Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency authorized to administer and enforce provisions of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes, regulating the granting or denial of applications for Home Improvement Contractor Licenses. On November 30, 1988, Petitioner submitted an application on behalf of a corporation known as "The Durocoat Company" (Durocoat) to Respondent for licensure as a home improvement contractor. On that application, Petitioner disclosed the identity of the two principals of the corporation and the position held by those two individuals. Petitioner listed himself as the president of the corporation and another individual, Russell W. Black, as the corporation's vice-president. Each principal owns 50 percent of the corporation. Following the section of the application providing for the disclosure of the identities and addresses of business principals, a number of questions are listed and the person executing the form is required to provide an "X" in a block to indicate a "yes" or "no" answer to each of those questions. Question number four reads as follows: Are there unpaid judgments against the applicant or any of the persons listed above? If "yes" attach a copy of the complaint and judgment(s). Petitioner placed an "X" in the space allotted for a "yes" answer to the inquiry regarding unpaid judgments against the persons listed as business principals, namely himself and Mr. Black. Petitioner then attached a copy of a document entitled "Notice of Levy" issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United States Department of the Treasury. In sum, the notice certifies the existence of a tax lien against Mr. Black, Durocoat's vice-president, in the amount of $27,546.25. It is undisputed by the parties that creditors held unpaid judgments against Petitioner at the time he submitted the application on November 30, 1988, and that he failed to attach copies of those judgments to the application. Further, Petitioner acknowledged at the final hearing that he was aware at the time of submittal of the application of the existence of one of these judgments. That judgement, entered in favor of The American Express Company (American Express) for $7,602, has existed since September of 1987. In mitigation of his failure to disclose the American Express judgement, Petitioner testified at hearing that he didn't have a copy of the judgement at the time he filed the application and was unaware of the requirement that he should attach a copy. In view of his action in attaching a copy of the existing tax lien against Mr. Black to the application, Petitioner's testimony that he was unaware that he should attach copies of unpaid judgments is not credited. A copy of Petitioner's credit report, introduced at final hearing by Petitioner, discloses that a business known as "Speeler Marine" obtained a judgement against him in the amount of $250 in March of 1986. Petitioner testified at hearing that he was unaware of the existence of this judgement. No settlement discussions have been initiated by him with the creditor. Petitioner's credit report further discloses that an outstanding loan to Petitioner in 1985 in the amount of $36,000 by a financial institution identified as "Sun Bank" is classified as a "bad debt, placed for collection." Petitioner testified that this debt represents loan funds obtained in a previous business venture and is the subject of settlement negotiations and that he has repaid $4,000 of the amount at the present time. Petitioner's testimony also establishes that the credit report's disclosure of a 1987 foreclosure certificate of title to real estate represented real property located in Gainesville, Florida, which Petitioner had taken in trade for money owed to him. In view of the distance to that city, Petitioner testified that he simply chose not to pay off the existing mortgage on the property or oppose foreclosure action by the mortgage holder. A representative of Nationwide Chemical Coating Company (Nationwide) testified at the final hearing regarding that company's business relationship with Petitioner's corporation. Since February of 1988, Nationwide has sold supplies valued at $250,000 to Durocoat. The company has always paid charges within the 30 day required time limit and is considered to be a "class A" customer. In regard to the federal tax lien which Petitioner attached to the application, Russell W. Black testified that the lien resulted from the disallowance by IRS of a tax shelter investment of $34,000 made by Black in 1977 or 1978. Black was notified by IRS in 1981 that the tax shelter was not considered to be a valid deduction for tax purposes. The amount owed by Black to IRS in 1981 was $20,630.64. The amount is now $27,546.25 and, according to Black, is still unpaid because he doesn't have the money. On advice of counsel, he has not contacted IRS to schedule payments on the debt. Respondent denied Petitioner's application by letter dated January 13, 1989, stating that Petitioner's failure to attach copies of the unpaid judgments against himself constituted a material misstatement of fact sufficient to authorize the denial. The letter further stated that the unpaid judgments, along with the federal tax lien against Mr. Black, demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility by both individuals and constituted an additional ground for denial of the application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. Petitioner's proposed findings consisted of 10 unnumbered paragraphs which have been numbered 1-10 and are treated as follows: 1-8. Addressed in part, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by direct admissible evidence. Rejected, unnecessary to result reached. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-2. Addressed. 3-4. Rejected, unnecessary. 