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GRADY WILLIAM APLIN, JR. vs FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 90-001844 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 26, 1990 Number: 90-001844 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1990

The Issue Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?

Findings Of Fact On October 4, 1989, Petitioner filed his application for licensure as a real estate salesman. Question #7 of the application asked whether the applicant (Petitioner) had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere even if adjudication was withheld (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The Petitioner admitted to having been arrested on July 3, 1984 and to pleading nolo contendere on October 17, 1985 to committing a sex offense against a child and the commission of lewd and lascivious acts. The Petitioner was placed on probation for ten (10) years for the first offense and was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the second offense with thirty-five (35) days credited for time served. A condition of his probation is that he cannot reside or stay overnight with a child under the age of 18. At the formal hearing in this case, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and admitted that he had molested his oldest daughter, age 11, and pleaded nolo contendere to said offense in 1984 and three (3) months later molested both his oldest daughter, then age 12, and his youngest daughter, then age 9, and pleaded guilty to said offenses. Petitioner further testified that the initial offense had been committed over a period of approximately two weeks and that the second offense had been committed over a period of approximately two months. The offenses occurred while he was undergoing rehabilitation therapy for the traumatic amputation of his leg. Since his release from jail, Petitioner has received treatment for his behavior at the Florida Mental Health Institute, North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center and Community Behavioral Services. Petitioner's brother testified concerning his brother's life. The Petitioner had been an Eagle Scout; had been a scoutmaster; had been a member of the Navy Reserve and had had no problems prior to loosing his leg in an accident. Since his release from jail, the Petitioner has provided child support to his ex-wife and daughters. Petitioner had resided with and been employed by his brother until his brother adopted a child. The condition of the Petitioner's probation that the Petitioner can not reside with a child under the age of 18 required the Petitioner to change his residence and employment with his brother. He was employed by Kelly Temporary Services at the time of hearing and was working in a bank in customer service. The Petitioner has remained in therapy as required by his probation. The Petitioner has been in the presence of children when other adults were present since his release from jail and the Petitioner's behavior was exemplary. The Petitioner's brother opined that the Petitioner had "rehabilitated himself," and pointed out that very severe consequences would result to Petitioner for a third offense. The Petitioner admitted that the offenses had occurred in isolated settings when no other adults were present.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to take the state examination for licensure as a real estate salesman be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-1844 The Petitioner wrote a letter to the Hearing Officer, which was read and considered. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-6. Adopted. 7. Rejected, as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joselyn M. Price, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 212 Orlando, FL 32801 Grady William Aplin, Jr. 905 South Kings Avenue Brandon, FL 33511 Darlene F. Keller, Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.17475.25
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TAMMY M. FORD vs MOLD-EX RUBBER COMPANY, 00-002309 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 31, 2000 Number: 00-002309 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes, by allowing Petitioner to be sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes, Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. Respondent manufactures rubber parts for housewares, aircraft, and the automotive industry. Respondent typically employs an untrained workforce then provides its employees with on-the-job training. Respondent experiences a high turnover in entry level jobs. Petitioner began working for Respondent on or about November 15, 1995. Her immediate supervisor was Walter Tate. Part of Mr. Tate's job was to train Petitioner how to operate a rubber injection machine. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Tate ever touched Petitioner or spoke to her in a sexually inappropriate manner. On December 6, 1995, Petitioner's hand was injured at work. This injury occurred when another employee drove a forklift into the platform where Petitioner was working. Mr. Tate did not blame Petitioner for the accident. He did not use the accident as a means to sexually discriminate against Petitioner. On or about February 16, 1996, Petitioner's machine caused a shut down in production. The machine broke down when someone placed a metal bar in the feed hole. The metal bar broke off between the machine's feed hole and its extruder, preventing the rubber from passing through. The machine was a silicon extruder; this type of machine is usually turned off when the designated operator takes a break. Based on a good faith belief that Petitioner was responsible for damage to her machine, Mr. Tate gave Petitioner a verbal warning for using the metal bar instead of a plastic one. Mr. Tate advised Petitioner that the next time she would be given a written warning. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Tate had any hidden agenda when he reprimanded Petitioner. Petitioner became visibly upset about the verbal reprimand and cursed Mr. Tate. Subsequently, Petitioner signed an employee warning report, indicating that she disagreed with the verbal warning but gave no reasons for her disagreement. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner met with Respondent's plant manager, Steve Wieczorek, and second-shift plant superintendent, Robbie Misenheimer. Petitioner complained that she did not like Mr. Tate telling her what to do because she already knew her job. Petitioner also complained that she did not like Mr. Tate's use of profanity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner never complained to Respondent about any form of sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Tate during this or any other meeting. During the meeting, Mr. Wieczorek took handwritten notes of Petitioner's complaints. According to Petitioner, she signed these notes before she left the meeting. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wieczorek typed the notes in accordance with his customary procedure. Mr. Wieczorek and Mr. Misenheimer signed the typed notes before placing them in Petitioner's personnel file. Petitioner did not sign the typed notes. The location of the handwritten notes was not established during the hearing. After the meeting, Mr. Wieczorek directed Mr. Misenheimer to investigate Petitioner's complaints. In accordance with that directive, Mr. Misenheimer talked to Mr. Tate and several of Petitioner's co-workers. Mr. Misenheimer concluded that there was no merit to Petitioner's complaints that Mr. Tate was treating her unfairly. Nevertheless, Mr. Misenheimer continued to check with Petitioner personally and to observe Mr. Tate for several days to ensure that Petitioner was not being mistreated. On February 27, 1996, Petitioner walked out of the plant, voluntarily leaving her workstation in the middle of her shift. Petitioner did not advise Mr. Tate or any other supervisor of her reason for leaving the work site. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Tate threatened Petitioner for turning him in before she abandoned her workstation. After leaving the plant, Petitioner did not call Respondent for three days to explain why she had not returned to work. Respondent did not attempt to contact Petitioner during this time. In accordance with the company's personnel policies, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on March 1, 1996. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent's policy was that sexual harassment was not to be tolerated. This policy was communicated to employees in group meetings. Petitioner admits that she received instruction on the procedure for complaining about sexual discrimination when she began working for Respondent. However, she could not remember whether she received the information in a training session or in a printed form. Respondent posted information in the employee break room about state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committe, Esquire 17 South Palafox Place, Suite 322 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Heather Fischer Lindsay, Esquire Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs 1400 South Trust Tower Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.569760.10760.11
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BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINERS vs. JEFFREY R ALSHIN, 86-000959 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000959 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1986

The Issue At issue is whether Jeffrey Alshin is subject to discipline for violation of Section 490.009(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), by committing an act upon a client which would constitute sexual battery or sexual misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983). Sexual misconduct in the practice of mental health counseling is prohibited by Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983); that statute states that sexual misconduct shall be defined by rule. According to the Administrative Complaint, Rule 21U-15.04, Florida Administrative Code, defines sexual misconduct. The Administrative Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 490.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes (1983), for failing to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. The factual basis for these various grounds for discipline is alleged to have been engaging in sexual activity with a client during the period March, 1984, through July 1984, when a counselor-client relationship existed with the client.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey R. Alshin, is a mental health counselor who has been licensed by the State of Florida during the times material to the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint. The client with whom Alshin is accused of sexual involvement, J.S., was referred to him by a Dr. Lemberg, who saw J.S. on March 1, 1984 (Tr. 24). J.S. telephoned Alshin's office and made an appointment to see him on Monday, March 5, 1984 (Tr. 24). On March 5, 1984, J.S. went to Alshin's office for a therapy session and met Alshin for the first time. She had another session with him on March 9, 1984 (Tr. 24-25). From March 5, 1984 a counselor-client relationship existed between Alshin and J.S. (Tr. 82). On the morning of Sunday, March 11, 1986, Alshin invited J.S. to his home for a barbecue (Tr. 26). After the barbecue, Alshin and J.S. went to Respondent's apartment and that evening they engaged in sexual intercourse (Tr. 27-28). Alshin engaged in sexual intercourse with his client on five other occasions between March and June, 1984 (Tr. 29). During the period in which Alshin and J.S. were sexually involved, Alshin was counseling J.S. (Tr. 28-29). Alshin was never married to J.S. Expert testimony submitted at the hearing establishes that for a mental health counselor to have a sexual relationship with a client is conduct which falls below the minimum standards of performance in professional activities for a mental health counselor when measured against prevailing peer performance (Tr. 80).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his license as a mental health counselor be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57490.009490.0111
