The Issue The issues in dispute in this matter are as follow: Was the Respondent, Wit Zajack, responsible for the acts of the Respondent, Home Hunters II, Inc., and its employees prior to July 7, 1981, when Zajack's registration as the corporate broker's active firm member became effective? Was Zajack relieved of responsibility for the acts of the corporate broker by appointing a manager and delegating duties to the manager? Did the Respondents use an advance fee rental contract containing information as required by Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code? Was the language used in said contract by the Respondents contrary to the intent of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and in violation of Section 475.453, Florida Statutes? Did the Respondents fail to refund advance fees upon demand in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(e) and 475.453(1), Florida Statutes? The proposed findings as submitted in this matter by the parties have been considered by the Hearing Officer. To the extent they have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Wit Zajack, is a licensed real estate broker holding License #0219881. The Respondent, Home Hunters II, Inc., was a corporate real estate broker holding License #0218141. At the time of the accounts described in the Administrative Complaint, Home Hunters was operating as a corporate real estate broker. Home Hunters was engaged in a rental service business and advertised rental property information or lists, collecting an advance fee from prospective lessees. Zajack was aware that Home Hunters was engaged in the advance fee rental business from the beginning of his association with the firm. Zajack applied for registration as the active firm member for Home Hunters on March 5, 1981. His application contained various discrepancies and was returned for correction on May 8, 1981. The application was corrected and returned after 20 days 1/ to the Board of Real Estate, whereupon Zajack was registered as the active firm member effective July 6, 1981. On or before May 6, 1981, Zajack was held out to the public as being affiliated with Home Hunters by a sign at Home Hunters' offices on Colonial Drive in Orlando, Florida. At all times material to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Zajack was an officer of Home Hunters. Home Hunters used the contract form exemplified in Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 11 from the start of its business activities until March of 1982. This form does not contain the language required by Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. At least as early as October of 1981, Zajack was aware of the fact that Home Hunters' contract did not meet the requirements of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. He directed Tom O'Toole, the manager of Home Hunters, to correct the forms around the first part of 1982, but the forms were not corrected. Zajack referred all calls and letters of complaint which he received regarding the failure of Home Hunters to make refunds to O'Toole. O'Toole was given the responsibility to deal with all disputes for Zajack. Zajack did not follow up on the complaints. During this time, Zajack resided in Fort Myers, Florida. O'Toole and Zajack's business partner, Ralph Snyder, Jr., organized and ran Home Hunters. Melissa Diehl entered into an advance fee rental contract with Home Hunters on July 1, 1981, paying Home Hunters $50 for this service Diehl did not receive information on apartments which was consistent with the specifications she had given Home Hunters, or which were available for rental. She called Home Hunters about apartments she saw listed in its advertisements in the newspaper and was advised they had been rented. Diehl located a rental on her own and requested a refund from Home Hunters. She made several demands for a refund but never received a refund. She specifically asked to speak with Zajack but was told he was not available. On June 16, 1981, Brenda Mosely entered into an advance fee rental contract with Home Hunters, paying Home Hunters $50 for its services. Mosely called Home Hunters as required by the contract but did not receive listing information which was consistent with the specifications she had stated in her contract. Mosely orally requested a refund of her money after the 21-day period. She was advised to put her request in writing, which she did. She was denied a refund by Home Hunters on the basis that she had not called for 21 days, because she had not called on weekends when Home Hunters was closed. Ralph Tropf contracted with Home Hunters on March 26, 1981, for rental information, paying a $50 fee to Home Hunters in advance for its services. None of the information he received was consistent with the specifications he had given to Home Hunters. Tropf called for the 21-day period required in the contract and found a rental on his own. On April 16, 1981, Tropf made a written request for a refund. He never received a reply from Home Hunters. Tropf reported the matter to the Better Business Bureau, which forwarded to him the reply of O'Toole which stated Tropf had not complied with the terms of the contract to call for 21 days. On April 27, 1981, O'Toole advised Tropf that Zajack was the person to whom Tropf should detail his complaints. In March of 1981, Mrs. Gwenda Eva Roe had a similar experience to those described above in attempting to obtain a refund of money paid by her minor daughter to Home Hunters for rental information services.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondents, Wit Zajack and Home Hunters II, Inc., are in violation of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and Sections 475.453 and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the license of Wit Zajack be suspended for one year. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Ordinance No. 06-03, as adopted by the Village of Islamorada, Village of Islands (Village), is consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development set forth in Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes (2006) (Guiding Principles).1
