The Issue Whether petitioner should recover $2,335 allegedly disbursed by respondent under Contract No. 3-11-038-005-005 to one Kenneth L. Jenks?
Findings Of Fact Kenneth L. Jenks of Franklin County was enrolled in a CETA program administered by the Bay County School Board at some point during 1983.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED that petitioner abandon its efforts to recover from respondent any monies claimed under Contract No. 2-11-038-005-005. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Lizanne Batey, Chief Bureau of Job Training Dept. of Labor & Employment Security Division of Labor, Employment & Training Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles Pettis, JTPA Coordinator Bay County School Board 3016 Highway 77 Panama City, Florida 32405 =================================================================
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner corporation's workers' compensation insurance policy was in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, cited below, despite not having a specific Florida endorsement; whether the Department properly issued a Stop Work Order against the Petitioner and whether the proposed penalty of $240,927.55 was properly assessed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, American Coatings, Inc., is a commercial painting corporation based in Tennessee. It has been in business since 1994 in the State of Tennessee, and through a predecessor entity, since 1985. The Petitioner does business in other states, including the State of Florida, and in fact operates in approximately 14 states. It has done so since the year 2000. It has had no workers' compensation claims from any of its Florida work sites during the entire time it has operated in Florida. On February 19, 2008, the Petitioner was painting portions of the premises at "the Estates of Rockledge" in Rockledge, Florida. It had other operations in Florida in the three years prior to February 28, 2008. When the Petitioner applied for workers' compensation coverage in Tennessee, the Petitioner advised its broker and insurance carrier that it maintained operations in Florida. The workers' compensation carrier and agent provided certificates of workers' compensation insurance for the Petitioner's Florida operations which supported its good faith belief that it had valid workers' compensation insurance in Florida. Respondent presented no evidence that Mr. Carswell and the Petitioner have committed fraud, misrepresentation, or omission concerning the obtaining and maintaining of workers' compensation insurance coverage for its Florida operations. There was no attempt to conceal the fact that the Petitioner had insurable operations in Florida. For the three years prior to February 28, 2008, the Petitioner maintained a policy of workers' compensation insurance for all employees, including those employees that performed operations in Florida. A workers' compensation premium was paid for each employee in question for all periods in the three years preceding February 28, 2008. The Respondent is an Agency of the State of Florida responsible for enforcing the various statutory requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, including Sections 440.107 and 440.38, Florida Statutes (2007). Its authority includes Section 440.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which imposes upon all employers in Florida the obligation to secure the payment of workers' compensation. The Respondent is statutorily charged with the obligation to monitor employers operating in Florida, to ensure that statutory employers maintain appropriate workers' compensation coverage on employees. There is no dispute that the Petitioner, is an "employer" for purposes of Sections 440.02(16)(a) and 440.02(17)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007). It was operating in the construction industry and regularly employed at least one person. Pursuant to the Division's statutory authority, Investigator Eugene Wyatt of the Department's Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance, visited the subject worksite in Brevard County, Florida, where an apartment complex was under construction. Mr. Wyatt inquired at the general contractor's headquarters trailer and was told that a painting subcontractor known as American Coatings was employing workers on the site. Using the Federal Employer Identification Number, Mr. Wyatt checked with the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) data base and learned that American Coatings, Inc. the Petitioner, which did business in Florida as A.C. Painting, Inc., did not have a record of a Florida workers' compensation coverage policy since December of 2003. Upon inquiry of the general contractor's supervisor at the job site, Mr. Wyatt learned that American Coatings, Inc., had furnished proof of insurance to the general contractor. It was shown as a certificate of liability insurance from American Coatings, in evidence as Department's Exhibit 17. Investigator Wyatt contacted the agent who had produced the Certificate of Insurance and asked if a Florida endorsement had been procured for that policy. He was told that the policy had a "an all states" endorsement. Mr. Wyatt then contacted the underwriter and was told that it was a policy for Tennessee and