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ANDREW ANTHONY TAYLOR vs STATE OF FLORIDA, 17-002295VWI (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 17, 2017 Number: 17-002295VWI Latest Update: Nov. 28, 2017

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.5790.80190.803961.01961.02961.03961.04961.06
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY vs DAVID FAUSTINO GRABAU, 97-003644 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 07, 1997 Number: 97-003644 Latest Update: May 21, 2004

The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a psychologist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Board of Psychology was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and professional discipline of psychologists in Florida. Respondent is and has been licensed as a psychologist in Florida and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Psychology. During the period April 11, 1995, through August 7, 1995, Respondent was employed as a psychologist at the University of South Florida Counseling Center for Human Development. In that capacity, Respondent saw the Complainant, K.R., on several occasions and established a psychologist-client relationship with her. At the initial visit of K.R. to his office, Respondent conducted an initial intake evaluation of her and, in his client notes, defined the goal of his continued treatment of her as being to assist Ms. K.R. in stabilizing her depression; and to clarify her needs and patterns with regard to her career and relationships. Upon completing the intake evaluation of K.R., Respondent referred her to himself as treating therapist, and between the initial meeting and the end of August 1995, met with her approximately thirteen times. Review of Respondent’s notes regarding his sessions with K.R. reveals that they discussed her relationship with her parents; her relationships with men; her ability to deal with her emotions, her anxiety, and depression. K.R. relates that during many of their sessions, Respondent told her she had nice legs and was very sexy. He also told her of his personal life, including his dissatisfaction with his marriage, and it appears that he met with her outside his professional office on a purely social basis. K.R. claims Respondent told her not to tell anyone about their friendship outside the clinic. The relationship between Respondent and K.R. culminated in their engaging in sexual intercourse which resulted in her becoming pregnant. The pregnancy was subsequently aborted. As a result of their relationship, K.R. filed a complaint against Respondent with the Board of Psychology relating the sexual nature of their relationship. Subsequent to the filing of K.R.’s complaint against Respondent, and the Agency For Health Care Administration’s (Agency) filing of an Administrative Complaint against him, the Agency deposed Dr. George J. Rockwell, Jr., a retired psychologist with a specialty in school psychology. Dr. Rockwell did not meet with Respondent or speak with him in any capacity. He examined the file collected in this case regarding the allegations against Respondent, and from his review of all the material, concluded that Respondent had established a psychologist/patient relationship with K.R. This relationship involves trust and the generation in the patient of a basic belief that the psychologist has the skills and knowledge that would assist the patient in dealing with whatever problems he or she has. The patient develops the ability to talk to a non- critical, non-judgmental person in an effort to help him or her deal with their problems or concerns. The psychologist has the responsibility to create an emotionally safe environment for the patient. In this process the patient is often made vulnerable. The patient must be open with the psychologist and feel comfortable in sharing emotions and incidents which he or she would most likely not be able to share with others. It is without question a special relationship, and in Dr. Rockwell’s opinion, it is unlikely that a patient will work with a psychologist and not form that special relationship. This special relationship places upon the psychologist special responsibilities toward the patient. These include abiding by the laws and rules relating to the practice of psychology; having respect for the patient; and keeping all matters confided by the patient confidential. In addition, the psychologist has the responsibility to comport himself or herself in a manner so as to maintain a professional relationship and distance with the patient. Specifically, sexual relationships between a psychologist and his or her patient are normally prohibited as being beyond boundaries that should not be crossed. It is the psychologist’s responsibility to set the limits on behavior so as to prevent an inappropriate relationship from developing. This applies even if the patient initiates sexual advances. These advances would not excuse the psychologist from professional responsibility toward the patient. In the event the psychologist detects what appear to be inappropriate sexual advances from the patient, the psychologist had a duty to discuss this with the patient; talk about the nature of the psychologist/patient relationship; and explain that such a relationship