Findings Of Fact At all times to the issues herein the Department of Environmental Protection was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of water pollution and the issuance of dredge and fill permits in the specified waters of this state. Mr. Byrd has been a resident of the City of Treasure Island, Florida for many years and resides at 123 123rd Avenue in that city. His property is located on Boca Ciega Bay next to a public boat ramp operated by the City. On April 12, 1995, the City of Treasure Island applied to the Department of Environmental Protection for a permit to construct a dock six feet wide by seventy-five feet long, located on the edge of its property on which the public boat ramp is located. This property is located in a basin off Boca Ciega Bay, which is classified as a Class III Outstanding Florida Water. The dock involves the placement of pilings in the water, and the construction of a walkway thereon. In order to be obtain a permit, the applicant must provide the Department with reasonable assurances that the proposed project will not degrade water quality and will be in the public interest. The project is permanent in nature, but the temporary concerns raised by construction have been properly addressed in the permit. In the instant case, the dock is intended to accommodate the boating public which will utilize it to more safely launch, board, debark, and recover small boats at the ramp in issue. The dock will be equipped with a hand rail which will increase the safety of the project. Evidence establishes that without the dock, boaters have to enter the water to launch and recover their boats on a ramp can be slippery and dangerous. The site currently in use as a boat ramp, a part of which will be used for the dock, is almost totally free of any wildlife. No evidence could be seen of any sea grasses or marine life such as oysters, and there was no indication the proposed site is a marine habitat. Manatees do periodically inhabit the area, and warning signs would be required to require construction be stopped when manatee are in the area. The water depth in the immediate area and the width of the waterway is such that navigation would not be adversely impacted by the dock construction, nor is there any indication that water flow would be impeded. No adverse effect to significant historical or archaeological resources would occur and taken together, it is found that the applicant has provided reasonable assurances that the project is within the public interest. Concerning the issue of water quality, the applicant has proposed the use of turbidity curtains during construction which would provide reasonable assurances that water quality would not be degraded by or during construction. The water depths in the area are such that propeller dredging and turbidity associated therewith should not be a problem. No evidence was presented or, apparently is on file, to indicate any documented water quality violations at the site, and it is unlikely that water quality standards will be violated by the construction and operation of the structure. The best evidence available indicates there would be no significant cumulative impacts from this project. Impacts from presently existing similar projects and projects reasonably expected in the future, do not, when combined with the instant project, raise the possibility of adverse cumulative degradation of water quality or other factors of concern. By the same token, it is found that secondary impacts resulting from the construction of the project would be minimal. It is also found that this project is eligible for an exemption from the requirements to obtain a permit because of the Department's implementation on October 3, 1995 of new rules relating to environmental resources. However, the City has agreed to follow through with the permitting process notwithstanding the exemption and to accept the permit including all included conditions. This affords far more protection to the environment than would be provided if the conditions to the permit, now applicable to this project, were avoided under a reliance on the exemption to which the City is entitled under current rules. To be sure, evidence presented by Mr. Byrd clearly establishes the operation of the existing boat ramp creates noise, fumes, diminished water conditions and an atmosphere which is annoying, discomfiting, and unpleasant to him and to some of his neighbors who experience the same conditions. Many of the people using the facility openly use foul language and demonstrate a total lack of respect for others. Many of these people also show no respect for the property of others by parking on private property and contaminating the surrounding area with trash and other discardables. It may well be that the presently existing conditions so described were not contemplated when the ramp was built some twenty years ago. An increase in population using water craft, and the development and proliferation of alternative watercraft, such as the personal watercraft, (Ski-Doo), as well as an apparent decline in personal relations skills have magnified the noise and the problem of fumes and considerably. It is not likely, however, that these conditions, most of which do not relate to water quality standards and the other pertinent considerations involved here, will be increased or affected in any way by the construction of the dock in issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue to the city the requested permit to construct the dock in issue at the existing public boat ramp at the east end of 123rd Avenue right of way in the City of Treasure Island. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Schnell, Esquire 3535 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 James W. Denhardt, Esquire 2700 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Christine C. Stretesky, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kenneth Plante General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner should terminate Respondent from his employment as a deputy sheriff for allegedly engaging in prohibited conduct pursuant to Chapter 89-404, Laws of Florida, as amended by Chapter 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act), and Petitioner's General Order Section 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.2--relating to loyalty, Rule and Regulation 5.4--relating to duties and responsibilities, and Rule and Regulation 5.6-- relating to truthfulness; General Order Section 3-1.3, Rule and Regulation 3.20--relating to reporting procedures for the use of force; and General Order 3-2--relating to ethical requirements.