The Issue Whether Petitioners committed the offenses alleged and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioners Jerry J. Robinson and Charles Osz, were detention deputies employed by the Respondent, Everett S. Rice, Pinellas County Sheriff (Respondent), and assigned to the Pinellas County Jail (Jail). Detention deputies are correctional officers and, as is the case with all detention deputies, Petitioners were responsible for the care, custody, and control of persons held at the Jail. On January 30, 1998, Officer John Fitzgerald of the Largo Police Department took Duston Llano into custody and transported him to the Jail. Joseph Nichols, an Explorer Scout with the Largo Police Department, accompanied Officer Fitzgerald to the Jail. Mr. Llano was not under arrest since he had committed no crime but was taken into custody pursuant to the Marchman Act based upon his intoxicated condition. When he was taken into custody, Mr. Llano did not resist or threaten physical harm to the officers but did threaten to sue the officers. On January 30, 1998, Petitioners Robinson and Osz were assigned to the booking area of the Jail. Upon Mr. Llano's arriving at the Jail, Petitioners Robinson and Osz took possession of him in the pre-booking area. Shortly thereafter, Petitioners transported Mr. Llano to the post-booking section of the Jail and placed him in Cell 4. Mr. Llano was barely able to walk and was assisted by Petitioners Robinson and Osz to the post-booking area. Once in Cell 4, Petitioners began a pat-down search of Mr. Llano. Petitioner Robinson was to the left of Mr. Llano and Petitioner Osz was to Mr. Llano's right. During the search, a substance Petitioners believed might be crack cocaine was found on the person of Mr. Llano. After the suspicious substance was found on Mr. Llano, Detention Deputy Monte Esry requested that Detention Deputy Larry Potts summon Officer Fitzgerald and Mr. Nichols and ask them to remain at the Jail to possibly process the substance and effect an arrest of Mr. Llano. Detention Deputy Potts complied with Detention Deputy Esry's request and then accompanied Officer Fitzgerald and Mr. Nichols down the hall from the pre-booking area to Cell 4 of the post-booking area where Mr. Llano was being held. The substance found on Mr. Llano's person and believed to be contraband was found by Petitioner Osz who gave the substance to Petitioner Robinson. Petitioner Robinson then handed the substance to Detention Deputy Esry who handed it to Detention Deputy Potts who, then, handed it to Officer Fitzgerald for testing. Having found what they believed to be contraband, Petitioners Osz and Robinson began a strip search of Mr. Llano. When they arrived at Cell 4, Officer Fitzgerald stood near the doorway to the cell and Mr. Nichols remained in the hallway outside the cell. From Officer Fitzgerald's and Mr. Nichols' vantage point, it was possible for them to see into Cell 4. Both Officer Fitzgerald and Mr. Nichols observed Mr. Llano sitting on the bunk in the cell with Petitioner Robinson on his left and Petitioner Osz on his right. Mr. Llano was slumped over and again made reference to suing everyone. However, Mr. Llano took no action to resist or otherwise justify the use of force. In an apparent response to Mr. Llano's threat to sue, Petitioner Osz grabbed Mr. Llano by his hair, straightened him up and slapped him on the face or head at least twice. While Petitioner Osz was slapping Mr. Llano, he said something to the effect of "how about another thousand" or "there is another thousand." From his vantage point in the hall, not more than 15 feet away, Mr. Nichols saw Petitioner Osz slap Mr. Llano and heard the comments by Petitioner Osz. Officer Fitzgerald, who was at the doorway of Cell 4, approximately nine feet, also saw the slapping incident and heard the comments made by Petitioner Osz. During the course of the slapping incident, Detention Deputy Potts was also in Cell 4. Nonetheless, he testified that he did not see Petitioner Osz slap Mr. Llano. When Petitioner Osz slapped Mr. Llano, Petitioner Robinson was in Cell 4 and within five or six feet of Petitioner Osz and Mr. Llano. However, at the time of the incident, Petitioner Robinson was preoccupied with depositing items obtained from Mr. Llano's person into a property bag that was on a steel table in the cell and did not see Petitioner Osz slap Mr. Llano. Also, because the Jail was very busy and loud on this evening, Petitioner Robinson did not hear Petitioner Osz slap Mr. Llano. Because Petitioner Robinson did not observe the incident, he did not respond to or report Petitioner Osz' actions toward Mr. Llano. Neither Officer Fitzgerald nor Mr. Nichols observed Petitioner Robinson during the slapping incident and could not testify as to where he was looking when the incident occurred. After the slapping incident, Officer Fitzgerald and Mr. Nichols then left the area of Cell 4 in order to conduct a test of the substance found in Mr. Llano's pants pocket. As a result of the test performed by Officer Fitzgerald, it was determined that the substance was not illegal. After conducting the presumptive test, Officer Fitzgerald and Mr. Nichols left the Jail. Officer Fitzgerald and Mr. Nichols subsequently reported the slapping incident to their supervisors and prepared reports memorializing the events they observed. A representative of the City of Largo Police Department then reported the incident to the Respondent, who initiated an investigation by the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Inspections Bureau, Administrative Inquiry Division. As a part of the investigation regarding the conduct in question, sworn statements were taken from Officer Fitzgerald, Mr. Nichols, Detention Deputy Potts, Detention Deputy Esry and Petitioners Osz and Robinson. Attempts to speak with Mr. Llano were fruitless based upon his lack of recollection of the incident. During the course of his sworn statement, Petitioner Robinson stated that he did not see Petitioner Osz slap Mr. Llano. Detention Deputy Potts, who was also in Cell 4 during the incident, also stated in his sworn statement that he did not observe Petitioner Osz slap Mr. Llano. During his sworn statement, Petitioner Osz denied that he ever struck Mr. Llano. After completing its investigation, the Administrative Inquiry Division presented its entire investigative file to the Chain of Command Board without conclusion or recommendation. The Chain of Command Board met and after reviewing the materials provided by the Administrative Inquiry Division and giving Petitioners the opportunity to respond further, the complaints against Petitioners were sustained. Specifically, the violations determined to have occurred as to Petitioner Osz were: Violation of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by the Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, subsection 4: conduct unbecoming a public servant; violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the office of the Sheriff; Violation of PCSO Rule C1, V, A (Level Five Violation), 006, relating to truthfulness; Violation of PCSO Rule C1, V, A (Level Five Violation), 021, relating to