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INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF FIREMEN AND OILERS vs. CITY OF GULFPORT, 77-000965 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000965 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1990

The Issue The issues posed for decision are: 1. Whether the Respondent, by its agent Lawrence McCarthy, unlawfully discharged Jerome Cilhar on June 21, 1976, in violation of Section 447.501(1)(b), of the Act. 2 . Whether the Respondent, by its agent and representative, Lawrence McCarthy, unlawfully interrogated and threatened employees on April 30, and May 4, 1976, within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), of the Act. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, including the entire record compiled herein) I make the following:

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, City of Gulfport, Florida, is a Florida municipal corporation located in Pinellas County, Florida. During times material to this proceeding, the City Manager was Mr. Harry Perkins (Perkins) who had the ultimate authority over personnel matters including hirings, discharges, levels of manpower, administration of federal employment assistance programs, as well as labor relations. During times material to this proceeding, Mr. Lawrence McCarthy (McCarthy) was employed by Respondent as Director of Public Works. As such, he had operational responsibility for sanitation, water and sewer, streets and parks among others. While McCarthy had the authority to manage his department, the hiring and discharge of employees and the general administration of budgets was handled by Perkins with some input and recommendation by McCarthy. During 1975, Gulfport contracted with Pinellas County, Florida to be a member of a consortium to receive federal supplemental employment assistance funds from the federal government under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Under this contract, Gulfport was required to follow all federal rules and regulations adopted under the CETA program. In March, 1975, Mr. Jerome Cilhar (Cilhar or the alleged discriminatee) had been unemployed for the requisite period of time to qualify for employment under the Pinellas County CETA program. Cilhar applied for a CETA position with Gulfport and, after the interview, was hired as a sanitation worker in the Public Works Department on March 3, 1975. He (Cilhar) was hired along with a Mr. Johnson who was also hired by Respondent under the CETA prograin as a sanitation worker, On July 17, 1975, an election was conducted by PERC among a comprehensive unit of Respondent's blue and white collar employees. The Petitioner therein did not receive a majority of the valid ballots cast. With these facts, both Perkins and McCarthy were under the impression that no union organizational campaign could begin until after the expiration of a one year period from the date of the election. Respondent operates on a fiscal year basis from October 1, until September 30. For the fiscal year 1975 to 1976, Respondent had budgeted approximately 130 positions for employees. In April and May, 1976, testimony reveals that Perkins became concerned that estimated revenues from services and taxes would not be reached during fiscal year 1975 through 1976 and that expenses would exceed the amount estimated. In this regard, it was noted that Respondent realized an operating deficit of approximately $200,000 for the fiscal year 1975 to 1976. In response to projected deficits, Perkins began personnel cutbacks in May, 1976, since personnel costs represented the largest single budget expenditure. Between May of 1976 and September 30, 1976, Perkins trimmed the City's work force by approximately 20 percent or a net loss of 26 employees. (See Respondent's Exhibit #4). In this regard, the evidence revealed that the City operated the sanitation department without any upward manpower adjustments until February, 1977, when employees were transferred to that area. Mr. Cilhar stated that he voluntarily informed Mr. McCarthy (the Public Works Director) of his desire for a union in late April, 1976. He testified that he and Barney White, a fellow employee in the sanitation department volunteered this information respecting their union activity because White was upset about the lack of pay raises. He testified that Barney White took the initiative in the conversation with McCarthy and in this regard, the evidence revealed that White who, as best as the record reveals, made all of the comments respecting their union activities. Cilhar testified that he noted no change in his relationship with the City and its employees during the six week interim between the date he and White made known their union activities to Respondent's agent (McCarthy) and the date of his discharge on June 21, 1976. Evidence reveals that Respondent made the decision (jointly by Perkins and McCarthy) to retain CETA employee Johnson, whose seniority was equal to Cilhar's, based on the fact that Johnson was more versatile in terms of his employment skills and Respondent was of the opinion that he would be of more assistance in that he could be assigned to a multitude of tasks. Cilhar also advanced the position that Respondent terminated him because he was arranging to schedule a union meeting on the date that he was discharged. The testimony in this regard establishes, on balance, that the Respondent made its decision to terminate Cilhar on Friday, June 18, but could not locate Cilhar because he had left to go home when the final decision was made by Respondent. He was contacted and advised of the termination decision by Respondent early the following Monday, June 21, 1976. He was given an exit interview and advised that his job was being abolished due to the lack of CETA fundings for the next fiscal year. He was also paid for his accrued annual leave from CETA funds. In this regard, Respondent established that this was done to curb employment costs from municipal funds since the payment of Cilhar's leave would have come from municipal funds had the decision been postponed until the end of the fiscal year. It was also noted in this regard that in its effort to realize economy through personnel cuts, Perkins terminated Ryan Larison, a budgeted city employee in the Sanitation Department on June 16, 1976 and thereby realized an economic savings. Pertinent CETA rules and regulations as well as the Respondent's contract with Pinellas County required that the City utilize federal CETA funds only as supplemental to budgeted employment positions. Thus Respondent could not maintain CETA positions instead of budgeted positions under its contract and the regulations. See Respondent's Exhibit #2, Section 205(c)(8). With these facts, I conclude that the Respondent did no more than it was required to do or in fact was compelled to do based on the financial restraints that it was operating under and its regulations with Pinellas County under the CETA program. As Respondent aptly notes, union activity does not insulate an employee from discharge for cause. While there were some uncertainties in this record, and some suspicions automatically arise from the fact that a union adherent was discharged while an employee of equal seniority with, as best as can be determined by the record, little or no union sympathies, these suspicions provide no substitute for record evidence upon which a finding can be made that the Respondent discharged the alleged discriminatee based on his union sympathies or desires as alleged in the complaint. I shall therefore recommend that this allegation be dismissed. THE ALLEGED THREATS AND INTERROGATION The complaints cite two instances in which the Respondent's agent, McCarthy, engaged in unlawful threats and/or interrogation. Witnesses testifying to these remarks during the hearing were Messrs. McCarthy and Rousseau. Both testified that in essence McCarthy warned that "they had a constitutional right to do any damn thing they wanted, but while on City property and on City time, solicitation of union activities was not condoned. Any one I heard would be subject to dismissal". McCarthy testified frankly and openly with respect to his remarks to employees respecting solicitation while on City time and property. Given all of the circumstances of this case and the complete absence of any evidence indicating that the Respondent engaged in any independent acts to unlawfully interfere with, restrain or coerce employees to exercise those rights guaranteed them in Chapter 447, I am of the opinion that the remarks given employees by McCarthy respecting solicitations for unions on City time on City property did not rise to the level of unlawful activity as defined in Chapter 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint allegations be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frank E. Hamilton, Jr., Esquire 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 William E. Sizemore, Esquire Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601

Florida Laws (3) 120.57447.203447.501
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. SHERMAN MERRILL, 83-002064 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002064 Latest Update: May 05, 1991

