The Issue Whether this cause should be dismissed for Petitioner's failure to comply with Section 120.80(14)(b)3., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is contesting an assessment of taxes, pursuant to an audit conducted by Respondent Department of Revenue. The total amount of the assessment was $32,312.24. Following the audit, in a letter to the Department's auditor dated April 17, 2006, Petitioner's counsel stated that taxes "in the amount of $5,744.80 is something [Petitioner] would be obligated to pay under the laws of the State of Florida, and as such, they are willing to do so. They would be willing to pay interest due on this money."1/ This statement constitutes a clear admission that Petitioner owes the stated amount of the tax, $5,744.80, plus interest that accrues daily. Petitioner's Memorandum makes the un-sworn statement that: At the time the parties met to discuss the assessment with the representative of the Department of Revenue, Martha Watkins, they offered to pay $5,744.80 of the taxes but were informed it was part of the $32,312.24, and they could either pay it all or contest it. At all times material hereto the petitioners have stood ready to pay the $5,744.80. On April 17, 2006, we wrote a letter to Martha Watkins making this offer for the second time. On August 17, 2006, we again wrote to the Department of Revenue attaching our letter of April 17, 2006, again making this offer. At no time was a response received to either letter. The August 17, 2006, letter alluded to in Petitioner's Memorandum is not of record and neither a copy of that letter, nor an affidavit of its contents, has been submitted by either party. At no time has Petitioner asserted that any amount of tax money was unequivocally tendered to Respondent. No affidavit to that effect has been filed in this case. The Second Affidavit of Martha Watkins, submitted with the Department of Revenue's timely Memorandum states, in pertinent part: I conducted the audit of C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., from which arose the challenged assessment and this controversy. During the course of the audit, and subsequent communication with C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., regarding the audit and assessment of taxes and interest, C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., made at least one settlement offer, that was unacceptable, and was rejected by the Department as such. At no time did C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., unequivocally tender to me, or unequivocally offer to tender to me, the uncontested tax and applicable interest, and at no time did I refuse to accept any payment of taxes. On September 21, 2006, a Request for Administrative Hearing was filed with the Department of Revenue. On September 28, 2006, the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue entered an Order Dismissing the Petition with Leave to Amend. That Order reads, in pertinent part: On September 21, 2006, the Florida Department of Revenue received a "Request for Administrative Hearing" from Petitioner, C & C Mechanical Contractors. While the document clearly is a request for hearing, the petition does not state what the Petitioner is disputing. A record search shows that at least one Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued by the Department on June 15, 2006 to this Petitioner. It is impossible to determine from the petition whether this proposed assessment is being challenged. However, because this request was sent within the applicable time frame to dispute the Notice of Proposed Assessment, the Department will treat it as such. As required by law, the notice stated that a formal protest for an administrative hearing had to be received in the Office of the General Counsel within sixty days after the assessment became final and had to be in compliance with chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The petition fails to meet the requirements contained in chapter 120, Florida Statutes and Uniform Rule 28- 106.201, Florida Administrative Code, the appropriate rule for use in filing a petition requesting a hearing involving disputed issues of material fact. A copy of the appropriate rule is provided with this order. Specifically, the petition does not contain: (1) a statement of when and how the Petitioner received notice of the agency decision; (2) all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, the petition must so indicate; (3) a concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, including the specific facts the Petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action; (4) a statement of the specific rules or statutes the Petitioner contends require reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action, and (5) a statement of the relief sought by the Petitioner, stating precisely the action the petitioner wishes the agency to take with respect to the agency's proposed action. Because of these deficiencies, Petitioner's documentation must be dismissed. IT IS ORDERED: The petition for hearing filed by Petitioner is DISMISSED. Such dismissal is without prejudice to Petitioner to amend the petition to provide the information listed above. . . . On October 11, 2006, the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed with the Department of Revenue. That Amended Petition stated, in pertinent part: 1. The Petitioner received a certified letter dated June 15, 2006, stating taxes were due and owing in the amount of $32,312.24. This amount included $5,774.80 in fabrication cost taxes which the Petitioner does not object too [sic]. The balance of the $32,312.24 was for taxes on items sold to non-taxable entities. The Petitioner would object to these taxes and gives as grounds the following: Items sold to non-taxable entities are not subject to the Florida Tax Code. The department made a determination the items sold to the non-taxable entities were taxable stating the contractor, in this case the Petitioner, was the end user. Florida Tax Code states in part ". . . a determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the form in which the transaction is cast." The department "shall adopt rules that give special consideration to factors that govern the status of the tangible personal property before its affixation to real property." The Department of Revenue has adopted a rule which is in violation of the incident [sic] of legislature and contrary to Florida Statute 212.08.2/ (Emphasis supplied). The Amended Petition constitutes a clear admission that the $5,744.80 portion of the taxes due under the audit were both uncontested and owed, as of October 11, 2006. The first Affidavit of Martha Watkins, filed November 28, 2006, in support of the pending Motion to Dismiss, states, in pertinent part: I am a [sic] sui juris and otherwise competent to testify in this matter. I am employed by the Florida Department of Revenue in the position of Tax Auditor III. I am familiar with the accounts, accounting methods, and maintenance of records at the Florida Department of Revenue for sales tax, interest, and penalties. I am authorized by the Department of Revenue to make affidavit regarding the payment status of sales taxes, interest and penalties relative to registered Florida dealers. I have reviewed, and have personal knowledge of the accounts of the Florida Department of Revenue regarding tax payment of C&C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., a Florida corporation that has in the past been issued a Certificate of Registration by the Department of Revenue. According to the records of the Department of Revenue, as of November 27, 2006, C&C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., has not paid any sums to the Department of Revenue against the assessed outstanding balance of sales tax, interest or penalties, since prior to April 16, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Revenue enter a final order dismissing the Amended Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2007.