Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Banana Island is separated by marshland into areas known as Islands No. 9 and No. 10. The respondent Association presently owns and operates on Island No. 10 a dock and a dive shop which sells snacks and compressed air to divers who use the nearby springs. The purpose of the proposed boardwalk is to connect the existing dock facilities on Island No. 10 to the upland area on Island No. 9, a portion of which will be used as a picnic area for boaters, swimmers and divers. The boardwalk is to be 220 feet long and six feet wide. The immediate area upon which the boardwalk is to be constructed is not utilized by the manatee because of its shallow depth. While the boardwalk would result in the shading of approximately 1,000 feet of marshland, this amount is too insignificant to affect the manatee. There are approximately 1,000 manatee in the United States, and the manatee has been designated as an endangered species under Federal and Florida law. The manatee exists throughout the southeastern portion of the United States. They inhabit areas off Texas, Louisiana, Florida, on up to North Carolina, though it is unusual to see them north of Brunswick, Georgia. The Kings Bay area of Crystal River, primarily around the Springs, and the area of Homosassa Springs provides a winter home for approximately 110 manatee, or about ten percent of the entire manatee population. The manatee come to the Kings Bay area in the winter months from mid-November through March 31st due to the warmer temperatures of the water around the springs. There is only occasional use of the springs area by the manatee between March 31st and November 15th. The numbers of manatee coming into the Kings Bay area has increased since 1971. This increase could be due to better observation techniques or to the reduction of other suitable habitats for the manatee. At least seventy percent of the population return each year. This year, seven new calves were born in the area. During the cooler months, approximately forty- five percent of the manatee can be found within five-eights of a mile of the main spring in Kings Bay. The proposed boardwalk is to be located approximately 150 feet from the main springs. No manatees have been sighted within twenty-five yards of the boardwalk site. The existing dock is located about seventy feet from the main springs. Manatees have been sighted near the end of this dock, which was built in 1971. The general area surrounding the site of the proposed boardwalk, primarily the springs area, is used heavily by boaters, swimmers and divers. Observations during a nonconsecutive seven-day period in late November and early December noted some 603 boats using the general area of Kings Bay, some 250 divers around the springs area and over 430 top-water observers of the manatee. These numbers would lessen during the Spring and pick up again during the Summer and latter part of the Fall months. On January 1, 1979, some fifty-two boats were served within the main springs area. In Citrus County alone, there are over 5,700 registered pleasure and commercial boats. When cruising, the manatee generally travels at a rate of speed of two to three miles per hour. When moving out of the way of a boat, the manatee can move at about eight to nine miles per hour. When confronted by an oncoming boat, the manatee either immediately submerges or turns to the right. Many manatee in the Kings Bay area have propeller scars on their bodies. A few of the manatee, generally the juvenile manatee, appear to enjoy and seek contact and association with the divers. The majority move away and seek to avoid the divers. During periods of heavier boat traffic around the springs, the manatee generally move out into the colder water adjacent to the springs. Continued disruptive activity such as motor sounds, fast moving boats, heavy diver or boat traffic, and harassment from divers and swimmers can prove to be dangerous to the manatee. Such activity can result in a failure to mate and reproduce, body wounds, and a forcing of the manatee out into colder waters, thus disrupting normal feeding patterns and behavior. In 1978, the Florida legislature passed the "Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act," declaring the State of Florida to be a refuge and sanctuary for the manatee. Section 370.12(2), 1978 Supplement to Florida Statutes. This Act directed the Department of Natural Resources to adopt rules regulating the operation and speed of motorboat traffic between the dates of November 15th and March 31st in the Kings Bay area of Crystal River, as well as in other portions of the waters of the State. At the time of the administrative hearing in this cause, the Department of Natural Resources was in the process of adopting Chapter 16N-22 in implementation of the Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act. These proposed rules establish slow speed zones, idle speed zones and prohibited zones for motorboats in Citrus County. The area in dispute herein is designated as an idle speed zone, defined as the minimum speed that will maintain the safe steerageway of a motorboat. The federal government is expected to adopt all state regulations pertaining to the protection of the manatee. It was the opinion of both of the witnesses having knowledge and expertise regarding the activities and behavior patterns of the manatee that any development which attracts and promotes human activity in the springs area could possibly have a deleterious effect upon the manatee. As noted above, the dock and dive shop have been in existence and operation since 1971. Boating and diving activity has increased since that time. The respondent Association has no objection to and is in favor of the proposed new boat speed regulations. While a few boats can now tie up to the existing dock, boats would not be able to tie up to the boardwalk. Trash receptacles are planned for Island No. 9. If Banana Island No. 9 were accessible via the proposed boardwalk for recreational and/or picnic activities, it is entirely possible that there would be less boating activity around the immediate area of the main springs. The majority of the boats around the springs are small boats which the divers and manatee observers rent for those purposes. It is possible that larger boats could be utilized to provide transportation for swimmers and divers to and from the area, thus reducing the number of boats in the immediate area of the springs. During the hearing, the applicant offered and stated its willingness to close down the boardwalk during the winter months should future studies or surveys illustrate that the manatee is being harmed therefrom. The successful and profitable operation of the respondent's boating and diving enterprises depends upon the continued habitation of the area by the manatee.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the respondent's application for a permit to construct and maintain a boardwalk be granted, subject to the stipulations proposed in the permit appraisal relating to the opening and the maintenance of vegetation. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones and Gay Post Office Box 1872 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Alfred W. Clark Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Baya M. Harrison Mark J. Proctor Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Assistant Department Attorney Carothers and Proctor 202 Blount Street Post Office Box 391 Crown Building Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the record owner of Lot 11, Block 4 and Lot 12, Block 2 of Ramrod Shores Marina Section subdivision on Ramrod Key in Monroe County, Florida. These lots lie across Angelfish Road from each other. They both lie across Mariposa Road from Torch Ramrod Channel which leads into Niles Channel which leads into the Gulf of Mexico to the north; to the south Torch Ramrod Channel leads into Newfound Harbor which opens onto the Atlantic Ocean. Mariposa Road appears on a subdivision plat filed in the official records of Monroe County in 1960, and on revisions of the original plat, one of which was filed in 1963, and the more recent of which was filed in 1969. On the two earlier plats, it is recited that "[r]oads shown hereon not previously dedicated or owned by the State or County are hereby dedicated to the perpetual use of the public." The evidence did not show whether Monroe County or any other governmental body had accepted the dedication of Mariposa Road. Cape Sable Corporation, a predecessor in title to petitioner, trucked in oolite fill to construct Mariposa Road; and repaired the road after occasional washouts, a practice which petitioner's immediate predecessor in title, James Brown, continued. Because the rock which was used to build Mariposa Road is loosely packed, water from the channel percolates through the road even when it is not high enough to move across the road in a sheet, which sometimes happens. There are also low lying places in the road through which tidal waters flow onto petitioner's property. Salt water up to a foot deep regularly stands on petitioner's property, which is overgrown with spider mangroves and red mangroves. The mangroves stabilize the shoreline on account of their root systems, which also serve to filter out certain substances which would otherwise run off into the channel. Decaying plant matter produced by the mangroves supports various microorganisms which constitute an early link in the food chain that results in commercial fisheries. Killifish, needlefish, jelly fish and wading birds all frequent petitioner's property in its present state. Covering petitioner's lots with fill would destroy or displace the marine life now flourishing there. Respondent has requested James Brown to remove the fill along Mariposa Road, citing Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the Army Corps of Engineers has taken similar action under applicable federal laws. Mr. Brown evinced an intent at the hearing not to comply with these requests, but to work instead to persuade Monroe County to blacktop Mariposa Road. Paving Mariposa Road with blacktop would involve compacting rock or otherwise creating an underbed impermeable to water. Mr. Brown envisions Mariposa Road being upgraded to the level of State Road 4, which it intersects, before being paved. If Mariposa Road were upgraded and paved in this fashion, it would act as a dam keeping tidal waters out of petitioner's lots, unless culverts were installed. In the event Mariposa Road is upgraded and paved and no culverts are installed, the marine habitat which now exists on petitioner's property would be doomed and filling the lots would hasten the process at worst.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for fill permit unless and until Mariposa Road is upgraded, without installation of culverts, and paved, so that it acts as a dam impervious to the waters of Torch Ramrod Channel. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Edward B. Johnson, Jr., Esquire 410 Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 Mr. Louis F. Hubener, Esquire Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION FRANCIS X. ATWATER, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-1409 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioners, Ian Koblick and Tonya Koblick, are the owners of Lots 3 and 4, Block 9, Anglers Park, Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida, according to the plat thereof recorded in plat book 1, page 159, public records of Monroe County, Florida. Such real property is contiguous to Largo Sound, a navigable water body, and title to the submerged lands under Largo Sound is vested in the State of Florida, in trust for all the people of the state. On December 5, 1991, petitioners sought permission from respondent's Division of Recreation and Parks to construct a private single family dock on the sovereign submerged lands contiguous to their property. According to the proof, such dock would measure approximately 70' in length and 4' in width, and include one boat slip measuring 30' in length and 9' in width. Apart from such limited proof, there is no evidence of record as to the use to which such dock would be put, although it is clear that its construction has no relationship to petitioners' ability to access their property since they have access to such property by road. By letter of December 27, 1991, respondent denied petitioners' request based on Rule 16D-2.011(3), Florida Administrative Code, which provides, pertinent to protections to be accorded John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park, as follows: (3) Construction activities. Unless specifically initiated by the Division, all construction activities of any kind are prohibited. No dredging, excavating, or filling operations are permitted in this state park; no materials of any kind may be deposited in or on the waters thereof. No structure of any kind shall be erected; no public service facility shall be constructed or extended into, upon or across this state park. By petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings, petitioners challenged the validity of such rule as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The gravamen of