Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner (Randolph) is an African-American female. 2. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on June 2, 1997, and was terminated by Respondent from her employment on September 30, 1997. 3. When initially hired, Petitioner’s official employment class title was Other Personnel Services (OPS) Paralegal Specialist. 4. On July 1, 1997, approximately one month after her date of employment, Petitioner’s official employment class title was changed to Administrative Secretary and Petitioner’s pay plan status was changed from OPS to Career Service. 5. On September 1, 1997, Petitioner's class title was reclassified to Paralegal Specialist. 6. From July 1, 1997, until the date of her termination, Petitioner was employed in a probationary status by DOAH with her primary job responsibilities being that of a proofreader. 7. Probationary employees are not entitled to progressive discipline and can be terminated at will pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. 8. Ann Cole, the clerk of DOAH, interviewed all candidates for the newly created proofreader position. 9. There were several applicants for the proofreader position and after a series of tests and interviews Ann Cole determined that Petitioner was the best applicant for the proofreader position and Petitioner was hired for the job. 10. Approximately one month after Petitioner was hired, a second proofreader (Dr. Rappendelli) was hired. Dr. Rappendeli is a white female. 11. Both Petitioner and Dr. Carol Ripandelli were supervised at DOAH by Ann Cole. ATTENDANCE HISTORY 312. During the first month of her employment Petitioner shared a work area in DOAH’s mailroom with current DOAH employee Elma Moore, an African-American female. 13. Elma Moore typically arrived at work between 7:00 and 7:15 a.m. even though the required start time for employees of the clerk’s office was 8:00 a.m. 14. Elma Moore was able to directly observe the times during which Petitioner arrived at work. Ms. Moore noted that Petitioner reported to work forty-five minutes late on her first day. Ms. Moore further noted that Petitioner would often be late. 15. Elma Moore was relocated to another part of the clerk’s office when Dr. Rappendelli was hired. 16. Elma Moore, even from her new workstation, continued to be situated such that she was able to observe the times at which Petitioner customarily arrived at work. 17. Elma Moore testified that during the four month period that Petitioner worked for DOAH, at least two to three times each week, Petitioner would arrive at work approximately ten to thirty minutes beyond the mandatory 8:00 a.m. start time for employees. 18. The testimony of Elma Moore is further corroborated by the affidavit of Deanna Hartford. 19. Ms. Hartford, who was the Deputy Clerk Supervisor for DOAH during Petitioner’s period of employment, stated that she observed Petitioner arrive to work late, without notice, on several occasions during her OPS employment and during her career service probationary employment. 20. Ms. Hartford stated in her affidavit that around the first week of September 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to observe Petitioner’s attendance. Ms. Hartford noted that during this period of observation Petitioner arrived to work at’ the following times on the dates as indicated: September 8, 1997, 8:20 a.m.j; September 9, 1997, 8:25 a.m.; September 10, 1997, 8:10 a.m.; and September 17, 1997, 8:20 a.m. 21. Ms. Hartford reported to Ann Cole, Petitioner's supervisor, that Petitioner was frequently late for work. 22. This is consistent with Elma Moore’s testimony that Petitioner, at least two to three days per week, was customarily late for work in excess of ten minutes. 23. Petitioner attempted to contradict the testimony of Elma Moore and the affidavit of Deanna Hartford by testifying that she was told by her supervisor, Ann Cole, to make up her tardy time thereby excusing the fact that she was habitually late for work. 24. Ms. Cole stated the importance of proofreaders being punctual to work, and testified that she and Petitioner had at least two meetings where they discussed Petitioner’s tardiness issue prior to her termination. 25. Ms. Cole stated that she spoke with Petitioner about her timesheet and attendance, and the need for Petitioner to tell her when she is late and how she plans to make up her time. 26. Ms. Cole stated that Petitioner’s communication regarding her promptness and plans to make up time never improved. 27. Ms. Hartford stated that she never observed Petitioner disclose her late arrivals to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. On more than one occasion, Ms. Hartford stated, she reported Petitioner’s tardiness to Ms. Cole, who indicated she was unaware of the late arrival. PHONE USE 28. Unlike some of the other jobs in the clerk's office, the proofreader’s duties and responsibilities did not require the utilization of the telephone. 29. Elma Moore stated that during the time that she shared an office with Petitioner, her desk was in close proximity to Petitioner’s desk and that on several occasions she noticed that Petitioner was talking on the telephone. 30. Elma Moore stated that Petitioner was using the telephone for personal calls frequently. 31. Elma Moore further testified that she knew that the responsibilities and duties of the proofreader did not require Petitioner to use the telephone. 32. Deanna Hartford noted in her affidavit that she personally observed that Petitioner was always on the phone. 33. Ms. Hartford also noted in her affidavit that other employees at the Clerk’s office had complained to her about Petitioner’s excessive use of the telephone. 34. Ms. Hartford advised her supervisor Ann Cole about Petitioner’s excessive phone use. 35. In response to the complaint about Petitioner's excessive use of the telephone, Ms. Cole contacted DOAH’s information services department and requested that they audit all of the telephone extensions for the clerk’s office. 36. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 85.5 outgoing phone calls. 37. Petitioner, however, had 294 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this period. Dr. Carol Ripandelli, the other proofreader, had 79 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this same period. 38. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 1.6 outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration. 39. The number of outgoing calls exceeding ten minutes in duration that were attributed to Petitioner's extension during the audit period totaled thirteen. Dr. Carol Ripandelli had only two outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration attributed to her extension during the audit period. 40. Petitioner denied having made the number of phone calls attributed to her extension. Petitioner also charged that it was possible that other employees could have made outgoing calls from the phone on Petitioner’s desk. 41. Elma Moore testified that it was neither the practice nor the custom of employees of the clerk’s office to regularly use the telephone of other employees. INITIATIVE 42. Deanna Hartford, in her affidavit, noted that in July of 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to provide additional training to the proofreaders. 43. Petitioner and the other proofreader were instructed to inform Ms. Hartford when they were caught up with their work so that the additional training could be provided. 44. Dr. Carol Rappendeli, the OPS proofreader, sought and received additional training in several areas including filing, assisting in the quarterly file purge and destruction, outgoing docketing procedures, and maintaining the Florida Administrative Code supplements. 45. Petitioner never sought additional training as requested. 46. Ann Cole observed Petitioner nodding off on at least three occasions while in an important proofreading standards meeting. 47. Ms. Cole observed Petitioner cutting coupons at her desk the morning of September 22, 1997, during business hours. 10 48. Elma Moore also testified to the fact that Petitioner, during business hours would frequently work on a personal book when she wasn’t proofreading. DISRUPTIVE AND RUDE BEHAVIOR 49. Ms. Cole testified that along with the attendance problems and telephone usage, Petitioner also had attitude problems. 50. On two occasions, Petitioner felt the need to apologize for rude comments made to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. 51. Ms. Cole observed rude behavior by Petitioner directed toward Dr. Ripandelli when they were discussing proofreading on a particular order. 52. Ms. Cole stated that when Petitioner gets in one of her moods, teamwork between Petitioner and Dr. Ripandelli is ineffective. 53. Ms. Cole testified that she had to speak with Petitioner about her radio and that it was so loud it caused a disturbance in the break room. 54. Dr. Ripandelli testified that Petitioner’s radio was so loud that she bought herself headphones in order to drown out Petitioner’s radio. i 55. In contrast, Ms. Cole testified that Dr. Ripandelli gets along with all the judges and that Dr. Ripandelli interacts fine with her. TERMINATION 56. Ms. Hartford stated that Petitioner never discussed with her any need to accommodate her for a disability or for her religion. 57. Ms. Hartford further stated that Petitioner never mentioned that she was being discriminated against for any reason. Ms. Hartford never observed Petitioner walk with a limp, or have sores or bandages on her legs. 58. Petitioner was terminated on September 30, 1997, due to her chronic tardiness, excessive use of the telephone, and her general failure to demonstrate initiative.
Conclusions Petitioner: Ms. Audrey Randolph, Pro Se 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209-2431 904-713-9913 For Respondent: Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 850-414-3300 ext. 4650
Recommendation 29 In the present case, Respondent showed a legitimate reason for discharging Petitioner. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon her race, religion, disability or marital status. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against her in retaliation for Petitioner engaging in an activity that was protected by Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4A day of Vabir ; 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, kative Law Judge sd Way, Bin A-0 32398-1703 Filed with the clerk of the Florida Commission of Human Relations this 2" day of December 2003. 30 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Audrey Randolph 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209 Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esq. Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Harry Hooper Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Secretary of Commission Mike Hanson Room 1801, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue Whether Respondent, American Support, discriminated against Petitioner, Linda Dodge, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the Act) sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes, based upon her sex or in retaliation for participation in a protected activity.1/
