The Issue Whether Respondent violated Chapter 509, F.S., and Chapter 7C, F.A.C., as stated in Notice to Show Cause, dated January 5, 1979. Respondent appeared at the hearing without counsel and was advised as to his rights in an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. He elected to represent himself at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Alfred L. Merritt owns and operates the Steven Hotel located at 136 Northeast 9th Street, Miami, Florida, under license No. 23-13111 issued by Petitioner. (Testimony of Brown, Merritt) On December 6, 1978, Roger Brown, an inspector for Petitioner, conducted a routine inspection of Respondent's public lodging establishment and, accompanied by the hotel manager, found apparent violations of Chapter 509, F.S., and Chapter 7C, F.A.C., during the course thereof as follows: Ceiling leak in third floor hall; ceiling out of bathroom on third floor, west side with rafters exposed; overhead doorframe in apartments 305 and 309 were loose and insecure; floors in room 307 and mens room, third floor, west side had rotten boards which were termite infested as evidenced by the presence of droppings and wings; baseboard in bathroom by the shower needed replacement; windows on the north side of the second and third floors were broken; plaster in ceiling of ladies room, second floor, needed repair of rotten boards; ceiling and wall in bathroom of east side, second floor, had exposed rafters and pipes and needed repair; storeroom floor on porch of the second floor was rotten and needed repair; wood strips were missing on the floor of first floor hall; toilets on the west side of the first and second floors needed repair; wall on the west side of the first floor had a hole which needed repair; an inoperable dumbwaiter needed to be closed or covered. (Rule 7C-1.03(1)) Reinspection on June 6, 1979, revealed that although some repairs had been effected, ceiling leaks still existed in the third floor hall, the ceiling of the bath of the third floor, west side, was still open, and doorframes in apartments 305 and 309 were still loose. Showers on second and third floors had mildew odor and needed cleaning, ceiling and walls in restrooms on the second and third floor were rotten and deteriorated. (Rule 7C-3.01(2)) Reinspection on June 6, 1979, revealed that these conditions had not been cured. Restrooms had not been designated by sex for men and women. (Section 509.221(1), F.S.) Reinspection on June 6, 1979, indicated that the restrooms were now so designated. Screen on north side of second and third floors needed replacement, as did screens and crawl spaces under building. (Section 509.221(8), F.S. and Rule 7C-1.03(3), F.A.C.) Reinspection on June 6, 1979, showed that the screens had not been replaced, but that the crawl space areas had been properly covered. Roach and vermin droppings had been observed in closets, drawers and shelves in the apartments. (Rule 7C-1.03(3)) Reinspection on June 6, 1979, revealed no vermin dropping but continued presence of roaches. Trash and debris were present on the exterior premises, including old mattresses and a refrigerator. (Rule 7C-1.03(7)) Reinspection on June 6, 1979, showed the continued presence of the refrigerator and an old tub. Lid was not closed on dumpster. (Rule 7C-1.03(5)) Reinspection on June 6, 1979, showed that a lid had been placed on the dumpster. Room rates were not properly posted in each room and Form DBR208 concerning room rates had not been filed with Petitioner. (Rule 7C-3.02(1)) On June 6, 1979, although Form 208 had been filed with Petitioner, room rates were still not posted. (Testimony of Brown) Respondent testified at the hearing that he was endeavoring to bring the building up to proper hotel standards but continuing repairs were necessary and it was not possible to have the premises in an acceptable condition at all time. It was uncontroverted that a three-month sheetrock strike occurred at the time of ceiling and wall repairs which made that material difficult to obtain, but that Respondent had used plywood in certain areas as a substitute. Respondent further contested the allegations that termites existed in the building and claimed that rotten flooring was caused by dry-rot. (Testimony of Merritt)
Recommendation That Petitioner impose a civil fine of $250 against Respondent, pursuant to the authority contained in Section 509.261(2), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Bayley Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alfred L. Merritt t/a Steven Hotel 136 NE 9th Street Miami, Florida
