The Issue 1. Whether the Emergency Rules on Sales and Use Tax on Services and Other Transactions adopted by the Respondent effective July 1, 1987, were adopted pursuant to Section 33, Chapter 87-6, l987 Laws of Florida, and Section 120.54(9), Florida Statutes (1987)? 2. Whether Rules 12AER87-31(1)(c), (5), (7)(i)(7)(k), (10), (12) and (13), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida. It is charged with the responsibility to implement, enforce and collect the taxes levied by the State of Florida, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes (1987). During the 1987 Legislative Session the Legislature enacted Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 777, which is codified as Chapter 87-6, 1987 Laws of Florida (hereinafter referred to as "Chapter 87-6"). This act, which amended Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, was signed into law by the Governor on April 23, 1987. Section 5 of Chapter 87-6, created Section 212.0594, Florida Statutes. This new Section of Chapter 212 imposed a sales tax on construction services performed on or after July 1, 1987. Section 33 of Chapter 87-6, authorized the Respondent to adopt emergency rules pursuant to Section 120.54(9), Florida Statutes, to implement the new law. In authorizing the adoption of emergency rules, the Legislature determined that the failure to promptly implement the provisions of Chapter 87-6 would present an immediate threat to the welfare of the State because revenues needed for the operation of the State would not be collected. On June 6, 1987, the Legislature enacted Committee Substitute for House Bill 1506, which is codified as Chapter 87-101, 1987 Laws of Florida (hereinafter referred to as "Chapter 87-101"). Chapter 87-101 is commonly known as the Sales Tax Glitch Bill. Chapter 87-101 was passed by the Legislature on June 6, 1987, signed into law by the Governor on June 30, 1987, and was effective beginning July 1, 1987. Section 5 of Chapter 87-101 repealed Section 5 of Chapter 87-6. Section 6 of Chapter 87-101, created a new Section 212.0594, Florida Statutes, taxing construction services, in replace of the Section 212.0594, Florida - Statutes, previously created by Section 5 of Chapter 87-6. Thus the Legislature substantially changed the manner in which sales tax was to be imposed upon construction services. Section 20 of Chapter 87-101 amended Section 33 of Chapter 87-6 but continued the authorization to adopt emergency rules and the justification for doing so. On May 8, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold public meetings and workshops on May 19 and 26, 1987, and June 6, 1987. Proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6 were to be considered at these meetings and workshops. On May 22, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold public meetings and workshops on May 26, 1987, and June 26, 1987. Proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6 were to be considered at these meetings and workshops. On May 29, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold a public meeting and workshop on June 6, 1987, to consider proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6. On June 5, 1987, the Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intent to hold a public meeting and workshop on June 12, 1987, to consider proposed rules relating to Chapter 87-6. Ultimately, the Respondent held four workshops concerning the emergency rules: May 19 and 26, 1987, and June 6 and 12, 1987. The workshop conducted on June 12, 1987, was conducted to consider Rules 12AER87-31, Florida Administrative Code. The rules considered at the June 12, 1987, workshop had been redrafted to implement Chapter 87-101. The rules considered at the workshop were available for a short period of time before the workshop and during the workshop. Comments were received by the Department at the June 12, 1987, workshop from the public, including representatives of the construction industry. As a result of these comments, changes in the Emergency Rules were made following the workshop. The Emergency Rules took into account the method of taxing construction services provided for in Chapter 87-101 rather than the method previously provided for in Chapter 87-6. The Respondent's emergency rules, including Rule 12AER87-31, Florida Administrative Code, were certified by the Executive Director of the Respondent and delivered to the Secretary of State for publication on June 18, 1987. The Respondent delivered the full text of the emergency rules, a statement of the specific reasons for finding an immediate danger, a statement of the reasons for concluding that the procedure followed to adopt the rules was fair under the circumstances and a summary of the purpose of the rules for publication in the first available issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The emergency rules had to be filed with the Secretary of State no later than June 18, 1987, in order to be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly by July 1, 1987, the effective date of Chapters 87-6 and 87-101 and the emergency rules. The full text of the emergency rules was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on June 26, 1987. The text of this notice, which was accepted into evidence as Petitioner's exhibit 4, is hereby incorporated into this Final Order. The Emergency Rules had an effective date of July 1, 1987. Initially the Emergency Rules were to expire January 1, 1988, six months after their effective date, as specified in Chapter 87-101. Pursuant to Section 1, Chapter 87-539, 1987 Laws of Florida, the Emergency Rules are effective through June 30, 1988. Representatives of the Respondent and the Petitioner met between the passage of Chapter 87-101 by the Legislature and June 18, 1987, and discussed the act. The Respondent expended a great deal of time and effort in adopting the emergency rules implementing Chapters 87-6 and 87-101, and in providing information to the public. The method of taxation to be implemented was unique and, therefore, the Respondent was unable to look to other jurisdictions for guidance concerning implementation of the tax. The taxation of construction services was one of a multitude of services taxed. Chapter 87-101, required substantial redrafting of the emergency rules, including Rule 12AER87-31, Florida Administrative Code, within a relatively short period of time. The new tax necessitated the registration of 100,000 to 150,000 new sales tax "dealers" by July 1, 1987. Prior to July 1, 1987, the Respondent received thousands of telephone calls and thousands of written requests seeking information concerning the sales tax on services. The Respondent was extensively involved with the Legislature during the period of time when Chapters 87-6 and 87-101 were adopted. Representatives of the Respondent discussed the acts with Legislative members and staff. Dr. James Francis acted as a liaison between the Respondent and the Legislature. Dr. Francis also served on the Revenue Estimating Conference. In his capacity with the Revenue Estimating