Findings Of Fact American Support is a third-party telemarketing contractor for providers of cable and satellite service, with an office located in Daytona Beach, Florida. American Support is an employer within the meaning of the Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Petitioner is a 61-year-old female who was hired on August 19, 2008, as a telemarketer for Evergreen, a predecessor company to American Support. Petitioner worked in telemarketing for approximately one year, was laid off by Evergreen, but was shortly thereafter reemployed by Evergreen as a receptionist/administrative assistant. Between October 2011 and December 2011, Petitioner solely performed receptionist duties. Petitioner was replaced as company receptionist by Debora Jenkins, whom Petitioner helped train. Ms. Jenkins was hired on a full-time temporary basis as the company was transitioning to new ownership. In December 2011, Petitioner was promoted to Human Resources Assistant by Nancy Cantero, Human Resources Director for American Support beginning in November 2011. Petitioner’s duties were to initiate and process criminal background checks and credit checks on applicants, validate I-9 information received for newly hired employees, create personnel files for new employees, and manage employee personnel files. Employee personnel files contain personal identifying information including dates of birth, social security numbers, driver’s licenses, and the results of criminal background and credit checks. Both parties agree that keeping applicants’ and employees’ personal information protected is a high priority for the Human Resources Department. Ms. Cantero left American Support in February 2012 and was replaced by Steven Schaible, first as a Human Resources Generalist under contract, then as corporate Human Resources Manager in March 2012. In his capacity as Manager, Mr. Schaible supervised Petitioner and two Human Resources Recruiters: Warren Hernandez and Elaine Zoe. Ms. Zoe was a virtual recruiter operating from her home in Phoenix, Arizona. Petitioner described Mr. Schaible as very friendly and outgoing when he first became Human Resources Manager. In mid-April 2012, Mr. Schaible hired a third recruiter, Anthony Sarelli, at a rate of $17 per hour. No evidence was introduced to establish the hourly rate of either Mr. Hernandez or Ms. Zoe, but Mr. Hernandez earned less than $17 per hour. Petitioner earned $13.50 per hour as Human Resources Assistant. On Thursday, April 19, 2012, Ms. Jenkins, the temporary receptionist, gave her notice and stated that she would be starting a new job Monday, April 23, 2012. Ms. Jenkins’ last day on the job was Friday, April 20, 2012. Mr. Schaible, together with Mary Celle, Vice President of Operations, made a decision to eliminate the position of receptionist. Mr. Schaible had been unable to keep Ms. Jenkins busy full-time with receptionist duties such as answering and routing phone calls, accepting parcel deliveries, handing out job applications, and directing individuals to appropriate offices. Mr. Schaible determined Petitioner was competent to perform these duties, in light of her previous service as company receptionist. Petitioner had the day off on Friday, April 20, 2012. When she returned to work on Monday, April 23, 2012, Mr. Schaible informed Petitioner that she would take over the receptionist duties while continuing to serve as Human Resources Assistant. Petitioner was physically moved from her desk to the receptionist desk at the front of the building.2/ Neither Petitioner’s title nor her salary changed when she was moved to the receptionist desk. Mr. Schaible made efforts to reduce Petitioner’s duties as Human Resources Assistant, reassigning responsibility of managing Kahuna, a software program through which new telemarketers were assigned log-in and password information, to a payroll employee, Maryanna Hilton. Additionally, Mr. Schaible instructed Petitioner to discontinue sending personal faxes for other employees. The company had taken some steps to streamline the receptionist function to make it more efficient and less time- consuming. For example, the company moved from paper applications to an online application system. The receptionist was to direct persons inquiring about job applications to computer terminals located at the building entrance in front of the receptionist desk. Similarly, the company telephone system was changed from a switchboard to automatic routing of calls to direct extensions by department. Petitioner was instructed to continue her regular Human Resources duties, but to place personnel files in a locked Human Resources file room located ten feet from the receptionist desk when she was away from her desk. On April 24, 2012, Mr. Schaible arrived at work early and noticed a stack of employee personnel files on the receptionist desk. Petitioner was not at the desk. Mr. Schaible concluded that the files had remained on the desk overnight. The files contained copies of social security cards, driver’s licenses, and the results of criminal background checks and credit checks for newly hired employees. Mr. Schaible secured the files and addressed Petitioner about the issue later that day. Mr. Schaible stressed with Petitioner the importance of keeping personnel files secure, and offered to get her a rolling file cabinet. The next day, April 25, 2012, Petitioner sent Mr. Schaible the following e-mail: “I apologize for the files when I left . . . it won’t happen again.” The following day, April 26, 2012, Mr. Schaible found a personnel file containing personal identifying information on Petitioner’s desk. Mr. Schaible removed the file and placed it in the locked file room. Later that same day, Petitioner sent the following e-mail to Mr. Schaible: “Will make sure forms are upside down on my desk before I take a break . . . my bad.” Mr. Schaible spoke to Petitioner that same day and explained that turning files upside down on the desk in her absence was not sufficient. He explained that personnel files must be secured in the locked file room when she was not at her desk. On Monday, April 30, 2012, Petitioner was on vacation, and Mr. Schaible sat at the front desk for at least some part of the day.3/ He discovered in one of the desk drawers over 50 completed W-4 forms for current employees. Mr. Schaible discussed with Ms. Celle the need to initiate the company’s progressive discipline policy and give Petitioner a verbal warning.4/ Mr. Schaible planned to meet with Petitioner late in the afternoon on May 1, 2012, and deliver the verbal warning. Petitioner was back in the office on May 1, 2012. While Petitioner was on a break and Ms. Hilton was manning the receptionist desk for Petitioner, Mr. Schaible discovered six personnel files on the desk. Mr. Schaible removed the files and decided to modify the verbal warning to a written warning, in essence moving to the second step of the company’s progressive discipline policy. Mr. Schaible did not have a meeting with Petitioner on May 1, 2012, as planned. On May 2, 2012, Mr. Schaible planned to meet with Petitioner at 3:00 p.m. to present her with the written warning and discuss the confidentiality issues. He requested that Carrie Santana, Manager of Customer Care and Quality, attend the meeting as well. At 3:00 p.m., Mr. Schaible asked Petitioner to come to his office. She was busily working in the Kahuna program, adding two new employees at the request of a manager in the Jacksonville office. Petitioner requested Mr. Schaible to wait until she completed the log-in and password information for the new employees. Mr. Schaible became angry, told her that task would have to wait, and ordered her into his office immediately. Petitioner accompanied Mr. Schaible to his office, where Ms. Santana was waiting. Mr. Schaible confronted Petitioner with the W-4 forms he had found in the receptionist desk on April 30, 2012, as evidence of her failure to follow his directions to secure personal information of company employees. Before Mr. Schaible brought up the six personnel files he had removed from the desk the previous day, Petitioner stated, “I quit,” stood up and left Mr. Schaible’s office, then exited the building. Petitioner denies that she quit her job on May 2, 2012, instead testifying that she stated, “I quit this,” meaning she quit Mr. Schaible’s treatment toward her. However, Mr. Schaible’s testimony that Petitioner stated, “I quit” on May 2, 2012, was corroborated by Petitioner’s own e-mail dated May 3, 2012, to company President Matthew Zemon, as well as Ms. Santana’s written memorandum dated May 3, 2012, in which she memorialized the events of May 2, 2012. The evidence conflicted as to whether Petitioner returned to the office on May 2, 2012, following the disciplinary meeting. Mr. Schaible testified he did not see Petitioner after the meeting that day or the next day, May 3, 2012. Petitioner testified that she returned to the building within 30 minutes, stating first that she went into Mr. Schaible’s office to complain about his treatment of her, but later testifying that his office door was closed, so she did not go in to see him. Mr. Schaible’s testimony on this issue is credible and accepted by the undersigned. Mr. Schaible e-mailed Ms. Celle following the disciplinary meeting on May 2, 2012, informing Ms. Celle that Petitioner had resigned. Mr. Schaible then completed a Record of Termination for Petitioner showing a separation date of May 2, 2012. The evidence showed that American Support did not accept Petitioner’s resignation. In response to Petitioner’s email of May 3, 2012, Mr. Zemon e-mailed Mr. Schaible and asked him to contact Petitioner and offer her a position in inbound/outbound sales at the high end of the pay range. Mr. Schaible did so, but Petitioner did not accept the offer. Petitioner clearly considered her assignment to the receptionist desk to be demeaning. She was subjected to comments from other employees suggesting she had been demoted because she could not perform Human Resources duties. She felt that the Human Resources Assistant did not belong at the front desk. Petitioner was overwhelmed with performing Human Resources duties while assisting job applicants at the computers, answering telephone calls that were not automatically routed, accepting delivered parcels, and dealing with the myriad inquiries typically made of the receptionist at any business. Petitioner complained that it was impossible to secure applicants’ and employees’ personal information with other employees passing by the front desk on their way in and out of the building. She noted that running back and forth to the Human Resources file room every time she was required to get up from the desk -- even though it was only ten feet away -- rendered her work inefficient, if not impossible. In support of her argument that she was discriminated against based on her sex, Petitioner alleged that Mr. Schaible hired a second male recruiter out of a mixed pool of applicants, that Mr. Schaible made inappropriate comments about some applicants, and that he hired a male recruiter at a rate of $17 per hour -– higher than other Human Resources employees. Petitioner submitted no evidence to establish what comments were made about any applicant for the position of Human Resources recruiter. As to hourly rates of pay, Petitioner testified that the new recruiter was paid at a higher rate than Mr. Hernandez. Further, Petitioner did not produce any evidence as to the rates of pay for either Ms. Zoe or Mr. Hernandez. Petitioner also alleged that following her move to the receptionist desk on April 23, 2012, Mr. Schaible instructed her not to take breaks with Mr. Hernandez, not to check her work e- mails from home, and excluded her from meetings with other Human Resources employees. However, Petitioner was unable to testify with certainty that other employees were allowed to continue checking e-mails from home. Ms. Zoe, the female virtual recruiter on the team, continued to participate in Human Resources meetings. Petitioner likewise complained that she was denied a raise while Mr. Hernandez received one. On April 19, 2012, in response to Mr. Schaible’s request, Petitioner submitted a self- evaluation for Mr. Schaible’s consideration. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hernandez told her a week later that he received a raise. Petitioner then asked Mr. Schaible about the time period for a decision on her raise; Mr. Schaible responded, according to Petitioner, “Not sure about it yet.[5/]” Petitioner’s hearsay statement alone is insufficient to support a finding that Mr. Hernandez received a raise. No evidence was introduced as to the status of other employees’ evaluations or raises. Petitioner’s most-repeated claim is that Mr. Schaible treated her unprofessionally by speaking to her sharply in front of other employees, yelling when he ordered her into his office on May 2, 2012, and “slamming” the W-4 files on the desk during the disciplinary meeting. Petitioner felt his treatment of her was demeaning, harassing, and embarrassing. Petitioner presented no evidence, however, that Mr. Schaible’s treatment of her was related in any way to her status as a female. In fact, when Mr. Schaible hired a replacement Human Resources Assistant, he hired another female. Petitioner alleged that Mr. Schaible acted in retaliation, but could not articulate any event for which the retaliation was lodged. When questioned by the undersigned as to her retaliation claim, Petitioner testified, It just didn’t seem like the right thing for an office atmosphere, I should say, or speak to an employee in such a manner. So it’s just his mannerism and his attitude toward me that made me feel like it was a retaliation [sic] for something, and I couldn’t figure out what it was.[6/] Petitioner may very well have been put in an impossible work situation, treated unfairly, or forced to resign. However, there is no evidence that her treatment was related in any way to her status as a female. Petitioner did admit to improperly handling employee personnel files and applicant files on at least two occasions. She denies that leaving the six files on the desk when Ms. Hilton was covering for her break was improper because Ms. Hilton worked in the payroll department and had access to employee personal information. As to the W-4 forms in her desk, Petitioner admitted that even if the forms were left in the desk by Ms. Jenkins, Petitioner was ultimately responsible for securing those documents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In July of 2006, Respondent advertised an opening for an Accountant II, position #70557, in its revenue and contracts division. The primary responsibility in the position was accounting for and paying or reimbursing expenses in state programs that were funded through federal money by drawing down the accounts in which the federal funds were maintained. Therefore, among other things, the position required accounting experience and a working knowledge of FLAIR. FLAIR is the computerized accounting and records system used by all state agencies in the State of Florida. The vacant position required significant knowledge and experience in both the accounting codes utilized in FLAIR and the computer screens associated with those codes. Additionally, there was a critical need to immediately fill the position with an experienced person because of the involvement with federal funds and due to the fact that another employee, Deborah Schimmel, was performing the work required in her position, as well as, the work required in the vacant position. In 2006, Petitioner, who is Caucasian and 67 years old, applied for the Accountant II position with Respondent. As part of the application process, Petitioner answered a series of qualifying questions relevant to the vacant position. The questions were used by Respondent to help with preliminary screening of the applicants. Some of the questions involved the applicants’ experience with FLAIR, grants and revenue. Petitioner answered the qualifying questions and indicated he had one year of experience with FLAIR, a college degree in accounting and experience with grants. There were four other applicants for the position. Petitioner did not know the race of any of the other applicants for the position and did not offer any evidence regarding the race of these individuals. Salwa Soliman, the Commission’s Revenue and Contracts Manager, was advised that the Accountant II position was vacant and had been advertised. She was also aware that the position needed to be filled as soon as possible with a person who could perform the accounting and billing duties of that position with little or no training. Ms. Soliman reviewed the applications for the vacant position. Based on a review of his application and qualifying questions, Petitioner was granted an interview because he was a veteran, held a bachelor's degree in accounting, had revenue experience and had experience with FLAIR. On October 13, 2006, Petitioner was interviewed for the position by Ms. Soliman and Ms. Schimmel. During Petitioner's interview, it was clear that Petitioner's experience with revenue related to tax returns and not grants. Likewise, Petitioner's experience with grants was only in writing or applying for grants. He had not billed or disbursed federal money from such grants. More importantly, Petitioner's experience with FLAIR was “view only” experience. “View only” experience or authorization meant that Petitioner was only able to view or look at certain screens but not input data or change the screens in FLAIR. Thus, Petitioner did not have experience with data input to FLAIR and/or the pull-down menus associated with such input. In short, Petitioner’s experience and skills did not relate to the work required in the position at issue. Neither tax experience nor grant writing experience was the type of revenue experience required for the vacant position. Additionally, Petitioner did not have sufficient experience or working knowledge of FLAIR to enable him to fill the position with little or no training. Petitioner was not hired for the position. In all likelihood, Petitioner could have been trained for the position. However, due to the nature of the position, Respondent reasonably wanted to hire a person who could immediately fill it. Indeed, none of the applicants for the position were hired because no person had the necessary working knowledge of FLAIR and grant billing to fill the Accountant II position immediately with little or no training required. There was no evidence that Respondent’s reasons for not hiring Petitioner were unreasonable or a pretext for discriminating against Petitioner. When a batch of applicants does not meet Respondent’s needs for a vacant position, Respondent’s policy was to review any applications for other employment opportunities with Respondent submitted within six months of the closing date of the job announcement for the current vacancy. Because of the critical need to fill the Accounting II position, Ms. Soliman asked that other previously submitted applications be forwarded to her by Respondent’s personnel department. In order to transfer an application from one job posting to another job posting, People’s First, the State’s contractor for some personnel matters, must transfer the previously filed application in its database to the file for the current vacancy. Other than requesting the transfer of the application, Respondent is not involved in the actions necessary to transfer an application to another file for a vacant position. In this case, Respondent’s personnel department requested People’s First to transfer applications from an earlier-filled Accountant II position with Respondent. One of the transferred applications was from Debra Shriver who was 23 years old and Caucasian. For unknown reasons, in the computer process of transferring the application, the date on Ms. Shriver’s application was changed. The evidence was clear that Respondent did not ask for or cause the date on Ms. Shriver’s application to change. In fact, the change in the application’s date was immaterial to Respondent’s criteria or requirements in filling the position at issue here and does not demonstrate any fraud, falsification or misrepresentation on the part of Respondent in filling the position. Based on her application, Ms. Soliman interviewed Ms. Shriver for the vacant position. The evidence was clear that Ms. Shriver had the experience and knowledge being sought and required for the position at issue. She was currently working in the grant billing division in another state agency and had significant experience and working knowledge of FLAIR as it relates to grants and billing. Ms. Soliman had worked with the successful candidate before but they were not personal friends. Ms. Soliman knew that Ms. Shriver was a competent employee. Based on these facts, Ms. Shriver was hired for the vacant position and did not require significant training once she began working in that position. There was no evidence that Ms. Shriver’s selection was based on her race or her age. She was selected based on her qualifications to immediately perform in the position for which she was hired. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner was not hired based on his race, which was the same as Ms. Shriver’s, or his age. Petitioner was not hired because he did not have the experience necessary to enable him to immediately begin performing the duties of the position for which he applied. Finally, there was no evidence that Petitioner’s requirements for selecting a person to fill the vacant position or for selecting Ms. Shriver were unreasonable or a pretext for discrimination against Petitioner. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert H. Beddy 7281 Sycamore Road Quincy, Florida 32351 Stan M. Warden, Esquire Emily J. Norton, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Ken D. Haddad, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 James V. Antista, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Patricia Smithwick Valz, is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as a "prevailing small business party" in the underlying administrative proceeding.