5-11. Addressed in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Riley, Esq. 2325 Fifth Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33713 William W. Byrd, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Office Of The Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 615 Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles Stutts, Esq. General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters involved herein; Petitioner held Florida real estate salesman's license number 0403224. Her license was listed with Century 21 ACR Equities; Inc., 4222 W. Fairfield Drive, Pensacola; on May 25; 1983. On March 4, 1985, Respondent listed her license with Century 21; Five Flags Properties; Inc., in Pensacola, without terminating her listing with ACR Equities. On March 22, 1985, Five Flags terminated her listing with that firm and on April 30; 1985, ACR Equities terminated her listing with that firm. On May 14; 1985; Respondent applied for a change of status to list her license with Old South Properties; Inc., in Pensacola. That firm terminated the association on July 9, 1985. On March 19; 1985; Emmison Lewis and his wife; Lillie Mae signed a handwritten sales agreement prepared by Respondent for the purchase of a piece of property located in Escambia County; for $33,000.00. The Lewises gave her a deposit of $500.00 by check made payable to Respondent and which bears her endorsement on the back. This check was made payable to Respondent because she asked that it be made that way. Several days later; Respondent came back to the Lewises and asked for an additional $1,500.00 deposit. This was given her, along with a rental payment of $310.00; in a $2,000.00 check on March 29, 1985. Respondent gave the Lewises the balance back in cash along with a receipt reflecting the payment of the $1,500.00. On that same date; Respondent had the Lewises sign a typed copy of the sales agreement which reflected that both the $500.00 deposit and the additional $1,500.00 were due on closing. This typed copy was backdated to March 19; 1985. Both the handwritten and typed copies of the sales agreement bear the signature of the Respondent as a witness. The sale was never closed and the Lewises have never received any of the $2;000.00 deposit back. On about four different occasions, Mr. Lewis contacted Respondent requesting that she refund their money and she promised to do so, but never did. They did, however, receive the $310.00 rent payment back in cash approximately two weeks later. On April 26, 1985, James E. Webster and his wife Pearlie signed a sales agreement as the purchasers of real estate with Respondent. This property had a purchase price of $31,900.00. At the time of signing, Mr. Webster gave Respondent $150.00 in cash and a check drawn by his wife on their joint account for $400.00. Due to Mrs. Webster's change of mind, the Websters did not close on the property. They requested a refund of their deposit and Respondent gave the Websters a check for $400.00 which was subsequently dishonored by the bank because of insufficient funds. The Websters called Respondent at home several times, but she was always out. Calls to the broker with whom her license was placed were unsuccessful. Finally, however, Respondent refunded the $400.00 to the Websters in cash. Respondent had listed her license with ACR Equities in May, 1983. At no time while Respondent had her license with Mr. Bickel's firm did she ever turn over to him as broker either the $2.000.00 she received from the Lewises or the $550.00 she received from the Websters. Mr. Bickel, the broker, was not aware of these contracts and did not question her about them. He terminated the placement of her license with his firm because he found out that in early March 1985, she had placed her license with another firm., Both sales agreements for the Lewises and that for the Websters had the firm name of ACR Equities printed on them as broker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law; it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee; Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Esquire p. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ralph Armstead; Esquire P. O. Box 2629 Orlando; Florida 32802
The Issue The issues in the case are whether Respondent's real estate broker's license had been revoked when he applied for a mortgage broker's license and whether Respondent falsely answered certain questions on his application for a mortgage broker's license.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed as a mortgage broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number HA 056265422-5P. He had been licensed continuously since August 5, 1986. Respondent previously has been licensed as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida. By Administrative Complaint filed March 1, 1985, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, alleged, among other things, that Respondent was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and breach of trust, among other things, in connection with an improper disbursement from an escrow account. Following a hearing on January 17, 1986, a Recommended Order entered April 18, 1986, found that Respondent was, as to the above-described allegations, guilty "at least of culpable negligence and breach of trust" and recommended that Respondent's license be suspended for one year. After a hearing on June 17, 1986, the Division of Real Estate entered a Final Order June 30, 1986, effective 30 days thereafter, adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Recommended Order, but revoking rather than suspending Respondent's license. By Application for Registration as a Mortgage Broker signed by Respondent on March 22, 1986, Respondent applied for a mortgage broker's license (March Application). The application was filed on March 25, 1986. Question 