Findings Of Fact The Florida Keys were originally designated an Area of Critical State Concern (ACSC) by the Administration Commission in 1975 and were re-designated by the Legislature in 1986. See § 380.0552, Fla. Stat. The Legislative Intent Subsection (2) of the statute and the Guiding Principles together require an effective land use management system that protects the natural environment and character of the Keys, maintains acceptable water quality conditions, ensures adequate public facility capacity and services, and provides adequate emergency and post-disaster planning to ensure public safety. The Village's Comprehensive Plan has been adopted pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, as well as the authority of Section 380.0552(9), Florida Statutes. Provisions pertaining to vacation rentals are established in Policies 1-2.1.10, 1-2.4.7, 1-2.4.8, and 1-2.4.9. The policies allow vacation rentals but provide limits for such uses within single-family and multi-family residential properties within the Village. In addition, these policies also provide for the establishment of land development regulations (LDRs), which address enforcement and implementation of those policies. The applicable Village Comprehensive Plan Policies are as follows: Policy 1-2.1.10: Restrict Development of New Transient Units. Transient use shall be defined as any use of any structure for a tenancy of 28 days or less. Transient uses shall be considered as residential uses for the purposes of transferring development rights pursuant to conditions established in Policy 1-3.1.4 of this Plan. Islamorada, Village of Islands shall cap the number of new transient units at the number of current and vested hotel and motel rooms, campground and recreational vehicle spaces existing within the Village as of December 6, 2001. Single family and multifamily residences shall not be considered part of the above cap but instead may be used for transient rental use as provided for in Comprehensive Plan Policies 1-2.4.7 and 1-2.4.8. Policy 1-2.4.7: Limit Transient Rental Use of Residential Properties. Islamorada, Village of Islands shall continue to allow the transient rental use of 28 days or less, of single family and multifamily residential properties within the Village, including properties located within the Residential Conservation (RC), Residential Low (RL), Residential Medium (RM), Residential High (RH), Mixed Use (MU) and Airport (A) Future Land Use Map categories. Property owners located in the RL, RM, RC, MU, RH and A Future Land Use Map categories may continue transient rental subject to the following requirements: Owners of such properties shall annually register with the Village and shall demonstrate at the time of registration: That since December 6, 2001 the owner had continuously either paid or filed for all County tourist development taxes due, and paid local impact fees, for the property it wishes to register; That owner has applied for appropriate state licensure to conduct transient rental for the property it wishes to register and shall receive the license within six months of application; That the property is not registered for a homestead tax exemption pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Florida; and That the property otherwise meets all requirements of the Village Land Development Regulations. The annual registration shall allow up to a total of 331 single family and multifamily transient rental units. For each annual registration period after the initial registration period, the following shall additionally apply: No new transient rental unit shall be allowed in any Residential Medium (RM) Future Land Use Map category, in mobile home parks or in the Settler's Residential zoning district. No new transient rental unit in the RH and MU Future Land Use Map categories may be registered unless it is assessed by the Monroe County Property Appraiser at a value in excess of 600% of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County. No new transient rental unit in the RC, RL, or A Future Land Use Map categories may be registered unless it is assessed by the Monroe County Property Appraiser at a value in excess of 900% of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County. The priority of registration for transient rental units for all registration periods, for purpose of the 311 unit cap, shall be based upon the total number of months that the unit owner has paid the Monroe County tourist development tax, with units registered in ascending order (i.e., those licenses demonstrating the most months of payment shall be the last retired). Notwithstanding paragraph 1.a. above, if the 331 unit cap is not reached in any year by those units that have paid the Monroe County tourist development tax, new units may be given priority by registration date. Property owners permitted transient rental use pursuant to this policy shall lose their privileges and retire their licenses when ownership (in whole or in part) of the unit is transferred, through an arm's length sale of the property or the asset. If the unit is owned by a natural person, the transfer of the fee simple ownership of the unit to the owner's spouse or children shall not result in termination of the license. Policy 1-2.4.8: Enforcement and Implementation of Transient Rental Regulations. Property owners permitted transient rental use pursuant to Policy 1- 2.4.7 shall pay an annual fee to the Village as established by resolution to be used for code compliance related to transient rental uses, with any excess funds to be used to further affordable housing programs. Transient rental unit owners shall lose their privileges and their permits shall be revoked for a property being used for transient rental if the property had been found by non- appealable Final Order on two occasions to have violated the Village Code regarding vacation renal units as provided for in the land development regulations. The Village shall establish land development regulations which shall address enforcement and implementation of transient rental use, including, but not limited to, the following: conspicuous notification on transient rental properties; requiring each unit to identify the unit manager who resides within the village; regulating the number and location of watercraft and automobiles on site; lease agreements to disclose village regulatory requirements and provide for access for adequate code enforcement; advertising to require identification of state and village license numbers; notification to adjacent property owners; and fines, penalties, revocation of license for violation of the regulations including but not limited to the advertising of units that are not lawfully licensed by the Village. Policy 1-2.4.9: Affordable Housing Study. The Village, based on its 2004 Workforce Housing Study, shall analyze appropriate policy revisions to the transient rental comprehensive plan policies and prepare a report no later than December 31, 2005. The Village shall establish and support the efforts of an Affordable/Workforce Housing Citizen Advisory Committee to address the relationship between affordable housing needs and transient rental uses within the Village. The applicable Village LDR, as modified by Ordinance No. 06-03 provides the following2: Section 30-1294. Vacation rental uses permitted within certain multifamily developments. Vacation rental uses shall be permitted to continue after May 1, 2003, in properly located in the Residential High (RH) future land use category of the Village Comprehensive Plan within multifamily developments with mandatory property associations, and if the member properly owners pursuant to applicable association requirements approve vacation rental uses within such multifamily development. Registration of Existing Vacation Rental Units. The owner of a property located in the RC, RL, RM, RH, MU, and A Future Land Use Map categories may continue vacation rental use provided that the owner's use of the unit meets all of the following conditions: Since December 6, 2001, the owner had continuously either paid or filed for all County tourist development taxes due and paid local impact fees for the unit it wishes to register as a vacation rental use; The owner has applied for and received the appropriate state licensure to conduct vacation rental use for the unit; The property is not registered for a homestead tax exemption pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Florida; The unit is not a deed restricted affordable housing unit; and The property otherwise meets all requirements of the Village Land Development Regulations. The Florida Keys Principles for Guiding Development are set out in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes: To strengthen local government capabilities for managing land use and development so that local government is able to achieve these objections without the continuation of the area of critical state concern designation. To protect shoreline and marine resources, including mangroves, coral reef formations, seagrass beds, wetlands, fish and wildlife, and their habitat. To protect upland resources, tropical biological communities, freshwater wetlands, native tropical vegetation (for example, hardwood hammocks and pinelands), dune ridges and beaches, wildlife, and their habitat. To ensure the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. To limit the adverse impacts of development on the quality of water throughout the Florida Keys. To enhance natural scenic resources, promote the aesthetic benefits of the natural environment, and ensure that development is compatible with the unique historic character of the Florida Keys. To protect the historical heritage of the Florida Keys. To protect the value, efficiency, cost- effectiveness, and amortized life of existing and proposed major public investments, including: The Florida Keys Aqueduct and water supply facilities; Sewage collection and disposal facilities; Solid waste collection and disposal facilities; Key West Naval Air Station and other military facilities; Transportation facilities; Federal parks, wildlife refuges, and marine sanctuaries; State parks, recreation facilities, aquatic preserves, and other publicly owned properties; City electric service and the Florida Keys Electric Co-op; and Other utilities, as appropriate. To limit the adverse impacts of public investments on the environmental resources of the Florida Keys. To make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys. To provide adequate alternatives for the protection of public safety and welfare in the event of a natural or manmade disaster and for a postdisaster reconstruction plan. To protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintain the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. Section 30-1294(a)(5) of Ordinance 06-03 has little to no impact on the Guiding Principles, except Principles (a), (d), (j), and (l). All it does it add to the Comprehensive Plan's vacation rental provisions authorizing properties in certain future land use categories to continued pre-existing vacation rental use the requirement those properties "otherwise meet all the requirements of the [LDRs]." In regard to Principle (a), Section 30-1294(a)(5) clearly provides further authority to the local government to regulate land use and development. The evidence also proved that this increased authority will strengthen the Village's capabilities for managing land use and development and achieving the objectives of the Guiding Principles without the continuation of the ACSC designation. Petitioners essentially make the argument that Section 30-1294(a)(5) is inconsistent with Principle (a) because "all requirements" of the Village's LDRs is too broad, too difficult to interpret, gives the planning director too much discretion to interpret the requirement, and places an impossible burden on applicants for vacation rental licenses, which ultimately will discourage compliance and undermine the vacation rental ordinance. The evidence did not prove any of those arguments. In regard to Principle (d), Section 30-1294(a)(5) further ensures the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. In regard to Principle (j), Section 30-1294(a)(5) addresses the critical need for affordable housing within the Florida Keys. With regard to Principle (l), Section 30-1294(a)(5) clearly demonstrates and provides for the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintains the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. When the legislative intent behind Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, is taken in account, it is clear that Section 30- 1294(a)(5) is not the type of land use decision that Chapter 380 is most concerned with. Because this provision does no harm to the natural environment and waters of the Florida Keys ACSC, the State's interest is protected. The issue is essentially local, and deference should be afforded the Village in establishing such regulations through its police powers. Given the purpose of DCA's involvement in this matter, the legislative intent of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the evidence presented in this proceeding, it is clear that Section 30-1294(a)(5) is consistent with the Guiding Principles, considered as a whole.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order approving Ordinance No. 06-03 as consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development set out in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2007.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Gerald Schultz was a real estate broker holding License #0215135 and active firm broker for Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation (formerly Choice Rentals, Inc., and hereinafter "Choice Rentals"), which was a corporate broker holding License #0195222. Rosemary Hufcut entered into a contract with Choice Rentals on July 30, 1980, for Choice Rentals to provide her with rental information based upon criteria she gave Choice Rentals. Hufcut paid a fee of $50 to Choice Rentals for its services. Hufcut was looking for an apartment for herself and her two daughters. She specified she wanted a good neighborhood with good schools. Hufcut was given rental data by Choice Rentals and, with her father, visited a number of the apartments listed. The apartments were not suitable. On the following day, Hufcut requested a refund and submitted a written request for a refund on August 6, 1980. On August 26, 1980, Hufcut's refund request was denied by a letter from Choice Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit #6). This letter provided in part: Refusal to accept available rental properties meeting the requirements as set forth in your contract with us, does not constitute cancellation of contractual agreement. (This is pursuant to the Florida Law regarding "obtaining a rental".) note - produced available rental property meeting the requirements stated on contract. Hufcut has never received a refund from Choice Rentals. The Board introduced Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through #6, which were received in evidence.
