Findings Of Fact During the 1977-78 school year, the Respondent, Erma Frederick, was employed as a classroom teacher in the Dade County Public School System, assigned to Buena Vista Elementary School. On October 10, 1977, a conference was scheduled between the Respondent, United Teachers of Dade, Representative, Ms. Mattie Squire and Ms. Linda E. Stuart, Principal of Buena Vista Elementary School. During the conference, Respondent was advised that based on two years of unsatisfactory evaluations (1973-74 and 1974-75) deficiencies in her teaching performance existed which, if not corrected by December 1, 1977, would affect her status as an employee in the Dade County Public School System and which, if not corrected by December 1, a complaint of incompetency would be filed seeking Respondent's dismissal. The substance of this conference was reduced to writing by letter dated October 10, 1977, and cited the following deficiencies: Failure to maintain pupil control by establishing and maintaining discipline. Failure to file instructional plans. Failure to implement lesson plans and to present materials correctly. Failure to correctly grade student papers and maintain accurate grade books. Failure to properly maintain cumulative records and to maintain attendance and other data entries on report cards. Failure to accurately take attendance. Failure to follow class schedules. Failure to maintain supervision of pupils at all times. Based on the Respondent's failure to otherwise remedy the above cited deficiencies to Petitioner's satisfaction, Petitioner suspended Respondent from her position as an instructional teacher on March 9, 1978. Respondent, although properly noticed, failed to appear at the hearing to refute the cited deficiencies relied on by Petitioner in suspending her as an instructional employee at Buena Vista Elementary School. Based thereon, and in the absence of any evidence having been offered by Respondent to refute or otherwise negate the above-cited deficiencies, they must be, and are, considered meritorious.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's appeal of her suspension by Petitioner be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact On November 19, 1981, the Florida Real Estate Commission, then Board of Real Estate, received the application of Kay M. Harvey, Petitioner, asking that she be licensed to practice real estate as a salesperson. A copy of that application form may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Following the review, and by correspondence dated February 19, 1982, the application for licensure was denied. A copy of that denial statement may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The basis for denial was as set forth in the Issues Statement to this Recommended Order, with the exception of the assertion that the answer to Question No. 6 was incomplete. That assertion was first offered at the final hearing in this cause. In keeping with the opportunity expressed in the letter of denial, Petitioner requested a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. The Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings was then requested to assign a Hearing Officer and the case was considered through the process of a formal hearing conducted on July 30, 1982. Petitioner is a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, residing at 2612 Sandra Lane. She has lived in Jacksonville for the period of her life. She is now twenty-nine (29) years old and is employed by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. She has held employment with that organization for ten and one half (10 1/2) years. During that time, she has held various clerical positions and at present is a rate clerk. In that capacity she calculates insurance premium rates and informs customers of their premium rates. Her position includes making decisions on the question of premium adjustment refunds for the benefit of customers. This responsibility includes a determination on the part of Petitioner on the subject of proper refund; however, Petitioner does not prepare the refund draft nor mail the refund check. Petitioner does not handle cash money in other facets of her employment. On the topic of the answer to Question No. 6, which is the focus of the dispute between the parties, when asked to describe her understanding of the instructions given to an applicant who was answering Question No. 6, she stated, "I feel that it is asking me whether I've ever been arrested, and if I have, what it was for, and whether I was on parole or not." On July 1, 1981, Petitioner was arrested for obtaining property by the issuance of a worthless check. The arrest occurred in Duval County, Florida, for an offense committed in that county. The amount of the check was two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), constituting a felony offense. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was placed on probation. The probation was successfully concluded on July 8, 1982, following restitution by Petitioner. This pertained to the circuit court case, Docket No. 81-5065CFR, Duval County, Florida. In connection with the offense involved with the issuance of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check, Petitioner purchased carpet from a merchant in Duval County, The Carpet Barn. When the check was processed, Petitioner was informed that she did not have sufficient funds to honor the check. This information was provided by an employee of the merchant. The check was then processed a second time and again Petitioner was informed that there was insufficient money in the account to allow the check to be negotiated. Petitioner was again told by the employee of The Carpet Barn that there were insufficient funds. Petitioner also received notice from her bank that there was insufficient money to honor the claim for a two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) payment. The check was not suitable on the first occasion due to the Petitioner's failure to deduct certain service charges from her bank account, which service charges had the effect of reducing the amount of available funds to be spent for other purposes. The check was not honored on a second occasion due the submittal of another check issued by the Petitioner, which had been outstanding, causing the reduction of available monies in the Petitioner's checking account, such that there were insufficient funds to honor the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($208.00) check when it was processed on the second occasion. In the face of the shortages, Petitioner was requested to provide money to balance the checking account and allow payment of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. This was not done. Petitioner then requested that she be given a month to place sufficient funds in the account to honor the claims by The Carpet Barn, and was granted that opportunity. Following the second submission for payment, an employee of The Carpet Barn contacted the personnel office where Petitioner worked and spoke with the Personnel Manager about the subject of the outstanding check. Petitioner was disturbed by this contact and called the employee of The Carpet Barn and entered into an argument on the subjects of the check and that employee's contact with Petitioner's employer. The employee of The Carpet Barn indicated that the matter would be turned over to the local State Attorney for prosecution. Petitioner then contacted The Carpet Barn to try to arrange for the payment of the check and was told that they expected total payment and no settlement was arrived at, in view of the fact that Petitioner was suggesting payment of a lesser amount. The Petitioner and the merchant being unable to resolve their differences, Petitioner was prosecuted. She retained the carpet she had purchased and an amount of two hundred sixty or seventy dollars ($260.00 or $270.00) in her checking account, which represented the difference between the initial cost of the carpet and the charges in her account which had been deducted, causing the disallowance of the payment of the full amount of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. At the time of the incident involving the check, Petitioner was making an annual salary of twelve to thirteen thousand dollars ($12,000.00-$13,000.00) and the merchant was repaid the amount of two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), in keeping with the terms of Respondent's probation. The repayment was made through installments over a period of eleven (11) months. The other conditions of probation related to maintenance of her position in employment with the State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and submission of periodic reports were compiled with. In 1975 or 1976, Petitioner, while married, wrote a check at a time when the bank upon which the funds were drawn did not believe that she had check writing privileges, in that the bank was not aware that a signature card had been executed by Petitioner, thereby entitling her to write checks on a joint account with her husband. Prior to being notified by Respondent that it wished to inquire about the event of 1975 or 1976, Petitioner did not feel that any crime had been committed or that any criminal law investigative record of the events involving this particular check existed. At hearing, Petitioner did acknowledge that she had been charged with the offense in 1975 or 1976, related to checks or worthless checks, in the sense that she received a court summons about the check. Petitioner, by her explanation, was taken "downtown" and signed papers and was fingerprinted. The signature card had in fact been signed and filed with the bank, but the bank, not being cognizant of that signature at the time the check was written, refused to accept it. On the date of court appearance, under summons, an official of the bank accompanied Petitioner to that proceeding and the matter was dismissed. If Petitioner were licensed, one Terry Baker, licensed broker in Florida, has indicated that he might employ Petitioner. Petitioner indicated that to guard against problems of the type which occurred with the check incidents, that she would be more careful in her calculations in protecting the interests of her clients as a real estate salesperson.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, a teacher, made some unkind remarks to a student one day in her third-grade class, as Petitioner, a district school board, alleges; and, if so, whether the school board has just cause to suspend Respondent from her position for ten days without pay.
