The Issue Whether the application of Ronald J. Palamara (“Palamara”) for licensure as a yacht and ship broker under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was previously a licensed yacht and ship broker in Florida, holding Yacht Broker License No.324. On April 28, 1999, the Petitioner’s prior license expired. The Petitioner reapplied for a Yacht Broker license on February 24, 2000. Robert Badger (Badger), at that time an investigator with the Division, investigated the application for form pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, and found that there were no problems with the form of the application. Badger also reviewed the application for moral character of the applicant pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3), Florida Administrative Code. On the application, the Petitioner indicated that he had a criminal background, but failed to disclose the nature of the criminal background on the application. In a letter from the Division addressed to the Petitioner, additional information was requested regarding his criminal background. The Petitioner replied in a letter that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor for resisting an officer without violence. The Petitioner also disclosed on the application that he had a civil Final Judgment against him in the matter of Chinnock Marine, Inc. v. Barthelemy & Palamara, Case No. 98- 19512 (Fla. 17th Cir. 1999). He did not fully disclose the details relating to events that led to the judgment. Instead, he stated on the application that the claims were “unfounded” and that Chinnock Marine “misled the court.” The subject application is dated February 22, 2000. On that application, the Petitioner was specifically required to disclose any “pending” civil suits involving a yacht. At the time of his application, another civil matter was pending against the Petitioner in World Class Yachts v. Palamara, Case No. 99-12923 (Fla. 17th Cir. 2001), which was filed on July 22, 1999. The Petitioner failed to disclose the pending World Class Yachts civil suit.2 Subsequent to the filing of the subject application, a non-final order was entered against the Petitioner finding that he was in default and rendering judgment for World Class Yachts in the amount of $157,500. The Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal of the circuit court’s non-final order of default to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order of default. Palamara v. World Class Yachts, Case No. 4D01-3260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The Petitioner admits that the World Class Yachts case relates to a yacht. Although the circuit court had not entered a Final Judgment against the Petitioner in the amount of $157,500.00 at the time of the hearing in this case, the World Class Yachts civil litigation involving a yacht should have been disclosed on the application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003(3)(a)6, Florida Administrative Code. In both Chinnock Marine and World Class Yachts, the Petitioner has moved to vacate the default judgments, alleging that he was not properly served. The Petitioner has worked in the yacht brokerage business in South Florida for many years. He has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license. In the community in which he lives and works he enjoys a reputation for being a person of integrity, honesty, and good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this case granting the license sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2002.
The Issue The issue is whether Kenneth Baurley should be eligible to sit for the examination to become licensed as a real estate salesman.
Findings Of Fact On July 14, 1988, Mr. Baurley's application for licensure as a real estate salesman was received by the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission). By letter dated October 3, 1988, the Commission notified Baurley that his application had been denied based on his answer to question 6 on the application. In responding to that question, Mr. Baurley disclosed that he had been involved in two criminal proceedings; in both an adjudication of his guilt had been withheld. The first case arose in 1982 on the charge of battery on a law enforcement officer, for which he received 18 months of supervised probation. The incident had its genesis in a shoving match involving Baurley and someone who turned out to be an off-duty police officer for a small municipality. The second was in 1983 for the municipal offense of prowling. Although under no obligation to do so, Mr. Baurley also stated that he had been arrested for driving under the influence in 1988. He was found not guilty on the last charge, so it has no bearing on the decision in this case. Mr. Baurley's response to question 6 was complete and truthful. At the time of these incidents, Mr. Baurley was 19 and 20 years of age. He successfully completed his probation. He has had no further relevant contacts with the criminal justice system for more than five years. Mr. Baurley is now 26 years old. He has resided in Pompano Beach, Florida since 1972, although he attended college in Tallahassee. He is employed currently as President of A Better Limousine Service, Inc. and as a supervisor at Baurley Marine Works, Inc., which is owned by his father. Prior to his employment in these two positions, Mr. Baurley worked in a business established by his brother, Baurley "No Frills" Auto Rental. Before he held these positions, Mr. Baurley attended college in Tallahassee and worked at Doc's Sports Bar and Grill and at Forest Meadows Athletic Club. He was also an adjunct instructor at Florida State University where he taught Tae Ywon Do for college credit. In the course of his employment in the positions set out in Findings 6 and 7 above, Mr. Baurley has been required to interact with patrons, sometimes under difficult circumstances. In all the positions delineated in Findings 6 and 7 (other than the position as adjunct instructor at Florida State University) Mr. Baurley has been required to handle other people's money on at least a weekly basis. Most of the positions have required him to deal with his employers' or customers' money on a daily basis. Petitioner has performed all his employment responsibilities honestly and without incident. Darlene Vlazeny, a real estate salesperson and housewife, met Mr. Baurley in a business capacity by telephone in October, 1988. At that time Mrs. Vlazeny was soliciting in-kind contributions on behalf of a school for hearing impaired children. Mrs. Vlazeny testified that Mr. Baurley's was the only limousine company which agreed to her request to provide limousine services in connection with a benefit for the school at reduced rates. Since the school benefit, Mrs. Valzeny has had social contact with Mr. Baurley. She is aware of the incidents detailed in his answer to question number 6 on his licensure application, but believes he is trustworthy, honest and has a high moral character based on her experiences with Baurley. Mrs. Vlazeny would have no reservation about working with Mr. Baurley in any professional capacity. John Belegesky, a practicing attorney for more than 30 years, has known Mr. Baurley since he was a small boy. Baurley and Mr. Belegesky's son have been friends since grade school. Mr. Belegesky is also aware of Mr. Baurley's past and believes that the acts disclosed in the response to question number 6 to be out of character for him, and the result of youthful indiscretion. Mr. Belegesky trusts Petitioner to have a key to his home, which contains many valuables, and to houseset when he and his wife are away for weeks at a time. Mr. Belegesky would have no reservation about referring his clients, including major developers, to work with Mr. Baurley, if he is licensed. Mr. Belegesky believes Mr. Baurley possesses a high moral character and is honest and trustworthy. Mr. Baurley has matured and regrets his past actions. Mr. Baurley is honest and trustworthy and is of good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Kenneth M. Baurley, be allowed to take the examination for licensure as a real estate salesman and if he passes the examination, be issued a real estate salesman license. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-5537 The proposed findings of Mr. Baurley have generally been adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32802 Marion E. Baurley, Esquire 1025 Vermont Avenue, North West Suite 915 Washington, D.C. 20005 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32902