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is liable for sales tax, together with interest and penalties on the purported unpaid tax amount, as referenced in the assessment and the Respondent agency's notice of decision issued on October 18, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the sole proprietor of a marina and restaurant business located in Pensacola Beach, Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing pertinent statutes and rules providing for the collection of sales and use taxes, as well as penalties and interest for tax amounts determined to be due and payable but not timely paid to the Department and the State of Florida. Included within the Department's regulatory authority over the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes is the authority to conduct audits of taxpayers to determine amounts of tax due and owing to the State, as well as whether such taxes have been timely and properly remitted and otherwise accounted for. The relevant audit period involved in this proceeding extended from October 1, 1987 through December 31, 1992. The Petitioner's marina and restaurant business operated during the audit period was operated on property owned by the Santa Rosa Island Authority (Authority) and the State of Florida Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environmental Protection, DEP). The property was leased to the Petitioner for the purpose of operation of this business. The property leased by the Petitioner from the Authority consisted of certain land above the mean high water mark and five boat slips. These five boat slips will be referred to sometimes hereafter as the "Santa Rosa boat slips". During the audit period, the Petitioner operated the restaurant business on the property leased from the Authority and rented the five boat slips to various boating customers. The Petitioner also rented 70 other boat slips to customers during the audit period. These slips were built by the Petitioner in 1977 on submerged land which had been leased from the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources, Bureau of Land Management. This property adjoined the property leased from the Authority. On November 16, 1992, the Department sent to the Petitioner a notice of intent to audit its books and records. As part of the audit, the Department requested that the Petitioner produce various records, including but not limited to, the Petitioner's federal tax returns, Florida corporation income tax returns, Florida sales and use tax returns, depreciation schedules, general ledgers, property records, cash receipts journals, cash disbursement journals, purchase journals, general journals, sales journals, sales invoices, shipping documents, purchase invoices, intangible property records, sales tax exemption certificates and lease agreements for the real or tangible property involved in the Petitioner's business. The Petitioner basically was able to provide few records to support his restaurant sales and boat slip rental receipts, except for Florida sales tax returns and federal income tax returns. There were no sales control documentation records, such as general ledgers and general journals provided to the Department's auditor for review, except for a cash register tape for the night of December 1, 1992, representing that night's restaurant gross receipts activity. The Petitioner's method of record keeping essentially consisted of his writing down the gross sales each evening from the cash register tapes, totaling those figures at the end of the month, and reporting this total on his Florida sales tax returns as the gross receipts from the restaurant business. However, the Petitioner did not keep the cash register tapes or maintain other documents to support the information reported to the Respondent on the monthly sales tax returns. The Petitioner reported as, "exempt income," the rental from the boat slips for the five Santa Rosa boat slips on the monthly sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. He did not report his monthly rental income from the remaining 70 boat slips on his sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. He did report a great deal more gross receipts on his federal income tax returns than on his Florida sales tax returns. The Department compared the Petitioner's federal income tax returns during the audit period with his Florida sales tax returns and determined that the gross receipts reported to the federal government were substantially larger than the gross receipts reported to the Department. It determined that the primary difference in the gross receipts was attributable to rental revenues from the boat slips, which were not accounted for by the Petitioner in his Florida monthly sales tax returns. The auditor determined that four percent of the recorded restaurant gross receipts were attributable to alcohol sales and 96 percent to food sales. The Department calculated the sales tax due on the undisclosed income through the audit, which represented gross receipts from the restaurant business and the boat-slip rental business, which was not reported by the Petitioner on his Florida sales tax returns. It calculated the sales tax due during the audit period on the rentals of the five boat slips, which were improperly listed as exempt sales on the Petitioner's monthly sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. It was also revealed that during the audit period, the Petitioner had sub-leased a portion of the Santa Rosa property to his former wife for $5,000.00 per year. The Department calculated that the Petitioner owed $300.00 in taxes based upon the sub-lease to his former wife. The Department additionally calculated that the Petitioner owed an additional $314.00 for use taxes, based upon non-exempt purchases of tangible personal property. The Department assessed the Petitioner's sales taxes based upon the estimated boat-slip rental receipts, although it did not assess the lease payments made by the Petitioner to the Authority or to the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources. On February 12, 1993, the Department assessed the Petitioner a total of $71,308.30 for the audit period, representing $45,694.90 of sales tax due, $14,093.37 of interest due thereon, $11,041.36 of penalties, and $314.98 of use tax, together with $91.02 of interest due on use taxes unpaid, and $72.67 of penalties due thereon. Daily interest of $15.13 commencing on February 13, 1993 was also assessed. Additionally, on February 12, 1993, the Department assessed the Petitioner $1,060.97 for the audit period, including penalties and interest, for local government infrastructure surtax due. Daily interest of $.29, commencing on February 13, 1993, was assessed on that amount. The Petitioner, in essence, does not dispute the Department's calculation of the assessed amount. The Petitioner, rather, contends that he believes that he reported all income and paid all sales taxes which were due and that his certified public accountant failed to account properly for his gross receipts and income to the federal internal revenue service, without the Petitioner's knowledge, during the audit period. He maintains, therefore, that the method of calculation of the Department's tax assessment, based upon the difference between the gross receipts depicted on the federal income tax returns and on the sales tax returns filed with the Department, is inaccurate, apparently because of the CPA's errors. Additionally, the Petitioner maintains that he was of the belief that the boat-slip rentals were not taxable and reportable for sales tax purposes to the Department because he believes, citing Rule 12A-1.061(5)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code. He bases this view on his assertion that the persons residing in the boat slips were "95 percent" live-aboard-type tenants, residing on their boats and that, essentially, they treated their boats as beach homes or condominiums, etc., for purposes of that rule, by residing for longer periods than six months. He thus contends that the rental revenues from such residents were tax exempt. The Department, however, established through its auditor's testimony and the Department's Composite Exhibit 2, that the Petitioner's CPA, through information he generated, did not establish that the difference between the gross receipts reported to the internal revenue service on the federal tax returns and the gross receipts reported on the Florida sales tax returns was not taxable. The Petitioner's proof does not show the factual elements necessary to establish that the 75 boat slips meet the rule's standard for exempt revenues from non-taxable residences.