Findings Of Fact Mr. Sherman Merrill began his position at Sunland Training Center in Orlando, Florida, on March 27, 1981 as an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. His last day on the job was August 7, 1982. As a behavioral program specialist, Mr. Merrill is responsible for supervising subordinate staff and for the behavior programming of HRS client residents in a residential living unit at the Sunland Training Center. He develops, monitors, and implements behavioral programs which are contained in each resident's habilitation plan. These plans are designed to eliminate inappropriate behavior and teach daily living skills. Mr. Merrill's responsibilities are professional and managerial. They do not require strenuous physical activity. On August ,12, 1982 Noel F. Windsor, the Superintendent of the Sunland Center, granted Mr. Merrill a temporary leave from his responsibilities without pay pending a diagnosis and prognosis from Dr. Robert C. Mumby on Respondent's physical ability to perform his responsibilities. Respondent asserted that he was no longer able to work due to back pain. An appointment with Mr. Mumby was scheduled for Respondent on August 17, 1982. On August 11, 1982 Mr. Merrill's immediate supervisor, Ms. Sharon Blume, limited Mr. Merrill's responsibilities to eliminate lifting any weight under any circumstances including emergencies. Prior to examining Mr. Merrill Dr. Mumby requested permission to see Mr. Merrill's x-rays which had previously been taken of his back. Mr. Merrill refused the request and as a result Dr. Mumby cancelled the examination appointment. The Sunland Center then scheduled an appointment for Mr. Merrill to be examined by Dr. Bott on August 19, 1982. Mr. Merrill did not keep this appointment and it was rescheduled for August 25, 1982. The August 25, 1982 appointment was kept and as a result of that appointment Dr. Bott reported in his findings that Mr. Merrill was able to return to work with restrictions. 1/ On October 15, 1982 HRS requested Respondent to return to work on October 19, 1982. He did not appear as requested. On October 25, 1982 Mr. Windsor wrote a letter to Respondent stating that he would continue to be carried in a leave without pay status until such time as Dr. Bott has evaluated the x-rays in relation to the examination conducted on August 25, 1982. The foregoing letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. It was later returned to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as unclaimed after attempts to deliver it were made on October 26 and October 30. On November 19, 1982 a copy of the October 25, 1982 letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. HRS again requested a release of Respondent's earlier x-rays for review by Dr. Bott. On December 10, 1982 Mr. Windsor wrote to Respondent a letter which stated in part: In accordance with the recommendation by Dr. Paul Raymond, your family practice physician in Cresson, Pennsylvania, we have scheduled an appointment for you with Dr. William K. Bott, Orthopedic Surgeon, 87 West Underwood Street, Orlando, Florida 32806, on Tuesday, December 21, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. As you are aware, we made an appointment for you with Dr. Bott on August 19 which you did not keep, and again on August 25, 1982. After the examination of August 25, Dr. Bott advised this agency that you were able to return to work with restrictions. He also advised us that he would re-evaluate you after reviewing your x-rays. You refused to allow Dr. Bott to make x-rays, and you also refused to authorize the release of previously made x-rays. Enclosed for your information is a copy of Chapter 22A-8 of the Florida Personnel Rules and Regulations. Please be advised that all fees for this visit will be paid by Sunland Center. Mr. Merrill did not see Dr. Bott on December 21, 1982, but was examined by him on January 4, 1983. On February 15, 1983 Mr. Merrill was told to report to work on February 21, 1983. Mr. Merrill did not report as ordered, but instead requested another leave of absence without pay. This request was denied on February 22, 1983 on which date Mr. Merrill was notified that he was absent without leave and that if he did not report to work by February 23, 1983 he would be deemed to have abandoned his position and voluntarily resigned from the career service system pursuant to Section 22A-8.02, Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Merrill did not report for work within the time allowed, three consecutive days after February 21, 1983. Mr. Windsor wrote him a letter on February 25, 1983 which stated: As you were advised in our letter of February 22, 1983, your request for an additional six (6) months leave of absence has been denied. Further, you were notified in that letter that you were to report to your work station prior to 3:15 P.M., February 23, 1983. You were examined by Dr. William K. Bott on August 25, 1982 and released to return to restricted duty. You failed to do so. You were re-examined on January 4, 1983 by Dr. Bott, and again, released to return to your Behavioral Program Specialist duties with restrictions. He indicated that you are able to perform sedentary type duties, you should not do repeated activities, repeated lifting or pulling using the lift [(sic) should be "left"] upper extremity (copy of diagnosis attached). You were advised by our letter of February 15, 1983 to return to your duties at Sunland Center, February 20, 1983 at approximately 2:00 P.M., you telephoned Living Unit 1E and left the message that you would not be reporting to work on February 21. At approximately midnight on February 20, 1983, you presented yourself on the Living Unit 1E to review the Personnel Rules and Regulations. On February 21, 1983, you presented your immediate supervisor with a request for additional leave of absence and left the facility. On February 23, 1983 at 1:50 P.M., during a meeting with your supervisors, you advised Ms. Patricia L. Gleason, Resident Life Program Supervisor, and Ms. Sharon Blume, Resident Life Unit Supervisor and your immediate supervisor, that you would not be coming to work. As you have failed to report to work for three (3) consecutive days, we must assume that you have abandoned your position with Sunland Center.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order determining that Respondent Sherman Merrill has abandoned his position in the State Career Service System as a Behavioral Program Specialist. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1983.

Florida Laws (2) 110.205120.57
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TERRELL OIL COMPANY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 88-001330 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001330 Latest Update: Nov. 09, 1988