The Issue Whether Respondent acted as a yacht broker in Florida without holding a yacht broker's license issued by petitioner?
Findings Of Fact Respondent, presently retired, was formerly employed with Sun Yacht Charters located in Camden, Maine. He has never been licensed by the State of Florida as a yacht and ship salesperson or broker. Respondent attended the 57th Annual Miami International Boat Show and Strictly Sail (boat show) held February 12-18, 1998. Respondent was in attendance at the Sun Yacht Charters Exhibit Booth, a booth in the Strictly Sail portion of the boat show. Investigators and other Petitioner employees regularly attend this specific boat show in order to find unlicensed activity, such as selling and brokering of regulated yachts by persons not holding valid salesperson or broker’s licenses. On February 13, 1998, Petitioner investigators James Courchaine and Peter Renje attended the boat show. They carried fictitious business cards with false names and the designation "Yacht Consultant" on the cards. Courchaine’s fictitious name was James K. Ramson. Renje’s card bore the name Pete Benson. While walking through the Strictly Sail portion of the show, the investigators saw the booth for Sun Yacht Charters and Respondent. Respondent’s name tag read "Pat Raum." Outside the tent, the two investigators checked their list of licenses and did not find Pat Raum’s name listed. Although a license is not required in the sailboat portion of the show, Courchaine, posing as James K. Ramson, went back into the show and introduced himself to Respondent, handing him the fictitious business card with the name James K. Ramson, Yacht Consultant, displayed on it. Courchaine, a/k/a Ramson, inquired of Respondent that he was looking for a boat for a client for an outright purchase for a client. Courchaine asked if there were any boats for sale through Sun Yacht Charters. Respondent replied that sometimes people in their charter program wanted to sell a boat and that Sun Yacht Charters would sell it for them. He gave Courchaine his business card identifying himself as Pat Raum, Director of Yacht Sales for Sun Yacht Charters. The business address on the card was Camden, Maine. Respondent also gave Courchaine a specifications sheet on the Southern Belle, destined to come out of the charter program in April of 1998. The specifications sheet listed an asking price of $9,000 for the boat. From conversations he had with Petitioner's employees at a previous time when he discussed obtaining a Florida license, Respondent understood that Florida law did not permit him to sell or purchase yachts in Florida as an owner's agent. On February 17, 1998, following contact with Sun Yacht’s Camden office, Courchaine learned that Respondent was still in Florida. Courchaine contacted Respondent and asked for a contract. Believing that he was dealing with a licensed Florida Yacht broker, Respondent agreed to what he thought was an appropriate arrangement between himself and Courchaine whereby the sale of the Southern Belle would involve a 30/70 split on the commission from the sale. Respondent later confirmed to Courchaine in a fax message that same day that Courchaine, a/k/a Ramson, would get three percent of the sales commission. Also, he included in the fax to Courchaine a blank Yacht Purchase and Sale agreement. It was Respondent’s understanding that in the event of a sale, the matter would have to be handled by Courchaine a/k/a Ramson, or another Florida broker, that he, Respondent could not act as a broker in Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the notice to show cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pat Raum Post Office Box 302 Kennebunkport, Maine 04046 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for a yacht and ship broker's license.
Findings Of Fact Applicants for yacht and ship salesman licenses and for broker's licenses are furnished with copies of Chapter 326 F.S. and applicable agency rules with the application forms. Petitioner originally applied and was licensed as a yacht and ship salesman in June, 1992. To be a salesman, one must be associated with a licensed broker who prominently displays the salesman's license. On April 15, 1994, Petitioner contacted Respondent agency by telephone to discuss renewal of his salesman's license issued June 3, 1992 and due to expire under its own terms on June 3, 1994. At that time, Kathy Forrester told Petitioner that his file reflected that his license had been "cancelled" effective March 10, 1993 due to a letter received on or about March 1, 1993 from Petitioner's employing broker, Frank Stanzel. Mr. Stanzel's letter showed that he was relocating his business from Miami to Ft. Lauderdale and that he wanted his two salesmen's licenses transferred to the new location. He enclosed with his letter the two salesmen's licenses for agency action, as required by agency rules. Mr. Stanzel further reported that Petitioner had left his employ on October 19, 1992, taking his license with him, so Mr. Stanzel could not return Petitioner's license to the agency. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted he had left Mr. Stanzel's firm on October 19, 1992 to pursue a construction job due to the vigorous insurgence of the construction industry following Hurricane Andrew. He took the original of his salesman's license with him and left only copies with Mr. Stanzel in Stanzel's Miami office. Petitioner asserted, however, that since "all it takes to sell yachts is a computer and a telephone," he continuously attempted to sell yachts from his own home after October 19, 1992. After October 19, 1992, Petitioner worked at least 40 hours a week in construction, did not sell any yachts or ships, and had no contact with Mr. Stanzel as his employing broker. Mr. Stanzel did not supervise Petitioner's sales activities after October 19, 1992. Petitioner never returned to Mr. Stanzel's Miami office after that date. Petitioner has never been in Mr. Stanzel's new office in Ft. Lauderdale. Mr. Stanzel paid Petitioner a commission in December 1992 for prior sales work on a yacht sale to Petitioner's father, which sale ultimately closed in December 1992, but since October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel has not considered Petitioner his employee. Petitioner received no IRS 1099 form (commission salesman's equivalent of employee's W-2 form) from Mr. Stanzel after 1992. After October 19, 1992, Mr. Stanzel did not display Petitioner's license, as required by agency rules for salesmen in a broker's employ. Nothing precludes a licensed salesman from selling yachts and ships out of his home if he is overseen by an employing broker. Petitioner had done so while employed by Mr. Stanzel prior to October 19, 1992. However, by law, all yacht and ship sale closings must be done through the employing broker's trust account. Petitioner has closed no sales on his own through Mr. Stanzel's trust account since October 19, 1992. The two have never discussed a return to work by Petitioner. They did not communicate on any subject between October 19, 1992 and April 15, 1994. Even if Mr. Stanzel had not written his March 1, 1993 letter, Petitioner still would not have been able to show that he has attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. On March 22, 1993, five months after Mr. Stanzel heard the last of Petitioner and approximately three weeks