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GEORGE W. EAGER AND CALUSA CAMP RESORT, INC. vs FLORIDA KEYS AQUEDUCT AUTHORITY, 89-005620 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavernier, Florida Oct. 16, 1989 Number: 89-005620 Latest Update: Jul. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a state agency whose primary purpose is to provide an adequate supply of potable water to the Florida Keys. To this end, it has acquired or constructed well fields, treatment plants, transmission pipelines, pumping stations, distribution pipelines, and other related facilities. Because of its exaggerated linear service area of 130 miles, it incurs high capital and operating costs. Chapter 76-441, Laws of Florida, Respondent's enabling act, confers upon Respondent the authority to impose the subject System Development Fee. Respondent imposed the subject System Development Fee, which is an impact fee, in December 1974. Respondent's Rule 48-3.002(1) expressed the purposes of the System Development Fee as follows: The System Development Fee is an impact fee charged to new and existing customers who modify, add or construct facilities which impose a potential increased demand on the water system. This fee is charged in order to equitably adjust the fiscal burden of a new pipeline and expanded or improved appurtenant facilities between existing customers and new water users. All system development fees are allocated to the direct and indirect costs of capital improvements made necessary by actual and expected increased demand on the water system. The term "unit" is a commonly accepted concept in the public utility industry, and impact fees are often assessed on a per "unit" basis. Respondent's Rule 48-3.002(5)(b) provides for the assessment of the System Development Fee on a per unit basis and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 5. (b) Where the premises served consists of single or multiple commercial units, the System Development Fee shall be assessed based on each individual unit. In those cases where the individual unit will require a meter size that exceeds a 5/8" meter to properly support the unit, the System Development Fee shall be based on the meter size required to serve that unit, whether individually metered or not. ... The term "unit", as used in Respondent's System Development Fee Rule is a technical term, but it is defined by Respondent's Rule 48-2.001(19) as follows: (19) "Unit" A unit is a commercial or residential module consisting of one or more rooms with either appurtenant or common bathroom facilities and used for a single commercial purpose or single residential use. The number of units existing in a multiple unit service operation are to be determined in accordance with Rule 48-2.007(1)(c), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ... The number of units, whether residential or commercial, will normally be determined according to applicable city or county occupational licenses, building permits, or plans of the subject structure. In cases of discrepancy or inconsistency in definition, or interpretation, the following Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority definition will control: A unit is a commercial or residential module consisting of one or more rooms with either appurtenant or common bathroom facilities and used for a single commercial purpose or single residential purpose. Respondent grandfathers in units that were in existence prior to December 1974 when the System Development Fee was first enacted. A System Development Fee is not imposed on any unit that was in existence prior to December 1974. Of the 376 improved campsites that presently exist at Petitioners' campground, 279 were improved prior to 1974. Consequently, only the 97 campsites improved after the enactment of the System Development Fee are at issue in this proceeding. Respondent is concerned with the potential use of a unit because it must be prepared to respond to that potential use. Once a customer has paid the System Development Fee for a unit, the owner of the unit can transfer the unit without the purchaser having to pay an additional System Development Fee regardless of the use the purchaser intends to make of the unit. Respondent has consistently applied the System Development Fee charges on a per unit basis for the purposes stated in its Rule 48-3.002(1). The per unit charge was $600 when first enacted in 1974, was increased to $1,500 in 1984, and was increased to its present level of $2,000 in 1986. A widely publicized amnesty program was in effect from August 1, 1984 through October 1, 1984, during which customers who had added units to their property without reporting same to Respondent could report the units during the amnesty program and pay the System Development Fee on an installment basis. Customers were advised that after the amnesty program closed, the System Development Fee would be based on rates in effect at the time an unreported unit was discovered, not at the rate the unreported unit was constructed. This policy serves to encourage Respondent's customers to promptly report newly added "units", and the policy produces fees commensurate with the expenses to be incurred by Respondent after it learns of the new units. Petitioner George W. Eager is the owner of approximately 30 acres of real property located west of U.S. 1 at Key Largo, Florida. Mr. Eager purchased the subject property in 1969, sold it in 1974, and reacquired it in 1975 by a deed given in lieu of foreclosure. This property is located within the area served by Respondent. Petitioner Calusa Camp Resort, Inc., a closely held Florida corporation whose stock is owned by Mr. Eager and his two children, operates a campground on this real property. In addition to the 376 campsites, the campground contains a grocery store, a marina, laundry facilities, bathrooms and showers, a swimming pool, a sewage treatment plant, and a sewage pumping station. The marina was not in operation at the time of the formal hearing. Petitioners hold the two business licenses they are required to have by Monroe County. One business license is for the operation of the campground while the other one is for the operation of the grocery store. Petitioners secured all pertinent building permits during the course of the improvement of the campground. Mr. Eager opened the campground in 1969, at which time he entered into a contract for services with Respondent. Mr. Eager constructed a private water system as part of the improvements to his real property. This private water system was connected to Respondent's water transmission system in 1969, and a one inch master meter was installed at that point of delivery. This one inch master meter has served Petitioners' property at all times pertinent to this proceeding. Mr. Eager entered into a new contract for services with Respondent in 1975. This contract did not indicate that Mr. Eager's property was considered a multiple unit operation and it did not indicate in the space available the number of units to be served. By a provision in this contract, Respondent reserved the right to change its rules and regulations and the rates for use of water from time to time. In 1976, Mr. Eager entered into another contract for services with Respondent for the provision of water to a swimming pool that he had constructed. This contract did not indicate that Mr. Eager's property was considered a multiple unit operation and it did not indicate in the space available the number of units to be served. Of the thirty acres owned by Mr. Eager, approximately twenty acres are west of the access road that divides the property and approximately ten acres are east of the road. Prior to 1974, Mr. Eager developed 279 individual campsites on eighteen of the acres west of the access road. These campsites had water, electrical, and sewer hookups for recreational vehicles and could accommodate all types of camping. A grocery store, bathrooms and showers, laundry facilities, and recreational facilities were also located on these eighteen acres. The remaining two acres west of the access road were reserved as the site for the marina. Prior to 1974, the ten acres east of the access road was used for open camping, but individual campsites were not designated. Water was made available to the campers who used this area through approximately 32 spigots spaced throughout the area and the other campground facilities were available to them. The ten-acre open area would accommodate up to 125 campsites. Since the enactment of the Systems Development Fee, Petitioners converted the ten-acre open camping area into 97 campsites with each campsite having water, electrical, and sewer hookups. This development, completed in 1983, organized the camping in the ten-acre area, but it did not increase the number of potential campers in the ten-acre area over the 1974 level. This development did, however, change the type camping that could be accommodated in this area. Prior to the development, the area could not accommodate camping in large vehicles such as motorhomes and recreational vehicles. After the development, the campsites were improved to accommodate all types of camping. None of the campsites are permanently improved with any structures or rooms and Petitioner does not rent campsites with accommodations on them. Persons renting the campsites provide their own method of camping, whether it be by car, truck, motorhome, travel trailer, tent, or otherwise. In 1983, Petitioners requested that the size of the water meter serving his property be increased from one inch to two inches. At that time, Respondent's staff suspected that Petitioners may have modified the campgrounds so as to have triggered the System Development Fee. Consequently, Mary Castellano, Respondent's Policy & Procedure Coordinator wrote a letter of inquiry to Petitioners' attorney. This letter, dated May 2, 1983, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The material submitted by you last March 2, 1983, has been reviewed. Although a planned layout of the campground was provided from 1969 showing a plan to develop 279 camp and trailer spaces, what is required, prior to approval of a change to a larger meter, is some type of proof showing the number of camp and trailer spaces in existence and actually served prior to June 13, 1974, and certification regarding the actual number of camp and trailer spaces in existence today. If those two numbers are the same, no system development fee will be assessed and Mr. Eager's request for a 2" meter will be honored upon payment of additional deposit, new service charge and tapping fee. However, if there were less camp and trailer spaces in 1974 actually in existence then than there are at the present time, then additional system development fees will be assessed on a per space basis for the difference. Ms. Castellano's letter of May 2, 1983, accurately stated Respondent's interpretation of its rule imposing the System Development Fee. The information requested by this letter was not forthcoming, and Petitioners did not pursue the request to change the master meter from one inch to two inch again until 1989. Respondent's staff did not pursue whether Petitioners owed a System Development Fee until the issue was again raised in 1989. The water bills sent by Respondent to Petitioners up until April 1989 reflected that Petitioners had been classified as a "single unit commercial" account. In April 1989, the billing reflected that Petitioners were classified as a "multiple unit commercial" account. Because Petitioners' private water system is located on private property, Respondent's staff could not discover any undeclared units except by conducting an appropriate inspection. In 1989 Respondent's staff conducted such an inspection of Petitioners' campground and determined that Petitioners had added 97 campsites, that each campsite was a "unit" within the meaning of Respondent's rules, and that a system development fee of $2,000 was due for each site. This was the first time that Respondent had inspected the property and was the first time that Respondent knew that Petitioners had improved the 97 campsites. Respondent does not routinely inspect all private water systems or keep an up-to-date count of all units within its service area because of the costs of gathering such information. On April 26, 1989, Mary Castellano, who was still employed by Respondent, but whose title had been changed to Director of Policy Administration, wrote Petitioners a letter which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Of the 376 spaces/units currently existing, the Authority accepts the documentation submitted to establish that 279 spaces/units existed prior to June 1974, for which no System Development Fees are due. However, the following fees are assessed and due for the remaining 97 spaces/units: System Development Fee ($2,000 x 97 Units) $194,000.00 Deposit ($75 x 97 Units) 7,275.00 Service Charge ($15 x 97 Units) 1,455.00 $202,730.00* *Plus Tapping Fee * * * 4. The Authority will require the execution of a Restrictive Covenant since a potential for future expansion exists. Petitioners thereafter filed a timely request for formal hearing after Respondent's Board of Directors upheld the assessment of the System Development Fee at a duly called meeting.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which upholds the assessment against Petitioners of the System Development Fee based on the improvement of the 97 campsites since 1974. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Gus H. Crowell, Esquire Tittle & Tittle, P.A. P. O. Drawer 535 Tavernier, Florida 33070 Floyd A. Hennen, Esquire Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority Post Office Box 1239 Key West, Florida 33040 Patty Woodworth, Director Planning & Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-5620 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 as being subordinate to the findings made or as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2-10, 12, 14, and 18-21 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. While it was established that one corporation operated the campground, it was not established that no additional business purpose exists at the property. The property contains, in addition to the subject campsites, a grocery store, a marina, laundry facilities, and a sewage pumping station that is available to non-campers. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are rejected as being conclusions of law. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 15 and 16 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 17 and 23 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The findings of fact contained in the first three sentences of paragraph 23 are adopted in material part. The findings of fact contained in the final sentence of paragraph 23 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent. The paragraphs contained in the findings of fact section of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order have been numbered 1-13 for convenience. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 7, 12, and 13 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The examples given by Respondent were not incorporated as a finding of fact because the examples used are not analogous to the facts of this case. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in part by of the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are rejected as being recitation of testimony or as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being recitation of testimony or as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order with the exception of the findings of fact contained in the final sentence of the paragraph, which are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached.