Findings Of Fact On September 21, 1987, petitioner, Terrell Oil Company (TOC), filed an application for renewal of its certification as a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) with respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT). TOC had been previously certified as a DBE for a two-year period commencing in January 1986. After reviewing the application, DOT advised TOC by letter dated January 20, 1988, that its application had been denied on the grounds the firm "(did) not appear to be performing a commercially useful function nor (was) it an independent business entity as required by D. O. T. Rule 14-78.05, Florida Administrative Code." 2/ The letter of denial precipitated this proceeding. Later correspondence from DOT on February 8, 1988, advised TOC that its existing certification would remain in effect until this proceeding was concluded. According to its original application dated September 21, 1987, TOC was established on February 5, 1986, and engaged in the business of "oil-gas- petroleum products." Its offices were then located at 1908 West Cass Street, Tampa, Florida. The application identified Grady F. Terrell, Jr., a black man, as being the sole stockholder in the firm, its president and chairman of the board. Other directors included Richard W. Gilliam, a white man, and Walter Scott, a black man. The application represented that Terrell served as president and treasurer of TOC while Gilliam held the positions of vice president and secretary. The application reflected also that Terrell and Gilliam shared the power in the areas of policy making, financial decisions, job estimating, bidding and supervising field operations and that Terrell alone had the power to dismiss employees and sign checks. Finally, the application represented that the corporation owned no equipment, it had earned $14,000 in calendar year 1986, Terrell had invested $6,000 of his own money in the firm, and it had two full-time and two cart-time employees. After receiving the original application, two DOT employees made an on- site investigation of the business and conducted an interview with Terrell on October 20, 1987. They found no sign on the building at 1908 West Cass Street indicating that TOC occupied the premises, but they were directed by the landlord to a small 8' x 10' rear corner office. During the interview, Terrell was asked for copies of TOC business contracts but had none. Also, he did not have any cancelled checks, insurance coverage or bonding at that time. Terrell stated he had no employees so no insurance was needed. He represented further that he was "self-employed" by TOC and devoted 100% of his time to that endeavor. When the parties reviewed the application item by item and found several discrepancies or incorrect responses, Terrell agreed to amend his application in the presence of the DOT representatives. As amended, the application reflected that Terrell, Gilliam and J. Anthony Belcher, a white man, were the current directors, the firm had one full-time (Terrell) and no part- time employees, Terrell, Gilliam and Belcher served as president, vice-president and treasurer, respectively, while William V. Gruman, a white man and attorney, served as secretary, and there were no written, oral or tacit agreements concerning the operation of the firm between any persons associated with the firm. Terrell denied that Belcher worked for Belcher Oil Company (BOC), a large oil concern, and described him as a retired individual serving as an independent consultant for TOC. As to Gilliam, Terrell described him as an independent contractor who worked on a 100% commission basis and solicited business for the firm. During the same interview, Terrell represented that the $6,000 investment in capital was actually a loan from a local bank and denied that TOC owned or leased any equipment. Terrell could offer no proof that the firm had earned $14,000 in 1986 and indicated the firm had no projects underway. He described his business as being a broker of gasoline, diesel fuel and motor oil and that other persons supplied and delivered the fuel. According to Terrell, business transactions were conducted in the following manner. He first determined the market price of fuel from BOC, his principal supplier, and based upon that price, submitted a bid on a job. If TOC was successful, Terrell made a telephone call to BOC requesting that the fuel be delivered to the buyer. Through BOC, Terrell was able to purchase fuel two percent below the "rack" rate. TOC then added a percentage of profit to its sales price. In actuality, TOC never had physical possession of the fuel and, accordingly, needed no equipment to engage in this activity. At the same inspection, the DOT personnel confirmed through reading the firm's bylaws that each of three directors had one full vote, regardless of the number of shares held. Thus, the two white directors could outvote Terrell on any TOC decision. Also, a quorum of the directors could convene a meeting and theoretically conduct business without Terrell's knowledge. On November 23, 1987, or a little over a month after the DOT visit was made, TOC adopted a corporate resolution authorizing any one of the three directors to execute binding contracts on behalf of TOC. Thus, either of the two white directors had the authority to enter into contracts without Terrell's approval. A copy of the resolution has been received in evidence as respondent's exhibit 12. Shortly after the above resolution was approved, Gilliam and Belcher were given the opportunity to each purchase 19% of TOC's stock while Gruman was allowed to purchase the remaining 2%. This meant the three white officers now owned 40% of the stock while Terrell owned the remaining 60%. On December 1, 1987, TOC and BOC entered into an agreement whereby TOC agreed to buy fuel and petroleum products from BOC for resale to customers, and in return, BOC extended TOC a $200,000 line of credit. The agreement has been received in evidence as respondent's exhibit 1. Under the agreement, TOC's invoices to customers had to be approved by BOC, and the customers were required to remit moneys due for fuel to a special bank account controlled by BOC. That firm then sent its invoices to the bank and was paid out of the proceeds. The remainder in the account was for the use of TOC. This agreement was negotiated on behalf of TOC by Belcher, whose family once owned BOC, and until 1987 served as a consultant to that oil company. Because of numerous concerns raised during the October 10 visit, DOT continued its investigation of TOC. Besides learning about the above resolution, stock sale and agreement, DOT obtained various corporate records of T0C, including tax returns, cancelled checks, records of fuel sales and applications for minority certification with other governmental entities. Through its investigation, DOT uncovered the fact that Terrell did not devote 100% of his time to TOC as he had earlier claimed but had been employed as a car salesman by Crown Pontiac in St. Petersburg, Florida, on a full-time basis since July 1987. Indeed, Terrell worked there more than fifty hours per week. Contrary to Terrell's representation, authority to sign TOC checks had been delegated to Gilliam who had done so on numerous occasions prior to and after the application was submitted. As to Terrell's contention that TOC owned no equipment, the firm's corporate income tax return indicated it purchased a small tank truck in 1986 and carried the same on its books. The claim that Terrell alone controlled the business was refuted by the firm's corporate records which reflected that the two white board members could effectively control all management decisions and run the business on a day-to-day basis. DOT learned also that, although TOC had five customer accounts in 1988, of which four came from the private sector, the fifth account was with Hillsborough County, a governmental entity, and comprised more than 99% of its total business. In addition to the DOT application, TOC has sought minority business status from the City of St. Petersburg, the City of Orlando, Hillsborough County, Broward County and the federal government. A review of these applications revealed a maze of conflicting information submitted to the respective agencies. For example, Terrell represented to Hillsborough County that one Noble Sissel (a black man) was TOC's vice-president, secretary, treasurer and board member when in fact Sissel never held any of those positions. Terrell represented to Hillsborough and Broward Counties that TOC had two full-time employees while the amended DOT application reflected that TOC had only one. Further, Terrell gave conflicting answers to the various agencies as to the equipment owned by TOC and the purported gross receipts of the firm. In order to perform a commercially useful function, a DBE must manage and perform at least 51% of its work. In other words, the firm cannot subcontract out more than 49% of its business. Also, there is a requirement that a DBE's principal customers be entities other than governmental agencies in order to perform a commercially useful function. Through testimony and admissions of its officers, TOC acknowledged that it was merely acting as a broker. In industry parlance, this means that TOC did all its work by telephone, obtained a seller and buyer and then obtained a common carrier to deliver the product. As such, TOC never took physical possession of the product on its own equipment since it owned none, and it was not responsible for the movement of the product from the terminal to the customer. Further, since TOC purchased virtually all of its fuel from BOC, and under an agreement customer checks went directly to that firm, TOC was, in essence, conducting a broker operation for BOC. Therefore, TOC was not performing a commercially useful function. At hearing, Gilliam was TOC's only witness, and he attempted to establish TOC's entitlement to certification. Besides pointing out that Terrell was a black man and the majority shareholder in the firm, Gilliam attempted to show that Terrell actually controlled and ran the business. Also, he attempted to demonstrate the commercially useful function of the firm by the fact that 80% (4 out of 5) of TOC's five accounts are nongovernmental customers. Although not reflected on the amended or original applications, Gilliam acknowledged that TOC owns one 1200 gallon truck capable of making fuel deliveries. Gilliam contended further that Terrell had made an initial contribution to the corporation of $120,000 of his own funds. However, no proof of this claim was submitted. Given the overwhelming contradictory evidence of record, and the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of TOC representatives, Gilliam's testimony is not accepted as being credible.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the application of Terrell Oil Company for certification as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise. ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November 1988.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68287.094335.22 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-78.005
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WESLEY EVANS, JR. vs. VOLUSIA COUNTY TRANSIT SYSTEM/VOLUSIA TRANSIT, 83-001799 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001799 Latest Update: Dec. 02, 1983