Conference, Dr. Francis prepared estimates of tax revenues from the services tax. A revenue impact analysis of the services tax was also provided by the Respondent to the Legislature based upon each amendment and proposed amendment to Chapters 87-6 and 87-101. Representatives of the petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with the method of taxation of construction services contained in Chapter 87-6 because of the required itemization of building material costs on each contract. The Respondent prepared a revenue neutral (no loss of tax revenue previously estimated to be generated by Chapter 87-6) method of imposing the services tax on construction services without requiring itemization of building material costs. Pursuant to this method, a set percentage, generally equal to the average percentage of building material costs, is backed out of "contract price" or "cost price." The remainder is treated as the amount of the "contract price" or "cost price" attributable to the construction services. The revenue estimated by the Respondent and provided to the Legislature, based upon the elimination of an average percentage of building material costs, was based upon the inclusion in "contract price" and "cost price" of all expenditures associated with the construction industry, including the total expenditures for building materials supplied by owners to contractors. The Legislature was aware of this fact before it adopted Chapter 87-101. Fiscal notes for Chapter 87-101, which the Respondent had available prior to the adoption of the Emergency Rules, numerically quantified the estimated revenue to be generated by Chapter 87-101. The Respondent also knew what amounts were included in the estimate of revenue contained in the fiscal notes. These amounts were consistent with the revenue estimates provided by the Respondent to the Legislature. The Emergency Rules represent a contemporaneous administrative construction of Chapters 87-6 and 87-101 by an agency charged with responsibility to administer the acts and which was intimately involved in the adoption of the acts. The Petitioner has challenged the validity of Rules 12AER87-31(1)(c), (5), (7)(i), (7)(k), (10), (12) and (13) Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner withdrew its challenge of other portions of the Emergency Rules. Rule 12AER87-31(7)(i), Florida Administrative Code, defines the terms "contract price" which determines the amount of tax due on construction work performed pursuant to a contract and any speculative construction which is sold within six months of completion. The Petitioner has challenged Rule 12AER87-31(7)(i), Florida Administrative Code, to the extent that contract price is defined to include the fair market value of materials used by a contractor if the value of those materials is not otherwise included in the contract price. The Petitioner's contractor witnesses' understanding of Rule 12AER87- 31(7)(i), Florida Administrative Code, that the fair market value of materials supplied by the owner are to be included in the computation of contract price, is consistent with the Respondent's interpretation of the Rule. Prime contractors often estimate the cost of building materials in their daily business activities. The Respondent's interpretation of Rule 12AER87-31(1)(c), Florida Administrative Code, does not require a contractor or subcontractor who uses building materials which are purchased tax free to remit a tax. The rule simply makes it clear that there is not necessarily any link between the question of whether the purchase of building materials and the provision of construction services are tax exempt.
The Issue Did Respondent, Tarpon Liquors LLC (Tarpon Liquors), timely request a hearing to contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (Division)?
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. (2019). Christina Brigantty is a Division compliance investigator. She checks employers for compliance with Florida's workers' compensation law. If an investigator concludes that an employer is not in compliance, she issues a Stop-Work Order along with a penalty assessment for the asserted periods of non- compliance. The Division determines periods of non-compliance by examining a business's records obtained from the business through a business records request. Investigator Brigantty performed a compliance check of Tarpon Liquors on July 31, 2018. As a result of that check, the Division issued Tarpon Liquors a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment. Subsequently the Division issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated December 13, 2018. It included a Stop- Work Order and Notice of Rights advising that Tarpon Liquors had 21 days from receipt of the Amended Order to file a petition for a hearing challenging the assessment. The Notice of Rights also stated that failure to request a hearing during that period waived the right to challenge the assessment. The Division transmitted the Amended Order to Tarpon Liquors, attention Ronald J. Maniscalco, registered agent, at 907 Narragansett Lane, Key Largo, Florida, by certified mail. The Narragansett Lane address was the residence of Mr. Maniscalco and Tarpon Liquors' managing member, Mr. Maniscalco's wife, Lorraine Maniscalco. The Division received the certified mail receipt from the postal service with the name Lorraine Maniscalco signed in the box for "Agent", and December 28, 2018, indicated as the date of delivery. Tarpon Liquors maintains that the signature on the certified mail receipt for the Amended Order is not Ms. Maniscalco's signature. Mr. Maniscalco believed that the mail carrier forged the signature. Mr. Maniscalco thought the signature was a forgery because Lorraine Maniscalco always signs her signature the same way and her signature does not match the signature on the certified mail receipt. Mr. Maniscalco filed a complaint with the United States Postal Service, which investigated the matter. The investigation included questioning the mail carrier who could not remember the certified mail document in question. The postal service reached no conclusions. During December 2018, Mr. and Ms. Maniscalco were in the process of moving. They were traveling between Tampa, Punta Gorda, and Key Largo frequently. Mr. and Ms. Maniscalco are unsure whether they were home December 28, 2018, and if they were, when they may have been there. In addition, their Narragansett Lane house was for sale. Consequently, they had to vacate the house frequently when the realtor was showing the house to potential buyers. There is a possibility the realtor signed in an effort to be helpful. Mr. Maniscalco, Ms. Maniscalco, and Ms. Shea, their daughter and also a manager of Tarpon Liquors, are all confident that the signature on the certified mail receipt is not Ms. Maniscalco's signature. There are significant differences between the signature on the receipt and Ms. Maniscalco's signature on her driver's license and on the sample signature admitted into evidence. The bottom loop of the "L" is notably different. The angle of the "M" is different. In addition, Ms. Maniscalco's "M" drops below the signature line while the "M" on the receipt does not. The evidence does not prove who signed the receipt. The weight of the credible, persuasive evidence, however, proves that Ms. Maniscalco did not sign it. In June 2019, Ms. Shea learned of the Amended Order in conversations with Investigator Brigantty. On July 3, 2019, Ms. Brigantty provided Ms. Shea a copy of the Amended Order, including the Notice of Rights. This was the first time that Tarpon Liquors received written notice of the Amended Order and the right to request a hearing. On July 9, 2019, the Division received a request for hearing dated July 5, 2019, from Mr. Maniscalco, challenging the Amended Order. This is more than 21 days after the December 28, 2018, date on the receipt for certified mail. The request for hearing stated: I never received notice of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment that was sent on 12/12 and signed for on 12/28. The signature on the Return Receipt is not Lorraine Maniscalco's signature. Please see attached Drivers licenses for verification of Lorraine Maniscalco's actual signature for comparative purposes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, accept the request for hearing of Tarpon Liquors LLC as timely. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Leon Melnicoff, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Ronald Maniscalco Tarpon Liquors LLC 1421 Pine Island Court Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Lena Marie Shea, Manager Tarpon Liquors LLC 4978 Edgewater Lane Oldsmar, Florida 34677-6342 Rean Knopke, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Respondent issued a Notice Of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings against Jesus Abauza, also known as Jesus I. Valdez, on May 16, 1989, (the "assessment"). The assessment was made for the tax imposed on the unlawful transportation of approximately 90 kilograms of cocaine. The tax base in the assessment is the retail value of the cocaine. The retail value of the cocaine was estimated in the amount of $1,341,000 by multiplying the weight of the cocaine by the retail price listed in the Florida Department Of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") memorandum in effect at the time for Broward and Dade counties. The price per kilogram listed in the FDLE memorandum was $14,900. The FDLE memorandum became effective on May 4, 1988, and was the current price list used by the FDLE on May 8, 1989, when Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Tax was assessed against the tax base at the rate of 50 percent and in the amount of $670,500. A 25 percent surcharge was assessed in the amount of $335,250. The total tax assessed in the amount of $1,005,750 is the sum of the amount of tax due at the rate of 50 percent and the amount of tax due for the 25 percent surcharge. An additional 50 percent penalty was assessed in the amount of $502,875. The total tax and penalty assessed in the amount of $1,508,635 is the sum of the tax due ($1,005,750) and the penalty ($502,875). A Warrant For Collection Of Delinquent Sales and Use Tax (the "warrant") and a Corrected Warrant (the "corrected warrant") was issued against Petitioner on the same day as the assessment. The warrant and corrected warrant are identical except for the addition of Petitioner's social security number in the the top right corner of the corrected warrant and a note in the right margin of the corrected warrant stating: This CORRECTED WARRANT is being re-recorded to reflect the correct amount of tax lien as being $1,005,750.00. Interest will accrue at the rate of $330.66 per day beginning 6/2/89 thru date of satisfaction of lien. 11/26/91[.] The amount stated in the assessment, warrant, and corrected warrant as the tax due is $1,005,750. The amount stated as the penalty due in all three documents is $502,875. The amount stated as the total and grand total due in all three documents is $1,508,625. The note in the right margin of the corrected warrant, however, eliminates the 50 percent penalty by stating that the corrected amount of the "tax lien" is $1,005,750. Interest accrues on the tax due at the rate of one percent per month. The amount stated in the bottom left corner of the assessment, warrant, and corrected warrant, as the "Daily Interest Rate" is $329.86. The correct per diem amount of interest is $330.66. 5/ Interest begins accruing on the 21st day of the month following the month for which the tax is due.6 The tax was initially due in May, 1989, when the assessment was issued. Although the corrected warrant states that interest accrues from "6/2/89", interest actually began accruing on June 21, 1989. The assessment was mailed to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested. Petitioner received the assessment, but the date of receipt cannot be determined from the evidence of record. 7/ Petitioner unlawfully transported approximately 90 kilograms of cocaine. Petitioner was arrested by officers in the Metropolitan Dade County Police Department (the "Police Department") on May 8, 1989, and charged with possession of cocaine. In the criminal case against him, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the Police Department based upon the alleged illegality of the police officer's investigatory stop of the car Petitioner was driving. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Petitioner successfully appealed the trial court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. The district court's denial of the motion to suppress was reversed in United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. May 22, 1991), and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The district court granted the motion to suppress and scheduled the criminal case for trial during the two week period beginning September 23, 1991. 8/ Petitioner stipulated in the Supplemental Pretrial Stipulation that he did not admit or stipulate that any of the matters set forth in the stipulation were factually correct. The findings of fact made in this Recommended Order, however, are substantially the same as the factual account contained in the official transcript of the criminal proceedings and reported by the appellate court in Valdez as the basis for its reversal of the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress. On the afternoon of May 8, 1989, Detective Jerry Houck and Special Agent Steven Hills were conducting the surveillance of a residence (the "residence" or "house") located in Miami, Florida from an unmarked police car. Detective Houck and Special Agent Hills were part of a Police Department narcotics investigative team led by Detective Francisco Trujillo. Detective Trujillo was not personally present at the residence but monitored the events which occurred at the residence over the police radio in his unmarked vehicle. Detective Trujillo was assisted by Officer Douglas Almaguer, a uniformed police officer for the Police Department who was in a marked patrol car. Detective Houck observed a Honda