19 of the March Application asks: Has any judgement or decree of a court or other judicial, administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal been entered against you, or is any such case pending in this or any other state, province, district, territory, possession or nation, in which you were charged in the petition, complaint, declaration, answer, counterclaim or other pleading with any fraudulent or dishonest dealing? (If your answer is in the affirmative, attach complete signed notarized statement of the charges and facts, together with the name and location of the court in which the proceedings were had or are pending.) Respondent answered this question, "no." By Application for Registration as a Mortgage Broker signed by Respondent on July 1, 1986, Respondent applied for a mortgage solicitor's license (July Application). The application was filed on July 9, 1986, and approved by Petitioner on July 31, 1986. Question 16 on the July Application asks whether the applicant is currently licensed in any state as a real estate broker or salesman. Respondent answered this question, "no." Question 17 on the July Application asks: "Has your license of any kind ever been denied, suspended or revoked?" The question then asks for a complete signed statement of the charges and facts in full detail. Respondent answered Question 17, "no." On July 28, 1986, Respondent sent a notarized letter to Petitioner concerning the July Application. In the letter, he elaborated upon the circumstances surrounding the answer to an unrelated question, but did not elaborate upon the above-described answers Respondent did not answer accurately Question 19 on the March Application. Over a year earlier, Respondent had been charged with fraudulent dealing. Respondent had no basis for omitting this item from the application because, even though he had not received the recommended order, the case obviously was still pending at the time of submitting the March Application. Respondent's incorrect answer was an intentional attempt to conceal from Petitioner the license-revocation proceeding. Although Respondent's answer to Question 16 on the July Application may have been accurate because he had relinquished his license, his answer to Question 17 was inaccurate. Respondent testified that he understood that the Final Order, which had just been issued, had not yet taken effect, so that his license had not yet been revoked. However, without further elaboration, the answer to Question 17 was incomplete and misleading, regardless of Respondent's understanding of the technical status of his license. Respondent knew that his answer was incomplete and would mislead Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order revoking the mortgage broker's license of Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4380 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-7 Adopted or adopted in substance. 8 Rejected as irrelevant. 9-29 Adopted or adopted in substance. 30-32 Rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 33-34 Rejected as legal argument. 35-36 Adopted. 37-38 and 40 Rejected as legal argument. 39 and 41-42 Adopted or adopted in substance. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected as irrelevant. 45-50 Rejected as recitation of testimony. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-7 Adopted or adopted in substance. 8 Rejected as irrelevant. 9-13 Adopted. 14 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 15-21 Adopted or adopted in substance. 22-23 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 24-29 Adopted or adopted in substance. 30-31 Rejected as recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. 34-38 Rejected as irrelevant. 39 Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. James 258 East Altamonte Drive Altamonte Springs, FL 32701 Elise M. Greenbaum Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 501 Orlando, FL 32801 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact By Application for Licensure as a Real Estate Salesman dated September 10, 1985 (Exhibit 5) Respondent applied for and was approved to take the examination for licensure as a real estate salesman. As a result of passing this examination, he was duly licensed. In response to questions 7a and 7b inquiring whether the applicant had ever been charged with fraudulent or dishonest dealing, he answered "No -- but see add. disclosure info attached." Attached thereto was a long typewritten statement disclosing monetary judgments entered against him in Colorado based on non real estate related debt and a pending personal bankruptcy. Before submitting this application, Respondent telephoned the Real Estate Commission to inquire about the answer to question 7 and was referred to an attorney from the Attorney General's Office assigned to the Commission. That attorney advised Respondent that the Commission was primarily interested in criminal charges filed against an applicant and not civil charges. He was further told to include a supplement to his application with information concerning the civil charges, including the name of his attorney, so the Commission could obtain additional information if desired. Respondent complied with this advice by listing the name of his attorney and accountant at the time these civil actions were brought against him. After reviewing Respondent's application with the attached explanation of the civil actions brought against him in Colorado, his application to sit for the salesman's examination was approved. On September 24, 1987, Respondent applied for licensure as a Real Estate Broker and answered questions 7(a) and 7(b) simply "No" on the assumption that his qualified no on the salesman application had been approved and it was unnecessary to again explain the civil actions. The deposition of Respondent's attorney in the