The Issue Whether Cindy Cammarota and Quail Oaks Apartments violated the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance (Ord. 88-9 as amended) by discriminating on grounds of race and religion against Petitioners, Reverends William and Jacqueline Caractor with respect to an attempted eviction action.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cammarota is the resident manager of Quail Oak Apartments. Respondent Quail Oak is an apartment complex in Hillsborough County which is subject to the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance. Petitioners, who are black, are husband and wife. They are ordained ministers, who reside in Quail Oaks. They have used the community center at the apartment complex for services and frequently pray with other residents. They wear clerical garb and read their Bible in common areas at the complex. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Cammarota knew Petitioners were ministers at Mt. Carmel African Methodist Espiscopal Church. On July 30, 1990, a written rental agreement was entered into between Quail Oaks, lessor, and Petitioners, lessees, for an apartment at the complex. The term of the lease was from September 1, 1990 through August 31, 1991. At the option of Quail Oaks, payment of rent could be accepted conditionally by means of a personal check from the lessees. If the check was rejected for insufficient funds, Quail Oaks could require rent plus late charges to be paid by cashier's check, certified check or money order. In addition, Quail Oaks could terminate the lease for nonpayment of rent. Prior to leaving for vacation in November 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor issued a check in the amount of $645.00 for the November rent. The check was drawn upon the personal checking account belonging to her and her husband at Citizens and Southern National Bank (C & S). It was payable upon demand to Quail Oaks. Although a C & S counter check was used, all of the information on the check was correct. This check was accepted by Respondent Cammarota on behalf of Quail Oaks. It was presented to Barnett Bank of Tampa (Barnett) for collection and the bank was instructed to deposit the funds in Quail Oaks' account at the bank. Barnett Bank did not exercise ordinary care in regard to the check as required by the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead of collecting the funds from the payor bank, Barnett returned the check unpaid to Quail Oaks on November 5, 1990. Notice of the bank's dishonor was sent to Quail Oaks in a notice of debit with respect to the instrument together with the check itself. No reason was given by the bank for the dishonor. The provisional settlement of the check made by Barnett with Quail Oaks was revoked and the amount of credit given was charged back to Quail Oaks' account. Respondent Cammarota, who managed the Quail Oaks account with Barnett, misinterpreted this activity in the account as nonpayment of rent. A "three day notice" was issued by Quail Oaks to Petitioners for payment of rent or possession of the premises on November 7, 1990. The deadline for payment was November 13, 1990. Petitioners received actual notice on November 16, 1990, when they returned from vacation and found the notice posted on the front door of their apartment. A message concerning the matter was also on their answering machine. The message advised them that their check had been returned for insufficient funds. Petitioners went to their bank to determine why their check had not been honored. They had always paid their rent on time and they were concerned about the current state of affairs. The C & S Bank investigated the matter and discovered the check had never been submitted to it for payment. While Petitioners were present, a representative of the bank telephoned Respondent Cammarota and told her a bank error must have occurred as sufficient funds had always been available in Petitioners' account to cover the check, which had never been submitted to C & S for collection. Once Petitioners established that insufficient funds was not the basis for a dishonor of their personal check, they went to Respondent Cammarota to discuss the resolution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota was asked to resubmit the personal check for payment. She refused and requested a money order that included additional charges for the costs Quail Oaks incurred as a result of Barnett Bank's dishonor of the check. Respondent did not believe Petitioners' claim that the original check was a good check. Petitioners advised that they would not pay additional charges because they had complied with all of their responsibilities. They asked for the return of the original check and offered to pay the rent only by money order. Respondent Cammarota refused this potential solution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota did not believe Petitioners were at the office in order to make the check good. She did not believe that Petitioners were merely asserting their legal rights under the lease and negotiable instruments law. As a result, she was suspicious and unyielding during the discussion. She wanted them to pay late fees in order to remain in possession of their apartment. Petitioners, who were tired from their journey and surprised by Respondent Cammarota's lack of receptiveness to very reasonable requests, became somewhat excited by the fact that the process to remove them from their home had begun and they were being told to pay more money than they legally owed to remain in possession. In their response to the situation, Petitioners reminded Respondent Cammarota that they were Reverends. A suggestion that Respondent Cammarota should listen to God was construed by her as "preaching". The excited utterances from Petitioners caused the leasing agent in the office to ask them to leave, which they refused to do until they had read the notice of debit Respondent had received from Barnett Bank about their