not for Florida (apparently Tennessee rates and codes applied). The investigator then contacted Benjamin Carswell, the President of the Petitioner. He informed him that in his view the company was not in compliance with the Florida requirement that workers' compensation policies covering Florida work and Florida employees be specifically endorsed for the State of Florida. He stated that he would issue a Stop Work Order, which he did on February 19, 2008. (SWO). The SWO was posted at the worksite and served personally on Mr. Carswell on February 21, 2008. After the Petitioner entered into an installment payment plan as to the penalty, the SWO was ended with an Order of Conditional Release, on February 28, 2008. The Petitioner sent a copy of consolidated insurance policy number WC8263193, by fax to Terrence Phillips, the chief of the Respondent's Orlando compliance office. The information page of this policy showed that only Tennessee was listed in item 3A of the policy. Item 3C stated that the policy was in effect in all other states, however, except for North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and the states listed in item 3A. Item 4 listed various occupational classifications with their codes and the premium rates for each. The codes were for the State of Tennessee. The effect of these terms was that Florida was included in the category for "all other states." Florida Law requires that Florida be listed as a state in item 3A, and requires a policy to utilize Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals, in order for an employer to be compliant with workers' compensation coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Investigator Wyatt determined that compliance was deficient and that a penalty should be calculated and assessed. He therefore served a request for production of business records on Mr. Carswell on February 21, 2008. The business records were necessary to construct the payroll amounts and number of employees at issue, so that the penalty, based upon the Petitioner's Florida Payroll, could be calculated. Mr. Carswell believed in good faith, throughout all times pertinent to this matter that his company was compliant with Florida workers' compensation coverage requirements. After compliance was called into question, however, he also obtained an additional workers' compensation insurance policy, apparently obtained on or about February 20, 2008. It showed that coverage was effective, related back to May 1, 2007. Based upon this additional policy, the Petitioner provided Investigator Wyatt with an additional certificate of insurance for this policy. On March 6, 2008, Investigator Wyatt learned that the SWO was a duplicate and had to be substituted. A new SWO was issued as an amended SWO. A Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and an Amended Order of Conditional Release from SWO, under the second SWO number of 08-092-D4, was issued. Investigator Wyatt calculated the penalty by reviewing the business records supplied by the Petitioner and determining what each employee had been paid between February 23 and December 31, 2005; during all of 2006; during all of 2007 and between January 1, and February 22, 2008. Each employee's payroll, for each year or portion thereof, was divided by 100 and multiplied by an actuarial figure known as the "approved manual rate," which is related to the job duties the employee performed. In the case at hand, all the employees were engaged in commercial painting and, therefore, their classification codes were all 5474. Each trade, occupation or profession has a particular code assigned to it by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and each code has its own rate, the codes and rates being adopted in the Respondent Agency's Rules. The product of one one-hundredth of the gross payroll, and the approved manual rate, constitutes the "evaded premium." In effect this is the insurance premium the employer should have paid during the years it did not actually secure the appropriate payment of workers' compensation for its Florida Employees (proper Florida or Florida-endorsed coverage). Each employee's premium added together was then multiplied by the statutory factor of 1.5 in order to determine the total penalty amount the Respondent seeks to assess. The penalty amount herein was calculated using the correct Florida Approved Manual Rate and class codes. The Respondent established that its calculations indicated that, for the Florida employees of the Petitioner, based upon its Florida payrolls for the three year period in question, the total workers' compensation premium, under the Florida rate, would be in the amount of $160,618.15. Based upon that Florida workers' compensation premium amount, when multiplied by the statutory factor of 1.5 times that amount, the Respondent arrived at a total proposed assessed penalty of $240,927.55. The Petitioner established, through the testimony of Mr. Carswell that, for the time period at issue, for the Florida employees and payroll, the Petitioner had paid workers' compensation premiums of $111,682.21 for the coverage it had in effect. It acknowledges that this was not paid pursuant to Florida rates, rather it was based upon Tennessee rates. It is the position of the Petitioner that the difference in premiums. between