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by VOTRAN from June 6, 1977, until his discharge on January 19, 1982. He started as Serviceman; was promoted to Mechanic B on October 31, 1977; to Night Leadman on August 7, 1978; to Mechanic A on January 13, 1980; and to permanent Night Leadman on November 30, 1981. He was the senior mechanic in the maintenance department and, prior to December, 1981, was Leadman on the day shift. Effective November 30, 1981, the position as Leadman on the day shift was abolished and these duties were absorbed by the Maintenance Superintendent, Owen Davis. Pursuant to the Union contract in effect at VOTRAN, available jobs are bid by seniority and go to the most senior qualified man seeking the position. When the Day Leadman position was abolished, Petitioner bid on the Night Leadman position and, as senior mechanic, was awarded the job. Working days (or nights) for the Night Leadman are Tuesdays through Saturdays, with Sundays and Mondays off. This was known to Petitioner at the time he submitted his bid and was awarded this position. After a short time as Night Leadman, Petitioner requested leave on Saturday to attend an uncle's funeral in Georgia. Davis told Petitioner this would leave them shorthanded. Petitioner then told Davis that he did not like working on Saturday and wouldn't come in. Davis reported this incident to the General Manager, Kenneth Fischer. Late in December Petitioner met with Fischer, at which time Petitioner told Fischer he was unable to handle the job of Night Leadman. Fischer offered Petitioner the option of swapping jobs with a Mechanic A on the day shift but that job paid less and Petitioner turned it down. On another occasion, Fischer learned Petitioner had called in and said he could not come to work on Saturday because he had to move furniture. That resulted in a memo of January 12, 1982 (Exhibit 3) memorializing the December 29, 1981, meeting between Petitioner and Fischer in which Fischer repeated his warning to Petitioner against calling in sick on Saturdays unless his illness could be documented. This memo was delayed getting into Petitioner's box and was not received by him until the following Friday. Fischer was off Saturday, Petitioner was off Sunday and Monday, and on Tuesday, January 19, 1982, Petitioner met with Fischer. After Fischer had entered his car in the parking lot around 6:00 p.m. preparing to go home, Petitioner approached the car and told Fischer he would like to speak to him. Fischer got out of his car, they walked back into the building, Fischer unlocked his office, and they entered. Petitioner tossed the memo of January 12, 1982, on the desk complaining that he thought he was being discriminated against and that if the rules respecting sick leave of less than three days were being changed they should apply to all employees and not just to Petitioner. The meeting quickly escalated into a confrontation with Petitioner telling the younger Fischer that Petitioner was a 40-year-old man with a family, and that Fischer was not man enough to fire him. Whereupon Fischer told Petitioner to "hit the door." Petitioner then told Fischer that he would get VOTRAN's "shit" together and for Fischer to get Petitioner's "shit" together, and Petitioner left. Petitioner's voice immediately prior to his departure was sufficiently loud to be heard by two employees from 200 feet down the hall from Fischer's office. Petitioner's testimony conflicted with the above finding of what went on at the fateful meeting of January 19. Petitioner testified that he remained calm during the meeting, that he never told Fischer that the latter was not man enough to fire him, that he told Fischer they should discuss the matter like grown men, that he used the word "shit" to indicate personal property, and that Fischer is the one who got angry and told Petitioner to "sit down" before he told Petitioner to "hit the door." Petitioner also testified that during the little ever a month he was Leadman on the night shift he missed one or two Saturdays, that the memo of January 12 made him feel he was being treated differently from others, and that he and Fischer had at least three conferences before January 19, 1982, when he was fired. VOTRAN is a publicly owned transportation company subsidized by Volusia County and originally financed by the Federal Government. While funded by the Federal Government VOTRAN was subject to and in compliance with all federal laws proscribing discrimination. Of the 83 employees of VOTRAN, 20 are black. In Volusia County blacks constitute approximately 13 percent of the population. While employed at VOTRAN, Petitioner attended three schools to improve his training and VOTRAN paid the tuition. Although there was a discrepancy between Petitioner's testimony that he was the only black mechanic employed by VOTRAN, and VOTRAN's testimony that there were two blacks employed as mechanics, the evidence was unrebutted that following Petitioner's discharge another black mechanic was hired by VOTRAN. To further support his claim that he was fired because of his race, Petitioner testified that as a Leadman he was never issued a white shirt, that white shirts and blue pants were provided supervisors (including leadmen) by VOTRAN, and that blue shirts were issued to other workmen except in the bodyshop where the workers were issued white pants and shirts. Petitioner mentioned this difference to one of the shop's stewards who told Petitioner that if he felt wronged he should file a grievance. Petitioner never filed a grievance and neither the Superintendent nor the Director of Maintenance was asked by Petitioner to provide him with a white shirt. Other witnesses testified that some leadmen wore white shirts, others wore blue shirts, and it was generally left to the choice of the leadman which color shirt he wore. One witness called by Petitioner testified that he once overheard a Fischer and Davis conversation at which the phrase "dumb niggers" was used. Both categorically denied ever making such a racial slur. No other witness testified to any incident which could lead to a conclusion that Fischer was in any manner prejudiced or racially discriminatory. His reputation among the bus drivers is that he "goes by the book." As another ground to support his charge of racial discrimination, Petitioner testified that while he was Night Leadman he was not provided a key to the Superintendent's desk which other night leadmen had been provided; and that when it was necessary to get into the desk for special tools kept there, it was necessary to call the Superintendent, who would come down and unlock the desk. The Superintendent, Davis, confirmed that Petitioner had not been issued a key because a short time before Petitioner started the night shift too many keys had been issued, all of these keys had been called in, and, when he found his presence was frequently required at night to open the desk, he reissued a key to the Night Leadman. By this time Petitioner had been terminated. The contract between VOTRAN and the Teamsters Union provided for arbitration of grievances. This document also provides that neither employer nor Union will discriminate against any individual with respect to recruitment, hiring, training, promotion, or other employment practice for reasons of race, etc. (Exhibit 1, Article 9). When Petitioner told the shop's steward (also black) that he had been fired, he did not indicate he was fired by reason of race. Petitioner was advised by the shop's steward that he could file a grievance with the Union and his firing could go to arbitration if not settled prior to that step. Petitioner was not a dues-paying member of the Union, and, although covered by the contract, did not feel he would get a sympathetic ear from the Union. The General Manager, William Barrett, who preceded Fischer, was called as a witness by Petitioner. Barrett was General Manager when Petitioner was hired, approved the various training programs taken by Petitioner at VOTRAN's expense, and found Petitioner to be a good and reliable employee. Barrett further testified that it was necessary to maintain discipline in order to operate effectively and that if an employee challenged his authority he would have no choice but to fire the employee immediately.

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SHEILA DAVIS vs POLK COUNTY SHERIFF`S OFFICE, 01-003466 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Aug. 31, 2001 Number: 01-003466 Latest Update: Mar. 18, 2003

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Polk County Sheriff's Office, violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1993), as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Shelia Davis. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that Respondent retaliated against her by using "insubordination" as a cover-up for her termination for reporting a fellow officer beating a handcuffed inmate and discriminated against her because of her marital status.