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Respondent assessing the taxes, penalties, and accumulated interest in the above-found amounts. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 94-7256 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted, based upon the Petitioner's testimony in this regard, but immaterial. 3-4. Rejected, as not established by preponderant evidence. The Petitioner did not show that all or even most of the tenants are on annual rentals and, moreover, if they were, the rule cited by the Petitioner himself requires that such lease agreements or contracts be written. The Petitioner has simply failed to establish that the boat-slip rental arrangements were exempt transactions. Rejected, as incorrect as a matter of law and as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected, as immaterial and irrelevant to the issues in this proceeding. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not probative by a preponderance of evidence that the assessment is incorrect. Rejected, as immaterial to the issues in this proceeding. The Department is not seeking to establish fraudulent intent. 9-27. These constitute argument and enunciation of the Petitioner's and the Respondent's perceived legal positions, and attempted equitable arguments concerning justification for the Petitioner's lack of relevant records, including a description of his financial difficulties related to destruction of his business by fire and by two hurricanes. While this is understandable and regrettable, these arguments and positions asserted by the Petitioner are immaterial and irrelevant to the issues in this case. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-26. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Wells 715 Pensacola Beach Boulevard Post Office Box 505 Pensacola Beach, FL 32562-0505 Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The facts in this cause are essentially undisputed. The Pen Haven Company was a Subchapter "S" corporation for federal income tax purposes and therefore incurred no State income tax liability. It was formed in 1960 and retained its Subchapter "S" status thorough 1976 for federal income tax purposes. In December of 1977, the capital stock of Pen Haven Sanitation Company was sold to the Board of County Commissioners of Escambia County. Inasmuch as the sole corporate stock holder then was no longer an individual, but rather a governmental entity, the corporation Subchapter "S" election for federal income tax purposes was terminated. Escambia County did not wish to own stock in a private corporation so it accordingly liquidated Pen Haven and its assets were distributed to the County's direct ownership. Thereafter the Corporation filed a final corporate income tax return for 1977 which reflected capital gains on the assets of the corporation which had been distributed. Some of those assets had tax bases which had been reduced to zero through reduction by depreciation, most of which had been charged off prior to January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. All of the depreciation deductions had been taken prior to the termination of the Subchapter "S" status of the Pen Haven Company. On disposition of the Pen Haven assets however, a gain was reported equal to the fair market value or salvage value, less the basis. This gain was accordingly reported on Pen Haven's federal income tax return, and on the 1977 Florida corporate income tax return, albeit under the protest as to the Florida tax return. Inasmuch as Pen Haven had previously deducted depreciation since its inception, and had the benefit thereof for federal tax purposes, it was required by the Internal Revenue Service to recapture the depreciation for federal tax purposes upon its sale and the filing of its tax return in 1977. The same recapture of depreciation treatment was required of West Florida Utilities. Thereafter an application was made by the Petitioner corporations for Florida Corporate Income Tax Refunds asserting that they should have not paid taxes on the amount of gains which represented a recapture of depreciation which had been taken as a deduction prior to the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax on January 1, 1972. In effect the Petitioner is contending that the so- called "income" which is the subject of the tax in question was not realized in 1977, but rather merely "recognized" in that year by the federal tax law and that it represented income actually "realized" during the years when the depreciation was taken as a deduction prior to January 1, 1972. The Petitioners contend that "realization" for federal income tax purposes occurs when the taxpayer actually receives an economic gain. "Recognition" on the other hand refers only to that time when the tax itself becomes actually due and payable. The Petitioners maintain that when the tax became due and payable in 1977 that was merely the point of "recognition" of the subject taxable gain and not "realization" in that the gain was actually realized prior to the Florida Jurisdictional date of January 1, 1972, in the form of the economic benefit derived from those depreciation deductions applied to federal tax liability prior to that date. The Petitioners cite SRG Corporation vs. Department of Revenue, 365 So2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), for the proposition that Florida could not tax those gains accruing to the taxpayer prior to Florida's having the constitutional and statutory power to impose a corporate income tax. The Respondent in essence agrees that the question of when the economic benefit to the Petitioners was received by them or was "realized" is the key question in this cause. The Respondent contends, however, that "realization" of a taxable gain occurred when the assets were disposed of by the Petitioners in 1977, well after the date when Florida's power to tax such a gain was enacted. The underlying facts in the case of West Florida Utilities are substantially similar. This corporation, however, was organized in 1962 and has never been clothed with Subchapter "S" corporate status. The only grounds upon which it can therefore claim a refund is its assertion that Florida does not have authority to tax that portion of the capital gains attributable to recapture of depreciation which was originally charged off as a deduction prior to January 1, 1972. The Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida both denied the refund claim made on behalf of the Petitioners, and thereafter they seasonably petitioned for a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witness and pleadings and arguments of counsel it is, therefore RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Thurston A. Shell Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32578 Robert A. Pierce, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Basile, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32310
The Issue Whether Petitioner ("DEPARTMENT") is entitled to assess sales or use taxes, penalties, and interest against Respondent ("VOLPE") pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set out in its Notice of Proposed Assessment dated March 20, 1980.