Colorado civil actions was admitted as Exhibit 7. Exhibit 1, which includes a judgment of the District Court for the City and County of Denver, Colorado, found Respondent (a corporate defendant in that case) effected a fraud upon the plaintiffs. This finding was entered in a default judgment against Respondent when his attorney negligently failed to timely file an answer to the complaint. Respondent's substitute attorney's motion to set aside the default judgment was denied. Respondent is in the process of filing personal bankruptcy and therein will challenge the default judgment's conclusion that Respondent's actions leading to that judgment were fraudulent. Since no evidence was ever presented regarding the allegations in the Colorado complaint, that judgment is not res judicata in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order finding Rene A. Remund not guilty of obtaining his licenses as a real estate salesman and broker by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Bruce D. Lamb General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-34698 Wayne J. Boyer, Esquire 1968 Bayshore Boulevard Dunedin, Florida
The Issue By Administrative Complaint dated February 20, 1991 and filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on April 23, 1991, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, alleged that Respondent had obtained a real estate license by means of fraud in that Respondent had a prior criminal charge and 1976 conviction in New Jersey and had not disclosed same in his July 30, 1990 application for licensure as a real estate salesman, contrary to and in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(m) F.S.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints against real estate licensees pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30 F.S. and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 0566757 in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. The last license issued was as a nonactive salesman, in care of 380 Mercers Fernery Road, DeLand, Florida 32720. On his July 30, 1990 application, Respondent made a sworn application for licensure as a real estate salesman with the Petitioner. Question No. 7 of the July 30 application read, in pertinent part, as follows: 7. Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? Under oath, Respondent answered "no" to the foregoing Question No. 7. Thereafter, Petitioner based this instant prosecution on a series of loose pages which purported to be a report from the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Petitioner's Exhibit B). This item is not a business record of the Petitioner, and Petitioner has shown no reason this printed hearsay should be admitted and considered. Consequently, it has not been admitted or considered. Respondent was interviewed by Petitioner's investigator. The investigator, Mr. Miller, testified concerning his interview of Respondent, but nothing in their conversation constituted an "admission of a party opponent." Nor was anything said in that conversation sufficient to supplement or explain any other testimony or exhibit. See, Section 120.58(1) F.S. Likewise, the conversation did not even support the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Respondent's testimony at formal hearing was disjointed and inconclusive but to the general effect that at some time he had been arrested in New Jersey in connection with a burglary of his dwelling and a subsequent police search thereof which produced a cache of marijuana. He denied telling a deliberate lie on his real estate application and stated he simply could not recall anything further about the New Jersey incident which he described.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the agency enter a Final Order dismissing with prejudice the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1990.
The Issue Whether Defendants breached an oral contract with their employer. Whether the Defendants, both of whom were registered salesmen employed by Rivas Realty, Inc., conducted themselves in such a manner that the sellers of a certain parcel of real estate suffered a loss of a substantial profit from their property. Whether the licenses of the Defendants should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Defendants Victor Hugo Hernandez and Elisa Hernandez, husband and wife, were registered real estate salesmen employed by Rivas Realty, Inc., a corporate broker, with offices located at 2341 N.W. 7th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. Defendants were employed by Rivas Realty, Inc., a corporate broker, under an oral employment agreement whereby real estate transactions entered into by them or either of them as registered salesmen or personally or jointly for their own account were to be handled through said broker's office; that all details of any such real estate transaction were to be available in open files in said office; that they were to identify themselves as salesmen for Rivas Realty, Inc. On or about December 20, 1973, Defendant Victor Hugo Hernandez individually and for the benefit of himself and his wife jointly contracted to buy the residence at 526 E. 44th Street, Hialeah, Florida, from Frank J. Crawford, Jr., and Alexis Jo Crawford, his wife, for the sum of approximately $27,000. The transaction closed on or about January 3, 1974, and conveyance by warranty deed was made by the Crawford to Paul G. Block, Trustee. The property was soon resold. The Real Estate Commission contends: That the Defendants represented themselves as individuals desiring to purchase the home from the Crawfords for their son; That the Defendants had no intention of purchasing said property for the son and in fact, soon thereafter resold the property at a substantial profit to themselves; The Defendants through their misrepresentation defrauded the