would not be appropriate. The constrictors on the professional are even more specific in the event the psychologist finds himself or herself sexually attracted to the patient. Under no circumstances should the professional act on those feelings, but should evaluate the situation to ensure that those feelings are in no way interfering with the therapeutic relationship. There is absolutely no situation which Dr. Rockwell can think of in which it would be appropriate for a therapist to engage in sexual relations with a patient, either during or after termination of a therapy session. Inappropriate sexual contact between a therapist and a patient can have severe and deleterious effects on a patient. These might include feelings of guilt and depression, based on the patient’s belief that the inappropriate behavior was his or her fault. The patient might also feel embarrassment and be reluctant to undergo further treatment. Further, the patient would most likely lose trust in the involved therapist and potential other therapists. Dr. Rockwell concluded that notwithstanding Respondent’s contention that he saw K.R. solely for the purpose of career counseling, and at no time entered a psychologist/patient relationship with her, Respondent’s clinical notes regarding K.R. clearly indicate a professional psychologist/patient relationship was formed. An independent review of the records supports that conclusion, and it is so found. Even were the counseling limited solely to career counseling, it would still constitute counseling, the conduct of which is covered by the standards of the profession. Here, however, Dr. Rockwell is convinced that Respondent’s conduct toward K.R., as alleged, constituted sexual misconduct in the practice of psychological counseling which fell below the minimum standards of performance and professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. It is so found.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Psychology enter a final order in this matter finding Respondent guilty of all Counts in the Administrative Complaint, and revoking his license to practice psychology in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen L. Holz, Esquire Williams & Holz, P.A. 211 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 O. C. Allen, Qualified Representative 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Dr. Kaye Howerton, Executive Director Board of Psychology 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Amy M. Jones, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57490.009490.011190.80290.80390.804 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B19-17.002
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF OPTICIANRY vs DAVID A. BRESSETTE, L.D.O., 20-003419PL (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Jul. 30, 2020 Number: 20-003419PL Latest Update: Jan. 13, 2025

The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to the crime of Aggravated Assault relates to the practice of or ability to practice opticianry, and, therefore, constitutes a violation of section 484.014(1)(q), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, David Allen Bressette, L.D.O., was a licensed optician within the State of Florida, having first been issued license number DO 3755 on or about May 1, 1992. Respondent's address of record is 4545 Sweet Bay Avenue, Melbourne, Florida 32935. On or about November 29, 2017, the Brevard County Sheriff's Office arrested Respondent for 10 counts of Possession/Viewing Materials Depicting Child Sexual Conduct, in violation of section 827.07(5), Florida Statutes (2017). On or about March 2, 2018, Respondent was charged with four counts of Possession/Viewing Materials Depicting Child Sexual Conduct, in violation of section 827.07(5), Florida Statutes (2017), in Case No. 05-2017-CF-052816- AXXX-XX. On or about March 20, 2019, Respondent pled nolo contendere to one count of Aggravated Assault, a third-degree felony, in Case No. 05-2017-CF- 052816-AXXX-XX. The ability to practice or the practice of opticianry requires interacting with children built on trust and maintaining social boundaries. A special condition of Respondent's order of probation for his plea to the crime of Aggravated Assault requires that Respondent have “no unsupervised contact with a child under the age of eighteen (18) unless supervised by the child's parent or legal guardian or by a court order.” Evidentiary Findings of Fact Respondent owned a practice with Dr. Ronald Ryan, an ophthalmologist. Dr. Ryan sold his interest in the practice in 2016 to Dr. David Hendrix. Respondent sold his interest in April 2018. He has not practiced opticianry since that time. Respondent intends to resume practicing opticianry when this case is resolved. During the investigation of the complaint that led to Respondent’s arrest and his ultimately being charged with four counts of Possession/Viewing Materials Depicting Child Sexual Conduct in Case No. 05-2017-CF-052816-AXXX-XX, Respondent submitted to a recorded interview. In the interview, Respondent alluded to the possibility of his having used his devices to view images of girls in their mid-teens -- 14 or 15 years of age -- though his description of what may have been on his devices was insufficient, in itself, to support a finding that they were unclothed or engaged in sexual conduct. Nonetheless, Respondent admitted to masturbating to, and deriving sexual gratification from those images. At the conclusion of the interview, Agent Kersey seized Respondent’s iPad and iPhone. A warrant was subsequently executed at Respondent’s home where other devices were seized. Agent Kersey testified that he personally observed images of what he described as child pornography, depicting sexual acts or genitalia of what he believed to include pre-teen juveniles, retrieved from Respondent’s electronic devices. Agent