Findings Of Fact During 1975-1977, VOLPE was a general contractor engaged in the construction of a United States Post Office and Vehicle Maintenance Facility at Miami, Florida. In connection with that construction project, VOLPE purchased materials from numerous subcontractors, including Hardware Lighting and Emporium, and Jemco, Inc. (Testimony of Alford, Danca; P.E. 2, 3) On March 8, 1979, after audit of VOLPE's records, the DEPARTMENT proposed to assess VOLPE for delinquent sales and use tax, together with interest and penalties thereon, which it claimed were due from VOLPE's purchase of materials from various subcontractors. The DEPARTMENT's proposed assessment was based on its inability to verify, to its satisfaction, that sales and use tax due from those sales transactions was paid by VOLPE to the vendors, and subsequently remitted to the DEPARTMENT. (Testimony of Alford, P.E. 3.) With the DEPARTMENT's encouragement, VOLPE then wrote its vendors in the various sales transactions requesting proof that the requisite Florida sales or use tax had been remitted to the DEPARTMENT. In response, two vendors, Ohio Medical Products and Power Wash, remitted tax vendors, (collected from VOLPE at time of sale) to the DEPARTMENT, in the amounts of $10,070 and $1,635.50, respectively. In addition, VOLPE discovered that it had not paid the requisite tax to a vendor in one transaction and remitted a payment to the DEPARTMENT in the amount of $1,442.53. (Testimony of Danca, Alford, P.E. 1.) These late tax payments made by Ohio Medical Products, Power Wash, and VOLPE in partial satisfaction of the DEPARTMENT's March 8, 1979, proposed assessment consisted only of the tax due on the individual sales, including interest thereon. No penalty payments were made because Salvatore Danca, VOLPE's comptroller involved in collecting the sales tax from the various vendors, reasonably and in good faith believed that the DEPARTMENT would waive penalties if late tax payments were promptly submitted. Although Louis A. Crocco, the DEPARTMENT's representative, by affidavit denies making such a representation, he admits that the possibility of adjusting the penalties, otherwise due, was discussed with Danca. In the absence of more explicit evidence from the DEPARTMENT concerning those discussions, or attacking the credibility of Danca's testimony, it is determined that, based on discussions with DEPARTMENT representatives, Danca reasonably and in good faith believed penalties would be waived. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 1, 6, R.E. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.) As a result of partial payments and adjustments made to the DEPARTMENT's proposed sales and use tax assessment, the DEPARTMENT issued a fourth revision of the proposed assessment on March 20, 1980. By that revision, the DEPARTMENT asserts VOLPE, as of March 20, 1980, is liable for payment of tax, interest, and penalties as follows: Sales Transaction Sales And Use Tax Due Interest Penalties (25 Percent) Jemco, Inc., sale of mechanization equipment to VOLPE, per agreement dated December 5, 1975. $16,229.53 $4,047.88 Hardware, Lighting and Emporium, sale of finished hardware and accessories to VOLPE per VOLPE Purchase Order dated October 2, 1975. 1,556.10 389.02 Ohio Medical Products' Power Wash's, and unidenti- fied vendor's sale to VOLPE for which late payments of tax due and interest have been made. -0- 2,737.43 TOTAL: $17,856.10 $5,779.42 $7,174.33 (Testimony of Alford, Danca, 3.) Stipulation of Counsel; P.E. 1, 2, [AS TO JEMCO, INC./VOLPE TRANSACTION] By its standard Agreement dated December 5, 1975, VOLPE agreed to purchase from Jemco, Inc., of Fort Worth, Texas, post office mechanization equipment for the contract price of $347,900. Subsequent change orders resulted in an adjustment to $405,689.70. In order to minimize on-site installation problems, Jemco, Inc., was required to maximize assembly of the mechanization equipment at its out-of-state plant prior to shipping to the Miami job site. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 2, R.E. 1.) The written sales Agreement, including attachments, between Jemco, Inc., and VOLPE expressly states, in three separate places, that the total contract sales price includes Florida sales tax. The DEPARTMENT admits that VOLPE has paid all monies due Jemco, Inc., under the contract. By virtue of its full payment of the contract price which expressly included sales tax, it must be concluded that VOLPE paid the requisite sales or use tax to Jemco, Inc. (Stipulation of Counsel; P.E. 2.) VOLPE's standard form, entitled "Subcontractor's Application for Payment" was used as a basis to make incremental payments to Jemco, Inc., pursuant to the Agreement. That form required the subcontractor to certify that, among other things, it had complied with state tax laws applicable to performance of the Agreement. (Testimony of Danca; R.E. 11.) VOLPE's actions in connection with the Jemco, Inc., sales transaction were consistent with its standard practice when entering contracts with vendors or subcontractors. That practice is to require that the sales price include the payment of necessary sales tax, the vendor or subcontractor is required to remit the required tax to the appropriate government entity. After performance of the contract, the subcontractor is required to certify that these requirements have been satisfied. The certification is in the form of a General Release which discharges VOLPE from all claims, debts and liabilities which the subcontractor may have against VOLPE because of the contract. In this case, Jemco, Inc., executed such a General Release in favor of VOLPE. (Testimony of Danca; R.E. 1.) The DEPARTMENT has not audited Jemco, Inc.'s records, thus, it does not know whether the tax it seeks to assess against VOLPE has already been remitted by Jemco, Inc. (Testimony of Alford.) The DEPARTMENT offered no affirmative evidence to contravene VOLPE's assertion that it had paid the requisite sales or use tax to Jemco, Inc. Its claim rests solely on the fact that VOLPE's evidence of payment does not contain a sales invoice or other documentation which itemizes, or separately states the amount of sales tax due from VOLPE. [AS TO HARDWARE AND LIGHTING EMPORIUM TRANSACTION] By purchase agreement dated October 2, 1975, VOLPE agreed to purchase finished hardware from Hardware and Lighting Emporium of Miami, Florida, for the contract price of $23,877, which expressly included Florida state sales tax. Each billing invoice issued by Hardware and Lighting Emporium separately itemizes and states the Florida sales tax due. In applying for payment under the agreement, Hardware and Lighting Emporium completed the VOLPE "Subcontractor's Application for Payment" forms certifying compliance with state sales tax laws in performing the agreement. VOLPE has fully satisfied its payment obligations under the purchase agreement. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 3, R.E. 9, 10.)
Conclusions Conclusions: VOLPE established by a preponderance of evidence that it previously paid to its several vendors the sales and use tax which the DEPARTMENT now seeks. Accordingly, the proposed tax assessment, with penalties and interest thereon, cannot be sustained. Recommendation: That the DEPARTMENT's Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties, and Interest, under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, dated March 20, 1980, be DISMISSED. Background By written notice issued on March 20, 1980, Petitioner ("DEPARTMENT") proposed to assess Respondent ("VOLPE") taxes, penalties, and interest allegedly due pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In response, VOLPE claimed that it had previously paid the tax in question, and requested an opportunity to submit proof at a formal hearing. On April 17, 1980, the DEPARTMENT forwarded VOLPE's request to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and asked that the requested hearing be conducted by a hearing officer. On May 15, 1980, final hearing was set for July 18, 1980. On June 17, 1980, the DEPARTMENT filed a motion to realign the parties. As grounds, it stated that VOLPE had the burden of proof, and the duty to present a prima facie case at hearing since VOLPE requested the hearing and was the party seeking relief. At the DEPARTMENT's request, ruling on its motion was withheld until presentation of arguments at final hearing. At hearing, the DEPARTMENT's motion was denied for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law below. In support of its proposed assessment against VOLPE, the DEPARTMENT called Marvin P. Alford, a tax examiner, as its only witness, and offered Petitioner's Exhibits 1/ 1 through 6, inclusive, each of which was received into evidence. VOLPE called Salvatore Danca, its comptroller, and Harold G. Gregory, its branch manager, as its witnesses, and offered Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 11, inclusive, each of which was received. At the conclusion of hearing, the parties were granted the opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and memoranda within ten (10) days after filing of the transcript of hearing. The post-hearing submittals were filed by August 21, 1980. Based on the evidence submitted at hearing, the following facts are determined:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the DEPARTMENT's Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties, and Interest, Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, dated March 20, 1980, be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of September, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1980.