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence, and the entire record compiled herein, the following evidentiary, relevant, material and ultimate facts are determined. Respondent, Polk County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff), at all times material to this cause, was an "employer" as that term is defined under Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Shelia Davis (Ms. Davis), at all times material to this cause, was an "aggrieved person" as that term is defined under Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.02(10), Florida Statutes. Ms. Davis alleges in her Petition that on May 29, 1998, the Sheriff terminated her in retaliation for her preparing an incident report on January 3, 1998. Ms. Davis also alleged that her termination was also because of her marital status, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (Act), Chapter 760.10 Florida Statutes. In 1994, Ms. Davis was hired by the Sheriff as a Book- In Clerk and remained employed by the Sheriff until her termination on May 29, 1998. While employed by the Sheriff, Ms. Davis married Curtis C. Young (Young) in 1997, in Pasco County. Ms. Davis and Young subsequently divorced at some point in time before April 1998. In December 1997, the Sheriff initiated an administrative investigation into allegations that Ms. Davis was passing confidential information about inmates to her then husband, Young. The administrative investigation continued through April 1998. On January 3, 1998, while on duty Ms. Davis observed and reported to Sergeant Petote an incident of Officer Sanders allegedly beating a handcuffed inmate. Sergeant Marshall, Ms. Davis' supervisor at that time, was made aware of the reported incident, and he made jokes of the use of the slang term "Jacked Up" used by Ms. Davis in her report to Sergeant Petote. The following day, January 4, 1998, Ms Davis was working in the Booking Area information desk. During her tour of duty, Ms. Davis got into an argument with a civilian. After a discussion between Ms. Davis and Sergeant Marshall, he relieved Ms. Davis of duty in the Booking Area and reassigned her to duty in the control tower. From the testimony of the conversation between the two, tension became evident. As a result, Sergeant Marshall reported Ms. Davis as being "insubordinate," relieved Ms. Davis from duty, and sent her home for the remainder of the night shift. The above incident was reported to Lieutenant Tom Cockroft who instructed Sergeant Marshall to suspend Ms. Davis for the remainder of the January 4, 1998, tour of duty. Upon informing Ms. Davis of her suspension, another argument ensued between Ms. Davis and Sergeant Marshall. On January 5, 1998, based on the report by Sergeant Marshall and the concurrence of Lieutenant Cockroft, Ms. Davis was charged with violating the Sheriff's General Orders G.O. 26.1.E.,8.,a (Respect Toward Supervisors); G.O. 26.8.,b.,2. (Abusiveness); and G.O. 26.1. E.,8.,d. (Compliance and Execution of Lawful Orders). Ms. Davis, at some time prior to January 1998, began to participate in the Polk County Crime Stoppers, a program designed to permit civilians to report known and suspected criminals and criminal activities. It was the policy of Crime Stoppers to give monetary rewards to those persons whose information and tips resulted in or assisted in the arrest of persons committing or who had committed criminal acts. Ms. Davis became aware that her ex-husband, Young, may have been incarcerated in the Pinellas County Jail under an alias. Sometime during the month of April 1998, Ms. Davis contacted the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office and related that she may have information regarding an inmate jailed under an alias, i.e. her ex-husband, Young. Upon becoming aware that Ms. Davis was an employee of the Sheriff, Lieutenant Jacobs of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office advised Ms. Davis to work through the Sheriff and not directly with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office in the future. The Pinellas County Sheriff's Office informed the Sheriff of Ms. Davis' contact, and Lieutenant Blackwelder, of the Sheriff's Administrative Investigation Department, engaged in a joint effort to confirm the identification of the Pinellas County Jail inmate, believed to be Young. Lieutenant Blackwelder ordered Ms. Davis to cease calling the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office regarding Young. At this meeting an argument ensued. Subsequent to the above meeting with Lieutenant Blackwelder and the order to discontinue interference with the investigation by the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Ms. Davis telephoned the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office regarding Young for the intended purpose of collecting a Crime Stoppers reward. Ms. Davis acknowledged making contact via her cell phone on her off-duty hours with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office after being ordered by Lieutenant Blackwelder to cease all contact. This course of conduct resulted in an allegation that Ms. Davis violated G.O. 26.1.E.,8.,d. (Compliance and Execution of Lawful Orders) and G.O. 26.1.E.,8.,a. (Respect Toward Supervisors). On or about April 22, 1998, Lieutenant Cockroft suspended Ms. Davis with pay for the violations hereinabove. In May 1998, a pre-disciplinary hearing regarding the above-cited charges was held, and all charges were sustained resulting in termination of Ms. Davis' employment with the Sheriff on May 29, 1998. Ms. Davis filed a discrimination complaint with FCHR in October 1998, and in 1999, FCHR informed Ms. Davis that her complaint was unsubstantiated.

Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereinabove, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order DISMISSING Petitioner's discrimination complaint herein filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 2002.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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JUANITA O. JONES vs SEMINOLE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 02-000958 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sanford, Florida Mar. 06, 2002 Number: 02-000958 Latest Update: Feb. 24, 2003

The Issue Whether or not Respondent, Seminole County Public Schools, discriminated against Petitioner, Juanita O. Jones, in employment by reason of race, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, and documentary evidence, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a black female, who has been employed by Respondent since 1991. She has served Respondent as an Executive Secretary, Elementary Education; Executive Secretary to the Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent; and a Technical Assistant, Media Center, Sanford Middle School. Prior to her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was employed as a word processing systems operator by the Florida Department of Corrections. In late 1999 or early 2000, Petitioner applied for the advertised position of Specialist, Applications Software. Respondent had advertised three separate Specialist, Applications Software, position vacancies during a two-month period. Although interviewed for the vacancies for the first two positions, Petitioner was not selected for the first two advertised vacancies. Petitioner does not contend that her non- selection for the first two positions was a result of unlawful discrimination. Applicants for the three Specialist, Applications Software, positions were interviewed by a two-person panel: Regina Klaers and John Davis. Ms. Klaers is Supervisor, Student Support; Mr. Davis is Manager, Student Support and Information Services. These individuals supervised the Specialist, Applications Software, position and were intimately familiar with the job requirements. Thirteen individuals applied for the third Specialist, Applications Software, position. Of the thirteen, ten met the minimum qualifications. Three applicants were interviewed. Applicants who had been previously interviewed, Petitioner among them, were not interviewed an additional time as the interviewers felt they had sufficient knowledge from the previous interviews. Petitioner had been interviewed twice previously. The interviews focused on three areas: (1) school- based experience with student data; (2) customer service experience; and (3) "people skills." These were critical areas for the position. The interviews were particularly important in assessing an applicant's "people skills." It was the opinion of the interviewers that one applicant's qualifications in these critical areas exceeded the other applicants', including Petitioner's. Based on the interviews, Elizabeth Jean Smith, a white female, was selected for the position. Ms. Smith had significantly greater school-based "data-entry" experience with the student data systems, WANG and SASI, than did Petitioner. Immediately prior to being selected for the position in question, Ms. Smith's position was Clerk/Receptionist-Customer Service. Both interviewers agreed that Ms. Smith demonstrated better "people skills." Credible evidence supported the selection of Ms. Smith based on her extensive school-based experience with student data systems and her customer service experience. While "people skills" are less empirically quantifiable than the other critical areas of the interviewers' focus, nothing revealed during the final hearing led the undersigned to believe that Petitioner had better "people skills" than did the individual selected for the position. Respondent selected Elizabeth Jean Smith for the Specialist, Applications Software, position because she was more qualified for the position than other applicants, including Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Alberto E. Lugo-Janer, Esquire 3501 West Vine Street, Suite 281 Kissimmee, Florida 34741-4673 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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DIANNA DECKER vs THE GADSDEN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD AND REGINALD JAMES, SUPERINTENDENT OF GADSDEN COUNTY SCHOOLS, 08-002528 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 22, 2008 Number: 08-002528 Latest Update: Aug. 04, 2009