Florida Laws (4) 120.5795.01195.03195.11
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PONDEROSA PARKS, INC. vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 80-001195 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001195 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1980

Findings Of Fact Quality of Service Of more than 250 customers presently served by the utility, only four customers testified at the hearing. Two were concerned that water and sewer rates were already too high and no further increase in rates should be allowed, a third complained of the utility's water having a bad taste and odor, while the fourth objected to an odor emanating from the utility's sewerage treatment plant approximately one year ago. Additionally, a number of deficiencies in the quality of service were identified by the Commission in Order No. 9216, supra. However, all deficiencies have now been resolved to the Commission staff engineer's satisfaction. Based on the entire record, the evidence supports a finding that the utility's water and sewer service is satisfactory. Rate Base Petitioner has proposed a rate base of $10,897 and $36,832 respectively for its water and sewer operations for the twelve months ending June 30, 1979, which is the test period in this proceeding. The Commission staff proposed five further adjustments to water and sewer rate base, none of which were contradicted by the utility. These adjustments affect plant in service, accumulated depreciation, contributions in aid of construction (CIAC), accumulated depreciation on CIAC and the working capital allowance. The adjustments are supported by the record, and should be accepted. The following schedule portrays the adjusted rate base for the utility's water and sewer operations, and the basis for each of the adjustments made in arriving at those amounts. Ponderosa Parks, Inc. Average Rate Base Year Ending June 30, 1979 WATER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Utility Plant $52,293 9,142 (1) $61,435 Accum. Deprec. (9,335) (1,055) (2) 10,390 CIAC (33,926) (5,938) (3) (39,864) Accum. Deprec.- CIAC -0- 6,742 (4) 6,742 Working Capital 1,865 60 (5) 1,925 Rate Base $10,897 $19,848 SEWER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Utility Plant $92,962 ($15,631)(6) $77,331 Accum. Deprec. 18,270 5,718 (7) (12,552) CIAC (39,188) 254 (8) (38,934) Accum. Deprec.- CIAC -0- 6,320 (9) 6,320 Working Capital 1,328 (215)(10) 1,113 Rate Base $36,832 $33,270 Adjusts water plant in service by (a) reallocating a portion of sewer plant to water operations, (b) readjusting the cost of certain water meters, and (c) adjusting the plant accounts from a year-end basis to a 13-month average balance. Adjusts accumulated depreciation to (a) reflect the use of a composite depreciation rate of 2.5 percent of all water plant and lines except meters for which a 2.63 percent rate is used, and (b) restate the balance in the account using a 13-month average balance in lieu of year-end balance. Adjusts contributions in aid of construction by (a) restating an amount previously improperly booked as revenues during the years 1970-1974, and (b) restating the year-end balance to a 13-month average. Adjusts the balance in the accumulated depreciation on CIAC account to reflect the use of a 13-month average rather than a year-end balance. Recomputes the working capital allowance to reflect one-eighth of adjusted operating and maintenance expenses. Adjusts sewer plant in service by (a) reallocating certain water lines from sewer to water operations, (b) removing certain non-utility land from the land account, (c) deleting that portion (50 percent) of the sewage treatment costs not used and useful in providing sewer services, and (d) adjusting the plant accounts from a year-end balance to a 13-month average balance. Adjusts accumulated depreciation by (a) using a 2.5 percent composite depreciation rate on all sewer plant and lines except for a 2.63 percent rate on meters, and (b) reflecting the use of a 13-month average in said account. Adjusts contributions in aid of construction by (a) adding to that account contributions previously recorded as revenues in 1970-1974, and (b) using a 13-month average in lieu of a year-end balance. Restates accumulated depreciation on CIAC by using a 13-month average in lieu of a year-end balance. Recomputes the working capital allowance to reflect one-eighth of operating and maintenance expenses. Net Operating Income Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 shows adjusted test year gross operating revenues of $20,370 for water operations and $14,692 for sewer operations. The utility's net operating income for the same time period on water and sewer services was $1,282 and $48 respectively. Staff Exhibit Nos. 2 and 4 make adjustments to operating revenues, operating and maintenance expenses, depreciation expense, and taxes other than income, none of which were contested by the utility. The record supports a finding that these adjustments are appropriate, and should be accepted. The following schedule shows the net operating income of the utility for the year ending June 30, 1979 and the derivation of those amounts. Ponderosa Parks, Inc. Average Rate Base Year Ending June 30, 1979 WATER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Operating Revenues $20,370 2,083(1) $18,287 Operating Expenses: Operation 16,137 (736)(2) 15,401 Depreciation 1,663 (1,119)(3) 544 Taxes other than 1,228 (52)(4) 1,236 Income Net Operating Income $ 1,282 $ 1,106 SEWER ADJUST TEST UTILITY ADJUST. YEAR Operating Revenues $14,692 4,293 (5) $10,399 Operating Expenses: Operation 10,121 (1,216)(6) 8,905 Depreciation 2,741 (1,781)(7) 960 Taxes other than 1,783 (107)(8) 1,675 Income Net Operating Income $ 48 $ 1,141 Adjusts test year water revenues by (a) removing that amount requested by the utility to show actual results of operations, and (b) reflecting a new surcharge rate (66/1000 gal.) charged by Pasco Water Authority. Adjusts operating and maintenance expenses by (a) removing costs associated with excessive unaccounted for water, (b) disallowing purchased water costs related to a prior accounting period, and (c) annualizing the new cost of water ($1.03/1000 gal.) purchased from Pasco Water Authority. Adjusts depreciation expense by (a) reflecting a composite depreciation rate of 2.5 percent for plant and lines and 2.63 percent for meters, and (b) removing depreciation expense on CIAC from operating expenses in accordance with Section 367.081(2) Florida Statutes (1980). Adjusts taxes other than income taxes by removing gross receipts taxes associated with the requested revenues previously removed in item (1)(a) above. However, an appropriate amount of taxes ($52) should be added back after the new revenue requirements are determined. Adjusts test year sewer revenues by removing the revenues requested by the utility to show actual results of operations. Adjusts operating and maintenance expenses by amortizing the cost of nonrecurring repair work over a 3-year period instead of charging the total cost to test year operations. Adjusts depreciation expense by (a) recomputing the balances using a 2.5 percent composite depreciation rate for all sewer plant and lines except for a 2.63 percent rate on meters, and (b) removing depreciation expense on CIAC in accordance with Section 367.081(2), Florida Statutes (1980). Restates taxes other than income by removing gross receipts taxes associated with the requested revenues previously removed in item (5). However, an appropriate amount of taxes ($107) should be added back after the new revenue requirements are determined. Cost of Capital Ponderosa has not requested a specific rate of return on utility investment. However, the requested revenues on water operations equate to a rate of return of 11.76 percent on water rate base while the requested amount of sewer revenues produces a rate of return on sewer operations of 9.15 percent. The utility and Commission staff agree such returns are reasonable given the circumstances of this proceeding. These rates of the returns are supported by the record, and should be used. Revenue Requirements The application of a 11.76 percent rate of return to the adjusted rate base for water operations reflects the utility is entitled to increase its water revenues by $1,260 in order to achieve that return. Similarly, it is necessary to increase sewer revenues by the amount requested, or $4,293, to produce the requested return of 9.15 percent. The utility should be permitted to revise its tariffs to generate these amounts of additional revenues. Rate Structure The utility's present rate structure imposes a minimum charge for the first 3,000 gallons of water used, and a gallonage charge for each 1000 gallons thereafter. Sewer charges for residential customers are presently assessed on a flat rate basis irrespective of the usage of the individual customer. This type of rate structure has two inherent deficiencies. First, it offers no means by which a customer may control the amount of his bill by consuming more or less amounts of water. Second, it fails to allocate in a fair and impartial manner the minimum costs associated with providing water and sewer service. A base facilities charge will remedy these deficiencies. Under this structure, a minimum charge will be imposed for the purpose of recovering the fixed or base costs of providing water and sewer service, such as depreciation, taxes and a portion of billing and customer accounting expenses. Thereafter, a charge for each thousand gallons used will be made. The latter charge will cover costs relating to purchased water, transmission and treatment expenses, and a portion of billing, collecting and customer accounting expenses. This type of rate structure is supported by the evidence, and should be used.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Ponderosa Parks, Inc., 301 Embassy Boulevard, Port Richey, Florida 33568, be granted and that the utility be authorized to file new tariffs to be approved by the Florida Public Service Commission that will generate additional annual gross water revenues of $1,260 and additional annual gross sewer revenues of $4,293. It is further RECOMMENDED that the utility be required to implement a base facility charge in structuring its water and sewer rates. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 21st day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (1) 367.081
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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs. WILLIAM J. LINDH, 83-000512 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000512 Latest Update: Dec. 21, 1983

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, at all times material to the Administrative Complaint in this proceeding, was a land surveyor licensed by the State of Florida, having been issued license number 1305. The Respondent is also a licensed professional engineer and a licensed architect. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged under Chapter 472, Florida Statutes, and appurtenant rules with the licensure and regulation of licensure status of land surveyors in Florida and the regulation and enforcement of their practice methods and standards. The Board of Land Surveyors published "Minimum Standards for Land Surveyors (Rule 21HH-6) effective September 1, 1951. The Respondent was unaware of the promulgation of those minimum standards. The Respondent had not attended meetings of the "Manasota" Chapter of the Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors at which those standards were discussed and a checklist for the standards was distributed. On August 24, 1982, the Respondent prepared a land survey of a part of Lot 306, Overbrook Gardens, in Sarasota County. The survey was submitted to the Sarasota County Building Department in connection with an application for a building permit pertaining to that real property, filed on August 26, 1982. The offenses charged are alleged violations of the minimum standards with respect to that survey. The Respondent's client had delivered to him a survey prepared by Lemonde Surveying, Inc., of Port Charlotte, Florida, which was prepared on February 28, 1980. That survey contained a metes and bounds land description. The client engaged the Respondent to survey the same parcel of land with that description and provide a survey drawing to be used in conjunction with an application for the subject building permit. The survey gas not certified by the Respondent in accordance with minimum standards. The Respondent admitted this and it was undisputed that the signature and seal of fixed on the survey complied with the legal requirements enforced before the adoption of the abovementoned minimum standards, of which the Respondent was unaware. The Respondent admitted to failure to refer to all sources of information upon which the survey was predicated. The Respondent used a legal description from a previous survey provided him by Darrell Newell, the contractor who was agent for the owner of the property. The survey the Respondent submitted to the building department only showed the name of the owner. The older survey submitted by the Respondent's client was his only source of information in this regard. The parties stipulated that the allegation regarding failure to show measured distances to the nearest intersection was incorrect and that indeed the Respondent had shown the distance to the nearest intersection. The Respondent failed to show the location of a telephone company underground terminal pedestal and an abandoned wire fence of unstated dimensions which is outside the surveyed property near the north and east boundaries. The fence does not encroach on the surveyed property at all. The telephone terminal pedestal is approximately one foot or less in height, located just inside the northerly boundary of the property, approximately midway between the two northerly corners. The telephone terminal was not visible at the time of the survey due to high grass, weeds, and undergrowth covering the property when the fieldwork was conducted by the Respondent's survey party chief. The triangular parcel of property involved was located with reference to an established, identifiable real property corner. All three corners were monumented prior to the survey by the Respondent, so that the location of boundaries near the abandoned, partial, non-encroaching fence could be established with reasonable certainty. On September 15, 1932, personnel of the county building department charged with the responsibility of issuing the building permit for the property requested advice with regard to the efficacy of Respondent's survey from Mr. Emerson, the County Surveyor, who testified for the Petitioner. Mr. Emerson spoke with the Respondent by phone and mailed him copies of the "minimum standards" and the "Surveyor's Checklist" of the Manasota Chapter of the Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors, which relates to those minimum standards in the rule cited below. The Respondent then promptly and voluntarily prepared a new survey which fully complied with those minimum standards which he had at that point first become aware of, and the building permit was duly issued to the Respondent's client. The Respondent's client's interests were not shown to be prejudiced and the complaint to the Board of Land Surveyors did not emanate from the Respondent's client, but rather from Mr. Emerson of-the county building department, who did not bother to consult the Respondent or obtain his explanation prior to lodging the complaint with the Board. The survey originally submitted to the Sarasota Count Building Department would have been adequate support for the issuance of the building permit before adoption of the minimum standards. The survey was shown to be totally adequate in terms of its substance and reflection of technical surveying competence, as opposed to the particular format prescribed by the minimum standards. This is the first disciplinary action ever taken against the. Respondent as a land surveyor licensee, and the Respondent's practice of his profession has always been characterized by a high degree of technical competence and professional integrity.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, William J. Lindh, be accorded the penalty of a private, written reprimand for violation of Rule 21HH-6.03(1) and (6),,Florida Administrative Code, and Section 472.033(1)(g) , Florida Statutes (1951) , and that the Administrative Complaint, in all other respects, be dismissed. DONE ADD ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles J Cheves, Esquire Cheves & Rapkin 341 West Venice Avenue Venice, Florida 33595 Allen R. Smith, Jr., Executive Director Board of Land Surveyors Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION BOARD OF LAND SURVEYORS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Petitioner, CASE NO.: 83-512 vs. LICENSE NO: 1308 WILLIAM J. LINDH, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (3) 455.227472.031472.033
