The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for nonconforming status on his property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of facts filed by the parties, the following findings of fact are determined: Mr. Mayhew resides in Hawthorne, which is located in the southeastern portion of Alachua County (County). (Some papers filed in this case identify his residence as being in Cross Creek, rather than Hawthorne, but with the same street address.) Since November 1998, he has owned property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida. More specifically, the property is in an older, single-family residential neighborhood known as Florida Park which is located several blocks west of U.S. Highway 441, which runs in a north-south direction through the City, and approximately one-quarter mile north of Northwest 8th Avenue. In broader geographical terms, the property is located around one mile north of the University of Florida campus. There are two structures (or units) on Petitioner's property. One is a three-bedroom, two-bath dwelling constructed by the original owner (Mr. Gainous) in 1949, who occupied that dwelling with his wife. That unit's address is listed on the County Property Appraiser's records as 1607 Northwest 12th Road. The second structure, a two-bedroom, one-bath dwelling (also referred to as a "cottage"), was built by Mr. Gainous in 1957, and was apparently used primarily as rental property by the owner. The address of the second unit on the Property Appraiser's records is 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road. Separate gas meters and a single water line and electric meter serve the two units. (Although the two units are given separate street addresses by the Property Appraiser, only one tax bill is issued by the County Tax Collector.) When these structures were built, the County did not issue building permits. The property was in the unincorporated area of the County until 1961, when the City annexed the property. In 1964, the City adopted its first zoning plan and placed the property in what was then known as the Single-Family Residential (R-1a) zoning district. This category was used since the property was "closely consistent" with that zoning classification. A few years later, the property was rezoned to the Residential Single-Family zoning district (RSF-1), which apparently replaced the R-1a zoning district, and it still remains in that zoning classification. Under current zoning regulations, unless a property has "legal" nonconforming status, two family dwellings are not permitted in the RSF-1 zoning district. However, if a structure and use of land was in existence before the City annexed the property and adopted its zoning code, and was not otherwise shown to have lost that status, the nonconforming use is grandfathered and allowed "to continue until [it is] removed" or otherwise conflicts with conditions pertaining to nonconforming lots, uses, or structures. See § 30-346, Code of Ordinances. (Nonconforming status allows the owner to rent each unit on the parcel to no more than three unrelated persons. Thus, six unrelated persons could legally occupy Mr. Mayhew's two units. However, Mr. Mayhew has always rented to smaller numbers of tenants, and then only to graduate students or "professionals.") One way a property can lose its status is for the owner to not use the property in a nonconforming status for nine consecutive months. In the case of a rental property, this means that the owner has not rented the property for at least nine consecutive months. If this occurs, the owner is presumed to have abandoned the nonconforming status. See § 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances. The precise date on which the City began using the nine-month time period is unknown. According to Mr. Calderon, this time period has been in the Code of Ordinances for "awhile," it was in the Code of Ordinances when "Citywide zoning" was first used in 1982, and he implied that it was in the first zoning code adopted in the 1960s. The City has no formal process by which it monitors properties to ensure that they continue to meet the requirements for legal nonconforming status. Generally, the issue arises after a complaint is filed by a third party or an inspection is made by City officials, who then require that the owner confirm (or prove) that the property still qualifies for that status. In this case, in October 2006, the tenant who occupied the cottage filed a complaint with the City concerning the installation of a new gas stove and other possible code violations. Prior to that time, no other complaints had been lodged against Mr. Mayhew's property. In response to that complaint, a code enforcement officer, Michael Wohl, inspected the property. During the course of that inspection, Mr. Wohl noticed that there were two rental units on one parcel of land. As a routine part of the inspection process, Mr. Wohl made an inquiry to determine if Mr. Mayhew had a landlord permit for each unit. Under the Code of Ordinances, a landlord permit is required for each rental unit. (The specific provision in the Code of Ordinances which imposes this requirement was not given.) According to Mr. Calderon, this requirement has been in the Code of Ordinances since 1989. Mr. Wohl learned that Mr. Mayhew had purchased one landlord permit for the parcel in the year 2000 (and had renewed that permit each year) but did not have a second permit. (When he purchased the property