The Issue Whether, under Section 381.494-381.499, Florida Statutes, Humana, Inc., d/b/a Kendall Community Hospital, is entitled to a Certificate of Need to construct a 150-bed acute care hospital in the west Kendall area of south Dade County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact HUMANA is an investor-owned, multi-institutional hospital system which owns and operates more than 90 hospitals, most of which are medical/surgical facilities. (DHRS Ex.1, p.10). HUMANA applied for a Certificate of Need from DHRS to construct a 150- bed acute care community hospital in the west Kendall area of south Dade County, Florida. The specific area to be served is bounded on Miller Drive to the north, southwest 177th Avenue to the west, Coral Reef Drive to the south, and Calloway Road to the east. The proposed 150-bed hospital includes 100 medical/surgical beds, 20 pediatric beds, 20 Level II obstetric beds, 10 intensive care/critical beds, and a Level II nursery in conjunction with the obstetric unit. (TR 277). The proposal includes a 24-hour, physician-staffed emergency room and a "dedicated" outpatient surgery department, with separate recovery room. Surgery suites are specifically designed and reserved only for outpatient surgery, thereby facilitating outpatient scheduling and efficient operations. (TR 279). The outpatient surgery unit is intended to reduce the costs of health care by providing a cost-effective alternative modality of health care delivery. (TR 278). Finally, the proposal contemplates a full-body CT Scanner, digital radiography and general state-of-the-art ancillary equipment. (TR 278). If built, it would be the westernmost hospital in south Dade County. It is a "community" hospital, designed to provide hospital care to the rapidly growing population of the west Kendall area, but not serve as a major referral center for patients living elsewhere. (DHRS Ex. 1, pp. 32-34; TR 250, 280). The local health planning agency, then the Health Systems Agency ("HSA") of South Florida, Inc., 1/ reviewed HUMANA's application for a Certificate of Need, along with four other similar applications, and recommended that all five be denied because of asserted inconsistency with the HSA's Health System Plan. ("HSP") 2/ (DHRS Ex. 1, TR 77). The applications were then submitted to DHRS, the single state agency empowered to issue or deny Certificates of Need. 381.493(3)(a) and 381.494(8), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1982). DHRS reviewed the HSA recommendation, conducted its own evaluation, and then denied all five applications, including HUMANA's. DHRS concluded: None of the five proposed projects are in compliance with the adopted Goals, Criteria, Standards and Policies of the Health Systems Agency of South Florida, as stated in the Health Systems Plan (HSP) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). A need to add acute care hospital beds to Dade County does not exist at the present time. The proposed projects would add to excess capacity and underutilization of hospital beds that now exist in Dade County. There are only five hospitals in Dade County that are at the recommended occupancy level of 80 percent based on licensed beds (none of which are located in South Dade), and the number of beds per 1000 population. The primary alternative would be not to construct any of the proposed projects. While all of the proposed projects represent some degree of financial feasibility, none are felt to be cost effective because increased bed capacity would result in costs and revenue higher than those projected for existing "High Cost" hospitals in 1984 as determined by the Hospital Cost Containment Board. (DHRS Ex. 1, p. 404) Thereafter, HUMANA timely instituted Section 120.57(1) proceedings challenging DHRS's denial; HUMANA's standing to do so is uncontested. HUMANA's position, maintained throughout, is that its proposed 150-bed hospital satisfies every legal criterion for the issuance of the applied-for Certificate of Need. Intervenor Baptist Hospital Intervenor BAPTIST HOSPITAL will be substantially affected if HUMANA is granted a Certificate of Need. BAPTIST is a fully licensed and accredited 513- bed, general acute care hospital located within HUMANA's proposed service area, at 8900 North Kendall Drive, Miami, Florida. (STIP-para. 8). If the proposed hospital is built, it would significantly and adversely affect the patient census and revenues of BAPTIST HOSPITAL. (TR 16, VOL 4). In 1982, BAPTIST drew 36.7 percent of its patients from HUMANA's proposed service area. (TR 15, 16, VOL 4). Fifty percent of the residents of the proposed service area (who were admitted to hospitals in Dade County) were admitted to BAPTIST HOSPITAL. (TR-440). It is estimated that BAPTIST would lose 15,047 patient days to the new HUMANA hospital and would experience significant adverse economic impacts. (TR 88-89, VOL 5). The proposed hospital would also adversely impact BAPTIST's ability to hire and retain nursing and technical personnel. BAPTIST has experienced difficulty in hiring and retaining these personnel. (TR 18, 60-73, VOL 4). Historically, the opening of a new hospital has adversely affected the hiring and retention of such personnel in nearby hospitals. (TR 72-73, VOL 4). Here, approximately 84 percent of BAPTIST's nurses live near HUMANA's proposed cite, thus increasing the likelihood that BAPTIST will be adversely affected in this manner. (TR 135, VOL 5). BAPTIST opposes the issuance of a Certificate of Need for HUMANA's proposed hospital, and supports DHRS's initial denial. Intervenor American Hospital Similarly, intervenor AMERICAN