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs SUPERIOR INSURANCE COMPANY, 00-003238 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 04, 2000 Number: 00-003238 Latest Update: Apr. 08, 2002

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent has made unauthorized payments to Superior Insurance Group, its corporate parent, and whether Respondent has properly disclosed these payments on its financial reports filed with Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a domestic stock insurance company operating under a certificate of authority to transact in Florida the business of property and casualty insurance. As a nonstandard automobile insurer, Respondent primarily deals with policyholders whose driving records and accident histories preclude their coverage by standard automobile insurers. Superior Insurance Group, Inc. (formerly GGS Management, Inc. (GGS)) owns Respondent; Symons International Group, Inc. (Symons) owns Superior Insurance Group, Inc. (Superior Group); and Goran Capital, Inc. (Goran) owns 73 percent of Symons. Although publicly traded, Goran was founded, and probably is still controlled, by the Symons family. Superior Group serves as Respondent’s managing general agent. GGS changed its name to Superior Group in early 2000; where appropriate, this Recommended Order refers to this entity as GGS/Superior Group. Respondent owns Superior American Insurance Company (Superior American) and Superior Guaranty Insurance Company (Superior Guaranty), which are both domestic stock insurance companies authorized to conduct in Florida the business of property and casualty insurance. Also engaged in the nonstandard automobile insurance business, Superior American and Superior Guaranty transfer all of their premiums and losses to Respondent under a reinsurance agreement. All financial information concerning Superior American and Superior Guaranty, which, for the purpose of this case, are mere conduits to Respondent, are included in the financial information of Respondent. On or about April 30, 1996, GGS acquired the stock of Respondent, as well as other assets, from an unrelated corporation, Fortis, Inc. or one of its subsidiaries. From the regulatory perspective, the acquisition started when, as required by law, on or about February 5, 1996, GGS filed with Petitioner a Form A application for Petitioner’s approval of the acquisition of Respondent. This was an extensive document, consisting of more than 1000 pages. One of the purposes of the application process, as described in Section 628.461, Florida Statutes, is to assure the adequacy of the funds used by the entity acquiring the insurer. The proposed acquisition is described by the Statement Regarding the Acquisition of More Than Five Percent of the Outstanding Voting Securities of Superior Insurance Company . . . by GGS Management, Inc., dated February 5, 1996 (Acquisition Statement). The Acquisition Statement states that GGS Management Holdings, Inc. owned GGS. (The distinction between GGS and GGS Management Holdings, Inc. is irrelevant to this case, so “GGS,” as used in this Recommended Order, shall also refer to GGS Management Holdings, Inc.) According to the Acquisition Statement, Symons owned 52 percent of GGS; GS Capital Partners II, L.P., owned 30 percent of GGS; GS Capital Partners II Offshore, L.P., owned 12 percent of GGS; and three mutual funds (probably all affiliates of Goldman Sachs) owned the remaining 6 percent of GGS. GS Capital Partners II, L.P., was owned by 100 investors, including The Goldman Sachs Group, L.P. (16.54 percent), “wealthy individuals and trusts, corporate pension funds, foundations and endowments, family trusts/corporations and one state pension fund.” The ownership of GS Capital Partners II Offshore, L.P., resembled the ownership of GS Capital Partners II, L.P. The Acquisition Statement states that GGS “will be the manager of all insurance operations for [Respondent] and will act as the holding company for [Respondent] and [an Indiana nonstandard automobile insurer known as Pafco whose stock Symons was contributing to GGS].” The Acquisition Statement projects the stock-purchase price, which was expressed as a formula, to be about $60 million. Citing the $2 billion in capital of the two Goldman Sachs limited partnerships and the $50 million in capital of Goran, the Acquisition Statement assures that “GGS has tremendous wherewithal to fund the growth needs of [Respondent] . . ..” Alluding to Goran’s 20 years’ experience in managing nonstandard automobile insurance companies, the Acquisition Statement represents that the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships and Goran “possess the capital and leadership resources to support the proposed activities of [Respondent].” According to the Acquisition Statement, the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships and Goran “anticipate that the acquisition of [Respondent] is but the first step in an effort to build a significant non-standard auto insurance company.” The Acquisition Statement describes the respective contributions of the two owners of GGS: Symons will contribute Pafco, which then had a current GAAP book value of $14 million, and the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships will contribute $20 million in cash. With the backing of Symons and the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships and secured by all of the stock of Respondent and GGS, GGS will execute a six-year promissory note with The Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) for $44 million. Drawing $40 million from this credit extension and using the $20 million cash contribution of the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships, GGS will fund the anticipated cash purchase price of $60 million. The Acquisition Statement represents that GGS will be able to service the debt. Due to the cash contribution of the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships, the Chase debt represents only two-thirds of the purchase price. Due to the cash contribution of the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships and the stock contribution by Symons, the Chase debt represents only about one-half of the initial capital of GGS. The Acquisition Statement states that GGS will service the Chase debt in part by “the combination of the management activities of both Pafco and [Respondent] within GGS, billing fees, other non-insurance company activities and anticipated insurance company operating economies which will result from the combination of these two operations [Pafco and Respondent].” The equity contributions of cash and stock “contribute significantly to the financial stability of GGS, allowing GGS to service the debt using operating cash flows only, including, if necessary, normal dividends from earned surplus as a secondary source of debt service funds. GGS does not anticipate using dividends from either Pafco or [Respondent] as a primary source of debt service funds.” The Chase Credit Agreement, which is dated April 30, 1996, requires GGS to use its best efforts to cause Respondent to pay "cash dividends or other distributions or payments in cash including . . . the payment of Billing Fees and Management Fees" in sufficient amounts to pay all principal and interest due under the financing instrument. The Chase Credit Agreement defines "Billing Fees" as: "fees with respect to the payment of premiums on an installment basis that are received by an Insurance Subsidiary from policyholders and in turn paid to [GGS] or received directly by [GGS] . . .." The Chase Credit Agreement defines "Management Fees" as: "all fees paid by an Insurance Subsidiary to [GGS] that are calculated on the basis of gross written premiums." With respect to the "Management Fees" described in the Chase Credit Agreement, the Acquisition Statement describes a five-year management agreement to be entered into by GGS with Pafco and Respondent (Management Agreement). The Management Agreement, which GGS and Respondent executed on April 30, 1996, provides that GGS “will provide management services to both Pafco and [Respondent] and will receive from [Respondent] as compensation 17% of [Respondent’s] gross written premium” and a slightly lower percentage of premiums from Pafco (Management Fee). Under the Management Agreement, Respondent “will continue to pay premium taxes, boards and bureaus costs, legal and audit fees and certain computer costs.” The Acquisition Statement states that Respondent’s “operating costs" were about 21%, so the 17% cap “will allow [Respondent] to see a significant and immediate improvement in its overall financial performance”-- over $1 million in 1994, which was the last year for which financial information was then available. The Management Agreement gives GGS the exclusive right and nondelegable and nonassignable obligation to perform a broad range of business actions on Respondent’s behalf. These actions include accepting contracts, issuing policies, appointing adjustors, and adjusting claims. The Management Agreement requires GGS to "pay [Respondent’s] office rent and occupancy operating expenses from the amounts that it receives pursuant to this Agreement.” In return, the Management Agreement requires Respondent to pay GGS “fees for the business placed with [Respondent as follows:] Agents commission plus 17% not to exceed 32% in total.” The scope of the services undertaken by GGS in the Management Agreement is similarly described in the Plan of Operation, which GGS filed with Petitioner as part of the application. The Plan of Operation provides that, in exchange for the 17 percent “management commission,” GGS assumes the responsibility for all aspects of the operating expenses of the book including underwriting, claims handling and administration. The only expenses which remain the responsibility of [Respondent] directly are those expenses directly related to the insurance book, such as premium taxes, boards and bureaus, license fees, guaranty fund assessments and miscellaneous expenses such as legal and audit expenses and certain computer costs associated directly with [Respondent]. In response to a request for additional information, Goran’s general counsel, by letter dated March 13, 1996, to Petitioner’s application coordinator, added another document, Document 26. The new document was a pro forma financial projection for 1996-2002 (Proforma) showing the sources of funds for GGS to service the Chase debt. The seven-year Proforma contains only two significant sources of income for GGS: “management fee income” and “finance & service fee income" (Finance and Service Fees). By year, starting with 1996, these respective figures are $28.6 million and $7.0 million, $34.2 million and $8.6 million, $38.1 million and $9.9 million, $42.6 million and $11.0 million, $47.5 million and $12.3 million, $53.0 million and $13.7 million, and $59.3 million and $15.3 million. Accounting for the principal and interest payments over the six-year repayment term of the Chase Credit Agreement, the Proforma shows ending cash balances, during each of the covered years, culminating in a final cash balance, in 2002, of $43.9 million. By letter dated March 29, 1996, Goran’s general counsel informed Petitioner that an increase in Respondent’s book value had triggered an increase in the purchase price from $60 million to $66 million. Also, the book value of Pafco had increased from $14 million to $15.3 million, and the cash required of the Goldman Sachs limited partnerships had increased from $20 million to $21.2 million. Additionally, the letter states that Chase had increased its commitment from $44 million to $48 million. A revised Document 26 accompanied the March 29 letter and showed the same income projections. Reflecting increased debt-service projections, the revised Proforma projected lower cash balances, culminating with $39.8 million in 2002. During a meeting in March 1996, Mr. Alan Symons, president and chief executive officer of Goran and a director of Superior Group and Respondent, met with three of Petitioner's representatives, including Mary Mostoller, Petitioner's employee primarily responsible for the substantive examination of the GGS application. During that meeting, Mr. Symons informed Petitioner that GGS would receive Finance and Service Fees from Respondent's policyholders who paid their premiums by installments. Ms. Mostoller did not testify, and the sole representative of Petitioner who attended the meeting and testified candidly admitted that he could not recall whether they discussed this matter. In response to another request for additional information, Respondent’s present counsel, by letter dated April 12, 1996, informed Petitioner that the “finance and service fee income” line of the Proforma “is composed primarily of billing fees assessed to policyholders that choose to make payments on a monthly basis,” using the same rate that Respondent had long used. The letter explains that the projected increase in these fees is attributable solely to a projected increase in business and not to a projected increase in the rate historically charged policyholders for this service. In an internal memorandum dated April 18, 1996, Ms. Mostoller noted that GGS would pay the Chase Credit Agreement through a “combination of the management fees and other billing fees of both Pafco and [Respondent].” Later in the April 18 memorandum, though, Ms. Mostoller suggested, among other things, that Petitioner condition its approval of the acquisition on the right of Petitioner to reevaluate annually the reasonableness of the “management fee and agent’s commission”--omitting any mention of the "other billing fees." On April 30, 1996, Petitioner entered a Consent Order Approving Acquisition of Stock Pursuant to Section 628.461, Florida Statutes (Consent Order). Incorporating all of Ms. Mostoller's recommendations, the Consent Order is signed by Respondent and GGS, which "agree to and consent to all of the above cited terms and conditions . . .." The Consent Order does not incorporate by reference the application and related documents, nor does the Consent Order contain an integration clause, which, if present, would merge all prior written and unwritten agreements into the Consent Order so as to preclude the implementation of such agreements in conjunction with the Consent Order. Among other things, the Consent Order mandates the following: [Respondent] shall give advance notice to [Petitioner] of any proposed changes in the [Management Agreement] and shall receive written approval from [Petitioner] prior to implementing those changes. In addition, for a period of three (3) years, [Petitioner] shall reevaluate at the end of each calendar year the reasonableness of the fees as reflected on Addendum A of the [Management] Agreement[.] Furthermore, [Petitioner] may at its sole discretion, and after consideration of the performance and operating percentages of [Respondent] and any other pertinent data, require [Respondent] to make adjustments in the [M]anagement [F]ee and agent's commission. GGS . . . shall file each year an audited financial statement with [Petitioner] . . .. In addition to the above, for a period of 4 years from the date of execution of this Consent Order . . .: [Respondent] shall not pay or authorize any stockholder dividends to shareholders without prior written approval of [Petitioner]. Any direct or indirect contracts, agreements or transactions of any type or nature including but not limited to the sale or exchange of assets among or between [Respondent] and any member of the Goran . . . holding company system shall receive prior written approval of [Petitioner]. That failure to adhere to one or more of the above terms and conditions shall result WITHOUT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS in the Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner DENYING the above acquisition, or the REVOCATION of the insurers' certification of authority if such failure to adhere occurs after the issuance of the Consent Order approving the above acquisition. The Consent Order addresses the Management Fees and the commissions payable to the independent agents who sell Respondent's insurance policies. However, the Consent Order omits any explicit mention of the Finance and Service Fees, even though GGS and Respondent had clearly and unambiguously disclosed these fees to Petitioner on several occasions prior to the issuance of the Consent Order. On its face, the Consent Order requires prior approval for the payment of Finance and Service Fees, which arise due to a contract or agreement between Respondent and GGS/Superior Group. The Consent Order prohibits "direct or indirect contracts, agreements or transactions of any type or nature including . . . the sale or exchange of assets among or between [Respondent] and any member of the Goran . . . holding company system," without Petitioner's prior written approval. The exact nature of these Finance and Service Fees facilitates the determination of their proper treatment under the Consent Order and the facts of this case. Ostensibly, the Finance and Service Fees pertain to items not covered by the Management Fees, which cover a wide range of items. In fact, the Finance and Service Fees arise only when a policyholder elects to pay his premium in installments; if no policyholder were to pay his premium by installments, no Finance and Service Fees would be due. The testimony in the record suggests that the Finance and Service Fees pertain to services that necessarily must be performed when policyholders pay their premiums by installments. This suggestion is true, as far as it goes. Installment payments require an insurer to incur administrative and information-management costs in billing and collecting installment payments. Other costs arise if late installment payments necessitate the cancellations and if reinstatements follow cancellations. Installment-payment transactions are undeniably more expensive to the insurer than single-payment transactions. The record as to these installment-payment costs, which are more in the nature of a service charge, is well- developed. However, the Finance and Service Fees also pertain to the cost of the loss of the use of money when policyholders pay their premiums by installments. Installment-payment transactions cause the insurer to lose the use of the deferred portion of the premium for the period of the deferral. The record as to these costs, which are more in the nature of a finance charge or interest, is relatively undeveloped. At the hearing, Mr. Symons testified that an insurer does not lose the use of the deferred portion of the premium for an established book of business. Mr. Symons illustrated his point by analyzing over a twelve-month period the development of a hypothetical book of business consisting of twelve insureds. If an insurer added its first insured in the first month, added a second in the third, and so forth, until it added its twelfth insured in the twelfth month, and each insured chose to pay a hypothetical $120 annual premium in twelve installments of $10 each, the cash flow in the twelfth and each succeeding month (assuming no changes in the number of insureds) would be $120-- the same that it would have been if each of the insureds chose to pay his premium in full, rather than by installment. Thus, Mr. Symons' point was that, after the first eleven months, installment payments do not result in the loss of the use of money by the insurer. Mr. Symons' illustration assumes a constant book of business after the twelfth month. However, while the insurer is adding installment-paying insureds, the insurer loses the use of the portion of the first-year premium that is deferred, as is evident in the first eleven months of Mr. Symons' illustration. Also, if the constant book of business is due to a constant replacement of nonrenewing insureds with new insureds--a distinct possibility in the nonstandard automobile market--then the insurer will again suffer the loss of the use of money over the first eleven months. Either way, Mr. Symons' illustration does not eliminate the insurer's loss of the use of money when its insureds pay by installments; the illustration only demonstrates that the extent of the loss of the use of the money may not be as great as one would casually assume. The Finance and Service Fee is sufficiently broad to encompass all of the terms used in this record to describe it: "installment fee," "billing fee," "service charge," "premium fee," and even "premium finance fee." However, only "installment fee" is sufficiently broad as to capture both types of costs covered by the Finance and Service Fee. The dual components of the Finance and Service Fee are suggested by the statute authorizing its imposition. Section 627.902, Florida Statutes, authorizes an insurer or affiliate of the insurer to "finance" premiums at the "service charge or rate of interest" specified in Section 627.901, Florida Statutes, without qualifying as a premium finance company under Chapter 627, Part XV, Florida Statutes. If the insurer or affiliate exceeds these maximum impositions, then it must qualify as a premium finance company. The "service charge or rate of interest" authorized in Section 627.901, Florida Statutes, is either $1 per installment (subject to limitations irrelevant to this case) or 18 percent simple interest on the unpaid balance. The charge per installment, which is imposed without regard to the amount deferred, suggests a service charge, and the interest charge, which is imposed without regard to the number of installments, suggests a finance charge. The determination of the proper treatment of the Finance and Service Fees under the Consent Order is also facilitated by consideration of the process by which these fees were transferred to GGS/Superior Group. As anticipated by the parties, after the acquisition of Respondent by GGS, Respondent retained no employees, and GGS/Superior Group employees performed all of the services required by Respondent. The process by which Respondent transferred the Finance and Service Fees to GGS/Superior Group began with Respondent issuing a single invoice to the policyholder showing the premium and the Finance and Service Fee, if the policyholder elected to pay by installments. As Mr. Symons testified, Respondent calculated the Finance and Service Fee on the basis of the 1.5 percent per month on the unpaid balance, rather than the specified fee per installment. The installment-paying policyholder then wrote a check for the invoiced amount, payable to Respondent, and mailed it to Respondent at the address shown on the invoice. Employees of GGS/Superior Group collected the checks and deposited them in Respondent's bank account. From these funds, the employees of GGS/Superior Group then paid the commissions to the independent agents, the Management Fee (calculated without regard to the Finance and Service Fee) to GGS/Superior Group, and the Finance and Service Fee to GGS/Superior Group. Respondent retained the remainder. Finance and Service Fees can be considerable in the nonstandard automobile insurance business. Many policyholders in this market lack the financial ability to pay premiums in total when due, so they commonly pay their premiums in installments. At the time of the 1996 acquisition, for instance, about 90 percent of Respondent's policyholders paid their premiums by installments. For 1996, on gross premiums of $156.4 million, Respondent earned net income (after taxes) of $1.978 million, as compared to gross premiums of $97.6 million and net income of $5.177 million in 1995. At the end of 1996, Respondent's surplus was $57.1 million, as compared to $49.3 million at the end of the prior year. "Surplus" or "policyholder surplus" for insurance companies is like net worth for other corporations. In 1996, Respondent received $2.154 million in Finance and Service Fees, as compared to $1.987 million in the prior year. However, Respondent did not pay any Finance and Service Fees to GGS in 1996. For related-party transactions in 1996, Respondent's financial statements disclose the payment of $155,500 to GGS and Fortis for "management fees," assumed reinsurance premiums and losses, and a capital contribution of $5.558 million from GGS, of which $4.8 million was in the form of a note. These related-party disclosures for 1996 were adequate. In August 1997, Symons bought out Goldman Sachs' interest in GGS for $61 million. Following the 1996 acquisition, Goldman Sachs had invested another $3-4 million, but, with a total investment of about $25 million, Goldman Sachs enjoyed a handsome return in a little over one year. Mr. Symons attributed the relatively high price to then-current valuations, which were 100 percent of annual gross premiums. More colorfully, Mr. Symons' brother, also a principal in the Goran family of corporations, attributed the purchase price to Goldman Sachs' "greed. " At the same time that Symons bought out Goldman Sachs, Symons enabled GGS to retire the Chase acquisition debt. The elimination of Goldman Sachs and Chase may be related by more than the need for $61 million to buy out Goldman Sachs. The 1996 Annual Statement that Respondent filed with Petitioner reports "total adjusted capital" of $57.1 million and "authorized control level risk-based capital" of $20.7 million, for a ratio of less than 3:1. Section 8.10 of the Chase Credit Agreement states that GGS "will not, on any date, permit the Risk Based Capital Ratio . . . of [Respondent] to be less than 3 to 1." Section 1 of the Chase Credit Agreement defines the ”Risk-Based Capital Ratio" as the ratio of Respondent's "Total Adjusted Capital" to its "Authorized Control Level Risk-Based Capital." In August 1997, Symons raised $135 million in a public offering of securities that probably more closely resemble debt than equity. After paying $61 million to Goldman Sachs and the $45-48 million then due Chase under the Credit Agreement (due to additional advances), Symons applied the remaining loan proceeds to various affiliates, as additional capital contributions, and possibly itself, for cash-flow purposes. The $135 million debt instrument, which remains in place, requires payments over a 30- year term, provides for no repayment of principal until the end of the term, and allows for the deferral of the semi-annual dividend/interest payments for up to five years. Symons exercised its right to defer dividend/interest payments for an undetermined period of time in 2000. The payments that are the subject of this case took place from 1997 through 1999. During this period, on a gross basis, Respondent paid GGS $35.2 million in Finance and Service Fees. In fact, $1.395 million paid in 1999 were not Finance and Service Fees, but were SR-22 policy fees, which presumably are charges attributable to the preparation and issuance by GGS of certificates of financial responsibility. Because Respondent's financial statements did not separate any SR-22 fees from Finance and Service Fees for 1997 or 1998, it is impossible to identify what, if any, portion of the Finance and Service Fees in those years were actually SR-22 fees. Even though SR-22 fees represent a service charge without an interest component, they are included in Finance and Service Fees for purposes of this Recommended Order. For 1997, on gross premiums of $188.3 million, Respondent earned net income of $379,000. For 1998, on gross premiums of $179.8 million, Respondent suffered a net loss of $8.122 million. For 1999, on gross premiums of $170.5 million, Respondent suffered a net loss of $19.232 million. Respondent's surplus decreased from $65.1 million at the end of 1997, to $57.6 million at the end of 1998, to $34.2 million at the end of 1999. In its Quarterly Statement filed as of September 30, 2000, Respondent disclosed, for the first nine months of 2000, a net loss of $5.89 million and a decline in surplus to $24.0 million. By the end of 2000, Respondent's surplus decreased to $21.6 million. However, at all times, Respondent's surplus exceeded the statutory minimum. For 1999, for example, Respondent's surplus of $34.2 million doubled the statutory minimum. Respondent also satisfied the statutory premium-to-surplus ratio, although possibly not the statutory risk-based capital ratio. As of the final hearing, Petitioner had required Respondent to file a risk-based capital plan, Respondent had done so, Petitioner had required amendments to the plan, Respondent had declined to adopt the amendments, and Petitioner had not yet taken further action. From 1997-1999, Respondent's annual statements, quarterly statements, and financial statements inadequately disclosed the payments that Respondent made to GGS. The annual statements disclose "Service Fee on Ceded Business," which is a write-in item described in language chosen by Respondent. Petitioner's contention that this item appears to be a reinsurance transaction in which Respondent is ceding risk and premiums to a third-party is rebutted by the fact that the Schedule F, Part 5, on each annual statement discloses relatively minor reinsurance transactions whose ceded premiums would not approach those reported as "Service Fee on Ceded Business." Notwithstanding the unconvincing nature of Petitioner's contention as to the precise confusion caused by Respondent's reporting of the payment of Finance and Service Fees, Respondent's reporting was clearly inadequate and even misleading. The real problem in the annual statements, quarterly statements, and financial statements is their failure to disclose Respondent's payments to a related party, GGS. Respondent unconvincingly attempts to explain this omission by an imaginative recharacterization of the Finance and Service Fee transactions as pass-through transactions. These were not pass-through transactions in 1996 when Respondent retained the Finance and Service Fees. These were not pass- through transactions in 1997-1999 when Respondent properly accounted for these payments from policyholders as income and payments to GGS as expenses. The proper characterization of these transactions involving the Finance and Service Fees does not depend on the form that Respondent and GGS/Superior Group selected for them-- in which policyholders pay Respondent and Respondent pays GGS/Superior Group--although this form does not serve particularly well Respondent's present contention. Even if Respondent had changed the form so that the policyholders paid the Finance and Service Fees directly to GGS/Superior Group, the economic reality of the transactions would remain the same. Even if policyholders paid their installments to Respondent, GGS/Superior Group, or any other party, the Finance and Service Fees would initially vest in Respondent, which, under an agreement, would then owe them to GGS/Superior Group. The inadequacy of the disclosure of the Finance and Service Fees is a relatively minor issue, in itself, in this case. In its proposed recommended order, Respondent invites direction as to how Petitioner would like Respondent to report these payments in the future. The major impact of Respondent's nondisclosure of these payments is that none of the statements filed after the 1996 acquisition notified Petitioner of the existence of these payments. It is thus impossible to infer an agreement or even acquiescence on the part of Petitioner regarding Respondent's payment of Finance and Service Fees to GGS/Superior Group. The major issue in this case is whether the Consent Order authorizes Respondent to pay $35 million in Finance and Service Fees after the 1996 acquisition or, if not, whether Petitioner has approved of such payments by any other means. As already noted, the Consent Order authorizes the payment of agents' commissions and Management Fees, but not Finance and Service Fees. To the contrary, the Consent Order prohibits the payment of Finance and Service Fees for four years, at least without Petitioner's approval, because of the provision otherwise prohibiting agreements, contracts, and the transfer of assets involving Respondent and its affiliates. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, the absence of an integration clause invites consideration of oral agreements that may have preceded the execution of the Consent Order. The Consent Order is somewhat of a hybrid: Petitioner orders and Respondent consents. However, the Consent Order is sufficiently an agreement to be subject to interpretation under normal principles governing the interpretation of contracts. Respondent contends that such agreements encompassed the payment of Finance and Service Fees because Respondent disclosed such payments several times to Petitioner prior to the issuance of the Consent Order. (Any testimonial assertion of an explicit agreement by Petitioner to the payment of the Finance and Service Fees is discredited.) Respondent repeated disclosures to Petitioner of the Finance and Service Fees began with the Acquisition Statement at the start of the application process. The parties discussed these fees in March 1996. The Proformas disclose two main revenue sources from which GGS/Superior Group could service its acquisition debt: Management Fees and Finance and Service Fees. And the Proformas project almost exactly the amount that Respondent paid GGS in Finance and Service Fees from 1997-99. Although the ratio of Management Fees to Finance and Service Fees was 4:1 in the Proformas, this ratio does not minimize the role of the Finance and Service Fees. Based on gross revenues, this ratio is no indication of the relative profitability of these two sources of revenue. In fact, in 1999, the expenses covered by the Management Agreement exceeded the Management Fees by $3 million. The Finance and Service Fees are thus an important component of the revenue on which GGS intended to rely in servicing the acquisition debt. However, neither the clear disclosure of the Finance and Service Fees nor Petitioner's recognition of the importance of these fees in servicing the acquisition debt necessarily means that Petitioner agreed to their payment. By a preponderance of, although less than clear and convincing, evidence, the record precludes the possibility that Petitioner agreed in preclosing discussions or the Consent Order to preapprove the Finance and Service Fees. In this respect, Petitioner treated the Finance and Service Fees differently from the Management Fees, which Petitioner agreed to preapprove, subject to annual reevaluation for the first three years. At the level of a preponderance of the evidence, it is possible to harmonize this construction of the Consent Order with Respondent's repeated disclosures of the Finance and Service Fees. The Acquisition Statement mentions dividends as a revenue source--although a "secondary" source--and the Consent Order clearly did not impliedly preapprove the payment of dividends. Aware of the reliance of GGS upon the Finance and Service Fees to service the Chase acquisition debt, Petitioner may have chosen, for the first four years, to consider Respondent's requests for approval of the Finance and Service Fees, based on the circumstances in existence at the time of the requests. This interpretation is consistent with the testimony of Petitioner's employee that he believed that Petitioner would be able to restrict Respondent's payment of Finance and Service Fees to GGS/Superior Group because Petitioner's approval was required for the payment of dividends. The payments are pursuant to a contract or agreement for services and, as such, are not dividends, but the Consent Order requires Petitioner's approval for all contracts and agreements during the first four years. The common point is that Petitioner understood that its approval would be required for Finance and Service Fees, which had not been preapproved like Management Fees. During the application process, GGS may not have been concerned by Petitioner's failure to preapprove the Finance and Service Fees. At the time of the 1996 acquisition, as contrasted to the period after the 1997 refinancing, GGS enjoyed a relatively light debt load due to Goldman Sachs' equity investment and the "tremendous wherewithal" of its 48 percent co-owner. Another practical distinction between the Finance and Service Fees and the Management Fees militates against finding that the Consent Order impliedly approves the Finance and Service Fees and militates in favor of a finding that GGS viewed these fees as more contingent and less likely to be needed than the Management Fees. At the start of the application process, GGS submitted to Petitioner a form Management Agreement. At no time did GGS ever submit to Petitioner a form Finance and Service Agreement. The contingent nature of the Finance and Service Fees, relative to the Management Fees, is reinforced by the fact that, in 1996, Respondent retained the Finance and Service Fees. Respondent's contention that the Finance and Service Fees were a component of the agreement between it and Petitioner is not without its appeal. The contention is sufficient to preclude a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the agreement between the parties did not include a preapproval of Finance and Service Fees. Unlike the Management Fees, the maximum amount of the Finance and Service Fees is set by statute. Two consequences follow. First, Petitioner might not have found it necessary to incorporate these fees in a written agreement, as long as the maximum amount were acceptable to Petitioner, because the law establishes a ceiling on the fees and identifies the services for which they are compensation. Second, Petitioner might not have found it necessary provide for annual reevaluation of the fees, again due to the applicable statutory maximum. In one respect, the relatively contingent quality of the Finance and Service Fees inures to Respondent's benefit, at least in theory. If no policyholder paid by installments, there would be no Finance and Service Fees; however, as a practical matter, the Finance and Service Fees are almost as pervasive as the Management Fees. More importantly, though, the Finance and Service Fees, especially when imposed as a percentage of the unpaid balance, contain a significant interest component. Paying these fees to GGS/Superior Group, Respondent denies itself the investment income attributable to this forbearance. Alternatively, to the extent that the Finance and Service Fees defray services, as they do to some unknown extent, the greater weight of the evidence, although not clear and convincing evidence, establishes that these services are among the services that GGS/Superior Group undertook in the Management Agreement. These factors militate strongly against treating the Finance and Service Fees as an implied exception to the provision of the Consent Order requiring approval of all contracts or agreements with affiliates during the first four years. For these reasons, Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence, although not clear and convincing evidence, that GGS/Superior Group and Respondent needed Petitioner's approval for all payments of Finance and Service Fees prior to April 30, 2000. To the extent that, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner withholds such approval, the next issue is to determine the amount of Finance and Service Fees that GGS/Superior Group must return to Respondent. The determination of the amount of the repayment is substantially affected by two facts. First, Petitioner's approval is not required for any Finance and Service Fees that Respondent paid GGS/Superior Group after April 30, 2000. The Consent Order did not require Petitioner's approval for such payments, which were not dividends, for which approval would always be required, if inadequate surplus existed. Second, GGS/Superior Group is entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit, against any liability for improperly received Finance and Service Fees, for about $20 million that it directly or indirectly transferred to Respondent since the 1996 acquisition. Half of the $20 million credit arises from Management Fees that GGS did not collect from Respondent in 1996 and 1998. As Petitioner notes, there is little, if any, documentation concerning these uncollected fees. Mr. Symons persuasively testified that the proper characterization of these amounts is dependent upon the outcome of Petitioner's effort to disallow the Finance and Service Fees already paid by Respondent. Petitioner must credit to GGS/Superior Group these $10 million in fees as an offset to the $35.2 million (or such lesser amount remaining after any retroactive approvals from Petitioner) that Respondent improperly paid GGS/Superior Group in Finance and Service Fees. Also, in 1997, GGS contributed about $10 million to Respondent's capital. As was the case with the uncollected Management Fees in 1996 and 1998, the record contains little, if any, documentation concerning the transfer, including any conditions that may have attached to it. Petitioner should credit GGS/Superior Group with this sum as an offset against the $35.2 million (or such lesser amount remaining after any retroactive approvals from Petitioner) that Respondent improperly paid GGS/Superior Group in Finance and Service Fees. As for the remaining $15 million in Finance and Service Fees that Respondent improperly paid to GGS through 1999 and any additional amounts through April 30, 2000, the impropriety arises because Respondent failed first to obtain Petitioner's approval--not because any transaction was otherwise necessarily improper. Concerning the remaining $15 million, then, Petitioner should give Respondent and GGS/Superior Group an opportunity to request retroactive approval for the payment of all or part of this sum, without regard to the lateness of the request. Applying any and all factors that Petitioner would ordinarily apply in considering such requests, Petitioner can then reach an informed determination as to the propriety of this $15 million in Finance and Service Fees. If Petitioner determines that Respondent must obtain from GGS/Superior Group repayment of any Finance and Service Fees, then Petitioner may consider the issue of the timing of the repayment. As Petitioner mentions in its proposed recommended order, an evidentiary hearing might be useful for this purpose. Obvious sources would be setoffs against Management Fees and Finance and Service Fees that Respondent is presently paying Superior Group.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final cease and desist order: Determining that, without the prior written consent of the Department, Superior Insurance Company paid Finance and Service Fees to GGS/Superior Group in the net amount of approximately $15 million, plus all such amounts paid after the period covered by this case through April 30, 2000. Requiring that Superior Insurance Company immediately file all necessary documentation with the Department to seek the retroactive approval of all or part of the sum set forth in the preceding paragraph. If any sum remains improperly paid after implementing the procedure set forth in the preceding paragraph, establishing a reasonable repayment schedule for Respondent to impose upon Superior Group--if necessary, in the form of setoffs of Management Fees and Finance and Service Fees due at the time of, and after, the Final Order. Determining that Superior Insurance Company inadequately disclosed related-party transactions and ordering that Superior Insurance Company comply with specific guidelines for the reporting of these transactions in the future. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 S. Marc Herskovitz Luke S. Brown Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street, Sixth Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Clyde W. Galloway, Jr. Austin B. Neal Foley & Lardner 106 East College Avenue, Suite 900 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (11) 120.569120.57624.310624.4095624.418624.424626.7491627.901627.902628.371628.461
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LEHIGH UTILITIES, INC. vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 80-001202 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001202 Latest Update: Feb. 09, 1981

Findings Of Fact Although numerous customers were present, four of them testified at the hearing. No service quality problems were described with regard to either water or sewer service. Indeed, several of the customers described water quality as being good or excellent. The primary concern of the customers was the magnitude of the proposed rate increase, although a number of then opined that some increase in rates may he necessary. Expert engineering witnesses presented by both the Comission and the Petitioner established that the Utility has not been cited by any local, state or federal agency for health or environmentally related violations. No corrective orders are in force either by the Department of Environmental Regulation, the Lee County Health Department, or the Public Service Commission. The water and sewer treatment exceeds all governmental quality standards extant. In order to enhance service quality, the company has constructed a one million gallon ground storage tank and has installed an additional high-service pump. All parties agree that the cost of these improvements should be added to the Utility's rate base for purposes of this proceeding. Rate Base The Utility propounded evidence alleging its proper water rate base to be $1,872,470.00 and the appropriate sewer rate base to be $1,917,931.00. In arriving at the Utility's net investment in property used in the public service (rate base), it is necessary to calculate the amount of contributions-in-aid-of-construction, which serve to decrease the Utility's investment. Normally, where there has been a previous rate case for a utility in which the utility's net investment would have been determined by the Commission, the calculation of the utility investment in a current rate case is generally competed by adding additions to plant-in-service and subtracting additional contributions-in-aid-of construction in order to arrive at the current net "return yielding" investment. In the instant proceeding, however, Lehigh has elected to take issue with the amount of contributions-in-aid-of-construction (CIAC) previously determined by the Commission in the last rate case. In that last case (Docket No. R-73384-WS), the amount of CIAC was determined by multiplying water connections by $350.00 and sewer connections by $400.00. (See Exhibits 10, 19 and 20) The Utility in the prior proceeding agreed with that method of calculation and, further, two land sales contracts in evidence show that a charge of $750.00 for "sales price of water and sewer" to purchasers of houses in the service area has been imposed by the Utility or its predecessor, Lehigh Corporation (development company), when the Utility was merely a division of the development company. Notwithstanding that prior position, the Utility in this proceeding has elected to attempt to prove its level of CIAC ab initio and has conducted a "Special CIAC Study" in an attempt to show that the amount of contributions is now substantially less than the amount it and the Commission agreed to be applicable in the last rate proceeding and that which the Commission maintains is germane to this proceeding. The Utility thus is alleging that the appropriate charge per connection for CIAC is $650.00 for a water and sewer connection as opposed to the Commission's contention that the figure should be $750.00 per connection. Although a developer's agreement with an affiliated company shows a water and sewer connection charge of $650.00, the testimony of a senior officer of the Utility establishes that there were a total of 1,308 such contracts indicating a sales price for water and sewer service of $750.00. The Utility contends that only $650.00 of the $750.00 charge in question was actually transferred to the utility company and that, therefore, the $650.00 is the appropriate amount to attribute to CIAC. There is no question, however, that with regard to these 1,308 land sales contracts, that $750.00 was actually collected from the lot purchasers involved as the sales price of water and sewer service. Thus, the actual amount of CIAC paid by those 1,308 customers was $750.00 each, for a total of $981,000.00 for water and sever service and that figure represents in its entirety contributions-in-aid-of-construction. The contracts for which the customers involved paid $750.00 for water and sewer service, were entered into in the latter 1960's and