Accord automobile (the "Honda") driven by Petitioner stop in front of the residence. Petitioner got out of the car, knocked on the front door of the house, and entered the residence. Detective Houck was unable to observe the events which took place inside the house. While Petitioner remained inside the house, two men later identified as Jose and Jorge Fernandez came out of the residence. They moved two cars parked in the yard and positioned the Honda so that its trunk was in close proximity to the front door of the residence. Jose and Jorge Fernandez opened the trunk of the Honda, reentered the residence, and reappeared within the next few minutes outside the house carrying plastic garbage bags which appeared to Detective Houck to be fairly heavy. The two men placed the garbage bags with their contents in the trunk of the Honda. They reentered the residence and quickly reappeared carrying additional bags which they also placed in the trunk of the Honda. Shortly thereafter, Valdez came out of the residence, got into the Honda, and drove away. Detective Trujillo advised Officer Almaguer that: [W]e were conducting an investigation and we had a vehicle we wished for him to follow, and if that person was to commit a traffic infraction which he normally cites somebody for, we wished for him to stop the vehicle. If that occurred, and he did stop the vehicle, I wanted him to ask the occupant of the vehicle for consent to search the vehicle, and I instructed him to ask if he would consent to a search. Officer Almaguer did not recall that he had been directed by Detective Trujillo to stop the Honda only for something which constituted the kind of traffic offense for which he would ordinarily stop a driver. Over the police radio, Detective Houck provided Detective Trujillo with the description and tag number of the Honda and notified Detective Trujillo when Petitioner drove away from the house. Detective Houck left his surveillance position at the residence and followed the Honda to 122nd Avenue. At that point, Detective Trujillo identified the Honda and Detective Houck confirmed the identification. As Petitioner approached the intersection of 8th Street and 122nd Avenue, Detective Trujillo was positioned across the intersection. Officer Almaguer was directly behind Detective Trujillo in his marked patrol car. Petitioner made a right turn against a red traffic light signal and violated the right-of-way of a vehicle approaching through the green traffic light signal. The approaching vehicle slowed abruptly in order to avoid a collision with Petitioner's Honda. Neither Detective Trujillo nor Officer Almaguer were able to state the speed at which the approaching vehicle was traveling before it slowed down, and neither officer heard any screeching of the tires of the approaching vehicle. Detective Trujillo advised Officer Almaguer that Petitioner was the subject of the narcotics investigation. Officer Almaguer followed the Honda for 18 blocks from the intersection where the traffic violation had occurred and then stopped Petitioner. Detective Trujillo parked two blocks away from the point of the stop and observed Officer Almaguer conduct the stop. Officer Almaguer approached Petitioner and asked for Petitioner's driver's license and registration. Petitioner produced his driver's license but stated that the car was loaned to him by a friend. Officer Almaguer asked Petitioner if Petitioner knew why he had been stopped. Petitioner answered "yes." Officer Almaguer requested permission to search the car, and Petitioner consented. Officer Almaguer found five sealed trash bags inside the trunk of the Honda. Officer Almaguer asked Petitioner what was inside the bags. Petitioner replied that it was cocaine. Officer Almaguer arrested Petitioner, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car until Detective Trujillo arrived at the point of the stop. Officer Almaguer issued Petitioner a citation for violation of the right-of-way. Detective Trujillo then advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights. Officer Almaguer's stop of Petitioner's vehicle was unreasonably pretextual, and Petitioner's consent to search was not voluntarily given. Officer Almaguer would not have pursued Petitioner's Honda, stopped it, and issued a traffic citation, but for Detective Trujillo's instructions that the Honda was the car which the narcotics investigation team wanted stopped. Officer Almaguer ordinarily did not search a vehicle for a violation of right-of-way, or even ask its driver for consent to search the vehicle. Officer Almaguer had no reason to ask for permission to search the vehicle based solely on the traffic violation he observed. Petitioner's consent to the search was tainted by the illegal, pretextual stop and detention. The contents of the five bags seized by the Police Department when Petitioner was arrested were tested by a chemist for the Police Department. The contents of the five bags weighed approximately 90 kilograms. Samples of each kilogram from the bags were tested and found to contain cocaine. The percentage of cocaine and purity of the cocaine was not determined.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order upholding the assessment of tax and interest in the amount determined by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of February, 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Omni International of Miami, Limited (Omni), is the owner of a large complex located at 1601 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. The complex is commonly known as the Omni complex, and contains a shopping mall, hotel and parking garage. On July 30, 1981, Petitioner filed two applications for refund with Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, seeking a refund of $57,866.20 and $4,466.48 for sales tax previously paid to the Department of Revenue on sales of electricity and gas consumed by its commercial tenants from April, 1978 through March, 1981. On November 22, 1982, Respondent denied the applications. The denial prompted the instant proceeding. The shopping mall portion of the Omni complex houses more than one hundred fifty commercial tenants, each of whom has entered into a lease arrangement with Omni. The utility companies do not provide individual electric and gas meters to each commercial tenant but instead furnish the utilities through a single master meter. Because of this, it is necessary that electricity and gas charges be reallocated to each tenant on a monthly basis. Therefore, Omni receives a single monthly electric and gas bill reflecting total consumption for the entire complex, and charges each tenant its estimated monthly consumption plus a sales tax on that amount. The utility charge is separately itemized on the tenant's bill and includes a provision for sales tax. Petitioner has paid all required sales taxes on such consumption. The estimated consumption is derived after reviewing the number of electric outlets, hours of operations, square footage, and number and type of appliances and lights that are used within the rented