in late 1998, Mr. Mayhew did not know that such permits were even required. He obtained one as soon as this was brought to his attention.) After Mr. Mayhew advised Mr. Wohl that he was unaware that a permit was needed for each unit on his property, Mr. Wohl spoke with Mr. Calderon, who instructed Mr. Wohl to verify if the property was a legal nonconforming use (and therefore could qualify for two landlord permits) since it was located in a single-family zoning classification. Shortly thereafter, a citation was issued to Petitioner. The specific nature of the citation was not disclosed. In any event, by letter dated September 25, 2006, Mr. Calderon requested that Mr. Mayhew provide documentation to support the nonconforming use of the cottage at 1607 1/2 NW 12th Road as an accessory dwelling unit. In response to Mr. Calderon's request, on October 2, 2006, Mr. Mayhew submitted a lengthy letter with supporting documentation, including photographs of the units; copies of rental agreements of tenants who had rented the cottage since he had purchased the property in November 1998; information regarding the date of construction of the two units; and Property Appraiser records showing two units on the parcel. On December 7, 2006, the Department advised Mr. Mayhew by letter that "[b]ased on the physical evidence, property appraiser records and documents provided by you, the property is therefore classified as an existing non-conforming two-family development and is subject to regulations governing non-conforming uses." However, because the City apparently has a policy of notifying residents who live within 300 feet of the subject property of this type of decision, the City also issued on the same date a Notice of Decision to Issue Non-Conforming Status to Petitioner's Property (Notice)." (The record is unclear whether this notice was given pursuant to a policy or a specific Code provision. Other provisions within the Code of Ordinances provide for such notice when the Board conducts hearings on variances, appeals alleging error by an administrative official, and requests for special zoning exceptions. See § 30-354(h)(6)(i)-(k), Code of Ordinances.) In response to the Notice, affidavits were filed by a number of residents who lived adjacent to, or near, the subject property. After reviewing those affidavits, on December 20, 2006, the Department advised Petitioner by letter that based on "new information . . . submitted by affected persons within 300 feet of your property . . . [the] staff [is going to] reconsider the nonconforming status of your property." On January 25, 2007, Mr. Calderon issued a letter denying Mr. Mayhew's request for the following reasons: I have reviewed the information you submitted and those submitted by surrounding property owners. Based on the information and affidavits, there appears to be no consensus or conclusive data establishing emphatically that the subject property has been used consistently as a two-family development since annexation into the city. Evidence from the property owner would suggest that since 1998, the subject property has been used as a two- family dwelling and that no nine-month period has elapsed where the property was not used as a two-family dwelling. However, due to uncertainty for the period around and prior to 1998, staff cannot make a determination about the status of the development around and prior to 1998. Staff cannot determine whether the subject property was illegal, legal non-conforming or lost its non-conforming status at the time of ownership change in 1998. Since the current zoning of the subject property is RSF-1 (Single-family residential, 3.5 dwelling units per acre), the current use as a two-family dwelling is not permitted. Staff is therefore denying the request on the basis that available information cannot demonstrate continued use of the property as a two-family development, since annexation into the [C]ity of Gainesville. On February 8, 2007, Mr. Mayhew filed his appeal of that decision. Because Mr. Mayhew alleged that there were disputed issues of material fact, the appeal was forwarded to DOAH, rather than the Board. In his appeal, Mr. Mayhew alleged that the City had improperly relied on affidavits from neighbors to reconsider its decision, that there was no new evidence submitted to support a change in the City's initial decision, and that he could not get a fair hearing from the Board because several members of the Board live in the affected neighborhood or are members of a neighborhood association that includes the Florida Park area. Section 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances, as amended in November 2006, provides the following restrictions on nonconforming uses: Whenever a nonconforming use of land or a building or other structure or any portion thereof is abandoned or the use is discontinued for a continuous period of nine months or more, such abandonment or discontinuance shall be presumed to constitute an intention to abandon or discontinue such use, and such use shall no longer be permitted. Any subsequent use of such building or structure or land shall be in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. Although this section was amended in November 2006, the amendment did not affect (or otherwise change) the nine- month time period for losing a nonconforming use. Prior to the amendment, the section provided that if a nonconforming use was lost due to abandonment or discontinuation, the reestablishment