Crawfords of a substantial profit; They did not inform the Crawfords that they were in fact salesmen for Rivas Realty, Inc.; That the Defendants violated the oral agreement they had with the employer, Rivas Realty, Inc., when they failed to process the purchase and the resale of the Crawford property through the Rivas Realty, Inc.; That the Defendants are guilty of misrepresentation, concealment, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device and breach of trust in a business transaction, all in violation of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes; That the registrations of Victor Hugo Hernandez and Elisa Hernandez should be suspended or revoked. The Defendants contend: That at the time of the sale and the purchase of the home from the Crawfords they had secured permission from the Rivas Realty, Inc. to purchase a home for their son; That the employer, Mr. Anthony Rivas, had given permission to the Defendants, as long time and effective salesmen, to purchase the property inasmuch as it was for the benefit of the son; That the son did not want the property after it was bought and therefore the property was immediately placed for sale; That the Defendants shortly after the purchase and sale of the property in question did in fact buy for their son a home in another location; That they in no way planned to trick the Crawfords into the sale of their home by not representing themselves as real estate agents; That in fact they did so represent themselves as real estate agents and placed the sign of Rivas Realty, Inc. in front of the Crawford home before the resale; That it was generally understood by the owners and among the long time employees of Rivas Realty, Inc. that they could at times buy and sale for their own personal benefit properties that members of their family might desire without processing the sale through the business office of Rivas Realty, Inc. or dividing the profit with the corporation. That they did not breach the oral contract between themselves and the employer. The Hearing Officer finds: That the Defendants, Victor Hugo Hernandez and Elisa Hernandez, bought the home of Mr. and Mrs. Crawford under circumstances which tended to deceive the purchasers but without actual misrepresentation; That there was no showing of an actual loss by the Crawfords; That the oral agreement between the Defendant salesmen and the employer, the Rivas Realty, Inc., was at times waived by the owner, Mr. Rivas or his brother, as special favors to their salesmen; That the Defendants acted under a waiver of the oral agreement between themselves and the Rivas Realty, Inc. when they purchased and resold the home of Mr. and Mrs. Crawford, or their acts were approved or condoned by the employer; That the evidence received and the testimony taken do not show that the Defendants, Victor Hugo Hernandez and Elisa Hernandez, breached the fiduciary relationship with their employer, Rivas Realty, Inc.; That the evidence received and the testimony taken do not prove the Defendants to have been guilty of misrepresentation, concealment, dishonest dealing, trick, schemes or device and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, at all times pertinent, was a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0314085. This license is currently under suspension as a result of disciplinary action by Petitioner. Respondent was, at all times pertinent, the President and a stock holder in D.S.A.E., Inc. D.S.A.E., in turn, was the owner (or co-owner with another corporation) of a tract of land located adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Broward County. Respondent, acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, sought buyers for segments 1/ of the U.S. 27 property. He had made earlier sales of other property to Mrs. Lottie Kay and her son Michael Kay, and contacted the former in October, 1980, regarding the U.S. 27 property. The D.S.A.E. tract was zoned B-3 (business) on that portion which fronted U.S. 27. The rear segments were zoned A-1 (limited agriculture) and did not front U.S. 27. Initially, Respondent mentioned segments being offered for $60,000 and $24,000. However, Lottie Kay indicated that she could not afford the higher priced segments (which were zoned B-3). Lottie Kay asked Respondent to show her the property, and a visit to the general area was made. However, Respondent told her they could not get to the property which he said was located "on the other side of the construction." After visiting the area, she was not aware of the actual location of her property or of its character. 2/ She continued to believe that the property was "right on" U.S. 27. She based this belief on Respondent's original sales presentation rather than her visit to the area. The segment she purchased is about one quarter of a mile from U.S. 27. Lottie Kay was also confused as to the zoning on the property. She believed it was "commercial" and does not recall being told of the agricultural zoning by Respondent until about a year after the purchase. Her son, Michael Kay, who was present during a part of Respondent's initial sales presentation, heard only the B-3 zoning mentioned. Since he was not present throughout the discussion, he could have missed Respondent's reference, which he claims to have made, to the agricultural zoning on the back segments. On October 8, 1980, Lottie Kay, as buyer, contracted with Respondent on behalf of D.S.A.E. and a third party corporation, as sellers, to purchase "Tract 14" for $24,000 on an "agreement for deed." Under the terms of the contract, Lottie Kay paid $4,000 down and was to pay $215.59 per month thereafter beginning in November, 1980. Lottie Kay made the monthly payments through 1983. When she missed her first two payments in 1984, Respondent offered to reduce the contract price by $2,000 if she would resume