Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law the Hearing Officer recommends that the transfer of John Jackson, Sr., be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Vance W. Kidder, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. John Jackson, Jr., Department of Environmental Regulation 2551 Executive Center Circle, West Lafayette Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a black male, was hired on May 17, 1978, by Respondent as a Maintenance Worker I, and was assigned to the water and sewer section of Respondent's utility department. In accordance with Respondent's personnel rules, Petitioner was required to serve a probationary period of six months, the purpose of which was "[t]o provide [Petitioner] with an opportunity to demonstrate basic qualifications and a desire to perform the duties as assigned . . . , and [t]o provide [Respondent] with an opportunity to observe [Petitioner], his work habits and attitude." Under Respondent's personnel rules, "probationary employees" are not afforded many of the protections enjoyed -- by "regular employees" who have completed their probationary employment period. For example, vacation days and sick leave days are not accrued during an employee's probationary period, nor are probationary employees entitled to reimbursement for time off taken due to illness during the probationary period. Whereas "regular employees" are entitled to leaves of absence without pay for a period not to exceed one year for sickness, disability, pregnancy or , . . other good and sufficient reasons which are considered to be in the best interests of (Respondent] . . .", no such privileges are enjoyed by "probationary employees". In addition, although Respondent's personnel rules allow for dismissal of any employee for cause, dismissals of "regular employees" may not take effect until at least ten days from the date a written statement of the reasons for dismissal is subpitted to the employee and his department head. Finally, one of the grounds for dismissal "for cause" for any city employee is " . . . failure to maintain a satisfactory attendance record or properly report absence due to illness, emergency, or other reason". At the time of his initial employment, Petitioner completed and filed with Respondent an "Application for Employment" form and a form entitled "Required Personnel Information, both of which provided telephone numbers at which Petitioner could be contacted in case of emergency. While employed by Respondent, Petitioner's job consisted of a five-day work week, during which Petitioner was to report to work at 7:30 a.m., and leave at 4:00 p.m. During the period of his employment it was possible for Petitioner to have worked a total of 44 days, with one day off for the July 4 holiday. During this 44-day work period, Petitioner was late in checking in for work a total of 25 times, and was absent from work for personal reasons a total of approximately 4 days. Petitioner was cautioned on several occasions by his superiors, including his foreman, a black male, that continued tardiness and absences could endanger his continued employment by Respondent. Although Respondent was never absent from his duty station without permission from his supervisors, he never gave advance notice of such requests, instead delaying such requests until the day on which he was to absent himself from his job. As a result of Petitioner's tardiness and absences, his foreman was unable to fully evaluate his abilities as an employee in that Petitioner never worked a full week during the time that he was employed by Respondent. By letter dated July 13, 1978, Petitioner was advised by Respondent's Director of Utilities that he would be separated from the work force of Respondent effective the following day. The reasons civen by Respondent for terminating Petitioner's employment were that he had failed to furnish an emergency telephone number, he was habitually late for work each morning, and had been constantly absent from work. There is a total absence from the record in this proceeding of any direct evidence that Petitioner's discharge was in any way related to race. Petitioner testified that the question of race never was discussed between him and his supervisors, and Petitioner's forenan, a black male, also testified that no such discussion ever occurred, and that Petitioner's discharge was the direct result of his poor attendance record. Another white male employee of Respondent was alleged by Petitioner to have received preferential treatment, though his work record with respect to tardiness was similar to that of Petitioner. However, it appears from the record that this white employee had been a long-time employee of Respondent, and was, therefore, not in "probationary" status. It further appears that that employee's record of tardiness was not as extensive as Petitioner's. The record also clearly establishes that Respondent placed a written reprimand in the white employee's file, which is a procedure allowed under Respondent's personnel rules. Petitioner and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact in this proceeding. To the extent that those findings of fact are not adopted in this Recommended Order, they have been specifically rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.
The Issue Proposed transfer of Bernice Ino, as specified in letter of Anthony Ninos, Director of Division of Hotels and Restaurants, dated July 27, 1976. This is an appeal of a career service employee pursuant to Section 110.061, Florida Statutes. The appeal was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Career Service Commission on November 24, 1976.
Findings Of Fact By the General Appropriations act emanating from the 1976 state legislative session, 38 employee positions of the Respondent's Division of Hotel and Restaurants were abolished. Although the specific positions were not identified in the appropriations act, the Division director was informed by a staff representative of the legislative committee on appropriations that 25 Hotel and Restaurant Inspector I positions and six Inspector II positions should be among those eliminated. The Division previously had 103 Inspectors of the two classes. Respondent identified the positions statewide to be eliminated and requested the Secretary, Department of Administration, to approve the concept that the competitive area for layoff of employees be statewide within the Division. Approval of this plan was secured and Respondent proceeded to abolish the positions and to layoff Inspectors in its various districts throughout the state. Since the Division at the time had eight vacancies for Inspector positions only 23 employees were actually eliminated. Layoffs were carried out