the above Florida premium amount, and the premium that the Petitioner actually paid, was $48,935.94. The Petitioner maintains that this differential is what really should be determined to be the unpaid or "evaded" premium, based upon Florida rates, and, if that amount was multiplied by 1.5 then the total penalty actually due should be $73,403.91. An initial penalty payment of $24,092.76 has already been made by the Petitioner. Periodic penalty payments, assessed beginning March 2008, and continuing, have been paid in the amount of $36,139.40. The total penalty already paid by the Petitioner, as of the hearing date, is thus $60,232.16. The Petitioner contends that the actual penalty to be paid should be based upon the differential between the correct total premium due, when using the correct Florida manual rate, and the total premium actually paid by the Petitioner, which, when applied in the above-referenced calculation results in the penalty due of $73,402.91. This would then be reduced by $60,232.17, the amount already paid, for a total remaining amount due of $13,171.75, as of the hearing date.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, finding that the Petitioner failed to fully secure the payment of workers' compensation for its employees in the manner prescribed by the above-referenced authority and that a penalty in the amount of $73,402.91 is due, less a credit of $60,232.16 already paid, and with credit applied to the above amount for penalty payments made since January 28, 2009. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Dietz, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A. Post Office Box 3000 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas H. Duffy, Esquire Douglas D. Dolan, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Tracey Beal, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Alex Sink Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $9,000.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 1 Filed December 26, 2012 3:52 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. The six-month survey cycle is imposed and conditional licensure status is imposed beginning on 9/19/2011 and ending on 10/06/2011. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this al day of Decente — , 2012.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this sh ay of , 2012. Richard Shoop, Agency k Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit | (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Tria Lawton-Russell Jonathan S. Grout, Esq. Office of the General Counsel Attorney for Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 2011 (Electronic Mail) Winter Park, FL 32790 (U.S. Mail) Cathy M. Sellers Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings | Electronic Mail)
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part Il, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Administrative Complaint is withdrawn. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this | | day of ai > 2014. , Secretary th Care Administration Filed July 15, 2014 4:03 PM Division of Administrhtive Hearings
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and cor otis Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this / A ay of / , 2014. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Deborah E. Leoci Ana M. Andrade, Administrator Office of the General Counsel Residential Paradise, Inc. Agency for Health Care Administration 9041 S.W. 142" Court (Electronic Mail) Miami, Florida 33186 (U.S. Mail) Edward T. Bauer, Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as facts stipulated to by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Central Corporation, formerly known as TFC Teleservices Corporation, is a provider of alternative operator services (AOS). An AOS provider provides operator assisted long distance telecommunications services to various entities including hotels, motels, universities, hospitals and private pay telephone providers. This new AOS telecommunication industry emerged after 1984 when AT&T ceased paying commissions to hotels for toll-traffic from guests and when the Federal Communications Commission authorized privately-owned pay phones. There are currently nine AOS providers in Florida. Central is authorized by Certificate Number 1528, issued by the PSC on November 21, 1986, to operate as an interexchange carrier within the State of Florida. Central currently operates in Florida under an approved tariff on file with the PSC, which tariff became effective on September 15, 1987, and authorizes Central to charge certain amounts for its services. Prior to the challenged action, the PSC never placed any conditions upon Central's approved tariffed rates. Interexchange companies (IXCs) are companies which provide long distance telephone services. They are certificated by the PSC on a statewide basis and engage in competition with each other. Such competition, along with the PSC's fitness screening and approval of tariffed rates, is considered adequate to protect the public. Consequently, the PSC does not regulate the rates of IXCs, at least minor IXCs including AOS providers. The PSC does not set rate levels for minor IXCs and does not set an authorized rate of return on equity for minor IXCs. Indeed, in accordance with Section 364.337, Florida Statutes, which