custody of arrestees/prisoners; Violation of PCSO Rule C1, V, C (Level Three Violation), 060, relating to standard of conduct. Under the PCSO Guidelines, a sustained finding of two Level Five violations and one Level Three violation is the basis for assigning 115 disciplinary points. As a result, Petitioner Osz was assessed 115 disciplinary points. The Sheriff's Office General Order B-15 identifies a disciplinary range for a total point award of 115 points to be a minimum discipline of a 15-day suspension and a maximum discipline termination. In the instant case, the discipline imposed against Petitioner Osz was termination. Specifically, the violations determined to have occurred as to Petitioner Robinson were: Violation of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by the Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, subsection 4: conduct unbecoming a public servant; violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the office of the Sheriff; Violation of PCSO Rule C1, V, A (Level Five Violation), 006, relating to truthfulness; Violation of PCSO Rule C1, V, B (Level Four violation), 037, relating to reporting violations of laws, ordinances, rules or orders. Under the PCSO Guidelines, a sustained finding of one Level Five violation and one Level Four violation is the basis for assigning 80 disciplinary points. As a result, in the instant case, Petitioner Robinson was assessed 80 disciplinary points. The Sheriff's Office General Order B-15 identifies a disciplinary range for a total point award of 80 points to be a minimum discipline of a 10-day suspension and a maximum discipline of termination. In the instant case, the discipline imposed against Petitioner Robinson was termination. The conduct engaged in by Petitioner Osz in slapping Mr. Llano was unnecessary, excessive, did not constitute a good correction practice and is not consistent with the training or conduct expected of correctional officers.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the PCSO enter a Final Order: 1) finding Petitioner Osz guilty of the conduct alleged in the charging document; (2) upholding the termination of Petitioner Osz' employment as a detention deputy with the PCSO; (3) dismissing the charges against Petitioner Robinson; and, (4) reinstating Petitioner Robinson as a detention deputy with the PCSO. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. LauBach, Esquire Executive Director Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association 3737 16th Street, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 Jean H. Kwall, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500 Charles Osz, pro se 2545 Coachman Road Northeast Number 127 Clearwater, Florida 33765 Keith Tischler, Esquire Power, Quaschnick, Tischler and Evans Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 B. Norris Rickey Office of Pinellas County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616 William Repper, Chairperson Pinellas County Sheriff's Civil Service Board Post Office Box 539 Clearwater, Florida 33757
The Issue The issues are whether, in violation of sections 120.54(1)(a) and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, Respondent has made an agency statement that is an unadopted rule in implementing a 2017 statutory amendment broadening the category of first-time test-takers to be counted when calculating the passing rate of the graduates of Petitioner’s prelicensure professional nursing education program (Program) and whether, pursuant to section 57.111, Petitioner may recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Respondent. At Petitioner’s request, the parties presented evidence concerning constitutional challenges that Petitioner intends to present to a district court of appeal.
Findings Of Fact The Program is a prelicensure professional nursing education program that terminates with an associate degree. Respondent approved the Program in 2013, thus authorizing Petitioner to admit degree-seeking students into the Program, as provided in section 464.019. As provided by section 464.019(5)(a)1., the passing rate of the Program’s graduates taking the NCLEX for the first time must meet or exceed the minimum passing rate, which is ten points less than the average passage rate of graduates taking the NCLEX nationally for the first time. Until June 23, 2017, the passing rate of a Florida program was based only on first-time test-takers who had taken the exam within six months of graduating (New Graduates). Chapter 2017-134, sections 4 and 8, Laws of Florida, which took effect when signed into law on June 23, 2017 (Statutory Amendment), removes the six-month restriction, so that the passing rate of a Florida program is now based on all first-time test-takers, regardless of when they graduated (Graduates). The statutory language does not otherwise address the implementation of the Statutory Amendment. For 2015 and 2016, respectively, the minimum passing rates in Florida were 72% and 71.68%, and the Program’s New Graduates passed the NCLEX at the rates of 44% and 15.79%. As required by section 464.019(5), Respondent issued the Probationary Order. The Probationary Order recites the provisions of section 464.019(5)(a) specifying the applicable passing rate, directing Respondent to place a program on probation if its graduates fail to pass at the minimum specified passing rates for two consecutive years, and mandating that the program remain on probation until its passing rate achieves the minimum specified rate. The Probationary Order details the 2015 and 2016 passing rates of Petitioner’s relevant graduates and the minimum passing rates for these years. The Probationary Order makes no attempt to describe the condition of probation, which might have included a reference to New Graduates, other than to refer to section 464.019(5)(a)2., which, unchanged by the Statutory Amendment, specifies only that a program must remain on probation until and unless its graduates achieve a passing rate at least equal to the minimum passing rate for the year in question. For 2017, the minimum passing rate for a Florida program was 74.24%. If, as Respondent contends, the new law applies to all of 2017, six of the fifteen of the Program’s Graduates failed the NCLEX, so the Program’s passing rate was inadequate at 60%. If, as Petitioner contends, the old law applies to all of 2017, twelve of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates, and only three of them failed, so the Program’s passing rate was adequate at 75%. Respondent clearly applied the Statutory Amendment retroactively to January 1, 2017, in the Order Extending Probation because the order states that that the passing rate of the Program’s Graduates for 2017 was only 60% and therefore extends Petitioner’s probationary status for 2018. The Order Extending Probation provides Petitioner with a clear point of entry to request an administrative hearing. Each party applies the Statutory Amendment without regard to the effective date of June 23, 2017, but Respondent reaches the correct conclusion: the passing rate of the Program’s graduates for 2017 was inadequate. The NCLEX is administered