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., is a Delaware corporation duly authorized to transact business in the State of Florida, having an office in Daytona, Florida, and doing business in Florida itself, or through its wholly owned subsidiaries. (Petition) Petitioner, on a consolidated basis with its subsidiaries, duly filed its Florida corporation income tax returns for the fiscal years ending December 31, 1977, and December 31, 1978. (Petition) The Florida Department of Revenue, after audit of these returns, alleged a deficiency in both years totaling $1,247.00. In both fiscal years in question and pursuant to Section 220.13(1)(b) 3, Florida Statutes, a "New Jobs Credit" of 100,000 was taken by Petitioner for each year. During each of such years the amount of wages and salaries paid or incurred by Petitioner within the State of Florida for each of the taxable years in question exceeded $100,000, but the maximum credit applicable pursuant to the U. S. Internal Revenue Code is $100,000, such limitation being adopted in Section 220.13(1)(b)3, Florida Statutes. (Petition, Exhibit 1) Respondent's audit of Petitioner's returns resulted in adjustments producing the alleged tax deficiency by reducing Petitioner's deductions for "New Jobs Credit" under Section 220.13(1)(b)3, Florida Statutes, to $92,396.00 in 1977 and $51,742.00 in 1978. The reduction of these deductions was based upon application of Respondent's Rule 12C-1.13(1)(b)3, Florida Administrative Code, which limits the deduction for salaries and wages paid in creating new jobs in Florida to a prorata amount of the total expended in all states for which credit is given under Section 280C of the Federal Internal Revenue Code. Since Petitioner expended $222,437.00 in such wages and salaries in Florida in 1977, with a total of $240,759.00 being expended by it everywhere, it was allowed only some ninety-two percent of the federal maximum of $100,000 for New Jobs Credit as a deduction on its tax return. Similarly, in 1978, it was allowed about fifty-one percent since its Florida expenditures amounted to $221,656.00 for new jobs, and a total everywhere, of $428,386.09. (Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That the petition herein be DISMISSED and that the tax deficiency against Petitioner be appropriately enforced. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David C. Latham, Esquire Post Office Box 17711 Orlando, Florida 32860 Randy Miller, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Does Petitioner have standing to challenge Rule 12A- 1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code? If Petitioner has standing, is Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority? See Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Rathon Corporation, formerly known as Diversey Corporation, is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in Florida. It manufactures various detergents, cleaners, and soaps, and the equipment to dispense those products. The products are marketed in Florida and other states. The customers of the products include hotels, hospitals, factories, and restaurants. The devices that dispense the detergents, cleaners, and soaps are referred to as "feeders." Those feeders can range from simple hand soap dispensers to electronically regulated machines that inject soap into commercial dishwashers. The feeders are loaned to Petitioner's customers at no additional charge for the period of time that the customer continues to purchase the product(s) dispensed by the feeder. These circumstances existed in the period of July 1993 through March 1995. In the period of July 1993 through March 1995, Diversey Corporation, now Rathon Corporation, paid the State of Florida $58,969.22 in use tax associated with the feeders. During the period in question, the Petitioner manufactured the feeders at a facility in Santa Cruz, California. The feeders were not warehoused in the Santa Cruz facility for an extended period. They were prepared for shipment and shipped to customers in the various states, to include Florida and California customers, to be used in the places of business operated by the customers. The feeders being shipped were not packaged with other products. During the period July 1993 through March 1995, the Petitioner not only paid use tax to Florida for the feeders, it paid use tax in forty-four other states and the District of Columbia, based upon the costs of manufacturing the feeders. California was among the other forty-four states. During the period in question, Petitioner accrued and paid use taxes to Florida and California limited to the feeders used by customers in those states, based upon the product sales allocation method it used in relation to the forty-three other states and the District of Columbia. The feeders that were provided to Florida customers were shipped by common carrier. Upon their arrival in Florida no tax had been paid to California pertaining to those feeders. When the feeders arrived in Florida during the period at issue, use tax would be remitted to Florida. Subsequently, the Petitioner paid the State of California a use tax associated with the feeders that had been shipped to Florida customers and upon which a use tax had been imposed by the State of Florida and paid. The California payment is described in detail below. Petitioner had paid Florida use tax on the feeders shipped to Florida customers based on the total manufactured cost of the feeders to Petitioner, including materials, labor, and overhead. The additional use tax paid to California for those feeders was based only on the cost of materials. The overall costs of feeders allocated to Florida for the refund period was $982,803.00. Petitioner remitted a 6% use tax to Florida totaling $58,969.22 for the period in question. In 1996, Petitioner was audited for sales and use tax compliance by the State of California. That audit process included the refund period that is in question in this case, July 1993 through March 1995. Following the audit, the State of California issued a Notice of Determination asserting additional liability for tax and interest that totaled $355,753.95. Petitioner paid that assessment. The California auditor had arrived at the assessment by concluding that Petitioner owed California for 44.57% of all feeders manufactured at Petitioner's Santa Cruz facility. The 44.57% represented all newly manufactured feeders that had been loaned by Petitioner to its customers during the refund period over the entire United States. As a consequence, the assessment of use tax by the State of California included tax on feeders for which Petitioner had paid Florida $58,969.22 in use tax prior to the California assessment of $355,753.95. Petitioner did not apply for credit in California for the portion of the $355,753.95 that would relate to the feeders brought to Florida during the period in question. Petitioner took no action to obtain a credit on the amount paid to Florida as a means to reduce the California tax obligation pursuant to the 1996 audit, because Petitioner had