The Issue The issues presented are whether two separate sales of unregistered securities to elderly persons demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance in violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2001); and, if so, what penalty, if any, should Petitioner impose against Respondent's license. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed in this state as an insurance agent pursuant to license number A124652. The license authorizes Respondent to perform the duties of an agent for health and life insurance and variable annuity agent. Respondent is not licensed to sell securities. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the business of insurance in this state. Petitioner is not authorized to regulate the sale of securities. On September 18, 1998, Respondent sold eight shares of unregistered securities in Palm Beach Investment Group, Inc. (Palm Beach) to Mr. and Mrs. Anthony and Lucille Fusco (Fusco) for $40,000. On January 5, 1998, Respondent sold 18 shares of unregistered securities in Palm Beach to Mrs. Gladys Speth (Speth) for $90,000. The Department of Banking has jurisdiction over the sale of unregistered securities by unlicensed individuals. The Department of Banking disciplined Respondent for the sales of unregistered securities to Fusco and Speth. On November 10, l999, Respondent and the Department of Banking entered into a Settlement Stipulation and Final Order whereby Respondent admitted he violated Sections 517.07 and 517.12 by offering for sale or selling unregistered securities while he himself was not authorized to sell securities. Respondent did not dispute these facts at the administrative hearing of this case. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sections 626.611(7)(9)(13), 626.621(2)(3) and (6), and 626.9541(1)(e)1 when he sold unregistered securities to Fusco and Speth. In Petitioner's PRO, however, Petitioner admits that Respondent could not have violated any statute other than Section 626.611(7) because Respondent did not engage in the business of insurance when he sold securities to Fusco and Speth. In relevant part, Petitioner states: Petitioner concedes that the alleged conduct does not involve insurance transactions and therefore cannot be considered transactions under Respondents [sic] insurance licenses. As a result, no violation of the other enumerated statutes has occurred. Petitioner's PRO at 11, paragraph 5. The only remaining issue that Petitioner asserts is whether Respondent violated Section 626.611(7). A licensee violates Section 626.611(7) if he or she demonstrates a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Petitioner asserts that Respondent violated Section 626.611(7) by engaging in a business other than the business of insurance in a manner that demonstrates a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Neither Fusco nor Speth are experienced investors. Neither buys or sells stock or securities and neither has any training or education in investing. Mr. and Mrs. Fusco are retirees, as is Speth. Fusco invested $40,000 of their life savings, and Speth invested $90,000 from a personal injury settlement. Mrs. Fusco had never purchased shares of stock before. Her father had lost a great deal of money in the l929 market crash and there was a long-standing family prejudice against stock. Fusco had business experience with Respondent prior to the time that Respondent sold Palm Beach securities to Fusco. That prior experience is relevant to the perspective and understanding that Fusco brought to the Palm Beach transaction. Sometime in l998, while Respondent worked with a previous employer, Respondent solicited Fusco to invest funds in a Certificate of Deposit (CD). Fusco did so and believed they were completing a similar transaction when they later purchased Palm Beach securities from Respondent. After Respondent sold the CD to Fusco, but still in l998, Respondent changed his employment to Evergreen National (Evergreen). Respondent telephoned Fusco and informed them that he had moved to Evergreen and that he was selling a very good security that they might be interested in purchasing. Mrs. Fusco explained to Respondent that they were not interested in securities, but they would be interested in purchasing a CD similar to the one they had previously purchased from Respondent. Fusco made an appointment to visit Respondent at his office. At Respondent's office, Mrs. Fusco stated unequivocally that Fusco desired to purchase only a CD. Fusco wanted no risk to their funds, and they made that clear to Respondent. Respondent represented to Fusco that Respondent was selling a CD that was fully guaranteed and insured against any loss. Respondent represented that Fusco would be investing in a proportionate share of a jumbo CD issued by Palm Beach, that they would enjoy a 14 percent return on their investment, and that their investment was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Great American Insurance Company (Great American). Respondent provided Fusco with various brochures about the investment that verified Respondent's representations that the investment was an insured, safe way to earn a high interest rate. Fusco relied on the representations contained in those brochures and those made by Respondent. Fusco was still somewhat hesitant to invest their funds. Respondent then brought into his office Darrin Carlson, the president of Evergreen (Carlson). Carlson