throughout the year, and the dates of graduation are available for Petitioner’s Graduates taking the NCLEX in 2017, so it is possible to calculate a combined passing rate, using only New Graduates under the old law for testing dates through June 22 and all Graduates under the new law for testing dates after June 22. From January 1 through June 22, 2017, five of the Program’s test-takers were New Graduates and they all passed. From June 23 through December 31, 2017, four of the eight Graduates taking the NCLEX passed the test. Combining these results for all of 2017, the Program’s passing rate was nine divided by thirteen, or 69%, which was inadequate for 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Phillip J. Aleong, D.V.M., violated Section 474.214(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), by failing to pay an administrative fine and investigative costs within 30 days from the date of the filing of Final Order BPR-2005-04911 with Petitioner's Clerk as alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, on June 26, 2006, in BPR Case Number 2005-066424; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice veterinary medicine in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The following facts were stipulated to by the parties: Respondent is licensed in the State of Florida as a veterinarian, having been issued license number VM-6466. On September 1, 2005, Respondent appeared before the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine to approve a Settlement Stipulation as to DOAH Case No. 05-1971PL. At the hearing, the terms of the Settlement Stipulation (herein after the "Stipulation") were placed on the record and the members of the Board voted to approve the settlement. On September 9, 2005, the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine rendered the Final order Approving Settlement Stipulation Number BPR-2005-04911 (herein after the "Final Order") against Respondent's veterinary license, by filing the original Final Order with the Department's Agency Clerk. A copy of the Final Order was mailed to Respondent's Counsel. However, a copy was not sent or mailed directly to the Respondent. The Settlement Stipulation, as adopted by the Final Order, amongst other terms, required Respondent to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5000.00 and investigative costs in the amount of $479.76 within thirty (30) days from the date of filing the Final Order with the Department's Agency Clerk. As the Final Order was filed with the Agency Clerk on Setpember [sic] 9, 2005, Respondent's compliance with the payment terms of the Final Order was required on or before October 9, 2005. Pursuant to the Final Order and the Stipulation Agreement incorporated therein by reference, Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Respondent's veterinarian license would be suspended for 90 days in the event that Respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Stipulation or the Final Order. Respondent was aware of this penalty provision at the time of signing the agreement, was present as the time of its adoption by the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine, and was aware that the sums would be due 30 days after the Board signed the Final Order itself which was to occur sometime after the September 1, 2005 meeting. Respondent failed to remit payment of the administrative fine and cost required under the Final Order by October 9, 2005. On December 27, 2005, the DBPR mailed Respondent an investigatory complaint placing Respondent on notice that the fine had not been paid. The computer printout attached to the investigatory complaint, as well as the handwritten complaint generated by the Petitioner, both of which were included therein allege that Respondent had not paid the fine. Neither document asserts that the Respondent failed to remit the costs, however, a copy of the Stipulation and Order were included with the investigatory complaint. On January 12, 2006, after receipt of the investigatory [sic] complaint, Respondent paid the fine. Respondent paid the costs on May 8, 2006. On June 26 2006, after both the fine and costs were paid in full, Petitioner filed this proceeding alleging that the fine and costs had not been paid. Petitioner has stated that it has not located any cases in its records where a fine was imposed, then paid late, in which an administrative complaint was not filed. However, Petitioner is unable to offer testimony, with absolute certainty, that prior to the administrative complaint filed in this matter, that all other veterinarians have paid fines assessed in a final order by their due date. Petitioner has not found any evidence indicating that it has ever filed an administrative complaint against a party for failure to timely pay an imposed fine, after said fine was paid by the party. Petitioner has found no evidence contrary to or may otherwise reasonably dispute that the administrative complaint against a party for failure to timely pay an imposed fine, after said fine was paid by the party. The facts in Final Order BPR-95-05774 (Exhibit "B") and Final Order BPR-2003-02869 (Exhibit "C") are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Veterinary Medicine finding that Phillip J. Aleong, D.V.M., has violated Section 474.214(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as described in this Recommended Order, and requiring that he pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Drew Winters, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Bradford J. Beilly, Esquire Law Offices of Bradford J. Beilly, P.A. 1144 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Juanita Chastain, Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 15A-9.006(2) (the Rule) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to section 120.52(8)(b), (c), and (d), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact An IID is: A breath alcohol analyzer connected to a motor vehicle's ignition. In order to start the motor vehicle engine, a convicted person must blow a deep lung breath sample into the analyzer, which measures the breath alcohol concentration. If the breath alcohol concentration exceeds the fail point on the [IID], the motor vehicle engine will not start. Fla. Admin. Code R. 15A-9.003(13). Rule 15A-9.005, which is entitled, "Specifications," provides in part: All [IIDs] will be required to meet or exceed the standards set forth in the model specifications published in the Federal Register, Volume 57, No. 67, pages 11772- 11787 by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Technical specifications for the operation and installation of the [IID] shall be described in the contract between [Respondent] and the manufacturer(s). The [IIDs] alcohol fail point shall be the level specified by Section 316.1937, Florida Statutes. Rule 15A-9.005(4), (5), and (6) establishes performance specifications for failed-point tests on initial startup and rolling retests and for an emergency bypass. Rule 15A-9.007, which is entitled, "Certification," provides: Each manufacturer under contract with [Respondent] will submit certification from an independent laboratory certifying