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the Sheriff of Pinellas County and a constitutional officer described in Article VIII, Section 1, Florida Constitution. From sometime in 1989 until the termination of Respondent’s employment on March 14, 2008, Petitioner employed Respondent as a deputy sheriff in the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (the PCSO). Respondent was last assigned to the courthouse security division of the PCSO. On Saturday, November 3, 2007, Respondent was off-duty and volunteering as one of a number of parents who were supervising several high school bands that were practicing at Clearwater High School (CHS). Three juvenile males on bicycles approached the band practice area. Respondent yelled at them to stop, but did not identify himself as a deputy sheriff. One juvenile stopped. The other two juveniles ignored the commands and proceeded toward the Tarpon Springs Band. One of the riders wore a back pack with a baseball bat attached to the pack. Respondent reasonably believed that the juveniles, who were approximately 16 and 17 years old,1 presented an imminent danger of running into and potentially injuring members of the nearby Tarpon Springs Band. Respondent ran after the juvenile with a bat attached to his pack, grabbed the bat, and separated the juvenile from the moving bicycle. The second juvenile stopped at the point of separation. The juvenile with the baseball bat struck Respondent with his fist, and Respondent delivered a knee-spike2 to the mid- section of the juvenile. The knee-spike disabled the juvenile. The second juvenile was preparing to strike Respondent, when another parent pulled that juvenile away. Petitioner notified Respondent of the charges against him in a memorandum dated March 14, 2008 (the charging document). In relevant part, the charging document alleges in a paragraph entitled “Synopsis” that, during the altercation, Respondent failed to act within the scope of his responsibilities as a deputy sheriff. If that allegation were properly construed to allege that Respondent used excessive force, the fact-finder finds that a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of that charge of misconduct. Respondent acted reasonably during the altercation. Respondent used reasonable force to protect band members from harm, and Respondent used reasonable force to defend himself from a juvenile. The exigencies of the moment did not afford time for Respondent to disclose his employment with the PCSO before taking action he reasonably believed to be necessary to protect members of the Tarpon Springs Band. Respondent cooperated with the police investigation at CHS. CHS is located within the jurisdiction of both the PCSO and the Clearwater Police Department. The Clearwater Police Department responded to the scene and conducted an investigation. The investigation was documented in Clearwater Police Report No. CW07-33468 (the police report). Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent was untruthful by deliberately or intentionally omitting or misrepresenting material facts outlining his involvement in the altercation, including a memorandum Petitioner authored on November 5, 2007. The fact- finder finds that a preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of this charge of misconduct. It is undisputed that Respondent telephoned Corporal Victor Griffin, Respondent’s immediate supervisor on the evening of November 3, 2007, and reported the altercation in detail, including the attack by the juvenile and Respondent’s use of a knee-spike. Corporal Griffin instructed Respondent to inform Sergeant Edward Marshall, the next in command. Respondent telephoned Sergeant Marshall that night and informed him of the use of force and the details of the incident. At the hearing, Sergeant Marshall had little or no recall of the details of the conversation with Respondent on November 3, 2007. The only credible and persuasive testimony concerning that conversation is the testimony of Respondent. On the evening of November 3, 2007, Sergeant Marshall instructed Respondent to write a memorandum describing the incident and Respondent’s use of force when Respondent returned to work on Monday, November 5, 2007. Sergeant Marshall instructed Respondent to either reference the police report in the memorandum or attach a copy of the police report to the memorandum. Respondent drafted a memorandum on November 5, 2007. The memorandum referred to the police report, and Respondent submitted the memorandum to his supervisor. The police report included a handwritten, detailed description by Respondent of the use of force in the altercation. Petitioner had reasonable access to the police report. The Clearwater Police Department and the PCSO, by agreement, utilize a computerized joint records management system identified in the record as ACISS. Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent failed to document the use of force, as required by agency policy. The fact-finder finds that a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Respondent is guilty of this charge of misconduct. A complete description of the altercation and use of force was attached to the police report. That information fully documented the use of force and was available to Petitioner through ACISS.3 Another allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent compromised the criminal investigation of the altercation by “accessing unauthorized information” and by “interfering with an ongoing investigation.” This allegation is based in substantial part on two undisputed facts that occurred on or about November 5, 2007. First, Respondent obtained a copy of the police report and discovered that the police report listed Respondent as a “victim/suspect.” Suspects are not entitled to a copy of a police report, but law enforcement officers may access the report. Second, Respondent persuaded the property department to change the status of brass knuckles found in a back pack at the scene of the altercation from being held for destruction to being held as evidence, so that the brass knuckles would not be destroyed. The fact-finder finds that a preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the undisputed actions of Respondent compromised the criminal investigation by accessing unauthorized information and intervening