early 1970's. Prior to that time, the same type of contracts carried an amount of $650.00 for water and sewer and following the period of time when the fee was $750.00, the line item in the contract was changed so that there was no longer any separate item providing for "sales price of water and sewer." The water and sewer charge was thereafter included in the amount charged for "sales price of improvements." Thus, contrary to the position of Lehigh, because of the segregation of the items in the purchase price shown in these land sales contracts into separate figures for price and for the sales price of water and sewer service, there have been shown to be definite, proven amounts of contributions-in-aid-of-construction supported by company records. The remaining portion of the contributions attributable to the Utility and not represented by these contracts were contributed in the sum of $650.00 per connection, with which figure both parties agree. An additional issue regarding contributions and the "Special CIAC Study" concerns contributions recorded as income from the inception of the Utility operation until November 30, 1964. As demonstrated by Exhibit 12, the amount of contributions recorded as income equals $756,656.00. The Utility's own "Special CIAC Study" refers to contributions recorded as income and Lehigh received sums of money for the availability of water and sewer service in the early 1960's which it treated as income. During the early 1960's when the Utility was regulated by Lee County, the Lee County regulatory board allowed it and other water and sewer utilities to receive and record service availability fees as revenue. This was done in order to enhance the apparent financial posture of the utilities and therefore improve their credit status as an aid to financing improvements. There is no question that those fees during this time period were paid into the Utility or its predecessor for water and sewer service availability and hence should properly be accounted for as CIAC. It might be argued, as the Utility does, that if Lehigh declared the contributions it received to be revenues with the Internal Revenue Service, then the benefit of those contributions or the amount of revenue they represent to the Utility would be reduced by the amount of the resulting income tax, and that if they are now determined to be contributions instead of revenue that an additional detriment to the Utility would occur by the reduction by that amount of its rate base and, therefore, its dollar return. It should be pointed out, however, that because of the tax advantages of the Utility's demonstrated operating loss carry-overs and investment tax credits, as well as accelerated depreciation, all of which tax advantages this Utility has been able to employ, no actual income tax has been paid on such "revenue." Further, Lehigh is depreciating this $756,655.00 in assets in its returns to the Internal Revenue Service and is thereby recovering the costs of the assets. If the Utility is permitted to treat them for regulatory rate-making purposes as revenue instead of CIAC, then the effect would be to maintain rate base and return at a correspondingly higher level than if these amounts are determined to be CIAC, which would reduce rate base and thereby the net investment upon which a return could be earned for regulatory purposes. Thus, the appropriate amount of contributions-in-aid-of-construction for the water system as of the closing date of March 31, 1979, equals $1,057,000.00. The amount of contributions-in-aid-of-construction attributable to the sewer system as of that date equals $1,389,977.00. (Net of amortization). The detailed calculations and adjustments supportive of the above findings with regard to rate base are attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Schedules I, II and II. The first issue to be concerned with in calculating the operating expense basis for the revenue requirement is the cost of the above-referenced CIAC study. The Utility prepared this special CIAC study because of its fear that, in view of the Commission's decision in Tamarac Utilities, Inc. v. Hawkins, 354 So.2d 437, that it would not otherwise be able to meet its burden of proof on the issue of contributions and therefore would suffer a dismissal of the petition. In the Tamarac case, the Public Service Commission auditors encountered numerous problems resulting from a lack of primary data supporting the amount of contributions and the Commission issued an order allowing the Utility to provide clarifying evidence. When the Utility failed to satisfactorily perform this task, it ultimately suffered a dismissal of its petition and a refund of monies collected under interim rates. In this case, however, it has been demonstrated that there is no dearth of primary data or books and record supportive of the level of CIAC; nor has an order been issued requiring this Utility to provide such clarification or a "study" of its CIAC. Moreover, in the case of this utility, a previous rate case has been finalized wherein it was found by the Commission that there was a definite, specific level of contributions which were also consistent with those alleged by the petitioner in that proceeding. Thus, there is adequate primary data upon which a determination of CIAC can be computed in this proceeding without resort to a "Special CIAC Study" and the additional increment of rate case expense it represents. It should be further noted that even if the instant case involved a "Tamarac situation" where financial books and records were not adequate to properly document contributions-in-aid-of-construction that, in that event, if a CIAC study were made, then the proper rate-making treatment would be to amortize tile cost of that study over several years, since it is a large, nonrecurring expense in the Utility's operation, as opposed to allowing the entire expense to be written off (and charged to the customers through rates) based upon one year. The Utility has alleged that certain additional pro-forma adjustments to various expense items should be accomplished in order to arrive at the appropriate revenue which will support an adequate rate of return. Thus, the increased costs alleged for purchases of lime, chlorine and gasoline, depicted in the attached schedules incorporated herein, were undisputed, agreed to, are reasonable and therefore should be accepted. The alleged pro-forma cost for payroll is a mere estimate and not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Additionally, it was established by the Commission's accounting witness that certain rate case expenses arose from a prior rate case and therefore should be removed from consideration in arriving at revenue requirements for purposes of this proceeding. This adjustment was not contested, nor were similar adjustments to remove depreciation expense on construction work in progress, to remove depreciation expense on the contributed property, to remove unsupported property taxes, and to remove property tax as an expense and depreciation expense attributable to non-used and useful portions of the Utility's invested plant. None of these adjustments were disputed by the Utility. They are appropriate and reasonable and should be adopted. The Utility has also requested allowance of a $55.00 annual fire hydrant charge and a $10.00 charge for the initial commencement of service. The Utility submitted evidence (Exhibits 6 and 7) supportive of the actual number of water and sewer connections made during the test years as well as the costs upon which the initial commencement of service charge requested is based. The Commission did not dispute, therefore, the requested $10.00 charge for initial commencement of service and, inasmuch as the current $25.00 annual fire hydrant charge was established in the late 1960's and was shown to be no longer sufficient to cover costs, the Commission also did not dispute the increase in the annual fire hydrant charge from $25.00 to $55.00, which accordingly should be increased. Cost of Capital The Utility has requested a rate of return of 11.76 percent which includes an attrition allowance of .78 percent. There is no dispute as to the debt-equity ratios in the capital structure of the Utility. The common stock equity represents approximately 49.57 percent of the total capitalization. Long-term debt makes up 35.96 percent of capital and cost-free capital items make up 14.47 percent. The cost rate of the equity in the capital structure was established by the Commission's financial expert witness to be 14.5 percent or the midpoint in a range for companies and utility companies possessing a similar degree of risk to equity investors of 13.5 percent to 15.5 percent. The 14.5 percent cost of equity figure represents an accurate assessment of the opportunity costs of equity capital for such a company. The imbedded cost of long-term debt is 8.3 percent, which is a very advantageous rate to be enjoyed by such a company in today's money market and reflects a high degree of management efficiency on the part of the operation and management personnel of the petitioner. These two items, when combined with a zero cost factor shown to be appropriate for the cost-free capital items, results in a calculated rate of return of 10.35 percent, which does not take into account an attrition allowance due to inflation. The Utility advocated an attrition allowance equal to 10 percent of the weighted cost of equity capital to help offset the erosion in earnings caused by inflation. There can be little doubt that attrition of earnings due to significant inflation in costs of operation experienced by such companies is a very real factor. However, this record contains no substantial and competent evidence to demonstrate whether the utility wants coverage of capital attrition or attrition of its ability to cover operation and maintenance expenses nor which could justify the alleged 10 percent factor or any other quantification of attrition of earnings which may be experienced. Thus in the absence of a definitive establishment of the appropriate attrition factor, a cost of equity and a corresponding return on rate base in the midpoint of the range found above is appropriate. Thus, the proper return on rate base for this Utility has been shown to be 10.35 percent, which is within the range 9.85 percent to 10.84 percent. A summary of the cost of capital structure and weighted cost of capital calculation is depicted as follows: CALENDAR YEAR 1979 COMMON STOCK EQUITY RATIO 49.57 COST RATE 14.5 WEIGHTED COST 7.19 LONG TERM DEBT 35.96 8.8 3.16 COST FREE 14.47 -0- -0- 10.35 Floor CSE at 13.5 9.85 Ceiling CSE at 15.5 10.34 In summary, the required operating revenue for the Utility's water system should be $658,451.00 which results in an operating income of $211,407.00. The sewer system requires an annual, gross operating revenue of $475,629.00 in order to obtain a return or operating income of $130,017.00. The operating expenses and adjustments supportive of these figures are depicted in more detail in Schedules IV, V and VI attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein. The sewer revenue requirement found herein is less than the interim revenues authorized for sewer service, thus a refund is in order.

Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Lehigh Utilities, Inc. be granted in part, and that the Utility be authorized to receive a gross annual water revenue of $658,451.00 and gross annual sewer revenue of $475,629.00 to be achieved by rates filed with and approved by the Public Service Commission. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Utility be required to file revised tariff pages containing rates designed to produce annual revenues in the above amounts. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Utility be required to refund the interim sewer revenues previously authorized in this proceeding which exceed those sewer revenues determined to be appropriate herein. It is further RECOMMENDED that the above refunds be accomplished within ninety (90) days. This Recommended Order entered this 13th day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: R. M. C. Rose, Esquire 1020 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William H. Harrold, Esquire 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 367.0817.19
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TWIN PALMS MOBILE HOME COURT, INC., AND DOWN YONDER MOBILE HOME ESTATES, LTD. vs RANCH MOBILE WWTP AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 91-000330 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Jan. 15, 1991 Number: 91-000330 Latest Update: May 29, 1991

The Issue What is the appropriate rate to charge for providing waste water treatment services to the customers of Ranch Mobile WWTP, Inc.?

Findings Of Fact Ranch Mobile WWTP, Inc., is a Class "C" wastewater treatment facility located in the City of Largo, Florida. The original certificate currently held by Ranch Mobile was issued on March 22, 1977 to Midway Service Corporation and was transferred on April 17, 1985 to Ranch Mobile. Ranch Mobile serves three mobile home parks, Ranch Mobile, Down Yonder and Twin Palms. The utility is owned by its largest customer, Ranch Mobile, a cooperative mobile home park with 488 members. Down Yonder has 229 members, and Twin Palms has 149 members. After purchasing the utility, Ranch Mobile commenced efforts to bring the utility in compliance with Department of Environmental Regulation's requirements. These efforts included preparing new percolating ponds, which, when completed, did not allow the utility to meet DER requirements. Faced with disciplinary action by DER, Ranch Mobile was offered the option by DER of connecting to the City of Largo's wastewater treatment facility in lieu of much more expensive procedures which were not guaranteed to meet DER requirements. Suffice it to say, Ranch Mobile opted for connecting to the City of Largo system and did so. It is to recover the costs of the services provided by the City of Largo that Ranch Mobile seeks the rate increase here involved. On April 3, 1990, Ranch Mobile filed for a staff-assisted rate case and paid the filing fee. On May 22, 1990, the PSC staff engineer conducted a field investigation resulting in memorandum dated June 4, 1990. (Exhibit 1) The PSC Division of Audit and Finances reviewed the utilities operation expense, files, and rate application to establish reasonableness of the original cost, utility plant retirements, and quality of service, resulting in the memorandum dated August 21, 1990. (Exhibit 3) On September 27, 1990, a customer meeting was held to allow customers to provide testimony regarding the qualify of service being provided by the utility. No adverse testimony to quality of service was offered. Although Petitioners' witness questioned some minor costs allowed by the PSC staff report, this witness was not qualified as an expert in utility rate proceedings, and his opinion is given little, if any, credence. The rates proposed in Exhibit 2 are just, reasonable, compensatory, and not unfairly discriminatory, and conform to the requirements of Section 367.081 and 367.0814, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered approving and establishing rates for Ranch Mobile to charge its customers as set forth in the Final Order granting temporary rates in Event of Protest and Notice of Proposed Agency Action, Order Approving Increased Rates and Charges. ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Reynolds, Esquire Suite 300, 100 2nd Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Vernon R. Wagner, Esquire 4508 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33711 Robert J. Pierson, Esquire E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0863 Steve Tribble Director of Records and Recording East Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Susan Clark General Counsel Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Room 212 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 David Swafford Executive Director Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Room 116 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Florida Laws (2) 367.081367.0814