after he notified the agency of Petitioner's leaving his employ, Mr. Stanzel's broker's license expired. Under the terms of the agency rules, Mr. Stanzel was required to apply for a new license. He applied. His broker's license was not renewed retroactively, and his new license became effective August 30, 1993. For approximately five months, from March 22, 1993 to August 30, 1993, Mr. Stanzel was not a licensed Florida broker. Neither Mr. Stanzel nor the Respondent agency notified Petitioner of this fact nor did anyone notify Petitioner at that time that his salesman's license was deemed "cancelled" during the broker's lapse. After finding out for the first time on April 15, 1994 that the agency presumed his salesman's license "cancelled" by Mr. Stanzel's notification that Petitioner had taken his salesman's license and left Mr. Stanzel's employ, Petitioner and his father prevailed upon Mr. Stanzel to execute an affidavit dated May 19, 1994 to the effect that Mr. Stanzel had misunderstood, now believed Petitioner had been diligently working at yacht sales after October 19, 1992, and wanted Petitioner's salesman's license reinstated. The affidavit was submitted to the agency. Although Ms. Forrester had misgivings about the affidavit, the agency reinstated Petitioner's salesman's license, effective April 29, 1994, after receiving the affidavit (TR 25-28). The reinstated license still had the original expiration date of June 3, 1994. The agency did not reinstate Petitioner's salesman's license retroactive to October 19, 1992 when Petitioner went into construction work fulltime, to the date of Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expiration, or to the date of Mr. Stanzel's new broker's license. Petitioner accepted his salesman's license as reinstated. Petitioner did not renew his salesman's license on June 3, 1994, so it expired by its own terms. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner filed an application to be licensed as a yacht and ship broker, together with the required bond, fee, and fingerprints. On August 2, 1994, Peter Butler, Head of the Section of Yacht and Ship Brokers, wrote Petitioner a deficiency notice, explaining that the agency regarded Petitioner's salesman's license "cancelled" during the lapse of his employing broker's license. The agency has no rule which specifically states that when an employing broker's license expires, his salesmen's licenses are automatically cancelled. The language employed in the deficiency notice was, "any salesman licenses held by [the employing broker] were considered cancelled (sic) for that period of time [the period while the employing broker's license was expired/lapsed] because they did not have an actively licensed broker holding their license." [Bracketed material added for clarity.] This language became the focus of the concurrent Section 120.535 F.S. proceeding. The deficiency notice did not refer to the prior "cancellation" of Petitioner's salesman's license based on Mr. Stanzel's March 1, 1993 notice that Petitioner had left his employ effective October 19, 1992. The deficiency notice cited Section 326.004(8) F.S. [1993] which provides: Licensing.- (8) A person may not be licensed as a broker unless he has been a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years, and may not be licensed as a broker after October 1, 1990, unless he has been licensed as a salesman for at least 2 consecutive years. The deficiency notice also specified that if Petitioner paid another dollar for a fingerprinting fee and provided an explanation of his 1992 yacht sales, the agency would issue a new salesman's license. There was no way Petitioner could alter the past lapse of the broker's license. Petitioner did not pursue relicensure as a salesman. Bob Badger, an agency investigator, submitted a report to Mr. Butler dated September 1, 1994 expressing his opinion that even with Mr. Stanzel's after-the-fact affidavit, Petitioner's salesman's license would have been interrupted by the fact that he had no licensed broker holding his salesman's license during Mr. Stanzel's broker's license lapse of five months. He further concluded that Petitioner's salesman's license was "suspended" for a short period for not renewing his salesman's license bond. After review of the investigation report, on September 19, 1994, the agency issued its Intent to Reject Petitioner's broker's application pursuant to Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. alluding to the deficiency notice and citing Section 326.004(8) F.S., for Petitioner's failure to complete two consecutive years as a salesman. Even if Mr. Stanzel's broker's license had been reinstated without lapse, thereby by implication reinstating Petitioner's salesman's license without lapse, it would not retroactively change the fact that Petitioner has not attained the type and duration of training in the sale of yachts and ships which is associated with two uninterrupted years of broker-supervised salesman's status. Petitioner claimed that he was "cancelled by ambush," because the agency did not timely notify him of Mr. Stanzel's lapsed broker's license, and further asserted that the agency's failure to timely notify him constituted a violation of Rule 61B-60.002(6) F.A.C. At the present time, the agency writes a letter to salesmen advising them when their employing broker's license is cancelled. However, such a letter would not have been written to Petitioner, even if it were being used by the agency on March 22, 1993 when Mr. Stanzel's original broker's license expired, because Petitioner's license had already been effectively cancelled by his own removal of his license from Mr. Stanzel's office, by his assuming other full time employment in construction, and by his removing his yacht-selling activities, if any, from Mr. Stanzel's immediate oversight. Section 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and rules enacted thereunder clearly place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesmen's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of a salesman's license when a broker is no longer associated with the selling entity. Typically, salesmen turn in their licenses through the original broker for cancellation by the agency and receive new ones when they move from one broker's oversight to another's. Salesmen who are employed by one broker also switch their salesman's licenses to another active broker whenever the first broker disassociates from a yacht sales company and moves to another company, quits, retires, or lets his broker's license lapse. Due to the common dynamics of the employment situation whereby salesmen are under the active supervision of their employing broker in the company office, they usually know immediately when a broker's license is in jeopardy or the broker is not on the scene and supervising them. This knowledge is facilitated by the statutes and rules requiring that all licenses be prominently displayed in the business location. Anybody can look at anybody else's license on the office wall and tell when it is due to expire. If licensees are in compliance with the statute and rules, no active salesman has to rely on notification from the agency with regard to the status of his own or his broker's license. In the present case, Petitioner removed himself from all contact with Mr. Stanzel as of October 19, 1992. Therefore, he did not know what was occurring in the office or with any licenses. All agency witnesses testified substantially to the effect that since they have been employed with the agency and so far as they could determine since its inception, agency personnel have relied on Sections 326.002(3), 326.004(8), 326.004(14)(a) and (b) F.S. and Rules 61B-60.005 and 61B-60.008(1)(b) and (c) F.A.C. to preclude licensing someone who has not been actively supervised by a Florida licensed employing broker for two consecutive years. More specifically, agency personnel have always applied Sections 326.004(14)(a) and (b) to place on the broker the responsibility of maintaining and displaying the broker's and salesman's licenses as well as providing for a suspension of the salesman's license when his broker is no longer associated with the sales entity. The agency has always interpreted the word "broker" as used in Chapter 326 F.S. and Chapter 61B-60 F.A.C. to mean "Florida licensed broker." See also, Section 326.002(1) and 326.004(1) F.S. and Rule 61B-60.001(1)(g) F.A.C. These interpretations are in accord with the clear language of the applicable statutes and rules. Petitioner asserted that he had been treated differently than others similarly situated because other salesmen were notified by the agency when their employing broker's license lapsed and because the agency cancelled their salesman's licenses for other reasons but did not cancel their salesman's licenses because of their broker's license's lapse. The facts adduced did not closely parallel his own situation so as to demonstrate disparate treatment. Petitioner did not demonstrate that the agency affirmatively set out to notify any other salesman that his salesman's license was cancelled due to a lapse of his employing broker's license. Rather, the agency was tipped off by a complaint that Bryan Long's salesman's license had expired February 27, 1993. The agency investigated and determined that the license of Mr. Long's broker had expired on February 14, 1993, before Long's own salesman's license had expired. The broker's name was Herbert Postma. Upon discovering that Long and Postma were selling yachts without licenses, the agency investigated the broker's transactions and commissions paid. As a result of its investigation, the agency discovered that two more salesmen, Villalon and Grzeszczak, held salesman's licenses which, like Long's license, had expired during the time Postma's license was lapsed. As with Petitioner, the agency did not attempt to notify any of the salesmen when their broker's license lapsed. The disciplinary investigation of Long's sales and of Postma's transactions and commissions peripherally notified the other salesmen of their lapsed salesman's licenses and of the broker's lapsed license. Petitioner is correct that none of the four licensees were listed as "cancelled" in the agency's records, and Brian Long entered into a Consent Order with the agency which did not mention he was "cancelled" because of the broker's license's lapse. However, the duration dates of each type of license were shown in the agency records. Like the current situation, the new licenses were not issued retroactive to the date of each salesman's prior license's expiration or retroactive to the date of the broker's prior license expiration. Also like Petitioner's reinstatement, none of these licenses showed a reinstatement without a lapse. The agency printout for yet another salesman, Preston, showed that like Petitioner, he was "cancelled" when he had no broker and was reinstated 21 days later. The printout also shows that like Petitioner, Preston was not reinstated retroactively. None of the named salesmen were shown to have been granted a broker's license as having been employed by a broker for two consecutive years.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht and ship broker. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of April, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-6033 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted except that legal argumentation pejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. Rejected as not credible. Covered in substance in FOF 5, 6, and 8. Accepted that this is what the letter stated. However, not dispositive due to the facts as presented. See FOF 11. Rejected as mere legal argument. 9-10 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 11 Rejected as mere legal argument. 12-19 Accepted except that legal argumentation prejorative words, and unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. 20 Rejected as mere legal argument. 21-25 Rejected in FOF 32-37 upon the greater weight of the evidence as a whole and in part as mere legal argument. 26-42 These proposals are mixed legal argument and some fact proposals, largely without any citation to the record. The legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts. The facts not accepted are either rejected as covered specifically within the recommended order or are rejected as not dispositive. Ms. Forrester's testimony is mischaracterized in proposed fact 24, and it is rejected for that reason. The legal arguments are addressed in the conclusions of law. Respondent's PFOF: 1-19 The proposed facts have been accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized. The interspersed legal argumentation has been rejected as not proposed facts, but has been addressed in the conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire GUSTAFSON & TILTON, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. Harper Field, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated March 30, 1998, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating yacht and ship brokers in Florida. Section 326.003, Florida Statutes (1997). Nivardo Beaton is a resident of Miami, Florida. He is not now, and never has been, licensed as a yacht broker or salesperson. The Division has no record of any prior enforcement or disciplinary actions against Mr. Beaton. At the times material to this action, Mr. Beaton worked at Avanti Powerboats, where he did assembly, electrical installation, and motor installation work on the boats built by Avanti Powerboats. Although he was originally a salaried employee of Avanti Powerboats, at the times material to this action, Mr. Beaton worked on a "piece work" basis and was paid a flat fee when he completed rigging a boat. Mr. Beaton also had a verbal agreement with Raul Rodriguez, the owner of Avanti Powerboats, whereby he was to be paid a five-percent commission for each direct sale of an Avanti boat and a one-and-one-half- percent commission for each Avanti boat sold by a dealership he had recruited as an Avanti distributor. An advertisement appeared in the October 17, 1997, edition of South Florida Boat Trader in which "Beaton Boat Sales and Service - Nivardo Beaton" offered three new boats and three used boats for sale. The three new boats were all Avantis; the three used boats were a twenty-one-foot Corona, a thirty-five- foot Contender, and a thirty-three-foot Avanti. Mr. Beaton owned the Corona; the Contender was owned by a friend, and Mr. Beaton did not expect any compensation from the sale of this boat; and the Avanti, an open-decked fishing boat, had been taken in trade by Mr. Rodriguez and was owned by Avanti Powerboats. Pursuant to a verbal agreement with Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Beaton was to receive a five percent commission on the sale of this used thirty-three- foot Avanti. The advertisement was seen by an employee of the Division, and, when the Division's records revealed that neither Mr. Beaton nor Beaton Boat Sales and Service were licensed to offer yachts for sale, an investigation was initiated. Peter Renje, the Division's investigator, contacted Mr. Beaton on November 19, 1997, and informed him that he could not offer for sale used boats over thirty-two feet in length with the expectation of compensation unless he was licensed as a yacht broker. After Mr. Renje's first visit, Mr. Beaton immediately contacted the South Florida Boat Trader and discontinued the advertisement. He also provided Mr. Renje with the materials he requested to assist him in his investigation. Mr. Beaton abandoned the idea of doing business under the name of Beaton Boat Sales and Service. Mr. Beaton never sold a boat or transacted any other commercial transaction through this business. The only action Mr. Beaton took under the name of Beaton Boat Sales and Service was placing the advertisement in the October 17, 1997, issue of the South Florida Boat