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent, Lavern W. Burroughs, began work with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) on July 1, 1987, and that she was not present for work on July 22, 25, or 26 of 1988. Between March 3, 1988, and July 7, 1988, Ms. Burroughs, a clerk typist, was absent on fourteen occasions. Each time "LW" was entered beside her name on an attendance and leave sheet. "LW" is used when an employee has used up all sick and annual leave, but is nevertheless authorized to take leave. The designation LW means leave without pay, but it does not indicate whether leave was authorized or unauthorized. In December of 1987, Ms. Burroughs had received a "conference letter," HRS' Exhibit No. 1, after discussing her attendance problems with Mr. Weston and his immediate supervisor, Mr. Mathis. On April 15, 1988, Mr. Weston sent her a letter in 4 which he reprimanded her for being absent without leave. HRS' Exhibit No. 2. The letter stated: It is hoped that you will view this disciplinary measure in a constructive manner and there will not be a recurrence of this nature. However, you are cautioned that further offenses of this standard will result in more stringent disciplinary measure of a ten (10) days suspension without pay up to dismissal. Mr. Mathis testified that the ordinary practice, if petitioner's absenteeism had been handled as a career service matter, would have seen a ten (10) day suspension as HRS' next response, in the event of another unauthorized absence; and that dismissal would not have occurred, unless the ten (10) day suspension failed to cure the problem. On Thursday, July 14, 1988, Ms. Burroughs went to work, as it turned out, for the last time. The next morning she called in, shortly after 9:00 o'clock, to report that she had received notice of judicial proceedings designed to foreclose on her house. Unable to reach Mr. Weston, she asked for his supervisor, Mr. Mathis. Unable to reach him, she spoke to Ms. Evan Gibson, Mr. Mathis' secretary, and told her that she would not be coming to work. Ms. Gibson said she would relay the message. Ms. Burroughs left for Georgia in an effort to obtain money from a cousin with which to retain a lawyer to represent her in the foreclosure proceedings. The next Monday, July 18, 1988, Ms. Burroughs' daughter, Sheronda, telephoned HRS' Jacksonville offices. Apparently she spoke to Mr. Weston when she reported that Ms. Burroughs had trouble with her eye. On July 20, 1988, Ms. Burroughs telephoned herself. Again unable to reach Mr. Weston, she ended up telling Ms. Gibson that her eye was running and painful. Also on July 20, 1988, she visited the Riverside Clinic, received a prescription for erythromycin, and filled it that day. A nurse filled out a form employee's medical excuse saying that Ms. Burroughs had been under the care of a doctor at the clinic "and may return to work on 7/21/88." Joint Exhibit No. 1. Mr. Weston has never denied an employee's request for sick leave. Ms. Burroughs had been granted sick leave on more than three occasions and had produced a doctor's statement on each occasion. On Thursday, July 21, 1988, Ms. Burroughs called and spoke to Mr. Weston. In a telephone conversation that lasted perhaps two minutes, she told him about the problem with her eye, and also spoke to him about the threatened foreclosure. She did not say when she would return to work, but it was clear that she was not coming in that day. After Mr. Weston responded, "Okay," his only contribution to the conversation, Ms. Burroughs said goodbye and hung up. She did not explicitly ask for leave, even as she had never done before. Her eye stopped running on July 25, 1988, a Monday. On July 26, 1988, Ms. Burroughs set out for work, having spent, she testified, all her money, except for a quarter she had with her, on gasoline, for transportation to and from work that week. When her car overheated on 1-495 she was obliged to cut her journey short. She used her only quarter to telephone her brother's house, where a sister also lived. She asked this sister to call work to tell them what had happened. Instead, a friend, Wanda Stewart, learned the circumstances from Ms. Burroughs' sister, and made the telephone call to report why petitioner would not be in that day. Anna Williams, who worked in Mr. Weston's unit last summer, took the call. Because he was not in the office, she relayed the message to Mr. Mathis' secretary. When Ms. Burroughs' called herself, on July 27, 1988, she was informed she no longer had a job.
The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent was formerly employed as a Tax Auditor II in Respondent's Fort Lauderdale office. In May, 1987, Petitioner filed a charge against Respondent with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charge was docketed as Charge No. 150871115. Eleven months later, Petitioner filed a second charge against Respondent with the EEOC. This second charge was docketed as Charge No. 150881243. By letter dated May 3, 1988, Petitioner requested that he be granted leave without pay "until both EEOC investigations [were) over." Petitioner's request resulted in a memorandum of understanding and agreement between Petitioner and the Acting Director of Respondent's Division of Audits, Glenn Bedonie. The memorandum was signed by Bedonie on May 9, 1988, and by Petitioner the following day. It provided in pertinent part as follows: This memorandum will confirm our agreement that the Department is granting your request for leave without pay until such time as the two Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigations are completed and the findings or conclusions are rendered and final. This action is based upon your voluntary request dated May 3, 1988 attached herein. You will remain on approved leave without pay commencing at 8:00 a.m., Wednesday, May 11, 1988 for (12) twelve calendar months or until a finding or conclusion has been rendered and becomes final by the EEOC in both of the above EEOC investigations. If a finding is not so rendered in both investigations within (12) calendar months, and if you make a timely request to this office the Department agrees to request an extension from the Department of Administration of your leave of absence without pay under Rule 22A- 8.016(2), F.A.C. Such extension is to last until such time as an investigative finding or conclusion is rendered and becomes final in both investigations. On May 10, 1988, the same day he signed the foregoing memorandum of understanding and agreement, Petitioner advised his supervisor in writing that the following were "two addresses where mail will reach me:" P.O. Box 22-2825, Hollywood, Florida 33022 and 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33016. Petitioner did not indicate any other manner in which he could be contacted. By letter dated August 31, 1988, Petitioner and Respondent were informed that the EEOC's Miami District Director had determined, with respect to Charge No. 150871115, that the evidence obtained during the investigation [did] not establish a violation of the statute." The letter also contained the following advisement: This determination does not conclude the processing of this charge. If the charging Party wishes to have this determination reviewed, he must submit a signed letter to the Determination Review Program which clearly sets forth the reasons for requesting the review and which lists the Charge Number and Respondent's name. Charging Party must also attach a copy of this Determination to his letter. These documents must be personally delivered or mailed (postmarked) on or before 09-14-88 to the Determinations Review Program, Office of Program Operations, EEOC, 2401 E. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20507. It is recommended that some proof of mailing, such as certified mail receipt, be secured. If the Charging Party submits a request by the date shown above, the Commission will review the determination. Upon completion of the review, the Charging Party and Respondent will be issued a final determination which will contain the results of the review and what further action, if any, the Commission may take. The final determination will also give notice, as appropriate, of the Charging Party's right to sue. Petitioner requested review of the Miami District Director's determination in Case No. 150871115. By letter dated April 28, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent were notified of the results of that review. The body of the letter read as follows: The Commission has reviewed the investigation of this charge of employment discrimination and all supplemental information furnished. Based upon this review, we agree with the determination issued by our field office and hereby issue a final determination that the evidence obtained during the investigation does not establish a violation of the statute. Therefore, the Commission dismisses and terminates its administrative processing of this charge. As the charge alleged a Title VII violation, this is notice that if the Charging Party wishes to pursue this matter further, (s)he may do so by filing a private action in Federal District Court against the Respondent(s) named above within 90 days of receipt of this Determination. IF CHARGING PARTY DECIDES TO SUE, CHARGING PARTY MUST DO SO WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THIS DETERMINATION; OTHERWISE THE RIGHT TO SUE IS LOST. By letter dated March 8, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent were informed that the EEOC's Miami District Director had determined, with respect to Charge No, 150881243, that the "evidence obtained during the investigation [did) not establish a violation of the statute," The letter further advised: If the Charging Party does not request a review of this determination by March 22, 1989 this determination will become final the following day, the processing of this charge will be complete, and the charge will be dismissed. (This letter will be the only letter of dismissal and the only notice of the Charging Party's right to sue sent by the Commission.) FOLLOWING DISMISSAL, THE CHARGING PARTY MAY ONLY PURSUE THIS MATTER FURTHER BY FILING SUIT AGAINST RESPONDENT(S) NAMED IN THE CHARGE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE DISMISSAL. Therefore, in the event a request for review is not made, if a suit is not filed by June 21, 1989 the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost. Petitioner did not request review of the District Director's determination in Case No. 150881243. Therefore, this determination became final on March 23, 1989. On May 5, 1989, Respondent's Personnel Officer, William P. Fritchman, sent Petitioner a letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, directing Petitioner to report to work immediately. The letter was mailed to P.O. Box 22- 2825, Hollywood, Florida 33022. The body of the letter provided as follows: This letter is to notify you that your tax auditor II position in Fort Lauderdale, Florida is ready for you to return to work. Your return to work will be effective immediately upon your receipt of this letter. The Department of Revenue agreed to your request for a leave of absence without pay for 12 months or until EEOC in Miami had concluded its investigation of your EEOC charges, numbers 150-88-1234 [sic] and 150-87-1115. As you know, EEOC has now concluded its investigations and issued its findings in both cases. The Department considers the reason for granting the leave of absence to be expired. Please contact Mr. Bill Hammock, Chief of Audit Activity or Mr. Howard Maxwell, Field Audit Supervisor, immediately upon receipt of this letter concerning your intentions regarding your actual reporting to work in Fort Lauderdale. Their phone number is (904) 488-0310. Your immediate supervisor will be Ms. Mary Jane Myscich. Please report to her concerning any necessary details surrounding your reporting to work. If you do not contact either of the above individuals as instructed in this letter within three workdays from the date you receive this letter, the Department will consider that you have been on unauthorized leave without pay for that three workday period. Such unauthorized leave will be considered to be abandonment of position and a resignation from the Department of Revenue as outlined under Rules 22A- 7.010(2) and 22A-8.002(5). Please contact me at (904) 488-2635 if you have any questions concerning this matter. Efforts to deliver the letter to Petitioner were unsuccessful. It therefore was subsequently returned to Fritchman as "unclaimed." By letter dated May 7, 1989, but not mailed until May 10, 1989, Petitioner requested "an extension of leave without pay status for six additional months."