check. After the notice of debit was read and returned to Quail Oaks, Petitioners began to take their leave. At this point, Respondent Cammarota said something like, "And you people call yourself ministers". On November 20, 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor gave Quail Oaks a second November 1990 rent payment in the form of a money order. A letter dated the same day from Quail Oaks advised Petitioners that the money order could not be accepted because their account had already been turned over to Quail Oaks' attorney for eviction proceedings. On November 21, 1990, eviction proceedings were filed against Petitioners by Respondent Quail Oaks for nonpayment of rent. On November 28, 1990, Petitioners filed a housing discrimination complaint against Respondents. Attempts to resolve the housing discrimination complaint through conciliation was unsuccessful. Respondent Cammarota uses the term "you people" in conversation whenever she refers to two or more people in her presence. Ordinarily, it is not used to differentiate blacks from whites. In her conversation with the Petitioners, however, the term referred to their race or religion or both. It is Respondent Cammarota's opinion that ministers should behave differently than the Petitioners were behaving when they were asserting their legal rights in her office on November 16, 1990. Respondents did not articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the eviction action for non-payment of rent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of County Commissioners enter a Final Order finding that an unlawful discriminatory housing practice occurred when Respondent Cammarota, agent for Respondent Quail Oaks, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners because of race or color and religion. That Respondents be required to pay a $500 fine to Hillsborough County. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See See HO HO #2. #11. 4. Accepted. See HO #3. 5. Accepted. See HO #5. 6. Accepted. See HO #10. 7. Accepted. See HO #11. 8. Accepted. See HO #12. 9. Accepted. See HO #13. 10. Accepted. See HO #14. 11. Accepted. See HO #14. 12. Accepted. See HO #14. 13. Accepted. See HO #18. 14. Accepted. See HO #20. 15. Accepted. See HO #21. 16. Accepted. 17. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Docket speaks for itself. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #22. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and loose agreements. Rejected. Inconclusive evidence. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. #17. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Redundant. 49.-57. Rejected. Irrelevant. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #5, #7 and #8. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. See HO #12. Accepted. See HO #13-#14. Rejected. Self serving. Accepted. See HO #21. Accepted. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to lease. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and legal test for unlawful discrimination. COPIES FURNISHED: Cretta Johnson, Director Hillsborough County Equal Opportunity and Human Relations Department P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 John McMillan, Esquire Levin & McMillan 9385 N. 56th Street, #200 Temple Terrace, FL 33617-5594 Catherine P. Teti, Esquire Assistant County Attorney P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 Reverend William Caractor Qualified Representative 4747 W. Waters Avenue #3807 Tampa, FL 33614
Findings Of Fact Roy Howard rented an apartment from Respondent from 23 October 1977 until 31 August 1978. The lease was oral with the rent of $175 payable monthly and due on the first of each and every month after October 1977. Respondent received a security deposit from Howard in the amount of $100 when the apartment was leased to Howard. Sometime shortly before August 15, 1978 Howard notified Mrs. Williams by telephone that he intended to vacate the premises on 31 August 1978. No written notice was given; however, Respondent acknowledged that actual notice was received of Howard's intention to quit the premises on 31 August 1978. Within a few days after Howard left the apartment, Mrs. Williams inspected the apartment and found damage to wall in hall due to furniture being moved out, the apartment dirty, and damage to hardwood floors. On 15 September 1978 Mrs. Williams sent Howard a letter outlining the above damages and a check for $31.50 representing the balance from the $100 security deposit after she had paid for the cleaning of the apartment. Howard protested withholding part of his security deposit for cleaning and complained to Petitioner, who issued the Notice to Show Cause in this case. At the time Howard entered into the lease with Mrs. Williams she told him his full security deposit would be refunded if he left the apartment in the same condition with respect to cleanliness and repair it was in when occupied by Howard. Subsequent to September 15, 1978 Mrs. Williams obtained an estimate of $115.95 to repaint the hallway and ceiling leading to the apartment occupied by Howard. No evidence was introduced indicating that any damage to the hall ceiling was occasioned by Howard's move from the apartment.