into an investigation in which Respondent was listed in the police report as a suspect. The undisputed actions of Respondent were consistent with the actions of the Clearwater Police Department, and neither action by Respondent compromised the investigation. The investigating officer for the Clearwater Police Department was off-duty on Monday and Tuesday, and she did not return to work until Wednesday, November 7, 2007. When the investigating officer returned to work, her sergeant instructed her to change the police report to list Respondent as a law enforcement officer, to delete his address from the report, and to change the designation of Respondent from a “victim/suspect”4 to a “victim” before finalizing the report. The investigating officer made those changes to the police report by computer entries on November 7, 2007, and those changes were available to the PCSO through ACISS. The sergeant also instructed the investigating officer to change the status of the brass knuckles from being held for destruction to being held as evidence, so that they would not be destroyed. The investigating officer contacted the property department of the PCSO to change the status of the brass knuckles to that of evidence and discovered the property department had already made that change at Respondent’s request. Respondent was entitled to a copy of the report because he was a law enforcement officer and was incorrectly listed on the report as a suspect. The actions of Respondent in changing the status of the brass knuckles so that they were listed as evidence was consistent with the actions of the Clearwater Police Department. Respondent did nothing on November 5, 2007, that the Clearwater Police Department did not do on November 7, 2007. If the investigating officer were to have returned to work on Monday, November 5, 2007, it is reasonable to conclude that the Clearwater Police Department would have provided a copy of the police report to Respondent, because Respondent would not have been listed as a suspect, and the Department would have changed the status of the brass knuckles so that they were being held as evidence. The investigating officer and her sergeant concluded the altercation was a matter of mutual combat and did not refer the case for prosecution by the state attorney. The nascence of the charges against Respondent emerged from two events. First, the mother of the two juveniles filed a complaint of excessive force against the PCSO. Second, when the investigating officer discovered that Respondent had already persuaded the property department to change the status of the brass knuckles, so that they would not be destroyed, the Clearwater Police Department complained to the PCSO about a deputy sheriff allegedly interfering with evidence. As a result, Petitioner initiated an administrative investigation that led to this proceeding. The penultimate allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent provided confidential information regarding an open criminal case to another suspect. It is undisputed that when Respondent discovered on November 5, 2007, that he was listed as a suspect in the police report, Respondent told the parent that had prevented the second juvenile from attacking Respondent that the parent was also listed in the report as a suspect. The disclosure by Respondent was immaterial and had no impact on a pending criminal investigation. The Clearwater Police Department classified the altercation as mutual combat and did not refer the case for prosecution. The final allegation in the synopsis of the charging document is that Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of material facts regarding his “involvement in the ongoing . . . criminal investigation” and “subsequent actions” that Respondent took. The distinction, if any, between “involvement in the ongoing investigation” and “subsequent actions” is unclear to the fact-finder because the charges deal with Respondent’s actions during a pending investigation. The charges of misconduct do not address Respondent’s “subsequent actions” after the investigation was completed and case was closed. The investigating officer did not inform Respondent when she responded to the scene on November 3, 2007, that she was listing Respondent as a suspect. She did not decide to list Respondent as a suspect until she prepared her report that evening, long after Respondent had completed his written report that was included with the police report and had left the scene. Respondent did not learn that he was a suspect until Respondent obtained a copy of the police report on November 5, 2007. After obtaining a copy of the police report, Respondent talked to Lieutenant Rachel Hughes of the Courthouse Security Division at the PCSO and another of Respondent’s supervisors. Significant variation exists in the separate accounts of the conversation between Respondent and Lieutenant Hughes. The testimony of Lieutenant Hughes is inconsistent, self- contradictory, and less than credible and persuasive. The only credible and persuasive testimony concerning the conversation is the testimony of Respondent. During the conversation between Respondent and Lieutenant Hughes, Respondent expressed his displeasure at being listed in the police report as a suspect, stated that he would like to complain to someone at the Clearwater Police Department, and asked if Lieutenant Hughes knew anyone there. Lieutenant Hughes suggested that Lieutenant James Steffens at the Clearwater Police Department is a “good guy.” Before contacting Lieutenant Steffens, Respondent called the property department and identified himself as “Milewsky from over at the courthouse.” Respondent did not disclose that he was a suspect in the case involving the brass knuckles. Respondent knew or should have known that the property department employee reasonably believed that the call and request was related to official business. Lieutenant Larry Smith was in charge of the property department at the time and testified at the hearing. The property department would not have enhanced the status of the brass knuckles at the request of someone who was listed as a suspect in the police report. The failure to disclose to the property department that Respondent was a suspect in the case is not alleged in the charging document, and the ALJ cannot find Respondent guilty of a charge not alleged in the charging document. The relevant language in the charging document is confined to an allegation that Respondent failed to