Findings Of Fact The School Board is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Miami-Dade County Public School System. At all times relevant to this matter, including specifically the 2019- 2020 school year, Reid was employed as a third-grade teacher at the North County K-8 Center. Reid has been a District employee for approximately 21 years. The alleged incident upon which the School Board relies as the grounds for suspending Reid occurred, according to the Notice of Specific Charges, on Thursday, September 26, 2019. It is alleged that “[o]n that date [Reid] stated to student D.M. that the best birthday and Christmas present she had received was when D.M. was absent from school. She also told D.M. that she did not want him in her class but was stuck with him.” D.M.’s hearing testimony matched the District’s principal allegation nearly verbatim. In his recollection, “Ms. Reid said that it was the best birthday slash Christmas gift ever because I wasn’t there on Thursday, and she said she doesn’t want me in the classroom and that she is stuck with me, and that if I want to, I could leave the classroom and she can pick on anybody.”1 1 It is not clear exactly when, or for how long, D.M. was absent. On direct examination, D.M. responded affirmatively when the School Board attorney suggested that he had been out “for a few days,” but, in his own words, D.M. specifically mentioned only “Thursday,” which happens to be the day of the week on which the alleged incident allegedly occurred. Perhaps D.M. was simply mistaken about which day he had been out, or maybe his absence had occurred a week or more before the alleged incident. On cross-examination, D.M. said that he might have been absent due to a dental appointment, which would not likely have required a “few days” off, or even, ordinarily, a full day for that matter. To be sure, this confusion is not fatal to the School Board’s case. Still, if D.M. had been out, e.g., for the three days (Monday through Wednesday) immediately preceding the alleged incident, that fact—which was not proved—would have made the School Board’s case stronger. Conversely, if D.M. had been out of class only for one day (likely), and if his absence had taken place a week or more before the alleged incident (possible), there is less likelihood of Reid’s having made the comments at issue. This is because, generally speaking, a shorter absence likely would make less of an impression, and a more remote one would be more likely forgotten—and vice versa. D.M. frequently misbehaved in class and was often in trouble. Although it was still early in the school year, by the time of the alleged incident, Reid already had spoken with D.M.’s mother several times about D.M.’s poor conduct in the classroom. Nevertheless, according to D.M., Reid made the alleged remarks for no reason, out of the blue, without any provocation such as misbehavior on D.M.’s part, and indeed in the absence of any circumstances which might have prompted Reid to say such things. Perhaps ironically, however, D.M.’s testimony, which is unrebutted, weakens the District’s case. Common experience teaches that comments of the kind in question are more likely to be made in the heat of the moment, when angry or upset, than without some contemporaneous provocation, real or perceived. To be clear, it is not inconceivable that a teacher would make such remarks gratuitously, as D.M. claims happened in this instance; it is just more likely that such comments would be made in a moment of exasperation. The only corroborating eyewitness presented by the School Board was D.M.’s close friend, J.T., who testified that Reid “was, like—she was, like, ‘D.’—she was, like, ‘I’m so glad that D. wasn’t there those few days.” When later prompted with a leading question, whereby the District attorney asked J.T. whether Reid had mentioned “anything about birthday or Christmas gifts,” J.T. answered, “Yeah. She said it was the best Christmas gift.”2 Reid flatly denied having made the alleged comments, or anything like them, to D.M. This is not a case, in other words, where the teacher attempts to explain, put it in context, dispute the contents of, or otherwise downplay the meaning or effect of a remark that was, at least in some form, admittedly made. Reid did argue, in her testimony, that she would not have made the remarks attributed to her because (i) neither her birthday nor Christmas occurs on or around September 26 and (ii) she does not use the word 2 J.T. clarified that the “it” in question was “[t]hat [D.M.] was absent those few days.” To repeat for emphasis, however, it is unlikely, based on D.M.’s testimony, and thus, it is not found, that D.M. had been absent for a “few days” prior to the alleged incident. See footnote 1, supra. “Christmas” in the classroom. The District ridicules this argument as unpersuasive. In the undersigned’s view, the argument makes a fair point, but it is neither dispositive, nor compelling. Regardless of its relatively limited persuasive force, however, the argument does not undermine Reid’s unconditional denial, because it is entirely consistent with her testimony that she did not make the remarks at issue. DETERMINATIONS OF ULTIMATE FACT The District has failed to prove its allegations against Reid by a preponderance of the evidence. It is, therefore, unnecessary to make findings of fact concerning Reid’s disciplinary history, if any, for purposes of applying the progressive discipline policy in this case, as there is no current basis for discipline. To elaborate on the credibility determinations, this is basically a “he said/she said” case because D.M. and Reid have given irreconcilably conflicting testimony about the alleged incident.3 It is not necessary, however, for the undersigned to decide which of the two witnesses was the more credible, and then to make findings of fact in accordance with that witness’s testimony. This is because, whereas the District has the burden to prove that its allegations are more likely than not true, Reid need not prove her innocence. At bottom, the District’s evidence, although plausible, does not meet the standard of proof, as a matter of ultimate fact. At the same time, Reid’s testimony, although credible as far as it goes, does not, when weighed in the 3 J.T.’s testimony adds very little weight to D.M.’s because, as D.M.’s friend, he was not a disinterested witness, and because J.T. did not provide a unique perspective or add any relevant new fact(s) to the record. If the incident took place as alleged, moreover, then surely there would be other students, besides J.T., with personal knowledge of the event. That none were called instead of, or in addition to, J.T., whose neutrality may reasonably be doubted, is detrimental to the District’s case. The testimony of D.M.’s mother likewise carries relatively little weight because she was not an eyewitness; her secondhand knowledge of the alleged incident is necessarily derivative of D.M.’s. balance with D.M.’s testimony and the District’s other evidence, support affirmative exculpatory findings. Thus, the undersigned cannot find Reid guilty as charged, and he cannot find her innocent, either. Because the District bears the burden of proof, however, its case fails, and Reid prevails.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Christopher J. La Piano, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 430 Miami, Florida 33132 For Respondent: Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater, Florida 33761-1526
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a final order exonerating Nicole S. Reid of all charges brought against her in this proceeding and awarding Reid back salary as required under section 1012.33(6)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher J. La Piano, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 430 Miami, Florida 33132 Anastasios Kamoutsas, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Richard Corcoran, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Alberto M. Carvalho, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 912 Miami, Florida 33132 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater, Florida 33761-1526
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint, as amended, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondent, Maria Illescas-Dupree, held Florida educator's certificate number 631483, covering the areas of health education and physical education, which was valid for a period extending from 1994 through June 30, 1999, at which time it expired and was not renewed. From 1988 to 1992, Respondent was employed by the School Board of Dade County, Florida (School Board) as a physical education instructor and assigned to Citrus Grove Elementary School. Among those who knew of her, Respondent was regarded as an extremely competent and professional educator, who was dedicated to her students, who maintained an exceptional rapport with faculty and staff, and who evidenced good moral character. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) In 1992, Respondent took maternal leave from her employment with the School Board for the birth of her first child, Maggie (now 7 years of age). That leave was subsequently extended by the arrival of Respondent's second child, Caitlin (now 6 years of age) and thereafter by the arrival of Respondent's third child, Lauren (now 4 years of age). Given the size of her family, as well as the expiration of her maternal leave, 1/ Respondent resigned her employment with the School Board (presumably in 1995) with the expectation that she would continue in the role of homemaker and that her husband would continue to support the family. However, Respondent's expectations were short-lived, and by early September 1995, with his abusive behavior escalating (with threats of physical violence), Respondent was compelled to have her husband removed from their home. With her husband absent from the home, Respondent was left without a source of income, with de minimus funds to support the family, 2/ and without any permanent means of transportation. However, Respondent's neighbor, Ileana DePhillips, immediately offered her assistance. Over the ensuing days Mrs. DePhillips provided groceries for Respondent and her children, drove Respondent to the office of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (H.R.S.) to apply for food stamps and to W.I.C. "to get. . . milk and cereal, and basic things for the children since they were under five-years-old." Mrs. DePhillips also accompanied Respondent to court so she could obtain a restraining order against her husband. While apparently successful in obtaining a restraining order, and notwithstanding his abusive character, Respondent nevertheless allowed her husband to return to the family home before the end of September 1995. 