/1 In support of his request, Petitioner erroneously stated the following in the letter: Findings and conclusions of both EEOC Charge Nos.:150871115 dated 5/13/87 and 150881243 are as EEOC has informed you are rendered but not final. The former charge is still under appeal. Petitioner's May 7, 1989, letter, as well as the envelope in which it had been sent, reflected that Petitioner's current mailing address was 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33316. Accordingly, on May 12, 1989, utilizing a next- day delivery service, Fritchman sent to that address the following letter informing Petitioner of the denial of his leave request: I am in receipt of your letter sent May 10, 1989 to Mr. Bedonie. In your letter you request the Department to seek an extension of your leave without pay for an additional six months. For the reasons expressed in my letter to you dated May 5, 1989, copy attached, your approved leave of absence is concluded. Under the written agreement between you and the Department the two EEOC investigations have concluded; therefore the reason for your leave no longer exists. A copy of my letter to you dated May 5, 1989 is attached to this letter and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth. If you have already received a copy of that letter, then your return to work is effective on that date of your receipt. You are expected to resume your duties as a Tax Auditor II. Please contact me at (904) 488-2635 if you have any questions concerning this matter. The next-day delivery service unsuccessfully sought to deliver this letter and attachment to Petitioner at 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33316. On May 18, 1989, the letter and attachment were returned to Fritchman. Later that same day, Fritchman attempted to contact Petitioner by telephone, but was unable to reach him. As of May 18, 1989, Petitioner had not yet returned to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent at any time subsequent to the expiration of the leave he had been granted pursuant to the May, 1988, memorandum of understanding and agreement. In view of Petitioner's failure to report to work, Fritchman sent to Petitioner's Hollywood post office box a letter dated May 19, 1989, informing Petitioner that, because he had been absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays, he was deemed to have abandoned his Tax Auditor II position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. Fritchman further explained in the letter as follows: You did not report to work on May 11, 1989 under the terms of your agreement with the Department. You were therefore on unauthorized leave without pay effective May 11, 1989 or on receipt of the May 5, 1989 letter, whichever occurred first. You have not reported to work as agreed in the May 11, 1988 agreement. You are not entitled to rely on a unilateral request for an extension of leave without reporting to work. Rule 22A-8.002(5)(b), F.A.C. states: "If an employee's request for leave is disapproved and the employee takes unauthorized leave, the agency head shall place the employee on leave without pay and after an unauthorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall consider the employee to have abandoned the position and resigned from the Career Service." You did not report to work on May 11, 1989 nor any day after that. The Department considers you have been on unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays. The Department considers that effective certainly no later than 5:00 p.m., Thursday, May 18, 1989 you have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. The Department's records will indicate that this is a voluntary resignation from employment with the Department. It is this determination that Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service which is the subject of the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his Tax Auditor II position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Sherman Merrill began his position at Sunland Training Center in Orlando, Florida, on March 27, 1981 as an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. His last day on the job was August 7, 1982. As a behavioral program specialist, Mr. Merrill is responsible for supervising subordinate staff and for the behavior programming of HRS client residents in a residential living unit at the Sunland Training Center. He develops, monitors, and implements behavioral programs which are contained in each resident's habilitation plan. These plans are designed to eliminate inappropriate behavior and teach daily living skills. Mr. Merrill's responsibilities are professional and managerial. They do not require strenuous physical activity. On August ,12, 1982 Noel F. Windsor, the Superintendent of the Sunland Center, granted Mr. Merrill a temporary leave from his responsibilities without pay pending a diagnosis and prognosis from Dr. Robert C. Mumby on Respondent's physical ability to perform his responsibilities. Respondent asserted that he was no longer able to work due to back pain. An appointment with Mr. Mumby was scheduled for Respondent on August 17, 1982. On August 11, 1982 Mr. Merrill's immediate supervisor, Ms. Sharon Blume, limited Mr. Merrill's responsibilities to eliminate lifting any weight under any circumstances including emergencies. Prior to examining Mr. Merrill Dr. Mumby requested permission to see Mr. Merrill's x-rays which had previously been taken of his back. Mr. Merrill refused the request and as a result Dr. Mumby cancelled the examination appointment. The Sunland Center then scheduled an appointment for Mr. Merrill to be examined by Dr. Bott on August 19, 1982. Mr. Merrill did not keep this appointment and it was rescheduled for August 25, 1982. The August 25, 1982 appointment was kept and as a result of that appointment Dr. Bott reported in his findings that Mr. Merrill was able to return to work with restrictions. 1/ On October 15, 1982 HRS requested Respondent to return to work on October 19, 1982. He did not appear as requested. On October 25, 1982 Mr. Windsor wrote a letter to Respondent stating that he would continue to be carried in a leave without pay status until such time as Dr. Bott has evaluated the x-rays in relation to the examination conducted on August 25, 1982. The foregoing letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. It was later returned to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as unclaimed after attempts to deliver it were made on October 26 and October 30. On November 19, 1982 a copy of the October 25, 1982 letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. HRS again requested a release of Respondent's earlier x-rays for review by Dr. Bott. On December 10, 1982 Mr. Windsor wrote to Respondent a letter which stated in part: In accordance with the recommendation by Dr. Paul Raymond, your family practice physician in Cresson, Pennsylvania, we have scheduled an appointment for you with Dr. William K. Bott, Orthopedic Surgeon, 87 West Underwood Street, Orlando, Florida 32806, on Tuesday, December 21, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. As you are aware, we made an appointment for you with Dr. Bott on August 19 which you did not keep, and again on August 25, 1982. After the examination of August 25, Dr. Bott advised this agency that you were able to return to work with restrictions. He also advised us that he would re-evaluate you after reviewing your x-rays. You refused to allow Dr. Bott to make x-rays, and you also refused to authorize the release of previously made x-rays. Enclosed for your information is a copy of Chapter 22A-8 of the Florida Personnel Rules and Regulations. Please be advised that all fees for this visit will be paid by Sunland Center. Mr. Merrill did not see Dr. Bott on December 21, 1982, but was examined by him on January 4, 1983. On February 15, 1983 Mr. Merrill was told to report to work on February 21, 1983. Mr. Merrill did not report as ordered, but instead requested another leave of absence without pay. This request was denied on February 22, 1983 on which date Mr. Merrill was notified that he was absent without leave and that if he did not report to work by February 23, 1983 he would be deemed to have abandoned his position and voluntarily resigned from the career service system pursuant to Section 22A-8.02, Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Merrill did not report for work within the time allowed, three consecutive days after February 21, 1983. Mr. Windsor wrote him a letter on February 25, 1983 which stated: As you were advised in our letter of February 22, 1983, your request for an additional six (6) months leave of absence has been denied. Further, you were notified in that letter that you were to report to your work station prior to 3:15 P.M., February 23, 1983. You were examined by Dr. William K. Bott on August 25, 1982 and released to return to restricted duty. You failed to do so. You were re-examined on January 4, 1983 by Dr. Bott, and again, released to return to your Behavioral Program Specialist duties with restrictions. He indicated that you are able to perform sedentary type duties, you should not do repeated activities, repeated lifting or pulling using the lift [(sic) should be "left"] upper extremity (copy of diagnosis attached). You were advised by our letter of February 15, 1983 to return to your duties at Sunland Center, February 20, 1983 at approximately 2:00 P.M., you telephoned Living Unit 1E and left the message that you would not be reporting to work on February 21. At approximately midnight on February 20, 1983, you presented yourself on the Living Unit 1E to review the Personnel Rules and Regulations. On February 21, 1983, you presented your immediate supervisor with a request for additional leave of absence and left the facility. On February 23, 1983 at 1:50 P.M., during a meeting with your supervisors, you advised Ms. Patricia L. Gleason, Resident Life Program Supervisor, and Ms. Sharon Blume, Resident Life Unit Supervisor and your immediate supervisor, that you would not be coming to work. As you have failed to report to work for three (3) consecutive days, we must assume that you have abandoned your position with Sunland Center.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order determining that Respondent Sherman Merrill has abandoned his position in the State Career Service System as a Behavioral Program Specialist. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Clarence E. Burtoft, was hired by respondent, Southern Linen Service, in November, 1982 as assistant general manager at its Daytona Beach plant. Prior to this employment, he had back surgery performed in Augusta, Georgia but the effects of such surgery did not interfere with his job duties. After being on the job for approximately three days, he was told by the regional manager that labor costs needed to be reduced, and that one employee must be laid off. He was also told to shift two female employees from one department to another. There is a dispute between the parties as to what the actual instructions were, and whether they were in fact carried out by Burtoft. Nonetheless, the employer construed Burtoft's actions as not complying with its instructions, and Burtoft was accordingly terminated the following day and told he was not the right man for the job. The back surgery was not related in any respect to the termination and Burtoft himself acknowledged as much. Burtoft's complaint is that his job records at Southern Linen Service contain a notation that he was fired for refusing to follow instructions. He only wants that adverse information removed. 