monthly payments and make up the missing payments. Lottie Kay agreed to this modification of the contract, but discontinued further payments in April, 1984. Lottie Kay bought this property for speculation in reliance on Respondent's claim that its value would increase substantially in the immediate future. Respondent showed her newspaper clippings which supported his claim that the general area was one of future growth. He predicted her segment would be worth at least $30,000 in one year and stated that as to possible appreciation, "The sky's the limit." Respondent did not, however, point out that Lottie Kay's property could not be resold for any use other than agriculture since her segment was too small for even a home site under the existing zoning. Respondent also neglected to advise her that the property was underwater much of the year, and would have to be filled and probably permitted before any development could take place. The testimony of a real estate appraiser called by Petitioner established that the property was worth about $750 when purchased by Lottie Kay in October, 1980. 3/ This valuation was based on the witness' study of nearby land sales over a period of years as well as his inspection of the area in which the Kay segment is located. Respondent attempted to establish a higher market value by producing various warranty deeds whereby he or his affiliates had sold similar segments to other buyers for amounts approximating that agreed to by Lottie Kay. These sales do not establish value but, rather, indicate the gullibility of other buyers in making such purchases. After she fell behind in her payments, Lottie Kay tried to resell her property through Respondent in reliance on his claim at the time of his initial sales presentation that he could resell it for her in one week. When requested to do so he was unable to produce any prospective buyer. Thus, there appears to be no real market for this property, other than that generated by Respondent in his initial sales campaign. Lottie Kay did not consult an attorney or have the land surveyed or appraised prior to contracting for the purchase. Rather, she trusted Respondent who she knew to be a real estate professional. She was also aware that he was an owner of the property, but still believed she could rely on his statements that the current market value of her segment was at least $24,000 and that future profits were assured. Respondent attacks the fairness of these proceedings on the alleged misconduct of Petitioner's investigator, who encouraged Lottie Kay to come forward after she (with the help of her son) had filed a complaint with Petitioner. The investigator made statements to the Kays which indicated his belief that Respondent was engaged in fraudulent land sales, and was a menace to the public. Although the investigator's statements to the Kays were gratuitous and inconsistent with his fact finding role, there is no indication that such statements resulted in any false testimony or other unreliable evidence. Respondent notes that Lottie Kay continued to make payments on her contract with Respondent even after she had filed a complaint with Petitioner and reasons that she must have considered the property a worthwhile investment. Lottie Kay demonstrated through her testimony and recitation of her dealings with Respondent that she is gullible and imprudent in financial matters. Thus, her continued investment of funds in this property indicated lack of prudence rather than an informed belief that the property had any substantial value.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of misrepresenting property value as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years to begin upon completion of his current license suspension period. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1984.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction by misrepresenting that money he borrowed from a one Julie Couch would be used for the purchase of a lot but, instead, he utilized the money in connection with the purchase of a house for use by his family and for payment of other vacation and travel expenses and refuses to repay the loan, in a manner violative of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes.3
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, is a licensed real estate salesman and holds license number 0329068. On or about July 13, 1984, Respondent solicited and obtained $3,500 cash from Julie S. Couch (Couch) for the stated purpose of assisting Respondent in purchasing a lot on behalf of Keith and Beverly Rayburn, friends of the Couches. In connection therewith, Respondent executed and delivered to Couch a mortgage note dated July 13, 1984, to secure the $3,500 loan via certain real property owned by Respondent.4 Pursuant to the terms of the note executed by Respondent and given to Mrs. Couch, Respondent was to repay Couch the principal of $3,500 plus $1,000 interest due on or before July 27, 1984. On July 30, 1984, Respondent attempted to repay part of the loan via check dated July 30, 1984 drawn in the amount of $1,000. Respondent's check was returned unpaid by the Drawers Bank with the notification "insufficient funds." (Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4) Thereafter, Respondent advised Mrs. Couch that the money was used to pay for his moving, vacation and other relocation costs for his family. Keith Rayburn attempted to buy property from the Respondent which was owned by Southern Standards Corporation. At no time during the attempted purchase by Keith Rayburn did Respondent offer to loan him money to purchase a lot from Southern Standards Corporation. Respondent executed and drafted the terms of the note which was given to Julie Couch which memorialized the loan from Mrs. Couch to Respondent. In this regard, Respondent contends that Julie