reiterated to Fusco that the investment was insured and was completely safe and without risk. Fusco elected to invest $40,000 to purchase a CD. They gave a check to Respondent, and Respondent promptly remitted the check to Palm Beach. On September 18, 1998, Fusco signed a document entitled Subscription Agreement. The terms of the Subscription Agreement state that it is an application for Fusco to purchase shares of stock in Palm Beach. The agreement is clearly not an application to purchase a CD. In fact, no reference is made in the document to any CD or to Fusco's $40,000. Fusco did not understand the terms of the Subscription Agreement. Respondent did not explain the terms of the agreement to them. Fusco relied on the representations made by Respondent. Approximately three weeks later, Fusco received a stock certificate in the mail issued by Palm Beach showing that they owned eight shares of stock in Palm Beach. The certificate makes no reference to any CD or Fusco's $40,000 investment. Fusco was confused and upset. The stock certificate does not document that the Fusco's owned any CD or any share in a CD. Furthermore, Respondent offered no evidence of the use of the funds by Palm Beach. Fusco contacted Respondent. Respondent assured Fusco that this was the "way things were done," and their investment was safe. Fusco trusted Respondent and relied on the representation by Respondent. In May of l999, Fusco received a letter from Palm Beach informing Fusco that they would receive a full refund of their money plus interest as of June 7, l999. Palm Beach did not deliver on its promise. When Fusco did not receive any money from Palm Beach, Fusco contacted Respondent. Respondent assured Fusco that their investment as safe, that they were insured, and that they would soon receive their money. Fusco has never received the original $40,000 or any interest payment from Palm Beach. Palm Beach has never provided an accounting to Fusco showing the value of their investment. Fusco has suffered a loss of $40,000 plus accumulated interest at a fair market value rate. Respondent also sold unregistered securities to Speth. Sometime in January l999, Respondent visited the home of Speth. Speth had recently received $90,000 as a personal injury settlement and was looking for a secure investment. Speth wanted a risk-free investment. She told Respondent that she would purchase a CD, but had no interest in purchasing stock. Respondent suggested that Speth invest in a proportionate share of a jumbo CD to be issued by Palm Beach that would yield a 14 percent return. Respondent represented that the CD would be insured and risk free. Respondent showed Speth various brochures claiming that the investment was fully insured by the FDIC as well as other insurance companies. Respondent did not inform Speth that there was a risk she could lose her entire investment. Speth gave Respondent a check for $90,000 made out to Palm Beach to invest in a CD with a one-year maturity date. Speth subsequently received a stock certificate in the mail from Palm Beach showing that she owned 18 shares of Palm Beach stock. Speth was puzzled, telephoned Respondent, and told him that she thought she had purchased a CD. Respondent represented to Speth that her money was safe and fully insured. Speth has not received either her original investment or any interest on that investment. Palm Beach has not provided Speth with an accounting showing the value of her investment. Speth has suffered a loss of $90,000 plus accumulated interest at a fair market value rate. Respondent sold investments to Fusco and Speth that were not appropriate for their age, skill, and investment objectives. Both Fusco and Speth clearly expressed the maximum aversion to risk. Neither Fusco nor Speth would have invested in Palm Beach if they knew they were investing in stock. Both Fusco and Speth intended to purchase a CD or a proportionate share of a CD that was insured by the FDIC and Great American. At no time were their investments insured by the FDIC or any insurance company. Respondent had actual knowledge of the investment goals and skill of Fusco and Speth. Respondent believed that he was selling an investment vehicle that was appropriate to the knowledge, skill, and goals of Fusco and Speth. Prior to selling any securities in Palm Beach, Respondent undertook several independent inquiries that are fairly characterized as a form of due diligence. Some of Respondent's efforts toward due diligence are relevant to the unauthorized sale of unregistered securities. Other efforts are relevant to the nature of the investment as a secured investment. Palm Beach represented in a letter to Respondent that the securities offered for sale were exempt from registration. Carlson believed the securities were exempt and assured Respondent that Respondent did not need a license to sell the securities. Carlson went on-line to the web site of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and obtained a letter from private securities attorneys stating that the securities were exempt. Carlson believed that the securities were insured by Great American and obtained a copy of a financial institution bond with a limit of $5 million. Carlson represented to Respondent that any investment in Palm Beach securities was an insured investment. Respondent thought that he had verified the matter by telephoning the office of Great American and obtaining verbal assurances that