1/ He is not contending that his employer unlawfully discriminated against him, or requesting that his job be reinstated with full back pay. Indeed, it was only after he visited the State employment office that he filed this complaint upon that office's encouragement. At no time was he ever told by any Florida Commission on Human Relations representative that its jurisdiction extended only over certain employment practices, and that any complaint must necessarily be founded on some form of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed by Clarence E. Burtoft be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1984.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from his employment in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Petitioner is a black male who was employed by the Respondent, City Gas Company of Florida, from June, 1966 until October 31, 1988. At all times material to this case, the Respondent had an after hours policy which prohibited its employees from working for other gas companies, contractors, self employment, or any gas related field without prior permission from the Respondent's executive office. Failure to abide by that policy would subject an employee to immediate termination. The Respondent's policy for services performed while on duty required the employee to work only on behalf of the company. Monies for services rendered by Respondent's employees while on company time were to be remitted to the Respondent's office with the appropriate paperwork within a timely manner. Normal business practice would be for a repairman to remit monies and paperwork either the afternoon of the job or the next business day if a same day return to the office would be impractical. In April, 1988, the Petitioner was given a work assignment at the home of a customer named Mrs. Rhodes. Petitioner was to turn on Mrs. Rhodes' furnace. After inspecting the unit, Petitioner advised Mrs. Rhodes that the furnace should be cleaned. Subsequently, she authorized that work and the Petitioner dismantled and cleaned the furnace while on company time. Upon completing the task, Petitioner asked for and received from Mrs. Rhodes two checks: one payable to Respondent to cover the turn on and deposit; one made payable to Petitioner personally for the cleaning of the unit. The Petitioner cashed the second check, in the amount of $25.00, and remitted the other check to the company. Sometime later, the Respondent received a complaint from Mrs. Rhodes concerning the furnace. Mr. Hixon, vice president and general manager for the company, confronted the Petitioner regarding the matter. During that conference Mr. Hixon asked Petitioner for an explanation regarding the second check which Mrs. Rhodes had reportedly paid to him. Petitioner did not admit that he had performed additional work on company time (beyond the routine turn on). Also, Petitioner did not admit that he had received monies payable to himself, and that he had cashed that second check. Bill Joynt is a white male employed by Respondent. In September, 1988, Mr. Joynt was assigned to make a service call for a customer named Mr. Cox. After installing a valve on Mr. Cox's furnace, Mr. Joynt received $80.00 cash from the customer. Later Mr. Cox contacted the Respondent to complain that the furnace was still not operating correctly. Mr. Cox advised the company that he had paid $80.00 for the repair but that he was unsatisfied with the work. Mr. Hixon contacted Mr. Joynt and confronted him as to why the $80.00 had not been remitted to the company. Mr. Joynt immediately acknowledged that he had forgotten to turn in the payment. Subsequently, Mr. Joynt turned in the $80.00 to the company. Because he readily admitted his error, the Respondent suspended Mr. Joynt for three days without pay and allowed him to return to work. Because he did not admit his error (in fact, Petitioner continued to deny it until the day of the hearing in this cause), the Respondent terminated Petitioner from his employment. Petitioner's lack of forthrightness, not his race, was his own undoing. The vacancy created by Petitioner's termination was filled under the terms of the Company's bargaining agreement with the union. A white male was entitled to and did fill the vacant position. Since leaving Respondent's employment, Petitioner has become employed by the Brevard County School Board but earns less than his prior employment afforded him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-5856 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: None timely submitted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraph 1 is accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 2 is accepted. With regard to the remainder of the paragraph, it is accepted that Petitioner knew all on duty work was to be done for the company; off duty work was performed by employees, including this Petitioner, with Respondent's approval and assistance. Paragraphs 3 through 6 are accepted. With the deletion of the word "repeated" paragraph 7 is accepted. With the clarification that Mr. Joynt agreed to turn the money in when he was confronted (perhaps found out), paragraph 8 is accepted. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as irrelevant or hearsay. The first sentence of paragraph 12 is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The company loaned Petitioner tools and sold him appliances to install during his off duty time. His failure to the company resulted from his on duty activities in his own cause and his failure to readily admit his error when confronted. Paragraphs 13 through 16 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan K. Erlenbach 503 South Palm Avenue Titusville, Florida 32796 C. Graham Carothers Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570
The Issue Whether or not Respondent employer has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, by termination of Petitioner's employment on the basis of her sex (female) or by retaliatory discharge for Petitioner's participation in another female employee's Equal Employment Opportunity Claim.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Florida Power Corporation (FPC) is an electrical utility engaged in the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. At all times material, it qualified as an "employer" under the relevant statutes. Petitioner Karen Austin, a white female, was initially employed by FPC in May 1985 at its Crystal River, Florida, production site. The Crystal River production site consists of five generating units-- one nuclear unit and four coal-fired units. The coal-fired units are Units 1 and 2 located on the south side and Units 4 and 5 located on the north side. FPC maintains a five-shift rotation in coal handling with a shift supervisor responsible for each shift of employees. The five shift supervisors report directly to John Price, Site Operations Superintendent, who is responsible for all coal handling operations at the Crystal River site. Mr. Price reports to Ed Carnahan, Crystal River Coal Plant Site Support Manager, and Mr. Carnahan reports to R.C. Bonner, Site Director, Fossil Operations. Danny Douglas, Assistant Site Support Manager, is also a supervisor of Mr. Price. From June 1987 until her termination from employment on October 13, 1988, Petitioner worked as an assistant fuel handler, which is the entry level position in the coal handling department. She was the only female in this job description on her shift. Lynn Graves-Donaldson testified to overhearing some generalized adverse comments from unidentified male shift supervisors and coworkers about not wanting to train or work with a female when Petitioner was promoted in 1987 to assistant fuel handler. While employed as an assistant fuel handler, Petitioner reported directly to J. D. Stephens, who reported directly to John Price. Petitioner's employment relationship with FPC was regulated by the collective bargaining agreement between FPC and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). In January 1988, John Price and other management personnel began receiving telephone calls from local businesses complaining that Petitioner had written and given them bad checks. Writing bad checks is a violation of FPC policy. Section 7.3 of FPC's Human Resources Manual states, "Employees who do not handle their personal or financial affairs without reflecting discredit upon themselves and the company are not desirable employees, and are, therefore, subject to discharge." The codified policy does not facially discriminate, by sex or otherwise, against any employee or class of employee. As one of the largest employers in Crystal River, a small community, FPC attempts to maintain good community relations with its "clients." Due to its self-cast good neighbor/good utility role, FPC pays greater attention to the private, off-job site activities of its employees than many other employers would. In so doing, its management personnel regularly rely on hearsay in the nature of complaints, gossip, and newspaper articles in the administration of its policy codified in the FPC Human Resources Manual. FPC tries to follow a progressive discipline procedure, depending on the severity of the offense against its codified policy. With employee problems such as writing bad checks, the steps generally consist of an informal talk by the employee's immediate supervisor; a counselling session; an oral reprimand; a written reprimand; and suspension without pay and/or termination. On one occasion, John Price counselled a male employee (race not in evidence) concerning bad checks, and that employee paid up with no further disciplinary action. FPC has also discharged male employees for violations of its policy. Richard Brown (Black male) and Richard Frankie (white male) were discharged by FPC on February 6, 1985 and May 5, 1986, respectively, for failing to handle their financial affairs without reflecting discredit upon themselves and the company. The precise job status of these male employees is not in evidence, but all employees, regardless of job description, are subject to the rules and policy contained in the FPC Human Resources Manual, and so these employees may be considered employees who are "substantially similar" to the Petitioner for purposes of this proceeding. After receiving the initial complaints about Petitioner's financial affairs, John Price asked J. D. Stephens, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, to discuss the problem with Petitioner. Mr. Stephens subsequently reported back to Mr. Price that he had talked with Petitioner on February 23, 1988 and she agreed to take care of the debts occasioned by her bad checks. However, weighing the credible evidence as a whole, it is found unlikely that such a conversation ever occurred between Mr. Stephens and Petitioner or at least that it occurred on that date. In the course of his testimony, Mr. Stephens' candor and demeanor on this subject did not comport with that of a truthful person. Moreover, in the course of hearing, it became clear that Mr. Stephens had made