under a retention point system based on length of service and performance evaluations, computed and applied under the provisions of Department of Administration Emergency Rule 22AER76-1, Subject "Emergency Rule Governing Layoff of Career Service Employees". As to Inspectors I, the 83 such positions in the state were placed on a numerical list, according to total number of retention points of each employee, and those with the lowest numbers were selected for layoff. Seven employees were terminated in District I (Jacksonville) and one in District IV (Ft. Lauderdale). (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibits 1, 9-12) As a result of the abolishment of Inspector positions, there was an imbalance in manning levels in the various state districts. In Jacksonville, there had been eight inspector positions. The abolishment of three of these left five vacancies that had to be filled. On the other hand, there were negative vacancies in the Ft. Lauderdale district. The Division director therefore instructed the Respondents' personnel officer, Lee Dorn, to reapportion the state to effectively cover all inspection areas. Specifically, he directed that five Inspector I positions be transferred to Jacksonville, 3 of them to come from the Ft. Lauderdale district. In a Memorandum to Dorn, dated July 15, 1976, the director identified the three positions in Ft. Lauderdale for transfer as those held by A. V. Maloni, Bernice N. Ino, and J. F. Friedman. The retention points of these employees had been calculated respectively at 210, 169, and 165. These three employees, and two others to be transferred to Jacksonville from District V, were those Inspectors who had the lowest number of retention points after those having less retention points had been laid off. It was stipulated by the parties that the number of retention joints calculated for Petitioner is correct based on the criteria set forth in the Department of Administration's Emergency Rule. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibit 2) It thereafter developed that of the three Ft. Lauderdale employees, Petitioner was the only one who would actually have had to take an involuntary transfer to Jacksonville. Mr. Friedman, who had less retention points, secured a new position with another agency. Maloni, who had more retention points than Petitioner, was reassigned to a position in the Ft. Lauderdale district that was vacated when the incumbent, in turn, was reassigned to another position made vacant by the illness and eventual separation of its incumbent, John W. Murray. The person replacing Murray, A. J. Pergament, had 792 retention points. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Smith, Exhibits 4, 6-8, 14-21) Petitioner was orally informed in late June of her proposed transfer by her District Supervisor, Chauncey D. Smith. This was followed by a letter, dated July 27, 1976, from the Division director that formally advised her of the transfer of her position to the Jacksonville district, effective August 1, 1976. The letter gave as a basis for the transfer the fact that legislative abolishment of positions made it necessary for the Division to reapportion its staffing to effectively cover all inspection areas and that the proposed changes were being made to obtain "equity, effectiveness, and efficiency within our districts". The letter further advised Petitioner of her right to appeal the transfer to the Career Service Commission. Although this letter did not reach Petitioner through the mail due to an incorrect address, a copy was personally served on her on July 29. Petitioner acknowledges that the incorrect address was due to her negligence in advising Respondent correctly as to the same. In a memo to Petitioner, dated July 28, Smith had conveyed Division instructions for her to report to Jacksonville on August 2. Petitioner declined to accept the transfer. She filed her appeal by letter of July 31, 1976 and thereafter resigned, effective August 2, 1976. Her appeal letter stated that she had not been given sufficient notice to relocate and that the transfer would be a great financial hardship due to the fact that she had purchased a home in the area recently. (Testimony of Dorn, Smith, Ino, Exhibits 3, 13, 22-23) At a meeting with Smith and the Division's Chief of Enforcement, B. E. Fernandez, in early August, Petitioner was informed that she would be given the next opening in Ft. Lauderdale. In fact, Inspector Murray was not separated until November but his job had been filled on a temporary basis by Maloni. When Murray was finally separated, Maloni stayed in the position. Petitioner had been told by Smith that it would be a hardship for Maloni to suffer a transfer because of family considerations, but would not be so difficult for her because she could obtain unemployment compensation and she need not be concerned because her husband was working. When Murray finally departed, Petitioner called the Division director regarding the promise that she would have the next opening and he wrote her in December, 1976, that, although she was next in line for any vacancy, Maloni had received Murray's job because he had more retention points. Also, during this period, Fernandez and Smith offered Petitioner openings in Gainesville and Daytona Beach, but she declined to accept them because she wished to stay in Broward County. Smith also suggested that she get a job as a hostess or cocktail waitress because she was cute and petite. (Testimony of Ino, Smith, Fernandez, Exhibit 4) Petitioner testified that she was of the opinion her sex was a factor in the matter because nothing was done for her by Division personnel and because of the comments made by Smith concerning her eligibility for unemployment compensation and his comments concerning the possibility of her becoming a cocktail waitress. (Testimony of Ino) Petitioner was employed by Respondent from June 1, 1973 to August 2, 1977. She had performed her duties in an exemplary manner. (Testimony of McCulley)