Recommendation Having found the Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate suspend the licenses of Respondents for ten years. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. Gerald Schultz c/o John Hume, Esquire 5100 North Federal Highway, Suite 405 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Choice Rentals & Realty 3367 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioners' rental property was licensed under Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners, Robert Meller, Jr., and Kristine M. Meller, were owners of a rental property (a house located at 4516 Bowan Bayou) in Sanibel, Florida. In addition, they owned a condominium in the same area. Respondent Cross held a valid real estate license at all times material to matters at issue. Respondent Cross had a business relationship with Petitioners, which antedated the purchase of the Bowen Bayou house as a result of being the leasing agent for a condominium association with which Petitioners were associated. Respondent DBPR is the State of Florida agency which represents the FREC in matters such as this matter. In January 2000, Petitioners purchased the house in Sanibel located at 4516 Bowan Bayou. On or about January 20, 2000, Respondent Cross mailed a Rental Property Management Agreement to Petitioners for the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou, Sanibel, Florida. The parties to this contract were Petitioners and Properties in Paradise, Inc. Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., signed the contract and returned the contract to Respondent Cross. Petitioners maintain that the Rental Property Management Agreement was not signed by Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., and that his name is forged. He maintains that he entered into an oral agreement with Respondent Cross, individually, to manage the property. From the purchase of the house in January 2000 through April 2001, Petitioners received correspondence, including a monthly "owner statement" reflecting short-term rental income, commissions, and debits for maintenance, from Properties in Paradise, Inc., regarding all aspects of the business relationship contemplated by the Rental Property Management Agreement. By letter dated January 20, 2000, Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., authorized "Revonda Cross of Properties in Paradise as my agent in establishing telephone and electrical service and so forth for my property on Sanibel Island at 4516 Bowen's [sic] Bayou Road." Thereafter, Petitioners received correspondence from Respondent Cross relative to the subject property wherein she is identified as "Operations Manager, Properties in Paradise, Inc." During the relevant time period, Petitioners' property was rented at least 22 times; once for 17 days, four times for 14 days, once for nine days, thirteen times for seven days, and once for five days. The frequency and term of these rentals qualify for the statutory definition of a "resort dwelling" and transient rental dwelling. Properties in Paradise, Inc., listed the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou in the list of properties it provided the Division of Hotels and Restaurants as licensed in accordance with Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2005). In April 2001, Properties in Paradise, Inc., through an attorney, notified clients that it had effectively ceased doing business. At that time, Petitioners were owed $11,588.06, which went unpaid. Petitioners made a claim in July 2001, against Respondent Cross to recover their loss from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. In October 2003, Petitioners' claim was denied by the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, enter a final order denying Petitioners' claim for recovery from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Solla, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Robert L. Meller, Jr., Esquire Best & Flanagan, LLP 225 South 6th Street, Suite 4000 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-4690 Revonda Stewart Cross 1102 South East 39th Terrace, No. 104 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission impose an administrative fine in the amount of $75 on each of the respondents. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1984.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Susan Ellen Walton, was a registered and licensed real estate broker at all times material hereto. The Respondent, Walton Associates, Inc., was a licensed real estate broker at all times material hereto. The Respondents have been issued licenses numbered 0092944 and 0111791, respectively. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure status and practice of real estate brokers, broker salesmen and salesmen in the State of Florida. In October of 1979, Richard E. Turner, Jr. was moving from Gainesville, Florida, to the Daytona Beach, Florida, area. Mr. Turner took two days in October, 1979, and went to Daytona Beach to look for some rentals. He was unable to find any suitable housing through his own efforts so he went to the Respondents' rental agency asking for information regarding residential rental property. Mr. Turner ultimately entered into a written agreement with the Respondents whereby the Respondents would supply him with a list of rental homes that were within his stated financial means. In return for this service, Mr. Turner paid a $40.00 fee to the Respondents. The Respondents supplied Mr. Turner with a list of approximately four homes in the $175.00 to $225.00 per month rental price range. These homes proved to be unsuitable to live in or, on the day in question, were already rented. Mr. Turner therefore returned to the Respondents' office to obtain a second list of homes. He encountered the same problem with the second list of homes supplied him by the Respondents. Mr. Turner then went back to the Respondents' office the third time and was given three or four more houses to survey. On this list, one listing in particular was a house located at 118 Rio Way in Riviera Oaks Subdivision. The rental price stated for that house was approximately $375.00 per month. Mr. Turner made an extensive search to look for 118 Rio Way, but was unable to find the address. He drove all the way around Rio Way and, being unable to locate 118, went to the Riviera Oaks Subdivision sales office on Calle Grande, which was the street on the other side of the Rio Way circle. Riviera Oaks is a Tompkins Development subdivision. Mr. Turner stopped at the Tompkins Development office and talked to a saleswoman, Debbie Snowden, to see if there was a 118 Rio Way address in the subdivision. Ms. Snowden showed him a map of the subdivision in her office which revealed that there was not a 118 Rio Way address listed. Being therefore unable to locate a 118 Rio Way address and rental house, Mr. Turner returned to the Respondents' office. The person who had been helping him in the Respondents' office indicated that the card in their file describing the rental property