3/ At the time, Respondent was hopeful for a reconciliation; however, by January 1996 she was convinced otherwise, left the family home, and filed for divorce. Today, Respondent is divorced, resides in Lakeland, Florida, with her three daughters, and hopes to resume her teaching career. The claim of misconduct Petitioner's claim of misconduct is premised on the banking activities of Respondent and Mrs. DePhillips in October 1995 (shortly after Respondent's husband returned to the marital home). It is Petitioner's contention that "Respondent deposited stolen checks into her own checking account worth $5,525.00 . . . [and that she] and her accomplice [Ileana DePhillips] had agreed to split the money." Respondent denies any wrongdoing and avers she was not aware the checks were stolen when they were deposited or when she wrote checks against the account, and that she immediately ceased writing checks when she learned from the bank that the checks (Mrs. DePhillips had asked her to deposit) were returned unpaid and her own checks were being dishonored. According to Respondent, she only allowed Mrs. DePhillips to deposit the subject checks into her account as an accommodation, and is of the opinion that Mrs. DePhillips deceived her. The transactions at issue The first questionable transaction occurred on or about October 11, 1995, when Mrs. DePhillips asked Respondent to deposit her paycheck (from Angel Norberto Diaz, Petitioner's Exhibit 2) in Respondent's bank account so she might clear and access the funds. Apparently, Respondent, who felt a sense of obligation for Mrs. DePhillips' recent acts of kindness, harbored no reason to distrust her and had previously accommodated such requests from Mrs. DePhillips (who did not have a bank account). Again, Respondent agreed and deposited the check to her account on October 11, 1995. Unknown to Respondent, as well as Mrs. DePhillips' employer, Mrs. DePhillips had made the check for $500.00, as opposed to the $175.00 that was due her. At or about the same time she was in the process of defrauding her employer, Mrs. DePhillips stole a book of checks from her sister-in-law, Raquel Saavedra. 4/ Subsequently, Mrs. DePhillips would write five checks to the order of "cash," and prevail on Respondent to deposit the checks to her account (as she had previously done with Mr. Diaz' checks). When Respondent accommodated Mrs. DePhillips by depositing the checks, and subsequently wrote checks against the deposits, she did so unwittingly, without knowledge of Mrs. DePhillips' unlawful conduct. 5/ The checks Mrs. DePhillips stole and forged on Mrs. Saavedra's account, and prevailed on Respondent to allow her to deposit to her (Respondent's) bank account, totaled $5,025.00, were dated between October 12, 1995, and October 22, 1995, and were deposited between October 13, 195, and October 23, 1995. The transactions were as follows: Check number 300, dated October 12, 1995, was drawn in the amount of $425.00 and deposited on October 13, 1995. Check number 248, dated October 20, 1995, was drawn in the amount of $500.00, and deposited on October 20, 1995 (as part of a larger deposit of $1,050.00). Check number 226, drawn in the amount of $2,025.00, and check number 232, drawn in the amount of $875.00, were both dated October 20, 1995, and were deposited on October 23, 1995 (as part of a larger deposit of $2,975.00). Check number 234, dated October 22, 1995, was drawn in the amount of $1,200.00, and deposited on October 23, 1995. Against these deposits, as well as the deposit of the Diaz check, Respondent wrote (with Mrs. DePhillips' permission or at her request) numerous checks during the month of October 1995 before she received notice from her bank that the checks were being returned unpaid and her own checks dishonored. The checks she wrote totaled $5,312.73, with $2,021.25 being written for Respondent's or her family's benefit, $1,257.77 being written for Mrs. DePillips' or her family's benefit, and the balance representing mixed purchases that benefited both families (i.e., a joint shopping trip to the grocery store). 6/ Facially, given the size of her family (two adults and three children), as well as the nature of the purchases or character of the store visited, the purchases appear to represent routine living expenses, as opposed to extravagances. Given the proof, it must be resolved that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate clearly and convincingly, that, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, "Respondent deposited stolen checks into her own checking account worth $5,525.00 . . . [and that she] and her accomplice [Ileana DePhillips] had agreed to split the money" or otherwise engaged in any unlawful or improper conduct with regard to her banking activities. 7/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 2000.
The Issue Whether or not, between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees or their agents, servants or employees allowed the license premises to be kept, set up, maintained or operated for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of Section 509.032(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Whether or not, between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, Ulysses Brown, the licensee and/or operator of the licensed premises had been convicted of letting the premises for prostitution and keeping a disorderly place, thereby violating Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the notice to show cause, Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown were the holder of license No. 23-7079H held with the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants. This license was held to do business as Young's Rooming House, located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida. The facts in this case show that on October 23, 1976, Officer Otis Chambers, of the Dade County Public Safety Department, Dade County, Florida, went to the licensed premises known as Young's Rooming House located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida. At that time, Officer Chambers was operating in the capacity of an undercover plainclothes officer investigating vice matters. He was in the company of a prostitute and when he approached the desk in the licensed premises, he spoke with the licensee, Ulysses Brown. In the conversation with Mr. Brown, he identified the woman in his company as being a prostitute, as shown by the remarks to Brown, and Brown acknowledged this information and rented a room to the officer. Subsequent to the events that transpired in the conversation between Officer Chambers and the licensee Brown, Brown was arrested and charged with violations of Section 796.06, Florida Statutes, which pertains to renting space for prostitution and with a violation of Section 796.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes, which is an allegation of receiving, offering or agreeing to receive, any person into any place, structure, building or conveyance with the purpose of prostitution or permitting any person to remain in those locales for such purpose. The licensee was found guilty of both offenses and placed on a period of probation for six months. Evidence of this finding by the Court may be seen as Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. It was also shown in the course of the hearing that a number of complaints have been made by neighbors who live in the area of the licensed premises, to the effect that the licensed premises was a place in which prostitution was occurring; The comment was also made by these individuals that men and women were seen in the licensed premises who were not wearing clothes. The opinions were testified to by Officer John Wilson of the Dade County Public Safety Department who had spoken with a number of the residents of the area where the licensed premises is located. Although Ulysses Brown has claimed that he is no longer involved with the licensed premises, a recent inspection by Agent John H. McKinnon of the Division of Hotels and Restaurants reveals that Ulysses Brown is still working in the licensed premises. According to Brown, and in keeping with what the agent actually observed about the licensee's intention, Brown is to work and take care of the licensed premises and Young is to be the owner. Based upon the facts as reported, the Petitioner has brought two charges in the notice to show cause. The first charge alleges that between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees, their agents, servants or employees, allowed the premises to be kept, set up, maintained or operated for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of Section 509.032(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Section 509.032, Florida Statutes, states the duties of the Petitioner in the following language: 509.32 Duties.- (1) GENERAL.- The division shall carry out and execute all of the provisions of this chapter and all other laws now in force or which may hereafter be enacted relating to the inspection or regulation of public lodging and public food service establishments for the purpose of safe- guarding the public health, safety, and welfare. The division shall be responsible for ascertaining that no establishment licensed by it shall engage in any misleading advertising or unethical practices as defined by this chapter and all other laws now in force or which may hereafter be enacted. The division shall keep accurate account of all expenses arising out of the performance of its duties shall file monthly itemized statements of such ex- penses with the Department of Banking and Finance together with an account of all fees collected under the provisions of this chapter. A reading of this paragraph of this section leads to the conclusion that its purposes are to create the authority in the Petitioner to implement regulations to enforce the provisions of the overall Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. It is not read to be a substantive law which would empower the Petitioner to take action based upon the language of that section per se. Therefore, an violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes, would not promote the right to take action against the licensees under Section 509.032, Florida Statutes. The second count in the notice to show cause pertains to an allegation that between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees and/or the operator, and in this instance that person is Ulysses Brown, has been convicted for letting the premises for prostitution and keeping a disorderly place which is in violation of Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes. That provision of the statutes reads as follows: 509.261 Revocation or suspension of licenses; fines; procedure.- (4)(a) Any person interested in the operation of any such establishment, whether owner or operator, has been convicted, within the last past 5 years in this state or any other state or the United States of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, keeping a disorderly place, illegally dealing in narcotics, or any other crime involving moral turpitude. The term "convicted" shall include an adjudication of guilt on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the forfeiture of a bond when charged with a crime. As stated before, Ulysses Brown, one of the licensees, was found guilty of Sections 796.06 and 796.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Those violations were established through an entry of the judgment finding the licensee guilty on January 20, 1977. That finding was reached within five years of the date of the action for suspension or revocation. This finding by the Court, coupled with the continued involvement by Ulysses Brown in the operation of the licensed premises and the background problems which have been prevalent in the licensed premises, would justify action being taken against both licensees, to-wit, Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown. The action spoken of was the right of action under Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and is the right of direct action against Ulysses Brown and a right of indirect action against Alma Mae Young for her knowledge, negligence or lack of due diligence in the operation of the licensed premises.