advise his “supervisors” of his “involvement in the ongoing . . . investigation” and his “subsequent actions.” Those assigned to the property department are not “supervisors” of Respondent. Respondent next telephoned Lieutenant Steffens of the Clearwater Police Department to discuss the fact that Respondent was listed as a suspect in the police report. Respondent and Lieutenant Steffens disagree over material details of the conversation, including the issue of whether Respondent requested Lieutenant Steffens to change the police report to delete Respondent’s name as a suspect. The fact-finder resolves the disparity in testimony between Respondent and Lieutenant Steffens against Respondent. The testimony of Lieutenant Steffens is the only credible and persuasive testimony concerning the conversation between the two men. Respondent did not want to remain listed as a suspect, but denied that the purpose of his call to Lieutenant Steffens was to have the report changed to delete his status as a suspect. Respondent insisted that his telephone call to Lieutenant Steffens was “unrelated” to changing his designation as a suspect. The testimony of Lieutenant Steffens was plausible, credible, and persuasive. Lieutenant Steffens recalled that Respondent advised Lieutenant Steffens that a Clearwater Police Department investigation contained erroneous information, and Respondent sought to get the error corrected “as soon as possible.” After emphasizing Respondent’s seniority and the lack of experience of the investigating officer, who was a rookie, Respondent stated that he did not want to make a complaint against the investigating officer, but just wanted the report changed so that Respondent was listed solely as a victim in the report. Respondent asked Lieutenant Steffens if they could get that done as quickly as possible. Lieutenant Steffens sent a message by email in this regard to Sergeant Wilton Lee, the supervisor for the investigating officer, asking Sergeant Lee to telephone Respondent. Sergeant Lee did not return to work until Wednesday, November 7, 2007. Before Lieutenant Steffens heard from Sergeant Lee, Lieutenant Steffens received a voice mail from Respondent inquiring as to why nothing had been done yet on the case. Lieutenant Steffens also received a telephone call from another suspect. Lieutenant Steffens telephoned Sergeant Lee directly about the inquiries. When Sergeant Lee reported to work on November 7, 2007, the police report was waiting for his approval. Sergeant Lee telephoned Respondent, whom Sergeant Lee knew to be a deputy sheriff, and agreed that Respondent should not be listed in the police report as a suspect. Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of two forms of involvement in the investigation. First, Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of his involvement in the enhancement of the brass knuckles from that of waiting for destruction to that of evidence. Second, Respondent failed to advise his supervisors of his efforts to change the police report to delete his name as a suspect. A preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the failures described in the preceding paragraph violate requirements for loyalty and truthfulness. Those requirements are described in General Order 3-1.1 and Rules and Regulations 5.2 and 5.6. The Progressive Discipline Worksheet assigns 75 Progressive Discipline Points for violations of all of the charges in the charging document. However, a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Respondent is guilty of violating only two of the six charges of misconduct described in the synopsis in the charging document. The Worksheet does not delineate the points assigned to each charge, and Petitioner has not promulgated intelligible standards that enable the fact- finder to determine the points that should be allocated to the two violations committed by Respondent. No aggravating factors are evidenced in this proceeding. Respondent has no prior discipline during his 19 years of experience with the PCSO. The culpable actions of Respondent did not result in physical or financial harm to a member of the public or members of either the PCSO or the Clearwater Police Department. The culpable actions of Respondent did not compromise an ongoing criminal investigation. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that termination of employment is a reasonable penalty. Untruthfulness and disloyalty are serious offenses but, absent any aggravating circumstances, a reasonable penalty is suspension without pay beginning on March 14, 2008, and reinstatement to the former position of employment immediately upon the entry of a final order.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings of this Recommended Order; suspending Respondent’s employment without pay from March 14, 2008, to the date of the final order; and returning Respondent to his former position of employment as of the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Ben A. Posdal is the owner of property commonly known as 166 Brightwater Drive, in the City of Clearwater, Florida. On August 7, 1986, he applied for variances to construct two wooden decks on his property, located at the above address. The property which is the subject of the variance request is a building which contains four apartments, which are rented by Ben A. Posdal to various tenants. On August 28, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board (DCAB) denied the variance requested by Mr. Posdal on the grounds that he had not demonstrated a hardship and that he had not demonstrated that the requested variance would not violate the general spirit and intent of the Clearwater Land Development Code. On September 9, 1986, an appeal was filed by Ben A. Posdal from the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board. The appeal alleges that the DCAB decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable on the following grounds: Other properties allegedly are in violation of the back line setback regulations; The DCAB failed to give enough evidentiary weight to photographs he submitted; and Appellant allegedly is being deprived of the beneficial use of the property in a manner commensurate with the community. There are no physical conditions which are unique to the property. There is no particular physical surroundings, shape or topographical condition that would result in an unnecessary hardship upon the Appellant. Failure to obtain a variance would not impinge upon Appellant's use of the property in any way. The record on appeal contains competent, substantial evidence to support the DCAB decision. Nonconforming uses in the area of the subject property are legal nonconforming uses.