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents are guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Richard Charles Weit has been a real estate broker licensed in the state of Florida, having been issued license numbered 0094418, and Respondent R C Properties International, Inc., has been a real estate broker licensed in the state of Florida, having been issued license numbered 0195105. At all times material hereto, Respondent Weit has been licensed and operating as a qualifying officer and broker of Respondent R C Properties. Jose Martinez met Respondent Weit in approximately 1986 as a result of a newspaper ad which had been placed by Weit. Weit personally owned a number of properties. At the time, Martinez was a construction worker, looking for real estate considered to be a "handyman special." Martinez wanted to buy property which was in need of repair so that he could make the repairs and then sell the property at a profit. Martinez purchased from Respondent Weit three such properties owned by Weit during 1986 and one during 1987. He bought them, repaired them, and sold them at a profit. On several occasions, Respondent Weit sold those properties for Martinez after Martinez had executed the necessary repairs. On all occasions, Respondent Weit sold those properties to Martinez for very small down payments since they both understood that Martinez needed his available cash to make the necessary repairs in order to be able to sell them at a profit. Respondent Weit was not acting as a real estate broker in any of those transactions or in the transaction involved in this proceeding. The properties which he sold to Martinez were owned by Weit. As the business relationship developed between Martinez and Weit, both men developed a trust for each other and worked together somewhat informally in that business relationship which resulted in a profit for both of them. By 1989 Martinez had gone into business with a partner, Jesse Deveras. As a licensed general contractor, Deveras was able to "pull permits" for the repairs which Martinez needed to make to the "handyman specials." In early 1989, Martinez and Deveras talked with Respondent Weit about purchasing an apartment building that Weit owned at 227 Northeast 26th Street, Miami, Florida. The apartment building was a three-story CBS structure containing 18 units. At the time, Martinez and Deveras were interested in purchasing that apartment building and another building located on the next street. Respondent Weit set the sale price for the apartment building at $190,000 and drafted a contract to that effect. Martinez and Deveras did not wish to pay that much for that building, and the contract was never executed. Martinez and Deveras thoroughly inspected that building at that time and fully understood that the building was in need of repair. Around that time, Respondent Weit received a letter from the Department of Housing and Urban Development of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, notifying him that the apartment building was in need of repairs and was in violation of certain minimum housing standards. That letter gave Respondent Weit 60 days in which to remedy the violations. The violations were all clearly visible and involved such things as repairing windows and screens, replacing deteriorated door jambs and baseboards, replacing broken electrical switch cover plates, and repairing the damage from some "apparent water seepage." Respondent Weit showed Martinez and Deveras that letter. On November 13, 1989, Jorge Garcia, a police officer for the City of Miami Police Department, was dispatched to Respondent Weit's apartment building to check for "criminal elements." While there, he noticed a strong smell of gas. He notified the Fire Department, which responded to his call with fire engines and a fire inspector. The Fire Department subsequently summoned an inspector from the City of Miami Code Enforcement Section. A determination was made that there was a gas leak in the building. Accordingly, the remaining tenants were evacuated, and all utility service to the building was terminated. Officer Garcia obtained from a family living there the name and telephone number of Respondent Weit as the person in charge of collecting rent. He contacted Respondent Weit and spoke with him personally no later than the following day. He advised Weit that the building was going to be condemned, that the tenants needed to be relocated, and that the building was to be boarded up to prevent entry. Since the tenants had just made a rent payment, Officer Garcia told Respondent Weit that he should refund the rent payment so the tenants could move elsewhere. Respondent Weit went to the police station on Biscayne Boulevard where Officer Garcia worked and left the rent money he had collected so that it could be returned to the tenants. On November 14, when City of Miami officials returned to the apartment building, they discovered that Respondent had complied with their instructions. The doors and windows of the apartment building were locked and boarded up to prevent entry. Further, the iron gate at the front door was padlocked and chained. Maurice Majszak was the City of Miami fire inspector who responded to the property on November 13, 1989. During his inspection he found violations of the South Florida Building Code