Recommendation It is recommended that the license held by the Respondents Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown to trade as Young's Rooming House located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida, license No. 23-7079H be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alma Mae Young Ulysses Brown Youngs Rooming House 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue Miami, Florida
The Issue Whether Respondent's teacher's certificate should be revoked or Respondent otherwise disciplined for alleged violation of Section 238.28(1), F.S., as set forth in the Petition herein, dated July 24, 1978. This proceeding arises from a petition filed by the Professional Practices Council, Department of Education, on July 24, 1978, that seeks to revoke or suspend the teaching certificate of Respondent Doris J. Black, an elementary school teacher in the public schools of Gadsden County, Florida. The petition alleges that Respondent issued a number of worthless checks during the period 1974-1978, and an instance of shoplifting in 1977. Respondent requested an administrative hearing on the charges on August 21, 1978. The petition was amended on August 31, 1978, to allege two additional bad-check charges occurring in 1978. Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent under Section 238.28(1), Florida Statutes, on the basis that her conduct constitutes gross immorality and personal conduct which reduces her effectiveness as an employee of the Gadsden County School Board, and under Section 231.09(2), Florida Statutes, in that she has not set a proper example for students. The petition further asserts that Respondent's conduct is sufficiently notorious to bring her and the education profession into public disgrace and disrespect. At the commencement of the hearing, Respondent admitted the allegations contained in the petition, as amended, but reserved the right to present extenuating and mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, the parties agreed that evidence would be presented by both parties in support of their respective positions.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Florida Teaching Certificate No. 264506, Post Graduate, Rank II, valid through June 30, 1981, covering the area of elementary education and junior college. She has been employed in the public schools of Gadsden County at George Munroe Elementary School as an elementary teacher for eight and one-half years. (Petition, testimony of Boyd, Respondent) In 1969, Respondent opened a checking account at the Quincy State Bank, Quincy, Florida, Account No. 0123237100, in the name of Doris Black. Respondent also maintained a checking account at the Citizens Bank and Trust Company, Quincy, Florida, Account No. 115027, in the name of Doris Black during the years 1977-1978. On June 3, 1975, Respondent opened Checking Account No. 700666 in the name of Doris B. Tucker in the Lewis State Bank, Tallahassee, Florida. The account was opened with a deposit of $1,000, but became overdrawn on June 18, 1975, and was closed on August 28, 1975 for being in an overdrawn status whereby service charges of $182.51 had accrued. During the period June-August, 1975, the bank returned 37 checks for insufficient funds. Respondent continued writing checks on the closed account for approximately two years after it had been closed. (Testimony of Smith, Dawson, Hutchinson, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-5) Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, as supported by Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1, the following facts are found as to certain checks issued by Respondent on the above-cited checking accounts: On or about July 15, 1974, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $14.55 to A. L. Wilson Company in Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Quincy State Bank to pay same on presentation. Doris J. Black was arrested on or about September 9, 1974, and posted a bond in the amount of $40.00. The bond was estreated on October 15, 1974. Between the period November 25, 1974, to January 4, 1975, Doris J. Black presented six checks in the amount of $41.75 to Kelley Junior Store of Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such checks that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Quincy State Bank to pay same upon presentation. On September 20, 1975, Doris J. Black was arrested and charged with six counts of issuing worthless checks; she posted a $50.00 bond which was estreated on November 3, 1975. On or about March 15, 1975, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $33.02 to Rose's Supermarket in Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Quincy State Bank to pay same upon presentation. The check (#2) was returned marked insufficient funds and notices requesting payment were ignored. On or about June 14, 1975, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $35.00 to the Class of `65 in Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Lewis State Bank of Tallahassee to pay same upon presentation. The check was returned marked insufficient funds and notices requesting payment were ignored. On or about August 2, 1975, Doris J. Black was arrested and charged with two counts of uttering worthless checks. The Respondent posted a $25.00 bond on each count. The bonds were estreated on September 2, 1975. On or about January 26, 1976, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $45.65 to the Top Dollar Store in Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Lewis State Bank of Tallahassee to pay same upon presentation. The check (#150) was returned marked closed and notices requesting payment were ignored. Doris J. Black was arrested on February 19, 1976, and posted a bond in the amount of $40.00. The bond was estreated on March 1, 1976. On or about January 18, 1976, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $21.45 to Discount Grocery in Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Lewis State Bank of Tallahassee to pay same upon presentation. The check (#149) was returned marked closed and notices requesting payment were ignored. Doris J. Black was arrested on March 2, 1976, and charged with uttering a worthless check. She posted a $40.00 bond which was estreated on April 12, 1976. On or about December 23, 1977, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $29.04 to Top Dollar Store in Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Citizens Bank and Trust Company to pay same upon presentation. The check (#116) was returned marked insufficient funds and notices requesting payment were ignored. On or about December 29, 1977, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $32.84 to Auto Supply in Gadsden County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Citizens Bank and Trust Company to pay same upon presentation. The check (#117) was returned marked insufficient funds and notices requesting payment were ignored. On or about February 12, 1978, Doris J. Black was arrested and charged with two counts of uttering worthless checks. The respondent plead guilty on March 8, 1978, to both counts for which she was sentenced to one year's probation, ordered to make restitution and pay $75.00 court costs. On or about January 19, 1978, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $12.48 to the Yankee Peddlar in Leon County, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Quincy State Bank to pay same upon presentation. The charge was dismissed on April 18, 1974, on $40.00 court costs and restitution. On or about January 13, 1975, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $23.81 to the National Shirt Shop of Tallahassee, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Quincy State Bank to pay same upon presentation. The charge was dismissed on March 12, 1975, on $40.00 court costs and restitution. On or about November 18, 1974, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $13.28 to Millers of Tallahassee, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Quincy State Bank to pay same upon presentation. The charge was dismissed on $40.00 court costs and restitution on May 28, 1975. On or about August 1, 1975, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $14.00 to Ford's Shoe Store, Tallahassee, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Lewis State Bank of Tallahassee to pay same upon presentation Doris J. Black entered a plea of Nolo Contendere on November 26, 1975, and was found guilty. She was fined $15.00. On or about June 21, 1975, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $42.66 to K-Mart Store of Tallahassee, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check the maker did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Lewis State Bank of Tallahassee to pay same upon presentation. Doris J. Black entered a Plea of Nolo Contendere on November 26, 1975, and was found guilty. She was fined $15.00. On or about February 24, 1978, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $93.49 to Standard Sales of Tallahassee, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that she did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Quincy to pay same upon presentation. On or about March 3, 1978, Doris J. Black presented a check in the amount of $109.24 to Standard Sales of Tallahassee, Florida, which the Respondent knew or should have known at the time of uttering such check that she did not have sufficient funds on deposit or credit with the Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Quincy to pay same upon presentation. On August 17, 1977, Respondent took unpurchased merchandise, to wit: three bottles of Charlie Cologne, one bottle of Musk, one bottle of Mink and Pearls, one bottle of British Sterling, one bottle of Old Spice Musk, one Moon Drops Body Oil, one Vigorol 8, one Afrosheen, from the premises of a mercantile establishment, Skaggs Albertsons, located at 1925 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida, with the intent to convert said merchandise to personal use without paying the purchase price. She was apprehended by the assistant store manager after placing the above-described articles in a straw bag and leaving the store with the articles which were valued at approximately $48.00. She was subsequently arrested and, on November 30, 1977, entered a plea of Nolo Contendere to the charge of petty theft. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and she was placed on thirty days probation by the County Court for Leon County, Florida. At the hearing, Respondent admitted taking the merchandise at the suggestion of a friend of hers whom she met while she was in the store. (Stipulation, Testimony of Giberson, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) In the opinion of the Principal of George W. Monroe Elementary School, the Superintendent of Schools of Gadsden County, and the Chairman of the Gadsden County School Board, Respondent's effectiveness as an employee of the Gadsden County school system had been reduced as a result of her past conduct. They were further of the opinion that her actions failed to set a proper example for students and was in violation of ethical standards of the teaching profession. The school principal has received approximately fifty telephone calls at the school in the past five years from Respondent's creditors and, on several occasions, individuals had come on to school premises to discuss delinquent obligations with the Respondent. (Testimony of Boyd, Greene, Bishop) In her testimony at the hearing, Respondent attributed her financial difficulties primarily to her ex-husband Matthew Tucker, whom she met in May, 1974, and married in October, 1974. She testified that she had given her paycheck to Tucker on various occasions to deposit in her bank account, but he failed to do so, thereby providing an insufficient balance when she wrote checks on the account. She maintained that he would come to the elementary school on payday and induce her to turn over her check to him, and that he would intercept her mail so that she was unable to become aware of the status of her account by mailed bank statements. She further testified that her husband had been violent on occasion and had assaulted her at which times she had called the local police for assistance. Although records of the Gadsden County Sheriff's Office and the Quincy Department of Public Safety failed to reveal that any such incidents had been reported, Respondent's testimony was corroborated in part by the testimony of a friend, Catherine James, who saw the Respondent on an unspecified occasion with bruises on her face. Mrs. James had loaned money to Respondent on several occasions and had given as reasons for the loans the fact that her husband had not deposited money or had taken money from her. Respondent's mother, Fanny Black, had loaned money to her and her husband on several occasions in the past. She was further aware that Respondent's husband frequented dog and race tracks where he gambled with money earned by the Respondent. Although the Respondent divorced Tucker in August, 1977, she later learned that she was pregnant and continued to live with him until April, 1978. (Testimony of Respondent, F. Black, James, Woodham, Beach)
Recommendation That the teaching certificate of Respondent be suspended for a period of one year, pursuant to Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David Holder, Esquire 110 North Magnolia Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Luther C. Smith, Esquire Hugh Ingram, Administrator 121 1/2 South Monroe Street Professional Practices Council Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Department of Education Room 3, 318 W. Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether just cause exists to terminate Respondent's employment with the St. Lucie County School Board.
Findings Of Fact The Parties/Background Petitioner is the entity charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within St. Lucie County, Florida. In or around 1987, Respondent graduated from Florida Atlantic University with a bachelor of science degree in education. It is undisputed that Respondent holds no other professional degree, much less one that would permit him to utilize the title "doctor." (The significance of this point will be illustrated shortly.) The following year, in 1988, the School Board hired Respondent as a classroom teacher, a position he has held since that time. By all appearances, Respondent's employment with the School Board proceeded without incident for more than 20 years, during which period he earned favorable performance evaluations and received no disciplinary sanctions. In October of 2011, and as a minor bump in the road, the principal of Port St. Lucie High School ("PSLHS"), Dr. Mark Rendell, issued Respondent a "letter of concern" after he received information that Respondent had criticized a PSLHS graduate in a Facebook posting. Among other things, Dr. Rendell's letter cautioned Respondent that communications with members of the public should be "carried out in an ethical and professional manner," and that educators are held to a "higher standard than other citizens." Respondent's real troubles with the School Board began on May 18, 2012, with his arrest in Okeechobee County in connection with several criminal offenses——charges to which he would later plead no contest. The conduct that led to the arrest is fully explicated below; suffice it to say for the moment that Respondent allegedly utilized an inauthentic animal inspection certificate in connection with his sale (and shipment) of a dog to an out-of-state purchaser, Gail Richards. The School Board's ensuing investigation into Respondent's behavior, which culminated in the filing of the instant Complaint, uncovered other instances of alleged wrongdoing, namely: that Respondent had sold and shipped animals with bogus inspection records in two transactions that preceded the sale to Ms. Richards; and that, in connection with his service as a dog judge for the American Kennel Club, Respondent had misrepresented his educational qualifications by using the title "doctor." The undersigned begins with the facts relating to Respondent's transactions with Ms. Richards and the other purchasers. Transactions at Issue At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent bred and sold animals——specifically, cats and longhaired dachshunds——under the moniker "Aviance Show Dogs." Respondent's activities in this regard, which occurred during his employment with the School Board, occasionally involved the shipment of animals by commercial aircraft to out-of-state purchasers. The School Board alleges, and Respondent does not dispute, that an animal shipped from state to state via a commercial airline must be accompanied by a health inspection certificate, a document formally known as a "Certificate for Interstate or International Movement of Small Animals" (hereinafter "inspection certificate"). The pre-printed language of an inspection certificate solicits, among other information, the name and contact information of the animal's owner, a description of the animal, the identity and address of the purchaser, and, most important, a certification from a licensed veterinarian that the animal has been vaccinated for rabies, as well as examined and found to be free from clinical signs of contagious disease. As alluded to previously, the School Board contends that, in connection with three separate transactions that occurred over a span of 19 months, Respondent utilized inspection certificates that were fraudulent or otherwise illegitimate. The first transaction in question, which took place in late February or early March of 2009, involved Respondent's sale and shipment of a dachshund (named "Uno") to co-purchasers who resided in the state of Texas. Oddly, the dachshund, which Respondent shipped from Florida by commercial airline, was accompanied by a "State of California Department of Food and Agriculture" inspection certificate. Even more peculiar is the fact that, notwithstanding Respondent's admission in this proceeding that Uno had never been to California, the inspection certificate's handwritten entries indicated: that Uno was evaluated for signs of contagious disease at the Santa Clara Pet Hospital on February 28, 2009; that "Jennifer W. Lawrence," a California veterinarian, performed the examination (the inspection certificate bears what purports to be her signature); that Dr. Lawrence holds California license number 12620; and that, on the date of the examination, a rabies vaccine was administered. As it happens, there is a Dr. Jennifer Lawrence who holds license number 12620 and practices veterinary medicine at the Santa Clara Pet Hospital in Santa Clara, California; the problem, though, is that Dr. Lawrence——who, prior to this proceeding, had never heard of Respondent——credibly testified