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents are guilty of committing a discriminatory practice against Petitioner, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, by denying her a promotion and/or by constructively discharging her from her employment.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Dianna Decker, a white female, began her employment with Respondent Gadsden County School Board on July 14, 1998. Her first job position was as the Training Coordinator/Specialist. In July 2002, Petitioner absorbed the additional duties of Staff Development Coordinator. Respondent Reginald James, a black male, was elected Superintendent of Gadsden County Schools in November 2004 and has continuously served in that capacity due to his re-election in 2008. In July 2005, Superintendent James promoted Petitioner to Director of Staff Development and Personnel. Petitioner applied for this promotion on July 7, 2005, after James told her he would like her to take the job. This promotion included a $13,000 annual increase in her salary. On July 13, James directed the School Board's finance department to begin paying Petitioner at the increased pay rate retroactive to July 1. On July 26, the School Board officially appointed Petitioner to the position to which James had promoted her, with the retroactive effective date of July 1. For purposes of employment with the various school boards in Florida, the superintendent "recommends" that a person be hired for a particular position, and the school board approves or disapproves the recommendation. Respondent James also gave Petitioner an additional $1,500 increase in salary during the 2005-06 school year. Petitioner and James enjoyed a good working relationship. As Director of Staff Development and Personnel, Petitioner had at least daily contact with James. Throughout her employment with the School Board, Petitioner applied for a variety of employment positions outside of the Gadsden County School System. Some of the positions she applied for were education-related, and some were not. Some of the positions she applied for were in Florida, and some were outside of Florida. By her own testimony, Petitioner kept her eyes open for opportunities for growth and upward movement. Dr. James Brown was the Deputy Superintendent of the Gadsden County School System from prior to the beginning of Petitioner's employment until his retirement in July 2007. Petitioner, Superintendent James, Dr. Sonja Bridges, and other personnel attended weekly management-team meetings at which they discussed, among other things, the attempts being made to find a replacement for Dr. Brown. Prior to Dr. Brown's retirement date, the Deputy Superintendent position that Dr. Brown was vacating was advertised. Although Superintendent James interviewed several candidates for the position, he was unable to find an acceptable candidate to hire. During the months of searching for a deputy superintendent to replace Brown, Dr. Sonja Bridges told James that she would take the job if he could not find anyone else. In a letter dated July 10, 2007, Petitioner wrote to the Jefferson County Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, asking to be considered for the position of Director of District Personnel/Human Resources which was being advertised. The morning of July 11, 2007, Superintendent James asked Petitioner to post a job opening for an Assistant Superintendent for Academic Services position. Later that same day James announced that he had chosen Dr. Sonja Bridges to fill that position. Petitioner told James that Bridges was not qualified to fill the position as it was described in the job posting. James told Petitioner that they would modify the position so that Bridges would be qualified and instructed Petitioner to take down the job description that she had posted. Petitioner also did not meet the qualifications for Assistant Superintendent for Academic Services as the position was posted, and she did not apply for that position during the short time between its posting and its removal. At its July 24, 2007, meeting, in accordance with its standard practice, Respondent Gadsden County School Board proposed a rule change that would modify the job description for an Assistant Superintendent for Academic Services position. This proposed modification was required to be advertised to the public for 30 days to receive comments and could not be finalized until at a Board meeting following the conclusion of that notice period. On August 6, 2007, Petitioner re-posted the Assistant Superintendent for Academic Services position. The proper procedure would have been to wait until after the School Board had approved the rule change at a subsequent meeting, and then post the position. Neither James nor anyone else requested or authorized Petitioner to re-post the position prior to the position being approved by the School Board, and Petitioner re- posted it against established School Board procedure. Also on August 6 Petitioner completed her application for the position and handed it to Regina Gore, a secretary who reported to Petitioner. Petitioner gave Gore no instructions as to what to do with Petitioner's employment application. Petitioner's job responsibilities included compiling and submitting job applications and presenting them to Superintendent James for his consideration. However, Petitioner did not tell anyone other than Gore that she had completed an application for the Assistant Superintendent for Academic Services position, and she never compiled and submitted to James for his consideration her application and the other application that was received in response to her unauthorized August 6 job posting. At its August 2007 meeting, Respondent Gadsden County School Board adopted the rule change for the modified job description after receiving no comments from the public during the 30-day comment period. Respondent Gadsden County School Board then officially appointed Dr. Bridges to the position of Assistant Superintendent for Academic Services to which Superintendent James had promoted her, with a retroactive effective date of July 2, 2007. Dr. Bridges meets the qualifications for the modified Assistant Superintendent for Academic Services position, as does Petitioner. In her new position, Dr. Bridges became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Prior to Bridges' promotion, she and Petitioner had a professional and friendly working relationship; however, after her promotion, Petitioner became uncomfortable working under Dr. Bridges and had difficulty taking directives from her new supervisor. During the time that Respondent James has been the Superintendent of Gadsden County School System, he has recommended, and Respondent Gadsden County School Board has approved, two Assistant Superintendents: Dr. Bridges and Ms. Bonnie Wood. There have been no other Assistant Superintendents under Superintendent James. Dr. Bridges is a black woman, and Ms. Wood is a white woman. Ms. Wood is the Assistant Superintendent for Business and Finance and, like Dr. Bridges, reports directly to Superintendent James. There were three applicants for Ms. Wood's position: Ms. Wood and two black males, and Superintendent James hired her. There have not been any Deputy Superintendents since Dr. Brown retired. On September 28, 2007, Petitioner was offered the position of Director of Human Resources, Certified Division, with Jefferson County Schools in Louisville, Kentucky. By letter that same day to Superintendent James, not to her supervisor Dr. Bridges, Petitioner voluntarily resigned from her position with Respondent Gadsden County School Board, effective November 15, 2007. After her departure, Petitioner's position was filled on an interim basis by a white male. At the time she voluntarily resigned from her employment with Respondent Gadsden County School Board, Petitioner earned $66,363 annually. Petitioner's salary at her job in Kentucky with the Jefferson County Schools as of the date of the final hearing in this cause was $119,000 annually. Superintendent James never saw Petitioner's application for the position filled by Dr. Bridges until Respondents' counsel showed him a copy in February 2009 in preparation for the final hearing in this cause. Furthermore, James never heard of Petitioner having any interest in that position until after Dr. Bridges' appointment was made official by Respondent Gadsden County School Board. Even then, he did not hear of Petitioner's interest in the position from her; rather, he learned of her disappointment in not having been given the job from comments made to him by others. On December 10, 2007, Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging that she had been discriminated against by Respondent James and Respondent Gadsden County School Board.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondents committed an act of discrimination against her and dismissing Petitioner's petition for relief filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Alexander Minnick, Esquire The Minnick Law Firm Post Office Box 15588 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Matthew Carson, Esquire Linda G. Bond, Esquire Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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OLWEN B. KHAN vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-002577 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002577 Latest Update: Aug. 08, 1988

The Issue The issue is whether Ms. Khan abandoned her career service position by failing to report for work, or to apply for and obtain leave for three consecutive days.