authorizes the PSC to exempt from the requirements of Chapter 364 a telephone company which is in competition with or duplicates the services of another telephone company, the PSC has placed AOS providers under the separate rules and regulations pertaining to IXCs, which are not rate base regulated. The PSC has never established for any minor IXC a rate base or an authorized or required rate of return. Local exchange telephone companies (LECs) serve a franchised monopoly area. The LEC agrees to provide service indiscriminately to the public without competition, and, in return, the PSC guarantees the LEC the opportunity to earn a fair rate of return designed to emulate what might be achieved in a competitive market. The PSC sets rate bases and rate levels for LECs, and authorizes the rate of return on equity. In other words, unlike IXCs, LECs are rate base regulated utilities. LECs and/or the PSC may initiate rate relief or rate decrease proceedings. Interim relief is often necessary and is authorized by statute and case law due to the regulatory lag time pending the conclusion of the proceedings. Such interim rate relief or interim rate decreases are done on an individual case-by-case basis and are based upon the financial condition of the particular LEC. The PSC has never provided interim rate relief or interim rate decreases on an industry-wide basis. It has set a "generic" rate cap, establishing a 25 cent local call rate for privately-owned pay phones, but that was done on a prospective basis. The PSC has never imposed an industry-wide rate cap, with a requirement to hold subject to refund monies in excess of that cap. At the request of PSC staff, the PSC opened, on December 18, 1987, Docket Number 871394-TP styled "In re: Review of Requirements Appropriate for Alternative Operator Services provided from Public Telephones." This was designated as a "generic" proceeding, and emanated from numerous complaints the PSC had received from end users (i.e., guests of hotels and motels, hospital patients and pay telephone users) who had been charged for alternative operator services. The nature of the complaints included end users being charged for AOS without being aware of using the service, lack of prior knowledge of the rates being charged, inability to use the services of their preferred IXC and inability to access the LEC operator. The most significant complaint, however, was the excessive rate being charged by some AOS providers. The evidence demonstrates that the intrastate long distance rates charged by Central are considerably higher than the rates charged by Southern Bell, an LEC. Central entered an appearance in Docket No. 871394-TP on December 30, 1987. At an Agenda Conference held on February 2, 1988, the PSC voted on various recommendations of its staff. As pertinent to this proceeding, the PSC voted to set an expedited hearing to be held as soon as practicable to determine whether AOS are in the public interest and various other issues concerning the provision of AOS. The PSC also voted to require all AOS providers to place all revenues subject to refund that are generated by charges in excess of the AT&T rate for a comparable call. This vote exceeded the staff's recommendation, which did not include a "hold subject to refund" requirement. At an Agenda Conference held on February 16, 1988, the PSC voted to reconsider the rate cap applicable to AOS providers and to hold the Order reflecting their February 2nd vote pending such reconsideration. At its Agenda Conference held on March 15, 1988, the PSC reconsidered and raised the rate cap amount from the AT&T rate for a comparable call to the LEC rate for a comparable call, thereby decreasing the amount of revenues that AOS providers must hold subject to refund. The action taken on March 15, 1988, was embodied in written Order No. 19095 issued on April 4, 1988. This Order is entitled "Order Setting for Hearing the Issue of Whether Alternative Operator Services are in the Public Interest and Placing Revenues Subject to Refund ..." The remainder of the title relates to "proposed agency action" concerning other requirements for AOS providers, which are not challenged in this proceeding. Order No. 19095 declares that paragraph 7, which requires AOS providers to hold subject to refund all charges collected in excess of the approved rate, is effective February 2, 1988. The Order further recites "We are cognizant of the serious impact this action may have on AOS providers and their customers. However, it is our view that we must take immediate and effective action to remedy the abusive situation we perceive exists at this time. It is in consideration of these conflicting concerns that we have chosen the least drastic action available. This action does not require AOS providers to immediately stop charging current rates. It does not suspend or revoke any certificates of public convenience and necessity. It does not levy any fines or penalties. It merely places revenues subject to refund to allow for the return of these monies if it is subsequently decided that they were generated from inappropriate charges." Although not embodied within the terms of Order No. 19095, the parties stipulated that the hearing to determine public interest is scheduled for August 9-12, 1988. Central requested the PSC