Recommendation It is recommended that the Career Service Commission deny the appeal. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Roger D. Haagenson 800 E. Broward Building Suite 610 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue The matter presented here for consideration concerns the termination of the Petitioner, George Nelson, from his employment with the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, premised upon the purported authority set forth in Rule 22A-13.04, Florida Administrative Code, following the Petitioner's alleged decision to qualify as a candidate for office in the State of Florida, without first gaining permission of the appropriate authorities as set forth in Subsection 110.233(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22A-13, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, George Nelson, was a permanent status Career Service employee on July 14, 1980, working for the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Forestry. His specific employment was a firefighter. On the subject date, by correspondence directed to an official within the Division of Forestry, namely, Larry Wood, the petitioner notified the Respondent of his intention to run for a School Board seat, District IV, in Wakulla County, Florida. A copy of that notification may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. As stated in the correspondence, Nelson had made an attempt to determine the necessary steps to gain the approval of his agency before taking the oath of candidacy for the aforementioned position. (This request was made following a conversation with the same Larry Wood held on July 10, 1980, on the subject of Nelson's candidacy. On July 10, a letter was sent addressed only to "Larry" and at Mr. Wood's instigation the subsequent letter of July 14, 1980, was dispatched referring to Wood as "Mr. Larry Wood", for appearance sake.) As set forth in the Nelson correspondence, the last date for qualifying for the School Board position was July 22, 1980, at 12:00 Noon. Prior to that date, the Petitioner's request to run was forwarded through the decision-making channels within the Division of Forestry. At the time Nelson dispatched his letter of July 14, 1980, there was some concern expressed by Wood to the effect that there might be some scheduling conflict between Nelson's primary employment duties as a forest ranger and his duties as a School Board Member; however, Wood indicated that the scheduling matter could probably be accommodated. Wood offered no guarantee to the petitioner that the request to run for office would be approved by the appropriate agency officials. On July 18, 1980, and again on July 21, 1980, officials with the Division of Forestry orally indicated to the petitioner that he would not be allowed to run for the School Board. In view of the fact that the last day for qualifying was July 22, 1980, the petitioner determined to offer his candidacy without the permission of his agency head, and on that date he took the loyalty oath for public office for the School Board, District IV, Wakulla County, Florida, as may be seen by a Joint Exhibit No. 4, which is a copy of the Loyalty Oath and the Oath of Candidacy and Statement of Candidacy. On July 23, 1980, Larry Wood, District Forester and supervisor to the Petitioner, contacted the petitioner to inquire why the petitioner had offered his candidacy without permission of the agency. The petitioner responded that he did so because he did not feel that there was any conflict between school board duties and that of forest ranger. Wood informed him that he would hear from the Division of Forestry on the subject. Following the conversation with Wood, on July 24, 1980, the petitioner received two items in response to his request. One of those items was dated July 21, 1980, from John M. Bethea, Director, Division of Forestry, addressed to Larry Wood, in which the subject of the Petitioner's candidacy was discussed and the indication given that it would not be approved due to scheduling problems and conflict and controversies "that are generated by any local governmental political body". The memorandum went on to say, "These controversies might affect the Forestry Division's ability to carry out the responsibilities with the very segments of the public." A copy of this memorandum may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The second item received by the Petitioner on July 24, 1980, was dated on that date, and addressed to George Nelson from Larry Wood, indicating a denial of the petitioner's request to run for public office. This correspondence may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 3, a copy of which has been admitted into evidence. After the Petitioner had received the memoranda discussed herein, there ensued a series of meetings between the Petitioner and various officials within the agency in which the agency tried to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy in view of the fact that he had not gained their permission to run for the School Board. Throughout these discussions, the Petitioner continued to assert the conviction that unless some conflict of interest could be shown to him, he did not intend to withdraw as a candidate. In the discussions, the agency further stated that the choices open to the petitioner were ones of resignation from his position as Forest Ranger or withdrawal from the School Board race. They also stated that if he were caused to resign, there could be no rights to appeal beyond that point. In the course of the process, the Petitioner met with Director Bethea, who explained the Director's position on the Petitioner's right to run for office and reiterated his opposition, based upon his problems of scheduling to accommodate the needs of the Division of Forestry and the needs of the School Board of Wakulla County and also -he concern of possible conflicts and controversies arising out of the necessity for forest rangers to go on the property of the citizens of the several counties in the State of Florida and the fact that this might create a problem in view of the nature of the functions of a school board member. Although the Director generally held the philosophy that employees in positions such as the Petitioner's should not normally be allowed to run for local office, he did not absolutely foreclose the possibility that someone might persuade him to the contrary and thereby cause him to allow them to seek a local office. Each case would be reviewed on its own merits. The matter was also presented before representatives of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services, who took the same position as had been taken by the other authorities within the Department, and again the Petitioner indicated that he would decline to withdraw as a candidate. Following the meeting with the Department officials, Wood made one other contact to ascertain if the petitioner had changed his mind about withdrawing his name as a candidate and the Petitioner indicated that he had not. Subsequent to that latter conversation with Wood, the petitioner was hand-delivered a letter dated August 12, 1980, which may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 5. This letter informed the petitioner that he was deemed to have resigned his position as Forest Ranger effective August 15, 1980, and offered as a statement of authority Subsection 110.233(4)(a), Florida Statutes. That correspondence from Carl T. Dierking, Chief of Personnel