supposedly at 118 Rio Way showed that a Mr. Frank Kenney was the individual to contact concerning information on that residence. Mr. Turner attempted to reach Frank Kenney but was unable to do so. He returned to Riviera Oaks to see if he could locate Frank Kenney in that subdivision. He went to the sales office and was told by Ms. Snowden that she knew Mr. Kenney, who had formerly worked at her office and, in fact, she now held his former job. With Ms. Snowden's help, Mr. Turner attempted to locate Mr. Kenney once again and was unable to do so. On this occasion, Ms. Snowden attempted to sell Mr. Turner a house and he told her that he would consider it. That same evening, Mr. Turner continued his attempt to find Frank Kenney and was unable to do so. Turner was becoming irritated regarding finding any available rental property. He accordingly returned to see Ms. Snowden at the Riviera Oaks Subdivision and had her show him and his wife a house for possible purchase. They ultimately signed a Contract of Sale for a residence located at 108 Rio Way in the Riviera Oaks Subdivision. That contract was dated October 4, 1979. The Turners gave the Tompkins Development Company a $100.00 deposit on the purchase of this house. After signing the Contract for Sale, the Turners contacted the Respondents about receiving a refund on the rental fee arrangement. Mr. Turner filled out the necessary form in order to obtain the refund of his $40.00. This form was sent to the Respondents and the Respondents were otherwise informed by Mr. Turner that he wished his $40.00 refunded within 30 days from the date Mr. Turner first contacted the Respondents regarding obtaining information about rental property. Mr. Turner subsequently received a speed message bearing the date November 30, 1979, from the Respondents stating that his request for refund had been refused. The speed message was signed by S. Walton of Walton Associates, Inc. (see Petitioner's Exhibit 10). Before denying a refund to the Turners, the Respondent, Walton, contacted Debbie Snowden at Riviera Oaks Subdivision office and asked her if the Turners were indeed renting a house from her, and she responded that they were not renting a house, but were temporarily leasing a house at 108 Rio Way until they could effect the closing of a loan so they could consummate the purchase of that same house. Prior to the execution of the contract, Mr. Turner had told Ms. Snowden that they needed a place to live until the closing of the conveyance of the house and it was agreed by all parties that they could move into the house while awaiting approval on their loan and the subsequent closing, provided the Turners signed a Lease and Occupancy Agreement. The Lease and Occupancy Agreement was required because on past occasions people had put up a deposit of $100.00 on a house and stayed in that house for several months and then left without paying any further for the use of the house. The Lease Occupancy Agreement from Tompkins Development is not a normal procedure, but the general manager for Tompkins Development, Pat Gallo, occasionally lets people move into homes under a Lease and Occupancy Agreement pending closing on that same home for which they have already contracted to purchase. Under the Lease and Occupancy Agreement in question, the Turners were required to pay the costs of the construction loan, which was $10.48 per day. Further, Tompkins Development was shown to be a sales company, dealing only in sales or residential real estate and not engaging in rental of rental property management at all. The only way Tompkins Development would have leased a house such as this one to someone is if the parties seeking to lease the house were under a contract to purchase that house. Tompkins Development simply did not make a practice of advertising homes for rental and did not seek to service individual families coming to them looking for rental housing. After signing the Contract of Sale for the house on October 24, 1979, the Turners moved into the house at 108 Rio Way. One day after they moved into that house, a rain storm flooded the street and so they approached Ms. Snowden regarding that problem and advised her that they did not then wish to buy the house if it was going to be subject to periodic flooding after each heavy rain. After some negotiation, they then signed the contract for 1018 Calle Grande, but this contract was apparently not accepted by the home office of Tompkins Development. The Turners ultimately entered into a contract on March 29, 1980, for a home located at 112 Camino Circle. This contract was subsequently renegotiated and re-executed on May 12, 1980, due to a change in the type of FHA mortgage loan the Turners were obtaining. On July 31, 1980, the Turners closed and completed the conveyance on the house located at 112 Camino Circle. At no time during this series of events did the Turners nor Ms. Snowden nor Tompkins Development mutually agree or understand that the contractural arrangement they had undertaken was for a rental of the house at 108 Rio Way, rather it was, as described above, merely a convenient method whereby the Turners could pay the cost of the construction loan pending the closing of the permanent financing on the dwelling in return for living in it as a convenience to them until time for closing. It was established that prior to October, 1979, neither Debbie Snowden, the saleswoman who negotiated the sale of the residence at 108 Rio Way with the Turners, nor the previous salesman, Frank Kenney, had ever heard of the Respondents, nor did Tompkins Development have a non-exclusive rental agreement (or any other kind) with any rental agency in the Daytona Beach area, including Respondents. The Respondents' real estate brokers licenses have previously been suspended on one occasion in December of 1981 by the Board of Real Estate, now the Florida Real Estate Commission. Their licenses were suspended for a period of 120 days, with 30 days of that penalty period being suspended upon the Respondent, Susan Ellen Walton, making full restitution of a $40.00 rental fee to one Narenda H. Patel. That suspension stemmed from the Respondents' failure to make a refund of a $40.00 rental fee upon demand by Narenda H. Patel within 30 days of the rental fee agreement after Patel was unable to secure a rental using the Respondents' rental fee service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents, Susan Ellen Walton and Walton Associates, Inc., have their licensure status suspended for a period of ninety (90) days, with thirty (30) days of that period suspended provided that the Respondent, Susan Ellen Walton, makes full restitution of the $40.00 due and owing to Richard Turner within ten (10) days of the entry of the Final Order herein. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: John G. DeLancett, Esquire and James R. Mitchell, Esquire 801 North Magnolia Avenue, Suite 402 Post Office Box 6171-C Orlando, Florida 32853 Edward L. Cook, Esquire 1885 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the pleadings on file, the following relevant facts are found: In the October 1, 1982 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 39 at page 2685, notice was published of the respondent's proposed amendment of Rule 12A-1.61, entitled "Rental of Living Quarters, Sleeping or Housekeeping Accommodations." This notice contained the following language: "IF REQUESTED, A HEARING WILL BE HELD AT: TIME AND DATE: 9:00 a.m., October 22, 1982 PLACE: New Capitol, Lower Level" By letter dated October 7, 1982, the respondent received a request for a hearing and notification of an intent to appear at the hearing scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on October 22, 1982, for the purpose of protesting the proposed change in Rule 12A-1.61. This letter was not written by or on behalf of any of the petitioners in this proceeding. The respondent did not acknowledge that it received this request, nor did it schedule or hold the public hearing on October 22, 1982. On October 18 or 19, 1982, the petitioners in this proceeding filed with the respondent a "petition to convene separate proceeding pursuant to 120.54(16), Florida Statutes." Among other allegations, this petition states that: "3. Petitioners are particularly affected by the proposed rule and cannot adequately protect those interests merely by appearing at a public hearing. Petitioners intend to present extensive testimony from their own witnesses and from the staff of DOR. Requiring Petitioners to proceed at a hearing open to the public would so disrupt, hamper and frustrate Petitioners' presentation so as to unfairly restrain Petitioners' ability to adequately oppose adoption of the proposed rule. Petitioners must be afforded an individual proceeding where they would have complete and uninterrupted access to the staff of DOR and be able to present their own witnesses in an adversary-type proceeding, which cannot be done at a standard rule hearing. Only in this manner will Petitioners be afforded a fair hearing on the proposed rule. WHEREFORE Petitioners respectfully request that DOR suspend its rule- making proceedings and convene a separate proceeding under the pro- visions of Section 120.57." The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition to convene a separate proceeding pursuant to Section 120.54(16) on or about October 25, 1982. In the October 29, 1982, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 43, at page 2976, the following announcement appears: "The Department of Revenue announces that the hearing scheduled for October 22, 1982 on Rule 12A-1.61--Rental of Living Quarters, Sleeping or Housekeeping Accommodations, has been deferred for one month. Notice of this Proposed Rule was given in the Florida Administrative Weekly Vol. 8, No. 39, dated October 1, 1982, on pages 2686-2689." By "Final Order Denying Rule-Making Hearing and Draw-out Proceeding" dated November 8, 1982, nunc pro tunc to November 3, 1982, the respondent denied the petitioners' requests for a Section 120.54(3) and a Section 120.54(16) hearing. It was concluded that the requests were filed beyond 14 days from October 1, 1982, the date upon which notice of the proposed rule was published, and thus were untimely. It was found that since no timely request for a Section 120.54(3) hearing had been received by the respondent (a fact which the respondent now admits was erroneous), the respondent was not required to schedule such a hearing and, indeed, had not exercised its option to schedule such a hearing. Therefore, the respondent concluded that there existed no rulemaking proceeding from which to "draw-out" and the petition for a Section 120.54(16) proceeding was therefore moot. No reference was made in the respondent's order to the announcement which had appeared in the October 29, 1982, Florida Administrative Weekly that the October 22, 1982, hearing on Rule 12A-1.61 had been deferred for one month. The respondent's Order also concluded that the request for a draw-out proceeding, even had it been timely filed, was fatally defective for its failure to affirmatively demonstrate that a Section 120.54(3) rulemaking proceeding would not provide adequate opportunity to protect the petitioners' substantial interest. On November 9, 1982, the Governor and Cabinet adopted challenged Rule 12A-1.61, 1/ after receiving comments from the petitioners and counsel for the petitioners in this case. The petitioners received notice that the Governor and Cabinet would take up the proposed rule on November 9, 1982, by way of a telephone call received approximately 24 hours before November ninth. No notice was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly that a public meeting would be held by the Department of Revenue on November 9, 1982, which was the second Tuesday of the month. Notices did appear in the October 8, October 22, and November 5, 1982 editions of the Florida Administrative Weekly that public meetings would be held respectively on October 22, November 3 and November 16, 1982. These notices state that the "Department of Revenue will act on matters duly presented on its Agenda, which may include approval of rules" and other matters. The rules which govern the organization and administration of the Department of Revenue provide that regular public meetings of the Governor and Cabinet to transact the business of the Department of Revenue shall be on the first and third Tuesdays of each month or at such other place or time as may be designated, and that a standard notice of the meeting must be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly at least seven (7) days in advance. Rule 12-1.03, Florida Administrative Code. Any agenda item "deferred must be re-agendaed for the next regularly scheduled meeting of the Governor and Cabinet unless a longer period of deferment is approved by a majority vote of the Governor and Cabinet." Rule 12-1.06, Florida Administrative Code. In summary form, the challenged rule provides, inter alia, that individual condominium units are considered, with certain exceptions, taxable transient rental facilities if rented for periods of less than six months in continuous duration. The rule purports to make owners and/or rental agents for owners of individually-owned condominium units liable for the collection and payment of the applicable sales tax due on the rental. The petitioners in this proceeding are owners and/or rental brokers or agents for owners of individually-owned condominium units in Sarasota, Florida. G & B Properties, Inc. and Sarasota Surf Vacation Rentals, Inc. each had over $1 million in gross rental revenues last year. Many, if not most, of their present leases and rental contracts were entered into prior to the effective date of the challenged rule and the five percent sales, or transient rental, tax was not incorporated into those rental contract terms. The challenged rule has or will cause certain changes in the operations of these petitioners. Additional staff and overtime work are required to notify lessees of the newly imposed tax. New bookkeeping materials are required to account for and handle the tax, and supplies on-hand