to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to making the rate cap take effect, but this request was denied. The rate cap requirement and the disposition of the revenues held by AOS providers pursuant to Order No. 19095 are issues to be determined at the hearing to be held August 9- 12, 1988. The rate cap requirement set forth in Order No. 19095 applies to all AOS providers operating in Florida. Central's current tariff authorizes Central to charge more than the rate cap specified in Order No. 19095. Prior to Order No. 19095, there was no rate cap on AOS providers. Regardless of whether the PSC ultimately orders a refund, the "hold subject to refund" requirement which became effective on February 2, 1988, has immediate and significant adverse impacts upon Central. Central is a relatively new company and must use the revenue it generates on a daily basis. Prior to Order No. 19095, Central was able to rely on the unconditional use of revenues it receives under its approved Florida tariff. If Central continues to charge its current tariffed rates, it will have to set aside the difference between what it bills and the rate cap, place it in escrow and will not be able to utilize those funds. It is estimated that the revenues Central might have to refund if it continues to charge its current rates would between $1.2 and $1.7 million. Nonrecoverable commissions and the cost of a actually making the refund would increase the potential cost of the refund. If Central were to reduce its rates to the LEC rate, it would lose a substantial amount of revenue and does not know where it can make up that loss. Even if this option were chosen today, Central would still have to determine to whom it provided services since February 2, 1988, and what the potential refund would be. Additional staffing and/or computer equipment would be necessary to keep track of prior users and charges. A third option is for Central to withdraw from Florida intrastate operations pending the outcome and conclusions of the August PSC proceedings. Central operates in many states. While its Florida business makes up only 8 to 10 percent of its intrastate revenues, some 40 percent of Central's entire business originates at Florida properties. If Central were to cease paying commissions on intrastate revenues, its intrastate business originating from Florida would go to its competitors. While Central has made the decision not to do business in certain states due to those state's methods of rate regulation, such decisions were made on a prospective basis. Other immediate and adverse impacts upon Central include the administrative costs and burdens associated with separate bookkeeping for its Florida operations, as well as separate books within Florida to segregate the difference between the rate cap and its tariffed rates. Central has already experienced delays in loan financing. Lenders want to wait and see what the PSC does with AOS providers. The valuation of the company is affected due to money taken out of the revenue stream and placed in escrow. Central's financial statement must reflect the contingent liability of potential refunds and full disclosure must be made to the Federal Communication Commission.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from sales and use tax as a religious or charitable organization.
Findings Of Fact By Application for Consumer Certificate of Exemption dated March 17, 1992, Petitioner requested a sales tax exemption as a religious organization. The application indicates that Petitioner was incorporated on February 18, 1992. At all times, the president of Petitioner has been Reverend Robert M. Rinaldi. By letter dated April 16, 1992, Respondent requested that Petitioner supply information concerning its primary purpose, including a list of all activities or services and to whom they are generally offered. The letter also requested, among other things, statements of receipts and expenditures and a copy of the letter determining that Petitioner is exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner submitted to Respondent evidence of 12 expenditures during the quarter ending March 31, 1992. The expenditures and their descriptions are as follows: Morrisons-- dinner business; Holiday Inn in Tampa--lodging for quarterly convention; Maas Brother in Naples--attire; Marshalls-- personal; Martha's Health Food Shop--personal; Things Remembered--card case/business cards; RJ Cafe Tropical--lunch interview; Beach Works Marco Island--attire; annual membership fee for vice president's American Express card; Las Vegas Discount golf and tennis in Naples--personal; Eckerd's Vision Works--medical eyeglasses; Quality Inn Golf Country Club in Naples--lodging during business travel; Avon Fashions/Hampton-- personal; Del Wright in Sarasota--automobile expenses and travel; JC Penney--personal; Amador's Restaurant in Naples-- dinner/lunch; Avon Fashions/Hampton--personal; annual membership fee for treasurer's American Express card; and Mobil Oil--business travel. Petitioner produced other evidence of similar types of expenditures, such as for fitness center fees, car insurance, car service, car payments, utilities, and rent. Nothing in the record links these expenditures to religious or charitable activities. There were expenditures for printing religious tracts