petitioners' challenge, as set forth in their proposed final order, is that "a) Rule 16D-2.011 is invalid because it contravenes Section 253.141, Fla. Stat., which recognizes riparian rights; b) the Rule is invalid because it is inconsistent with the "subject to" clause in Dedication 22309A; and c) the Rule is arbitrary and capricious because it assumes that all construction activity adversely affects the Park." The John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park On December 3, 1959, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida (Trustees) dedicated certain portions of the outer Continental Shelf situated seaward of a line three geographic miles from Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida, to the Florida Board of Parks and Memorials, the predecessor to respondent's Division of Recreation and Parks. Such dedication was for the express purpose of establishing the area as the Key Largo Coral Reef Preserve, now known as the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park, and to restrict the use of such submerged lands to park, recreational and preservation purposes. At the time of the aforesaid dedication, the State of Florida and the United States of America (United States) had been involved in litigation regarding the seaward boundaries of the State of Florida in the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, and the Trustees recognized that all, or a portion, of the dedicated lands might ultimately be found not to lie within the boundary of the State of Florida. Notwithstanding, there apparently being a community of interest between the state and federal government regarding the preservation of the coral reef formation, the State of Florida dedicated whatever interest it might have in such submerged lands for park, recreational and preservation purposes. Ultimately, the United States prevailed, and the State of Florida was found to have no interest in the submerged lands lying seaward of a line three geographic miles from Key Largo. Notwithstanding, the dedication of December 3, 1959, was generally known to describe the westerly boundary of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park, and provided established reference points from which additional submerged lands dedicated on September 21, 1967, discussed infra, could be identified. By Dedication 22309A, dated September 21, 1967, the Trustees dedicated to the Florida Board of Parks and Historic Memorials, the predecessor to respondent's Division of Recreation and Parks, certain sovereignty lands in Monroe County, Florida, as follows: Those submerged tidal bottom lands in the Atlantic Ocean lying between the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park and Key Largo including the submerged land in Largo Sound and the various inlets along the easterly coast of Key Largo; as and for public State Park purposes only . . . SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to any riparian rights and interest which may exist in or affect the above described lands. Considering the dedication of December 3, 1959, which was commonly known to delineate the then western boundary of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park, and the dedication of September 21, 1967, the current boundaries of such state park can be located by a surveyor. Those boundaries extend from the three-mile limit offshore to the mean high water line of Key Largo, within fixed lines on the north and south, and include Largo Sound, under which the submerged lands contiguous to petitioners' property lie. Today, as a consequence of the aforesaid dedications and certain leases between the Trustees and respondent, John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park consists of approximately 56,000 acres, of which 53,000 acres are submerged. Administered by respondent's Division of Recreation and Parks, the park currently draws approximately one million visitors a year. The rule at issue The rule at issue in these proceedings, Rule 16D Administrative Code, prohibits all construction activities in John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park not specifically initiated by the Division of Recreation and Parks. Such rule has been effective since July 16, 1975, and is similar to rules applicable to all other state parks, which likewise prohibit construction activities not initiated by the division. 1/ The purpose of the rule is to protect and preserve the coral reef formations and other natural resources of the park, and is premised on the assumption that the cumulative impact of construction activities in the park, such as docks, seawalls, groins, boat ramps, mooring buoys and ski ramps, would have an adverse effect on the park's natural resources. At hearing, petitioners failed to offer any persuasive proof that the cumulative impact of construction in the park would not have an adverse effect on the park's natural resources, or that the ban of all construction activities in the park not specifically initiated by the Division of Recreation and Parks was not supported by reason, fact or logic. Docks in the park In or about May 1988, it became apparent that, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 16D-2.011(3), Florida Administrative code, encroachments into John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park existed. Consequently, the Board of Trustees, as head of the Department of Natural Resources (Department), directed the Department to prepare a comprehensive report on all filling and construction activities that had occurred in the park. Thereafter, on August 22, 1989, the Board of Trustees directed the Department to conduct public meetings with respect to a proposed policy to address the encroachments that were discovered. Pertinent to this case, the Department's study identified 40 private docking facilities within the park boundaries. Of those structures, the Department's report revealed that 7 were constructed prior to the park's creation in 1967, 22 had no apparent authorization, 6 had received permits from either the Department of Environmental Regulation, Monroe County, or the Army Corps of Engineers, and 5 had been authorized by the Department notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 16D-2.011(3). Regarding the Department's approval of such docks, the proof demonstrates that, more likely than not, such approval was secured from the Department's Division of State Lands pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 18- 21, Florida Administrative Code, and in apparent ignorance of the Division of Recreation and Parks' Rule 16D-2.011(3), which prohibited such activity. Certainly, the Division of Recreation and Parks was not aware that such approvals had been given until the Department's study, and it never authorized such construction within the park's boundaries. Based on the Department's study and the public meetings, the Division of Recreation and Parks and the Division of State Lands recommended a policy to the Board of Trustees, at their meeting of April 12, 1990, to address the encroachments that had occurred in the park. That policy, approved by the Board of Trustees, was as follows: . . .(1) that all docks in existence prior to 1967 within state park waters receive authorized structure status; (2) that all docks within state park waters legally authorized by the Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees during or after 1967 receive status as authorized structures; (3) that all other private docks in existence since 1967 within state park waters that are not legally authorized by Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees have been evaluated on a case-by- case basis, taking into consideration any authorization issued by state and federal environmental agencies and, using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria - 18-21.0041, Florida Administrative Code as a guideline for reviewing environmental impact on marine communities, designate the structure as either authorized or require removal or modification; and (4) that no future authorization will be issued for the construction of new private docks in state park waters. Repairs to existing private docks While the rule provisions prohibiting construction activities in the park are clear and unambiguous, petitioners sought to raise some uncertainty regarding the rule by reference to the circumstances under which the docks that had been grandfathered under the Board's policy statement of April 12, 1990, could be repaired. In this regard, petitioners elicited proof from the Division of Recreation and Parks that authorization for repair of such structures would have to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, giving due consideration to the extent or nature of the maintenance or repair, before a decision could be made. While the question of repairs to existing structures may raise some question of uncertainty to the owners of those docks, such uncertainty is not occasioned by the rule. Rather, such uncertainty is a product of the existence of docks in the park, albeit without the approval of the Division of Recreation and Parks, and the policy choice made on April 12, 1990, by the Board as to how to address those structures. Under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the rule, as or when enacted, is vague or otherwise objectionable.
Findings Of Fact The Hearing Officer's findings of fact in both the First Recommended Order and the Recommended Order As To Matters On Remand are accepted except as otherwise noted in either this Final Order After Remand or the First Final Order. The Florida Audubon has filed 80 pages of exceptions comprising 98 exceptions to findings of fact and 33 exceptions to conclusions of law. I have grouped these exceptions and ruled on them under the categories listed below. Scope of Remand and Hearing Officer's Preliminary Statement. Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 1(A)-1(G), 2(A)-2(M), 3(A)-3(C), 4(A)- 4(B), 5(A)-5(C) and 9(A)(3) in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's preliminary statement of the background of the case and the scope of the issues on remand. My review of the record in this case leads me to conclude that the Hearing Officer's factual summary and statement of the issues on remand in her preliminary statement is an accurate and concise description of the background of this case and is based on matters of record and competent substantial evidence. Accordingly, I reject these exceptions. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer's preliminary statement comprises neither findings of fact nor conclusions of law. Therefore, a ruling on these exceptions is not actually required. 5/ Nature of the Proposed Development. Florida Audubon's Exceptions 8(A)-8(I) in whole or part take exception to the Hearing Officer's description in F.O.F. Nos. 1-9 of the nature of the proposed development. These exceptions do not assert that F.O.F. Nos. 1-9 are not supported in the record by competent substantial evidence. Rather, the gist of these exceptions is that the Hearing Officer overlooked or did not give proper weight to evidence that may suggest a contrary finding. It is well settled that where a Hearing Officer's finding of fact is supported in the record by competent, substantial evidence. I am not at liberty to reject or modify it. See e.g., Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Heifetz v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Sections 120.57(1)(b)10., and 120.68(10), Florida Statutes. Nor may I reweigh the evidence considered by the Hearing Officer. Heifetz, supra. My review of the record shows that the Hearing Officer's F.O.F. Nos. 1-9 are supported in the record by competent, substantial evidence. The following summarizes F.O.F. Nos. 1-9 and the competent substantial evidence in the record which supports them. The proposed development on the island has been approved by the City of Naples and involves the refurbishment and expansion of existing Keewaydin Club facilities along with the construction of 42 single family homes within the city's jurisdictional boundaries. (F.O.F. No. 1: App. Remand Ex. 2). The Applicant is limited in its improvement of the Keewaydin Club facilities as follows: Construction must occur within the existing club property boundaries. A maintenance facility, firehouse, helipad and additional tennis courts are to be constructed. In addition, two buildings containing guest units and a building with 21 staff units can be built. Existing buildings can be remodeled to continue in their present functions and the clubhouse can be expanded by an additional 4,400 square feet. (F.O.F. No. 2: Stipulation of Respondents; DER Remand Ex. 2.). Marina expansion has been proposed by the Applicant, along with elevated walkways through jurisdictional wetlands, but are not essential to the proposed development. For purposes of consideration of secondary impacts the hearing on remand assumed that the marina expansion and walkways would be constructed so that the secondary impacts of the potential development could be considered during the current dredge and fill permit review. (F.O.F. No. 3: DER Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A at 18-19). The 42 single family homes are planned