email to confirm your receipt of requested items for licensure of the Wesley Chapel home at 31733 Baymont Loop. Please advise if additional information is needed. Also, do you have any idea when you will be available to inspect the home? In response to Hargrove's email, Leitold promptly sent an email stating as follows: I did receive the documents forwarded last week however, have not had an opportunity to review them. I should be able to get to them in the next week or two. After her review of the second application was completed, Leitold believed it was still incomplete because there was no lease agreement in the packet. At the underlying hearing, Leitold acknowledged that it was possible the lease agreement had been filed with the initial application on June 13, 2014, but thought it unlikely the Agency had lost the document. As found by Judge Crapps, however, an agreement was filed but its whereabouts are unknown. In any event, Leitold did not advise Hargrove that her application was still incomplete. Instead, she forwarded the second application, without a lease agreement, to the Central Office in Tallahassee for final disposition. Applications are sent to Tallahassee only if they are incomplete or involve pending violations by the applicant; otherwise, action on the application is made at the local level. Incomplete applications are always denied, and Leitold knew that when the application was forwarded to Tallahassee, this would be the final disposition of the matter. After the application packet was reviewed by the Central Office in Tallahassee, with no executed lease agreement, on October 6, 2014, the Agency issued its Notice of License Application Denial for Group Home (Notice) based upon the ground that it did not include a lease agreement. (Presumably, the application satisfied all other licensing requirements.) Two Agency employees in Tallahassee who reviewed the application, Kim Walsh and Tom Rice, testified without dispute that a lease agreement is an essential part of an application, and without the document, they had no choice under the law except to deny the application. Neither Walsh nor Rice had knowledge that a partially executed and unsigned lease agreement had been submitted with the first application but was apparently lost or misplaced, or that Lietold had failed to notify Hargrove that this specific item was missing before the packet was sent to Tallahassee. On October 23, 2014, Hargrove requested a hearing to contest the decision. Although she was knew why the application was denied, in her request for a hearing, Hargrove did not indicate any specific material facts in the Notice that were in dispute. Moreover, she never indicated that a lease agreement had been filed with her initial application. According to Mr. Rice, the Agency's Program Administrator, had Hargrove disclosed this fact in her request for a hearing or brought it to the attention of Agency personnel in a timely manner, the matter could have been resolved without a hearing. A formal hearing was conducted by Judge Crapps on February 24, 2015. Just prior to the hearing, a lease agreement was provided to the Agency in the form of a proposed exhibit. Because it was not fully executed, the case was not settled, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted. At the hearing, Hargrove testified that the fully executed lease agreement was at her home. In his Recommended Order, Judge Crapps accepted Hargrove's testimony that a lease agreement had been filed with the initial application but made no finding as to what happened to the document. Even if the agreement was lost by the Tampa office, or was not fully executed, he observed that the Agency did not notify Hargrove within 30 days after the application was filed of any apparent errors or omissions, as required by section 120.60(1). For this reason, he deemed the application complete by operation of law. He also criticized the Agency for failing to specifically identify the missing lease agreement in its email sent on July 29, 2014. He recommended that the Agency reconsider the application and make a decision to approve or deny. The Agency's Final Order adopted the Recommended Order without change and approved the application.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner’s mother is eligible for a replacement housing payment in addition to funds already received from the Department.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner and his mother, Frances Scott, owned real property owned property located in Pasco County, Florida, some of which was taken, and all of which was affected by the construction of the Department’s project no. 97140-2303. The Respondent, Department of Transportation, is the state agency in Florida responsible for the construction of public roadways in this state. In the acquisition of land for the construction of this project, the Suncoast Parkway, the Department of Transportation utilized Gulf Coast Acquisition Company. Consistent therewith, Gulf Coast initiated relocation programs for the individuals whose property was being taken for the construction of the project. Its operation was overseen by an engineering company, PBS&J, to ensure that all relevant policies and procedures were followed correctly. In this as in all acquisition cases, an initial determination was made, prior to any offer being made, as to value of the property to be taken. After the offer was made, an order of taking was entered. Once Final Judgment was entered, the relocation specialists went back to the property owner to see if any modification was necessary. In dealing with relocation of property owners, a replacement payment is defined as the difference between the acquisition price paid for the property and what it costs for an equal replacement of the property. In the instant case, Frances Scott, Petitioner’s mother, an octogenarian not in the best of health, was determined to be eligible for a replacement payment as a 180-day homeowner occupant of the property acquired. Her property consisted of two acres on which a residence was located. The approved appraisal amount for her property was $39,400. The value of the acquired dwelling on the homesite represented 67.9% of the approved appraisal amount, as calculated by the Department, which was $26,750. The value of the comparable replacement dwelling offered by the Department was $33,900. Therefore, the replacement housing payment amount was $7,150, the difference between the appraisal value of the dwelling and the replacement dwelling cost. However, through mediation, at which the Scotts were represented by counsel, a settlement payment for the entire acquisition in the amount of $114,000 was arrived at. Of this figure, $52,952 was attributable to the land, mobile home, and septic and water systems belonging to Frances Scott. The second mobile home located on the land, an unrelated septic system, the land other than that owned by Frances Scott, and damages relating to the move of Petitioner’s business amounted to a total of $61,048. Taken together, the two parcels and accouterments totaled the $114,000. Since that $52,952 