The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for a variance is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.
Findings Of Fact On or about May 15, 1989, Branch Sunset Associates (Petitioner), the owner of certain property located at 1856 U.S. Highway 19 North, Clearwater, Florida (Section 6-29-16), applied for a variance to eliminate a condition previously imposed by the Development Code Adjustment Board on a prior variance. The property is zoned CC (Commercial Center), and is the site of a strip shopping mall. In March, 1988, the Board granted a variance allowing a tenant in Petitioner's mall, Workplace, to have a building identification sign which is larger than would be allowed under the Code without a variance. In November, 1988, Petitioner was granted a variance for the square footage of a pylon property identification sign with the condition that a Workplace sign not be placed on the pylon property identification sign located at the right of way. Petitioner and this tenant, Workplace, are now seeking removal of this condition in order to allow Workplace to be identified on the existing pylon sign, while leaving Workplace's large building identification sign in place. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for variance on June 8, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. Workplace is located approximately 800 feet off of U.S. Highway 19, and due to this distance, the prior variance of 97 square feet was granted in March, 1988, to allow a business identification sign of 225 square feet. The Code allows business identification signs up to 128 square feet without a variance. The letters spelling out "Workplace" are from 4 to 6 feet in height. Since opening in May, 1988, Workplace has experienced a steady growth in its business, and now completes approximately 1000 transactions per day. It is an office products store, and is open seven days a week. When the condition was placed on the variance for the pylon identification sign in November, 1988, the property owner agreed to this condition. At this time, it is primarily the tenant, Workplace, which is seeking this variance to eliminate the condition agreed to in November, 1988, by the property owner. Workplace seeks to be allowed to be included on the property identification sign, but is unwilling to immediately conform to Code on its building identification sign, a variance for which was granted in March, 1988, if this currently sought variance is approved. Thus, Workplace seeks to retain its variance for the size of its building identification sign, while also being included on the pylon property identification sign, which is larger than otherwise allowed due to the November, 1988, variance. The reason that the Development Code Adjustment Board approved the variance for Workplace in March, 1988, was that there was no property identification sign on site at that time, and the store was to be located so far off the right of way. This was a newly opening mall, and Workplace was one of the first new tenants to open for business. There are some prior tenants on this property that had business identification signs on their buildings that are in excess of the square footage allowed by the Code, but these are prior nonconforming signs which must be removed or brought into compliance by October, 1992. Section 134.015(c). However, when the property owner sought the variance in square footage limits to erect a pylon property identification sign in November, 1988, the Workplace business identification sign was already in place. Rather than allow Workplace to benefit from two variances, the Board conditioned the November, 1988, variance on precluding Workplace from being shown on the pylon sign. This was a reasonable condition under the circumstances, and was agreed to by the property owner. There was no showing of hardship on behalf of Workplace since business has been very good, and since any concerns about distance from the right of way were fully addressed by the March, 1988, variance.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 7, 1986, Petitioner submitted an application for a variance from the open space and rear set-back line requirements applicable to property located at 2612 U.S. 19 North, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned CC (commercial center). Petitioner's application requests a variance to provide 12.33% open space instead of 25%, and to construct a building 30 feet from the rear property line rather than 50 feet as required by the Land Development Code for property zoned CC. On or about April 24, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for a variance, and Petitioner timely appealed on May 6, 1986. The only evidence in support of its application offered by Petitioner was the testimony of Robby Tompkins. He testified that Petitioner's application is "unique" because Petitioner was 90% complete with its architectural plans for the renovation and modernization of the subject property when the current ordinance took effect, and Petitioner therefore urges that the current ordinance should not apply. Additionally, Petitioner argues that there will be no injury to the public as a result of the variance, and in fact the project will add 6800 square feet to its shopping center. Tompkins admitted that an increase in financial return was the primary reason Petitioner has sought the variance. Finally, he stated that if Petitioner complies with the 25% open space requirement, there will not be enough parking to meet Code provisions, and if sufficient parking is provided, there will not 25% open space.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings and Conclusions of Law it is hereby Recommended that the Respondent, DER, issue a permit to Respondent, Fano Holding Corporation, to construct a 200 foot long by 5 foot wide pier with a 100 foot long by 5 foot wide "T" at the waterward end, as set forth hereinabove. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Segundo Fernandez, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Twin Towers Office Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Diane S. Guthrie, Esquire Spielvogel & Goldman, P.A. P.O. Box 1366 Merritt Island, Florida 3252 Edward M. Jackson, Esquire P.O. Box 127 Cocoa, Florida 32922 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION T. OSBORNE, et al., Petitioner, vs. DOAH Case NO.: 78-753 DER FILE NO.: 05-30-0543-4E FANO HOLDING CORPORATION and (6826) STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully dismissed from his employment with the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact On December 5, 1990, Truman Gooden was employed by the City of Clearwater as a truck driver and was assigned to pick up trash at Sand Key in Pinellas County. While driving the truck assigned to him on the beach below the high water line, the truck started to slide in loose sand, Gooden attempted to back and turn the truck away from the water, but was unsuccessful, and the truck slid into the water with the engine running. By the time Gooden extricated himself from the vehicle, the entire hood was under water (Exhibit X), the cab was full of water, and the engine was ruined. The total damage to the truck was approximately $22,000. Gooden reported the incident to his superior, and the vehicle was subsequently removed from the water by two tow trucks. Gooden testified that he had driven the truck in the same manner for several years performing the same tasks and had never encountered such a problem before. The tide was extremely low on December 5, 1990, and Gooden was driving the truck on the sand further seaward from the high water mark than normal. To perform the task, it was unnecessary for Gooden to drive very far seaward of the high water line, and Gooden's negligence in this regard was the proximate cause of the truck sliding into the water and becoming ruined. For this negligence, Gooden was assigned 20 disciplinary points. During the preceding two years prior to this incident, Gooden had received the following disciplinary actions for the following offenses: March 10, 1989 - counseling session: quitting work, wasting time March 23, 1989 - written warning: tardiness March 28, 1989 - 3 days suspension: unauthorized/ unexplained absenteeism April 4, 1989 - letter of reprimand: carelessness, vehicle accident June 20, 1989 - 4 days suspension: productivity not up to standards June 22, 1989 - less than satisfactory annual performance rating June 27, 1989 - letter notifying Gooden of accumulation of 60 points July 14, 1989 - letter of reprimand: vehicle accident Sept. 22, 1989 - less than satisfactory 3 month follow-up rating Nov. 13, 1989 - 6 days suspension: operating city vehicle without a license; failure to report lack of valid license April 16, 1990 - written warning: tardiness June 22, 1990 - less than satisfactory annual performance rating Aug. 10, 1990 - letter of reprimand: lack of personal hygiene Dec. 5, 1990 - current incident/recommendation for dismissal 10. At the time of the December 5, 1990 incident, Gooden had accumulated 60 disciplinary points and was given 20 disciplinary points for this incident. By letter dated January 27, 1989, Gooden was advised that he had accumulated 60 points since September 23, 1988, and any further disciplinary action within a 2-year time frame may be grounds for dismissal.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered sustaining the action of the City Manager in dismissing Truman Gooden from his position as truck driver for the City of Clearwater. ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: TRUMAN GOODEN 1144 ENGMAN STREET CLEARWATER, FL 33615 CYNDI GOUDEAU, CLERK CITY OF CLEARWATER POST OFFICE BOX 4748 CLEARWATER, FL 34618-4748 MILES A. LANCE, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4748 CLEARWATER, FL 34618-4748
Findings Of Fact On January 19, 1984, Applicant applied to DER, pursuant to Sections 253.123 and 403.087, Fla.Stat., and Chapters 17-3 and 17-4, F.A.C., for a permit and water quality certification to construct a 36-slip docking facility in Baker-Carroll Pointe Waterway (the lagoon). While the lagoon is located in Class II waters, the waters are prohibited for shellfish harvesting. On October 31, 1984, DER issued its letter of intent to issue the requested permits. Protestors timely filed a petition for formal administrative proceedings. Protestors' substantial interest will be directly affected by issuance of the subject permit. The proposed facility will be located as close as 50 feet to the main residential building of Protestors, and the proposed docks will be accessed by way of a seawall which is part of Protestors' common area. The Marina The permit sought by the Applicant would allow it to construct a 36- slip docking facility consisting of 615 linear feet of 5 foot wide marginal dock set 6 feet waterward and running parallel to an existing concrete seawall, with three 5 foot by 6 foot access ramps from the seawall to the marginal dock, and eighteen 30 foot by 4 foot finger piers extending waterward of the marginal dock. Nineteen mooring piles are to be installed. Total dock area is to be 5,325 square feet. The facility will be constructed of pressure treated piles and lumber. No fuel facilities are proposed. Applicant proposes to sell the 36 slips to unit owners in the Surf Colony complex, that is Vanderbilt Surf Colony I, Vanderbilt Surf Colony II and Vanderbilt Surf Colony III, and, if and when constructed, Vanderbilt Surf Colony IV and V. Each of the existing buildings contains 65 units. DER's October 31, 1984, letter of intent, proposed to issue the permit subject to the following conditions: Turbidity screens shall be utilized and properly maintained during the permitted construction and shall remain in place until any generated turbidity subsides. The lagoon shall be designated a "No Wake" zone. Markers and/or signs (PVC pipes or piles) shall be erected at the entrance to the shallow cove prohibiting navigation in said area with limits to be approved by the Punta Gorda DER office. No liveaboards shall be allowed at the permitted facility. No boat cleaning, hull maintenance, nor fish cleaning shall be allowed at the permitted facility. Trash receptacles shall be located at approved locations on the dock. The easternmost dock limit shall be lighted at night or equipped with reflective markers to aid navigation. No construction of the project shall take place until appropriate DNR approval is granted for the project per Section 253.77, Florida Statutes. The project shall comply with applicable State Water Quality Standards, namely: 17-3.051 - Minimum Criteria for All Waters at All Times and All Places. 17-3.061 - Surface Waters: General Criteria. 