space. This consumption is then applied to billing schedules prepared by the utility companies which give the monthly charge. The estimates are revised every six months based upon further inspections of the tenant's premises, and any changes such as the adding or decreasing of appliances and lights, or different hours of operations. The lease agreement executed by Omni and its tenants provides that if Omni opts to furnish utilities through a master meter arrangement, as it has done in the past, the tenant agrees to "pay additional rent therefor when bills are rendered." This term was included in the lease to give Omni the right to invoke the rent default provision of the lease in the event a tenant failed to make payment. It is not construed as additional rent or consideration for the privilege of occupying the premises. Omni makes no profit on the sale of electricity and gas. Rather, it is simply being reimbursed by the tenants for their actual utility consumption. If the applications are denied, Petitioner will have paid a sales tax on the utility consumption twice -- once when the monthly utility bills were paid, and a second time for "additional rent" for occupancy of the premises.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's applications for refund, with interest, be approved. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1983.
The Issue As to DOAH Case No. 18-4475RX, whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.044(5)(a) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.1/ As to DOAH Case No. 18-4992RU, whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") Standard Audit Plan, Vending and Amusement Machines--Industry Specific, section 1.1.3.3 ("SAP") is an unadopted rule in violation of sections 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Audit Period GBR is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida. Gilda Rosenberg is the owner of GBR and a related entity, Gilly Vending, Inc. ("Gilly"). GBR and Gilly are in the vending machine business. At all times material hereto, Amit Biegun served as the chief financial officer of the two entities. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's sales tax laws pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. This case concerns the audit period of January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2014. GBR's Provision of Vending Machine Services Prior to the audit period, the school boards of Broward and Palm Beach County issued written solicitations through invitations to bid ("ITB"), seeking vendors to furnish, install, stock, and maintain vending machines on school property. The bids required a "full turn-key operation." The stated objectives were to obtain the best vending service and percentage commission rates that will be most advantageous to the school boards, and to provide a contract that will be most profitable to the awarded vendor. The stated goal was that student choices from beverage and snack vending machines closely align with federal dietary guidelines. GBR operates approximately 700 snack and beverage vending machines situated at 65 schools in Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties. Of these 65 schools, 43 are in Broward County, 21 are in Palm Beach County, and one is in Miami-Dade County. The snack vending machines are all owned by GBR. Beverage vending machines are owned by bottling companies, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Of the 700 vending machines, approximately 60 percent of the machines are for beverages and the remaining 40 percent are for snacks. GBR has written vending agreements with some schools. In these agreements, GBR is designated as a licensee, the school is designated as the licensor, and GBR is granted a license to install vending machines on school property in exchange for a commission. Furthermore, GBR is solely responsible to pay all federal, state, and local taxes in connection with the operation of the vending machines. Ownership of the vending machines does not transfer to the schools. However, in some cases the schools have keys to the machines. In addition, designated school board employees have access to the inside of the machines in order to review the meter, monitor all transactions, and reconcile the revenue from the machines. GBR places the vending machines on school property. However, the schools control the locations of the vending machines. The schools also require timers on the machines so that the schools can control the times during the day when the machines are operational and accessible to students. The schools also control the types of products to be placed in the machines to ensure that the products closely align with the federal dietary guidelines. The schools also control pricing strategies. GBR stocks, maintains, and services the vending machines. However, Coca-Cola and Pepsi may repair the beverage machines they own. GBR is solely responsible for repairing the machines it owns. The schools require that any vendor service workers seeking access to the vending machines during school hours pass background checks. GBR route drivers collect the revenue from all of the vending machines and the revenues are deposited into GBR's bank accounts. In exchange for GBR's services, the schools receive from GBR, as a commission, a percentage of the gross receipts. However, neither GBR nor the schools are guaranteed any revenue unless sales occur from the machines. On its federal income tax returns, GBR reports all sales revenue from the vending machines. For the tax year 2012, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $5,952,270. Of this amount, GBR paid the schools $1,363,207, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2013, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,535,362. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,122,211, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. For the tax year 2014, GBR's federal income tax return reflects gross receipts or sales of $6,076,255. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $1,279,682, a percentage of the gross receipts which GBR characterized on the tax return and its general ledger as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. Thus, for the audit period, and according to the federal tax returns and general ledgers, GBR's gross receipts or sales were $18,563,887. Of this amount, GBR paid directly to the schools $3,765,100, as a commission and equipment space fee and cost of goods sold. The Department's Audit and Assessment On January 27, 2015, the Department, through its tax auditor, Mary Gray, sent written notice to GBR of its intent to conduct the audit. This was Ms. Gray's first audit involving vending machines at schools. Thereafter, GBR provided Ms. Gray with its general ledger, federal returns, and bid documents. On October 28, 2015, Ms. Gray issued a draft assessment to GBR. The email transmittal by Ms. Gray to GBR's representative states that "[t]he case is being forwarded for supervisory review." In the draft, Ms. Gray determined that GBR owed additional tax in