Findings Of Fact The sign owned by Westby Corporation located on U.S. 17, 12.32 miles north of S.R. 70, has no valid permit and the land on which the sign is located is zoned for agricultural use, A-1. Hardee County zoning regulations do not authorize erection of signs on A-1 zoned property. The license fee was last paid for this sign in 1969. U.S. 17 is a federal-aid primary highway.
Findings Of Fact The sign which is the subject of this proceeding is an outdoor advertising structure owned by the Respondent, which has been erected on the south side of Interstate 10, approximately 2.5 miles west of State Road 12 in Gadsden County, Florida, between 10 and 25 feet from the right-of-way fence. This sign does not have affixed to it a state sign permit, and none has been applied for. The subject sign has been erected a measured 814 feet from another sign which has been permitted by the Department of Transportation. The location where the subject sign has been erected is an unzoned area Qf Gadsden County. Gadsden County had no zoning at the time when the violation notice was issued.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's sign adjacent to Interstate 10, approximately 2.5 miles west of State Road 12 in Gadsden County, Florida, be removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 19th day of October, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 W. A. Woddiam, President Beaver Lake Campground P. O. Box 331 Quincy, Florida 32351
The Issue Whether the sign is in violation of 479.07 and 479.01 Florida Statutes for the reason that it has no permit tag attached thereto and has been enlarged.
Findings Of Fact A violation notice was issued to A. W. Lee, Respondent, on June 29, 1977, alleging that a sign owned by Respondent located at 12.85 miles north U.S. 441-Ellisville, Florida Highway I-75 with copy "Jiffy Junction" was in violation of 479.07 and 479.01 Florida Statutes and Rule 14-10.05(m) Florida Administrative Code. A request for administrative hearing was made by the Respondent and thereafter the Petitioner, Department of Transportation, requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to hold an administrative hearing. A sign in the same location as subject sign was tagged in 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974 for an 8 x 12 sign. The permit was issued to Harvey Campbell. The sign was approximately 15 feet back from the right of way of I-75. A fee of $2.00 was paid for the permit. Prior to June of 1977 ownership was transferred from Harvey Campbell to the Respondent, A. W. Lee. The Respondent filed an application for a permit on June 20, 1977, for a sign 14 X 12 indicating a fee of $2.00 A sign at the location was existing, had no permit and measured 8 x 20. The sign as it stands at date of hearing is a sign 8 x 20, it advertises "Burger King this exit, turn right 300 feet right." It has no permit. The Hearing Officer further finds a sign that had been repermitted through 1977 was a sign 8 x 10 and the permit was issued to Harvey Campbell. The sign that stands there in the approximate location is a sign 8 x 20 and has additional poles to hold the panels. It has no permit. The sign is located on property owned by A. L. Lee, the Respondent, and the smaller original sign was transferred by Mr. Campbell to Respondent prior to April, 1976.
Recommendation Remove the subject sign. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James J. Richardson, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1857 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the sign of Petitioner, White Advertising International, should be removed by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, for violation of Section 479.07(1) and Section 479.11(2), Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Findings Of Fact A notice of violation was sent by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, to the Petitioner, White Advertising International, on March 21, 1977, citing an outdoor advertising sign owned by the Petitioner located 1.97 miles west of U.S. #1, State Road 50 E/B with copy "Real Estate Service." The violation noted that the sign violated Section 479.071(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14ER77-09 (now Rule 14-10.04) and Section 479.11(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14ER77-10, 11 (now Rule 14-10.05 and 14-10.06). There is no dispute as to the location or copy or ownership of the subject sign. It is not in a zoned business, commercial or industrial area and is outside an urban area. The sign does not conform to the current setback requirements. The sign has a permit tag dated 1971, the only permit tag on the sign. No application was alleged to have been made for permit or annual fee paid or offered subsequent to 1971 until the application noted in 4, infra. A sign permit application and annual renewal was processed by White Advertising International dated January 21, 1977. The application was an annual renewal for the year of "19 72-1976." The printed application form stated that, "The signs listed above meet all requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Respondent, by its outdoor advertising section administrator, refused to grant the permit on the grounds that the sign which had been erected prior to the enactment of the current setback regulations and probably in the year 1967 had had no application for permit or annual fee paid since 1971 and therefore having become an illegal sign, no permit could be issued. The Petitioner sign company introduced into evidence a letter dated February 28, 1977, from Respondent, Department