figure attributed to Frances Scott’s property exceeded the $33,900 cost of a comparable replacement dwelling, the entitlement to a replacement housing payment was nullified. Because of the taking in issue here, and because of Frances Scott’s advanced age and fragile health, it became necessary to move her residence onto Petitioner’s property to keep the family together. The relocation program is designed to reimburse the expenses of people who are displaced by highway projects. Implementation of the program is governed by both federal and state law. (Public Law 91-646 - the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970; and Sections 339.09 and 421.55, Florida Statutes.) These statutory bases and the rules of the Department implemented thereunder spell out how payments are to be calculated. Replacement housing payments relate to housing only. In the instant case, the issue was one of mixed use which had to be distributed. Frances Scott met the criteria for eligibility and was found to be entitled to $7,150 as a replacement payment. She received this amount, and more, as a result of the settlement reached through mediation by means of which she received more than the amount calculated initially. There is an internal Department process through which the determinations of eligibility and payment amounts made at District level can be reviewed at Departmental level. In this case, the Scott file, at their request, was forwarded to the Department’s Relocation Manager, Mr. Eddleman, in Tallahassee. Mr. Eddleman reviewed the file and discussed its contents with District personnel. Based on his review, Mr. Eddelman determined that the calculation made at the District was correct. It is his policy in this process to lean towards the side of the displaced person in those cases where there is some question as to either entitlement or amount. Here, Mr. Eddleman found the District acted properly in denying extra replacement housing payment. It is easy to see the basis for Petitioner’s dissatisfaction. He relates, and there is no basis for doubting him, that at the mediation he was led to believe by the mediator that the relocation payments had nothing to do with the settlement amount to which he agreed. In this, he was misled. Inclusion of the amount for replacement payment in the settlement figure excluded him from further compensation and served to increase the settlement amount on which his counsel’s fee was based. Mr. and Mrs. Scott seem to have been poorly served in the process. They did not understand the communications they received from the state, categorizing them as “legal mumbo- jumbo.” They do not understand how the figure upon which the settlement was based and do not understand the 67.9 percent calculation. It was again explained at hearing but they remain unsatisfied with the settlement amount.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order affirming the relocation assistance payment (replacement housing) previously calculated for Petitioner’s mother, Frances M. Scott. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James O. Scott, pro se Post Office Box 11231 Spring Hill, Florida 34610 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Edward J. Miller, is entitled to be licensed as a resident life and variable annuity insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Edward J. Miller, is employed at Washington Mutual Bank. His supervisor is Tracy Tarach. It was Ms. Tarach's desire that Mr. Miller become licensed as a resident life and variable annuity insurance agent. To that end, she and Mr. Miller filed the necessary papers with Washington Mutual Bank to approve the application process as well as the course to become licensed. The process of having the bank issue the check to cover the licensing procedure was timely. Additionally, the Petitioner could only be scheduled for the licensure class and completion of the licensing process when the bank took favorable action on the request. Accordingly, for this Petitioner the licensing process was dragged out over the course of several months. In January 2003 the Petitioner completed the state application for licensure but did not transmit it to the state. He submitted the request to the bank for course approval and planned to submit the paperwork when it was successfully completed. At that time, the Petitioner did not have any criminal charges pending against him and the answers noted on the application were all correct and truthful. In February 2003 the Petitioner was stopped for DUI. The next workday the Petitioner went to his supervisor and fully disclosed the arrest as well as the charge. The Petitioner made no effort to hide the arrest from his employer and the employer considers the Petitioner a valuable employee, despite the incident. In March 2003 the Petitioner was formally charged with DUI, a misdemeanor. Meanwhile, the bank approved the Petitioner's request to take the course for licensure. The forty-hour course in another work location required the Petitioner to travel to the school site and reside in a hotel for a week while the course work was completed. Obviously the Petitioner's supervisor was willing to invest the costs of licensure school and accommodations for the Petitioner with full knowledge of the Petitioner's pending criminal matter. After successfully completing the licensure course in April 2003 the Petitioner submitted the license application to the state. He failed to double-check the forms. He failed to correct an answer that was now incorrect. That is, he failed to fully disclose the arrest. Subsequently, the criminal case went to hearing, and the Petitioner entered a plea and was placed on probation. The resolution of the DUI charges was completed after the application was submitted. Section 3 of the license application asks several screening questions of applicants for licensure. Applicants are required to answer "yes" or "no", depending on the information sought. In this case, it is undisputed that the Petitioner failed to correct his answers to the questions posed in Section 3. More specifically, the Petitioner failed to truthfully disclose that he had been arrested for DUI. This failure was an oversight on the Petitioner's part, and not intended to deceive the Department. The answers should have been corrected when the Petitioner amended the application form to include the information regarding his completion of the Gold Coast School of Insurance class on April 11, 2003. He did not do so. When the Department reviewed the Petitioner's application and discovered the false answer, it took action to deny the licensure request. That denial was entered on January 22, 2004. A notice of the denial was provided to the Petitioner and he timely challenged the proposed action. On October 31, 2003, the Petitioner completed all of the terms of his court-ordered probation and the entire DUI incident was put to rest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order granting the Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Edward J. Miller 6205 Northwest West Deville Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986