Trader. Mr. Beaton has worked in the management and production areas of the boat-building industry for over twelve years; he began working in sales in 1997. Before working for Avanti Powerboats, he worked for a short time selling Boston Whalers, Zodiac Inflatables, and Key West Boats. He also was employed as a full-time salesman by Fisherman's Paradise, Inc., a division of Warren Craft Distributing, Inc., from January to June 1997. Mr. Beaton was aware at the time he placed the advertisement in the South Florida Boat Trader that a person must have a broker's license in order to sell used yachts. He was not aware at the time he placed the advertisement that he needed to have a broker's license to offer for sale the thirty-three-foot Avanti open fishing boat. The evidence presented by the Division is sufficient to establish that Mr. Beaton, doing business as Beaton Boat Sales and Service, offered for sale a used boat over thirty-two feet in length and that he expected to earn a commission if he sold the boat. The evidence is also sufficient to establish that Mr. Beaton worked with Avanti Powerboats as an independent contractor, that he cooperated with the Division in its investigation, that he immediately cancelled the subject advertisement, and that he did not do any business as Beaton Boat Sales and Service. Mr. Beaton's testimony that he was not aware that a thirty-three-foot open-decked fishing boat fell within the statutory definition of a yacht is accepted as credible. Although Mr. Beaton had a few months' experience in boat sales, there is no evidence to establish that he engaged in the sale of used boats or that he sold boats in excess of thirty-two feet in length. The evidence presented by the Division is, therefore, not sufficient to permit the inference that Mr. Beaton knew or should have known that offering for sale a used boat over thirty- two feet in length without a broker's license violated Chapter 326. Likewise, the evidence presented by the Division is not sufficient to permit the inference that Mr. Beaton intended to violate Chapter 326. There was no evidence presented by the Division to establish that any member of the public suffered any injury as a result of Mr. Beaton's action in advertising for sale the used Avanti.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, enter a final order finding Nivardo Beaton guilty of violating Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes (1997); ordering Mr. Beaton to cease and desist from any other violations of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder; and imposing a civil penalty in the amount of $250. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: William Oglo, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Nivardo Beaton, pro se Beaton Boat Sales and Services 14812 Southwest 81 Street Miami, Florida 33193 Philip Nowicki, Ph.D., Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1030 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulations 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined based on conduct, set forth hereinafter in detail, which is specifically alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed herein dated June 24, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. At all times pertinent to the charges herein, Respondent was the holder of a Florida Real Estate license and operated as a real estate broker. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 and Stipulation of the parties). On October 17, 1985, Respondent obtained four exclusive listing agreements from John S. Blosnick (Blosnick) for warehouses he owned located in Miami, Florida. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2). Respondent was unable to find a buyer for the units and instead leased them to Jim Gardner and V.I.P Car Care pursuant to a business lease entered into on July 22, 1986. During the time, Blosnick was experiencing financial difficulties and needed someone to either purchase or lease the premises. The lease specified that Mr. Gardner would use the premises for the manufacture and repair of cars and boats. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). During the fall of 1986, a company that Respondent was affiliated with and served as President, Reaction Marine, Inc., took over the rental units and began constructing boat hulls from fiberglass resin. At this time, Reaction Marine erected a sign outside the warehouses where it remained during the time of the instant hearing. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). On January 6, 1987, Respondent's bookkeeper, a Mrs. Bryant, issued a check for payment of rent drawn on the account of Reaction Marine, Inc. to John Blosnick for $945.00. The check was subsequently returned for insufficient funds. That check remains unpaid as of the date of hearing. After Reaction Marine began occupancy of the Blosnick warehouses, Respondent and Jim Gardner had a dispute and Gardner is no longer affiliated with Reaction Marine. Respondent who owned the molds for boat manufacturing, continued to store the molds in the leased warehouses. During the time when Respondent obtained the exclusive listing agreement to sell the warehouses for Blosnick, they were good friends and Blosnick frequented Respondent's office and home two to three times per week. Respondent is an entrepreneur of sorts and owns three bars and various and sundry other businesses in the Miami area. Respondent and Blosnick often talked about different business ventures as Blosnick was interested in pursuing business ventures with Respondent. As early as the fall of 1986, Blosnick was aware that Respondent was affiliated with Reaction Marine, Inc., and that Reaction Marine thereafter occupied the subject warehouse. Respondent has offered to make good on the check which was returned for insufficient funds against the account of Reaction Marine, Inc., however that offer is contingent upon Blosnick's tender of the check to Respondent upon payment. Blosnick has requested that payment be made to a third party and has not offered to tender the check to that third party simultaneous with Respondent's tender of payment to make good on the returned check. Respondent has attempted to clean the floors of the warehouses by removing the resins, epoxys, and gel coats caused by Reaction Marine, Inc. This was done during January and February, 1987 by Respondent using the assistance of an acquaintance, Heather Rockcastle, who was involved with the cleaning of the warehouse and restoration of the floors to their original condition. The cleanup process took more than one day. In Respondent's second attempt to gain entry to the warehouses, Blosnick had hired a locksmith to change the locks and thereby prevented Respondent from gaining entry. The lease agreement entered into by Blosnick and VIP Car Care specifies that the property was to be used and occupied as a place for car and boat manufacture/repair. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3). Pursuant to the terms of that business lease, VIP Car Care was authorized to assign or sublet the premises for the usage here which was consistent with the usage for which VIP Car Care leased the premises. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3, first stipulation and condition of the business lease).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of May 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Contract Attorney DPR-Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mark Weissman, Esquire Katz and Weissman 300 Aragon Avenue Suite 330 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 William O'Neil Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause, by acting as a broker or sales person, without a license, on two occasions.