that their [IID] has been tested in accordance with the model specifications published in the Federal Register, Volume 57, No. 67, pages 11772-11787 by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the [IID] meets or exceeds those specifications, as well as criteria set forth in the contract with [Respondent]. The manufacturer shall be responsible for the continuing certification of [IID] service providers for use of an approved [IID]. Rule 15A-9.003(6) defines "certification" as the "testing and approval process required by [Respondent]." Rule 15A-9.003(16) defines "manufacturer" as the "actual producer of the [IID] who assembles the product and who may provide distribution and services." Rule 15A-9.003(21) defines "service provider" as the "retail supplier of the approved [IID]." Rule 15A-9.008 addresses the installation and removal of IIDs. Rule 15A-9.008(1) requires the "manufacturer or his [sic] representative" to install the IID in accordance with the guidelines of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Rule 15A-19.008(2) requires the "service provider" to develop and deliver an IID orientation to the convicted person. Rule 15A-9.009 addresses the servicing of IIDs. Rule 15A-9.009(2) requires the "service provider" to service the IID at the intervals stated in the contract with Respondent, calibrate the IID, retrieve data from the IID and timely submit the data to Respondent, and check for signs of tampering with the IID. Rule 15A-9.009(5) requires an IID to record the time and date of each breath test, the breath alcohol level of each test, and the time and date of any attempt to tamper with the IID. Rule 15A-9.009(6) requires the "manufacturer or service provider" to maintain a toll-free 24-hour emergency telephone support service and fix or replace any nonoperational IID within 48 hours of any call. Rule 15A-9.006, which is entitled, "Procedure for [IID] Approval," provides: All ignition interlock devices used pursuant to Sections 316.193 and 316.1937, Florida Statutes, must be approved by the department. The department shall contract with a manufacturer or manufacturers of ignition interlock devices for the services and commodities required for implementation of Sections 316.193, 316.1937, and 316.1938, Florida Statutes. The department shall maintain a list of approved ignition interlock devices. For the specific authority and laws implemented, Rule 15A-9.006 cites the same authority: sections 316.193, 316.1937, and 316.1938, Florida Statutes, and Federal Register Volume 57, Number 67, pages 11772-11787. Section 316.193 imposes penalties for DUI offenses. For second and third DUIs, convicted persons must have installed "an [IID] approved by [Respondent] in accordance with s. 316.1938." Section 316.1937 authorizes a court to order the installation of an IID under circumstances other than those described in section 316.193. Section 316.1937 provides that the court may prohibit the convicted person from operating a motor vehicle unless it is equipped with a "functioning [IID] certified by [Respondent] as provided in s. 316.1938 " The most relevant statute to this case is section 316.1938, which provides: [Respondent] shall certify or cause to be certified the accuracy and precision of the breath-testing component of the [IIDs] as required by s. 316.1937, and shall publish a list of approved devices, together with rules governing the accuracy and precision of the breath-testing component of such devices as adopted by rule in compliance with s. 316.1937. The cost of certification shall be borne by the manufacturers of [IIDs]. No model of [IID] shall be certified unless it meets the accuracy requirements specified by rule of [Respondent]. [Respondent] shall design and adopt by rule a warning label which shall be affixed to each [IID] upon installation. The label shall contain a warning that any person tampering, circumventing, or otherwise misusing the device is guilty of a violation of law and may be subject to civil liability. The document at Federal Register, Volume 57, Number 67, pages 11772, et seq., is a notice of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of technical specifications for IIDs (Model Specifications). Model Specifications applies to the manufacture, testing, calibration, data-reporting, and tamper-monitoring of IIDs. IIDs are manufactured by 16 corporations in the United States. Most, if not all, states operate IID programs for DUI offenders. Petitioner is a manufacturer and service provider of IIDs. Its sole manufacturing facility is in Cocoa, Florida, where Petitioner employs 30-35 persons. About 35,000 of Petitioner's IIDs are in use in 25 states, but not Florida. Intervenors, which are affiliated corporations, are manufacturers and service providers of IIDs. (References to Intervenors will include either Intervenor, as appropriate.) Pursuant to the contract described below, Intervenors have provided IID services to over 6000 convicted persons in Florida. Intervenor is a manufacturer and service provider of IIDs and presently operates in 46 states. Respondent has tentatively selected Intervenor as the sole vendor for the state of Florida in the 2013-14 procurement described below. In 2003, Respondent issued an invitation to negotiate for IIDs and IID services. Following a tentative award to Intervenors, a vendor challenged the award, arguing, at least in part, that Respondent lacked the authority to limit the number of IID service providers. In a settlement, Respondent awarded the south region of Florida to Intervenors and the north region of Florida to the bid protestor, which was #1 A Lifesafer, Inc. (Lifesafer). In 2004, Respondent entered into contracts for IIDs and IID services with these vendors. As extended, the 2004 contracts are set to expire on March 31, 2014. Respondent issued a Request for Proposals on July 3, 2013 (RFP). Providing for the replacement of the 2004 contracts described in the preceding paragraph, the RFP is to enable Respondent to select up to two vendors to "implement and operate an [IID] Program" in Florida. RFP Attachment C-19 provides that the term of the new contract(s) shall be five years with an "anticipated" renewal term of another five years.2/ The RFP calls for responses detailing, among other things, the IID hardware by name and model, which must comply with Model Specifications requirements; software to provide Respondent with online access to data downloads from IIDs; installation; service, inspection and monitoring; contractor staffing; training of staff; security and fraud prevention; and transition services for IID convicted persons being serviced by a party to the current IID contract. No one filed a specifications challenge to the RFP. Respondent received four responses; they were from Petitioner, Intervenors, Intervenor, and Lifesafer. Petitioner, Intervenors, and Lifesafer have challenged the tentative award to Intervenor, and these bid protests are pending at DOAH as DOAH Case Nos. 13-3924BID, 13-3925BID, and 13-4037BID. Respondent acknowledges that the procurement of IIDs and IID services by contract provides it more flexibility than if it specified requirements and performance standards by rule. Respondent concedes that other states allow IID service providers to operate IID programs with open competition. Respondent contends that procuring these IID services by statewide or regional contract ensures the delivery of services to rural areas that otherwise might be underserved, the delivery of uniform services throughout the state, the transmission from the IID service provider of compliance data that would be jeopardized if numerous IID service providers operated in the state, the existence of a process for the removal of an IID service provider that did not discharge its responsibilities in a timely and competent fashion, and the familiarity among Respondent's limited staff with the limited makes of IIDs in use in Florida.