the amount of $28,589.65, but there was no mention of any purported tax on the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. However, very close to the end of the audit, within one week after issuing the draft, and after Ms. Gray did further research and conferred with her supervisor, Ms. Gray's supervisor advised her to issue the B03 assessment pursuant to section 212.031 and rule 12A-1.044, and tax the monies paid by GBR to the schools as a license fee to use real property. Thus, according to the Department, GBR was now responsible for tax in the amount of $246,230.93, plus applicable interest. Of this alleged amount, $1,218.48 was for additional sales tax (A01); $4,181.41 was for purchase expenses (B02); $13,790 was for untaxed rent (B02); and $227.041.04 was for the purported license to use real property (B03). Ms. Gray then prepared a Standard Audit Report detailing her position of the audit and forwarded the report to the Department's dispute resolution division. On January 19, 2016, the Department issued the Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA") against GBR for additional tax and interest due of $288,993.31. The Department does not seek a penalty against GBR. At hearing, Ms. Gray testified that the Department's SAP is an audit planning tool or checklist which she used in conducting GBR's audit. Employees of the Department are not bound to follow the SAP, and the SAP can be modified by the auditors on a word document. The SAP was utilized by Ms. Gray during the audit, but it was not relied on in the NOD.4/
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to certain facts, legal issues, and their respective contentions, as follow: "1. At all times pertinent to this action, Petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc., was a Florida Corporation licensed and doing business in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this action, Respondent Department of Revenue, State of Florida, was an agency of the State of Florida exercising duties relating to the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent conducted an audit of tran- sactions involving Petitioner for the period November 1, 1972, through October 31, 1975. As a result of that audit, Respondent claims that as of September 17, 1976, the Petitioner had a balance due to the Depart- ment of Revenue of $17,383.58 in taxes, interest and penalties. The assessment indicating the above amount is attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner is in agreement that if the assessment is upheld, Petitioner owes to the Respondent the amount of $17,383.58 plus interest calculated to date of payment to Respondent. The tax assessment in this case is based upon two factual situations: Petitioner, manufactured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities consisting of cities, towns, municipalities, counties, school boards, junior colleges and others. Petitioner also hauled the asphalt to the job cite (sic) at a fixed ton/mile rate determined by bid. Petitioner, as a subcontractor, manu- factured and installed asphaltic concrete from raw material at a rate certain per ton determined by bid, as an improvement to the real property of political entities above described. The general contractor contracted with the political entities in various fashions but the Petitioner's duties were always the same and included manufacture, installation and hauling of asphaltic concrete based on a rate certain per ton and per ton mile. The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is correct in contending that the Petitioner must pay a sales and use tax on the produced asphalt which it uses in the performance of the construction contract jobs described in paragraph 6. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was remitted, by the Petitioner on the produced asphalt. It is agreed by the parties that no sales or use tax was paid by the instant customers to the Petitioner. It is Respondent's contention that, pursuant to the above-cited rules, the Peti- tioner is required to pay sales or use tax on the produced asphalt which is used to construct real property pursuant to a con- tract described in Rule 12A-1.51(2)(a), F.A.C. It is Petitioner's contention that the above-cited rules do not apply in the instant case since the customers involved in the instant fact situations are political subdivision or because the transaction was of the type described by Rule 12A-1.51(2)(d), F.A.C. Petitioner is entitled to rely on the earlier 1967 audit by Respondent because neither Petitioner's method of doing business, nor the law, has changed materially since 1967. Respondent agrees that this is an issue but fails to agree that Petitioner is so entitled to rely." All purchase orders or invitations for bid received by petitioner from political subdivisions stated that the entity was exempt from federal and state sales taxes and that such taxes should not be included in the bid. Typical bid forms entitled "Specifications for Asphaltic Concrete" called for a lump-sum price per ton for delivery and placement of the material by the vendor plus a sum per ton per mile for transportation costs. No breakdown of amounts for the cost of materials and cost of installation is reflected in the bid documents. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook, Exhibits 3, 7 (late filed)) Respondent audited petitioner's operations in 1967 and, although it had had previous transactions with governmental entities prior to that date, no assessment for back taxes was issued for failure to pay sales tax on such transactions nor was petitioner advised to do so in the future by state officials. After 1967, petitioner did not seek information from respondent concerning the subject of sales tax. As a consequence of the 1967 audit, petitioner believed that it was unnecessary to charge or pay sales tax on such transactions with political subdivisions. (Testimony of Cowan, Cook) As of April 1, 1977, Brevard County had a population of over 250,000. Although it is a large county in terms of size, respondent has only two auditors in the sales tax division to cover the entire county. (Testimony of Alberto, Cowan, Exhibit 4)
Recommendation That the petitioner Lawrence Nali Construction Company, Inc. be held liable for sales tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set forth in respondent's proposed assessment. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Brown, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Andrew A. Graham, Esquire Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