HOSPITAL would be significantly affected if the proposed HUMANA hospital is built. AMERICAN is a fully licensed and accredited 513-bed, general acute care hospital located and operated within HUMANA's proposed service area, at 11750 Bird Road, Miami, Florida, (STIP-para 8). AMERICAN currently draws 41 percent of its patients from HUMANA's proposed service area. The proposed hospital will cause AMERICAN to lose an estimated 5,300 patient days. (TR 76, VOL 5). This translates into an approximate loss of $4.1 million in potential revenues, based upon HUMANA's achieving a 75 percent occupancy rate and 41,000 patient days. (TR 75-76, VOL 5). Such a revenue loss may result in higher costs, which in the health care system, are normally translated into higher patient charges. (TR 86, VOL 5) HUMANA's proposed hospital would also aggravate AMERICAN's continuing shortage in nursing personnel. (Currently AMERICAN has approximately 50 full- time registered nurse vacancies.) (TR 134, VOL 5). It is reasonable to expect that HUMANA will hire a significant number of its nurses away from nearby hospitals. Over a six-month period, HUMANA's four existing hospitals in south Florida hired 112 registered nurses, 32.1 percent of whom were hired away from other hospitals in the area. (TR 783). AMERICAN, likewise, opposes the issuance of a Certificate of Need to HUMANA, and supports DHRS's initial denial. II. STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR CERTIFICATES OF NEED Section 381.494(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), prescribes standards for evaluating applications for Certificates of Need. Those standards pertinent to HUMANA's application include: The need for the health care facilities and services . . . being proposed in relation to the applicable district plan, annual implementation plan, and state health plan adopted pursuant to Title XV of the Public Health Service Act, except in emergency circumstances which pose a threat to the public health. The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing health care services . . . in the applicant's health service area. 7. The availability of resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation; the effects the project will have on clinical needs of health professional training programs in the service area; the extent to which the services will be accessible to schools for health professions in the service area for training purposes if such services are available in a limited number of facilities; the availability of alternative uses of such resources for the provision of other health services; and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the service area. 11. The probable impact of the proposed project on the costs of providing health services proposed by the applicant, upon consideration of factors including, but not limited to, the effects of competition on the supply of health services being proposed and the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of health services which foster competition and service to promote quality assurance and cost-effectiveness. In considering HUMANA's application, specific consideration must also be given to whether: . . .less costly, more efficient, or more appropriate alternatives to such inpatient services are . . . available and the development of such alternatives has been studied and found not practicable. . . . existing inpatient facilities providing inpatient services similar to those proposed are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. . . . alternatives to new construction, for example, modernization or sharing arrangements, have been considered and have been implemented to the maximum extent practicable. . . . patients will experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed, in the absence of the proposed new service. 381.494(6)(d) Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1982). The controversy here is whether in 1988 (using a five-year planning horizon) there will be a need for HUMANA's proposed 150-bed hospital in the west Kendall area of south Dade County. DHRS, BAPTIST, and AMERICAN say that there will be no need: that existing hospitals serving the area have excess capacity and are underutilized--and that this condition will persist through 1988. HUMANA contends otherwise. As the applicant for a license, the burden of proving entitlement rests squarely upon HUMANA. 3/ The most accurate and reliable method for determining bed-need in this case, the historical demand-based method, requires the following: (1) identify planning area boundaries; (2) from historical population data, project population for the planning area using the five-year horizon for hospital services; (3) calculate a hospital use rate or the rate at which patients in the service area have used hospitals in terms of patient days per thousand; (4) project patient days by multiplying the use rate times the area population, and divide by 365 to yield a projected bed need; (5) compare projected bed-need with the licensed bed capacity of area hospitals and, using an appropriate occupancy standard, determine whether there will be an excess or shortage of hospital beds in the proposed planning area. (TR 55, VOL 5). Selecting a Health Planning Area The first step in determining whether a new hospital will be needed is selection of the appropriate health planning area. In 1982, the now-defunct HSA of South Florida adopted a Regionalization Plan for south Florida dividing HSA IX, a region, into five districts. (AM Ex. 4). Although not specifically mentioning hospitals, this plan implies that hospital bed-need