for specific locations south of the club property. These homes will be on 15,000 square foot lots. It is anticipated that they will be landscaped with native vegetation and that residents will move around the island via golf carts on cart paths. (F.O.F. No. 4: App. Remand Ex. 2 at 1-1, 1-5, 1-16, 1-38, 2-7 to 2-9, and 5-2; App. Remand Ex. 11 at 6; Tr. at 413-15). Because the city has limited the planned development to the 42 residential units and the improvements to the club, both the Department of Natural Resources and South Florida Water Management District have approved permits specifically tailored to this development plan. (F.O.F. No. 5: App. Remand Exh. 2; App. Remand Ex. B at 6-10, App. Remand Ex. 11). The privately owned portion of the island cannot be developed further because of the city's approval conditions for this project. These two conditions are: (1) City Ordinance 89-5843 mandates all of the property in the land options involved with future development must be annexed into the city; and Once the property is annexed, the Applicant will give the city a conservation easement over 2,270 acres. This acreage is to be retained in its natural state and is expected to be maintained as suitable habitat for fish, plants and wildlife. (F.O.F. No. 6: App. Remand Ex. 2 at 1-3, 1-30; App. Remand Ex. 6; App. Remand Ex. 11; App. Remand Ex. A at 11-12). The City of Naples requires the developer to eliminate all septic tanks serving the Keewaydin Club as one if its conditions for approval of the current project. This has the potential to positively impact and improve current water quality on the island. (F.O.F. No. 7: Tr. at 317, 323-24; App. Remand Ex. D at 12; App. Remand Ex. F at 13 and 15; App. Remand Ex. 2). Specific measures have been proposed to minimize development impacts on the wildlife known to inhabit the island. Preservation of the osprey nest zone, upland gopher tortoise habitat, control of wheeled traffic on the beach, use of indirect lighting to avoid disorientation of baby atlantic loggerhead turtles as they hatch from nests, and trapping programs to control the raccoon population are prepared and ready for implementation. (F.O.F. No. 8: App. Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A. at 22; DER Remand Ex. 2). The vast number of natural plant species on the island will be protected in designated areas. The preservation has been planned so representatives of species of interest will continue to thrive. (F.O.F. No. 9: App. Remand Ex. F at 16; DER Remand Ex. A at 22; DER Remand Ex. 2; App. Remand Ex. 2 at 1-25, 2-7, 2-16, and 2-17). Since the above findings of fact are supported in the record by competent substantial evidence, I can not disturb these findings of fact. I therefore reject the above noted exceptions. The MSSW Permit and Reasonable Assurance As To Water Quality. Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 1(C)-1(F), 8(G)(3), 9(A), 9(I)(1)-(3) and 30(D) in whole or part take exception to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law that the applicant has provided reasonable assurance that the project will not cause violations of water quality standards. (F.O.F. Nos. 10-20; Conclusion of Law No. 42). 6/ The gist of these exceptions is that the Department erred in relying on the assumption that in issuing its Management and Storage of Surface Water ("MSSW") permit, the South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD") properly determined that the surface water management system for the island development provided reasonable assurance that the system would not result in violations of state water quality standards. There is competent substantial evidence in the record supporting the Hearing Officer's finding that the Department did not independently evaluate whether the development's surface water management system provided reasonable assurance that it would not violate state water quality standards. (F.O.F. No. 10; Dentzau, Tr. at 700-701, 712-13). It is therefore necessary to decide whether the Department properly relied on the MSSW permit for reasonable assurances that the surface water management system would not result in water quality violations, or whether the de novo hearing rendered the reliance moot in any event. Before the Department may issue a dredge and fill permit, it must determine that the applicant has provided reasonable assurances that the project, when considered with cumulative and secondary impacts, will not cause violations of water quality standards. Section 403.918(1), Florida Statutes. See also Conservancy v. A. Vernon Allen Builder, 580 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) and authorities cited therein. 7/ Where development is a secondary impact of a dredge and fill project, and the development will have a related surface water management system, the Department must also determine whether reasonable assurances have been provided that the surface water management system will not cause water quality violations. The first issue presented by this case is whether the Department may properly rely on a water management district's MSSW permit as the needed reasonable assurances, or whether the Department must "look behind" the water management district's MSSW permit and make a separate and independent evaluation of whether the necessary reasonable assurances have been provided. I note that in 1989 the Legislature enacted Ch. 89-279, Section 15, Laws of Florida, which created Section 373.418, Florida Statutes, providing in part that: It is the intent of the Legislature that stormwater management systems be regulated under this part [i.e., Part IV of Chapter 373] incorporating all of existing requirements contained in or adopted pursuant to Chapters 373 and 403. * * * (3) The department or governing boards may adopt such rules as are necessary to implement the provisions of this part. Such rules shall be consistent with state water policy and shall not allow harm to water resources or be contrary to the policy set forth in s. 373.016. The rules of SFWMD require that surface water management systems not cause violations of state water quality standards. Rule 40E-4.301(1)(c), Fla. Admin. Code. Also, State water policy requires that MSSW permits not cause violations of state water quality standards. Rule 17-40.420(3)(a), (b)1.a., Fla. Admin. Code. Although the Department is authorized to issue MSSW permits under section 373.418, it is the intent of Chapter 373 that Department powers be delegated to the water management districts to the greatest extent practicable. Section 373.016(3), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has ,thus established a scheme where strong preference is given to the regulation of surface water management systems by Water management districts through Chapter 373 MSSW permits. 8/ This scheme includes a mechanism in which the Department, the applicant, or a substantially affected person can petition the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission for a determination of the validity of the permit. See Section 373.114, Florida Statutes. If the Department in the context of a Chapter 403 dredge and fill permit evaluation were to second guess and make an independent assessment of whether a surface water management system which had already received a water management district MSSW permit actually provided the necessary reasonable assurances, it could lead to a collateral attack on the validity of the MSSW permit and defeat the Legislative intent expressed in Sections 373.418 and 373.114, Florida Statutes. I therefore conclude that where an MSSW permit issuance by a water management district has become final, the Department may accept the MSSW permit as reasonable assurance that, as to the operation of the system within the scope of the dredge and fill permit, the surface water management system will not cause violations of state water quality standards. Of course, the Department will continue to make an independent determination of whether the remaining aspects of the project, taking into consideration cumulative and secondary impacts, provide the necessary reasonable assurances. I note that in this case the MSSW permit has not yet become final, as it is pending review before the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. 9/ A second issue raised is whether the de novo hearing rendered moot any question as to the propriety of the Department's reliance on the MSSW permit. I note that in the remand hearing in this case expert testimony was introduced to the effect that the development's management and storage of surface water system would not cause violations of state water quality standards. (App. Remand Ex. B, Prefiled Test. of Means at 6-12, 14-17.). Since this proceeding on remand is a de novo determination of the issues on remand, if there was any error by the Department in relying on the MSSW permit, it is moot because the Hearing Officer found that the necessary reasonable assurances were provided based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Since the Hearing Officer's finding that reasonable assurances have been provided is supported in the record by competent substantial evidence, I may not disturb it. Accordingly, the above noted exceptions are rejected. Reasonable Assurances As to Water Quality. Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 1(C)-(F), 8(D)(2)-8(D)(3) , 8(E)(1), 8(F), 8(G)(1)-8(G)(3), 8(H) and 9(A)-9(K) in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding of fact that the Applicant has provided reasonable assurances that the proposed project, including the secondary impacts of the expected development, will not cause violations of water quality standards. (F.O.F. Nos. 10-20). Once again, Florida Audubon's exceptions do not assert the Hearing Officer's findings of fact are not supported in the record by competent substantial evidence, but essentially contend that the Hearing Officer did not give proper weight to what Florida Audubon contends is conflicting evidence. As I noted above, the standard which I must apply in ruling on exceptions to findings of fact is whether the Hearing Officer's findings of fact are supported in the record by competent substantial evidence. Florida Dept. of Corrections; Heifetz; supra. If I find any competent substantial evidence in the record to support a finding of fact I must accept the finding of fact even if there are contrary facts in the record and even if I would have weighed the facts differently. Heifetz, supra. 10/ As noted in Part III(3) above, the Department did not independently evaluate whether the design of the project's surface water management system provided reasonable assurance that the system would not violate state water quality standards. Rather, the Department relied on the issuance of the MSSW permit by the South Florida Water Management District. (F.O.F. No. 10; Dentzau, Tr. at 700-701, 712-713). Florida Audubon suggests that SFWMD did not in fact review the impact of the surface water management system on water quality, and that the Department's reliance on the MSSW permit precludes a finding that the Applicant has provided reasonable assurances that the project will not violate water quality standards. I disagree for the reasons stated in Part III(3) above. In particular, I note that the record on remand contains competent substantial evidence that the surface water management system will not result in violations of water quality standards. (App. Remand Ex. B, Prefiled Test. of Means at 6-12, 14-17). This proceeding on remand is a de novo determination of whether reasonable assurances have been provided that the project, taking into consideration the expected development of the island, will not result in violations of water quality standards. Therefore, regardless of whether the Department initially erred in relying on the MSSW permit, any error has been rendered moot by this de novo proceeding on remand in which the Applicant introduced competent substantial evidence that reasonable assurances have been provided that the stormwater management system will not cause violations of water quality standards. As to F.O.F. Nos. 11-20, the following summarizes the findings of fact and the competent substantial evidence in the record supporting them. In its review of the proposed development the Department identified several areas of potential adverse water quality impacts. Specifically, the Department investigated impacts from a potential marina expansion; the creation of all planned cart paths, proposed house pad construction, boardwalk and canoe launches, exempt docks, and beach renourishment. (F.O.F. No. 11: DER Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A, Prefiled Test. of Dentzau at 7-9, 11-25; DER Remand Ex. B, Prefiled Test. of Llewellyn at 5-13). The marina expansion, boardwalks, and canoe launches will impact existing jurisdictional mangroves, thereby affecting water quality. If later permitted, however, the Applicant can reasonably minimize such impacts and offset them in a suitable fashion. (F.O.F. No. 12: DER Remand Ex. A, Prefiled Test. of Dentzau at 20-21; DER Remand Ex. 2). 