Management and Employee Relations for the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, went on to say that in view of the Petitioner's decision to qualify as a candidate being made after the request to allow him to run had been initially denied by the Department and in keeping with Rule 22A-13.032, Florida Administrative Code, that the Petitioner could request an administrative hearing "toward obtaining an additional review of your situation." This request was to be forwarded through Robert Chastain, Esquire, General Counsel, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. After August 15, 1980, the petitioner was removed as a permanent party Career Service employee with the Respondent. On August 27, 1980, the Petitioner corresponded with Mr. Chastain through a letter which stated, "I would like to have an appeal of my dismissal of August 15, 1980, reason, not just cause." A copy of this petition letter may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. In turn Mr. Chastain contacted the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting that a Hearing Officer be assigned and a hearing be set. A copy of that correspondence addressed to the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 7, admitted into evidence. Through that correspondence, Mr. Chastain expressed his opinion that Rule 22A-13.032(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides that an employee has the right to a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing. Subsequent to the case assignment herein, the Petitioner through his counsel has filed a rules challenge to the Rules 22A-13.04 and 22A-7.10(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which may be found in the Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 80-1925R. In addition, the Petitioner in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 80-2049R has attacked the Joint Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3 pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, by contending that those aforementioned exhibits constitute invalid rules for reason that they were not duly promulgated. In fact, the Petitioner's duty assignment as a forest ranger would conflict at times with his function so School Board Member, in that some of the meetings of the School Board would be held at times when the Petitioner was actively on duty. In addition, the Petitioner is also on call and required to be available in his off-duty time should an emergency arise requiring his assistance as a forest ranger. The petitioner continued to work beyond August 15, 1980, and was eventually reinstated as a probationary employee with the Division of Forestry and holds the position of probationary forest ranger at this time.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent, Lavern W. Burroughs, began work with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) on July 1, 1987, and that she was not present for work on July 22, 25, or 26 of 1988. Between March 3, 1988, and July 7, 1988, Ms. Burroughs, a clerk typist, was absent on fourteen occasions. Each time "LW" was entered beside her name on an attendance and leave sheet. "LW" is used when an employee has used up all sick and annual leave, but is nevertheless authorized to take leave. The designation LW means leave without pay, but it does not indicate whether leave was authorized or unauthorized. In December of 1987, Ms. Burroughs had received a "conference letter," HRS' Exhibit No. 1, after discussing her attendance problems with Mr. Weston and his immediate supervisor, Mr. Mathis. On April 15, 1988, Mr. Weston sent her a letter in 4 which he reprimanded her for being absent without leave. HRS' Exhibit No. 2. The letter stated: It is hoped that you will view this disciplinary measure in a constructive manner and there will not be a recurrence of this nature. However, you are cautioned that further offenses of this standard will result in more stringent disciplinary measure of a ten (10) days suspension without pay up to dismissal. Mr. Mathis testified that the ordinary practice, if petitioner's absenteeism had been handled as a career service matter, would have seen a ten (10) day suspension as HRS' next response, in the event of another unauthorized absence; and that dismissal would not have occurred, unless the ten (10) day suspension failed to cure the problem. On Thursday, July 14, 1988, Ms. Burroughs went to work, as it turned out, for the last time. The next morning she called in, shortly after 9:00 o'clock, to report that she had received notice of judicial proceedings designed to foreclose on her house. Unable to reach Mr. Weston, she asked for his supervisor, Mr. Mathis. Unable to reach him, she spoke to Ms. Evan Gibson, Mr. Mathis' secretary, and told her that she would not be coming to work. Ms. Gibson said she would relay the message. Ms. Burroughs left for Georgia in an effort to obtain money from a cousin with which to retain a lawyer to represent her in the foreclosure proceedings. The next Monday, July 18, 1988, Ms. Burroughs' daughter, Sheronda, telephoned HRS' Jacksonville offices. Apparently she spoke to Mr. Weston when she reported that Ms. Burroughs had trouble with her eye. On July 20, 1988, Ms. Burroughs telephoned herself. Again unable to reach Mr. Weston, she ended up telling Ms. Gibson that her eye was running and painful. Also on July 20, 1988, she visited the Riverside Clinic, received a prescription for erythromycin, and filled it that day. A nurse filled out a form employee's medical excuse saying that Ms. Burroughs had been under the care of a doctor at the clinic "and may return to work on 7/21/88." Joint Exhibit No. 1. Mr. Weston has never denied an employee's request for sick leave. Ms. Burroughs had been granted sick leave on more than three occasions and had produced a doctor's statement on each occasion. On Thursday, July 21, 1988, Ms. Burroughs called and spoke to Mr. Weston. In a telephone conversation that lasted perhaps two minutes, she told him about the problem with her eye, and also spoke to him about the threatened foreclosure. She did not say when she would return to work, but it was clear that she was not coming in that day. After Mr. Weston responded, "Okay," his only contribution to the conversation, Ms. Burroughs said goodbye and hung up. She did not explicitly ask for leave, even as she had never done before. Her eye stopped running on July 25, 1988, a Monday. On July 26, 1988, Ms. Burroughs set out for work, having spent, she testified, all her money, except for a quarter she had with her, on gasoline, for transportation to and from work that week. When her car overheated on 1-495 she was obliged to cut her journey short. She used her only quarter to telephone her brother's house, where a sister also lived. She asked this sister to call work to tell them what had happened. Instead, a friend, Wanda Stewart, learned the circumstances from Ms. Burroughs' sister, and made the telephone call to report why petitioner would not be in that day. Anna Williams, who worked in Mr. Weston's unit last summer, took the call. Because he was not in the office, she relayed the message to Mr. Mathis' secretary. When Ms. Burroughs' called herself, on July 27, 1988, she was informed she no longer had a job.