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America owns and operates some forty nursing homes and retirement centers in approximately six states. It currently has twenty-six applications pending for Certificates of Need to establish new nursing homes in Florida. In preparing each application, it has been necessary to provide HRS with information regarding the accessibility of the proposed project to low income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons and other underserved groups. The Certificate of Need application also requires an applicant to project revenues and utilization on the basis of types of patients (i.e., Medicaid, Medicare, insurance, private pay, and indigent) which the applicant expects to serve. Petitioner Whitehall Boca operates a nursing home located in Boca Raton, Florida. This facility is presently licensed for 69 skilled nursing home beds, and desires to expand the number of skilled beds. The patients at Whitehall Boca are 100 percent private pay patients. This petitioner has never served and does not intend to serve Medicare or Medicaid patients or the medically indigent. Its financing is conditioned upon serving only private pay patients. The entire concept of this facility is to provide services to those persons in the upper income bracket who wish to continue an elite life-style in their later years. Petitioner Health Quest Corporation presently has several applications pending for Certificates of Need to establish and operate nursing homes in Florida. It has been the practice and policy of HRS in the past to consider the issue of geographic and economic accessibility when reviewing applications for a Certificate of Need. As noted in Paragraph 1 above, the printed instruction and application form requires information from an applicant regarding the economic accessibility of the proposal to minorities and low income groups. In documenting the financial feasibility of a proposal, the applicant is required to include a projection of income and expenses on a pro forma basis for the first two years of operation. after completion of the project. In order to project income, an applicant would have to project the percent of its total revenue to be derived from Medicaid, Medicare, and indigent patients as opposed to private pay and third-party insurance pay patients. These projections are also required in providing information to HRS regarding the projected total facility utilization. Rule 10-5.11, Florida Administrative Code, lists twelve general criteria against which applications for a Certificate of Need are to be evaluated. More specific criteria for specific health services are also provided in later portions of that Rule. The first twelve subsections of Rule 10-5.11 generally track the statutory criteria set forth in Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes. Prior to the challenged amendment, Rule 10- 5.11(3), Florida Administrative Code, read as follows "(3) The need that the population served or to be served has for such proposed health or hospice services." As a result of another rule-challenge proceeding, the District Court of Appeal, First District, invalidated Rule 10-5.11, Florida Administrative Code, to the extent that it did not explicitly contain any criterion which addressed the extent to which an applicant could meet the needs of minority and low income persons. Farmworker Rights Organization, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 430 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1983). The court noted that Section 381.494(7)(a), Florida Statutes, (now Section 381.494(8)(a)) requires HRS rules to be in accordance with federal statutes, and that federal statutes and regulations require Certificate of Need agencies to consider the degree to which medically underserved persons, including low income and minorities, have access to the services under review. Comparing the federal "access" requirements with HRS's Rule 10-5.11(3) (cited in Paragraph 5 above), the Court concluded that that subsection was not broad enough to include consideration of the criteria mandated by federal regulation and allowed HRS to ignore the federally mandated "access" criterion. To that extent, the Court found Rule 10- 5.11 to be inconsistent with federal regulations and statutes, and thus invalid. In response to the Court's decision in Farmworker, supra, and in order to codify its prior policy and practice, respondent HRS seeks to amend Rule 10- 5.11(3), Florida Administrative Code, with the following language: "(3)(a) The need that the population served or to be served has for the health or hospice services proposed to be offered or changed, and the extent to which all resi- dents of the district, and in particular low income persons, racial and ethnic minorities, women, handicapped persons, other underserved groups and the elderly, are likely to have access to those services. The extent to which that need will be met adequately under a proposed reduction, elimination or relocation of a service, under a proposed substantial change in admissions policies or practices, or by alternative arrangements, and the effect of the proposed change on the ability of members of medically underserved groups which have traditionally experienced difficulties in obtaining equal access to health services to obtain needed health care. The contribution of the proposed service in meeting the health needs of members of such medically underserved groups, particu- larly those needs identified in the appli- cable district plan and State health plan as deserving of priority. In determining the extent to which a proposed service will be accessible, the following will be considered: The extent to which medically underserved individuals currently use the applicant's services as a proportion of the medically underserved population in the applicant's proposed service area(s), and the extent to which medically underserved individuals are expected to use the proposed services, if approved; The performance of the applicant in meeting any applicable Federal regulations requiring uncompensated care, community ser- vice, or access by minorities and handicapped persons to programs receiving Federal financial assistance, including the existence of any civil rights access complaints against the applicant; The extent to which Medicare, Medicaid and medically indigent patients