of the use could be authorized by the Board, after hearing, if the Board found the design, construction, and character of the building not suitable for the uses in the district in which the nonconforming use is situated. Under the new amendment, that option no longer exists. The history note to this provision indicates that the original ordinance (No. 3777) was adopted on June 10, 1992, and was later amended on July 25, 1994.1 (However, Mr. Calderon indicated that the nine-month period dates back many years before the adoption of this particular Ordinance. See Finding of Fact 5, supra.) When an owner is required to demonstrate that his rental property has continuously retained its nonconforming status, he must show that the property has been continuously rented (with no nine-month breaks) not only for the period of time that he has owned the property, but also for the entire time the property has enjoyed nonconforming status, or in this case since the property was annexed by the City. Thus, Mr. Mayhew was obligated to show that the original owners (Mr. and Mrs. Gainous) rented the property continuously from the time the property was annexed in 1961 until it was sold to Mr. Mayhew in late 1998. The City's practice is to determine nonconforming status on a case by case basis but the burden is on the owner to prove that status through records such as building permits, landlord permits, zoning compliance permits, and occupational licenses, and "records from reputable sources." The parties agree that both units were continuously rented by Mr. Mayhew since the time he purchased the property in November 1998. The dispute here is whether the nonconforming use was abandoned for any nine-month period prior to Mr. Mayhew's purchase of the property. The City contends that Mr. Mayhew has presented no evidence to show that the cottage was rented by the prior owner from 1996 until the property was sold in late 1998. Although Mr. Mayhew clearly established (and the City agrees) that the property has been continuously rented since he purchased the parcel in late 1998, he conceded that the cottage was vacant when he purchased the property, that he had made no inquiry to the seller as to how long the cottage had been vacant, and that he had no personal knowledge regarding the rental history of the property during the three years preceding the purchase. He contended, however, that there are always periods of time when a unit remains vacant while the owner is actively seeking a new tenant or when necessary renovations must be made. While this is true, there is no evidence that this occurred during the years 1996, 1997, or 1998. (It is unknown where Mrs. Gainous presently resides, or even if she is still alive. When the property was sold in late 1998, Mrs. Gainous was described as being elderly and in poor health.) Significantly, City records show that Mrs. Gainous had secured landlord permits to rent the cottage from 1989 (when permits were first required) through 1995, but she had failed to obtain any permits for the years 1996, 1997, or 1998, at which time she sold the property to Mr. Mayhew. This raises a logical inference, not overcome by Mr. Mayhew, that she did not rent the cottage during those years. In addition, Dr. Kosch, who has lived across the street from the subject property for the last twenty years, testified that he personally observed several periods of time before the property was sold to Mr. Mayhew when there were no tenants in the cottage. Although Dr. Kosch could not specifically identify the exact time periods when this occurred (due to the passage of time), his testimony adds further support to a finding that there is insufficient evidence that the cottage was rented continuously (without any nine-month breaks) during the years 1996-1998. Mr. Mayhew purchased the property with the understanding that he could legally rent both units. While it may seem unfair for him to now have to prove that the property has been continuously rented (with no breaks exceeding nine consecutive months) since the 1960s, this interpretation of the Code of Ordinances has always been followed by the City without exception. According to Mr. Wohl, this situation has occurred at least 8 or 9 times in the last few years alone, and in each case, the property owner was required to prove a continued nonconforming use since the property was annexed by the City or placed in a more restrictive zoning classification.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Walter J. Zawada, is the owner of Lot 43 in College Hill Estates located at 731 Oberlin Drive, Clearwater, Florida. A residential home is situated on the lot. The property is currently zoned RS-75 (Single-Family Residence District) and was created primarily for single-family residential development. A large oak tree sits in the front yard of Zawada's property. In order to avoid cutting down the tree, the house was constructed approximately seven feet closer to the rear property line. Consequently, the back yard is smaller in size than other property owners in the neighborhood. Petitioner has constructed a 15' x 30' swimming pool in his back yard. He has also placed a concrete deck around the pool. A six foot-wooden privacy fence has been erected on the rear and side property lines. Because of the small back yard, a distance of only eight feet, nine inches lies between the edge of the pool and the north side property line. The concrete deck is only two feet from the line. Petitioner