Kersey’s employment since 2014 as an agent for the Special Victims Unit, charged with investigating, inter alia, child abuse, child sex crimes, and possession of child pornography, provides weight to his testimony that the images were of juveniles, and his testimony is accepted. Agent Kersey prepared a Case Supplement Report dated January 2, 2019, in which he provided a more detailed description of the images he observed. His descriptions are substantiated by his testimony, and are sufficient to support a finding that the images retrieved from Respondent’s electronic devices were of under-aged girls engaged in sexual acts or exposing their genitalia. Respondent argues that, as a matter of law, the crime to which he pled nolo contendere, Aggravated Assault, is not a “lesser included offense” to the crime of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child. He further argues that he did not commit the crime of Aggravated Assault: i.e., there was no intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent, involving a deadly weapon without intent to kill. See §§ 784.011 and 784.021, Fla. Stat. The Court Minutes that accompanied Respondent’s plea of nolo contendere to one count of Aggravated Assault in Case No. 05-2017-CF- 052816-AXXX-XX, including the Judgment/Order of Probation and the Plea Offer accepted by Respondent, establish the parameters under which Respondent understood and accepted his plea agreement. The Court Minutes establish that the charge of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child was “Reduced” to Aggravated Assault. The Court Minutes further provide that “[t]he Defendant withdrew the previously entered plea of not guilty,” and that “[t]he Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser included offense of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.” There are countless reasons why a person would chose to accept a plea to a crime, not all of which constitute a direct expression of culpability. Nonetheless, regardless of whether Aggravated Assault is a “lesser included offense” to the crime of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child, his plea, made in open court and with representation of counsel, was made with the intent that it be accepted as a lesser included offense. The plea was accepted by the circuit court on those terms. The Court Minutes demonstrate the link between the offense to which he pled, and the offense for which he was charged. The terms of Respondent’s probation included a number of Special Sex Offense conditions in addition to that identified in the Stipulated Facts. For example, the terms of probation included a psycho-sexual re-evaluation and, if recommended by the re-evaluation, “participation in and successful completion of a sex offender treatment program with qualified practitioners specifically trained to treat sex offenders”; annual polygraph examinations by a polygrapher trained in the use of the polygraph “for the monitoring of sex offenders” and for the purpose of obtaining “information necessary for risk management and treatment”; a restriction on accessing materials “that are relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior pattern”; and restrictions against distributing candy to children at Halloween, dressing as Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny “or other costume to appeal to children,” entertaining at children’s parties, or visiting schools, child care facilities, parks, and playgrounds. Section 120.569(2)(g) allows for the consideration of “evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs” in a proceeding under chapter 120. The terms of the plea and of the terms of probation, and Respondent’s agreement with those terms, are admissible and persuasive evidence that the crime to which Respondent pled nolo contendere is one that supports a finding that Respondent poses a sexual threat to children. Dr. Aeh testified that opticians operate from a position of trust, and that there is an expectation of professionalism and good judgment on the part of persons holding a license to practice opticianry. As stipulated by the parties, opticianry requires interacting with children built on trust and maintaining social boundaries. Upon her review of the police reports and court documents related to Respondent’s crime, Dr. Aeh opined that the acts described therein evince an erosion of the interests of trust and safety between the healthcare provider and the patient. Although she did not state that Aggravated Assault, per se, affects the ability to practice opticianry, when coupled with the evidence that the crime was a direct offshoot of child pornography, she had no hesitation in opining that Respondent’s crime did affect the ability to practice opticianry. Under the specific facts of this case, including the circuit court’s minutes demonstrating that the judgment of Aggravated Assault and the conditions of probation related to the charge of Possession of Material Depicting Sexual Conduct by Child, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Respondent’s plea of nolo contendere to Aggravated Assault relates to his ability to practice opticianry.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Opticianry, enter a final order: determining that Respondent violated section 484.014(1)(q); suspending Respondent’s license for a period of 60 months, to run from the March 20, 2019, date of his Order of Probation in Case No. 05-2017- CF052816-A in the 18th Judicial Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, Florida; placing Respondent’s license on probation for a period of 60 months, to commence upon the expiration of the suspension, subject to such conditions as the Board may specify, including requiring Respondent to submit to treatment or to work under the supervision of another optician as authorized by rule 64B12-8.020(7)(d); and imposing an administrative fine of $750.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Rose L. Garrison, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Douglas D. Marks, Esquire Douglas D. Marks, P.A. Post Office Box 33790 Indialantic, Florida 32903 (eServed) Alexander Ciupalo, J.D. Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Janet Hartman, Interim Executive Director Board of Opticianry Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3257 (eServed) Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.5720.43456.072456.073484.014784.011784.02190.40390.803 Florida Administrative Code (3) 28-106.20628-106.21364B12-8.020 DOAH Case (1) 20-3419PL