are served by the applicant; and Tile extent to which the applicant offers a range of means by which a person will have access to its services. In any case where it is determined that an approved project does not satisfy the cri- teria specified in subparagraphs (3)(a) through (d), the Department may, if it approves the application, impose the condi- tion that the applicant must take affirmative steps to meet those criteria. In evaluating the accessibility of a proposed project, the accessibility of the current facility as a whole must be taken into consideration. If the proposed project is disapproved because it fails to meet the need and access criteria specified herein, the Department will so state in its written findings. In any case where a project does not satisfy the criteria specified in sub- paragraph (3)(a) through (d) above, the Department shall so notify in writing the applicant and the appropriate Regional Office of the United States Department of Health and Human Services." In preparing this proposed rule amendment, respondent reviewed and considered the "access" rules effective in eight other States, portions of the "Model Access Provisions for State Certificate of Need Statutes or Regulations" and the federal regulations and statutes. The language contained in subparagraphs 3(a) - (d)4 of the respondent's proposed rule substantially tracks the language contained in 42 C.F.R. Section 123.412(a)(5) and (6), with changes made only for clarity or to reflect the different terminology utilized in the Florida Certificate of Need program. The language contained in subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the respondent's proposed rule is substantially identical to the language in federal regulations 42 C.F.R. Section 123.413(b) - (d) and 42 C.F.R. Section 123.410(a)(6) (1982). The federal regulations require the States to adopt, and use as applicable, specific criteria based upon the general considerations set forth in 42 C.F.R. Section 123.412 (1982). An economic impact statement was prepared by respondent for proposed Rule 10-5.11(3). The respondent concluded that, other than the normal costs to the agency of processing a rule amendment, no economic impact was expected as a result of the amendment's implementation. As the estimated costs or economic benefit to persons directly affected by the proposed amendment, the economic impact statement provides: "The proposed amendment is not expected to have an additional economic impact on existing health care providers, health care consumers, or certificate of need applicants who prepared applications under existing rules. Previous and current certificate of need decisions by the department have been made in consideration of existing Federal regulations and the criterion contained in 10-5.11(3) has been interpreted in accordance with Federal regulations." It was noted that the proposed amendment would affect competition among providers and certificate of need applicants consistent with existing rules and the proposed amendments. After discussions with others charged with the responsibility of implementing the Certificate of Need program, and based upon her own experience as a health planner, the author of the economic impact statement explained the "data and method of estimating costs" as follows: "Immediate costs for implementing the pro- posed amendment were calculated based on cur- rent data available. Printing and distri- bution costs were based on similar experiences with HRS printing and distribution costs." This approach was utilized based upon the author's understanding that the proposed rule imposed no additional or new criteria for review of certificate of need applications.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its business located in Tampa, Florida. Respondent is a stated agency charged with responsibility for investigating and resolving unlawful employment practices. Its duties and powers are enumerated in Chapter 23, Florida Statutes, the Human Rights Act of 1977. 2. Respondent has adopted Rules 9D-8.06, 8.22(2), 9.03(4), and 9.03(7), Florida Administrative Code. These rules authorize Respondent to issue subpoenas, serve them by registered mail, and enforce them through judicial proceedings. The rules specifically authorize issuance, service, and enforcement of subpoenas in connection with investigations of unfair employment practices. They provide that inferences may be drawn from the failure of a person to provide requested information. . . Linda Parties filed a complaint against Petitioner with the Respondent, alleging sex discrimination by Petitioner. Based upon the complaint, Respondent initiated an investigation. It formally requested information from Petitioner on July 13, 1979. On April 7, 1981, Respondent issued a subpoena in connection with the investigation and served it by registered mail in accordance with its rules. Petitioner objected to the subpoena and has not provided the requested information. Respondent has sought to enforce the subpoena through a "Petition for Enforcement" filed in Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. Circuit Judge Donald O. Hartwell has entered an Order which provides: This cause came to be heard on the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena filed by the Human Development Center, Respondent. Both parties were represented by Counsel who presented argument to the court. The court being otherwise fully advised enters this its order; therefor it is, Ordered that the service of an investigatory subpoena served by certified mail pursuant to Rule 9D-8.22, Florida Administrative Code is valid service. Such service is not required to be served in accordance with Florida Statutes 48.031 or Rule 1.410(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. It is further, Ordered that the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena is denied. It is further, Ordered that further proceedings to enforce the investigatory subpoena in this cause are stayed pending the ruling of Hearing Officer G. Steven Pfeiffer in Case No. 81-2101RX now set for hearing on October 21, 1981. Respondent has made no determination of reasonable cause to believe that Petitioner has engaged in any unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact The Town and The Parties The City of Opa Locka is an incorporated municipality within Dade County, Florida. It is approximately 4.5 square miles, with a population of approximately 14,000, and some 5,000 registered voters. If this case is a valid example, citizens of Opa Locka actively and enthusiastically are involved in the local political process. The process can become lusty and raw with acrimony. Timothy Holmes, a citizen of Opa Locka and full-time community activist, receives disability income and is otherwise unemployed. From time to time he has provided various services or errands for attorney, James Greason, and at one time he had cards printed identifying himself as an investigator for Greason. His primary activities in recent years have been related to non- compensated membership on several municipal boards and committees. From approximately 1982, until its abolition