of Transportation, through its property management administrator which indicated that the State had previously contended the subject sign was built on an unplatted street and had to be removed without compensation but that it was discovered such was not the case and that the State then offered to reimburse Petitioner for relocation costs. Petitioner did not remove the sign and the letter states that the current position of the Respondent State is: That the sign is on the right of way, contrary to Section 339.301, Florida Statutes; Has no current permit; contrary to Section 479.07(1), F.S. Violates Section 479.13, Florida Statutes, as having been constructed, erected, operated, used and maintained without the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession or control of the property on which the sign is located; and The sign therefore is an illegal sign and must be removed by Petitioner without compensation. Respondent contends: that the sign is illegal, having failed to be permitted since the year 1971; that it has one pole of the sign pole on the right of way contrary to Section 339.301; that it has no lease contract as required by Section 479.13; that Respondent has no authority to renew delinquent permits; that once a sign becomes illegal a new permit cannot reinstate its nonconforming status. Petitioner, White Advertising International, contends: that it should be granted a permit inasmuch as permits for some signs had been granted by the Respondent although the annual permit fee was not timely made.
Recommendation Remove subject sign if the same has not been removed within thirty (30) days from the date of the Final Order. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire White Advertising International Post Office Box 626 Titusville, Florida
The Issue Whether the outdoor advertising sign of Respondent should be removed for lack of an outdoor advertising permit and for being erected without a permit within the prohibited distance of an interstate highway.
Findings Of Fact A violation notice and Notice to Show Cause dated August 3, 1978, was served upon the Respondent charging him with violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, Sections 335.13 and 339.301, Florida Statutes, and Rules 14-10.04 and 14-10.05, Florida Administrative Code. The sign in question carries the copy "Arrowhead Campsites" and is located 0.5 mile west of U.S. Highway 231 on Interstate Highway 10. An administrative hearing was requested on the charges. A billboard advertising Arrowhead Campsites has been erected within the past three years in Jackson County, Florida, about one-half mile west of U.S. 231 on the south side of Interstate 10. The sign is approximately fifteen (15) feet south of a fence located within the right-of-way of Interstate 10. The outdoor advertising is approximately one hundred (100) feet from the edge of the interstate highway and is clearly visible to the public traveling on the interstate. It obviously was erected to advertise the campsites to those traveling on the federal highway. The sign is located on private property in a rural area along the interstate highway. No outdoor advertising permit is attached to the subject sign, and no application has been made to the Florida Department of Transportation for a permit for subject sign. It was stipulated that the Respondent, Bill Reddick, is the husband of the owner of Arrowhead Campsites, and that Mr. Reddick accepted service of the notice and the notice has not been questioned.
Recommendation Remove the subject sign without compensation therefor and assess penalties as provided in Section 479.18, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James P. Appleman, Esquire 206 Market Street Post Office Box 355 Marianna, Florida 32446 Richard C. Hurst, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact A notice was sent to the Respondent on the 11th day of May, 1977, alleging violation of Section 479.07(1), 479.11(1), Florida Statutes, for the reason that the sign owned by the Respondent had no permit attached thereto and was located within 15 feet of the right of way of the secondary road. Respondent's sign is painted on a guard rail which had been erected in front of the residence which stood at the east/west end of the intersection or "T" of State Road 707 and State Road 707A. The copy on the sign which was in two parts read: "Indian River Beverage Deli Take-out Catering" and a telephone number "333-5600--1 1/2 miles South" with an arrow indicating a southerly direction. The immediate area of the residence protected by the guard rail includes a parking lot and a trailer park. The sign advertises the business of the Respondent located 1 1/2 miles from the zone. The sign is approximately 6 feet from the edge of the pavement of the secondary road. No permit was applied for or secured before the sign was painted on the guard rail. Petitioner contends that the sign must be removed inasmuch as it sits less than 15 feet from the edge of the paved secondary road and that no permit was applied for or secured. Respondent contends that he assumed that the owner of the guard rail had gotten a permit to erect the guard rail and that the guard rail was erected to protect the house inasmuch as the house had been invaded by traveling automobiles seven times in seven years. He further contended that the sign was all dirty and rusty, and he made an agreement with the owner of the property to paint the sign and that it was sandblasted, cleaned up and painted in white and made traveling on the state road safer as well as advertising his establishment.