false reports or had failed to transmit relevant employee information to Mr. Price on other occasions. Also, Petitioner was not regularly on the plant premises during this period of time due to her recuperation from a work-related hiatal hernia. Nonetheless, Mr. Price believed Mr. Stephens' representation at the time it was made in February or March of 1988. In February 1988, FPC had received a complaint from The Jeanery that Petitioner had written that business a check on a closed account. The Jeanery made a second complaint to FPC by letter dated March 3, 1988, and since Petitioner had failed to correct the problem, Mr. Price personally conducted a counseling session with Petitioner on March 31, 1988 to discuss the complaint from The Jeanery and the other complaints that FPC had received from local businesses. At their March 31, 1988 meeting, Mr. Price showed Petitioner Section 7.3 of FPC's Human Resources Manual which states that employees who fail to handle their financial affairs without reflecting discredit upon themselves and the company will be subject to discharge. Petitioner acknowledged to Mr. Price that she understood FPC's policy and would take care of the debt to The Jeanery. Following their March 31 meeting, Mr. Price received additional complaints from local businesses that Petitioner was continuing to write bad checks. On May 31, 1988, Mr. Price received a complaint from Jan's Uniforms that Petitioner had written that business a bad check. Mr. Price also received similar complaints from the Denim Patch, Cindy's Beauty Salon, Chest and Drawers, and Publix Supermarket. On July 6, 1988, FPC received a complaint from Joan's Consignment Boutique that Petitioner had written that business a check on an FPC credit union account which had previously been closed. Two days later, on July 8, 1988, Mr. Price received a bad check complaint from One Hour Photo. After receiving the call from One Hour Photo, Mr. Price called Petitioner, informed her of the complaint, and told her to go pay the debt. On July 9, 1988, Mr. Price received a complaint from Meineke Muffler that Petitioner had written that business a check on a closed account. Due to the number of bad check complaints since the March 31 meeting, Mr. Price determined that further disciplinary action against Petitioner was warranted. He scheduled a meeting with Petitioner, J. D. Stephens, and Sid Miller, Petitioner's union representative, on July 11, 1988 at 10:45 a.m. During this meeting, Mr. Price explained to Petitioner that FPC had received numerous complaints since their March 31 meeting, and he provided her copies of some of his notes detailing the complaints. Petitioner established that Mr. Price did not give Petitioner all of his notes, but that fact is not dispositive in this proceeding since it does not substantially affect the situation for which he ultimately held Petitioner responsible. (See, Findings of Fact 37-41, infra.) Mr. Price also issued Petitioner an oral reprimand and told her that her job was in jeopardy if she did not straighten out her bad check problem. Petitioner told Mr. Price during their July 11 meeting that she was not writing the bad checks and that the checks were being written by her husband or his girlfriend. Although Mr. Price told Petitioner that the checks were in her name and it was her responsibility to correct the problem, Mr. Price later the same day telephoned Claudia Keiser with One Hour Photo to verify whether Petitioner had written the bad check. Ms. Keiser described the Petitioner as the person who had written the check and also gave Mr. Price the driver's license number that had been given to her by the party who had written the check. Mr. Price confirmed to his satisfaction that the number given him by Claudia Keiser was Petitioner's driver's license number. Mr. Price also contacted Jan's Uniforms to verify that it was Petitioner who had actually written the bad check to that business and was satisfied after that telephone conversation that Petitioner had, indeed, given the foregoing businesses the bad checks they had complained about to FPC. Without making further inquiry, John Price also extended his disbelief of Petitioner's explanation concerning her husband and his girlfriend to all the other complaints against Petitioner of which he was aware, which disbelief contributed to his growing impression that Petitioner was not cooperating in resolving her bad check problem. Despite the issuance of the July 11 oral reprimand to Petitioner, FPC received additional complaints from One Hour Photo on July 11, Meineke Muffler on July 29, and Jan's Uniforms on August 1 that Petitioner had still not satisfied her debts. On August 4, 1988, Mr. Price prepared a written reprimand for Petitioner due to her failure to handle her financial affairs without reflecting discredit upon herself and the company. The written reprimand was presented to Petitioner on August 10, 1988. The written reprimand specified that Petitioner had fourteen days, until August 24, in which to make restitution to the businesses that had registered complaints and to provide FPC proof of restitution. The letter also notified Petitioner that any further complaints or failure to comply with the letter would result in termination of her employment. As of August 10, 1988, Mr. Price understood "further complaints" to mean any complaints regarding checks that were written after August 4, the date of the written reprimand. At some point, a misunderstanding occurred between Petitioner and Mr. Price as to whether he had required her to show him receipts for payment of her debts. At some point, Petitioner explained to Mr. Price that she could not pay off all her debts immediately and in full. On August 23, Petitioner again met with Mr. Price and provided proof that she had made payments to five of the 10 businesses to whom he had required she make restitution by August 24. One or more of the 10 businesses were closed or the accounts were closed out. Petitioner told Mr. Price that she was unable to contact the remaining businesses because her car was in the shop. At that point, Mr. Price orally altered the written reprimand and told Petitioner that he would accept a telephone call from the remaining businesses or other proof from her that she was attempting restitution to the remaining businesses rather than proof of full, immediate restitution to all the businesses. Petitioner also questioned Mr. Price during the August 23 meeting as to what "any further complaints" meant. As of that date, Mr. Price explained to Petitioner that from that point on he understood the questioned term to mean a complaint regarding a new bad check that had been written after August 4 or a complaint that Petitioner was not making restitution pursuant to the payment schedule that she had arranged with each business concerning the old bad checks written prior to August 4. Mr. Price told Petitioner that he considered complaints from businesses on those grounds to constitute a "further complaint," for which Petitioner could be discharged. Mr. Price initiated an August 24 meeting by asking to see Petitioner's receipts. Petitioner submitted proof on August 24 that she had arranged payment schedules with three businesses. At their August 24 meeting, Petitioner also raised her safety concerns about male employees arriving at work intoxicated. Mr. Price regarded her accusations concerning safety hazards to be digression or distraction, refused to discuss the safety issues raised by Petitioner at that time, and concentrated the conversation on her bad checks. At that time, Mr. Price still doubted Petitioner's credibility and resented that Petitioner had not initiated an earlier meeting to show him her receipts. The discussion between Petitioner and Mr. Price became very heated on this occasion, and each screamed at the other. At some point in the conversation, Mr. Price said, "You are doing just fine for a single woman working full-time with two children to raise." Petitioner's perception of this comment was that it was derogatory or discriminatory of her as a working woman. Mr. Price's perception was that the comment was either conciliatory or innocuous. At the August 24 meeting, Petitioner also presented extenuating circumstances why she had not finalized arrangements with the remaining two businesses. Within a few days, she submitted proof for the remaining two businesses. This late compliance by Petitioner substantially met the terms of Mr. Price's prior requirements, and he accepted Petitioner's slightly late compliance as fulfilling her obligations at that point. Although it was not specifically put into words by Mr. Price, it was intended by him that any failure on Petitioner's part to complete her restitution schedules would result in her termination. He did not specifically request her to bring receipts for each payment she made but he expected her to make a fair attempt at restitution and be able to prove it. Mr. Price later asked Mr. Stephens to get further receipts from Petitioner. It is undisputed that Mr. Stephens asked Petitioner if she had her receipts. Apparently a further misunderstanding arose between Petitioner and Mr. Price as to whether Mr. Price was going to pick up the receipts from her in the coal yard or whether he was requiring Petitioner to bring them to him in his centralized office. This misunderstanding was occasioned by the principals relaying their positions through the conduit of Mr. Stephens. Whether Mr. Stephens intended to picture Petitioner in a bad light for Mr. Price or whether it was Petitioner's mere lack of initiative in voluntarily taking receipts to Mr. Price which fueled Mr. Price's perception that Petitioner was uncooperative and was avoiding him is not entirely clear from this record, but, in fact, Petitioner did not bring any receipts to Mr. Price when J. D. Stephens merely asked her if she had them. Mr. Price felt her behavior confirmed his belief that Petitioner was not credible and that she also was resisting his authority. FPC received a telephone call from Don's Pharmacy on September 21 regarding Petitioner's failure to make her payment on September 14 pursuant to the agreed-upon payment schedule. Subsequent to August 24, Mr. Price also received complaints that Petitioner was not paying other businesses as she had agreed to do. Mr. Price then contacted other businesses with whom Petitioner had made payment arrangements and was told that she had not made any payments since the first one. Most businesses had been paid something on September 15. Mr. Price regarded these telephone conversations, whether initiated by the businesses or by himself, as "complaints" under the terms of his last understanding with Petitioner and as coming from businesses that were "more or less clients of FPC." (TR 153-156) After receiving this hearsay information, Mr. Price formed the conclusion that Petitioner had shown him receipts or had had creditors telephone him to indicate their acquiescence in a repayment schedule but that thereafter she simply did not faithfully make the scheduled payments. Prior to her termination, Petitioner never gave Mr. Price a repayment schedule for every business she owed, and he never knew for sure what those repayment schedules might be. No exhibit in evidence discloses what the payment schedules really were. No creditor testified to any due date for Petitioner's payments under their restitution schedule. In September and October 1988, Mr. Price and other