in December 1988, Timothy Homes was on the Opa Locka Code Enforcement Board. He was then appointed to the Zoning Board of Appeals. He was on that board in 1989 when he decided to run for the city commission in the 1990 elections, for the seat occupied by Ollie B. Kelley. He did not formally file for the election until early 1990, and it is unclear when his intent was made known, but he had previously endorsed candidates in opposition to seated board members. Ollie B. Kelley is employed as a baker for the Dade County School Board. She is currently vice-mayor of Opa Locka and has served on the commission since 1986. Robert Ingram is a visiting professor at Florida Memorial College and is mayor of the City of Opa Locka, having served in that elected office for approximately 5 years. He previously served as Opa Locka police chief from 1980 to 1985. For the past three years, L. Dennis Whitt has been city manager for the City of Opa Locka. Daniel Reyes was employed as assistant to the city manager, L. Dennis Whitt, from November 28, 1989 until November 30, 1990, when he was terminated for various alleged wrongdoings. Holmes' Removal From The Board When Dennis Whitt came to the city in the middle of June 1989, he was made aware of Timothy Holmes' activities. Holmes exhibited behavior which Whitt considered inappropriate for an official of the city. Whitt received complaints and questions about Holmes as to perceived conflicts between his function as a board member and his services to Attorney Greason, who was representing parties in litigation against or involving the city. Holmes also was alleged to have gained access to city facilities based on his public office, but in furtherance of outside interests. Holmes wrote letters to the newspaper criticizing the city commission and was heard berating the commission in their meetings, calling them "Papa Doc, Mama Doc and Baby Doc", in an unflattering reference to former Haitian dictators. This latter incident was particularly irritating to Commissioner Kelley. She approached Whitt and asked whether something could be done. In response, Whitt researched the city charter for the procedure for removal of board members; he drafted an affidavit of charges based on his conversations with Commissioner Kelley and his own personal observations. He met with Commissioner Kelley on September 27, 1989 and gave her the affidavit. Although Dennis Whitt understood that board members could be removed for cause, the existing procedures applied to employees of the city, so he developed the language of the affidavit from the city's personnel rules, citing violations of a "standard of conduct", "insubordination" and "disgraceful conduct", "antagonism", interference with the proper "cooperation of employees", and use of his official capacity to solicit attorneys in litigation with the city and to conduct a private investigation of a city employee. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7) Commissioner Kelley signed the affidavit; it was presented to the full commission at the September 27th meeting; and the commission unanimously voted (with Kelley abstaining, because she brought the charges) to suspend Timothy Holmes from the Zoning Board of Appeals. The action, reflected in Resolution No. 5138, also set a public hearing on removal for November 8, 1989. At Holmes' request the hearing was continued to a later meeting, January 10, 1990. In the meantime, Dennis Whitt was instructed to conduct an investigation and bring together witnesses and evidence for the hearing. The hearing on removal of Timothy Holmes commenced at 7:00 p.m. on January 10th and proceeded into the early hours of the morning of January 11th. Timothy Holmes was represented by counsel, James H. Greason. The city was represented by its city attorney, Teretha Lundy-Thomas. Ms. Kelley testified, and did not participate as a voting member of the commission. Two law enforcement officers also testified. Three members of the public, including former mayor John Riley, testified on behalf of Timothy Holmes. The Commission voted to sustain the allegations regarding general insubordination and similar charges, but the last two charges regarding misuse of office failed for lack of majority vote. After votes on the separate charges, Dennis Whitt informed the commission that Holmes' removal from the board would need to be finalized with a resolution. The meeting was recessed to allow the city attorney and city manager to prepare the resolution. When the commission reconvened, the resolution removing Timothy Holmes passed 4-0, again with Commissioner Kelley abstaining. Holmes' Complaint To The Ethics Commission Holmes was convinced that his removal was a political vendetta. At some point after the public hearing he was in Attorney Greason's office and met Daniel Reyes. Reyes mentioned that he was with the city when the hearing took place and in Reyes' opinion, the removal in January 1990 was wrong. Reyes had heard Holmes and others referred to as "V.C." or "Viet Cong" - political enemies to be eliminated. Holmes was delighted to get information which he felt confirmed his own suspicions. Reyes executed an affidavit, dated June 11, 1991, stating among other matters, that "In January, 1990, Affiant, while so employed [as assistant to the city manager] witnessed City Manager L. Dennis Whitt and Mayor Robert Ingram conspire together to formulate changes which were used to remove Timothy Holmes as a member of the Opa-Locka Zoning Board . . . " (Petitioner's exhibit #3) That affidavit and an affidavit executed by Timothy Holmes were attached to a Commission on Ethics complaint form executed by Timothy Holmes on October 23, 1991. The affidavits and complaint to the Ethics Commission were prepared with the assistance of James Greason. At some point the above-referenced date on Reyes' affidavit, "January 1990", was struck through, and "September 1989" was substituted. Reyes initialed the change. The "corrected" date on Reyes' affidavit made the affidavit false, since Reyes was obviously not employed by the City in September 1989. He initialed the change at Greason's direction and never really looked at the date or considered it. Reyes was employed at the time of the removal hearing, but not when the process was first initiated. He was present when the resolution for removal was drafted during the January meeting's recess, but admittedly had no personal knowledge of the drafting of the initial affidavit by Whitt or the suspension resolution. The substance of Timothy Holmes' complaint to the Commission in Ethics was that Kelley, Ingram and Whitt conspired to remove him for actions protected by the First Amendment and for the purpose of discrediting him and politically damaging him in the November 1990 municipal election. He based the complaint on his own perception of the political climate and on what he understood were specific first-hand observations by Whitt's former assistant, Daniel Reyes. On January 29, 1992, the Commission issued its public report and order dismissing complaint: . . . On Friday, January 24, 1992, the Commission on Ethics met in executive session and considered this complaint