that she neither examined Uno nor signed the inspection form. What is more, Dr. Lawrence's testimony establishes that Uno has never been examined or treated by any veterinarian employed at the Santa Clara Pet Hospital. In other words, the veterinary information handwritten on the face of Uno's inspection certificate is false. Three months later, on June 5, 2009, Respondent shipped a cat named "Beau" by commercial aircraft from Florida to a purchaser in Texas. The "State of California" inspection certificate accompanying the shipment listed Respondent's name and address, the purchaser's contact information, and the cat's name, age, and gender. Although the inspection certificate's handwritten notations also indicate that Dr. Jennifer Lawrence examined Beau at the Santa Clara Pet Hospital (on June 4, 2009, a day Respondent concedes1/ he was not in California), Dr. Lawrence's credible testimony establishes, once again, that she did not sign the certificate, and, further, that the animal in question had never been evaluated or vaccinated by any veterinarian at her clinic. By all appearances, the two transactions discussed above did not result in any direct, adverse consequences to Respondent; the same cannot be said for the next sale at issue, which involved Respondent's shipment of a dachshund (identified as "Jackson") to Ms. Richards. It is undisputed that, on or about October 16, 2010, Respondent shipped Jackson by commercial airline from Florida to Missouri, where Ms. Richards resided. As with the other sales, Jackson was accompanied by a "State of California" inspection certificate that included Respondent's name and contact information, the name of the purchaser, and a description of the dog. The face of the inspection certificate also indicated that "Dr. Drew Lawrence" had examined and vaccinated Jackson at the "San Jose Animal Hospital" on October 14, 2010. (Whether such a veterinarian or clinic actually exists is of no moment, for Respondent admits that Jackson was never examined by a "Drew Lawrence" in the state of California or anywhere else.2/) The peculiarities of Jackson's inspection certificate did not go unnoticed: a short time after delivery, Ms. Richards contacted Respondent and inquired about the handwritten notations regarding the dog's purported examination and vaccination. Dissatisfied with Respondent's explanation, Ms. Richards ultimately filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Agriculture. Thereafter, on June 7, 2012, the State of Florida charged Respondent by information with three criminal offenses, all of which related to the transaction with Ms. Richards. In particular, Respondent was charged with: forgery of a certificate of veterinary inspection, a third degree felony3/ (Count I); failure to inoculate a dog or cat transported/offered for sale, a first degree misdemeanor (Count II); and failure to include a health certificate with a dog or cat offered for sale, a first degree misdemeanor4/ (Count III). Some six months later, on December 5, 2012, Respondent reached a plea agreement with the State, the terms of which called for the dismissal of Count II and the entry of no contest pleas to Counts I and III. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of the misdemeanor charge and sentenced to a probationary term of 12 months. With respect to the felony offense, the adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was placed on probation for five years; as a special condition of that probation, Respondent was ordered to make restitution to Ms. Richards in the amount of $2,050——Jackson's approximate purchase price. Although Respondent does not deny that the three inspection certificates at issue contained illegitimate veterinary information, he asseverates that the inauthentic entries were made without his knowledge or involvement. In particular, Respondent claims that the three animals in question were examined at his residence (in Okeechobee County) by a veterinarian who operated a mobile clinic; that the veterinarian supplied the inspection certificates; that he (Respondent) filled out some of the information on each of the forms, such as his name and address, the identities of the purchasers, and the names of the animals; and that the mobile veterinarian was responsible for the bogus vaccination and examination entries, which Respondent asserts he never saw. For a multitude of reasons, Respondent's explanation is rejected. First, Respondent's claim that he has no recollection of the mobile veterinarian's identity or the name of the clinic (a business he purportedly used on at least three occasions over a span of more than 19 months) is dubious at best. Further, it is highly improbable that Respondent could have managed to fill out some of the information at the top of each form——which he concedes he did——without taking notice of the headers reading "State of California." If that were not enough, Respondent's version of the events contemplates, incredibly, that the mobile veterinarian, on his or her own accord and without Respondent's involvement, affixed (to two of the forms) "Jennifer Lawrence" and "Santa Clara Pet Hospital"——a veterinarian and animal clinic used by Margaret Peat, a longtime acquaintance of Respondent's and a person with whom Respondent has co-owned various animals.5/ Finally, the record contains written statements from Respondent, albeit in connection with different transactions than the three at issue in this matter, which reflect his willingness to utilize illegitimate inspection certificates. For instance, on March 1, 2010, Respondent posted, via Facebook, the following message to Ms. Peat concerning an impending shipment of two dogs, "Blossom" and "Dimitri": That would be the perfect home for Blossie. I have a show 12-14 of March but I can run her to the airport any other day. I'd like to ship Dimitri at the same time to you so that I can combine the trip and the shipping. . . . PBI is the airport, use West Palm Beach and use Continental or Delta. I think both do prepay. I will use two of the blank health certificates you gave me so there will not be a charge for that . . . . Petitioner's Exhibit 23A, p. 16 (emphasis added). Subsequently, on April 19 and May 3, 2011, Respondent wrote as follows to a buyer identified as Jacqulyn Waggoner: Sorry for the delay. . . . I can have [the dog] out this Friday. The crate you used is way too small so I'll buy the next size up. I will do a health certificate from another dog so expenses will stay at a minimum. * * * So is [the flight] paid and confirmed? I'm sending [the dog] with a fake health certificate so you don't have a charge on that. Petitioner's Exhibit 22, pp. 392-393; 399 (emphasis added).6/ Based upon the findings detailed above, it is determined that Respondent was aware of, and responsible for, the illegitimate notations to the three inspection certificates in question.7/ Other Allegations As noted previously, the Complaint further alleges that Respondent has inappropriately utilized the title "doctor" in connection with his service as a dog judge for the American Kennel Club ("AKC"), and that such conduct occurred during his term of employment with the School Board. The first documented instance of such behavior occurred in 2002, when Respondent submitted several applications to the AKC for placement on its registry of dog judges. In one of the applications, dated March 28, 2002, Respondent wrote his name as: "John S. Contoupe, DR." The other application reads, similarly, "John S. Contoupe DR." Not surprisingly, the AKC identifies Respondent in its directory of judges as "Dr. John S. Contoupe." Subsequently, in late 2010 or early 2011, Respondent traveled to Russia to judge a dog show for an international organization. Upon his return, Respondent drafted an article (for a hunting publication of some sort) in which he described his overseas experience. The article, which Respondent disseminated to the publisher by e-mail using his School Board account, contained the following closing: "Respectfully, Dr. John S. Contoupe."8/ Respondent's inappropriate use of the title "doctor" has not been limited to written expression. Indeed, an acquaintance of Respondent's in the dog show community, Marianne McCullough, credibly testified that, during their first meeting in or around 2010, Respondent introduced himself as "doctor." Ms. McCullough further recounted, again credibly, that she has observed other persons address Respondent as "doctor" on various occasions and that Respondent never corrected them. Another witness called by the School Board, Mary Boyle (who likewise met Respondent at a dog show roughly four years ago), testified truthfully that she believed——erroneously, as she later found out——that Respondent held a doctoral degree, that she would introduce him to others as "doctor," and that Respondent never corrected her. Ultimate Findings It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of misconduct in office by virtue of his violation of School Board Policy 6.301(3)(b)(vii), a provision that subjects an employee to discipline, including termination, upon a conviction for any criminal act that constitutes a misdemeanor. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is not guilty of immorality, as that offense is defined by the State Board of Education. Although Respondent's use of the title "doctor" and falsification of the inspection certificates were unquestionably dishonest, there has been no showing that such behavior, which occurred outside the presence of students, brought the education profession into public disgrace or impaired Respondent's service to the community. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is not guilty of gross insubordination. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the disposition of Respondent's criminal offenses did not involve a conviction for, or plea of guilty to, a crime involving moral turpitude.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the St. Lucie County School Board enter a final order finding Respondent: guilty of violating School Board Policy 6.301(3)(b)(vii); guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056(2); not guilty of immorality; not guilty of gross insubordination; and not guilty of a crime of moral turpitude. It is further RECOMMENDED that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Claude Paul ("Respondent" or "Ms. Paul") committed the violations as alleged in the November 18, 2018, Petitioner's, Miami-Dade County School Board ("the School Board") action letter; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The School Board is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within Miami-Dade County, Florida. Ms. Paul began her employment with the School Board in 2008 as a substitute teacher. Since then, she was employed at several different schools. Starting in February 2016, she was assigned to Miami Park. Prior to the instant case, Ms. Paul had no prior discipline. Ms. Paul's employment with the School Board is governed by Florida law, the School Board's policies, and the collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and the United Teachers of Dade. Circumstances Giving Rise to Ms. Paul's Discipline The proposed discipline is based upon conduct occurring on September 5, 2018, as a result of an altercation between an 11 year-old student, J.B., and Ms. Paul while he was an Emotional and Behavior Disturbed (EBD) student in her fifth grade class. Ms. Paul had J.B. as a student the prior year for fourth grade. Due to his frequent disruptiveness, Ms. Paul placed J.B. at a desk in the back of the class facing a wall during most of his fourth grade year (2017-2018 school year). September 5, 2018, was at the beginning of the 2018-2019 school year. On that date, J.B. was talking to another student and did not stop when asked to do so repeatedly by Ms. Paul. Ms. Paul told J.B. she was moving his desk to the back of the class. As Ms. Paul approached his desk, J.B. dropped his pencil case and bent down to pick it up. Believing Ms. Paul was going to physically restrain or move him, as he stood up, J.B. slapped Ms. Paul once or twice on the face and called Ms. Paul a "bitch." The witnesses' recollections of what happened next diverge. According to J.B., Ms. Paul grabbed his arms and twisted them up high behind his back. It hurt immediately and he was "sad and mad at the same time." She then took him to the adjacent room of Clinician Kawine Clermont where Ms. Paul then slapped J.B. in the face after sending Ms. Clermont to check on the students in Ms. Paul's class. J.B. laid on a mat in Ms. Clermont's classroom. He had difficulty getting up and complained that his arms hurt. He was then escorted from Ms. Clermont's room by Antranique Andrews, Miami Park Security Monitor, and Claribel Garcia, Assistant Principal, to the main office. J.B. was also given a bag of ice for his wrist while his grandmother, Linda Carter, who was called by Ms. Paul to come pick up J.B., spoke to school staff. According to Ms. Paul's final hearing testimony, she grabbed both of J.B.'s arms to keep from falling after he slapped her. He struggled to get away and they both fell to the ground. She also testified that she did not pull J.B.'s arms behind his back but rather laid him down on the floor and held his arms. This is inconsistent with her written statement given the day of the incident in which she stated, "Then he punched me. Several time [sic] in the face. I almost fell to the ground . . . I ask [sic] another student to get the mat. I hold one arm in the back, the other on the side. He lay [sic] down crying." Ms. Paul denies being alone in Ms. Clermont's room with J.B. or that she slapped him. Ms. Paul testified that she sent another student to get Ms. Clermont who then escorted J.B. to the clinician's room. The best person to corroborate Ms. Paul's recollection is Ms. Clermont, who did not testify. However, she provided a written statement in which she recited her version of the events. The statement is oddly written in the third person wherein she refers to herself as "Clinician." It states in part: Clinician was in her classroom when two students came over and reported J.B. slapped Ms. Paul. Clinician rushed over and J.B. was laying [sic] on a mat in a ball crying. Clinician had J.B. go over to her classroom. When J.B. went over to clinician classroom he layed [sic] back on mat balled up crying. The statement does not say that she, Ms. Clermont, brought J.B. over, but that she "had" him go to her classroom. This does not preclude the possibility that Respondent escorted J.B. to her room as J.B. claims. Security Monitor, Antranique Andrews, was directed by Assistant Principal Garcia to respond to Ms. Clermont's room. There she observed J.B. curled up and crying on the floor. When J.B. did not get up as directed by Ms. Andrews, she asked teacher's aide, Mr. Flowers (first name unknown) to assist. Together Ms. Andrews and Mr. Flowers got J.B. to stand up and wash his face before they took him to the office. Ms. Andrews observed red marks on J.B.'s arms and that he was upset. Ms. Andrews testified, "His arms were a little reddish. I guess you could say bruised, but red, like if you had an imprint from pressing, but that was it." When Ms. Carter arrived at school to pick up J.B., she was told that J.B. slapped Ms. Paul. She was not informed that J.B. was hurt during the altercation, although she was aware J.B. was given an ice pack because he complained of pain in his wrist. She also observed that the side of his face was red, which she first attributed to him being upset or crying. Video from a school security camera shows J.B. exiting the school while holding the ice pack on his wrist. When Ms. Carter and J.B. reached Ms. Carter's vehicle, J.B. asked for help to open the car door. J.B. was physically unable to open the door. When they arrived home, J.B. asked his grandmother to take him to the hospital because he thought his arms were broken. Ms. Carter, who was not feeling well herself, told J.B. to take a bath and go to bed. However, J.B. needed assistance with undressing because he could not use his arms. The next morning, J.B. still complained that he could not use his arms. Ms. Carter took J.B. to the emergency room at North Shore Hospital. J.B. received x-rays that revealed fractures in both arms. He was asked why he had red marks on his face and what happened to his arms. This was the first time Ms. Carter heard from J.B. what happened at school. Detective Bernise Charley, Miami-Dade Schools Police Department, was dispatched to the hospital where she interviewed J.B. and his grandmother. J.B. described how he had been slapped and physically abused by Ms. Paul while at school. She also spoke with the medical staff and took photos of J.B.'s face and arms. She personally observed red marks on the side of J.B.'s face consistent with a handprint. J.B. was transported to Joe DiMaggio Children's Hospital ("Joe DiMaggio") for further evaluation and treatment. X-rays were repeated at Joe DiMaggio and revealed that J.B. suffered a spiral fracture to his right humerus (upper arm), a distal radial and buckle fracture to his left forearm, and a buckle fracture to his left wrist. The injuries were determined to be consistent with the incident with Ms. Paul as described by J.B. J.B. and Ms. Carter were subsequently asked to meet with the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") and the University of Miami Child Protection Team on September 13, 2018, to review the incident. J.B. and his grandmother were interviewed separately and each described the incident. Dr. Joan V. Alvaranga's report states: J. is an 11 year old boy with fractures of the right humerous and left wrist which are consistent with the report he provided. In addition, J. had red marks on his face, which had resolved by the time of the CPT evaluation, which he reported he sustained when the teacher slapped him on the face. In my medical opinion, this case represents child physical abuse. Deviation from Appropriate De-Escalation Techniques Craig Siegel, District Chairperson for the Clinical Art Therapy Department and lead trainer for Safe Crisis Management, testified that teachers are provided training by the school district in a variety of techniques to safely de-escalate a potentially violent situation and to protect themselves and others. Ms. Paul completed Safe Crisis Management training in December 2016. Teachers are taught that they are to use non- physical intervention strategies first to de-escalate a threatening situation. These include, but are not limited to: talking; evading; blocking; escaping to a "safe zone;" and summoning help. Physical restraint is to be used only as a last resort if the student poses an imminent risk of serious injury or death to themselves or others. The physical techniques taught to teachers are designed