The Issue Whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to excuse the late filing of Respondent's Election of Rights form.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating massage establishments pursuant to chapter 20 and section 20.43, Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed as a massage establishment in the State of Florida, having been issued license number MM 33902. Respondent's address of record is 440 South Military Trail, West Palm Beach, Florida 33415. The August 5, 2016, Letter and First Response On or about August 5, 2016, the Department issued a letter to Respondent at its address of record ("August 5 Letter"), advising Respondent that the Department was conducting an investigation based on an internally generated complaint that on July 24 and August 1, 2016, Respondent ran an advertisement on www.backpage.com ("Backpage") with images "of Asia women dressed in swim wear and lingere," which was considered by the Department as designed to "induce sexual misconduct." The August 5 Letter also alleges that Respondent failed to include a license number in the advertisement. The advertisement in question was not provided to Respondent by the Department. The August 5 Letter advised Respondent that it could submit a written response within 20 days of receiving the letter and that it was not possible to estimate how long it would take to complete the investigation. Respondent, who at that time was owned by Ms. Jing Hui Guo, contacted a retired attorney, Jule Paulk, regarding the correspondence from the Department. Ms. Guo only reads and speaks Mandarin. Ms. Guo had purchased the business, formerly known as "Ocean Spa," about 15 months prior. She was not familiar with the advertising content of Ocean Spa. When she purchased the business, Ms. Guo changed the name to Kai Xin Spa, Inc., and she kept paying the invoice from the prior advertising agency. After receipt of the August 5 Letter, Ms. Guo provided a copy of it to her advertising agency and directed that they remove and/or stop running the offending advertisements. According to her testimony, she approved new advertisement content with the business license number and with none of the cited offending content. That new advertisement ran as of August 8, 2016. On August 15, 2016, Mr. Paulk drafted a written response to the August 5 Letter ("First Response Letter") on behalf of Respondent. The First Response Letter was electronically signed by Ms. Guo and it contained the new advertisement which included the business license number and removed the women in bathing suits and lingerie. The First Response Letter states: We have taken immediate steps to address the issues in the letter mentioned above. We will continue to do so until all issues are resolved. We hope this letter will show our sincere efforts to bring our business into compliance. (Emphasis added). Ms. Guo sold the business in the beginning of 2017 to Mr. Haibing Wang. Hearing nothing further from the Department prior to sale, she reasonably assumed the Department approved of her new advertising and that matter was closed. The April 12, 2018, Letter and Second Response Despite receipt of the First Response Letter, the Department continued to "investigate" Respondent's alleged misconduct. On April 12, 2018, 20 months after its original notification to Respondent, the Department issued a second letter to Respondent ("April 12 Letter"), advising Respondent that the matter was still ongoing. The Department's April 12 Letter was identical to the August 5 Letter except for the date. When it was received by the new business owner, Mr. Wang, he forwarded it to Ms. Guo telling her that it was her problem because she did not tell him about the investigation at the time of the sale. Ms. Guo provided the letter to Mr. Paulk. Mr. Paulk recognized the letter as identical to the August 5 Letter, but noted there was a new document included, dated August 1, 2016, which was styled "Health Care Provider Complaint Form." This form states, "[w]e will send a copy of the Complaint to the health care provider if the complaint is assigned for investigation." The Complaint with the Department of Health was certainly assigned for investigation in 2016, but this form was not given to Respondent until 2018. Mr. Paulk also noted the following additional discrepancies in the Health Care Provider Complaint form: It was dated August 16, 2016, but attached to a letter dated April 12, 2018. The form identified the reason for the complaint to be that of advertising. The box for sexual contact was not checked. Attached to the Health Care Provider Complaint Form was a document signed by Mr. Kevin Lapham dated August 1, 2016. Such document identified the same advertisements, which were the subject of the prior investigation which were published on August 1 and June 24, 2016, and which he thought was resolved. Further, the initial August 5 Letter included an attachment which specifically references advertising to induce sexual misconduct and identifies specific Florida Statutes. However, the Department's April 12 Letter, nor the attachments thereto, reference sexual misconduct or a statute dealing with sexual misconduct. On or about April 16, 2018, Mr. Paulk submitted a written response to the Department's April 12 Letter ("Second Response Letter"), on behalf of Respondent. The letter was electronically signed by Ms. Guo. The Second Response Letter states: Your letter of April 12, 2018 refers to 2016 Case Number 2016-20171. By our letter of August 15, 2016 (copy enclosed), we responded to this Case, assuring your office that we had taken steps to correct the concerns you had listed. We are not sure why you are still addressing this same Case. We assumed that our August 15, 2016 letter had satisfied the concerns. In addition, the concerns expressed in your August, 2016 letter involved a Backpage ad. We corrected those issues at that time. Now, Backpage has been removed from the internet. We hope this information resolved this matter. Please contact us if otherwise. Ms. Guo received no response from the Department to her Second Response Letter. The Administrative Complaint On June 28, 2018, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging that Respondent inappropriately advertised to induce sexual misconduct and failed to include its license number in its advertising. The cover letter included with the Administrative Complaint stated: Please review the attached documents and return the Election of Rights form to my attention. You must sign the Election of Rights form and return the completed form to my office within twenty-one (21) days of the date you receive it. Failure to return this form within twenty-one (21) days may result on the entry of a default judgement against you without hearing your side of the case. (Emphasis added). The cover letter also referenced an enclosed Voluntary Relinquishment form for consideration described as "an offer to resolve this matter without the necessity of further proceedings and the expense of further proceedings." The Administrative Complaint contained a Notice of Rights section, which informed Respondent that "[a] request or petition for an administrative hearing must be in writing and must be received by the Department within 21 days from the day Respondent received the Administrative Complaint, pursuant to Rule 28-106.111(2), Florida Administrative Code." The EOR form included with the Complaint stated: In the event that you fail to make an election in this matter within twenty-one (21) days from receipt of the Administrative Complaint, your