Couch's ex-husband suggested the terms and the rate of interest which he inserted into the note which memorialized the loan from Julie Couch. On the other hand, Julie Couch testified that it was Respondent who suggested the terms and the interest which he provided with the executed note given her. Based on all of the evidence introduced herein including the fact that Respondent misrepresented the purpose for which the money would be utilized, and his failure to call Gary Couch as a witness to substantiate his claim that it was he, Gary Couch, who suggested the terms under which the loan would be made, the testimony of Julie Couch in this regard is credited.5 Respondent has repaid approximately $1,250 of the $3,500 loan from Julie Couch. Respondent, based on advice of his counsel, refuses to repay any further amounts on this loan contending that the interest rates were usurious and, further, that the State, in the person of Petitioner, is attempting to use its "strongarm tactics" to exact money from Respondent which is a usurious transaction. Respondent also contends that because the interest rate charged by Mrs. Couch was in excess of 45 percent per annum, Mrs. Couch committed a third degree felony. As previously stated, the weight of the evidence reveals that it was Respondent who drafted the note and provided the terms for repayment. It is also clear that Respondent misrepresented to Mrs. Couch the purpose for which he would utilize the money that he borrowed from her. It is therefore concluded that by such acts Respondent engaged in acts of misrepresentation, false pretenses, trick and dishonest dealing in a business transaction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the license of Respondent, Frederick L. Lundeen, be suspended for a period of one (1) year and that he be fined $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida.6 JAMES E. BRADWELL , Hearing officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488- 9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October 1985.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate brokers and holds license No. 0002997. On May 7, 1979, Respondent acted in the capacity of a real estate broker in the transaction of the sale of a parcel of real property located in Polk County, Florida. The purchaser in that transaction was Margaret Rhoden, and the seller was June Davis, who was represented in the transaction by a relative, Henry Goodwin. On May 7, 1979, Margaret Rhoden entered into a Contract for Sale of Rea1 Estate for the purchase of a piece of property Frostproof, Florida, from June Davis. The full purchase price of the property was $3,500, which Ms. Rhoden paid to Respondent in cash on May 7, 1979, and obtained a receipt from Respondent for that amount. At the time the contract was entered into, Ms. Rhoden was advised that a deed should be forthcoming from the seller within two to four weeks. A date of June 20, 1979, was established to close the transaction, subject to a 120-day curative period should any cloud on the title be discovered. The contract between the parties provided that should any such cloud appear of record, the seller would have a period of 120 days after receipt of written notice prior to the date set for closing in which to attempt to cure the defect. The contract further provided that if title defects were not cleared within the l20-day period, the deposit would be returned to the buyer, or, at the buyer's option, the transaction should be closed in the same manner as if no defect had been found. A warranty deed purporting to transfer the property from the seller to the buyer was executed on June 7, 1979, and a title binder was issued on that same date. The title binder indicated an outstanding mortgage on a larger piece of property of which the parcel purchased by Ms. Rhoden was only a part. When efforts to clear this cloud on the title took longer than expected, Ms. Rhoden asked, and was granted, permission by the seller's agent to commence construction on the improvements on the property notwithstanding the fact that she knew that a cloud remained on the title to the lot, and the transaction had not been closed. Construction was not completed on the improvements because Ms. Rhoden ran out of cash during the course of construction. She moved into the dwelling while it was still in a partially completed condition and, on September 8, 1979, with the permission of the seller's agent, received a loan of $3,000 from the $3,500 deposit she had placed with Respondent, Ms. Rhoden executed a promissory note dated September 8, 1979, in which she agreed to repay the $3,000 loan when clear title to the property was issued. Ms. Rhoden used the proceeds of this loan to make additional improvements on the property. On October 26, 1979, Respondent received both the warranty deed dated June 7, 1979, and the title binder issued on that date from the attorney for the seller. When approached by Ms. Rhoden, Respondent agreed to lend her the deed and title binder to attempt to obtain additional financing to complete construction on her home. The clear inference from the record in this proceeding is that there was never any understanding between Respondent and Ms. Rhoden that this deed could be recorded at this or any other juncture in this transaction. In fact, the contract entered into between the buyer and seller clearly called for the payment of the full purchase price of the property at closing, and the note subsequently executed by Ms. Rhoden conditioned the issuance of a warranty deed to her on the payment of the $3,000 face value of the note. Ms. Rhoden was unsuccessful in obtaining additional financing to complete construction on her home, probably due to the fact that when she sought that financing the outstanding mortgage on the property had still not been satisfied. When