for legal sufficiency pursuant to Commission Rule 34-5.002, F.A.C. The Commission's review was limited to questions of jurisdiction of the Commission and of the adequacy of the details of the complaint to allege a violation of the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. No factual investigation preceded the review, and therefore the Commission's conclusions do not reflect on the accuracy of the allegations of the complaint. The Commission voted to adopt the legal sufficiency analysis of its Executive Director, a copy of which is attached. Accordingly, this complaint is dismissed for failure to constitute a legally sufficient complaint with the issuance of this public report, which shall include the complaint and all documents related to the complaint. . . . The Petition for Fees and Costs Richard Venditti has handled legal matters for the City of Opa Locka and its officials in the past. He served as special master on contract with the City and also represented a couple of commissioners who were being investigated on charges by a private citizen. He represented Dennis Whitt in an action brought by Daniel Reyes for punitive damages related to his employment termination. When Whitt, Kelley and Ingram were served with Timothy Holmes' complaint to the Ethics Commission, they consulted individually with Richard Venditti. No papers or responsive pleadings were filed by or on behalf of respondents prior to the Ethics Commission's dismissal of the complaint. However each respondent was reasonably concerned and sought their attorney's advice. Petitions for costs and attorney's fees were filed with the Commission on Ethics on behalf of respondents, Kelley, Whitt and Ingram on February 28, 1992. Richard Venditti and L. Dennis Whitt drafted the petitions with information supplied primarily by Whitt. On March 11, 1992, Richard Venditti submitted individual bills to Whitt, Kelley and Ingram in the respective amounts of $1,665.00, $690.00 and $690.00. Most of the time reflected on the bills' itemization relates to the recovery of fees. The bills have not been paid, and the respondents are each unclear as to whether the city will pay the bills for them. They understand that they are personally responsible if the city does not pay the bills. Summary of findings Timothy Holmes filed his complaint with the advice and active assistance of an attorney. He was convinced that since his removal did not relate to specific misdeeds as a Zoning Board member, the removal was politically motivated and was in retaliation for zealous exercise of his rights as a citizen. He relied on those personal convictions and on statements by Daniel Reyes, whom he chanced to meet in his attorney's office and who gave him what appeared to be reliable inside information. Further investigation would have required his confronting the very persons he believed had conspired against him. The handwritten, "corrected" date on Reyes' affidavit was an error, but not Holmes' error. It apparently was an effort by someone other than Holmes to conform the statement to the date the process was initiated. Reyes, himself, explained that the "conspiracy" he witnessed was at the time of the removal hearing. This explanation is consistent with Whitt's testimony regarding the temporary recess required to draft the removal resolution. Reyes, and not Holmes, was negligent in checking the date on his affidavit before he initialled the change. Reyes presence when Dennis Whitt and the City Attorney drafted the removal resolution during the hearing recess makes it easy to understand why he felt the resolution was a foregone conclusion: it was. Each charge against Timothy Holmes had just been voted up or down, and the resolution, according to the city manager, was a necessary final step in the process. For good reason, the vote for removal was then beyond any doubt. The claim that Ollie Kelley had no knowledge of the facts in the affidavit of charges was based on Ms. Kelley's unfamiliarity with some of the terms used by Dennis Whitt in the draft. She was required to read the charges both at the meeting when suspension was voted and at the removal hearing. She stumbled over words such as "antagonistic". These were terms from the city's personnel manual and, although they may not have been part of Ms. Kelley's vocabulary, when explained to her they adequately expressed her personal concerns about Holmes' activities. It is neither necessary nor appropriate here to unravel the tangled web of political intrigue woven by the allegations and counter-allegations of the parties in this proceeding. Like Commissioner Kelley who was ignorant as to how to proceed but instinctively felt that something was wrong, Timothy Holmes reasonably relied on the advice of others in pursuing a remedy for relief. Timothy Holmes was misguided, but was not, himself, malicious.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter its Final Order denying fees and costs to Robert B. Ingram, Ollie B. Kelley and L. Dennis Whitt. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of September, 1992 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX The following are rulings made pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. the parties proposed findings of fact. Findings of Fact Proposed by Ingram, Kelley and Whitt: Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. and 3. Rejected as unnecessary or immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 2, otherwise rejected as unnecessary or immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 3, otherwise rejected as immaterial. and 7. Adopted in substance in paragraph 14. 8. - 13. Rejected as immaterial, since Holmes' reliance on Reyes was reasonable and consistent with his own perception of the events leading to his removal. 14. - 19. Rejected as unnecessary or immaterial. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 4 and 9. Adopted in part in paragraphs 10 and 26. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. 23. - 25. Rejected as unnecessary. 26. Adopted in paragraph 19. 27. Rejected as unnecessary. 28. Adopted in paragraphs 6 and 7. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraphs 10 and 11. Adopted in paragraph 13. 32. - 34. Rejected as unnecessary. 35. Adopted in substance in paragraph 19. 36. - 40. Rejected as unnecessary. Findings of Fact Proposed by Holmes 1. - 3. Rejected as unnecessary. Addressed in conclusions of law. Adopted in paragraph 18. The legal argument is rejected as contrary to prior ruling by the Commission. - 7. Legal argument rejected as provided in paragraph 5, above. The conclusion is adopted generally in paragraphs 23- 27. Adopted in "Recommendation". COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Venditti, Esquire 250 Bird Road, Ste. 102 Coral Gables, FL 33146 Timothy Holmes 275 Seaman Avenue Opa Locka, FL 33054 James H. Greason, Esquire 4165 NW 135th Street Opa Locka, FL 33054 Tracey Maleszewski Clerk & Complaint Coordinator Ethics Commission Capitol, Room 2105 P.O. Box 6 Tallahassee, FL 32302-0006 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics The Capitol, Room 2105 P.O. Box 6 Tallahassee, FL 32302-0006