the Palm Beach investment was insured. Respondent had a good faith belief that the securities he offered to Fusco and Speth, in part, were appropriate to the clients' investment goals because Respondent believed the securities satisfied the risk aversion expressed by Fusco and Speth. Respondent believed the securities were risk-free because he believed they were insured. Respondent knew the Palm Beach securities he offered to Fusco and Speth, in part, were not appropriate to the clients' investment goals because the securities were stock in a company and that neither Fusco nor Speth wanted to invest in securities. The first paragraph of the Securities Agreement clearly states that the investor is purchasing stock in Palm Beach. Respondent had actual knowledge that he was selling securities to Fusco and Speth and that neither wanted to purchase securities. Respondent has demonstrated in two separate transactions a willingness to sell a product to a person that the person did not desire to purchase. Even though the products sold were securities, rather than insurance, and even though Respondent believed the products represented the risk- free investment sought by Fusco and Speth, the willingness to sell securities to persons who have expressly stated that they do not want to purchase that type of product demonstrates a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Section 626.611(7). Respondent sold a product to Fusco and Speth that, in fact, was not risk-free. Respondent's due diligence prior to the sale did not include an independent attempt to ascertain whether Palm Beach in fact purchased a jumbo CD with the investments made by Fusco and Speth. Respondent did not disclose his omission to Fusco or Speth. After Respondent entered into a stipulation and final order with the Department of Banking, Respondent continued to represent to Fusco and Speth that their money was safe and that they would receive their money. Respondent has no prior discipline against his insurance license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 626.611(7) and suspending Respondent's license for nine months. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Elihu H. Berman, Esquire 509 South Greenwood Avenue Post Office Box 6801 Clearwater, Florida 33758 James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street, Room 612 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether Petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, just cause to terminate Respondent's employment.
Findings Of Fact Hill was a School Board employee from 1978 up to and including December 15, 1999. In the 1999-2000 school year, Hill was assigned to Palm Beach Gardens High School. Although classified as a "teacher on special assignment," his employment responsibilities paralleled those of an Assistant Principal. Hill's job responsibilities included monitoring the halls, supervising the campus and working with students in various functions. He was also responsible for student discipline. Hill enjoyed his work with students and was good at it. He was very well liked by students and interacted positively with them. His authority was rarely challenged. In his last two annual evaluations, Hill was described as a "team player" who "maintains excellent rapport with all students" and serves a "vital role" in the operation of the school. Hill's life and previously unblemished career began to unravel on the night of December 16, 1999. Sometime around midnight, Hill was the subject of a traffic stop. Hill was driving a car owned by his sister, and was alone when pulled over on Atlantic Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. Hill was detained because a Delray Beach police officer had observed that Hill's driving was erratic; that his left taillight was out; and the car's license tag was out of date. At all times during the traffic stop and the events which transpired after, Hill conducted himself as a "perfect gentleman." He was polite and fully cooperative with the police. After failing a roadside sobriety test, Hill was arrested and taken to the Palm Beach County Jail. Hill consented to a breath test, which revealed an unlawful blood alcohol level of .159/.158. The test result triggered an automatic suspension of Hill's driving privileges; however, those privileges were reinstated by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles when it came to light that the so-called Intoxilyzer breath analysis machine on which Hill's test was performed had not been maintained in the manner required by law. While being held in custody, Hill's personal belongings, including the contents of his pockets, were taken from him at the jail. During this process, police claim to have found a baggie weighing 7.4 ounces and containing cocaine. The evidence established that at least two Delray Beach police officers were involved in the portion of the booking process which resulted in the alleged discovery of a "dime bag" of cocaine; however, at the final hearing, Delray Beach Police Officer Scott McGuire (McGuire) was the only witness produced by the School Board who claimed knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged discovery of the baggie, which allegedly contained 7.4 grams of cocaine. McGuire's testimony fell far short of clear and convincing evidence that Hill did in fact possess a dime bag, a baggie, 7.4 grams of cocaine, or 7.4 grams of a substance containing cocaine. McGuire's