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence, the following facts are determined, as follows: Joseph Daniel Judson, Respondent, has never been licensed as a yacht and ship broker or sales person in the state of Florida. Respondent was informed in 1999 of the general requirements for being a yacht and ship broker and/or sales person in the state of Florida, and the need to obtain a license. Stephen D. Silver and Vicky A. Silver purchased a Pacemaker motor yacht (Hull ID No. 509484) on May 5, 1998, from Kenneth Thompson and Jeannette Myers in Brevard County, Florida. The Pacemaker motor yacht is over 32 feet in length and weighs less than 300 gross tons. Respondent listed the Pacemaker motor yacht for sale on his website during the summer of 2000. Respondent indicated that he had recently purchased the Pacemaker motor yacht on his website. Respondent sought to broker the yacht to a perspective buyer. The Pacemaker motor yacht listed on Respondent's website was the same Pacemaker motor yacht which was stored at the Banana River Marina in Brevard County, Florida, and was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Silver at that time. Respondent is not and has not been the owner of the Pacemaker motor yacht in question. Douglas Jeran, II, is the current owner of the yacht. He purchased the yacht directly from Mr. and Mrs. Silver. Dr. James H. Southard, Jr., first came into contact with Respondent via Respondent's internet website. Respondent sold a 41-foot 1949 Chris Craft (Hull ID No. C41015), held in his name, to Dr. Southard using a Texas Bill of Sale and Certificate of Title on April 14, 2000. Dr. Southard paid Respondent the full $10,000 purchase price for the Chris Craft. The Chris Craft is in excess of 32 feet in length and weighs less than 300 gross tons. Dr. Southard did not receive the title to the Chris Craft from Respondent until January 2001. Dr. Southard was a naïve yacht purchaser and was unaware that Respondent had not provided him with all the needed documents at the time of the sale. Respondent continued to use the title to Dr. Southard's Chris Craft as security in order to purchase another yacht, after Respondent had sold the yacht to Dr. Southard. Respondent did not inform Dr. Southard that the legal title to the Chris Craft was being used as security in another yacht transaction. Dr. Southard never conveyed any interest in the Chris Craft back to Respondent. Months after Respondent transported the Chris Craft to the Banana River Marina in Brevard County, Florida, Dr. Southard called to inquire whether Respondent had brought his Chris Craft to the marina and had it under repair. Respondent indicated to Dr. Southard that he had invested a "substantial" amount of money to refurbish the Chris Craft, purchased from Respondent for $10,000. However, the estimated value of the Chris Craft months after delivery to the marina was still approximately $10,000. Respondent charged Dr. Southard $10,000 for used diesel engines although he only paid $2,500 for them. Respondent initiated the search for the diesel engines and insisted on handling any repair work needed to make the vessel seaworthy. Respondent charged Dr. Southard a substantially inflated amount for repairs that he allegedly made to the diesel engines. Respondent told Dr. Southard that the Chris Craft was going to be placed in the water during the week of July 18, 2000. The Chris Craft was never returned to the water by Respondent. When the rusted diesel engines were recovered from the Banana River Marina, they were found partially disassembled and exposed to the elements due to sitting in the rain. Neither the boat nor the diesel engines were in a seaworthy condition when recovered. Leaving the Chris Craft out of the water for years without constant maintenance has rendered it virtually valueless. Dr. Southard lost his investment of $30,000 on the Chris Craft in his dealings with Respondent. Respondent operates an internet business when he seeks to buy and sell yachts. Respondent listed the Chris Craft owned by Dr. Southard on his website for sale, after April 14, 2000, when he was no longer the owner of the vessel. In addition, Dr. Southard's Chris Craft had a for sale sign posted on it, indicating a sale price of $50,000, and listing Respondent's phone number.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: That Respondent be found guilty of two counts of acting as a broker or sales person of yachts without a license under the Florida Yacht and Ship Broker's Act. That a civil penalty be imposed on Respondent in the amount of $10,000 for the unlicensed brokering of the Pacemaker motor yacht and an additional $10,000 for the unlicensed brokering of the Chris Craft for a total fine of $20,000. That a cease and desist order be issued and that the Secretary impose such other and reasonable provisions as is necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Gray Department of Business and Professional Regulation 5080 Coconut Creek Parkway, Suite B Margate, Florida 33063-3942 Joseph Daniel Judson a/k/a Dan Judson Post Office Box 146 Hallandale, Florida 33008 Michael Martinez, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ross Fleetwood, Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Peter P. Sedler, at all times material to the complaint, has been licensed as a real estate broker, holding license 0079017. He was last licensed as a broker c/o Marshall & Sedler, Inc., 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Marshall & Sedler, Inc., at all times relevant to the complaint, had been registered as a Florida real estate broker, holding license 0250511, its last licensed address was 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Peter P. Sedler was the qualifying broker and officer for Marshall & Sedler, Inc. On about July 3, 1987, Tom Teixeira was employed as a salesman by Cartier Realty, of 11852 42nd Road North, Royal Palm Beach, Florida. Cartier Realty had solicited, through a direct mailing, listings for property in the Royal Palm Beach area. Ms. Mary Myers, an older woman of about 70 years of age, responded to the advertisement, and gave Mr. Teixeira an open listing for real property which she owned. While Mr. Teixeira placed a Cartier Realty "For Sale" sign on the property, the sign was somehow removed shortly thereafter, and no party dealing with Ms. Myers during the months of July, August and September of 1987 would have been placed on notice that Cartier Realty had any listing on the property. Mr. Sedler had nothing to do with the disappearance of the sign. Ms. Myers had originally acquired the property from her daughter. Long before Ms. Myers gave a listing to Cartier Realty, William Kemp and his wife Gina DiPace Kemp had told Ms. Myers that they were interested in purchasing the property, which is adjacent to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Kemp. When Mr. and Mrs. Kemp first contacted Ms. Myers, she had wanted to keep the property, in the belief that she might eventually convey it back to her daughter. Mr. Teixeira brought to Ms. Myers an offer from David R. and Maureen C. Rose to purchase the land for $11,900. Ms. Myers did not accept that offer, but the Roses accepted Ms. Myers' counteroffer on July 24, 1987, to sell it for $12,300. The sale was contingent upon the buyers obtaining financing; they applied for a loan, and ordered both an appraisal and a survey. The closing was to be held by September 1, 1987. (Contract, paragraph VI.) The closing date passed, without the buyers obtaining the necessary financing, so the contract was no longer effective. On about September 8, 1987, Mr. Teixeira attempted to contact Ms. Myers. He had obtained no written extension of the contract but hoped the sale might yet close. Ms. Myers told Teixeira that she was still willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose. In the meantime, Mr. and Mrs. Kemp became aware that Ms. Myers wanted to sell the property, because they noticed Mr. and Mrs. Rose coming to look at the land, and had engaged them in conversation. Ms. Kemp then contacted Ms. Myers to remind her that they were still willing to purchase the property, and also to say that they would offer more than the current