to contain the student in the safest manner possible and reduce the risk of injury. Only the least amount of force necessary is to be used. The approved restraint methods do not include twisting a child's arms behind their back or slapping them in the face. Although Ms. Paul certainly had the right to protect herself when slapped in the face by J.B., it strains credulity to assert that a slap from a then 75-pound, 11 year-old boy, posed an imminent risk of serious harm or death such that it was necessary to apply enough force to break this child's arms in multiple places. No other adult witnessed the altercation, but they all saw J.B. curled up on the floor crying. J.B. was hurt badly enough that he was initially unable to get up off the floor without assistance, red marks were immediately seen on his arms and face, and he needed an ice pack for his wrist while still at school. J.B.'s story, that Ms. Paul twisted his arms behind his back and forced him to the floor, has remained consistent. No evidence was presented to suggest that J.B. received his injuries at the hands of anyone other than Ms. Paul. Regardless of whether Ms. Paul slapped J.B. or not, it is clear that she exceeded all bounds of reasonableness in her initial restraint of J.B. in reaction to him slapping her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a final order finding Claude Paul guilty of misconduct in office and terminating her employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater, Florida 33761-1526 (eServed) Christopher J. La Piano, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 430 Miami, Florida 33132 (eServed) Claude A. Paul 6113 Southwest 33rd Street Miramar, Florida 33023 Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Alberto M. Carvalho, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1308
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Earl Burno Allen, was born November 7, 1951. As of April, 1981, the Petitioner had attained an Associate Arts Degree from Dade County Community College. The Petitioner has had no teaching experience as of the date of the final hearing. The Petitioner presently is employed with the Veterans Administration at its hospital in Dade County, Florida, where he is employed as a "facilitator." The Petitioner testified, in a general way, that although he had a number of criminal offenses of record, that he was last released from prison on October 1, 1980, and has had his Civil Rights restored and therefore maintains that his past convictions should not be used against him to his prejudice in denying him certification as a substitute teacher. Subsequent to his last release from prison, the Petitioner obtained a federal civil service position at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Dade County. The Petitioner acknowledged that his earliest altercation with legal authorities occurred in approximately May of 1970, when he was allowed by an unidentified court to enlist in the Army "to avoid termination of probation." The Petitioner was enlisted in the United States Army for approximately one year when he was given a general discharge "under honorable conditions." The Petitioner maintains that the discharge under those conditions occurred because of the offense of Absent Without Leave. The Petitioner argued that his denial of certification as a substitute teacher was motivated by reasons of racial discrimination, citing an instance where a white coach employed by the School Board of Dade County was rehired after committing a crime. The Petitioner presented no proof establishing that to be the motivation for the Respondent's denial of his certification in this instance however. The Respondent, through Exhibits 1 through 6, established that on or about October 3, 1969, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed a two count information in Case No. 69-8540, charging the Petitioner with larceny of an automobile, which was the property of one Carl E. Stoeber on or about September 10, 1969, in violation of Section 811.20, Florida Statutes. In count two of that information, the Petitioner was charged with unlawful use of the vehicle without the owner's consent in violation of Section 811.21, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to count two of that information on March 23, 1970, and adjudication was withheld with the Petitioner being placed on probation for a period of six months. On or about December 10, 1971, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, filed a one count information in Case No. 71-10209-B. In that information, the Petitioner was charged with breaking and entering a dwelling on or about December 2, 1971, in violation of Section 810.01, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner was charged with feloniously breaking and entering the property of George Investment Company, Inc., a corporation doing business as Turf Motel. That entry was charged to be with the intent to steal or carry away money, goods or chattels of value of more than $100, in violation of Section 810.01, Florida Statutes. On January 17, 1972, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to that charge and was adjudged guilty and sentenced to one year in the Dade County Jail with credit for time already served. On or about November 17, 1971, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County filed a one count information in Case No. 71-9595, in which it was charged that the Petitioner was guilty of larceny of an automobile belonging to one Dwight Carey on or about November 9, 1971, in violation of Section 814.03, Florida Statutes. As a result of that charge, a plea of guilty was entered by the Petitioner on January 17, 1972, and the court adjudged him to be guilty of that charge, sentencing him to confinement in the Dade County Jail for two days followed by probation for a period of two years. On or about December 28, 1972, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County filed a five count information in Case No. 72-8959 against the Petitioner. The first count of that information charged him with an offense, on December 9, 1972, of carrying a concealed firearm, to wit: a shotgun, in violation of 790.01, Florida Statutes. The second count of that information charged the Petitioner with unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun, in violation of Section 790.221, Florida Statutes. Count three of that information charged the Petitioner with robbery, on or about December 9, 1972, in that he allegedly unlawfully and feloniously assaulted one Willie Smith and did by force and violence or placing that person in fear, rob or carry away certain personal property of his, in violation of Section 813.011, Florida Statutes. Count four of that information charged the Petitioner with possession of a stolen motor vehicle on December 9, 1972, to wit: a 1965 Dodge automobile which was the lawful property of Robert Vawdergri, in violation of Section 814.03, Florida Statutes. Lastly, count five of that information charged the Petitioner with unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen property, to wit: that same 1965 Dodge automobile, in violation of Section 811.16, Florida Statutes. The plea of guilty was entered by the Petitioner to count two of that information involving the unlawful possession of the sawed-off shotgun. Petitioner was adjudged guilty and a nunc pro tunc order amending his sentence, dated November 20, 1979, directed that the Petitioner be confined in the State Penitentiary for two and one-half years, with credit given for time already served in the Dade County Jail. On or about February 13, 1978, the State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, filed a two count information in Case No. 78-1225. The first count of that information charged the Petitioner with unlawfully entering a structure, to wit: the property of H & S Stores, Inc., a building, on or about January 24, 1978. He was charged with entering that building with intent to commit a theft, in violation of Section 810.02, Florida Statutes. The second count charged the Petitioner with grand theft of the second degree by his removing from that property three television sets valued at more than $100, which were the property of H & S Stores, Inc., contrary to Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner was convicted of count one of that information, which charged him with burglary, and the court, on or about December 18, 1978, entered a order adjudging him guilty of the offense of burglary and sentencing him to two and one-half years imprisonment, which sentence was to run concurrently with the two and one-half year sentence pertaining to Case No. 72-8959-A. The Petitioner was released from prison on or after October 1, 1980, and subsequently completed two years of higher education at the Miami-Dade Community College and has obtained employment in the Federal Civil Service System as a "facilitator" at the Veterans Administration medical facility in Dade County.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's application for the issuance of a substitute teacher's certificate be DENIED and that the petition be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Earl Burno Allen 6043 North West 20th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142 Craig R. Wilson, Esquire 315 Third Street Suite 204 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 The Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 3230