Findings Of Fact Olwen B. Khan was employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as a Public Assistance Specialist in the medically needed program in Broward County, Florida. Ms. Khan is Jamaican, and cares for her elderly father. In order to provide for his care, she arranged to go to Jamaica to sell some property there. On March 1, 1988, Ms. Khan requested, and was granted, 32 hours of leave for March 7 through the close of business on March 10, 1988. Ms. Khan had accumulated annual leave and sick leave so that the annual leave requested did not exhaust the leave available to her. Ms. Khan purchased an airline ticket to Jamaica which would have resulted in her return the evening of March 10, 1988. On March 9, 1988, it became clear that Ms. Khan's business could not be concluded by March 10 and she would have to remain in Jamaica a few more days. She was then in Maninbay, Jamaica, where telephone service is not sophisticated. She had to go to the local telephone company office to make an overseas call when a line was available. She did so at approximately 2:45 p.m. on March 9 but when she reached the HRS office, she was placed on hold for an extended period of time. She then terminated the call and attempted to place another call on March 10 but was not able to get through to the HRS office. The evening of the 10th she made a collect call to her home in Fort Lauderdale at about 5:45 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. The purpose of the call was to have her daughter request additional leave so she could conclude her business in Jamaica. Ms. Khan's ex-husband answered the phone, which surprised her. He agreed to make the request to the Department for additional leave. The following Tuesday Ms. Khan spoke with her ex- husband again, and he said that the message had been given and the additional leave had been taken care of. In fact, no one ever contacted the Department on Ms. Khan's behalf to explain her failure to report to work on Friday, March 11; Monday, March 14; or Tuesday, March 15, 1988. Ms. Khan's supervisor, Norma Levine, did ask one of Ms. Khan's coworkers if she knew where Ms. Khan was. The coworker, Judy Fiche, did not know. After three days had passed with no word from Ms. Khan, Ms. Levine discussed the matter with her supervisor, Mr. Moran. Mr. Moran recommended termination for abandonment of position because no one had heard from Ms. Khan since her approved leave had ended on Thursday, March 10, 1988. A memorandum setting out the facts was prepared for the personnel office, and through the personnel office a certified letter was sent to Ms. Khan on March 17, 1988, informing her that as of the close of business on March 15, 1988, her employment had been terminated for abandonment of her position. When Ms. Khan did return on March 16, she was informed that her position had been terminated. She attempted to see Mr. Moran that day but he was unavailable. She eventually did speak with him but was unsatisfied with his response and ultimately spoke with the personnel officer for HRS District X, Mr. Durrett, on March 30, 1988. Mr. Durrett maintained HRS's position that Mr. Khan had abandoned her job and was unmoved by her explanation that she had been out of the country to take care of a family problem and had thought that her message about needing additional leave had been relayed to the Department. When Ms. Khan was first employed by the Department, she signed a receipt for an employee handbook setting out its policies. The policy on absences requires that an employee who does not report to work notify the employee's supervisor by 8:30 a.m., and if that supervisor is not available, the employee is to notify another supervisor that the employee will not be in to work and state why. The employee performance appraisal for Ms. Khan completed in November 1988, was the last appraisal before her termination. It shows that she was regarded as achieving prescribed performance standards.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that under Rule 22A- 7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, Olwen B. Khan abandoned her position by being absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays. DONE AND RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of August, 1988. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX The burden of all proposed facts contained in Ms. Khan's proposed finding of fact have been adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Kranert, Jr., Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1885 Lawrence D. Zietz, Esquire 8181 West Broward Boulevard #380 Plantation, Florida 33324 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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CLARENCE E. BURTOFT vs. SOUTHERN LINEN SERVICE, 83-003758 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003758 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Clarence E. Burtoft, was hired by respondent, Southern Linen Service, in November, 1982 as assistant general manager at its Daytona Beach plant. Prior to this employment, he had back surgery performed in Augusta, Georgia but the effects of such surgery did not interfere with his job duties. After being on the job for approximately three days, he was told by the regional manager that labor costs needed to be reduced, and that one employee must be laid off. He was also told to shift two female employees from one department to another. There is a dispute between the parties as to what the actual instructions were, and whether they were in fact carried out by Burtoft. Nonetheless, the employer construed Burtoft's actions as not complying with its instructions, and Burtoft was accordingly terminated the following day and told he was not the right man for the job. The back surgery was not related in any respect to the termination and Burtoft himself acknowledged as much. Burtoft's complaint is that his job records at Southern Linen Service contain a notation that he was fired for refusing to follow instructions. He only wants that adverse information removed. 1/ He is not contending that his employer unlawfully discriminated against him, or requesting that his job be reinstated with full back pay. Indeed, it was only after he visited the State employment office that he filed this complaint upon that office's encouragement. At no time was he ever told by any Florida Commission on Human Relations representative that its jurisdiction extended only over certain employment practices, and that any complaint must necessarily be founded on some form of discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed by Clarence E. Burtoft be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1984.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68760.10
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JUDY A. SOREY vs MASTERCORP, INC., 08-001456 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 24, 2008 Number: 08-001456 Latest Update: Dec. 02, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice with regard to Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Ms. Sorey is an African-American woman who at the time of the hearing was a resident of Panama City, Florida. Mastercorp was Ms. Sorey's employer at all relevant times and is engaged in the business of providing housekeeping and cleaning services to timeshare resorts in the State of Florida and elsewhere. Mastercorp has its headquarters in Crossville, Tennessee. Ms. Sorey was employed by Mastercorp at a resort in Panama City called the Landmark, from August 2005 until Mastercorp's contract with Landmark ended in September 2006. Ms. Sorey began her employment with Mastercorp at Landmark as a housekeeping supervisor. She was eventually assigned to the laundry. It was while working in the laundry at Landmark that she alleged discriminatory treatment. Ms. Sorey was supervised by an executive housekeeper (EH) and an assistant EH. The EH and assistant EH are management level employees who are supervised by area, district, or regional managers, and ultimately by corporate managers working out of the Crossville office. An EH is responsible for all operations at a client property, including budgeting and supervising all Mastercorp employees located there. Miguel Palacios began his career with Mastercorp in 2004 as an assistant EH and worked his way up to EH at a client property in the Orlando area. Later, he was used as a roving manager by Mastercorp. As a roving manager, he was assigned