11/ The primary impacts from exempt docks are minimized by the development plan. The secondary potential impacts are negligible. (F.O.F. No. 13: DER Remand Ex. A, Prefiled Test. of Dentzau at 20-21; DER Remand Ex. 2). The cart paths will not be paved. Urban runoff from these surfaces will have an insignificant quantity of pollutants that are accounted for in the surface water management system design. (F.O.F. No. 14: App. Remand Ex. F, Prefiled Test. of McWilliams at 14; Applicant's Remand Ex. B, Prefiled Test. of Means at 6-12, 16; Applicant's Remand Ex. D, Prefiled Test. of Missimer at 11). The secondary impacts from the house pad construction and the urban runoff from associated impervious surfaces are minimal. Nevertheless, they are accounted for in the surface water management system design. (F.O.F. No. 15: Applicant's Remand Ex. 2 at 1-16, 5-2; App. Remand Ex. B, Prefiled Test. of Means at 6-10; App. Remand Ex. D, Prefiled Test. of Missimer at 11-12; App. Remand Ex. F, Prefiled Test. of McWilliams at 13-14). The agreements entered into between the Applicant, the City of Naples, and the Department of Natural Resources prohibit any additional shore hardening. The beach management plan includes periodic beach renourishment. (F.O.F. No. 16: DER Remand Ex. A, Prefiled Test. of Dentzau at 16; App. Remand Ex. 11; App. Remand Ex. E at 10, Prefiled Test. of Stephen at 10; Tr. at 368-369). A review of the surface water management plan presented at the remand hearing reveals that the potential for adverse secondary impacts is significantly limited due to the low density and minimal infrastructure for the proposed development. The 42 new homes will be spread over 430 acres. A series of swales, collection ponds and surface water treatment areas have been designed to minimize the impacts of development on the surface water. The use of fertilizer or pesticides by residents will be strictly limited. (F.O.F. No. 17: App. Remand Ex. B, Prefiled Test. of Means at 6-10; App. Remand Ex. D, Prefiled Test. of Missimer at 11-12; App. Remand Ex. F, Prefiled Test. of McWilliams at 12-19; App. Remand Ex. 6). The surface water management system meets the Department's water quality standards. (F.O.F. No. 18: App. Remand Ex. B, Prefiled Test. of Means at 6-14; App. Remand Ex. 6; Tr. at 185-89, 197-215). Potable water is already conveyed to the island from the city. Once the septic tanks are removed, the overall affect of the planned development on ground water will be negligible. (F.O.F. No. 19: DER Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A, Prefiled Test. of Dentzau at 16, 23-24). I conclude that the Hearing Officer's F.O.F. Nos. 10-20 are supported in the record by competent substantial evidence and therefore I will not disturb them. Accordingly, the above noted exceptions are rejected. Reasonable Assurances As to Public Interest Test. Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 10(A)-10(O)(2) in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact that reasonable assurances have been provided that the proposed project, taking into consideration the cumulative and secondary impacts, is not contrary to the public interest. (F.O.F. Nos. 21-34). As with the previous exceptions, Florida Audubon is essentially arguing that the Hearing Officer improperly weighed the evidence. My task is to determine whether the Hearing Officer's findings of fact are supported in the record by competent substantial evidence. If they are, I may not reject them. The following summarizes F.O.F. Nos. 22-33 and the competent substantial evidence in the record supporting them. All new construction is required to meet flood protection standards even though the owners will not be eligible for flood insurance. Home construction standards take into consideration many of the effects of hurricanes. (F.O.F. No. 22: App. Remand Ex. 2: App. Remand Ex. F at 15). The hurricane evacuation plan has been approved by the city and Collier County emergency management authorities. (F.O.F. No. 23: App. Remand Ex. 2 at Ib, 1-29; App. Remand Ex. A at 17-21). Public funds are protected as the proposed development is not dependent upon federal, state or local funding or insurance. The city has passed an ordinance that requires property owners to acknowledge that the city has no liability for rebuilding any damaged infrastructure or improvements. The monetary risk associated with the development will be borne by the developer and the residents. (F.O.F. No. 24: App. Remand Ex. 2 at 1-3 to 1-8). The 42 single family homes will be located within the island's Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) unit boundaries. The evidence adduced at hearing indicated that the CBRA designation will not be jeopardized by the proposed development. (F.O.F. No. 25: Tr. at 106-7; App. Remand Ex. A at 21-33; App. Remand Ex. 3; App. Remand Ex. 4; App. Remand Ex. E at 16). The proposed development will have negligible secondary impacts on fish and wildlife. The project protects or enhances various fish and wildlife habitats. All wetlands will be preserved. The beach dune system will be improved through removal of exotics and dune restoration. As a result, the interdependence of the estuarine area on the coastal barrier resource will not be adversely affected by the project. (F.O.F. No. 26: DER Remand Ex. A at 15- 16; App. Remand Ex. E at 19; App. Remand Ex. F at 10, 13-14, 15-16; Tr. at 414, 825-26, 829-30). Gopher tortoises will be relocated to an upland preserve on the same island. The removal of exotic plants, the introduction of native herbaceous plants and control of the raccoon population should positively effect the gopher tortoise population. (F.O.F. No. 27: DER Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A at 21- 22; App. Remand Ex. F at 15-16; Tr. at 855-60). Indirect lighting and the reduction of raccoons should benefit the atlantic loggerhead turtle population. (F.O.F. No. 28: DER Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A at 22; App. Remand Ex. 2). Threatened or endangered plant species on the site include golden leather fern, assorted orchids and bromeliads, golden polypody fern, shoestring fern and prickly pear cactus. Representatives of these species will be protected in preserve areas, according to conditions in the development plan approved by the city and conditions established in other permits. (F.O.F. No. 29: DER Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A at 22; App. Remand Ex. F at 16). The proposed project preserves all identified habitats which contribute to marine productivity. Low density development and other limitations already placed on the project were designed to minimize the adverse impacts on fishing and marine productivity. Recreational values will be enhanced by the project because of the proposed canoe launches and habitat restoration. (F.O.F. No. 30: App. Remand Ex. F at 16). The development is permanent in nature. Design limitations on the project, existing permit conditions and the low density aspect of the development combine to assure that the project has limited adverse impacts. (F.O.F. No. 31: App. Remand Ex. 2; App. Remand Ex. F at 17-18; Tr. at 872-73). There will be no adverse impacts on historical or archaeological resources. The Caloosa Indian Midden located on the property is to be preserved undisturbed. The Keewaydin Club Lodge is a designated structure on the National Historical Register and will be maintained as a historical building. (F.O.F. No. 32: DER Remand Ex. 2; DER Remand Ex. A at 22; App. Remand Ex. A at 16-17). Except for the creation of 42 single home residencies for people willing to spend a million dollars for a home on an island with access only by boat or helicopter and all monetary risk for infrastructure and improvements damaged by any cause, the current condition of the island will not be changed significantly. All high quality resources and their functions have been preserved by project design. (F.O.F. No. 33: App. Remand Ex. F at 17-18; Tr. at 872-73). The above findings of fact which are supported in the record by competent substantial evidence support the Hearing Officer's F.O.F. No. 21 that the project will not adversely affect public health, safety or welfare or the property of others. Since the above noted findings of fact are supported in the record by competent substantial evidence, I shall not disturb them and the above noted exceptions are therefore rejected. However, as to the Hearing Officer's "finding" that the project is not contrary to the public interest, this is ultimately a conclusion of law for which I have the final authority and responsibility to determine. 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Depart. of Environmental Regulation, 552 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. den., 562 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1990); Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), rev. den. 583 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 1991). Although the factors found in the Hearing Officer's F.O.F. Nos. 26-30 help alleviate the adverse impacts of the project, when I balance the public interest criteria I conclude that the project would be contrary to the public interest without the mitigation offered by the preservation conservation easement to be placed over 2,270 acres. When I take the mitigation into consideration, I conclude that the project, taking into consideration the cumulative and secondary impacts, is not contrary to the public interest. Barrier Island -- Executive Order 81-105 and Designation Under The Federal Coastal Barrier Island Resources Act (CBRA). Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 1(G), 3(A)-3(C), 5(A), 8(D)(1), 8(E)(1), 9(A)(3), 9(B)-9(D), 10(E)(1) (3), 10(J) 10(N)(3), 17 (A)-17(D), 21, 22, 24 and 25 in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding of fact that the federal Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) designation of Keewaydin Island will not be jeopardized by the proposed development (F.O.F. No. 25) and to the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law that the development is not prevented by Governor Graham's Executive Order No. 81-105. (C.O.L. No. 43). My review of the record shows that competent substantial evidence was admitted supporting the fact that Keewaydin Island's Coastal Barrier Resource System ("CBRS") unit designation does not prohibit the development of Keewaydin Island. It just precludes federal funds to facilitate such development. Therefore, that development would not jeopardize the CBRS unit designation. (App. Remand Ex. 3; App. Remand Ex. 4; App. Remand Ex. A at 21-23; App. Remand Ex. E at 16; Tr. at 106-107) Accordingly, I shall not disturb this finding of fact. Although I note that Executive Order No. 81-105 may have some weight in the balancing of the public interest criteria under Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes, I concur with the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law that Executive Order No. 81-105 does not per se preclude the development of coastal barrier islands where government funds will not be used to create the infrastructure that promotes development on the barrier island. In view of the above, the above noted exceptions are rejected. Exceptions Lacking Particularity. Florida Audubon Exceptions No. 6 and 7 lack sufficient particularity. Rule 17-103.200(1), Fla. Admin. Code, provides in part: Exceptions shall state with particularity the basis for asserting that the Hearing Officer erred in making or omitting specific findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a recommendation ... The reason for the above requirement is clear. It is impossible for the parties to respond, or for me to rule, when the basis for a purported error is not clearly stated. Exceptions No. 6 and 7 fail to state how the Hearing Officer has erred in a finding of fact, conclusion of law, or recommendation. Such exceptions do not comply with Rule 17-103.200(1), Fla. Admin. Code, and therefore must be rejected. For this reason, I reject these exceptions. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Hearing Officer's conclusions of law in both the First Recommended Order and the Recommended Order As To Matters On Remand are accepted except as otherwise noted in either this Final Order After Remand or the First Final Order as modified by the court's opinion in Conservancy v. A. Vernon Allen, Builder, supra. Scope of Remand. Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 11-14 in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law No. 36-39. The gist of these exceptions is that the Hearing Officer misconstrued the scope of the remand and consequently lacked jurisdiction. There is no merit in the contention that the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was conferred by the court's mandate that the matter be remanded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. See Conservancy v. A. Vernon Allen Builder, 580 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Nor do I agree that the Hearing Officer misconstrued the scope of remand. The opinion of First District Court of Appeal stated: In the instant case, we disagree with appellee that the contemplated development of 75 estate homes is speculative and is not closely linked or causally related to the proposed dredging and filling. We perceive there to be little difference between the Department's aforestated need to "consider what will be at the end of the bridge or road," and the necessity here to consider what will be at the end of the pipeline, especially when the evidence, proffered or admitted, suggests that the development enabled by the dredge and fill permit could have devastating environmental impacts. Such evidence would be highly relevant to the Department's consideration of whether the applicant has carried its burden of giving reasonable assurances under section 403.918 that water quality standards will not be violated and the project is not contrary to the public interest. Thus, the Department's consideration of the proposed development solely in relation to the design of the pipeline system itself neglected the necessity in this case to consider potential secondary impacts. Consequently, it was error for the Hearing Officer to exclude the evidence proffered by appellants for the reasons set forth in her recommended order. Accordingly, this cause must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings and re-evaluation of the proffered evidence in a manner consistent with this opinion. 12/ Conservancy v. A. Vernon Allen Builder, 580 So.2d at 779 (quoting McCormick v. City of Jacksonville, (12 FALR 980, 981 (DER Final Order, Jan. 22, 1990); footnote omitted). I conclude that the Hearing Officer properly construed the scope of remand to require the consideration of "the secondary impacts associated with the development of Key Island, which the Court determined were closely linked and causally related to the proposed permit." (R.O.R., C.O.L. No. 37) I also note that this administrative proceeding on remand is a de novo determination of the issue of the secondary impacts, and that Florida Audubon has fully participated and submitted testimony and evidence on the issue of the secondary impacts. I therefore conclude that the administrative hearing fully complied with the scope of remand, and accordingly reject the above noted exceptions. Reasonable Assurances As To Water Quality. Exceptions No. 14, 15(A)-15(C), 16, 18, 24 and 30(D) in whole or part take exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law that reasonable assurances have been provided that the project and its cumulative and secondary impacts will not cause violations of water quality standards. (C.O.L. Nos. 40, 41, 42). Based on the Hearing Officer's findings of fact which I have accepted, I conclude that the project, taking into consideration cumulative and secondary impacts, provides reasonable assurance that water quality standards will not be violated. I therefore reject the above noted exceptions. Reasonable Assurances As To The Public Interest Test. Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 15(A)-15(C), 16, 17, 18, and 21-24 take exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law that reasonable assurance has been provided that the project together with its cumulative and secondary impacts are not contrary to the public interest. (C.O.L. No. 43) As I noted above, the determination of whether reasonable assurances have been provided as to the public interest test is ultimately a conclusion of law for which I have the final authority and responsibility to determine. 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Depart. of Environmental Regulation, 552 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. den., 562 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1990). Based on the Hearing Officer's findings of fact which I have accepted, I conclude that the project, taking into consideration the cumulative and secondary impacts and the offered mitigation of the preservation conservation easement over 2,270 acres, has provided reasonable assurance that the project is not contrary to the public interest. Therefore the above noted exceptions are rejected. Barrier Island -- Executive Order 81-105 and Designation Under The Federal Coastal Barrier Island Resources Act (CBRA). Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 17(A)-(D), 21, 22, 24 and 25 in whole or in part take exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law that Executive Order No. 81-105 and the Federal Coastal Barrier Island Resource Act do not preclude the proposed development on Keewaydin Island. Based on the Hearing Officer's findings of fact which I have accepted, and for the reasons stated in Part III(6) above, I concur with the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law and reject the above noted exceptions. Evidentiary Issues Official Recognition of Hurricane Andrew and Amendment to Rule 28-21.003 Florida Audubon's Exceptions No. 25, 30(A)-30(C) do not take exception to any specific finding of fact or conclusion of law. Rule 17-103.200(1) requires rulings only to exceptions to findings of fact, conclusions of law or recommendations. Although lacking in specificity, these exceptions apparently assert that the Hearing Officer erred in an implied conclusion of law when she declined to take official recognition of (1) an amendment to Department of Natural Resources Rule 18-21.003 relating to leases or consent to uses of sovereign submerged lands incident to the development of undeveloped coastal barrier islands, and (2) the effects of Hurricane Andrew on Keewaydin Island. The Hearing Officer, relying on the authority of Collier Medical Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 462 So.2d 83, 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), denied these motions on the ground that the evidentiary hearing had ended. I note that the decision to give official recognition, like judicial notice, lies in the discretion of the Hearing Officer. See ., Huff v. State, 495 So.2d 145, 151 (Fla. 1986)("It is upon the wisdom and discretion of the judges of our courts that the doctrine of judicial notice must rest."). Even assuming that the Hearing Officer's decision to deny official recognition is an implied conclusion of law to which an exception is appropriately made, I cannot say that I believe the Hearing Officer abused her discretion in declining to take the requested official recognition. Florida Audubon has suggested no competent substantial evidence in the record which would be a basis for determining whether the amended Rule 18-21.003 would be applicable to the proposed development on Keewaydin Island. Furthermore, even if the rule was applicable to Keewaydin Island, the effect of the rule would be relevant to the necessary permit, easement or consent to use from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The Department's permit does not remove the applicant's need for a Board of Trustees permit over sovereign submerged lands. 13/ As to the request for official recognition of Hurricane Andrew, it cannot be said that it is generally known and not subject to dispute how Hurricane Andrew would have effected Keewaydin Island if the proposed project has been in place. Therefore official recognition of Hurricane Andrew is neither appropriate nor material for the purposes sought by Florida Audubon. Accordingly, I conclude that the Hearing Officer did not abuse her discretion in denying official recognition. I therefore reject the above noted exceptions. Official Recognition of Facts In the MSSW Permit Proceeding Before SFWMD. Florida Audubon's Exception No. 27, although lacking in specificity, appears to be taking exception to the Hearing Officer's implicit denial of taking official recognition of facts in the administrative proceedings of another case, i.e., the MSSW permit proceedings before the SFWMD. Apparently Florida Audubon is contending that the Hearing Officer erred in not taking official recognition of Florida Audubon's assertion that the SFWMD did not consider impacts on water quality when it issued the MSSW permit. As I noted in my discussion in Parts III(3) and III(4) above, the Department may properly rely on the issuance of an MSSW permit as reasonable assurance that the surface water management system will not cause violations of water quality standards. Regardless of whether the SFWMD properly considered water quality impacts when it issued the MSSW permit, in this case the issue is moot because a de novo proceeding was held where the record contains competent substantial evidence that the surface water management system provides reasonable assurance that the system will not cause violations of water quality standards. This exception is therefore rejected. Miscellaneous Exceptions. Exception 13 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's C.O.L. No. 38 describing the nature of the proffers made in the previous hearing. Since the hearing on remand was a de novo hearing on the issue of secondary impacts of the island development in which Florida Audubon presented all of its evidence related to the issue, I find no error that is relevant or material to this proceeding. Exception 13 is therefore rejected. Exception 14 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's C.O.L. No. 39 holding that the Department acted in good faith in its pre-hearing review of the information regarding the development. Once again, since the hearing was a de novo proceeding to establish the secondary impacts of the development I find no relevant or material error. Exception 14 is therefore rejected. Exceptions No. 19(A)-19(C) take exception to the Hearing Officer's C.O.L. No. 45, which concluded that the Department witnesses who disagreed with the proposed project did not apply the tests set forth in the statutes as did the Department witnesses who actually made the initial determination of whether the permit should issue. This exception also looses sight of the fact that this remand proceeding is a de novo determination of the facts. Florida Audubon presented witnesses who opposed the permit, and the Applicant presented witnesses and evidence in favor of the permit. The Department presented witnesses as to the Department's initial determination of the matter. I find no error and reject the exception. Exceptions 20(A) to 20(C) taking exception to the Hearing Officer's recommendations. These exceptions essentially are attacks on the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law as to reasonable assurances. The exceptions are denied for the same reasons stated in Parts III(3), (4) and (5) and IV(2) and (3). Exceptions 28 and 29 take exception to the Hearing Officer's acceptance of proposed findings of fact in the proposed recommended orders of the Applicant and the Department. These exceptions are redundant and are rejected for the same reasons stated in Parts III and IV(1)-(5) above.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered approving Respondent Builders' dredge and fill permit in DER File No. 111486645 filed August 31, 1988, subject to the following modifications: Specific condition number 6 should be amended to read: 6. Dredging shall be done by mechanical means (no hydraulic dredging) as there does not appear to be an appropriate area for discharge retention available. No dredging shall be allowed during the weeks of July 1st through September 30th of any year. If rock is encountered during the dredging activity along the proposed pipeline corridor, the rock is to be punctured by mechanical means. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the proposed findings of fact filed by Petitioners are addressed as follows: Accept that John Remington holds the option on the property. See HO #1. Reject the rest of paragraph 1 as contrary to fact. See HO #6. Accept the description of the project locale. See HO #7. The rest is rejected as irrelevant. Outside scope of hearing. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #7. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside scope of hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside scope of hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside scope of hearing. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Argumentative. Rejected. Improper summary. Irrelevant. Accepted. See Ho #2. Accepted. See Preliminary Matters. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Immaterial. Accepted. Rejejcted. Improper summary. Accepted. Rejected. Immaterial. Rejected. Legal argument. Rejected. Beyond the reasonable assurances standards. Accepted as a reasonable possibility. See HO #11. Accept the first sentence. See HO #11. The rest is rejected as argumentative. Accept as a fact summary. The assumption portion is rejected as argumentative. Rejected. Premature analysis of future sewer treatment plant permit. Accept first sentence. The rest is rejected as argumentative and beyond scope of hearing. Accepted. Accepted to the point that such information could be known, based upon the methods used to form the opinion. Rejected. Argumentative. Respondent Builders' proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #7 and #9. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. See HO #21. Rejected, except that there is no evidence of scour activity. There was insufficient evidence for the conclusion that the pass is very stable. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #21. Accepted. Rejected. Premature in this proceeding. Accepted. See HO #16 and #17. Accepted that reasonable assurances provided. See HO #11 and #16. Accepted. See HO #33. Accepted. See HO #13 through #16. Accepted. See HO #16 and #17. Accepted. Rejected. Repetitive. Accepted. See HO #31. Accepted. See HO #18. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #21 and #29. Accepted. See HO #23-#25. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #21, #22 and #29. Accepted. See HO #30. Accepted. Accepted. Respondent DER's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #4 and HO #7. Accepted. See HO #5. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. Conclusionary. See HO #21 and #29. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #23. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #22. Accepted. See HO #22. Accepted. See HO #16. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. Speculative. Accepted. See HO #16. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #6. Rejected. Outside of scope of hearing. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Z. Fleming, Esquire 620 Ingraham Building 25 Southeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Terry E. Lewis, Esquire Kevin S. Hennessy, Esquire MESSER VICKERS CAPARELLO FRENCH AND MADSEN Suite 301 2000 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Richard Grosso, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether 1044PVB, LLC (“Applicant”), is entitled to Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”) No. IND-109-143282-1 from the St. Johns River Water Management District (“District”), authorizing the construction of a surface water management system to serve a proposed residential development in St. Johns County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Nancy Condron is a resident and landowner in St. Johns County. Her residence is located across Ponte Vedra Boulevard from the Project. Petitioner uses the nearby Guana River Wildlife Management Area for nature-based recreation, including hiking and bird-watching. Applicant is a foreign limited liability company and the applicant for the ERP at issue in this case. The District is an independent special district granted powers and assigned duties under chapter 373, Florida Statutes, including powers and duties related to the regulation of construction activities in wetlands. The Project is within the boundaries of the District. The Project Site The Project site is 17.13 acres located at 1044 Ponte Vedra Boulevard in St. Johns County, Florida. The site currently consists of forested lands on the east and west and pasture areas in the middle. There is an existing trail road that runs the length of the property and a small residence. The site has four small ponds excavated as watering holes, ranging in size from 0.04 to 0.24 acres. There are 4.41 acres of wetlands and other surface waters on the site. There is a 3.49-acre area of mixed forested wetland on the site that continues offsite to the south and west. There are also three isolated wetlands on the site, each less than a half-acre in size. The wetland system adjacent to the Project site flows to the Guana River. The Guana River is a freshwater, Class III waterbody. It is an Outstanding Florida Water, but has been designated by the Department of Environmental Protection as impaired for nutrients. The site is not used by threatened or endangered species for feeding, nesting, or breeding. The Project The proposed Project is a 22-lot, single-family subdivision. The proposed surface water management system for the Project includes curb and gutter paved roadways, storm inlets, concrete pipes, vegetated natural buffers, treatment swales, and a wet detention stormwater pond. The wet detention stormwater pond would discharge into adjacent wetlands that flow to the Guana River. Wetlands The point of discharge from the Project’s stormwater management system is not in the designated Outstanding Florida Water. Applicant proposes to fill the four ponds and the three isolated wetlands. Applicant also proposes to fill 0.28 acres of the larger wetland. The Project includes a number of upland buffers that are a minimum of 15 feet in width and average of 25 feet in width. These buffers are intended to prevent potential adverse secondary impacts to adjacent wetlands. All wetland impacts and mitigation were assessed using the Uniform Mitigation Assessment Method (UMAM) in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-345. The UMAM assessment takes into consideration the location and landscape support, water environment, and community structure of the wetlands to be impacted. The District also considers the condition, hydrologic connection, uniqueness, location, and the fish and wildlife utilization of the wetlands and other surface waters. The District did not require mitigation for filling the artificial ponds. The District also did not require mitigation for filling the isolated wetlands because each is less than a half-acre in size. As mitigation for filling 0.28 acres of the larger wetland, Applicant would purchase 0.25 mitigation bank credits from the St. Marks Pond Mitigation Bank. The St. Marks Pond Mitigation Bank is located in the same drainage basin as the wetland area that would be filled. The District determined that purchasing the mitigation bank credits would offset the functional loss associated with filling part of the wetland. Two areas on the site where no upland buffers are proposed were assessed for secondary impacts to wetlands in the UMAM evaluation. The mitigation bank credits proposed for the Project would offset all of the adverse, direct, and secondary impacts to wetlands or surface waters associated with this Project. Because direct and secondary impacts would be fully mitigated, the Project would not cause cumulative impacts. Water Quantity A majority of the Project’s stormwater runoff would be conveyed to the wet detention pond. The wet detention pond provides water quantity protection by attenuating the post- development peak rate of discharge. Applicant modeled the pre-development peak rate of discharge and the post-development peak rate of discharge. The modeling indicated that the post-development peak rate of discharge will not exceed the pre-development peak rate of discharge for the 25-year, 24-hour storm event. Section 3.3 of the Applicant's Handbook, Volume II, prohibits a reduction in the 10-year or 100-year floodplain for projects with an upstream drainage basin of five square miles or greater. The proposed Project has an upstream drainage basin of 4.6 square miles, so this criterion is not applicable. Applicant showed the Project would increase offsite flood elevations by only 0.01 feet, which is negligible. The Project would not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters or adjacent lands. Water Quality Water quality would be managed in the Project through a combination of wet detention pond, swales, and vegetative natural buffers (“VNBs”). The wet detention pond would treat a majority of the runoff from the Project. Section 8 of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume II, contains presumptive criteria for the design of a wet detention pond. The proposed wet detention pond meets the presumptive criteria. Therefore, the detention pond is presumed to provide reasonable assurance that the water quality of receiving waters will be protected. Applicant is proposing to construct swales at the back of Lots 20, 21, and 22 to treat runoff by infiltration. Section 9 of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume II, contains presumptive criteria for swale system design and performance. The Project meets the presumptive criteria for swales. Applicant is proposing VNBs on Lots 1 through 14. The use of VNBs is a commonly-used best management practice accepted by the District for treating stormwater runoff. Like swales, VNBs treat runoff by infiltration. Stormwater runoff from the backyards of Lots 1 through 14 would drain to the VNBs. On some of these lots, stormwater runoff from the front yards, side yards, and rooftops would also drain to the VNBs. The lots would be graded so that runoff would sheet flow to the VNBs to maximize their treatment function. The VNBs would have native soils and plants. The VNBs would have Type A soils, which are well-drained soils that provide the highest rate of infiltration and the most permeability. Petitioner contends that, because soil borings were not taken at the location of the VNBs, reasonable assurance was not provided that the VNBs would function as proposed. However, Petitioner did not show that the soils at the VNB locations were unsuitable soils. In addition, Applicant agreed to use Type A soils in the VNBs. Therefore, reasonable assurance that the VNBs would have suitable soils was provided by Applicant. Petitioner referred to a draft rule to support her contention that the proposed VNBs are not properly designed, but the draft rule has no controlling effect and is hearsay. The Applicant’s Handbook does not contain presumptive criteria for VNBs. Applicant demonstrated that the VNBs would infiltrate 80 percent of the runoff from a three-year, one-hour storm event, which is the same treatment efficiency the District requires when swales are used. Reasonable assurance was provided that the VNBs would function as proposed. Because the Project would discharge to wetlands that flow to the Guana River, a waterbody impaired by nutrients, section 2.2 of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume II, requires Applicant to demonstrate there would be a net improvement in water quality with respect to nutrients. Applicant performed a pollutant loading analysis using the BMPTRAINS model. The BMPTRAINS model is a generally-accepted tool used by stormwater engineers for this purpose. The BMPTRAINS model incorporates the information about the pre- and post-development conditions associated with land use and impervious area. The model accounts for site-specific conditions, including the elevation of the groundwater table and storage capacity of the soil. The design of the surface water management system is then incorporated into the model to estimate the pollutant removal efficiency and estimate the average annual pollutant load that will leave the site. Applicant’s BMPTRAINS modeling indicated that the average annual post-development loading for total nitrogen and total phosphorus would be substantially less than the pre- development loading for those nutrients. Therefore, Applicant demonstrated the Project would result in a net improvement. Operation & Maintenance The Ponte Vedra Beach Preserve Homeowners Association would be the entity responsible for operation and maintenance of the stormwater management system. The wet detention pond, swales, and VNBs would be located within an easement and maintained by the homeowner’s association. Applicant and the Ponte Vedra Beach Preserve Homeowners Association have the ability to accept responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the Project. Public Interest An applicant for an ERP must demonstrate that a proposed project affecting wetlands and other surface waters would not be contrary to the public interest. This determination is made by balancing seven factors found in section 10.2.3(a) through (g) of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume I. Public interest factor (a) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. There is no aspect of the Project that would affect public health, safety, or welfare, except the potential for flooding. Reasonable assurance was provided by Applicant that the Project would not cause flooding. Factor (b) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species or their habitats. The mitigation bank credits offset all of the potential adverse impacts that the proposed project would have on the conservation of fish and wildlife. Factor (c) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The parties stipulated that the Project will not adversely affect navigation or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The record evidence shows the Project will not adversely affect the flow of water. Factor (d) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity. The Project would not affect fishing or recreational values in the vicinity. The mitigation bank credits offset all of the potential adverse impacts the proposed project would have on marine productivity in the vicinity. Factor (e) is whether the regulated activity will be of a temporary or permanent nature. The activities are of a permanent nature. The mitigation is also permanent. Factor (f) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources. The Project will have no effect on historical and archaeological resources. Factor (g) is the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed regulated activity. The relatively small loss of functional value would be offset by the proposed mitigation. Considering and balancing these seven factors, the Project would not be contrary to the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the St. Johns River Water Management District enter a final order approving the issuance of Environmental Resource Permit No. IND-109-143282-1 to 1044PVB, LLC, with the conditions set forth in the Technical Staff Report dated April 11, 2016. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen C. Ferguson, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District 4049 Reid Street Palatka, Florida 32177 (eServed) Jane West, Esquire Josh Smith, Esquire Jane West Law, P.L. 6277 A1A South, Suite 101 St. Augustine, Florida 32080 (eServed) Eric Olsen, Esquire Amelia A. Savage, Esquire Hopping, Green and Sams, P.A. Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 (eServed) Ann B. Shortelle, Ph.D., Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District 4049 Reid Street Palatka, Florida 32177 (eServed)