testimony alternated general statements about what usually happens during the booking process with what happened with respect to Hill's booking on the night of December 16, 1999. McGuire's casual demeanor while testifying, coupled with the imprecise nature of the questions asked and the answers given by him, rendered the undersigned unable to conclude that an appropriate chain of custody had been maintained. In other words, the School Board failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the contents of Hill's pockets--and only the contents of Hill's pockets--were at all times accounted for and handled in a manner adequate to assure that no items were removed or added. Initially, the School Board, relying solely upon police reports, asserted that the baggie alleged to have been found in Hill's possession contained 7.4 grams of cocaine. That assertion was negated by Gina Evanzia (Evanzia), Senior Forensic Scientist for the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Crime Laboratory and the only School Board witness with personal knowledge of the actual baggie alleged to have been found among Hill's possessions. Evanzia testified that the baggie which the School Board attributed to Hill was not large enough to hold 7.4 grams of anything. The baggie provided to Evanzia for testing and alleged to have come out of Hill's pocket contained 18 milligrams of a substance which contained cocaine, and not the 7.4 grams alleged to have been found in Hill's possession on the night of December 16, 1999. At the time of Hill's arrest and at final hearing, neither McGuire nor any other witness provided a useful physical description of the baggie alleged to have been in Hill's pocket. The gaps in McGuire's testimony coupled with the unexplained discrepancies between the 7.4 gram baggie alleged to have been found in Hill's possession and the much smaller baggie about which Evanzia testified makes it impossible to determine what, if any, contraband was found on Hill's person. The alleged discovery of the 7.4 gram baggie resulted in the police recommending that Hill be charged with introducing contraband into a correctional facility. Declining to do so, the State Attorney instead charged Hill with possession of cocaine. Prior to the time Hill was transported to the jail, the arresting officers searched Hill's sister's car for contraband. Finding none, the police made arrangements for the car to be impounded and towed to a privately owned lot for storage. After the car was placed in the custody of the towing company, one of its employees claimed to have found two more baggies alleged to contain significant amounts of cocaine in plain sight on the floorboard of the car. Police tested the baggies for fingerprints but found none. There is no credible evidence that there was any cocaine on the floorboard of the car while it was in Hill's possession and control. The testimony of Officer V. Gray (Gray) that he failed to spot the baggies "[because he] didn't have a flashlight to go through the car real good" was so implausible that Gray was readily cross-examined out of it on the next page of transcript. 1/ No criminal charges were brought against Hill on account of these baggies. Although Hill had substantial and legitimate defenses to the criminal charges which the State Attorney did elect to file, Hill accepted responsibility for the arrest by accepting the State Attorney's offer to enter into a plea bargain which would take into account Hill's previously spotless record. The State Attorney, believing that Hill should be afforded an opportunity to atone for the aberrational events of December 16, 1999, and to rehabilitate himself, permitted Hill to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of driving while intoxicated, and to dispose of the cocaine charge by entering a pretrial intervention (PTI) program. At the time of the final hearing, Hill was in full compliance with all of the terms of the PTI agreement. At all times material to this case, Hill was appropriately contrite about the DUI arrest. He was and is willing to demonstrate his contrition and his commitment to public service by accepting any assignment, coupled with any degree of probation and/or supervision deemed appropriate by the School Board, to assure that he is fully rehabilitated before being allowed to resume contact with students.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a Final Order reinstating Hill's employment with the School Board with back pay and benefits retroactive to the date of termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Delbert W. Ogden holds license number CR 0051562 as a registered roofing contractor in the State of Florida. He held this registration at all times material to this action. Mr. Ogden was the qualifying agent for Sealtite Roofing and Waterproofing, Inc. from December 15, 1986 through May 30, 1987. The Watkins Contract On April 1, 1987, Sealtite Roofing and Waterproofing entered into a contract with Pauline Watkins (Ms. Watkins' name is now Pauline Watkins- Biddulph), to replace the roof on her home. The work included both a cement tile roof and a flat gravel roof. In her dealings with Sealtite Ms. Watkins dealt with a salesman, Tom Pagano. She never dealt with Mr. Ogden. Sealtite Roofing agreed to provide a written warranty on the roofing work for a period of 10 years. It delivered the Warranty when the work was completed. Ms. Watkins made a deposit with