and the National Fire Protection Agency life/safety handbook, which the City of Miami was authorized to enforce. He returned to his office and drafted a letter to Respondent Weit on that same day, describing the violations which he had found and ordering Respondent Weit to correct those violations within 45 days. That violation letter was attached to a transmittal letter dated November 14, 1989. Respondent Weit had continuing problems with receiving his mail at the address of R C Properties. Accordingly, he had made arrangements with fire inspector Maurice Majszak so that whenever the City of Miami Fire Department needed to contact Respondent regarding any of the properties owned by him, rather than mailing notices to Respondent, Inspector Majszak would hand- deliver notices to Respondent after 2:00 p.m. That arrangement had worked well over the years, and Respondent Weit had always signed for any notices which the fire department hand-delivered to him. On November 14, 1989, Inspector Majszak attempted to hand deliver the two fire department letters to Respondent Weit-- the November 13 violation letter and the November 14 transmittal letter. Since he was unable to do so because Respondent Weit was not there, Inspector Majszak subsequently sent the letters to Respondent Weit by certified mail, but he failed to receive them. Pursuant to his inspection, the inspector from the Code Enforcement Section of the Building and Zoning Department of the City of Miami directed a letter to Respondent Weit dated November 22, 1989, advising him that the apartment building needed to be repaired or demolished. That letter was sent to Respondent Weit by regular mail but was not received by him. On December 9 or 10, 1989, Martinez and Deveras approached Respondent Weit about purchasing the apartment building. They advised Respondent Weit that they had again inspected the building approximately a week earlier. Since the apartment building was now vacant (not producing rental income) and due to the nature of the repairs needed, Respondent Weit agreed to reduce the purchase price by $40,000. On December 11, 1989, Martinez and Deveras entered into a contract with Respondent Weit whereby they agreed to purchase the apartment building from him. The new purchase price was $153,000, for which Martinez and Deveras put up a deposit of only $500. The contract recited that although Respondent Weit was a registered real estate broker, he was selling the property on his own account, that no commission would be paid by the purchasers, and that the property was being sold "as is." The contract further provided that the buyers would pay $8,500 in cash at the time of closing, of which the $500 deposit would be a part. Under the contract, Respondent Weit would take back a purchase money wrap-around mortgage. The contract specifically provided that the purchasers were taking title to the building on that same day although the closing would take place at a later date. It further provided that although interest on the mortgage would begin running from that same day, no mortgage payment would be due until 75 days later. Taxes, rent, and other revenue and expenses were to be prorated as of December 11, 1989, the date of the contract. The contract also specifically recited that the apartment building being purchased was vacant. It was understood by Respondent Weit, by Martinez, and by Deveras that Weit was requiring only a small down payment because Martinez and Deveras needed to have their cash available to effectuate repairs to the building in order to rent it and then sell it at a profit. Further, all three understood that the repairs needed to commence quickly so that the building could be rented. Although the three men considered Martinez and Deveras to be the "official owners" of the building as of December 11, 1989, the date they signed the contract for the purchase and sale of the building, they knew Martinez and Deveras would not be owners of record until the closing took place. They also understood that there might be some problem with the City of Miami insofar as Deveras "pulling permits" to begin the repair work prior to Deveras and Martinez becoming the owners of record. Accordingly, at the request of Martinez and Deveras, Respondent on December 11, 1989, executed an affidavit that he had just sold the property to Martinez and Deveras. The three men reasoned that the affidavit would be sufficient to allow Deveras to begin "pulling permits." The closing was scheduled for January 12, 1990. Martinez requested that Respondent Weit's attorney prepare all of the closing documents so that Martinez could avoid incurring additional expenses relative to acquiring title to the property. No title examination was performed by Martinez or Deveras or by anyone on their behalf, and they did not require one. Prior to the closing date, Martinez again approached Respondent Weit and explained that he could not pay the cash at closing because he needed to utilize all of his money for the necessary repairs. Respondent Weit agreed that Martinez and Deveras would pay him no cash at closing and that Martinez would give him a mortgage on a different property owned by Martinez instead. The closing did take place on January 12, 1990, using a closing statement computed