Respondent advised the seller's attorney that he had loaned the warranty deed to Ms. Rhoden for the purposes outlined above, he was advised that there was nothing to keep Ms. Rhoden from recording the deed, at which point Respondent apparently determined that it would be prudent for him to retrieve the deed from Ms. Rhoden's possession. Ms. Rhoden had her mother return the deed to Respondent in February of 1980. According to the testimony of both Ms. Rhoden and her mother, they felt the purpose for the returning of the deed was to have it recorded. Respondent denies any such understanding. In resolving this conflict in testimony, the clear inference from the circumstances involved in this transaction, including the wording of the contract of sale and the note executed by Ms. Rhoden, supports a finding that all of the parties to this transaction either knew, or should have known, that the recording of the deed at this juncture in the transaction would have been improper. Although the outstanding mortgage had been satisfied in January of 1980, Ms. Rhoden had not Performed her obligation under the contract of sale by paying the full purchase price. When Respondent had recovered the deed from Ms. Rhoden, he was advised by the attorney for the seller not to record the deed until he had received payment from Ms. Rhoden in accordance with the contract and the promissory note. As indicated above, the outstanding mortgage on the property was satisfied in January of 1980. On February 6, 1980, Respondent Prepared a closing statement reflecting the purchase price of the property as $3,500. From this amount he deducted a total of $478 for state documentary stamps, title insurance, Preparing the deed, and amount of real estate commission leaving a the apparently forwarded the note from Ms. Rhoden for $3,000, together with the $22.00 cash balance remaining from her initial $3,500 deposit to the seller along with the deed which the seller had earlier executed. Ms. Rhoden apparently never made or tendered payment of the $3,000 note, the transaction never closed, and at the time of final hearing in this cause an eviction action was apparently pending between the seller and Ms. Rhoden. Paragraph seven of the contract of sale executed between the seller and Ms. Rhoden Provides as follows: If Buyer fails to perform this contract, the deposit this day paid by Buyer as aforesaid shall be retained by or for the account of Seller as consideration for the execution of this agreement and in full settlement of any claims for damages.
Findings Of Fact At times pertinent hereto, Respondents were the holders of Florida real estate licenses. During all times material hereto, Respondent, Robert F. Nagel was licensed and operating as a real estate broker. Additionally, Respondent Nagel was the qualifying broker for Bluff's Realty, Inc. During times material, Respondents had an open listing agreement with Angelo Traina to sell his property at 401 Ocean Bluffs Boulevard, 305, in Jupiter, Florida. On or about December 7, 1986, Respondents prepared a purchase-sales contract signed by Carl and Lila Holback, as purchasers and Angelo Traina, as seller, for the purchase of the above referred property for the price of $98,450.00. The sales contract called for a $1,000.00 deposit to be held in escrow by Respondents. An additional $8,000.00 was to be deposited in escrow with the Respondents upon acceptance by the Seller. The contract signed by the Holbacks and Traina's contained a failure of performance provision. The failure of performance provision was contained in paragraph S of the contract and provided essentially that if the buyer failed to perform as required per the terms of the contract, the deposit could be retained by the seller as liquidated damages, or seller, at seller's option, could proceed at law or in equity to enforce the seller's legal rights under the contract. On the following day, December 8, 1986, the Holbacks informed the Respondents that they were no longer desirous of purchasing the Traina property. The Holbacks requested that the $1,000.00 deposit instead be transferred from the Traina/Holback transaction to a new contract to purchase a different condominium unit. This was done on December 8, 1986, as directed by the Holbacks without the knowledge and consent of Angelo Traina. The Holbacks considered that they had been pressured by Mr. Traina into executing the purchase agreement and that after reflection on the "duress" exerted by Mr. Traina, the Holbacks considered that they had a 72 hour period in which they could withdraw from the transaction. They therefore advised Respondents that they were no longer desirous of purchasing the Traina property. The Holbacks closed on a different property on January 12, 1987. Subsequent to December 8, 1986, but prior to January 13, 1987, Respondents offered to pay Mr. Traina $500.00 in return for a release from any potential liability under the contract. This offer was rejected by Mr. Traina. Thereafter, on or about January 13, 1987, Mr. Traina retained counsel who demanded a payment of $10,000.00 from Respondents for alleged damages for breach of a fiduciary duty. The Respondents refused to pay $10,000.00 to or on behalf of Angelo Traina based on the listing agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine against Respondents for Two Thousand Dollars (2,000.00) payable within thirty (30) days of entry of Petitioner's Final Order. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Bryan, Jr., Esquire Scott, Royce, Harris, Bryan & Hyland, P.A. 450 Royal Palm Way Post Office Box 2664 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation- Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Bruce D. Lamb General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Laurence A. Gonzalez, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