offer on the property. On about September 11, 1987, Ms. Kemp contacted Cartier Realty to say that she also wished to make an offer on the Myers' lot. For a reason which was never adequately explained at the hearing, Teixeira, who should have been working on behalf of the seller, refused to take the offer, even though it was for a higher price. After this rebuff by Teixeira, Ms. Kemp contacted Marshall & Sedler, Inc., in order to try to find a broker who would convey their offer to Ms. Myers and spoke with Patricia Marshall, Ms. Marshall referred her to her partner, Peter Sedler. The Kemps told Sedler that Ms. Myers had told them that she had received a $9,000 offer on the lot. Why Ms. Myers told the Kemps that the Rose offer was $9,000 is not clear, for the actual offer had been $12,300, but Sedler did not know this. There was no listing of the lot in the local board of realtors multiple listing service book, and Mr. Sedler found the address of Ms. Myers through the public records. Mr. Sedler knew from his conversations with Ms. Kemp that Cartier Realty had some involvement with an offer on the property. He called Cartier Realty and tried to speak with the broker handling the matter. He spoke with a man named Tom, who he thought was a brother of the owner of Cartier Realty, Pete Cartier. Mr. Sedler actually talked with Tom Teixeira. Sedler believed he was dealt with rudely by Teixeira, who had hung up on him. Sedler then called Pete Cartier directly to find out whether there was an outstanding contract on the property, and Cartier told Sedler that he would call Sedler back. When Cartier called Sedler, Cartier warned Sedler that he should stay out of the deal. Mr. Sedler became suspicious about Cartier Realty's failure to bring a higher offer to the attention of the seller, and on September 16, 1987, filed a complaint against Tom Cartier with the Lake Worth Board of Realtors. Mr. Sedler then traveled to Pompano Beach to meet with Ms. Myers at her home, and brought with him a contract for sale and purchase of the property, already signed by the Kemps and dated September 14, 1987. While at the door, Ms. Myers asked Peter Sedler if he was "Tom." Ms. Myers knew that she had been dealing with a "Tom" at Cartier Realty, but all her dealings were on the phone, and she did not know what Tom Teixeira looked like. Sedler replied "Yes, but you can call me Pete." Sedler merely intended the comment as humor. At that time Sedler gave Ms. Myers his pink business card and specifically identified himself as Pete Sedler of Marshall & Sedler, Inc. Mr. Sedler asked Ms. Myers if she had any paperwork, such as the prior contract for the sale of the lot which had expired on September 1, 1987, but she did not. While Sedler was with Ms. Myers, she agreed to sell the property to the Kemps for $12,500 and signed the Kemp contract. The Kemps had put the purchase price of $12,500 into the Marshall & Sedler escrow account. Three days later, on September 18, 1987, Mr. Sedler, in the company of his wife Bonnie, presented a post-dated check to Ms. Myers in the amount of $11,020, the net amount due to Ms. Myers for the lot, based on the purchase price of $12,500. When they met this second time he introduced himself again as Pete Sedler and offered Ms. Myers his card for a second time. The post-dated check was conditioned by an endorsement making it good upon a determination that the title to the lot was good. A quit claim deed to Mr. and Mrs. Kemp was executed by Ms. Myers and witnessed by Bonnie Sedler. The post-dated check was given to Ms. Myers because she was about to leave on vacation. The check was given as a sort of security for good title, in return for the quit claim deed which closed the transaction. Mr. Sedler had structured the transaction in this way because he was concerned that someone at Cartier Realty might also attempt to purchase the property from Ms. Myers on behalf of one of their clients. At that time, Mr. Sedler held the reasonable belief that no other party had a subsisting contract to purchase the property from Ms. Myers. Sedler had no reason to believe the Roses would or could pay more for the property than the Kemps offered. Ms. Myers knew that Tom Teixeira from the Cartier realty firm represented a distinct business entity from Marshall & Sedler or Pete Sedler. After a title search showed that Ms. Myers had clear title to the property, the check which Mr. Sedler had given to Ms. Myers on September 18, 1987, with the restrictive endorsement was replaced. Later Mr. and Mrs. Rose tried to close their purchase, but found they could not. Ms. Myers had failed to inform them of the sale she made to the Kemps through Mr. Sedler. Mr. Teixeira, in retribution, filed an ethics complaint about Mr. Sedler with the West Palm Beach Board of Realtors.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Peter P. Sedler and Marshall & Sedler, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of March, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6183 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1. Rejected as unnecessary. 2 and 3. Adopted in Finding 1. 4 - 6. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 3. Implicit in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 6. Implicit in Finding 6. This does not mean that the contract subsisted, however. Rejected. Ms. Myers was willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose after the contract expired, but she was not under any obligation to do so. Adopted in Finding 7. Rejected, because there was no pending contract. Teixeira never obtained a written extension of the closing date and Ms. Myers was free to sell elsewhere. Rejected. No one could have truthfully told Sedler there was a pending contract. None existed. Rejected, because Mr. Sedler had no reason to believe that there was a subsisting contract for the sale of the property; there was none. Admission number 20 is not to the contrary. Adopted in Findings 10 and 11. Rejected. See, Findings 9 and 10. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected as cumulative to Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frank W. Weathers, Esquire Frank W. Weathers, P.A. Post Office Box 3967 Lantana, Florida 33465-3967 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action and, if so, whether Respondent Stuart Yacht Corporation is entitled to the General Permit which the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) intends to issue.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 4 in St. Lucie Settlement, a subdivision in Stuart, Florida. The subdivision has one border along the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. The subdivision has a finger fill that extends to the South Fork with canals on both sides. There are four lots on the finger fill, Lots 1 through 4 of the subdivision. Lot 4 is farthest from the river. On the north side of Petitioner’s property he has a dock where he keeps a boat. The dispute in this case involves the canal on the south side of Petitioner’s property. All references to “the canal” hereafter, unless otherwise noted, will be to the canal on the south side of Lot 4. Between Lots 2, 3, and 4 and the canal is a road which provides access to the lots on the finger fill. Between the road and the canal is a narrow strip of land. Petitioner owns this narrow strip of land where it corresponds with his lot lines. In other words, the southern boundary of his Lot 4 abuts the canal. However, because the canal is artificial, having been created by dredging, Petitioner has no riparian rights associated with the canal. That was the holding of the circuit court for Martin County in the litigation between Stuart Yacht Corporation and Petitioner. It was also established in the circuit court litigation that St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., which is the homeowner's association for the subdivision, owns the northern half of the canal and Stuart Yacht Corporation owns the southern half of the