as of December 11, 1989. Rather than receiving cash at closing, Respondent Weit received a mortgage in the amount of $8,500 on the other piece of property owned by Martinez. Accordingly, on January 12, 1990, Martinez and Deveras became owners of record of an 18-unit apartment building for a total expenditure of approximately $500 in closing costs. Thereafter, Martinez and Deveras went to the City of Miami to "pull permits" to begin the repair work. At that time, City of Miami officials showed Deveras and Martinez copies of the November letters which had been mailed to Respondent Weit. Respondent Weit had never told Martinez or Deveras about those November letters since he had not known about them. Deveras and Martinez never made any repairs to the apartment building. Further, they never made any mortgage payments to Respondent Weit pursuant to either the mortgage on the apartment building or the mortgage on the other property owned by Martinez which had been used to substitute for the cash owed to Respondent at closing pursuant to the purchase and sale contract. Instead, on April 23, 1990, Martinez and Deveras entered into a contract to sell the apartment building to Miguel Santiago for $165,000. That contract recited that the property was being sold "as is." The only specific disclosure regarding the condition of the building contained in that contract is as follows: "Buyer acknowledges that there exists code violations on the property which he agrees to correct at his own expense." The contract further required the buyer to begin repair work on the property within two weeks of closing. Respondent Weit agreed to the transfer of the mortgage and approved of the sale to Santiago. In approximately November of 1990 he voluntarily appeared before the Unsafe Structures Board of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, to assist the subsequent owners of the apartment building to show cause why the building should not be demolished. Eventually, the City of Miami entered into a contract for the demolition of the building. The building was demolished in September of 1991. By 1990, Martinez had become licensed as a real estate salesman in the state of Florida. Since then, he has been employed part time as a real estate salesman working out of his own home. Respondent Weit eventually filed suit against Martinez and Deveras due to their nonpayment under the mortgages. In June of 1991 Martinez and Deveras filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation alleging that Respondent Weit had sold them a building without them knowing its condition. That complaint resulted in the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents Richard Charles Weit and R C Properties International, Inc., not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against them in this cause. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of June, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Mr. Richard C. Weit 775 Northeast 79th Street, Suite B Miami, Florida 33138-4743 R C Properties International, Inc. 775 Northeast 79th Street, Suite B Miami, Florida 33138-4743 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-11 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 12 has been rejected as not being supported by any competent evidence in this cause.
The Issue The purpose of the hearing in this case was to provide Petitioner an opportunity to present evidence as to the relief to which she is entitled in a housing discrimination case.2
Findings Of Fact As a result of the admitted facts alleged in the Petition for Relief, Petitioner has suffered both tangible and intangible harm. As a result of the admitted facts, when Petitioner and her family were evicted from the apartment they had been subletting, they were locked out of the apartment and were unable to retrieve most of the personal property that was in the apartment. The reasonable value of the personal property that was lost as a result of the acts alleged in the Petition for Relief is $5,281.00.6 Petitioner also suffered intangible harm as a result of the admitted facts. The most serious aspects of the intangible harm were humiliation and loss of personal pride and self-esteem as a result of, in her words, “being treated like a dog.” Petitioner also suffered a substantial amount of personal inconvenience and indignity, because for a period of time after the eviction from the apartment she was truly homeless and was forced to live in her automobile. The harm to Petitioner described in this paragraph cannot be quantified. There is no evidence in this case that Petitioner incurred any attorney’s fees or costs. Alina Portuono is no longer employed at the apartment complex where the events giving rise to this proceeding occurred. Whoever owned the apartment complex at the time of the events giving rise to this proceeding is no longer the owner. The subject apartment complex no longer rents apartments as all the units are now condominiums.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order awarding quantified damages in the amount of $5,281.00 to Petitioner, if the FCHR believes it has provided adequate notice to Respondent(s) in this case and has jurisdiction arising from such notice.8 DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004.