wishes to construct an aluminum enclosure on the north side of the pool. An enclosure is required to shield the pool from oak tree leaves that have clogged the pool filter. Existing zoning regulations dictate that the minimum setback from the side property line for swimming pool enclosures be no less than six feet. Under the plans submitted by Petitioner, the enclosure would be erected two feet from the side property line, thereby requiring a four-foot variance from existing regulations. Petitioner contends the variance is necessary because, if none were granted, the enclosure would have to be constructed on top of the concrete decking. This in turn would leave only two feet, seven inches of space between the edge or lip of the pool and the inside of the enclosure. Petitioner estimates that at least three feet of space is necessary in order to safely permit construction of the enclosure. He also points out that the home is unique to other property owners because a large oak tree in the front yard resulted in a smaller back yard in which to place a swimming pool. The City opposes the application on the ground Petitioner created a self-imposed hardship. It reasons that he constructed the pool and deck too close to the property line and gave no consideration to the space that would be required should an enclosure be constructed at a future date. Therefore, it contends Petitioner does not qualify for a variance.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, H.A.P. Partnership, has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. The Petitioner, H.A.P. is a general partnership. The partners of the Petitioner are Billy G. and Jeanette Smith, Earl and Marie Womble, Mr. W. H. Sharp, Larry and Hilda Strom and Charles and Margaret Fulton. The Petitioner's address is 5174 Maddox Road, Tallahassee, Florida. In May, 1985, the Petitioner purchased approximately 3.1 acres of land, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20-409 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 1"). Parcel 1 is located at 4015 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. At the time of purchase by the Petitioner, Parcel 1 was zoned R-3, single and two-family residential. Under R-3 zoning, a maximum of 7.2 units per acre of land could be constructed. Parcel 1 was purchased by the Petitioner from Billy Hatcher. In December, 1986, the Petitioner purchased an adjoining parcel of property consisting of approximately 3.5 acres, Tax Identification No. 21-04-20- 408 (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 2"). Parcel 2 is located at 3969 North Monroe Street, Leon County, Florida. Parcel 2 was zoned R-3 at the time of its purchase by the Petitioner. Parcel 2 was purchased by the Petitioner from Marie Bannerman. Development of the Property; Prior to the Petitioner's Purchase. The previous owner of Parcel 1, Billy Hatcher, had retained Poole Engineering to develop plans for site location on Parcel 1, of multi-family dwellings. A stormwater management permit, number 4241, was issued by Leon County to Mr. Hatcher on June 25, 1984. Mr. Hatcher also obtained a permit from the State of Florida Department of Transportation for a driveway onto Parcel 1 from North Monroe Street. The permit was approved June 12, 1984. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for Parcel 2 prior to the Petitioner's purchase of Parcel 2. The Petitioner relied upon the zoning on Parcel 1 and 2 and the permits that had been issued with regard to Parcel 1 at the time that the Petitioner purchased Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. Parcel 1 and 2 would not have been purchased otherwise. Development of the Property; Subsequent to the Petitioner's Purchase. In November, 1987, the Petitioner retained PVC Corporation to plan the development of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), and to provide project management services for the development of multi-family residences on the Property. Consistent with R-3 zoning, PVC Corporation proposed a development consisting of 42 units on the 6.6 acres of the Property. In the Summer of 1989, the Petitioner sought a change in zoning for the Property. The Petitioner's request to have the Property zoned commercial was denied by Leon County. No permits were obtained from Leon County or any other entity for the Property subsequent to the Petitioner's purchase of the Property. Except for the stormwater management permit, no other permits were obtained from Leon County by the Petitioner and no request for building permits, plots or site plans were submitted to Leon County. Development of the Property was not commenced by the Petitioner. Alleged Change in Position or Obligations and Expenses Incurred. The total purchase price for Parcel 1 was $156,000.00. The total purchase price for Parcel 2 was $110,000.00. The Petitioner paid a total of $106,572.87 in interest on the Property, $15,109.67 in real property taxes and $2,300.00 in engineering fees. Vadden Shadden, M.A.I., appraised the Property on January 18, 1988, prior to the effective date of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, at a value of $417,500.00. On November 3, 1990, Mr. Shadden appraised to value of the Property to be $41,750.00, taking into account compliance with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Development of the Property under the 2010 Plan. Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Property is located in an area designated as Lake Protection Land Use. Property in the Lake Protection Land Use category may be developed by the construction of one dwelling unit for residential purposes per two acres, plus minor commercial uses (retail but not office uses) of up to 20,000 gross square feet. Site plan approval for all commercial property over five acres is required by the Leon County Subdivision Regulations. Procedure. On or about November 12, 1990, the Petitioner filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with Leon County. By letter dated February 26, 1991, from Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, the Petitioner was informed that the staff of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department had recommended that the Application be denied. Mr. Gumula also informed the Petitioner that a hearing before a Staff Committee could be requested. Charles Fulton, general partner of the Petitioner, informed Leon County that the Petitioner waived its right to a hearing before the Staff Committee and requested a formal hearing before a Hearing Officer. By letter dated March 19, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal hearing in this case.
Findings Of Fact Appellants are the owner of the residence located at 1387 Lemon Street, Clearwater, Florida, having purchased the property in October 1991. The residence is a 3-bedroom 2-bath house containing approximately 1600 square feet. On the back of the property and adjacent to the house is a patio and screen porch. The proposed storage shed would be located some 10 feet from the screened room and rest on concrete blocks. The proposed storage shed is 10 feet by 14 feet and would extend into the 7 feet utility easement in the rear of the property and come within 2.83 feet of the real property line. The Clearwater Building Code requires a 10 foot setback from the real property line. Accordingly, Appellants have asked for a 7.17 foot variance. Appellants intend to store books and records in this shed, if approved, as they contend there is insufficient room in the house for these records. Appellants engaged the services of a person observed erecting a gazebo a few blocks away to construct the storage shed. The contractor employed by Appellants apparently was not licensed and when Appellant asked the contractor if he needed a permit for the storage shed the contractor advised that he didn't pull permits. Appellants engaged the contractor to construct the storage shed without making any inquiries to the city building department to ascertain if a permit was required. After the structure was nearly completed a stop work order was posted on Appellants residence because no permit had been issued for the work. When Appellants applied for a permit it was learned that the proposed building would encroach into the setback and that a variance would be required before the permit could be issued. When the variance was applied for the Planning and Zoning Board denied the variance for the stated reason that the application did not meet the requirements of Section 137.012 of the Land Development Code of the City of Clearwater. These proceedings involve Appellants' appeal from that denial. Appellants' lot is neither square nor rectangular having a slight curve generated by Lemon Street in front and the rear property line runs at an oblique angle with the side property lines which run north and south. However, this rear property line is only a few degrees from being perpendicular to the side property lines. The plat plan accompanying the variance request shows none of the lots in the vicinity of Appellants lot to be truly rectangular and are little different in shape than is Appellants' lot. Appellants' backyard is quite small with the southeast corner of Appellants' house approximately 15 feet from the rear property line. A spa located in the southwest corner of this lot appears from Exhibit 2 to be approximately 10 feet from the rear property line. Appellants propose to have the storage shed painted to look like the house and to be firmly secured against heavy weather. Appellants contend that it would constitute a hardship if they are not granted the requested variance. Appellants also contend that their property is unique; but unless the location of the house near the rear property line constitutes a unique situation, no other evidence was presented that their lot is substantially different from all of the other lots in the vicinity. When Appellants moved into this house they found that the previous owners had used the southeast portion of this lot for storing old lumber and other junk which Appellants cleaned up to make room for the proposed storage shed. They contend the proposed shed is a vast improvement over the clutter formerly existing in this location.