Recommendation That the allegations against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562, Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Regis Reasbeck, Esquire 6011 Rodman Street Hollywood, Florida
The Issue Whether subject sign is in violation of state and federal law for the reason that no permit was secured at time of erection of subject sign.
Findings Of Fact Respondent proceeded to erect subject sign prior to January 29, 1975, and continued such erection after January 29, 1975, the date a Notice of Outdoor Advertising Violation was served on Respondent Corporation by the District Sign Inspector. Said notice of violation notified Respondent that Respondent Corporation was in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes or Section 335.13, Florida statutes for the reason that no permit had been secured and that the erection of said sign was in violation of the specific requirement of Chapter 479, Florida statutes inasmuch as subject sign was approximately 250' from an existing sign. Respondent continued to erect subject sign despite objections from the Florida Department of Transportation. On the date of the hearing the Respondent testified that as of that date an application had been made and permit had been approved. The sign coordinator testified that the sign which had been permitted and which was so spaced to prohibit the building of Respondent's sign had been removed after the Notice of Hearing had been set. The complainant contended that Respondent erected subject sign without first applying for a permit; that after Notice of Violation Respondent disregarded the notice and the law and continued to build subject sign; that not until notice of this hearing was received did Respondent "buy out" the offending sign which prohibited the issuance of permits. The Respondent did not deny that no permit was issued before erection of subject sign but contends that permits have now been issued.
The Issue Whether Respondent was in violation of Subsection 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, providing for the permitting of outdoor advertising structures.
Findings Of Fact Respondent maintained two outdoor advertising signs adjacent to U.S. Highway 90 in Gadsden County, Florida. The first sign listed on the notice of outdoor advertising law violation dated August 5, 1974, has been removed. No further action is necessary in regards to this sign. The second sign listed on the August 5, 1974, Notice of Violation is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 90 1/2 mile West of the city limits of Quincy, Florida. The second sign was not permitted in the years 1973 or 1974. Respondent has not made application for a current permit as of the date of hearing.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is trustee for the owner of the sign advertising Riverfront Lots located adjacent to State Road 200 (A1A) 10.34 miles east of U.S. 1. SR 200 is a federal-aid primary highway. No permit has ever been issued for this sign and the land on which the sign is erected is zoned Open Rural.
The Issue Whether the signs of the Petitioner should be removed for violations of Section 479.07(2) and 14-10.04(2), no current permit and the violation of Section 479.07(2) and 14-10.06(3), a spacing violation.
Findings Of Fact An alleged violation of Chapter 479, Section 335 and 339.31, Florida Statutes, and notice to show cause was sent to the Petitioner on the 13th day of February, 1978 alleging that a sign owned by Petitioner located on a roof top thirty (30) feet east of Mills Avenue and State Road 50 with copy reading "WFTV Eyewitness News" is in violation of Section 479.07(2), having no current permit visible. A second sign located on the same roof top, 30 feet east of Mills Avenue and State Road 50 with copy "B.J. 105 Radio Station", was in violation of Section 479.07(2) as having no current permit visible and also in violation of Section 479.02(2), Rule 14-10-06(3), Florida Administrative Code, violation of a spacing requirement. An application was made by Petitioner for a permit but was denied by the Respondent for the two subject signs. The sign with the copy "B.J. 105 Radio Station" is less than 500 feet from a permitted billboard and has no current permit tag attached thereto. The sign with the copy "WFTV Eyewitness News", has no current permit tag attached thereto. The subject signs advertise off-premise businesses and must have permits from the Respondent, Department of Transportation. No permits have been issued for either of the subject signs. Petitioner has agreed that any improper use of the sign will be discontinued and contemplates an "on-premise or on-site" sign which the Respondent has agreed is a proper use and not in violation of the statutes and rules.
Recommendation Remove the signs of Petitioner within 30 days from the date hereof unless such signs are permitted by the Respondent after a change in the copy on the sign structures. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce E. Chapin, Esquire 201 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Philip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact A notice was sent to the Respondent on the 11th day of May, 1977, alleging violation of Section 479.07(1), 479.11(1), Florida Statutes, for the reason that the sign owned by the Respondent had no permit attached thereto and was located within 15 feet of the right of way of the secondary road. Respondent's sign is painted on a guard rail which had been erected in front of the residence which stood at the east/west end of the intersection or "T" of State Road 707 and State Road 707A. The copy on the sign which was in two parts read: "Indian River Beverage Deli Take-out Catering" and a telephone number "333-5600--1 1/2 miles South" with an arrow indicating a southerly direction. The immediate area of the residence protected by the guard rail includes a parking lot and a trailer park. The sign advertises the business of the Respondent located 1 1/2 miles from the zone. The sign is approximately 6 feet from the edge of the pavement of the secondary road. No permit was applied for or secured before the sign was painted on the guard rail. Petitioner contends that the sign must be removed inasmuch as it sits less than 15 feet from the edge of the paved secondary road and that no permit was applied for or secured. Respondent contends that he assumed that the owner of the guard rail had gotten a permit to erect the guard rail and that the guard rail was erected to protect the house inasmuch as the house had been invaded by traveling automobiles seven times in seven years. He further contended that the sign was all dirty and rusty, and he made an agreement with the owner of the property to paint the sign and that it was sandblasted, cleaned up and painted in white and made traveling on the state road safer as well as advertising his establishment.