Recommendation Remove the sign unless it has been removed within five (5) days after final order is issued. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. O. E. Black, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Martin K. Hawthorne Indian River Beverage, Inc. 2222 Indian River Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 33457
The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.
Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is in violation of Sections 479.07(1) and 479.11(1) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Fred C. Glass, Outdoor Advertising Inspector, testified that he had inspected an outdoor advertising sign located on State Road 8 (I-10) 3.48 miles south of State Road 53 which was not located within a municipality. Said sign was located 31 feet from the right of way of I-10. His inspection revealed that said sign did not have a permit tag affixed. Located near the sign was a small building without windows and a gas pump. There was no one present on the site when inspected. The building and pump wore locked up. Glass testified that the pump and building did not look as if it had ever been used. Glass identified Composite Exhibit 1, as polaroid pictures he had taken on October 3, 1975 at 3:00 p.m. and they were received into evidence. From his duties Glass would have been aware of any application received for such a sign, and he stated he had never received an application. Glass said he had not talked with Davis about the sign, but concluded it was Davis' sign from the nature of the sign's advertisement, and the fact that the J. B. Davis' service station was located at the next exit. J. B. Davis testified that the sign was not his but was located on the site of a service station belonging to L. H. Thurman, Route 2, Lee, Florida. J. B. Davis identified Exhibit 2A as a copy of Thurman's Sales Tax Certificate and Exhibit 2B as Thurman's gasoline Dealers License which David had obtained from Thurman. Davis testified that as the gasoline distributor for the counties in the area he supplied gasoline to Thurman who operated the station. He supplied a couple of hundred gallons to Thurman per month. The property where the station is located is leased by Thurman from a Mr. Woods. Davis further testified that one would take the "next exit" to go to Thurman's station.
Recommendation Having failed to show J. B. Davis' ownership of the sign, the Hearing Officer recommends the charges be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay Hendrickson, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 J. B. Davis, President J. B. Davis, Inc. Base and Duval Street Madison, Florida 32340
Findings Of Fact The sign which is the subject of this proceeding was cited for violations of the Florida statutes and rules regulating outdoor advertising structures by notice of violation dated November 3, 1983, and served on the Respondent as owner of this sign. The subject sign is located on the north side of Interstate 10, 1.6 miles east of State Road 267, in Gadsden County, Florida. This structure is an outdoor sign, or display, or device, or figure, or painting, or drawing, or message, or placard, or poster, or billboard, or other thing, designed, intended or used to advertise or inform with all or part of its advertising or informative content visible from the main traveled way of Interstate 10. The structure is located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the pavement of Interstate 10, as alleged in the violation notice dated November 3, 1983. The structure was located outside any incorporated city or town on the date it was built. The structure was not located in a commercial or industrial zoned or unzoned area on the date it was built. The structure was constructed, or erected, without a currently valid permit issued by the Department of Transportation; it was operated, used, or maintained without such a permit; and a Department of Transportation outdoor advertising permit has never been issued for the subject structure. The structure does not fall within any of the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes. The structure was located adjacent to and visible from the main traveled way of a roadway open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic in the State of Florida at the time it was built. The structure had affixed the copy or message as shown on the notice of violation when it was issued; namely, Texaco Next Exit Turn Left - Food Store. Hinson Oil Company is the owner of the sign or structure which is the subject of this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the sign owned by the Respondent, Hinson Oil Company, located on the north side of Interstate 10, 1.6 miles east of State Road 267, in Gadsden County, Florida, be removed. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Horns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Fl. 32301-8064 Mr. E. W. Hinson, Jr. Hinson Oil Company P O. Box 448 Quincy, Florida 32351 WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1984. Paul Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