been told that the use tax for the feeders used by Florida customers was legally due in California and not in Florida. In arriving at the determination that 44.57% of the feeders manufactured during the period in question had been loaned to customers within the continental United States, the California auditor took into account that 21.8% of the feeders and feeder parts were sold for export, leaving 78.2% to be used in the United States. Of the 78.2% remaining for the United States, 57% were complete feeders sent to customers within the United States, and 43% were repair parts that were sent to Petitioner's Cambridge Division in Maryland, where those repair parts were being stored for future use. The percentage of 44.57% was arrived at by multiplying 57% times 78.2%, representing the percent of total feeders manufactured for use in the United States that were sent to customers within the United States and not held in inventory as repair parts. Again, California based its use tax for tangible personal property manufactured in that state to include only the cost of materials. Consequently, when the California auditor computed use tax to be collected by California using the 44.57% of total feeders manufactured to be used in the United States by Petitioner's customers in the United States, the California auditor used a cost factor of 55% of overall costs which was attributable to the cost of materials only. The total cost of feeders manufactured by Petitioner in California during the period in question, as related in the California tax audit, was $19,028,714.00. The total cost manufactured for use in the United States was $8,481,098.00, representing 44.57% of the overall cost of manufacturing. When the $8,481.098.00 is multiplied by 55%, representing the cost of materials only, the total costs of the goods subject to the use tax for the period in question is $4,664,604.00. A use tax rate of 7% was applied against the amount of $4,664,604.00. To attribute the portion of use tax paid to California following the 1996 audit associated with feeders that had been sent to Florida during the period in question, the answer is derived by multiplying $982,803.00 by 55% for a total of $540,542.00, and in turn multiplying that amount by 7%, the rate of tax imposed by California. That total is $37,837.91 in use tax that was subsequently paid to California after $58,962.22 had been paid to Florida for use tax on the same feeders. Diversey Corporation sought a tax refund in the amount of $58,977.00, through an application dated August 8, 1996, in relation to the period July 1993 through March. Eventually through the decision by the Respondent in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial dated July 16, 1997, Respondent refused to grant the refund of $58,977.00. At present, Petitioner requests that it be given a refund of $37,837.91, which represents the portion of use tax paid to Florida that has been duplicated in a payment of use tax to California. Respondent, in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial entered on July 16, 1997, and based upon the facts adduced at the final hearing, premises its proposed agency action denying the refund request upon the language set for in Section 212.06(1)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes. The determination to deny the refund request was not based upon reliance on Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code. The theory for denying the refund is premised upon Respondent's argument that use tax was due to Florida, "as of the moment" feeders arrived in Florida for use in Petitioner's business operations associated with its customers. Petitioner then paid the use tax to Florida at the time the feeders arrived in Florida. Having not paid California Use Tax prior to paying Florida Use Tax, Respondent concludes, through its proposed agency action, that it need not refund to Petitioner the use taxes it paid to California at a later date. Petitioner had referred to Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, following receipt of the Notice of Proposed Refund Denial issued on December 9, 1996, possibly creating the impression that Petitioner believed that Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, would support its claim for refund. It later developed that Petitioner did not have in mind reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, to support its claim for refund. Instead, Petitioner made reference to that rule and specifically Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a means to perfect a challenge to Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 15, 1997, claiming that the challenged rule was an invalid exercise of authority. That challenge was assigned DOAH Case No. 97-5908RX. In summary, notwithstanding Petitioner's argument to the contrary, Respondent has never relied upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, or any other part of that rule in its proposed agency action denying the refund request. Absent Petitioner's affirmative reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, the rule has no part to play in resolving this dispute. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties to this action in accordance with Sections 120.56, 120.569(1), and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner sought repayment of funds paid into the State Treasury for use taxes for the period of July 1993 through March 1995. See Section 215.26(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent, in defending its decision to deny the repayment, has consistently relied upon provisions within Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as well as the language within Section 215.26(1), Florida Statutes. In particular, Respondent has relied upon the language at Section 212.06(7), Florida Statutes, in defending its proposed agency action. Petitioner did not look to the provisions of Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to assist the Petitioner in its refund claim. Instead, Petitioner claims that an inference has been created that Respondent utilized Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to determine the refund question adverse to the interest of Petitioner. Petitioner believes this creates the opportunity to challenge the rule. Given that Respondent did not rely upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, to defend against the Request for Repayment of Funds, Petitioner is not substantially affected by the rule and is not entitled to seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule. Upon consideration, it is ORDERED: That Petitioner's challenge to the validity of Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, is DISMISSED.1 DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the agreement of the parties as to the relevant facts in this case, the following facts are found: For the calendar years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973, petitioner filed its federal corporate income tax returns reporting gross income from dividends in excess of its taxable income before the special deduction of 85 percent of the dividends received, limited to 85 percent of taxable income. As a result, a maximum of 15 percent of its net income was included in its taxable income on the federal tax returns. The federal returns for calendar years ending December 31, 1972 and 1973 reflected the deduction of net capital losses incurred and carried forward from years ending prior to January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. For its calendar years 1972 and 1973, petitioner filed its Florida corporation income tax returns reporting no Florida net income. The respondent examined the returns and determined deficiencies of $374.49 for 1972 and $566.40 for 1973. Such determination was based primarily on the additions to income of net capital losses carried forward from years ending prior to January 1, 1972.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that there is no basis for affording petitioner relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiencies of corporate income tax of $374.49 and $556.40 for 1972 and 1973 respectively, be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of June, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. T.H. Swindal Chief, Corporate Income Tax Bureau Department of Revenue Post Office Box 3906 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mr. Robert Fried Suite 210, Professional Centre 9000 Southwest 87th Court Miami, Florida 33176 Attorney for Petitioner Mr. Stephen E. Mitchell Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Attorney for Respondent