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs. BELTRAN J. PAGES, 87-001882 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001882 Latest Update: May 31, 1988

The Issue The central issue in these cases is whether Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Florida. Respondent, Beltran Pages, M.D., was, at all times material hereto, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0036079. Respondent is a board certified psychiatrist who has practiced in the Palm Beach County area since July, 1981. Respondent left private practice in September, 1985, and is currently employed at the South Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center, an HRS facility for the criminally insane. During the period February, 1982 through September, 1982, Respondent treated Lynn Harrington (now Lynn DeGrado) at his Boca Raton office which was located in the Weir Plaza Building. This office space was shared with a Dr. Cohn. The Boca Raton office consisted of a waiting area, a hallway with bathroom, and two physician offices. The walls in this facility were not sound proof and noises could be heard, if not distinguished, between the rooms. Mrs. Harrington had a regular Tuesday appointment at 10:00 a.m. During these weekly visits Mrs. Harrington discussed her marital difficulties with Respondent. One of the problems was an affair Mrs. Harrington was having which she did not want to abandon. Mrs. Harrington did not find her husband sexually attractive and, while she hoped the sessions with Respondent would enable her to rehabilitate her marriage, the Harringtons eventually divorced. During the latter months of the marriage, Pat Harrington became aware of his wife's infidelity. Mr. Harrington felt that Respondent had misrepresented progress being made to save the Harrington marriage. Mr. Harrington amended his petition for dissolution of marriage to claim Mrs. Harrington was an unfit mother. In a sworn statement taken October 27, 1982, Mrs. Harrington claimed she and Respondent had had sexual relations during the course of her treatment. This sworn statement was given in connection with a settlement of the dissolution issues. The statement was not to be used in court since the parties had resolved all their differences regarding the children. Later, Mr. Harrington sued Respondent in a civil suit for damages in connection with the claimed sexual conduct. This suit was later dismissed by the court. During the course of treatment with Mrs. Harrington, Respondent had many frank, open conversations of a sexual nature with her. These conversations included discussions of Mrs. Harrington's affair and her fantasies. During this time the Respondent did not engage in sexual intercourse with Lynn Harrington. Mrs. Harrington's testimony that she and Respondent had engaged in sexual intercourse was not credible. Mrs. Harrington was unable to describe with any detail any incident or time during which such conduct occurred. During the period June, 1983 through November, 1984, Respondent treated Lorry Thomas at his Delray Beach office on Linton Boulevard. The walls in Respondent's Delray Beach office were sound proof. Lorry Thomas came to Respondent with a history of depression. In addition to prescribing medications for her, Respondent saw Mrs. Thomas on a weekly basis. During these sessions Respondent and Mrs. Thomas engaged in frank, open discussions of a sexual nature. These discussions led to further activities which ultimately resulted in Respondent and Mrs. Thomas engaging in sexual intercourse. The Respondent engaged in sexual intercourse with Lorry Thomas during the time she was being treated as his patient. Following the sessions with Respondent, Lorry Thomas would often emerge to the outer office in a rumpled, upset condition. This condition was observed by Respondent's receptionist/secretary, Jolene Stratton. When Mrs. Thomas determined she could not continue as both a patient and a lover, she elected to cancel appointments in an effort to continue seeing Respondent. During the course of her treatment with Respondent, Mrs. Thomas was married and living with her husband, Mike. When Mike was transferred to California, Mrs. Thomas moved there also but continued written or telephone communications with Respondent. In December, 1984, Lorry Thomas went to see a clinical psychologist in Santa Clara, California, named Jean Bayard. Mrs. Thomas complained of a despair in her life and an uneasy feeling regarding her marriage. During the course of her discussions with Dr. Bayard, Mrs. Thomas disclosed her past sexual relationship with Respondent. On one occasion Respondent "made a pass" at and kissed Ms. Stratton. This incident occurred when they were viewing pictures in a magazine featuring nude females. Respondent's denial of the sexual relationship with Lorry Thomas was not credible. It is improper for a physician to engage in sexual intercourse with a patient during that patient's treatment. Such conduct is contrary to acceptable standards for psychiatrists.