can no longer be utilized. One real estate agent estimated the expense of changing his bookkeeping system to be $1,500. This agent also opined that a considerable block of renters has been lost due to the increased five percent charge and change in contract terms, and that there has been a loss of goodwill between himself, as a rental agent, and condominium owners and tenants who have entered into lease agreements in years past without the imposition of the tax. Prior to the adoption of the challenged rule, the respondent's rules did not address individual condominium units and a transient rental tax on such units was not collected from tenants, owners or rental agents by the Department of Revenue. The "summary of the estimate of economic impact of the rule" contained in the notice of the amendment of Rule 12A-1.61 appearing in the October 1, 1982, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 39, page 2686, provides as follows: "None. The proposal contains amendments to existing rules and is predicated upon legislation enacted. The fiscal impact occurred upon the amendment to 212.03, F.S. by Chapter 97-359, Laws of Florida." The actual Economic Impact Statement prepared for the challenged amendment recites that the cost to the respondent of implementing the amendment is estimated at $15,122, and the "amount of paperwork is substantial." For the "estimated cost or economic benefit to persons directly affected by the proposed action," the Economic Impact Statement notes that the Revenue Estimating Conference has identified the revenue loss as $2,702,000. It lists those classes of persons (tenants) exempted from the tax as persons benefiting from the rule, and further states that the revenue loss of $2,702,000 will be offset by about $200,000 resulting from the taxable status of certain condominium rentals. The Economic Impact Statement provides that the rule "will not place any business at a competitive disadvantage, nor will it have any impact on the open market for employment." In its "statement of data and method used in calculating estimates," the Economic Impact Statement sets forth the basis for the $15,122 agency cost of promulgating and implementing the proposed rule. It then states that the "revenue impact is based on Revenue Estimating Conference consensus estimates." Neither the "Revenue Estimating Conference," its "consensus estimates" nor the basis or methodology utilized in its figures are further identified or explained in the respondent's Economic Impact Statement. According to the respondent's Director of Research, Planning and Budgeting, the Revenue Estimating Conference is an informal body under the Governor's office consisting of the State Economist and two legislative staff directors whose purpose is to develop revenue forecasts, impacts and estimates in a non-political environment. The figures utilized in the Economic Impact Statement for the challenged rule are taken directly from those utilized in connection with the passage of a 1979 amendment to Section 212.03, Florida Statutes, by Chapter 79-359, Laws of Florida. The respondent did not attempt to make its own estimate of revenues or costs or economic benefits to persons directly affected by the proposed rule, nor did the respondent request the Revenue Estimating Conference to revisit its 1979 estimate of economic impact. The instant petition challenging the validity of Rule 12A-1.61 was filed by the petitioners with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 2, 1982. By Order of Assignment dated December 10, 1982, the undersigned was designated as the Hearing Officer. By letter dated December 14, 1982, the undersigned suggested a final hearing date of January 3, 1983. The undersigned was informed by telephone message from counsel for the petitioners that the parties were going to file a stipulation waiving the requirement that a hearing be held within thirty days. While a written stipulation was never received to this effect, it was the understanding of the undersigned that the parties did not desire to utilize the previously suggested hearing date of January 3, 1983. Through telephone conversations between the offices of the Division of Administrative Hearings and counsel for the petitioner, a hearing date of January 10, 1983, at 4:00 p.m. was originally made available and then was changed to January 14, 1983, because more hours were thought to be necessary to complete the hearing. On January 12, 1983, a notice of appearance as co- counsel for the respondent was filed, as was a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceeding on the ground that the Division of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to entertain this rule-challenge proceeding inasmuch as the hearing was not scheduled within the thirty days required by Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes. Oral argument on this motion was heard prior to the commencement of the final hearing on January 14, 1983. Finding that counsel for the petitioner reasonably believed that respondent's counsel had agreed to waive the thirty-day hearing requirement and that respondent had not demonstrated that it had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever by the four-day delay in commencing the final hearing, the Motion to Dismiss or Stay was denied.
Findings Of Fact At all times referred to in these findings of fact, Carlson was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued License Number 0187184. The last license issued was as a salesman, c/o Pauls Real Estate and Investments, Inc., 441 East Shore Drive, Clearwater Beach, Florida 33515. From October 13, 1982, to June 28, 1983, Carlson was licensed as a real estate salesman in the employ of corporate real estate broker Alliance Real Estate, Inc. of which Nicholas G. Mastro was a qualifying broker and officer. During her employment, Carlson was employed to solicit and obtain landlords and tenants in connection with the rental property management brokerage business of Alliance Real Estate, Inc. Carlson worked out of Alliance's Clearwater Beach office, ten miles from the main office on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, Clearwater. Generally, Alliance's official policy was that the originals of property listings, property management agreements and rental agreements were to be maintained at the main office, with work copies filed at the Beach office. Correspondence and miscellaneous property management papers, such as invoices, frequently are maintained exclusively at the Beach office. Funds were to be deposited into, and checks were to be written out of, Alliance's operating account by Alliance's staff at the main office. However, due to the distance between the main office and the Beach office, it was inefficient and inconvenient for Carlson to follow the official policies and procedures. Instead, Carlson began using her own personal bank account as a conduit for funds flowing to and from Alliance (including brokerage fees to Alliance). She also ceased following the procedure for maintaining certain original papers at the main