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (“Commission”) is entitled to the requested minor modification of its existing Environmental Resource Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization, which would authorize the backfilling of a portion of Fisheating Creek as part of a restoration project.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating construction activities in waters of the State. The Department has also been delegated authority to process and act on applications for authorization from the Board of Trustees for activities on sovereignty submerged lands. The Commission is the state wildlife management agency. The Commission is the applicant for the minor modification at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner, Save Our Creeks, Inc., is a non-profit Florida corporation with its offices in Lake Place, Florida. Save Our Creeks’ members are interested citizens and groups devoted to the conservation of natural resources, especially creeks and small waterways. Save Our Creeks owns property on Fisheating Creek in Glades County, approximately nine miles upstream of Cowbone Marsh. Petitioner, Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Inc. (ECOSWF), is a non-profit Florida corporation with its offices in Sarasota, Florida. A substantial number of the members of Save Our Creeks and ECOSWF use and enjoy the waters of Fisheating Creek for a variety of purposes, including canoeing, boating, fishing, and wildlife observation. Their interests would be affected by the proposed project. Fisheating Creek and Cowbone Marsh Fisheating Creek flows from Highlands and Desoto Counties south and east through Glades County. The Creek runs in a northeastern direction through Cowbone Marsh before draining into Lake Okeechobee. The Creek contributes approximately nine percent of the flow into Lake Okeechobee. Fisheating Creek is designated as Class III waters. Cowbone Marsh is located about eight miles west of Lake Okeechobee. It is a mile and a half long and two miles wide, covering about 2,500 acres. Fisheating Creek and Cowbone Marsh are within the Fisheating Creek Wildlife Management Area. In 1929, the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("USACOE") prepared a survey map which shows Fisheating Creek as an open water route from Lake Okeechobee through Cowbone Marsh and continuing beyond. The accuracy of the course of the Creek as it is depicted in the 1929 map is not disputed by the parties. The 1929 map does not describe the depth or width of the Creek. Some evidence about historical widths and depths was presented, but it was incomplete. There was credible evidence showing that some segments of Fisheating Creek were four to five feet deep and 20 to 30 feet wide. There was also credible evidence that other segments of the Creek were shallower and narrower. The record shows only that canoes, kayaks, and other vessels drawing twelve inches of water or less have been used on the Creek. For a number of years, much of Fisheating Creek has been choked by vegetation and “tussocks.” Tussocks are floating mats of vegetation. Carolina willow now dominates Cowbone Marsh, having replaced areas that were previously open water or covered with herbaceous marsh communities. The vegetation in the Creek made navigation difficult or impossible through Cowbone Marsh. The 1998 Judgment and 1999 Settlement Agreement In 1989, Lykes Bros., Inc., asserted ownership of Fisheating Creek and tried to prevent public access to the Creek. The Board of Trustees responded with a civil action against Lykes Bros., seeking a determination that Fisheating Creek throughout Glades County is navigable and, consequently, the title to its bottom is held by the Board of Trustees as sovereignty submerged lands. Petitioners in this administrative proceeding intervened in the circuit court case on the side of the Board of Trustees. The jury found Fisheating Creek navigable throughout Glades County and the court entered a judgment in 1998 determining that the Creek is sovereignty land held in trust by the Board of Trustees. The judgment did not include any findings about the widths and depths of Fisheating Creek. The court retained jurisdiction to determine the boundaries of the Creek, but the boundaries were never determined. The circuit court case was appealed, but in May 1999, the parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which Lykes Bros. agreed to sell to the Board of Trustees a conservation easement on upland areas adjacent to Fisheating Creek, to be held and managed for the benefit of the public. The conservation area is known as the Fisheating Creek Expanded Corridor. The settlement agreement also called for the Board of Trustees to lease the Fisheating Creek Expanded Corridor to the Commission, who the Board of Trustees designated as the managing agency. The settlement agreement acknowledges the public's "right to boat and canoe on Fisheating Creek throughout the entire Expanded Corridor.” With respect to navigation, the settlement agreement provides: Protection of Navigation. The navigability of Fisheating Creek throughout the entire Expanded Corridor shall be maintained and enhanced through a navigation maintenance program which includes aquatic weed control and removal of fallen logs and similar obstructions. This section does not authorize dredging. The Cookie-Cutter Project In January 2009, the Commission aerially applied an herbicide to kill the vegetation along the course of the Creek. In April 2010, the Commission contracted with A & L Aquatic Weed Control (“A & L”) to “[m]echanically dismantle floating tussocks.” The Commission directed A & L to perform the project by “shredding vegetation and accumulated organic material to re-open the navigation across Cowbone Marsh.” The Commission instructed A & L to re-open a channel "approximately 2.2 miles long and 18-20 feet wide,” and to clear some areas of the Creek “as wide as 35-feet wide occasionally as necessary to turn shredding equipment during the shredding process.” The Commission did not direct A & L to dredge a deeper channel. The vessel used by A & L to perform the work is known as a “cookie-cutter.” The cookie-cutter has two cutting wheels at the front of the vessel to shred and side-cast vegetation. The cutting wheels also act as propellers to propel the cookie- cutter forward. The cookie-cutter can clear woody vegetation up to four inches in diameter. The two cutting wheels can be lowered or raised in order to cut vegetation at various depths in the water. Evidence was presented to show how the cutting wheels could be lowered two to three feet, but it was not made clear whether the cutting wheels could be lowered even more. No evidence was presented to establish how deep the cookie-cutter blades were lowered into Fisheating Creek during the work performed by A & L. No evidence was presented to establish what depth of soil the cookie-cutter was capable of dredging through if the cutting wheels cut into the Creek bottom. The cookie-cutter began on the eastern side of Cowbone Marsh and moved upstream. The parties disputed the point of beginning. Petitioners contend it was farther upstream, but the more persuasive evidence for the point of beginning was presented by the Commission. The cookie-cutter generally followed the course of Fisheating Creek as depicted on the 1929 USACOE map. However, there are three areas where the cookie-cutter deviated from the 1929 map. One deviation is about 100 feet off-line. The other two deviations are 25 to 30 feet off-line. No explanation was given for the deviations, but the cookie-cutter operator generally followed the path of dead vegetation killed by the aerial spraying of herbicide and the line may have deviated from the true course of the Creek in these three areas. During the cookie-cutter project, water levels within the Creek and Marsh fluctuated. At some point, the project was postponed due to low water conditions. A sandbag dam was placed in the channel to artificially raise the water level so the cookie-cutter could continue. In July 2010, the Department and USACOE ordered the Commission to stop the project due to its adverse environmental impacts, including the draining of Cowbone Marsh. Before the cookie-cutter stopped, it had cleared about two miles of Fisheating Creek. Where the cookie-cutter stopped there is a discernible channel continuing west, but it is shallower and narrower than the channel created by the cookie-cutter. At this terminus, the cookie-cutter was dredging a deeper and wider channel than existed naturally. Additional evidence of dredging along the Creek channel is the soil cast up on the banks, and the removal of peat soils in the bottom of the Creek and exposure of underlying mineralized soil. The cookie-cutter altered the natural conditions of the Fisheating Creek in some areas by dredging the sides and bottom of the Creek. The dredging by the cookie-cutter altered the hydrology of the Creek and Marsh. The Marsh drained rapidly to Lake Okeechobee. In addition, large quantities of soil, muck, silt, and debris disturbed by the cookie-cutter were carried downstream toward Lake Okeechobee. Some of the soil and debris settled out at the mouth of the Creek, causing shoaling. The sides of the channel in many areas is continuing to erode. The Department’s Emergency Final Order In July 2010, the Department issued an Emergency Final Order, which directed the Commission to: (a) remove the cookie- cutter and immediately stop all activities associated with the cookie-cutter; (b) place temporary emergency flow restrictors in the channel to reduce flow velocities and minimize downstream sediment transport, as well as raise the water level to minimize surface and groundwater flow from the adjacent marsh into the channel; and (c) develop a long-term remedial plan to return water levels within the Marsh to pre-impact conditions and apply to the Department for an Environmental Resource Permit to implement the plan. In August 2010, pursuant to the Emergency Final Order, the Commission constructed an aluminum weir in the Creek to decrease flow velocities, reduce erosion, and maintain the hydration of the Marsh. The weir was placed approximately half a mile downstream from where the cookie-cutter stopped. During the wet season of 2010, the aluminum weir was completely submerged. Erosion and shoaling occurred immediately downstream. The Commission determined that the weir was ineffective and removed it. The EPA Compliance Orders In March 2011, the EPA issued an Administrative Compliance Order in which it alleged the Commission had engaged in "unauthorized activities associated with the excavation and construction of a channel within Cowbone Marsh.” The Commission was ordered to construct an initial check dam in the upper reaches of the Marsh to minimize the loss of groundwater and prevent further adverse impacts. In April 2011, EPA issued a second Administrative Compliance Order, directing the Commission to construct five additional check dams. The order describes the check dams as "initial corrective measures" and states that the “final restoration plan will include measures for backfilling the unauthorized cut through Cowbone Marsh.” The Initial Permits In May 2011, the Department issued to the Commission an Environmental Resource Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization, which authorized the construction of six earthen check-dams within the portion of Fisheating Creek where the cookie-cutter had operated. The purpose of the check dams was to improve the hydrology of Cowbone Marsh and promote the accumulation of sediments within the channel to restore the natural depth and width of Fisheating Creek. The check dams were constructed using sand bags, marine plywood, coconut matting, and pressure-treated posts. The check dams have ten-foot wing walls which extend into the surrounding marsh. The wing walls are to prevent erosion around the dams and to direct water into the marsh. The installation of the check dams was completed in July 2011. Since that time, some repair efforts have been required to replace lost sandbags and to address erosion that has occurred around the check dams. The check dams have been somewhat successful in maintaining higher water levels in the Marsh. However, they have not restored natural hydrologic conditions, or prevented erosion along the channel. The Proposed Modification In June 2012, the Commission applied for a "minor modification" to the existing permits, which the Department granted. The modified permits authorize the Commission to backfill the channel cleared by the cookie-cutter with approximately 27,000 cubic yards of sand. The check dams would not be removed. The sand for the backfilling would be excavated from a "borrow" area