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Florida Corporate Income Tax Code subjects to taxation items realized for federal income tax purposes prior to the effective date of the Code but recognized for federal purposes after the effective date of the Florida Code.
Findings Of Fact In a joint stipulation filed with the Hearing Officer, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts of this proceeding. Findings (1) through (6) listed below are quoted directly from that stipulation of facts. In 1965 MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION (whose name at that time was Morris Grain Corporation) exchanged certain property used in its trade or business with Continental Grain Company for six thousand seven hundred twenty three (6,723) acres of real estate located in Florida a description of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 1 containing a layout of the ranch acreage acquired by MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION from Continental Grain Company, including the nine hundred fifty eight (958) acre parcel sold in the fiscal year ending in 1968, the one thousand (1,000) acre parcel sold in the fiscal year ending in 1969, and the remaining acreage sold in the fiscal year ending in 1973, as well as a small parcel of property retained by the Corporation. Although MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION realized income for federal tax purposes in 1965 when it exchanged a grain elevator and other property for real estate described on Exhibit 1, the Corporation did not recognize any income for federal tax purposes in 1965 pursuant to Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. The real estate acquired in exchange for the property traded by MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION had a fair market value in 1965 of ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($1,613,520.00), or TWO HUNDRED FORTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($240.00) per acre. The tax cost basis of the property given up by MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION in the exchange was TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY TWO AND SIXTY SIX/100 DOLLARS ($267,832.66). MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION paid TWENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE AND FIFTY FIVE/100 DOLLARS ($20,453.55) in cash for the purchase of mineral rights to the four thousand six hundred five (4,605) acres sold during the fiscal year ending in 1973 and there were ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY TWO AND FIFTY FIVE/100 DOLLARS ($162,522.55) of costs connected with the sale of the property consisting of commissions of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THREE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($133,300.00), attorneys fees of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($18,000.00), and documentary" stamps and miscellaneous expenses of ELEVEN THOU- SAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO AND FIFTY FIVE/100 DOLLARS ($11,222.55). MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION sold four thousand six hundred five (4,605) acres-of the property acquired in the exchange in 1965 during its fiscal year ending May 31, 1973, for a gross sales price of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVEN AND NINETY SIX/100 DOLLARS ($2,961,807.96). On its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1973, Petitioner excluded income from the 1973 sale of the 4,605 acres, although this income was reported as recognized on its federal income tax return. The Respondent, Department of Revenue, issued its proposed deficiency for the 1973 fiscal year assessing Petitioner $121,389.33. This assessment was based upon the gain received by Petitioner for the 1973 transaction, said gain being measured by the difference between the original cost of the property exchanged in 1965 and the adjusted sales price of the property sold in 1973. The Petitioner filed a protest against the proposed deficiency. An informal conference failed to resolve the matter and the Petitioner thereafter filed its petition for an administrative hearing. On August 4, 1976, the parties entered into a joint motion for stay of proceedings pending the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the case of Dept. of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc. and Leadership Communities, Inc., 343 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1977). Thereafter, a prehearing conference was held to narrow and define the issues, briefs were filed and a hearing was held to receive oral argument on the legal issues involved.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the proposed corporate income tax deficiency for the Petitioner's fiscal year ending in 1973 be held invalid. Said deficiency should be recomputed by subtracting from the gross, sales price of the real estate sold in 1973 the amount realized on Petitioner's federal return in 1965, the selling expenses and the purchase of additional mineral rights. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald T. Hart Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer, Turner and Rhodes Post Office Box 1876 Suite 701, Lewis State Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. Wilson Crump, II Assistent Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Post Office Box 5377 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Having considered the pleadings, evidence and legal arguments presented in this cause, the following facts are found: Petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey and qualified to do business is one State of Florida. Two of the subsidiaries of Petitioner are Island Properties, Inc., formerly known as Heftler International, Inc., and Island Land Corporation, formerly known as Heftler Construction Company of Puerto Rico, Inc. These corporations are organized under the laws of the State of Florida and the State of New Jersey respectively and maintain principal places of business in Puerto Rico. For the fiscal years ending July 31, 1972 and July 31, 1973, petitioners properly included losses from the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations in their consolidated income tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service. For the fiscal years ending July 31, 1972, and July 31, 1973, petitioners timely filed with the respondent consolidated income tax returns including therein the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations. After a timely audit, the respondent excluded, for the purposes of computing adjusted federal income as defined by 220.13, the losses sustained by the Puerto Rico corporations. The respondent also excluded from the computation of the apportionment factors defined in F.S. s. 214.71 and 220.15 the value of the property, payroll and sales utilized in the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations. The respondent cited F.S. ss. 220.13(1)(b)2.b, 220.15(3) and 214.71 as its authority. The adjustments made by the respondent results in a net proposed deficiency of $75,076.46 for the two fiscal years in question. After attempts by the parties to resolve the issues by informal means failed, the petitioner requested a formal hearing and the respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that there is no basis for affording petitioners any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $75,076.46 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire WILLIAMS, SALOMON, KANNER DAMIAN 1003 du Pont Building Miami, Florida 33131 E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Petitioners are liable for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue (the Department)?