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COOPER CITY UTILITIES, INC. vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 80-001188 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001188 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Cooper City Utilities, Inc. provides water and sewer service to its customers in Broward County, Florida, under the jurisdiction of the Commission pursuant to Chapter 367, Florida Statutes. The company was incorporated in 1973. All of the outstanding stock of the utility was owned by Moses Hornstein until his death on October 28, 1979, when ownership thereof became vested in the estate of Moses Hornstein, deceased. The personal representatives of this estate are Gertrude Hornstein, S. Lawrence Hornstein, and Judith A. Goldman. Gertrude Hornstein serves as president of Cooper City Utilities, Paul B. Anton as vice president, and Lawrence Lukin as secretary. Quality of Service At the hearing, a representative of the Broward County Health Department testified concerning the quality of service. Although some customer complaints had been received, there are no outstanding citations against Cooper City Utilities, Inc., and the quality of the utility's service will be improved when its new lime-softening plant, under construction, is completed in approximately August, 1980. The investigation by the Commission's staff engineer did not reveal any outstanding citations against either the water or sewer treatment facilities. Accordingly, on the basis of the entire record, the evidence supports a finding that the utility is in compliance with all state standards, and that the quality of its water and sewer service is satisfactory. Rate Base and Operating Statement Between the time in July when public hearings commenced, and September 24 when the hearings concluded, the utility abandoned its position on several matters which had been in dispute, leaving only two controverted subjects for resolution. These two remaining areas of disagreement are, (1) the cost of money [because of a pending petition for approval of additional financing (Docket No. 800562-WS)], and (2) the expense for an additional field laborer hired subsequent to the test year, which the utility seeks to have included as a pro forma expense. Based on the stipulation of the parties, the following schedule sets forth the rate base of Cooker City Utilities (Exhibit 15): Water Sewer Utility plant in service $2,331,137 $3,723,347 Plant held for future use (47,989) (166,375) Accumulated depreciation (286,651) (460,297) CIAC (net of amortization) (1,322,487) (2,302,707) Working capital allowance 51,083 37,680 Rate Base $ 725,093 831,648 Based on the stipulation of parties, prior to any consideration of the allowance of any expense for the laborer hired subsequent to the test year, the following schedule sets forth the utility's operating statement (Exhibit 15): Water Sewer Operating Revenues $ 368,562 $ 489,886 Operating Expenses: Operation 346,916 232,406 Maintenance 61,750 69,030 Depreciation 22,447 25,543 Amortization -0- -0- Taxes other than income 55,853 75,043 Other expenses -0- -0- Income taxes -0- -0- Total Operating Expenses $ 486,566 $ 402,022 Operating Income (Loss) $ (118,404) 87,864 5. On the matter of allowance of sufficient revenue to cover the cost of one additional laborer hired after the test year, the estimated annual expense is approximately $7,240. However, to the extent that this employee was hired due to an increase in the number of customers subsequent to the test year, or due to plant capacity not used and useful, it is not a proper pro forma adjustment. Without an affirmative showing that the laborer was necessary during the test year for existing customers, the adjustment should be disallowed, and there is insufficient evidence in this record to support such a finding. On the issue of cost of money, during the test year the utility's capital structure was composed of one hundred percent debt at a stated cost of ten percent. In Docket No. 800562-WS the company seeks Commission authority to borrow an additional sum of $450,000, and it plans to amend this application to include authority to borrow $400,000 more in order to make refunds to customers in compliance with a Commission order which was upheld in Cooper City Utilities, Inc. v. Mann (Fla. Sup. Ct. Case No. 58,047, September 12, 1980). However, the utility's proposed debt has not yet been approved by the Commission, and will not be incurred until some time in the future, if approved. In these circumstances, it is not appropriate to take the cost of new debt into consideration in determining cost of capital in this rate case. The evidence in the record supports a ten percent cost of capital. The earned rate of return for the water system is a negative 16.33 percent. The earned rate of return for the sewer system is 10.57 percent. Therefore, the utility's water rates should be increased, and its sewer rates should be decreased, to achieve an overall ten percent rate of return. Accordingly, the annual revenue requirement for the water system is $564,370, which amounts to an annual revenue increase of $195,808. The annual revenue requirement for the sewer system is $485,067, which amounts to an annual revenue decrease of $4,819. Rate Structure The present rates of Cooper City Utilities are structured in the conventional manner, consisting of a minimum gallonage charge and a one-step excess rate over the minimum. The utility proposes. rates with the same basic structure, but with changes in the minimum charge and the minimum gallonage allowance. However, the Commission has consistently taken the position that any rate that requires customers to pay for a minimum number of gallons, whether used or not, is discriminatory. Invariably, a base facilities type of rate structure has been required to be implemented in these circumstances. Under the base facilities charge, each customer pays a pro-rata share of the related facilities cost necessary to provide service, and in addition, pays only the cost of providing the service actually consumed under the gallonage charge. The evidence in this record supports the implementation of the base facilities charge form of rate structure. Under its tariff, Cooper City Utilities is authorized to charge guaranteed revenues in an amount equal to the minimum rate for water service and the applicable rate for sewer service for each equivalent residential connection to be served for a period of one calendar year in advance. Under the base facilities charge type of rate structure, the utility should be authorized to collect guaranteed revenues solely in the amount of the base facilities charge.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Cooper City Utilities, Inc., 3201 Griffin Road, Suite 106, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 33312, be granted for the water system and denied for the sewer system, and that the utility be authorized to file revised tariff pages, containing rates designed to produce annual gross revenues of $564,370 for its water system and $485,067 for its sewer system. It is further RECOMMENDED that the utility be required to implement a base facility charge type of rate structure. It is further RECOMMENDED that the utility be required to make appropriate refunds to its sewer customers in amounts to be approved by the Commission. It is further RECOMMENDED that the rate-refunding bond filed in this docket be maintained until the utility has accomplished the refunds indicated above. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 18th day of November, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrew T. Lavin, Esquire Post Office Box 650 Hollywood, Florida 33022 Sam Spector, Esquire Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James L. Ade and William A. Van Nortwick, Esquires Post Office Box 59 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 John W. McWhirter, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2150 Tampa, Florida 33601 Alan F. Ruf, Esquire 2801 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 William H. Harrold, Esquire Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION In re: Application of Cooper City DOCKET NO. 800415-WS (CR) Utilities, Inc. for a rate increase ORDER NO. 9699 to its water and sewer customers in DOAH CASE NO. 80-1188 Broward County, Florida. ISSUED: 12-16-80 / The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter: WILLIAM T. MAYO GERALD L. GUNTER JOSEPH P. CRESSE JOHN R. MARKS, III Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, William B. Thomas, held public hearings in this matter on July 16 and 17, and on September 23 and 24, 1980, in Cooper City, Florida. The Division of Administrative Hearings assigned Case No. 80-1188 to the above-noted docket. APPEARANCES: Andrew T. Lavin, Esquire Post Office Box 650 Hollywood, Florida 33022 and Sam Spector, Esquire Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 for the Petitioner, Cooper City Utilities, Inc. James L. Ade and William A. Van Nortwick, Esquires Post Office Box 59 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 for PCH Corporation Intervenor in opposition. John W. McWhirter, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2150 Tampa, Florida 33601 and Alan F. Ruf, Esquire 2801 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 for the City of Cooper City, Florida, Intervenor in opposition. William H. Harrold, Esquire Florida Public Service Commission 101 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 for the Respondent, Florida Public Service Commission and the public generally. The Hearing Officer's Recommended Order was entered on November 18, 1980. The time for filing exceptions thereto has expired and no exceptions have been filed. After considering all the evidence in the record, we now enter our order.

Florida Laws (1) 367.081
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TIMBERLAND UTILITIES vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 80-002045 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-002045 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact On or about July 7, 1980, Timberland Utilities (hereinafter "Petitioner") filed a petition for permanent rate relief and immediate interim rate relief with the State of Florida, Public Service Commission (hereinafter "Commission") seeking authority to increase its authorized rates to realize an increase in authorized revenues from the provision and sale of natural gas to its customers within its service area pursuant to chapter 366, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a public utility as that term is defined within Section 366.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner provides and sells natural gas to its subscribing customers within its service area which comprises Cantonment, Florida, and the immediately surrounding rural and unincorporated territory in Escambia County, Florida. Petitioner was last granted permanent rate relief by the Commission on or about June 25, 1975, pursuant to Commission Order No. 6746, Docket No. 74768- GU. For purposes of this proceeding the Commission authorized Petitioner to use the twelve months beginning January 1, 1979 through and including December 3, 1979 as the test year period for this proceeding. During the test period, at its existing rate structure Petitioner experienced a loss in net operating income of $24,680.00. On or about September 4, 1980, the Commission authorized an interim rate increase under bond for Petitioner of $34,644.00, before taxes, pursuant to the Commission's Order No. 9520, Docket No. 800200-GU. Petitioner and the Commission have agreed on the following salient points: Capital Structure and Rate of Return The capital structure as of December 31, 1979, is: WEIGHTED AMOUNT RATIO COST COST Partner's Equity $137,465 55.18 12.34 6.81 Short Term Debt 96,280 38.65 13.46 5.20 Customer Deposits 15,381 6.17 8.00 .49 $249,126 100.00 12.50 The Commission has agreed to accept Petitioner's proposed overall return of 12.50 percent based on the year end 1979 capital structure. Rate Base The Petitioner and Commission agree on the following rate base as proposed by the Petitioner and adjusted by the Commission. Utility's adjusted year end Rate Base: $359,485.00 Commission adjustments (explained below): $ 79,007.00 Rate Base (December 31, 1979): $280,478.00 Calculation of 13 Months Average Plant in Service: Petitioner used a year end rate base in determining its requested rate relief whereas a 13-month average rate base is more appropriate. A 13-month rate base has been calculated which has the effect of increasing the Petitioner's rate base by $24,584.00. Extraordinary Property Loss: During the last month of the test year, Petitioner abandoned certain cathodic protection plant which was not used and useful. This was the result of a show-cause proceeding in Docket No. 79-650-GU, regarding the noncompliance with certain rules and regulations related to the cathodic protection of its distribution system. Since this plant was retired during the last month of the test year, it was not included in Petitioner's rate base but is included in the 13-month average rate base. This plant was not used and useful during the test year, therefore, it would be appropriate to remove it from plant in service together with the related reserve for depreciation which results in a net reduction to rate base in the amount of $19,268.00. Pro Forma Plant Adjustment - 1981 and 1982 Construction Labor: Petitioner included in its pro forma plant adjustment $23,380.00 and $14,476.00 for estimated 1981 and 1982 labor for constructing its replacement of abandoned plant in service related to its cathodic protection system. Since this adjustment relates to estimated expenditures, so far removed from the test year, it should be disallowed from Petitioner's constructed rate base. Meter and Regulator Change Out: Petitioner included in its pro forma plant adjustment $33,523.00 and $9,900.00 for changing out 683 meters and regulators, or virtually all of its meters and regulators. Petitioner is only required by Commission rules and regulations to change out 10 percent of its meters and regulators each year or a complete change out over a 10-year period. Because of the plant replacement program being undertaken currently, Petitioner has deferred this change out. However, in order to make the test period as normal as possible, it would be appropriate to allow at least a 10 percent change out, or approximately 70 meters and regulators, which would require a reduction in Petitioner's constructed rate base of $38,453.00. Plant In Service - Credit Memo Subsequent to its test year, Petitioner received a credit memo from Sherrod and Associates for work performed during the test year and recorded in plant. Therefore, it is appropriate to reduce test year plant in service by $600.00. Plant In Service - Misclassified Expenses: During the test year, Petitioner classified certain expenditures totalling $1,213.00 which more appropriately should have been expensed. This adjustment also affects the Company's Pro Forma Expense Adjustment No. (f), related to annual surveys and is discussed under Net Operating Income Adjustment No. (f). Plant In Service - Radio Tower: Petitioner recorded on its books a radio tower which was owned by a previous partner and not used by the utility. Petitioner and the Commission agreed to reduce Petitioner's rate base by the net cost of $124.00. and Working Capital - 1/8 Operating and Maintenance and Tax Lag: Because of certain adjustments to operating and maintenance expenses together with two items involving taxes other than income taxes, which were improperly classified as operating expenses, it is appropriate to reduce the allowance by $804.00. Also, since adjustments were made to income taxes, it is also appropriate to reduce rate base for the related tax lag in the amount of $273.00. Net Operating Income The Petitioner shows a net operating loss of $24,680.00 for the test year. The commission has made adjustments of $38,616.00 as described below to show an adjusted net operating income of $19,936.00. The utility has accepted these adjustments which are: Interim Increase in Revenues: Petitioner was authorized by Order No. 9520, issued September 4, 1980, to increase its rates on an interim basis, which would generate $34,644.00 in additional annual revenues. N.O.I. was increased by this amount less related revenue taxes of $34,081.00. Insurance Expense: Subsequent to the test year, Petitioner changed insurance agents resulting in lower insurance rates in the amount of $2,453.00. N.O.I. was adjusted