canal. No subdivision documents were presented to show the extent of rights granted to homeowners within St. Lucie Settlement related to the construction of docks or other uses of water bottoms that are included within the subdivision. Petitioner testified that he terminated his membership in the homeowners association three-and-a-half years ago. Stuart Yacht Corporation owns and operates a marina on the south side of the canal which includes docks over the water. At some point in the past, but before Petitioner purchased Lot 4 in 1995, Stuart Yacht Corporation constructed a dock along the north side of the canal, over the water bottom owned by St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. The dock along the north side of the canal has been used for mooring large yachts. The portion of the dock that ran along the boundary of Lot 4 was recently removed by Stuart Yacht Corporation following the rulings in the circuit court. The balance of the dock along the north side of the canal would be removed as a part of the proposed permit that Petitioner has challenged. In addition to removing the dock along the north side of the canal, the proposed permit authorizes Stuart Yacht Corporation to construct a new dock that is four feet wide and runs 150 feet along the property boundary in the center of the canal. No part of the proposed new dock would be on the property of St. Lucie Settlement, Inc. St. Lucie Settlement, Inc., did not challenge the proposed permit. In his petition for hearing, Petitioner alleged that the proposed new dock would cause the following injuries to his interests: interference with ingress and egress to Petitioner’s shoreline; interference with Petitioner’s desire to obtain a permit in the future to construct a dock or to “harden” the southern shoreline; and interference with Petitioner’s riparian rights. Petitioner’s testimony about his past use of the canal was inconsistent. He said he moored his boat in the canal once in 1995. He said he boated into the canal to fish on several occasions. He said that (at least twice) when he attempted to enter the canal by boat, he was denied access by representatives of Stuart Yacht Corporation. However, in a deposition taken before the hearing, Petitioner said he had never attempted to use the canal. The only testimony presented by Petitioner to support his claim that the proposed permit would interfere with his navigation, fishing, and desire to obtain a dock permit in the canal was the following: I couldn’t get a boat in there with that proposed dock in the center line of the canal right on their side of the canal. It would be 150 feet long. It would be a huge Wall of China. My neighbor and I couldn’t get to our shoreline. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to navigate into the canal in a small boat or to fish in the canal if the proposed dock is constructed. The evidence was also insufficient to prove that Petitioner would be unable to construct any kind of dock for any kind of watercraft if the proposed dock is constructed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department dismiss the petition for hearing based on Petitioner's failure to prove standing, and issue the proposed permit to Stuart Yacht Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Beason, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Paul B. Erickson, Esquire Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, P.A. 340 Royal Poinciana Way, Suite 321 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Amanda Gayle Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Office of the General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Stop 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Guy Bennett Rubin, Esquire Rubin & Rubin Post Office Box 395 Stuart, Florida 34995
Findings Of Fact Gary Porter, an individual, is the sole stockholder, owner, and decision-maker for the two corporate entities, Gary Porter, Inc., and Gary, Inc., that are petitioners in these consolidated cases. In early 1990, Mr. Porter reached an oral agreement with Jerry Thompson, a Florida resident, to purchase two boats from Miss Angie, Inc., a Florida corporation owned and operated by Mr. Thompson. The two boats were the only boats owned by Mr. Thompson and his corporation. The purchase price for the two vessels, the "Miss Angie" and the "Christy Lynn", plus related fishing equipment and gear, was $285,000.00 (two hundred eighty-five thousand dollars). Separate sales agreements were drawn up for the sale of the two boats and a closing was scheduled in the office of an attorney in Destin, Florida, Dana C. Matthews, Esquire. Approximately one week before the closing, the $285,000.00 was paid to Mr. Thompson. On March 19, 1990, the closing took place. The two sales agreements and two bills of sale were executed by Mr. Thompson personally and in his capacity as President of Miss Angie, Inc. In the case of the Miss Angie sales agreement, Gary Porter, in the capacity of president of the corporation, signed the agreement on behalf of Gary, Inc. In the case of the Christy Lynn sales agreement, Gary Porter, as president, signed the agreement on behalf of Gary Porter, Inc. Title to the Miss Angie passed from Miss Angie, Inc., to Gary, Inc. Title to the Christy Lynn passed from Miss Angie, Inc. to Gary Porter, Inc. No reference to payment of taxes is made in the Sales Agreements or the Bills of Sale. At the closing, Mr. Thompson represented to both Mr. Porter and Mr. Matthews that he would see that all taxes arising from the transactions were paid. Contrary to his representations to Mr. Porter and Mr. Matthews, no sales or use taxes were paid by Mr. Thompson, Miss Angie, Inc., or anyone else. The Christy Lynn has been continually berthed in Destin, Florida, both before and after its sale from Mr. Thompson to Gary Porter, Inc. The Miss Angie was also berthed in Destin both before and after the sale by Mr. Thompson. But, the Miss Angie disappeared from its berth about one and one-half years after the purchase by Gary, Inc. Mr. Porter represented to the Department that, at the time of the sales, the value of the Miss Angie was $275,000.00 and of the Christy Lynn, $10,000.00. The Department revised its assessments to conform to Mr. Porter's representations. The revised assessments were received by the Petitioners and are mathematically correct. Upon the $10,000.00 value of the Christy Lynn, Mr. Porter paid to the Department the sum of $600.00 as sales tax, (6 percent of $10,000.00). But no other taxes, interest or penalties, have been paid on the sales of the Christy Lynn or the Miss Angie. As of June 14, 1994, the total amount due, according to the assessment amended that date, on the sale of the Miss Angie to Gary, Inc., was $24,452.77, the sum of $16,525.00 in total tax due, $4,131.25 as a late filing penalty and $3,796.52 in interest. As of June 14, 1994, the total amount due, according to the assessment amended that date, on the sale of the Christy Lynn to Gary Porter, Inc., was $925.00, the sum of $625 in total tax due, $256.25 in a late filing penalty and $143.75 in interest. Of the $925.00 due on the sale of the Christy Lynn, $600.00, as mentioned above, has been paid by Mr. Porter. Mr. Porter has steadfastly maintained that neither he nor his corporations are liable for sales tax, interest and penalties beyond that which he has already paid because Mr. Thompson had represented that the taxes would be paid.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue upholding its assessments of tax, interest, and penalties against the Petitioners and that Gary Porter, Inc. be credited for a payment of $600.00 toward the total assessment due from Gary Porter, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed recommended order does not contain any proposed findings of fact. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary Porter 219 Benning Drive Destin, FL 32541 Mark T. Aliff Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