17-3.121 - Criteria - Class III Waters - Recreation, Propagation and Management of Fish and Wildlife: Surface Waters. Applicant has agreed to comply with all conditions established by DER. The Marina Site Baker-Carroll Pointe Waterway (the lagoon) is a partially man made navigable lagoon, with access to Water Turkey Bay which lies to its east. The south side of the lagoon is bulkheaded (along the proposed docking facility site), and the north and west side of the lagoon is composed of dense mangrove forest within the Delnor-Wiggins Pass State Recreation Area (Park). The waters of the proposed project abut and mix with those of the Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) of the Park. Rule 17-3.041(4)(c), F.A.C. The Park is located on the western and northern shores of the lagoon, and the Park's boundary is located underneath the existing lagoon. The Park has a boat ramp and dock at the mouth of the lagoon. Associated with the ramp are 36 parking spaces for boat trailers. The access channel from Water Turkey Bay varies from 100 to 150 feet wide, the end of the lagoon is approximately 200 feet wide, and the lagoon is approximately 700 feet long. The bulkheaded shoreline has a shallow, 6 foot wide shelf that is covered by a few inches of water during low tide and is colonized by oyster assemblages. Depths increase rapidly from the edge of the shelf to -7 to -8 feet NGVD approximately 40 feet offshore. Depths at the finger piers will be -4.5 to -6.5 NGVD feet. The majority of the central lagoon has uniform depths of -7 to -8 feet NGVD with approximately one foot of silt overlying a firm substrate. Increased depths of -9 to -10 feet NGVD are found in the channel leading from the lagoon to Water Turkey Bay. Channel depths within Water Turkey Bay are -5 feet NGVD or less. Except for a shallow cove at the northwestern extreme of the lagoon, water depths of -5 to -7 feet NGVD are found approximately 30 feet waterward of the mangrove fringe along the western border of the lagoon. In the immediate project site there are no seagrasses or other significant biota. The only productive area within the project site is the shallow six foot wide shelf which parallels the bulkhead and is colonized by oyster assemblages. There are no other significant biota because the area was extensively dredged in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Seagrasses are found in the smaller cove located in the extreme northwest of the lagoon. The western and northern shores of the lagoon are extensively populated by red, black and white mangroves. Aquatic fauna known to inhabit the vicinity, and found in association with the grassbeds in Water Turkey Bay, include lightening whelks, blue crabs, sheepshead minnows, mullet, pin fish, and silver perch. Areas of Concern During construction of the marina elevated turbidity may be expected by disruption of the lagoon sediments caused by installing the facility's pilings. This can, however, be adequately controlled by the use of turbidity curtains during construction. Shading of the benthic environment is a long term impact associated with marinas. While there are presently no seagrasses in the project area, the 6 foot wide shelf which parallels the bulkhead is colonized by oyster assemblages and algae. Since the marginal dock will be placed 6 feet waterward of the seawall, sunlight will be permitted to reach the productive shelf which parallels the seawall. Additionally, since the marginal dock is 5 foot wide, the closest any boat will be to the seawall will be 11 feet. This will result in a buffer zone of 5 feet between the waterward extreme of the 6 foot shelf and any boat moored at the marina. Boats by their very existence and operation present potential negative short term and long term impacts to the environment. Potential damage from existing craft and those which occupy the marina to the seagrass beds in the extreme northwest portion of the lagoon will be eliminated or minimized by the planned installation of markers and/or signs prohibiting navigation in that area. Potential damage from wave action generated by boat operation will be eliminated or minimized by designating and posting the lagoon as a "No Wake" zone. The fueling of boats, hull maintenance and sewage discharge are additional pollution sources associated with marinas. While the proposed marina will have no fueling or maintenance facilities, and while no liveaboards, boat cleaning, hull maintenance, nor fish cleaning will be allowed at the marina, additional conditions must be attached to the permit to eliminate or minimize potential impacts from these potential pollution sources. In addition to the special conditions established by DER, the following special conditions are necessary: All craft docked at the marina shall be prohibited from pumping bilges and sewage into the waters of the lagoon. Ownership and use of the boat slips, or any of the marina facilities, shall be limited to those person(s) who own condominium unit(s) at the Surf Colony complex, to wit: Vanderbilt Surf Colony I, Vanderbilt Surf Colony II, Vanderbilt Surf Colony III, and, if and when constructed, Vanderbilt Surf Colony IV and V. Leasing or any other use of the boat slips, or the marina facility, by any person(s) other than the actual owner thereof shall be prohibited. Since the facility is small, and a full-time dock master is not proposed, limiting ownership and use of the boat slips to owners of condominium units at the Surf Colony complex will provide reasonable assurances that the conditions imposed on the requested permits will be complied with. Prohibiting the pumping of sewage and bilges will provide reasonable assurances that DER standards for bacteriological quality will not be violated. Protestors suggest that oils and greases, including lead found in marine fuels, could cause a degradation of water quality and affect the biota in the area. Protestors presented evidence through Dr. Nancy Nicholson, an expert in marine ecology and marine biology, that oils, greases, and lead could reasonably be expected to be ejected into the water column from boats occupying the marina, and that such pollutants, after entering the sediments, could be expected to enter the food chain. Protestors offered no evidence of the quantities of oil, greases or lead which could be expected to be injected into the water column, or to enter the food chain, other than "they are not large." Petitioner offered no evidence that the oils, greases or lead emitted by the boats occupying the marina would