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Prior to her termination on July 18, 1983, petitioner, Pacharee K. Hasper, was a member of the Senior Management Service employed as Chief of the Bureau of Research and Analysis with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Employment Security. She held this position for approximately one and a half years and her managerial effectiveness rating was "outstanding". In December of 1982, petitioner's request for maternity leave without pay from March 14, 1983 through July 15, 1983 was approved by her then Division Director, Katie Tucker. By letter dated February 28, 1983, Ronald Villella, the new Division Director, advised petitioner that her request for maternity leave was confirmed and that "we will search for a suitable position to which you can be appointed upon completion of the leave period. If successful, you will be returned from leave of absence to the new assignment. If a suitable position cannot be located, you will be returned from leave of absence for one workday and then separated from the Senior Management Service in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.12. To avoid any unauthorized overlap in the Chief of Research and Analysis position, should you require use of sick leave during the maternity leave, we are requesting Secretary Orr to authorize a 30-day overlap in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.06(A) and Chapter 22K-9 F.A.C." Director Villella had previously told petitioner that he needed her position for a person who had helped with the Governor's campaign. When petitioner returned to work from her maternity leave on Monday, July 18, 1983, she was not permitted to go to her prior office and was told that she would be terminated at the end of that day. Thereafter, she received a letter dated July 18, 1983, from Director Villella, reading in pertinent part as follows: "We have not been successful in locating a suitable position to which you could he appointed upon the expiration of your leave of absence. Therefore, in accordance with the terms of my letter to you dated February 28, 1983 (copy enclosed), you will be separated from the Senior Management Service in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.12, F.A.C., effective 5:00 p.m. July 18, 1983. By copy of this letter, I am requesting our personnel officer to pay you for any unused annual leave in accordance with Senior Management Rule 22SM-1.12, F.A.C." Petitioner has filed a petition with the Department of Labor and Employment Security requesting a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and seeking reinstatement to her position as Chief of the Bureau of Research and Analysis with back pay and interest.
The Issue The issue for determination at the final hearing was whether the Respondent, City of Largo, as employer of Petitioner, Cleareather B. Gross, committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, a black female, was hired as a Clerical Assistant I for the City of Largo's City Clerk's Office on September 21, 1981 and was assigned to the mail room. The Petitioner was hired for the position by City Clerk Kay Klinsport, a white female. The interview went well and, although there were other candidates for the position, the Petitioner was hired. Shortly after commencing work with the City Clerk's Office, the relationship between the Petitioner and her supervisor, Kay Klinsport, began to turn sour. Ms. Klinsport utilized very strict management and supervisory techniques and was not considered a very good personnel manager by many of her subordinates. The Petitioner is an extremely assertive person and takes pride in her willingness to "speak her mind" in all situations. Ms. Darlene Trowell, a white female, worked as a secretary in the City Clerk's Department during the time in question. Ms. Trowell also had trouble with Ms. Klinsport's management and supervisory techniques, but decided that the best way to deal with her was by keeping quiet and having limited contact. Ms. Klinsport antagonized several of her subordinates, both white and black. Ms. Klinsport decided that the Petitioner should be watched especially close and asked Ms. Trowell to "keep an eye on her (Petitioner)." This occurred as a result of Ms. Klinsport's management techniques, the Petitioner's overall assertive attitude and several complaints that were received regarding the Petitioner. Ms. Klinsport no longer works for the City of Largo. Darlene Trowell frequently complained to the City Manager regarding Ms. Klinsport's managerial techniques. The City of Largo has written guidelines governing employee conduct and discipline; those guidelines are titled "Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Measures" and a copy is provided to all employees. The guidelines require that supervisors pursue a philosophy of "progressive discipline" by administering gradually increasing disciplinary actions for each successive instance of employee misconduct. Possible disciplinary actions include oral reprimand, written reprimand, suspension, and ultimately, dismissal. Kay Klinsport received several complaints regarding the Petitioner, at least one of these complaints came from the Fire Chief and one complaint came from an employee of the Police Department. In her position with the City Clerk's Office, the Petitioner had occasion to come into contact with employees of the Police and Fire Departments. One of the complaints about Petitioner came from a black employee of the Police Department. On December 3, 1981, J. G. Knight, Fire Chief, sent an interoffice memorandum to Kay Klinsport complaining of the Petitioner's behavior. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Mr. Knight had received numerous verbal complaints and at least two written complaints of confrontations and harrassments by the Petitioner when it becomes necessary for fire department clerical employees to conduct business in or around the mail room. In addition, the complaint alleged that the Petitioner wrongfully opened a sealed envelope addressed to an employee of the fire department concerning the death of a member of his immediate family. On January 29, 1982 Kay Klinsport, City Clerk, issued the Petitioner a written reprimand. The reprimand specifically addressed friction between the Petitioner and other employees and noted the following: 11-16-81 - Failure to complete a project from personnel; 12-1-81 - A confrontation with Becky from the Fire Department; 12-10-81 - A confrontation with Barbara from Public Works Department Refusal to stamp signatures on annexation notices; A confrontation with Bonnie concerning Vivian and Marlene; Problem involving mail from P. O. Box 137 and directions given from Lynn in Finance; A confrontation with Charlotte regarding mail pick-up during distribution; 1-25-82 - Compensatory time confrontation as to date used; 1-26-82 - Attitude involved throughout day and into next.' The written reprimand stated that if Petitioner received another reprimand for the same reason, she would be suspended without pay for five days in accordance with personnel rules and regulations. On February 16, 1982 Kay Klinsport, City Clerk, issued a written reprimand to the Petitioner. This reprimand involved a complaint that Ms. Klinsport had received from the Police Department concerning the Petitioner's use (or rather misuse) of the microfilming equipment. The Police Department allows the City Clerk's Office to use certain camera equipment for microfilming records. Specifically, the reprimand alleged that the Petitioner continued to run documents through the machine without proper preparation (i.e., removing staples and paperclips) despite being instructed as to the proper use of the equipment. Improper use of the machine by failing to remove staples and paperclips can cause the machine to malfunction because the staples and paperclips accumulate in the bottom of the machine. The written reprimand warned Petitioner that if she continued to misuse the camera equipment at the Police Department, she would be suspended for three days. On October 8, 1982 Kay Klinsport, City Clerk, issued a written reprimand to the Petitioner. The written reprimand cited the following: 10-1-82 - Incident involving Lynn McKenzle, Finance Department, in failure to readily relinquish use of the computer; 10-6-82 - Copy paper incident with Brenda stemming from incorrect certificate of indebtedness turned into supervisor, department head; and Verbal complaints from several other employees. On the basis of this written reprimand, the Petitioner was suspended for five days without pay. The Petitioner was warned that should her attitude continue to interfere with subordinate and/or fellow employee relationships, she would be dismissed. On November 12, 1982, the Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination against the City of Largo with the Equal Opportunity Commission (case #025830181). On November 30, 1982 Kay Klinsport issued a written reprimand to Petitioner, Specifically, the reprimand addressed the Petitioner's poor attitude and ability to deal with subordinates and/or fellow employees and noted a confrontation between the Petitioner and "Kay and Leah." On the basis of this written reprimand, the Petitioner was suspended without pay for five days, with termination of employment to take effect on December 7, 1982. Effective July 4, 1982, the Petitioner was moved from Clerical Assistant I to Acting Clerical Assistant II. On September 29, 1982, the Petitioner sent a memo to Kay Klinsport indicating her desire to apply for the permanent position of Clerical Assistant II. On November 21, 1982, the Petitioner was returned to her permanent position of Clerical Assistant I. Lynn McKenzie, a white female, was hired to fill the Clerical Assistant II position. The Petitioner performed poorly on the Clerical Assistant II written test and was not hired for the vacant position. Of the five people that took the examination, the Petitioner placed last; however, Ms. McKenzie did not make the highest score. On March 21, 1982, the Petitioner's probationary appraisal was made by Kay Klinsport. In the evaluation, the Petitioner was rated "satisfactory" on overall performance. With the exception of "attitude," all factors were rated "satisfactory;" attitude was indicated as "generally neutral; disposition and outlook varied with mood." On September 21, 1982, the Petitioner received her "anniversary performance appraisal" which was completed by Kay Klinsport. The Petitioner's overall performance was rated as "satisfactory." Ms. Klinsport did, however, mention that the Petitioner's attitude varied with her mood. The Petitioner appealed her discharge and on September 19, 1983, an order of the Federal Mediation and Faciliation Service was issued directing that the City of Largo reinstate the Petitioner without any back pay to the position held by her on the date of her discharge. The Mediation order found that the Petitioner's conduct warranted a disciplinary penalty short of discharge. The Petitioner returned to work on October 5, 1983. However, the Petitioner resigned on February 4, 1984.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner's Petition for Relief be denied in that no unlawful employment practice has been shown. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of December 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Aurelio Durana, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Ms. Patricia Catalano Personnel Analyst City of Largo Post Office Box 296 Largo, FL 33540 Ms. Cleareather B. Gross 915 North Garden Avenue Clearwater, FL 33515 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esq. P. O. Box 639 201 E. Kennedy Blvd. Suite 838 Tampa, FL 33601
Findings Of Fact Petitioner in this case is K. Kristine Nowacki. She was employed as an attorney in the office of the legal counsel for Respondent's District One in Pensacola, Florida, from November 14, 1988, until termination of her employment on June 9, 1989. Respondent is the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Rodney Johnson, the district's chief legal counsel. Cheleene Schembera was Johnson's immediate supervisor and chief administrator of District One. Upon commencement of Petitioner's employment, the work force in the legal office consisted of Johnson, a male, and Teresa Goodson, another female attorney. Another attorney, Randy Werre, was male and began employment in March of 1989. Since Petitioner had never used a dictaphone and could type exceedingly fast, 140 words per minute, she was given a word processor to prepare preliminary drafts of her work products. Word processing equipment was limited in the office. Johnson considered the provision of such equipment to Petitioner to be an exceptional employee benefit, as opposed to a burden or impairment. Petitioner never requested that she be provided with a dictaphone. Both Johnson and Schembera were concerned about Petitioner's