located about a mile away. Petitioners contend that the borrow area is in wetlands, but the more persuasive evidence is that it is uplands. A 1.164-mile temporary access road would be constructed from the borrow area through uplands and wetlands to a 100-square-foot staging area adjacent to Fisheating Creek where the backfilling would begin. Wetland impacts would be minimized by constructing the temporary access road and staging area with interlocking mats. Petitioners did not show that the route or manner in which the temporary road would be constructed and used would have unacceptable adverse impacts to the environment or otherwise fail to comply with applicable criteria. The sand would be dumped into the Creek and then compacted. As the Creek was filled, the compacted sand would be used as a roadway for the trucks to transport sand to the end of the filled area to dump more sand, until the backfilling was completed. The proposed backfilling would not restore a typical stream profile, deepest in the middle and becoming more and more shallow moving toward the banks. That kind of profile can be seen in the photographs of Fisheating Creek taken before the cookie-cutter project. The proposed modification calls for filling the cut channel from "bank to bank": Final Grade: Fill must be compacted and ground surface elevations must be the same as the adjacent marsh ground surface elevations (within a tolerance of +6/-6 inches) The filled channel would be seeded and fertilized to grow native vegetation. The proposed seed mixture is mostly water grasses, but has some willow included. Compliance with Criteria Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-343.100 provides that a modification is treated as either minor or major depending on the magnitude of the changes and the potential for environmental impacts that differ from those addressed in the original permit: modification shall be considered to be minor only where the modification does not: Require a new site inspection by the Department in order to evaluate the request; or Substantially: Alter permit conditions; Increase the authorized discharge; Have substantially different or increased impacts on wetlands and other surface waters. . . ; Decrease the retention/detention specified by the original permit; Decrease any flood control elevations for roads or buildings specified by the original permit; or Increase the project area. At the final hearing, it was not shown how the modification meets the criteria for a minor modification. The proposed modification does not meet the criteria because it required new site visits, substantially alters the original permit conditions, and has a substantially different impact on wetlands. The criteria applicable to an application for a major modification were not identified, nor was it shown how the evidence presented at the final hearing satisfies the requirements for such an application. The proposed backfilling plan would not restore the natural conditions that existed in Fisheating Creek. The Commission did not show that it made a reasonable effort to determine the pre-disturbance conditions throughout the disturbed area. The proposed modification would not restore the natural depths in the Creek. The backfilling plan calls for a finished grade of plus or minus six inches above the level of the adjacent marsh. A final grade of zero to plus six inches would essentially eliminate Fisheating Creek. The maximum allowed depth of minus six inches below the level of the adjacent marsh would be shallower than the natural depths in portions of the Creek. Even the Department described the Creek was "one to two feet deep" before the cookie-cutter project. Adequate measures are not included in the permits to ensure that after backfilling and planting, the Creek would have the ordinary attributes of a creek. The proposed modification would not restore the pre- existing hydrologic conditions of the Creek. The modified Environmental Resource Permit requires strict compliance with the terms of the 1999 settlement agreement. The modification would not be consistent with the 1999 settlement agreement because the backfilling and planting would destroy the navigability of the Creek. Petitioners want to preserve the current depths of Fisheating Creek, but some of those depths are unnatural, being the result of dredging by the cookie-cutter. However, the proposed backfilling would not restore the natural depths in some parts of the Creek and would not maintain the navigability of the Creek, even for shallow draft vessels such as canoes and kayaks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department deny the requested modification to the Commission's Environmental Resource Permit and Sovereignty Submerged Lands Authorization. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Alisa A. Coe, Esquire Joshua D. Smith, Esquire Bradley I. B. Marshall, Esquire Earthjustice 111 South Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold "Bud" Viehauer, General Counsel Ryan Osborne, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Herschel T. Vinyard, Jr., Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Matthew Z. Leopold, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-10.041(3)(d) of the South Florida Water Management District (“the District”) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Conservancy is a non-profit Florida corporation with its offices in Naples, Florida. It has 6,200 members residing in Southwest Florida. The mission of the Conservancy is to protect the environment and natural resources of Southwest Florida. The Caloosahatchee River is an important focus of the Conservancy’s organizational activities and objectives. A substantial number of the members of the Conservancy use the Caloosahatchee River for drinking water, boating, fishing, wildlife observation, and scientific research. The proposed rules create a prospective reservation of water in the not-yet-operational Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Reservoir “for fish and wildlife.” The Conservancy’s interests would be substantially affected by the proposed reservation. The District is a regional water management agency created, granted powers, and assigned duties under chapter 373, Florida Statutes (2013). It is headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida. Proposed rule 40E-10.041(3) states: (3) Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir: All surface water contained within and released, via operation, from the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is reserved from allocation. The water reserved under this paragraph will be available for fish and wildlife upon a formal determination of the Governing Board, pursuant to state and federal law, that the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is operational. The reservation contained within this subsection and the criteria contained in section 3.11.4 of the Applicant’s Handbook for Water Use Permit Applications within the South Florida Water Management District, incorporated by reference in Rule 40E-2.091, F.A.C., shall be revised in light of changed conditions or new information prior to the approval described in paragraph (3)(b) above. Pursuant to subsection 373.223(4), F.S., presently existing legal uses for the duration of a permit existing on [RULE ADOPTION DATE] are not contrary to the public interest. The Conservancy challenges only paragraph (3)(d), contending that it modifies or contravenes the implementing statute, section 373.223(4).
Findings Of Fact Max and Anne Makowsky (Respondents Makowsky) are the owners of real property located at Lot 5, Block 35, Venetian Shores Subdivision, Plantation Key, in unincorporated Monroe County, Florida. Respondents Makowsky's property is located in the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. On November 20, 1992, Monroe County, Florida (Respondent County) issued a building permit, Building Permit No. 9230008125, to Respondents Makowsky. The permit authorized Respondents Makowsky to construct and place on their property a boat ramp which measures six feet by thirty feet. Petitioner received a copy of the Building Permit from Respondent County on November 24, 1992. Submerged lands adjacent to Respondents Makowsky's property are owned by the State of Florida. The boundary between the State's submerged lands and Respondents Makowsky's property is the mean high water line. Twenty feet of the proposed boat ramp would extend below the mean high water line. The twenty feet would lie over submerged lands. Chapter 9.5, Monroe County Code, contains Respondent County's Land Development Regulations. Section 9.5-345(m) contains the environmental design criteria applicable to submerged lands in Respondent County. Section 9.5-345(m) provides in pertinent part: All structures on any submerged lands and mangroves shall be designed, located and constructed such that: * * * * No structure shall be located on sub- merged land which is vegetated with sea grasses except as is necessary to reach waters at least four (4) feet below mean low level for docking facilities; No docking facility shall be developed at any site unless a minimum channel of twenty (20) feet in width where a mean low water z depth of at least minus four (4) feet exists. In the permit application, Respondents Makowsky provide that the intended use for the ramp is to launch a windsurfer and a small inflatable boat or dinghy. Respondents Makowsky's dinghy has a motor with a shaft which extends two and one-half feet below the boat's water line. As the proposed boat ramp would allow access to the water via watercraft, the term "docking" facility," as used in Section 9.5-345(m), is applicable to Respondents Makowsky's proposed ramp. The submerged land adjacent to Respondents Makowsky's property is very shallow and heavily populated by sea grass, i.e. turtle grass. The turtle grass areas serve as nursery grounds and provide food and shelter for juvenile fish and invertebrates. These habitat values increase when coupled with the mangrove fringe (the roots of mangroves) located along the area. The mangrove roots also provide food and shelter for the juvenile fish and invertebrates. The turtle grass would be adversely impacted by the ramp itself if the proposed ramp was approved and constructed. The structure itself would shade out the needed sunlight to the grasses underneath the boat ramp, causing those grasses to die. Also, the use of the ramp to dock small boats would adversely impact the turtle grass. The bottom of the submerged land is a very loose, calcarious substrate. Launching a boat would cause the sand to "kick up" (lift up). When the sand comes down, it would settle on the turtle grass and smother it because there would be no way for the turtle grass to clean itself. Further, using a motorized boat, as Respondents Makwosky's, would cause "prop dredging" to occur, harming the turtle grass. In "prop dredging," the motor's propeller would destroy the grasses directly by tearing them up or destroy the grasses over a period of time through siltation after churning up the sand from the substrate. The mean low water depth, i. e., the average mean low tide, at the terminal end of the proposed ramp is less than four feet. In the permit application, the depth at the end of the ramp is indicated to be zero feet mean low water. Petitioner estimates the water depth at low tide as between one foot and two feet. The proposed ramp site is not located at a channel of twenty (20) feet in width where a mean low water depth of at least minus four (4) feet exists. Respondents Makowsky have boat access through a boat basin approximately 320 feet to the southwest of their property. The boat basin is located in their Subdivision. A slip in the boat basin is assigned to Respondents Makowsky and they are entitled to use it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order DENYING Monroe County Permit No. 9230008125. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1317DRI Petitioner's proposed findings of fact 1 - 13 have been adopted in substance, although not verbatim, in this recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Bob Bradley, Secretary Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Executive Office of The Governor 1601 Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory C. Smith, Esquire Governor's Legal Office 209 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 James F. Murley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan Stengle General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Karen Brodeen Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Stephanie Gehres Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs Marathon Regional Service Center Suite 212 2796 Overseas Highway Marathon, Florida 33050 Max and Anne Makowsky 1900 Glades Road, Suite 245 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Carolyn Dekle, Director South Florida Regional Planning Council 3400 Hollywood Boulevard Suite 140 Hollywood, Florida 33021 James T. Hendrick, Esquire Morgan & Hendrick 317 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33041-1117 Bob Herman, Director of Growth Management Monroe County Regional Service Center 2798 Overseas Highway Marathon, Florida 33050-2227