managers simply relied on the hearsay statements of business people in the community whom they contacted or who contacted them. Some of their information could have been inaccurate or could have related to accounts that did not fit Mr. Price's final August 23-24 definition of "complaints." However, Petitioner did not testify and did not otherwise refute any of Mr. Price's expressed motivations for her termination, and the evidence is insufficient to establish that she had actually timely met all her payments to all of the businesses which had been contemplated by Mr. Price's final definition of "complaints." It is also clear that some of FPC's managers' time was still being taken up with some complaints from the community about Petitioner. Mr. Price and Danny Douglas, Assistant Site Support Manager, determined to their satisfaction that Petitioner was not complying with her payment schedules and that further counselling sessions or ultimatums from FPC's management to Petitioner would be useless. Likewise, they concluded that assigning Petitioner a suspension without pay would not help her pay her creditors or resolve the problem of complaints to FPC management about her bad checks or relieve the impression she was creating in the business community. Accordingly, with the concurrence of Ed Carnahan, Petitioner was terminated from her employment with FPC on October 13, 1988 for violating company policy, which requires all employees to handle their financial affairs in a manner which does not reflect discredit upon themselves and the company. Sometime between September 20, 1988 and her discharge on October 13, 1988, Petitioner was interviewed by FPC Human Resources Representative Dotty Wertz. Ms. Wertz interviewed Petitioner and approximately eight or nine other female employees as part of an internal company equal employment opportunity (EEO) investigation into a sexual harassment complaint filed by a female employee, Talesa Lloyd, against her supervisor, Jimmy Hitson. Ms. Wertz interviewed Petitioner at the request of Talesa Lloyd. Petitioner was formerly a subordinate of Mr. Hitson, but did not work for him in September or October of 1988. Four or five of the eight or nine female employees interviewed by Dotty Wertz made negative comments about Mr. Hitson. Petitioner was one of those who made such negative comments. FPC ultimately took disciplinary action against Mr. Hitson. The nature of FPC's internal discipline against Mr. Hitson is not in evidence, but apparently it was something short of termination. Talesa Lloyd had been a temporary worker at FPC when she lodged her sexual harassment claim, and she was invited back to work by FPC despite her claim. However, Mrs. Lloyd told FPC that she chose not to go back to work until she heard the outcome of her claim. That information was never reported to her, and she testified at formal hearing herein that she considered the outcome of her claim to be unfavorable to her and the internal complaint procedure in general to be unsatisfactory because no one had ever revealed the outcome of her claim to her, because Ms. Wertz refused to show her Ms. Wertz' report, and because Ms. Wertz told her that Ms. Wertz had been required by the company to rewrite her report. After her interviews, Ms. Wertz disclosed the results of her investigation to management, but did not orally identify to John Price, Ed Carnahan, R. C. Bonner, or J. D. Stephens those female employees she had interviewed or what information each individual had provided to her. Ms. Wertz also did not discuss the contents of any of her interviews with John Price, Ed Carnahan, R. C. Bonner, or J. D. Stephens, but Mr. Price admitted that he knew before he fired Petitioner that Ms. Wertz had interviewed Petitioner. Mr. Price denied knowing what Petitioner had said to Ms. Wertz. Given the physical layout of the employer's plant and the way in which Ms. Wertz made contact with the Petitioner, it may be reasonably inferred that one or more of her other supervisors also knew that Petitioner had been interviewed by Ms. Wertz and for what reason and further knew that several interviewees had commented unfavorably on Mr. Hitson. Ms. Wertz testified that Mr. Hitson himself could have seen her report and figured out who said what about him, but since Ms. Wertz' report did not attribute comments by name of interviewee, probably only Mr. Hitson or Ms. Wertz could have been sure who said what from reading the report. Mr. Price denied reading the report. There is no evidence that any of Petitioner's other supervisors read the report. Therefore, it is pure speculation that any affected manager knew, prior to her termination, that the Petitioner's comments about Mr. Hitson had been unfavorable. Todd Lemieux is employed by FPC as an assistant fuel handler (as was Petitioner) at its Crystal River site and has held that position approximately five years. In June 1988, Mr. Lemieux came to Mr. Price and reported that he had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and would have to serve some time in jail. At that time, Mr. Lemieux' work performance was excellent; he had never missed a day from work or taken any time off, and he had never been the subject of any FPC disciplinary action. Since this was the first community offense made known to FPC, Lemieux was allowed to use all of his accrued vacation and holiday time and a two-week job suspension without pay to serve his jail sentence. Lemieux was not terminated because he had an excellent work record, because he took the initiative of approaching his supervisor to report the violation, and because it was his first disciplinary offense with the company. However, in Lemieux' case, FPC's progressive discipline system of talk, counselling, oral reprimand, and written reprimand was not used, and Lemieux was given a written reprimand letter informing him that any further incidents of that nature would result in termination. Petitioner attempted to show that FPC had accommodated Mr. Lemieux despite a driver's license suspension which affected his work and two prior DUI convictions. Ed Carnahan testified that although he knew about Mr. Lemieux' two prior DUI charges as of the date of formal hearing, he did not know about them when Mr. Lemieux was disciplined in 1988. John Price was under the impression Mr. Lemieux received a permit to drive for employment purposes during his license suspension. John Argernon was employed by FPC as a fuel handler at its Crystal River site. Mr. Argernon was counselled by Mr. Price about his off duty alcohol abuse because Mr. Argernon was frequently tardy arriving at work and because he often used sick leave due to his drinking problem. Mr. Argernon subsequently participated in the FPC Employee Help Program for alcoholism, which FPC offers only one time to all employees at company expense while that employee draws full pay. Mr. Argernon quit the FPC Help Program before graduation, and thereafter, when FPC discovered further evidence of Argernon's alcohol abuse, he was terminated. Several managers, including John Price, had heard gossip that Petitioner was "at Charter" (a rehabilitation facility) during part of the spring of 1988 when the complaints concerning her bad checks reached crisis proportions, but they regarded that situation as confidential and did not probe behind the gossip. No evidence established that Petitioner specifically requested and was denied admission to the FPC Help Program for stress or bad check writing. Mr. Carnahan counselled with Mr. Argernon regarding spouse abuse after reading in the newspaper that Argernon's wife had brought such charges against him but did not pursue the issue since Mr. Carnahan was later informed either by Mr. Argernon or by another supervisor that the spouse abuse charges against Mr. Argernon had been dropped. Mr. Carnahan admittedly did not personally follow up on the matter to verify Mr. Argernon's truth and veracity or lack thereof on the subject of spouse abuse. Mr. Price did not discipline Mr. Argernon for spouse abuse because at the time he did not have any evidence that Argernon was guilty of spouse abuse. At the time Mr. Price recommended Petitioner's termination, he had been warned by Petitioner about intoxicated employees (see Finding of Fact 34) but he had no specific knowledge that Fred Fluchel, a white male fuel handler, had violated any company policy. Mr. Price first learned of a possible rule violation by Mr. Fluchel when Petitioner alleged in her initial charges, dated November 14, 1988, that on one occasion, Mr. Fluchel had come to work drunk and had driven his own pickup truck, containing two underage passengers, into a coal pile on the plant site. At that time, Mr. Price had questioned J. D. Stephens about Petitioner's allegation and Mr. Stephens had told Mr. Price that he was not aware that Mr. Fluchel had violated company policy as alleged. Mr. Price thereafter relied on Mr. Stephens' representation without further investigation. However, two days prior to the formal hearing herein, Mr. Price determined, contrary to Mr. Stephens' prior representations, that Mr. Fluchel had, indeed, violated company policy in such a drunken truck-driving incident on the job site, and Mr. Price testified at formal hearing that appropriate disciplinary action will now be taken against Mr. Fluchel. Such disciplinary action against Mr. Fluchel had not been taken by FPC as of the date of formal hearing herein. Messrs. Lemieux, Argernon, and Fluchel constitute employees "substantially similar" to Petitioner. Jim DeNicola, a white male, is employed as a Senior Maintenance Supervisor at FPC's Crystal River facility. He is not in a union bargaining unit like Petitioner. Also, his job description is supervisory and dissimilar in substance and authority to Petitioner's, but since FPC's Human Resource Manual applied to him as it did to all other FPC employees, including Petitioner, he may be considered an employee who is "substantially similar" to Petitioner for purposes of this proceeding. In 1985, before Petitioner was promoted to assistant fuel handler, Mr. DeNicola borrowed some furniture from FPC for his personal use. In so doing, he required at least two female employees, Petitioner and Lynne Graves-Donaldson, to assist in moving the furniture from the FPC plant site to his home. Both Mrs. Graves-Donaldson, who testified, and Petitioner, who did not testify, perceived that Mr. DeNicola's actions were stealing at worst, and at best, were done without permission of appropriate supervisors. Mrs. Graves-Donaldson expressed no concerns that she was asked to do heavy labor or that moving the furniture amounted to FPC employees doing Mr. DeNicola's personal business on company time. Mr. DeNicola returned the furniture to the FPC site after he no longer needed it. Mr. DeNicola was not disciplined by FPC for borrowing the furniture. Although some of Mr. DeNicola's middle management peers and some superiors apparently "looked the other way" over the furniture borrowing episode because Mr. DeNicola was going through a divorce, and although others did not know that he was borrowing the furniture at all, the evidence as a whole also does not reveal that FPC has any specific policy on such a subject or that the incident got any publicity in the community or had any effect on community perception of FPC.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief and denying the relief sought thereby. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991.