Findings Of Fact Salma is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 2231 Del Prado Boulevard, Cape Coral, Florida, 33990. Gausia is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 11571 Gladiolus Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, 33908. Petitioners are in the business of operating gas stations with convenience stores. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. Petitioners were selected for audit because their reported gross sales were less than the total cost of items purchased (inventory) for the audit period. The Department issued Salma and Gausia each a Notice of Intent to Conduct a Limited Scope Audit or Self-Audit, dated April 26, 2013, for sales and use tax, for the period February 1, 2010, through January 31, 2013 (collectively referred to as the Notices). The Notices requested that Petitioners provide the Department: (a) a list of all their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) their total purchases of alcohol and tobacco, by vendor, for the period July 2010 to June 2011; (c) copies of their federal tax returns for the examination period; (d) purchase receipts for all purchases for the last complete calendar month; and (e) daily register (Z tapes) for the last complete calendar month. The Notices gave Petitioners 60 days to gather the requested documents before the audit was to commence. The Notices also requested that Petitioners complete an attached Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet. In response to the Notices, Petitioners requested a 30- day extension of time until July 18, 2013, to provide the requested documents and to designate a Power of Attorney. Petitioners did not provide the Department any books and records for inspection, nor did they complete and return the questionnaire and self analysis worksheets. As a result, the Department's auditor determined the sales tax due based upon the best information available. To calculate an estimated assessment of sales tax, the Department used the purchase data of Petitioners' wholesalers and distributors of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011; the 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and in-store sales percentages of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products; and historical audit data. After reviewing the purchase data for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, and for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012, the Department's auditor determined that the data was missing a few vendors. As a result, the Department's auditor estimated the amount of Petitioners' cigarette purchases, based on historical audit data that shows that cigarette sales are generally 4.31 times more than beer sales. The Department's auditor and audit supervisor testified that the estimated gross sales seemed reasonable and consistent with the national averages and the purchase data for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012. The Department estimated gross sales (i.e., the retail sale value of the goods sold) by marking up the taxable sales and exempt sales reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners. For example, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Salma purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $148,826.15, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $189,009.21. For July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Gausia purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $132,138.65, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $167,816.09. The Department's markup on the alcoholic beverage and tobacco products is reasonable because the Department's auditor testified that he used a combination of 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and the competitive pricing and information from audits of other convenience stores. The Department determined that the exemption ratio reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners was extremely high for their industry. The Department used an exemption ratio of 15 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry, to calculate Petitioners' estimated taxable sales. A review of Petitioners' sales and use tax returns revealed that they did not apply the tax bracket system to their taxable sales transactions, as required under sections 212.12(9) and (10), Florida Statutes. Instead, Petitioners remitted sales tax on their taxable sales based on their gross receipts at a flat tax rate. The Department's auditor testified that this method of reporting tax is inappropriate and does not accurately reflect the sales activity of the business. The Department calculated the average effective tax rate of 6.0856 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry. To calculate the estimated tax due, the Department multiplied the effective tax rate by the estimated taxable sales and gave Petitioners credit for any tax remitted with their tax returns. The Department issued Salma a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149872. The Department issued Gausia a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149749. The Department assessed Petitioners sales tax on their sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes gave Petitioners 30 days to request a conference with the auditor or audit supervisor, to dispute the proposed changes. Petitioners did not make such a request. The Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) to Salma on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $159,282.26; for penalty in the sum of $39,820.57; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $27,772.36. The Department issued a NOPA to Gausia on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $213,754.46; for penalty in the sum of $53,438.62; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $36,921.79. Additional interest accrues at $30.55 per day until the tax is paid. The NOPAs became final assessments on May 5, 2014. After filing a request for an administrative hearing, Petitioners completed the Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet and produced the following documents to the Department: (a) a list of all of their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) a list of vendors for alcohol and tobacco, for the examination period of July 2010 to June 2011; (c) a summary of their taxable sales, for the period February 2010 through December 2012; (d) copies of their federal tax returns, for the tax years 2010 through 2013; (e) copies of its purchase receipts for the months of July 2013; and (f) copies of their daily register (Z-tapes) for the month of July 2013. The Department's auditor testified that aside from being untimely, the records and information provided by Petitioners during these proceedings were not reliable because Petitioners did not provide any source documents that would allow the Department to reconcile the reported figures and confirm the supplied information. In addition, the purchase receipts and Z- tapes were not relevant because they were from outside of the audit period. The Z-tapes are also unreliable because the manager of the convenience store testified at the final hearing that employees purposely and routinely entered taxable sales into the cash registers as tax exempt sales. Petitioners argue that the Department did not use the best information available when estimating the taxes due. Petitioners claim that because their businesses are combination gas station/convenience stores, the national data for standalone convenience stores is inapplicable. However, notably absent from Petitioners' testimony or evidence was any alternative data upon which the Department could have relied for more accurate estimates.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioners' requests for relief and assessing, in full, the Department's assessments of sales tax, penalty, and interest against both Salma and Gausia. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2015.