and self- improvement educational materials, but they do not appear to be a substantial part of the total expenditures of Petitioner during the time in question. After receiving these materials, a representative of Respondent telephoned Reverend Rinaldi and stated that Petitioner would have to submit additional documentation of its income and expenses and formal affiliation with prison chapels where Petitioner reportedly conducted outreach programs. Respondent's representative also asked for evidence of Reverend Rinaldi's counselling credentials. Petitioner next submitted a copy of a letter from the Department of Treasury determining that Petitioner was exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner also submitted a budget for the year ending 1992 and a proposed budget for the year ending 1993. However, the budgets did not document a charitable purpose. The budget reveals that the largest disbursement was $4200, which was rent for an office and living quarters. The largest single receipt was $1764.27, which was a contribution from the incorporator, who was Rev. Rinaldi. There were no charitable receipts, such as from contributions from members, the public, or anonymous sources. On November 10, 1992, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner requesting additional information, including statements of the primary purpose of the organization and of receipts and expenditures. The request asked for a description or explanation for each charity-related program expenditure. On November 18, 1992, Petitioner submitted a second Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The information was essentially unchanged from the first application. Rev. Rinaldi also sent Respondent a religious flyer. On February 10, 1993, Petitioner submitted a third Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The material was essentially unchanged from the preceding two applications. On March 30, 1993, one of Respondent's representatives sent a letter to Petitioner stating that Petitioner does not meet the criteria for exemption from sales tax. In response, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent received April 8, 1993, requesting reconsideration of the denial. On May 4, 1993, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter stating that, as indicated during an earlier telephone conversation, Respondent had not yet received sufficient documentation to justify a sales tax exemption. Following up on Rev. Rinaldi's opinion that Petitioner qualified as a charitable organization, the letter suggests that he submit materials describing each charitable service or activity, the types of persons receiving such services, the frequency that the services are offered, the demonstrated benefit provided by Petitioner to disadvantaged persons, the fees charged by Petitioner, and the availability of Petitioner's services at the same or less cost elsewhere. The letter also asks for a statement of income and expenses. In response, Petitioner filed a fourth Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption on November 10, 1993. Rev. Rinaldi explained Petitioner's activities as informing people of the truth and the second coming of Jesus Christ and stopping addictions to drugs and alcohol. The enclosed materials included a church telephone number. The materials state that services are available 24 hours a day for no fees and are provided solely for the spiritual preparation of humanity. The materials also indicate several addresses at which religious activities are conducted. Upon investigation, Respondent learned that Petitioner's telephone number had been disconnected, the street address is Rev. Rinaldi's apartment, and the addresses at which religious activities are conducted are locations of Alcoholic Anonymous, from which Rev. Rinaldi and his church had been barred as public disturbances. Checking with the post office, the investigator learned that all mail for Rev. Rinaldi and Petitioner is being forwarded to an address in New York. Respondent asked for more information, and Petitioner supplied information no different than that previously supplied. By letter dated April 26, 1994, Respondent informed Petitioner that its application was denied. Following another exchange of correspondence, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny dated June 17, 1994. The Notice of Intent to Deny states that Respondent determined that: [Petitioner] travels from church to church and does not assemble regularly at a particular established location. [Petitioner] conducts services for short periods of time at numerous temporary locations. [Respondent] has reviewed your application and supporting documents and has determined that the primary purpose of your organization fails to meet the qualifications for sales tax exemption authorized by Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. By letter dated June 24, 1994, Petitioner requested a formal hearing on its application for sales tax exemption. Petitioner does not regularly conduct services. Petitioner does not engage in other religious activities nor does Petitioner provide services typically associated with a church. Petitioner has no established physical place for worship. Petitioner has generalized plans to construct one or more places for worship. However, these plans are post-apocalyptic in nature and thus do not assure the commencement of construction in the immediate future.