dress and appearance. On separate occasions, both individuals spoke with Petitioner about a need to effect changes in her personal dress and grooming habits. When Johnson offered employment to Petitioner, he discussed with her the need to do something with her long, bushy and unkempt hair style. Prior to his employment offer to Petitioner, Johnson was told by Schembera that he should counsel with Petitioner about her hair style if he intended to hire Petitioner. However, the need to change dress or hair style was not a condition of employment. On January 11, 1989, Johnson spoke with Petitioner and noted that she had handled a difficult evidentiary matter in a hearing that day. However, Johnson's comments did not amount to an endorsement of Petitioner as a person with potential to become a great trial attorney. Petitioner was hired to serve as Johnson's "backup" and to effectively take Johnson's place in the event of his absence. Petitioner never developed such capability in the course of her employment with Respondent. Although Schembera spoke with Petitioner on April 21, 1989, regarding the need for Petitioner to adopt a more conservative hairstyle and dress, Schembera sought to provide Petitioner with guidance in order that Petitioner might retain the respect of her peers. Schembera told Petitioner that the discussion had no significance with regard to Petitioner's job. Such counselling by Schembera is not unusual. She has counseled with other employees concerning dress or hair styles when she considered such action to be appropriate. On at least one occasion in proximity to Petitioner's employment, Schembera counselled a male employee regarding the necessity of that employee obtaining a hair cut. Schembera even-handedly applied her grooming code to both male and female employees. Petitioner was unable to properly perform her job duties. In the judgement of her supervisors, she did not adequately prepare for hearing or otherwise adequately present Respondent's position in numerous hearings. As an attorney in Respondent's employment, Nowacki was a select exempt employee serving at the pleasure of Respondent. As such an employee, Petitioner's employment could be terminated at any time by Respondent. By letter dated June 9, 1989, Johnson informed Petitioner that her employment had been terminated. Her gross wages at the time of discharge from employment were $788.46 biweekly. The testimony of Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Rodney Johnson, was candid, consistent and creditable. That testimony establishes that Petitioner's employment was terminated because of her work performance. Neither dress nor hair length or style were factors in her termination. Johnson felt that Petitioner's appearance had begun to improve at the time of her employment termination. Petitioner's testimony, as a result of inconsistencies in that testimony and her demeanor while testifying, is not credited and fails to establish that her supervisors unlawfully terminated her employment. During the course of her seven months of employment, Petitioner made extensive use of sick leave. From an initial allotment of 104 hours, Petitioner used all but 17 hours of that leave amount. On June 27, 1989, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination against Respondent alleging termination of employment on the basis of sex.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6600 The following constitutes my ruling on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in substance. Rejected with regard to pregnancy comment, credibility. Rejected, legal conclusion, argumentative and a mere restatement of Petitioner's position. The creditable evidence establishes that Petitioner was hired and retained in employment until her lack of capability was demonstrated. Rejected, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credited. As established by Johnson's testimony, which is credited, one of Petitioner's asserted strengths was her typing capability and she was provided a word processor as a benefit. Petitioner did not establish that she objected to this arrangement at the time. Rejected, creditability, insofar as grooming and dress requirements comprising employment conditions. Adopted in substance. 7.-8. Rejected, relevancy. Rejected, Petitioner's version is not supported by weight of the evidence, creditability. Rejected, relevancy. Adopted in substance, but not verbatim. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. 13.-16. Rejected, relevancy. 17. While Schembera frankly admitted her dislike for Petitioner's dress and grooming and also accepted responsibility for the ultimate approval of the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment, this testimony does not establish that the basis for employment termination was other than Petitioner's job performance. This proposed finding must be rejected as a mischaracterization of Schembera's testimony. 18.-19. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 22.-24. Rejected, unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-21. Adopted, although not verbatim. 22.-25. Rejected, relevancy. 26.-28. Adopted by reference. 29.-30. Rejected, relevancy. 31. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: John Barry Kelly,II, Esq. 15 West Main Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Peter S. Fleitman, Esq. Lynda Quillen, Esq. Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Suite 1501 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Ronald M. McElrath Executive Director Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discharging the Petitioner from his position with the Respondent. Petitioner contends that he was discharged on account of his sex. Respondent contends that Petitioner was discharged on account of a severe attendance problem. Petitioner contends that female employees with similar or worse attendance problems were not terminated.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a corporation which does business in the State of Florida. The Respondent is a distribution warehouse for Seven-Eleven Stores. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977. Petitioner is a male citizen of the United States. He was employed in various capacities by the Respondent from January, 1974, until he was discharged on November 24, 1981. At the time of his discharge, he was employed as a receiving clerk in one of the Respondent's warehouse facilities. Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations concerning his discharge in a timely manner. A determination of reasonable cause was issued by the Commission, effort at conciliation failed, and Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief in a timely manner. From late in 1978 until the time that Petitioner was discharged, all of the Petitioner's supervisors at the Respondent experienced difficulties with Petitioner due to a poor attendance record. At the time, the Respondent followed a four-step disciplinary procedure. Step 1 was employee counseling. Step 2 involved issuance of what was called a "pink slip," or unsatisfactory employee report. At Step 3, a final letter of warning would be issued. Step 4 was discharge. The first formal record that Respondent entered Step 1 of the disciplinary procedure was an employee counseling record issued October 31, 1978. It was therein noted that Respondent had failed to call in prior to an absence from his work shift. The second employee counseling record was issued April 4, 1978. The Petitioner's supervisor discussed repeated tardiness and absences with him on that occasion. Additional counseling records were issued April 11, 1979, and April 30, 1979, and raised the same problems. While these were apparently the only formal records of employee counseling, the Petitioner had been counseled on numerous other occasions regarding excessive tardiness and absenteeism. Respondent entered Step 2 of the disciplinary procedure on November 28, 1979, when a "pink slip," or unsatisfactory performance report, was issued. It was therein noted that the Respondent had been counseled about excessive absenteeism and that his performance had not improved. Petitioner's record did not improve, and on March 19, 1980, a warning letter was issued, thus placing Petitioner in the third step of the disciplinary process. The Petitioner's record regarding excessive tardiness and absenteeism was set out in the warning letter, and it was stated that if Petitioner did not improve, it could lead to termination of his employment. Despite issuance of the warning letter, Petitioner's performance did not improve. He continued to be frequently absent or tardy. A second warning letter was issued January 28, 1981. It was therein stated: As indicated to you on your performance review January 14, 1981, you have shown little or no improvement in your attendance since the warning letter of March 19, 1980. Since several months have passed without action, you are being given this letter to serve as formal notice that you remain at the third step of our disciplinary policy. If immediate improvement in [sic] not shown it could lead to termination of your employment. Despite the second warning letter and continuing efforts by Respondent's supervisor to counsel Petitioner, Petitioner's record of excessive absenteeism and tardiness continued. On November 24, 1981, his employment was terminated. At the time of Petitioner's termination, the Respondent did not have an established policy regarding how many times an employee could be late or absent without being subjected to various stages of the Respondent's disciplinary process. The Respondent did, however, have good grounds for counseling, reprimanding, warning, and ultimately terminating Petitioner. The Respondent's supervisors were lenient with Petitioner. He was counseled continuously and warned twice, once more than usual, before he was terminated. Petitioner alleged that three specific female employees of the Respondent had absentee problems as severe or more severe than Petitioner's, but were not terminated. The evidence does not support this allegation. Each of the three female employees, Theresa Roberts, Lisa Watt, and Gloria Sanders, had attendance problems. Each was subjected to disciplinary action by the Respondent. Sanders had received a Step 3 warning in October, 1981. Roberts had received a Step 2 unsatisfactory performance report in November, 1981. Watt had been counseled respecting her problem. None of these three female employees had attendance problems as severe as Petitioner's. Furthermore, each showed some improvement following counseling, unsatisfactory performance reports, or warnings. Nothing in the treatment of these three women vis-a-vis the Respondent's treatment of Petitioner demonstrates any sex-based bias, or discriminatory action, on the part of Respondent. The Respondent now has a set policy that includes a point system regarding discipline based upon excessive absences. The policy was not in effect when Petitioner was terminated. Some people with absentee problems less severe than Petitioner's were terminated for excessive absences during the years 1977 through 1981. Other employees with attendance problems more severe than Petitioner's were not terminated. It does not appear that this disparity had any basis other than the fact that Respondent had no set policy regarding excessive absences and dealt with the issue through its individual supervisors subjectively on a case-by-case basis. In 1981, the Respondent had approximately 170 laborers or unskilled workers in its warehouse. Forty-four of them were females. During the period 1977 through 1981, 20 employees at the warehouse were terminated for excessive absences or tardinesses. Thirteen of them were male, and seven were female. Five of the seven women who were terminated had fewer absences or tardinesses than Petitioner after receipt of the Step 3 warning. Neither these statistics nor any specific evidence regarding disciplinary action taken by Respondent demonstrates any sex-based bias or discrimination.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Petitioner was employed as a Clerk Typist with Respondent. Petitioner did not report to work on February 3, 4 and 5, 1988. Respondent's leave policy is that leave should be requested in advance; if an employee gets sick, he or she needs to call in. Petitioner had not requested leave prior to February 3, 1988. On February 3, 1988, Ms. Lester, a co-worker of Petitioner's received a telephone call from a Ms. Williams who stated that Petitioner was in the hospital. Ms. Baker, Petitioner's supervisor, called three hospitals in the area and none had a Ms. Stanyard listed as a patient. Also, she contacted Ms. Stanyard's brother and another person, neither of whom had any knowledge of Petitioner's whereabouts. Finally, Ms. Baker went to Ms. Stanyard's home, but could not find Ms. Stanyard. As of the end of the day on February 5, 1988, Petitioner had not contacted her supervisor or her office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Administration issue a final order ruling that Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the career service. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Ethelda Stanyard 7855 Wilson Boulevard Apartment 17 Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Scott D. Leemis Assistant District Legal Counsel Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Agustus D. Aikens, Jr. Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