to "problem properties." It was his job to ameliorate whatever was causing a property to be a "problem property." Mr. Palacios was assigned to Landmark because operations there were unsatisfactory and, as a result, Mastercorp was in danger of losing its contract. Mr. Palacios was instructed to support the existing EH at Landmark. Later, he took charge of the operation and ran it until a new EH, Wilmer Gonzalez, was hired. Ms. Sorey was working at Landmark when Mr. Palacios assumed his duties there. Debbie Green was one of Mastercorp's housekeeping supervisors at Landmark. Ms. Green is an African-American. Because of her excellent performance, Ms. Green became Mr. Palacio's acting assistant while he was in charge of the Landmark property. Mastercorp's Vice President of Operations, David Maier, visited the Landmark property in March 2006 and told Ms. Sorey that he was impressed with her work in the laundry. He complimented her on the good job she was doing there. Mr. Maier made a remark to Ms. Sorey to the effect that she should be her "own boss." Ms. Sorey interpreted this to mean she could run the laundry as she wished, and without supervision. This was the first of several incorrect assumptions made by Ms. Sorey. When a district manager questioned her placement in the laundry, she attempted to contact Mr. Maier for clarification, but was not able to do so. Payment for working overtime at Landmark was permitted only when approved by the EH. This was a policy dictated by the requirement for Mastercorp to remain within its budget. Ms. Sorey approached Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Palacios and informed them that she did not have enough time to complete her laundry during normal working hours and expressed a desire to work and be paid overtime. When rebuffed, Ms. Sorey became frustrated by the demands on her, which, it is found, were substantial. Eventually, Ms. Sorey brought a friend in to help her and the friend was put on the Mastercorp payroll. This alleviated some of the stress felt by Ms. Sorey. Subsequently, a corporate quality inspector named Nell Wilson came to Landmark in June 2006 and gave her department a 100 percent grade on its evaluation and provided a certificate of dedication. Neither Mr. Palacios nor Mr. Gonzalez found time to present the certificate to her. Mr. Palacios, a Puerto Rican, traveled to his native land on vacation in June of 2006 and returned with souvenirs for some of the employees at Landmark. These souvenirs included coffee mugs, liquor, and key chains. He presented Ms. Sorey with a coffee mug. She asserted that she was offended by the coffee mug. She referred to it as an "old devil cup" and considered it to be an inappropriate reflection on her race. Ms. Sorey related at the hearing, "I don't know nothing about Puerto Rico. Coming back here giving me no cup, calling me no black devil." It is clear how a person lacking sophistication in an international sense, or at least a Caribbean sense, could misinterpret the nature of the mug. The mug was black with a Puerto Rican flag superimposed upon it. On one side of the flag were the words "Puerto" and on the other, "Rico." Overlaid on the flag was a figure that vaguely resembled a man that was variously colored green, yellow, and red, and which appeared to be wearing a blue suit. The figure wore a cape with a yellow lining. The mug had the word "Vejigantes" written on it. In certain parts of Puerto Rico, Vejigantes are masks worn by dancers in carnivals. They represent various things such as strength and harmony. The masks are part of Puerto Rican culture and have nothing to do with race except that the festival itself may have had roots in Africa. Although Ms. Sorey appeared to be grateful at the time she was given the mug, two or three days later she called Gloria Turner, the general manager of the Landmark, telling her that she was offended by it. This was relayed to Mr. Palacios who went to Ms. Sorey and told her that he meant no offense and offered to provide her with another gift in return for the mug. She refused this offer. Several days later Mr. Palacios counseled Ms. Sorey because she had worked overtime without approval and was not following the direction of Mr. Gonzalez. This was memorialized in a written memorandum dated June 25, 2006. Subsequently, Ms. Sorey submitted a handwritten complaint, dated July 3, 2006, to Mastercorp's employee leasing company, Oasis. This was forwarded to Mastercorp because Ms. Sorey was an employee of Mastercorp. The aforementioned document was four and one-half pages long and complained about work issues relating to time and amount of work. The sole issue that could be interpreted as addressing race was this sentence: "Miguel Palacio went to Puerto Rico and when he came back he came to the laundry and gave me a black cup and on the cup was a body and a face like a devil like he is call me a black devil. This face had red horn on it and at the top of the cup have these letter 'Vejigantes.'" The July 3, 2006, memorandum was the only complaint that Mastercorp received from Ms. Sorey, and, as noted above, it was received indirectly. Nevertheless, Whitney Stoker, an employee in the human resources department in the Crossville, Tennessee headquarters was tasked to conduct an investigation into the matter. In effecting her investigation, Ms. Stoker interviewed Mr. Palacios. She attempted to contact Ms. Sorey by telephone on five occasions. She left messages imploring Ms. Sorey to provide her with details surrounding her complaint. Ms. Sorey had an ample opportunity to amplify the information contained in the complaint, but chose not to provide additional information. Ms. Stoker also conducted an Internet search into the matter of the "Vejigantes" mask that was featured on the mug, using the Yahoo search engine. She discovered that it was indeed a character signifying various aspects of Puerto Rican culture and related to festivals held in some Puerto Rican towns. She discovered that it had nothing to do with race or insulting someone. Mastercorp's contract with Landmark was by its terms set to expire in September 2006. In July or August 2006 it became clear that Mastercorp would not obtain another contract with Landmark and, therefore, there would be no more work there for Mastercorp's employees. However, a new opportunity for work arose in Mastercorp's contract at Club Destin, in Destin, Florida. Mr. Palacios took nine of the Panama City employees to the Destin job. There were not enough positions in Destin available for everyone who had been employed at the Landmark job. He did not consider race in deciding who would be offered employment in Destin. He was not concerned about the complaint Ms. Sorey had made. Ms. Sorey did not ask to be employed at Destin, and Mr. Palacios did not ask her to work there. Ms. Sorey did not complain at the time that she was not offered one of the positions in Destin. One of the employees employed at the Destin property was Donna Ponds, an African-American. She was trained at Landmark, but was hired in anticipation that she would work at Club Destin. She was hired as the EH at Club Destin. No evidence was adduced that indicated that anyone of another race was treated differently or more favorably than Ms. Sorey. Mr. Palacios did not need any help in the laundry at Club Destin because the property manager there was successfully using foreign exchange students. Ms. Sorey expressed no desire to move to the Destin facility at the time staffing decisions were being made. During the hearing she was asked, "Did you want to go to Destin." She answered, "Not really." Ms. Sorey's allegations of harassment, disparate treatment, and retaliation were precipitated by her anger at management due to having to work hard and not being allowed to incur overtime; the pressure she felt at not having enough time to complete her duties; and her opinion that she was not sufficiently recognized for her work in the laundry. No evidence whatsoever was adduced that adverse working conditions were precipitated by racial prejudice.

Recommendation it is Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Timothy Nathan Tack, Esquire Kunkel Miller & Hament 15438 North Florida Avenue, Suite 202 Tampa, Florida 33613 Judy Sorey 1025 North Everitt Avenue, Apt. A-3 Panama City, Florida 32401 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000E Florida Laws (5) 509.092760.01760.02760.10760.11
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