cause or contribute to a degradation of water quality below DER standards, or impact marine resources to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest. Juxtaposed with the opinion of Protestors' expert is the empirical testimony of DER's witnesses, Terri Kranzer, an expert in water quality and aquatic biology, and Douglas Fry, an expert in dredge and fill impacts on water quality and aquatic biology, that the proposed facility and its operation will not cause or contribute to a degradation of water quality below DER standards and will not impact marine resources to such an extent as to be contrary to the public interest, so long as the Applicant complies with the permitting conditions. Protestors also suggest that turbidity, caused by boats operating from the marina, could cause a degradation of water quality and affect the biota in the area. Protestors' witness, Dr. Nicholson, testified to observing boats increase turbidity within the lagoon. She further performed a Secchi depth test, which measures the distance to which light will penetrate water, in the lagoon area. The background was measured at 42 inches. After the passage of a motorboat through the subject lagoon, the Secchi depth was reduced to 27 inches, and returned to the background level in 2-1/2 to 3 hours. Dr. Nicholson further testified that if the sediments "kicked up" were of an oxygen poor material, that they could scavenge dissolved oxygen from the waters. Protestors offered no evidence, however, which equated the Secchi depth test with the tests and standards established by DER for turbidity and transparency. There was no evidence, assuming turbidity did increase during boat activity, that DER standards for turbidity and transparency would be violated. Further, no evidence was introduced that such turbidity would cause or contribute to a degradation of the dissolved oxygen levels of the lagoon below DER standards. Contrary to the testimony of Dr. Nicholson, Protestors' other witness, William Doherty, a resident of the Surf Colony complex testified that he had operated his own 28 foot boat in the lagoon, and observed other boats operating in the lagoon, and never observed any increased turbidity. Terri Kranzer testified to the same effect. The depth within the lagoon is adequate for navigation, and there should be no increased turbidity caused by boats operating in the lagoon unless they venture into the shallow cove in the northwestern part of the lagoon. Designating the lagoon as a "No Wake" zone, and prohibiting navigation within the shallow cove, would provide reasonable assurances that there would be no increased turbidity associated with the proposed facility or its operation. Finally, Protestors suggest that if the proposed facility is permitted, DER's standard for Biological Integrity, Rule 17-3.111(4), F.A.C., will be violated. Dr. Nicholson conducted a sampling of benthic macroinvertebrates on the bulkhead of the lagoon and on the bulkhead of a nearby yacht basin, in order to calculate a Shannon-Weaver diversity index for both areas. The Shannon-Weaver index for the yacht basin reflected a level of benthic macroinvertebrates of less than 75 percent of that measured in the lagoon. The results of Dr. Nicholson's sampling are not, by her own admission, statistically significant. The lagoon and yacht basic are entirely dissimilar. The lagoon, with its diverse mangrove forests and large opening into Water Turkey Bay flushes well and is an area rich in biology. The yacht basin, on the other hand, is connected to Water Turkey Bay by a small channel and is completely bulkheaded. No valid comparison can be drawn between the lagoon and the yacht basin.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the evidence sustains the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) to deny the application of the Appellant, Richard P. Levy, d/b/a T-Shirt Factory, for a four parking space variance at his property located at 1498 Gulf to Bay Boulevard, at the junction of Gulf to Bay Boulevard, Highland Avenue and Court Street, Clearwater, Florida. (The variance is required as a result of his desire to convert 877.5 square feet of storage space in his building on the property to retail use.)
Findings Of Fact Appellant, Richard P. Levy, d/b/a T-Shirt Factory, owns part of lots 5 and 8, and all of lots 6 and 7, Block G, Boulevard Heights, at 1498 Gulf to Bay Boulevard, at the junction of Gulf to Bay Boulevard, Highland Avenue and Court Street, 0.24 acres, more or less, Clearwater, Florida. The T-Shirt Factory utilizes back-out parking into Gulf to Bay Boulevard and Highland Avenue. This type of parking for retail use is a traffic hazard and does not conform to the requirements of the City of Clearwater Land Development Code (the Code), but the property enjoys the benefit a having its retail use "grandfathered" under the Code because the prior owner also used the property and parking for retail sales at the time the Code was adopted. Gulf to Bay Boulevard is a busy and fairly high speed traffic artery. Highland Avenue also is a busy street. They meet at an acute angle with the Appellant's property inside the angle. Gulf to Bay Boulevard and Court Street, also a busy and fairly high speed traffic artery, meet at an acute angle just across the street from the Appellant's property, further complicating the traffic pattern in the vicinity of the Appellant's property. The Appellant filed its application for a four parking space variance to allow him to convert 877.5 square feet of storage space in his building on the property to retail use. The Appellant can make reasonable use of his property without the additional retail space. The Appellant's primary purposes in increasing retail space are to directly increase revenue and profit and to make the retail displays in his store more attractive and more spacious, in large part to prevent shoplifting and thereby indirectly increase revenues and profit. As now planned, unless advertised, the existance of additional retail space in the store would not be readily apparent to passers by not already familiar with the store. Nonetheless, the Appellant did not prove that the additional retail use will not lead eventually to additional use of the existing back-out parking on Gulf to Bay Boulevard and Highland Avenue. Even if the retail space were expanded as planned, and not advertised, the expansion eventually could lead to an increase in retail business, one of the Appellant's primary long term purposes.