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered real estate salesman who holds license no. 005499. He was employed as a "listing solicitor" three days per week by World Wide Property Services, Inc., a registered real estate broker (now dissolved) from December 1, 1975 to June 1, 1976, soliciting listings for real estate in Florida. The solicitation was by telephone nationwide except Florida. Seymour L. Rottman was President of World Wide Property Services, Inc. and Lee Small was Vice President of the corporation during the time Respondent was employed. The purpose of World Wide Property Services, Inc. was to secure listings of and purchasers for various Florida properties. Mr. Rottman was a subpoenaed witness for Petitioner at subject hearing. During Respondent's period of employment he and Mr. Small were in charge of hiring salesmen for the company and hired Respondent. Respondent was employed to obtain listings by telephone from property owners who lived out of state but owned Florida property. The procedure followed was for a salesman to call an out of state land owner picked from a list of prospects and inquire if he or she would be interested in selling their property at a higher price than it had been purchased for. This was termed a "front" call and the salesman was termed as a "fronter". If the prospect expressed interest in listing the property, his or her name was provided to World Wide Property Services, Inc. who then mailed literature to the property owner describing the efforts that would be made by that organization to sell the property. Enclosed with this material was a listing and brokerage agreement. This agreement provided that the owner of the property would pay a prescribed listing fee to World Wide Property Services, Inc. which would be credited against a 10 percent commission due that firm upon sale of the property. In return, the corporation agreed to include the property in its "listing directory" for a one year period, direct its efforts to bring about a sale of the property, advertise the property as deemed advisable in magazines or other medium of merit, and to make an "earnest effort" to sell the property. The accompanying literature explained that the listing fee was necessary in order to defray administrative costs of estimating the value of the property, merchandising, advertising, brochuring and cateloging the information. The material also stated, that advertising would be placed in various foreign countries and cities of the United States. In addition, it stated that the property would be "analyzed", comparing it to adjacent property to arrive at a price based on recent sales of neighboring property and also review the status of development and zoning in the immediate area of the property to assist in recommending a correct selling price for approval by the owner. During the course of the calls to prospects Respondent advised them that the property would be advertised internationally and in the United States and that bona fide efforts would be made to sell the property. He represented himself as a salesman for that organization. After the promotional literature was sent to the prospect, the salesmen including Respondent, made what was called a "drive" call to answer any questions and to urge that the property be listed. After making these calls Respondent had no further contact with the property owner. The listing fee was $325. The salesmen received approximately one-third of the fee, about $100 per listing. The salesmen, including Respondent, telephoned the prospects and then read from the script entitled "front" and "drive". The instructions from the broker was to stay within the script but Respondent was not monitored at all times. During the course of operation of less than a year World Wide Property Services, Inc. secured about 200 listings and grossed approximately $80,000 to $90,000 in the "advance fee" listings, but no sales were made. Respondent made no sales but did secure a limited number of listings making a total of $2,400 during the six months employment at the rate of approximately $100 per listing. Respondent said he never visited the properties World Wide Property Services, Inc. had for sale in Florida except properties in Port St. Lucie and in the Grand Bahamas. He felt that property in those two areas was salable. Respondent testified that he read from the script heretofore referred to as "front" and "drive" and did not vary from it. He worked in a "listing office" which was one of the two offices of the employer. He was unaware of articles stating foreign investors were interested in buying Florida property. Respondent did not attempt to make sales inasmuch as it was not the job for which he was employed. He had no knowledge or information that the advance fee operation of which he was a part was an illegal operation or an unethical operation. Respondent had no supervisory capacity in the corporation for which he worked and he testified that he never guaranteed the sale of property to anyone, a fact which was borne out by a deposition of a client Respondent solicited. Petitioner contends: that while a salesman for World Wide Property Services, Inc. Respondent solicited and obtained listings by telephone of property owners and that as an inducement to list the property, falsely represented that the property could be sold for a price far in excess of its purchase price; that a bona fide effort would be made to sell the property and that it would be listed nationally and internationally and that the company had foreign investors wanting to purchase United States property. Respondent contends: that he did not know the "advance fee" operation was fraudulent; that World Wide Property Services, Inc. was a registered broker; that at the time of his employment the actions of his employer had not been held illegal; that he never misrepresented or fraudulently induced any potential customer to get his money.
Recommendation Reprimand the Respondent in writing. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Bush, Esquire Murray & Bush, P.A. Suite 1602-One Financial Plaza Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 3110 vs. DADE COUNTY DOAH CASE NO. 77-1582 LEONARD P. MARCUS, Respondent. /