Sealtite at the time the contract was signed. A further amount was paid to Sealtite when the work has halfway finished, on April 27, 1987, and the final payment was made when the work was completed on May 1, 1987. At the time the house was reroofed, the weather was dry. After rain which occurred in late June, 1987, (almost two months after the work had been completed) Ms. Watkins had a number of leaks, the most serious being a leak in the kitchen. Ms. Watkins notified Mr. Pagano of the problem on June 30; the next day an inspector from Sealtite came to the house. Ms. Watkins then spoke with the office manager of Sealtite who informed her that the roofing would be removed and all water damage would be repaired, that new material to replace the roof had been ordered, and the new roofing material should arrive so that the corrective work could be done during the week of July 6, 1987. No one came in early July to repair the damage, so Ms. Watkins contacted the engineering department of the building division of the Village of North Palm Beach. Nothing came of that contact. Ms. Watkins again called the building inspector for the Village of North Palm Beach on July 22 and was advised to contact the Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board, because by that time Sealtite's phone had been disconnected. On July 23, 1987, a Mr. Slee, the owner of Sealtite, informed Ms. Watkins that her roof would be inspected again the next day. On July 24, two men appeared at Ms. Watkins' home, inspected the roof and left without speaking with Ms. Watkins. Ultimately, by August 13, 1987, Ms. Watkins complained to investigators with the Florida Department of Professional Regulation about the roofing company's failure to honor its warranty. On August 14, 1987 she was contacted by a Mr. Greg Martin, who claimed to be the qualifier for Sealtite at that time, and Mr. Slee. They were to arrange for repair of the roof by August 31, 1987, but they never did so. Mr. Ogden Delbert Ogden had disagreements with Mr. Slee, the owner of Sealtite Roofing, which caused him to resign as the qualifier for Sealtite with the Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board. His letter of resignation was mailed to the Palm Beach County Board on April 27, 1987. He followed this action with a latter to the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, resigning as the qualifier for Sealtite with the State on May 14, 1987. As a result of his letter to the State, he received a receipt from the Jacksonville office of the Construction Industry Licensing Board on May 30, 1987, acknowledging that his license was placed on an inactive status. Mr. Ogden's first contact with Ms. Watkins was on November 6, 1987. He suggested that Ms. Watkins retain a lawyer to sue Mr. Slee and Sealtite. Ms. Watkins declined, maintaining that the dispute was between Mr. Ogden as the qualifier and Mr. Slee as the owner of the corporation which Mr. Ogden had qualified. Necessary Repairs Due to the inadequate work that was done on Ms. Watkins' roof by Sealtite, the roof had to be repaired. She paid $2,572.50 to remove and replace the roof Sealtite had installed, and also paid B & N Building Services $950.25 to repair the kitchen and porch ceilings and to replace a beam. She also paid 375 for new drywall, a repair to another damaged ceiling and other work done by another repair firm. Mr. Ogden's Past History with the Board On two occasions complaints had been made about Mr. Ogden's work to the Construction Industry Licensing Board. On September 9, 1987, the Board chairman signed a closing order finding there was probable cause to believe that Mr. Ogden did not obtain a permit in a timely manner, and on January 7, 1988, the chairman signed a closing order finding probable cause that Mr. Ogden had failed to honor a guarantee for work on a residential room addition. In both cases, Ogden was sent a letter of guidance. It appears that as the result of receiving the letter of guidance, Mr. Ogden was never provided an opportunity to formally dispute either of the complaints made against him. The mere fact that the Board found probable cause to believe Mr. Ogden may have violated Chapter 489 on prior occasions in no way proves that Mr. Ogden was actually guilty of misconduct on either occasion. There is no factual basis in the record for concluding that Mr. Ogden has been guilty of misconduct on prior occasions.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against Delbert W. Ogden be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitute my rulings on proposed findings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Findings Proposed by Department Covered in paragraph 1. Covered in paragraph 1. Covered in paragraph 2. Covered in paragraph 2. Covered in paragraph 4 Covered in paragraph 4. Covered in paragraph 4. Covered in paragraph 4. Covered in paragraph 4. Covered in paragraph 7. Subsidiary to the first clause in paragraph 7. To the extent relative, covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 5. Rejected as subordinate to finding of fact 1. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected for the reasons stated In finding of fact 8. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Delbert W. Ogden 360 Selve Terrace West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Seely, Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Drawer 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