office and even began maintaining files at her home. Alliance knew or should have known that Carlson was using her personal bank account as a conduit for Alliance funds. Alliance's ledgers showed these transactions, and Alliance's bookkeeper wrote reimbursement checks to Carlson for some of them. Since Ronald Lohr, Alliance's qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over the Beach office, did not testify, the evidence did not preclude the possibility that he had actual or constructive knowledge of this deviation from official policy. Regarding Carlson's maintenance of files (including original papers normally kept at the main office) at her house, Alliance did not have actual or constructive knowledge of this deviation from official policy. Rather, Alliance's minimal supervision of the Beach office gave Carlson the opportunity to deviate from that official policy without detection. Through the combined effect of these circumstances, Carlson was able to operate as a salesman for Alliance in connection with the following transactions while concealing the transactions from her employer and wrongfully retaining brokerage commissions which properly should have been paid over to Alliance. At the conclusion of these transactions (except one), Carlson "pitched" her file on it. In February, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $1,000.00 as rental payments from William Russ, as a tenant, for the rental of Unite 908, Clearwater Point Condominium, 830 S. Gulfview Blvd., Clearwater Beach, Florida owned by Bernhardt Elsen. In March, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $680 from Carl Dotterman, as a tenant, for the rental of Elsen's condominium. Notwithstanding that Carlson had received $1,680, Carlson advised Bernhardt Elsen that she had only received $1,600. Carlson disbursed $1,513.30 to Bernhardt Elsen, calculated as $1,600, minus $160 being a 10 percent management fee, plus $73.39 as reimbursement for payment of an electric bill. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Russ and Dotterman rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Elsen rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In February and March, 1983, Carlson negotiated for her son Martin Carlson, as tenant, and Dr. Rolando Perez, as owner, for the rental of Unit 207, Commodore Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Dr. Rolando Perez. Rent was to be $800. Carlson, for her son, paid Dr. Rolando Perez $720 calculated as $800 minus $80 being a 10 percent management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Carlson rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Perez rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In April, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $500 as rental payment from a Mr. and Mrs. Scalise, as tenants, for the period April 9, 1983, to April 15, 1983, for the rental of Unit 701, Sailmaster Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Anthony and Jeanette Eman. On or about April 14, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained a $100 rental deposit from Mr. and Mrs. Scalise for the rental of Eman's condominium for a period in 1984. On or about April 15, 1983, Carlson disbursed to Mr. and Mrs. Eman the $100 deposit and $200 of the $500 rental payment with $300 thereof being retained by Carlson as a management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Scalise rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Eman rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In January and February, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $2,400 as rental payments from Ernest Pfau, as a tenant, for the rental of Unit 605, Shipmaster Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Joseph Seta. Carlson disbursed to Joseph Seta $2,160 calculated as $2,400 minus $240 being a 10 percent management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Pfau rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Eifert rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. On or about June 7, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained a $100 rental deposit from Lawrence Augostino, as a tenant, for the rental of Unit 706, 450 Gulf Blvd., South Building, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Dr. Donald F. Eifert. Carlson was to hold the deposit until she was able to obtain a listing on the rental property. While waiting for a listing on the Eifert property, Alliance, through Mr. Mastro, became aware of one of Carlson's "secret clients," Mr. Elsen, and confronted Carlson about it. In response to Mastro's demand, she retrieved the entire Elsen file from her home. When Mastro learned about a second "secret client," Dr. Perez, a short time later, Mastro immediately terminated Carlson from her employment on June 15, 1983. Carlson did not advise Alliance of the Augostino deposit and was not able to get a good address for Augostino to return the deposit before she left the Clearwater area to go to Michigan for a month. Carlson collected and received the Augostino deposit in her own name. She engaged in the Eifert rental property management activities without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. As previously alluded to, Carlson produced evidence of having used her personal checking account as a conduit for funds flowing between Alliance and its customers (including brokerage fees payable to Alliance) with the actual or constructive knowledge of Lohr and Alliance's bookkeeper. But Carlson was unable to produce any similar evidence (such as Alliance's ledgers or her cancelled checks) in response to the absence of any Alliance corporate records indicating that Carlson paid any of the brokerage fees generated in the foregoing transactions over to Alliance. Carlson's self-serving and vague testimony that she did not owe Alliance any money was insufficient in this respect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order suspending respondent's license for two (2) years for violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32002 Bruce M. Harlan, Esquire 110 Turner Street Clearwater, Florida 33516 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Appellants raised several issues on appeal, including: (1) whether Appellee retroactively applied the LDC to Appellants' lawfully-established non-conforming vacation rental use; (2) whether Appellee violated Appellants' right to due process by applying Ordinance 004-1997, and its 2016 counterpart, retroactively to events which occurred and were established as a matter of record prior to 1997; (3) whether Appellants acquired vested rights when Ordinance 004-1997 was enacted, and the circuit court opinion judicially recognized those vested rights; (4) whether the Appellee erred by requiring compliance with Ordinance 004-1997, and its 2016 counterpart, in light of the doctrine of laches and equitable estoppel; and (5) whether Appellee erred, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, by not applying the circuit court opinion.
The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