by this amount which is proper to reflect known changes. Non-Utility and Out-of-Period Expenses: During the test year, Petitioner recorded as operating expenses $1,118.00 which related to a prior period and non-utility expenses. Therefore, it is appropriate to reduce expenses by this amount. Depreciation Expense: During the test year, Petitioner depreciated certain plant that was abandoned subsequent to the test year. The abandoned plant was removed from plant as a pro forma adjustment but the related depreciation expense was not adjusted. Depreciation expense was accordingly reduced by $1,698.00, since it is nonrecurring in nature. Amortization Expense: Petitioner originally included certain items in its extraordinary property loss account, which more appropriately should have received normal retirement treatment. Since these items were improperly included in the amortization of these property losses, Petitioner and the Commission have agreed to reduce same by $298.00. Pro Forma Survey & Consultant Fees: Petitioner made a pro forma adjustment to this expense to reflect a normal recurring cost of performing annual surveys. Petitioner stated that the annual recurring amount was $1,952.00 but it recorded only $950.00 for the test year, because of $1,213.00 in expenses misclassified as plant in service during the test year. After adjusting the Company's pro forma adjustment, the effect is to reduce this expense by $211.00. State and Federal Income Taxes: Petitioner was originally organized as a partnership and has not been subject to state and federal income taxes. However, effective January 1, 1981, Petitioner plans to incorporate and will be subject to these taxes. Net operating income, therefore, has been adjusted to recognize income taxes as a proper expense in the amount of $1,243.00. Rate Design (a) Petitioner and the Commission have agreed to the use of flat rates for residential and commercial rate schedules. Petitioner and the Commission have agreed to eliminate the net gross billing feature for residential and commercial rate schedules. Petitioner has agreed that its tariff should be revised to comply with current Commission rules, practices and procedures. Petitioner has agreed that revised pages 75, 76, 86, 88, 89 in the "R" section of the MFR's will be filed consistent with discussion with Commission staff at Petitioner-Staff conference. Petitioner has agreed with the Commission to increase the connection and reconnection charges for village and rural service areas to $10.00 and $15.00, respectively. Petitioner and the Commission have agreed that the N.O.I. deficiency, expansion factor and revenue requirements are as follows: Timberland Utilities Revenue Requirements Calculation Staff Adjusted Rate Base: $ 280,478.00 Rate of Return (Requested by Petitioner): 12.5 percent Required N.O.I.: $ 35,060.00 Staff Adjusted N.O.I.: 13,936.00 N.O.I. Deficiency $ 21,124.00 N.O.I. Deficiency at 17 percent Rate: $ 17,570.00 Expansion Factor at 17 percent F.I.T. Rate: :- 78.0888 percent Revenue Requirements: $ 22,500.00 N.O.I. Deficiency at 20 percent Rate: $ 3,554.00 Expansion Factor at 20 percent F.I.T. Rate: :- 75,3553 percent Revenue Requirements $ 4,716.00 TOTAL ADDITIONAL REVENUE REQUIREMENTS: $ 27,216.00

Florida Laws (2) 120.57366.02
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AUDREY LILLIEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF REBECCA LILLIEN vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 85-002458 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002458 Latest Update: Oct. 13, 1986

Findings Of Fact Rebecca Lillien is a 32-year-old developmentally disabled person who was involuntarily committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' (hereinafter "HRS") Residential Care Program. HRS has placed Rebecca Lillien at the Lyall Group Home in Opa Locka, Florida, under the Community Residential Training program. Rebecca Lillien also attends a day training program at United Cerebral Palsy in Miami, Florida. Under contract, HRS pays Lyall Group Home $411 per month to provide residential care (room, meals, and supervision) for Rebecca Lillien. Rebecca Lillien's total income consists of Social Security survivor's benefits and Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter "SSI") disability benefits totaling $345 per month. The SSI Program is a federal welfare program administered by the Social Security Administration. The SSI Program provides up to $345 per month in cash benefits to elderly, blind, or disabled persons who also meet financial eligibility requirements (income less than $345 per month and countable resources of less than $1,600). Audrey Lillien is the mother of Rebecca Lillien and is the representative payee of Rebecca's Social Security and SSI benefit checks. Audrey Lillien's total income consists of Social Security and SSI benefits totaling $345 per month. Rebecca Lillien is an adult client. She is unmarried and is considered to be a family of one since she is over the age of 18, has not been declared legally incompetent, does not have a guardian, and has no dependents. The Social Security and SSI benefits she receives are legally hers. On February 17, 1983, HRS granted a total waiver of fees for the residential care of Rebecca Lillien at the Lyall Group Home, retroactive to July 23, 1982. At the time the fee waiver was granted in 1983, Rebecca Lillien's only income was from Social Security and SSI benefits., From February 1983 until March 31, 1985, HRS did not bill Audrey Lillien for Rebecca's care. During that same time period, HRS did not require the annual submission of a completed Maintenance Fee Information Form, HRS Form 280, in order to determine the continued eligibility of Rebecca Lillien, for a total fee waiver or a reduced fee. In 1983, the Fee Collection Review Committee, in determining whether to grant a fee waiver or reduction, improperly considered personal expenses paid by parents for adult children. Due to serious fiscal impact and budget deficits in HRS District Eleven (the district within which Rebecca Lillien resides), the Pee Collection Unit was reorganized and received training on fee collections. It was discovered at that time that the Fee Collection Unit and the Fee Collection Review Committee were not following proper procedures for assessing a fee and were misinterpreting state law. Specifically, they were not requiring that a client's income based on benefit payments is to be applied first to the cost of care and maintenance of the client. In 1985 fee collections began to be implemented by District Eleven in a uniform manner in strict accordance with the regulations and policies of HRS. The provision that required as priority that room, board, and maintenance be offset was strictly enforced. This change in interpretation and implementation of the fee collection regulations and policies is not in violation of or contrary to any existing statute, regulation, or rule; rather, it is in compliance with the existing statutes, regulations, and rules. In March 1985, HRS assessed a monthly fee of $295 for the care and maintenance of Rebecca Lillien. The fee was calculated on the total income of Rebecca Lillien minus $50 personal allowance. The fee was assessed against Audrey Lillien in her capacity as representative payee. The personal allowance is an amount of $50 given to residential care clients for personal needs such as clothing, recreation, hygiene products, and miscellaneous needs. In March 1985 the personal allowance was $40 per month, but it was increased to $50 per month as of July, 1985. If a client's personal needs exceed $50 per month, HRS is authorized to allow $28 more per month as an incidental allowance, payable to the group home. In March, 1985, Audrey Lillien was notified by HRS that the monthly fee for Rebecca's maintenance would be $295. HRS further notified Audrey Lillien that Rebecca was responsible for that fee retroactively and interest would be assessed on the retroactive balance. At the final hearing in this cause, HRS properly waived any claim for retroactive payment and therefore any claim for interest. HRS is required to develop an habilitation plan each year for Rebecca Lillien. This annual habilitation plan sets forth the treatment and therapeutic objectives for the coming year based upon the needs of Rebecca Lillien. On April 3, 1985, an habilitation plan was developed for her. The HRS team that evaluated Rebecca Lillien determined that a group home was the most appropriate placement for her. The evaluation team also determined that Rebecca Lillien should continue regular visitation with her mother as long as it remains beneficial to her and that she should continue to participate in activities she enjoys, such as musical programs, movies, and going to restaurants. The evaluation team further determined that Rebecca Lillien needs training in daily living skills and in self-care skills. The daily-living goal is for Rebecca to be able to verbalize and demonstrate appropriate behavior in stores, and the goals for self-care skills include grooming and the ability to independently choose pieces of clothing that coordinate. There is no mention in the habilitation plan that any items must be purchased, however. Further, the daily living skills and self- care skills are part of the training Rebecca receives at the United Cerebral Palsy Program, the cost of which is paid by HRS. It is beneficial to Rebecca for her mother to reinforce the training that Rebecca receives in the day training program so as to support her continued progress in the development of those skills. The habilitation plan also calls for routine medical and dental care and vitamin C supplements. HRS and Medicaid pay for all medical and dental expenses of the client, including prescriptions. Rebecca Lillien is a healthy person who has good teeth and, as such, does not have extraordinary or unusual medical or dental expenses. There is no evidence that Rebecca Lillien has required any dental or medical care at all over the last several years. Petitioners did introduce one bill for a "consultation" but presented no evidence as to the reason for that consultation and, therefore, no evidence that that charge should have been incurred. Although Audrey Lillien does purchase vitamin C for Rebecca Lillien, she does not purchase any prescription drugs for her. The habilitation plan developed on April 30, 1986, contains the same goals and recommendations as the 1985 plan. HRS does not pay for Rebecca Lillien's clothes, personal care items, recreation needs (other than those provided by the group home), spending money, transportation to visit her mother, food, and shelter expenses not incurred at the group home, or medical and dental costs not covered by medicare or medicaid. Audrey Lillien uses Rebecca Lillien's income to cover her own household expenses and transportation, as well as to provide Rebecca with the items enumerated in the preceding Finding of Fact. Rebecca Lillien stays with her mother Audrey Lillien approximately every other weekend and on holidays. Audrey Lillien purchases two different sets of clothing for Rebecca. One set is for use at the group home and the other is for use at Audrey Lillien's home. Based upon Petitioners' income and the totality of circumstances, duplication of wardrobes is excessive and unwarranted. Rebecca Lillien has a hobby of making beaded jewelry. In a four-month period Audrey Lillien spent almost $300 on beads for Rebecca, including a total of $226 on a single day--March 6, 1986. 8ased upon Petitioners' income and the totality of circumstances, expenditures of this amount are excessive. Audrey Lillien spends approximately $100 per month for groceries for Rebecca for the days that Rebecca is visiting her. In addition, she and Rebecca also dine at restaurants while Rebecca is visiting. Such a food expense is excessive. Audrey Lillien claims-transportation expenses as expenses incurred on Rebecca's behalf. Audrey Lillien's testimony as to the expense of maintaining her personal automobile is conflicting, and her testimony that 98% of her automobile expenses are attributable to Rebecca's transportation is simply not credible. In view of Rebecca's regular visits with Audrey Lillien, however, allowance should be made for some reasonable expense of transporting Rebecca between the Lyall Group Home and her mother's home, with that expense being paid out of an incidental allowance. Audrey Lillien has monthly household expenses of approximately $52 (mortgage on her condominium), $65 (condominium maintenance fee), and $100 (utilities). Her mortgage payment and maintenance fee are fixed and have no relationship to whether Rebecca is visiting. Although her utility bill may vary somewhat depending upon the frequency and duration of Rebecca's visits, no evidence was introduced to show what portion of Audrey Lillien's utilities bill might be attributable to Rebecca. Audrey Lillien gives Rebecca Lillien $30 a month for "whatever she wants. n This amount is less than the standard personal allowance of $50 given by HRS to each of its residential clients and is, indeed, in addition to the $50 personal allowance paid by HRS. Audrey Lillien pays for Rebecca Lillien's haircuts. These cost $8 every four to six weeks. She also pays for some special shampoo and skin cream which Rebecca needs. The evidence is unclear as to whether the shampoo and skin cream are medically required. If they are, it may be that these items should be billed to medicaid or to HRS as covered prescriptions. Upon receiving notice in 1985 of the assessed fee of $295 per month ($345-$50=$295), Audrey Lillien requested a review of that fee for purposes of being granted a reduction or a waiver of the fee. The HRS Fee Collection Unit, which determines what fee is to be charged, does not have authority to assess a lower fee than the fee calculated by deducting the personal allowance from the total monthly income. The HRS Fee Collection Review Committee may review an assessed fee and, based upon allowable expenses and other criteria, may grant a reduction or waiver of that fee. For example, the fee may be reduced or waived if the client can show severe, unusual and unavoidable expenses or obligations that warrant special consideration. The personal need allowance of $50 per month is not sufficient to meet the personal needs of Rebecca Lillien in view of the fact that Rebecca spends a fair amount of her time residing with Audrey Lillien rather than at the Lyall Group Home where HRS pays for her support. Fifty dollars is the amount of personal allowance paid by HRS, apparently regardless of whether it is needed. However, Rebecca has unusual needs in that, as opposed to other clients, she incurs regular transportation costs between the Lyall Group Home and her mother's home, food must be purchased for her while she is at her mother's home, and her mother must pay increased utilities while she is there. HRS will pay an additional $28 a month (in addition to the $50 personal allowance) for unusual expenses. Clearly, Rebecca's food, transportation, and utility costs while at her mother's logically exceed $28 per month and Rebecca is, therefore, entitled to the extra $28 payment from HRS. Petitioners are not entitled to a reduction in the assessed fee, however, since they have failed to prove the reasonable costs of Rebecca Lillien's unusual expenses of transportation, food, and utilities attendant to her visits with her mother.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Rebecca Lillien's request for a waiver of fee; assessing a fee of $295 per month, effective upon entry of a Final Order in this cause; and granting to Rebecca Lillien the sum of $28 per month as an incidental allowance in addition to the $50 per month standard personal allowance to assist in the unusual expenses related to her visits with her mother, effective upon entry of a Final Order in this cause. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1986, LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rena R. Magnolnick, Esquire 2138 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 206 Miami, Florida 33137 Carmen Dominguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2200 N.W. 7th Avenue Miami, Florida 33127 Leo PloLkin, Esquire 2085 U.S. 19 North Suite 314 Jenniffer Complex Clearwater, Florida 3357

Florida Laws (2) 120.57402.33
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