Recommendation Remove the sign unless it has been removed within five (5) days after final order is issued. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. O. E. Black, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Martin K. Hawthorne Indian River Beverage, Inc. 2222 Indian River Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 33457
The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.
Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.
Findings Of Fact On or about January 27, 1988, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's sign along U. S. 19 in the vicinity of S. R. 595. The sign had no permit attached, and DOT records revealed no permit has ever been issued for this sign. The sign is visible from U. S. 19. U. S. 19 is a federal aid primary highway.
The Issue Whether the respondents or some of them erected and maintained outdoor advertising signs in violation of Rule 14-10.006(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, because more than two advertisements or "messages" were visible to motorists at the same location?
Findings Of Fact Visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards both of the same, concededly lawful size, mounted on a single structure, one on top of the other, 1.75 miles east of State Road 69 in Jackson County. The upper sign advertises a Holiday Inn in Marianna. The bottom sign advertises a Best Western motel (yellow logo against black background) and a McDonald's restaurant (golden arches and white lettering against a red background.) Between the two businesses's names on the bottom sign board appears "11 MI EXIT 21" against a white background. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1716T). Also visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards of the same size mounted on the same structure, one on top of the other, 2.4 miles east of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advertises the Chipley Motel. Over the words "THIS EXIT," the central portion of the lower sign advertises a Stuckey's store. Flanking this central portion, both ends of the billboard are taken up with advertisements featuring petroleum trademarks (a scallop shell and a star.) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1714T). Visible to east-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards of the same size mounted one on top of the other on the same poles, 1.2 miles west of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advertises a single business establishment. Underneath, half the sign is devoted to advertising the Washington Motor Inn and half to touting The Outlet Center. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1923T). Visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 are two billboards of the same size mounted on the same structure one on top of the other, 2.7 miles east of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advises motorists of the proximity of a motel. The lower sign advertises both a Chevron filling station and a Western Sizzlin restaurant, devoting half the panel to each. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1921T). Also visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 is a pair of billboards mounted one over the other at a site 1.3 miles west of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper panel is devoted exclusively to informing the driving public of a nearby motel. The lower billboard, like the lower billboard located 1.7 miles east of State Road 69, advertises a McDonald's restaurant and a Best Western motel, and does so in a similar bipartite manner. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89- 1922T) Finally, also visible to west-bound traffic on Interstate Highway 10 is another pair of billboards mounted on top of one another on the same poles, a mile east of State Road 77 in Washington County. The upper sign advertises a McDonald's restaurant. Like the lower sign located 2.4 miles east of State Road 77, the lower sign located a mile east advertises not only Stuckey's, but also Shell and Texaco gasolines. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 (89-1924T). A handbook DOT employees use depicts three billboards at one location, over the caption: "One of the three faces is illegal if erected after January 28, 1972. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. DOT has not promulgated the handbook as a rule. The evidence did not establish when the billboards in question here were erected. But for Milford C. Truette's perspicacity, these cases might never have arisen. As acting outdoor advertising supervisor for DOT's District II, he told Elsie Myrick, a property and outdoor advertising inspector for DOT, that she "might want to check into ... [the signs involved here] and see that they were in violation." Myrick deposition p. 8. In the subsequently formed opinion of Ms. Myrick, it is unlawful for an outdoor advertising sign to advertise three or more locations at which the same advertiser does business or three or more businesses at the same location, although the proprietor of a single store might lawfully advertise three or more products for sale at the store, and a motel owner is free to advertise a restaurant and a cocktail lounge, at least if they are under the same roof. Respondent's signs are in violation, in Ms. Myrick's view, because, "You're getting across more messages than what you're allowed in a space." Myrick deposition, p. 15. Ms. Myrick thought a sign advertising several stores housed in a single mall would be illegal, but Mr. Truette and Mr. Kissinger, DOT motorist information services coordinator, disagreed. Ms. Myrick rejected the suggestion that common ownership of advertisers would make a difference, but Mr. Kissinger's views on this point were less clear. T.52-3. Mr. Kissinger believes that an outdoor advertising sign can advertise multiple locations at which an enterprise conducts business, or even multiple business entities, if they are all located on the same parcel of real estate.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the notices to show cause issued in each of these consolidated cases. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 89-1714T, 89-1716T, 89-1921T, 89-1922T, 89-1923T, 89-1924 Except for the last sentence in proposed finding of fact No. 4, petitioner's proposed findings of fact 1 through 5 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact were not numbered, but have been treated fully in the recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802