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulations, Board of Medicine enter a Final Order dismissing Administrative Complaint (#30291), Case No. 87-4157. It is further recommended that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint (#70999) , Case No. 87-1882, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $5000, suspending Respondent's license for six months, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years with appropriate supervision and restriction, and requiring such continuing education programs as the Board may deem appropriate. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-1182, 87-4157 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are accepted. Paragraph 4(a) is rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 4(b) is rejected as argumentative. To the extent paragraph 5 finds Respondent and Lorry Thomas engaged In sexual Intercourse during the time she was in treatment such paragraph is accepted. Otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as unsupported by the record ("wide variety of sexual activity") or argumentative. Paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With regard to paragraph 8, only to the extent that Respondent and Lorry Thomas engaged in sexual intercourse during the time she underwent treatment is the paragraph accepted. As a matter of law, there would be a presumption she was not consenting. Otherwise, paragraph 8 is rejected as contrary to the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: William O'Neil, Esquire Jon King, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harry D. Dennis, Jr., Esquire 1401 East Atlantic Boulevard Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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JOHN JACKSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 81-000012 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000012 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 1981

The Issue The issue presented here concerns the jurisdiction of the Respondent State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to pass on the issue of whether the Petitioner, John Jackson, meets the definition of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes; it having been determined that the Department has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner. Secondarily, this Recommended Order considers the question of whether the Petitioner can, through the process of this administrative hearing, controvert the clinical summary dated October 13, 1980, by challenging the findings of that report, even if it has been determined that the Department has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner and the Department is without jurisdiction to enter a final order on the question of whether the Petitioner meets the definition of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Of particular interest on the secondary issue is that part of the report which indicates that the Petitioner still meets the definition of sex offender.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the Petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 5, 1981. Specifically, the Petition asked that a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing be conducted to consider the question of whether the Respondent State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner John Jackson, who was enrolled in one of the Respondent's sex offender programs at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. The prayer for relief offered by the Petitioner was in keeping with the language of Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977), which states: . . . if the department returns an offender to the court because the department has determined that it has exhausted all treatment of the offender, the court shall remove the offender from the custody of the department. A continuance of the formal hearing scheduled for January 30, 1981, was granted and the final hearing was eventually held on March 3, 1981. At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the Petitioner promoted a substantial change to the Petitioner's claim for relief. That change was one which conceded the dispute fashioned in the details of the "Petition for Administrative Hearing," in that the Petitioner and Respondent agree that the Respondent had exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the programs for sex offenders offered in the State of Florida. The Petitioner then attempted to amend his Petition to request that a final order be entered by the Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services which decided if the Petitioner continued to meet the definition of sex offender found in Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the Petitioner, in the person of his counsel, attempted to amend the Petition to attack the details of the staff report of October 13, 1980, dealing with the status of the Petitioner's condition with particular emphasis on the finding that Jackson continued to he a sex offender. The Respondent was opposed to the amendment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Respondent to consider these claims, it having been determined that the Respondent had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner and moreover, the Respondent objected to the change in the Petition which did not grant the Respondent sufficient notice to prepare to defend against the accusations. The Respondent's position was found to be meritorious and the reasons for that decision will be discussed in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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PHILLIP M. WHISLER vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 96-002614RU (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 30, 1996 Number: 96-002614RU Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1997

The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.

Florida Laws (6) 110.105110.227110.233120.52120.56120.68
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