failure to do so may be considered a waiver of your right to elect a hearing in this matter, pursuant to Rule 28-106.111(4), Florida Administrative Code, and the Board may proceed to hear your case. (Emphasis added). The Department mailed the Administrative Complaint, a Notice of Rights, and an EOR form via certified U.S. mail to Respondent's address of record. On July 14, 2018, Mr. Wang received the Administrative Complaint and gave the Administratve Complaint and EOR to Ms. Guo, who provided the documents to Mr. Paulk. Mr. Paulk consulted with counsel for Respondent, Mr. Samuel Holland, Esquire, about the EOR. Mr. Holland completed and signed the EOR on August 8, 2018. However, neither Mr. Paulk nor Mr. Holland returned the completed EOR to the Department until August 17, 2018, nine days later. Mr. Paulk testified that this nine-day delay was because he and Mr. Holland were "confused," "not quite sure how to proceed the best way," that he "needed to collect [his] thoughts," and that he needed to "do a little more looking into [the] matter" in order to decide the "best approach." This confusion is understandable and in large part created by the Department's own doing. At no time did the Department supply Respondent with a copy of the alleged offending advertisement. In fact, even the Administrative Complaint does not attach the advertisement at issue. The allegations in the Administrative Complaint deviate from the matters of which Respondent was provided notice were under investigation. For the first time, the Department indicates a concern that the advertisement contained hearts with arrows going through them, women in "sexually suggestive poses," and massage therapists described as "hot," "beautiful," and "young." The EOR and the penalty for failure to return such was not stated in absolute terms. The EOR form states, "[f]ailure to return this form within twenty-one days may result in the entry of a default judgment against you without hearing your side of the case." The use of the word "may" detracts from any finality to the consequences of failure to return the signed EOR. This sentence also suggests that a hearing will be conducted with or without the return of the EOR. Eventually, Mr. Paulk and Mr. Holland decided the best course of action would be to submit the EOR because "any further delay might be harmful." Twenty-one days from July 14, 2018, was August 3, 2018. The Department ultimately received the EOR via regular mail on August 20, 2018; 16 days after it was due. On or about September 12, 2018, the Department sent a letter to Mr. Holland ("Denial Letter"), denying Respondent's request for a formal administrative hearing. On October 15, 2018, the Department received a letter from Respondent ("October 9 Letter") contesting the Denial Letter. In the October 9 Letter, counsel for Respondent, Mr. Holland, explained the reason for the untimely filing and asked for a hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's request for a formal hearing under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, be permitted in accordance with the doctrine of equitable tolling. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent should be assessed a penalty for an alleged failure to obtain workers’ compensation, as charged in a Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact On March 3, 2015, Kirk Glover, an investigator employed by the Petitioner, observed two men who appeared to him to be installing soffits on a home at 8905 Dove Valley Way in the Champions Gate residential development near Davenport, Florida (the worksite). The two men were the Respondent, Lee Roy Lamond Sizemore, and his son, Chris Sizemore. The investigator asked the Respondent for the name of his company. The Respondent answered that he had not established his company, which was to be named “Lee’s Screen and Repairs.” The investigator then asked the Respondent if he had workers’ compensation coverage or an exemption or exclusion from the requirement to have coverage. The Respondent answered, no. The investigator verified this information and concluded that the Respondent was in violation. The investigator asked the Respondent to provide business records to facilitate the computation of the appropriate penalty. In response, the Respondent provided all the records he had for 2015, which consisted of bank statements on a personal account he shared with his wife, and their joint income tax returns for 2013 and 2014. The bank statements did not reflect any business activity. The 2014 tax return indicated that the Respondent was self-employed in construction but had no income for that year. The 2013 tax return indicated that the Respondent was self-employed selling and installing pool enclosures and had gross income of $6,264 that year. Based on the information provided by the Respondent, the Petitioner calculated a penalty of $11,121.16. The calculated penalty included $1,633.84 for the Respondent for the period from July 1 to December 31, 2013, based on the tax return for 2013. It also included $4,743.66 each for the Respondent and his son for the period from January 1 to March 3, 2015; those amounts were based on income imputed to them because the records provided for that period were deemed insufficient. The Respondent did not dispute the penalty calculation, assuming that workers’ compensation coverage was required and that penalties were owed. However, the evidence was not clear and convincing that coverage was required for either the Respondent or his son in 2015. The Respondent testified that he was in the process of establishing his business under the name of Lee’s Screen and Repairs on March 3, 2015. Up to and including that day, he was self-employed, but there was no clear and convincing evidence that he or his son had worked or had any income in 2015. The Respondent testified that his son had been released from prison in 2014, was not employed, and needed money. The Respondent brought his son to the worksite on March 3, 2015, hoping that the contractor on the job would hire him and his son to do soffit and fascia work. He had not yet seen the contractor when the Petitioner’s investigator arrived, and neither he nor his son had any agreement with the contractor to begin work or be paid. There was no clear and convincing evidence that there was any agreement by anyone to pay either the Respondent or his son for any work on March 3, 2015, or at any other time in 2015. The Petitioner did not contradict the Respondent’s testimony. In this case, the absence of business records for 2015 is evidence that no business was conducted that year, consistent with the Respondent’s testimony, and does not support the imputation of income and assessment of a penalty for 2015.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order imposing a penalty against the Respondent in the amount of $1,633.84 for 2013, but no penalty for 2014 or 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Lee Roy Sizemore 9728 Piney Port Circle Orlando, Florida 32825 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