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption certificate from sales and use tax. ENTERED on December 20, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 20, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Rev. Robert Rinaldi P.O. Box 1081 167 N. Collier Blvd. J-3 Marco Island, FL 33937-1081 Attorney Lisa M. Raleigh Office of the Attorney General The Capitol--Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Linda S. Powell, began her original employment associated with Orange County on February 19, 1975. The period from February 19, 1975, to July 1, 1980, is 5 years, 4.4 months. In order to be entitled to disability benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS), Ms. Powell must have completed five years of creditable service with the County on or before July 1, 1980. The period from February 19, 1975, through September 7, 1975, equals approximately 6.4 months. It is this 6.4 months which is at issue in this case because the Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, maintains that Ms. Powell was ineligible for creditable service because she was a temporary CETA employee. If the 6.4 months of CETA employment is deducted from the 5 years 4.4 months of total service before July 1, 1980, Ms. Powell has 4 years 10 months of creditable service, 2 months short of the 5-year requirement. Ms. Powell began employment with the Orange County Board of County Commissioners on February 19, 1975, as a keypunch operator under the CETA Program. At this time, and for several months prior to her beginning employment, Orange County had been operating under a federally subsidized program known as the Comprehensive Education and Training Act (CETA), which was operated by Orange County under two separate programs known as Title I and Title II. Title I was an on-the-job training program which provided employment positions to individuals in addition to the regular employment positions already maintained by the County. These individuals were brought on the regular payroll of the County and were given full benefits, including retirement and social security. Approximately 20 to 25 individuals took part in this program. In the latter part of 1974, the CETA Title II program was begun by the County. This program was for certain identifiable population groups of unemployment within the County. Individuals hired under Title II were put on the regular County payroll, and the County would submit a bill to CETA for payment of the individual's salary and benefit, which included retirement (FRS) and social security. In February 1975, the CETA Title VI program was implemented by Act of Congress. Title VI was a federal emergency employment measure designed to get people into productive job situations and to provide an immediate salary payment. In implementing Title VI, the County determined that no fringe benefits, including social security and retirement, would be paid for these individuals, since this method would allow approximately 20 percent more individuals to be hired in the program. The County determined that individuals in the Title VI program were to be temporary employees of the County. Individuals were further notified on the first day of employment during an orientation session that they were temporary employees and would receive no fringe benefits. Petitioner signed a statement on her first day of employment that she understood that she was placed in a federally funded program and had no assurance of continued employment at the end of the funding for such program. (Respondent's Exhibit 1). CETA Title VI funds were placed in a special, separate bank account by the County, and from this account the County would pay salary to Title VI individuals and other bills such as equipment and supplies purchased. This account was not a regular payroll account. Upon payment of Title VI individuals, the County would then invoice the federal CETA office for the salaries paid and receive reimbursement. Employees who worked under Title VI performed work in nonprofit agencies, such as United Nay, as well as work for the County. Petitioner continued to be an employee under CETA Title VI from February 19, 1975, to September 7, 1975, at which time she was transferred from CETA Title VI to CETA Title II and placed in a regularly established position. (Respondent's Exhibit 2). At this time, an employment history file was begun on the Petitioner, and said file reflected a service date of September 7, 1975. In addition, an "employee change notice" was completed on Petitioner, signifying a transfer from CETA Title VI to permanent status. (Respondent's Exhibit 3). The County began payment of retirement contributions on Ms. Powell in September 1975, as reflected by the certification of earnings provided by the County to Respondent. Ms. Powell filed an application for disability retirement benefits on April 5, 1983. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Linda S. Powell be denied service credit for her employment under CETA from February 19, 1975, to September 7, 1975. Said service is not creditable under the Florida Retirement System. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry C. Young, Esquire 109 East Church Street, Suite 301 Post Office Box 2631 Orlando, Florida 32802 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 207-C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a woman who suffered an aneurysm in 1987 which resulted in paralysis. Subsequently, she regained full use of her body except for her left hand. She possesses gross motor skills in her left hand but lacks fine motor skills. Respondent is a retail furniture store, which at times pertinent did about three million dollars in business annually. Respondent at times pertinent employed 23 to 26 full-time employees. Respondent went out of business on September 24, 2001. Petitioner interviewed with Doris Hudson and Cindy Gentry about three weeks prior to June 8, 2000. Petitioner was informed that she was hired and could begin work on June 8, 2000. The position she was hired for was accounts payable clerk. During the interview, the matter of the facility of Petitioner's left hand was not noted or discussed. Petitioner believed that the job consisted of mostly working on a keypad with numbers, in the accounts payable section of the bookkeeping office. Petitioner reported for work on June 8, 2000. Doris Hudson, Respondent's Comptroller, an employee of Respondent for over 41 years, provided her with a tour of the premises. Petitioner's first assignment was to type checks. She did this slowly because she could type only with her right hand. Typing checks is an important function of the accounts payable clerk. Most vendors were paid by checks which were prepared by data processing equipment but it was necessary to prepare many checks for local vendors on a typewriter. During the hour and a-half Petitioner worked at the typewriter, she correctly prepared three checks. Ms. Hudson expected an accounts payable clerk to prepare 25 to 35 checks in an hour and a-half. An accounts payable clerk, according to Ms. Hudson, should be able to type 55 words per minute; Petitioner could type only 30 words per minute on a good day. An accounts payable clerk's daily activities included kneeling on the floor and opening a large safe; swinging open a heavy door which has to be unlocked with two keys simultaneously; counting 30 to 50 checks per day and counting currency and coins; and printing out reports which were inserted in a large binder. A substantial part of the duties of the accounts payable clerk required excellent typing and data input skills. The accounts payable clerk was required to reload the printers and this required the coordination of two hands. The accounts payable clerk was required to prepare deposits which required that the employee flip each individual check with one hand and operate a calculator with the other. Ms. Hudson did not discover the deficiencies with regard to Petitioner's left hand until she made inquiry after noting the small number of checks which Petitioner prepared. Ms. Hudson could not use an employee who could not do the activities described in paragraph eight and nine, above. Ms. Hudson could not call others in the office away from their jobs to help a person who had limited use of one hand. She did not have enough employees. When Ms. Hudson's office was fully staffed there were many times when it was difficult to accomplish all necessary duties in an eight-hour day. It was Ms. Hudson's opinion that Petitioner could not perform the duties of accounts payable clerk and that it was impossible to accommodate her deficiencies without disrupting the orderly functioning of her office. After considering Petitioner's capabilities and the requirements of the accounts payable clerk, Ms. Hudson decided that Petitioner was not suitable for employment as an accounts payable clerk and as a result, discharged her. Petitioner was paid $22.61 for 2.66 hours of work. This reflected an hourly wage of $8.50. Petitioner worked as an administrative assistant at Century Boats in Panama City prior to obtaining the job with Respondent. She lost that job in February of 2000, due to a reduction in workforce. After Petitioner left Respondent's place of business she went to work at a clinic run by Bay Medical. She began working there on August 28, 2000, as an insurance coder and biller and was paid $8.00 per hour. She lost that job on February 28, 2001, when the facility closed. She was offered a job in the radiology section but it paid less so she elected to remain essentially unemployed for a year. She did work a one- week job with Cardiology Associates and worked for C-1 Medical Clinic for a month and a-half during that period. Petitioner, at the time of the hearing, was employed by Nextel Communications as a customer care representative and was paid $9.50 per hour. She started February 18, 2002. Petitioner has a hard time buttoning clothes but she can drive an automobile. She testified she could do, ". . . everything pretty much what everybody does." She can't throw a ball up with her left hand or play tennis anymore. She can lift heavy objects up to at least 75 pounds. She has no medical restrictions placed on the use of her left hand.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Amended Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Chesser 6802 Penny Road Panama City, Florida 32404 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4019 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