determinations should be made on a district basis. The Kendall area, extending east and west, generally is denominated as "District D," and is, in turn, subdivided into three subdistricts. "D-1" encompasses Coral Gables and South Miami; "D-2" and "D-3" include Weschester, Kendall, Killian, and the west central Dade areas, the boundaries of which are U.S. 1 and the Palmetto Expressway on the east, Coral Reef Drive and Eureka Drive on the south, conservation area on the west, and the East-West Expressway, and Tamiami Trail on the north. (HU Ex. 4). HUMANA chose "D-2" and "D-3" as the appropriate health care planning area for determining need for its proposed hospital. District "D," however, is a more appropriate and reasonable area to use in determining need for the proposed HUMANA hospital. (TR 203, 258; 145-146, VOL 4; 56-57, VOL 5). The entire area of District "D" may be traversed, by car, in approximately 30 minutes, the roads are adequate, and there are numerous hospitals in the district which are easily accessible to its residents. (TR 57-58, 66, 77-78, VOL 5). Hospitals located in one part of District "D" are readily accessible to patients who reside in other areas of the District. HUMANA's bed-need analysis fails to adequately take into account hospitals within "D-1" or which are outside the District but are readily accessible (within 30-minutes driving time) to the majority of residents in "D- 2" and "D-3." (TR 145-146, VOL 4). Existing hospitals which are readily accessible to residents of a proposed service area cannot be reasonably excluded merely because they are located outside a theoretical boundary line. (TR 145- 146, VOL 4). A health planning area should be the area where most of the residents seek health care. (TR 615; 78-79, VOL. 5). Hence, a proposed health planning area should be tested against the actual hospital use of its residents and the accessibility of existing hospitals to those residents. The residents of District "D" travel freely within District "D" in seeking hospital care. South Florida Hospital Association Utilization and Patient Origin Program ("HUPOP") data show that approximately 60 percent of the patients residing in subdistricts "D-2" and "D-3" seek inpatient hospital care elsewhere. (TR 72, VOL 5; 616; AM Ex. 7 p. 19). 4/ There is a corresponding inflow of residents from outside "D- 2" and "D-3" who seek hospital care within "D-2" and "D-3". (TR 72, VOL 5). In comparison, approximately 70 percent of the residents of District "D" seek hospital care within the boundaries of the District and--of all the districts within the region-- District "D" has the highest percentage of residents who seek in-district hospital care. (TR 72-73, 79, VOL 5; AM Ex. 7, p. 19). In actual practice, then, the residents of District "D" heed the District boundaries but largely disregard subdistrict "D-2" and "D-3" boundaries. The residents of "D-2" and "D-3" have ready access to numerous hospitals providing a broad range of medical services. (TR 78, VOL 5). BAPTIST is a large general hospital with tertiary, secondary, and primary care services. With the exceptions of a burn center and a Level III neotology unit, virtually all health care services are provided. BAPTIST, AMERICAN, Coral Reef, South Miami, and Larkin hospitals provide health care services to residents of "D-2" and "D-3," within a 20-minute travel time. (BH Ex. 10, p. 1-13-19; BH Ex. 5 and 7). The few specialized services not available at these hospitals are provided at Jackson Memorial Hospital, within a 30-minute travel time. (BH Ex. 10, p. 1- 13). Accessibility of Existing Acute Care Hospitals Section 381.494(6)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), requires examination of the accessibility of existing health care facilities providing similar services to the same health service. The generally accepted standard for determining accessibility, found appropriate here, is whether general hospital beds are available to the service area's population within 30-minutes travel time by automobile, under average traffic conditions and for non- emergency purposes. This standard is used by HSAs and DHRS is used by federal health care planners, and is widely used by professional health care planners. (DHRS Ex. 1; BH Ex. 10, p. 1-10-13; TR 90, 123, 144, 166, 193; 85, 133-134, VOL 4; 58, 77, VOL 5). Applying this standard, seven hospitals are reasonably accessible to residents of HUMANA's proposed service area: AMERICAN, BAPTIST, Coral Reef Hospital, South Miami Hospital, Larkin Hospital, Doctors' Hospital, and Jackson Memorial Hospital. District "D" contains eleven hospitals, with a total of 2,882 licensed beds. (AM 3, p. 41; 4, p. D-3). Moreover, five of these, AMERICAN, BAPTIST, Coral Reef, Larkin, and South Miami, are even closer, within 20-minutes average travel time. (BH 5, p. 11). There is no evidence that the residents of "D-2/D-3", or District "D," as a whole, have any difficulty using or gaining access to these hospitals. Beds are available. The five hospitals closest to HUMANA's proposed service area, AMERICAN, BAPTIST, Coral Reef, South Miami, and Larkin, have a total of 1,825 licensed beds, 326 of which are not in service; of the 1,499 beds in service, 109 are not used. So there are 435 licensed beds, within 20-minutes of "D-2/D-3," not in service or not in use due to lack of demand. (BH Ex.10, p. I- 26, 5, 7, 10, p. I-26-28). Occupancy Standard for Determining Need The generally accepted occupancy standard for hospitals, used in deciding if additional beds are needed, is the 80 percent average annual occupancy rate. This standard is included in the 1981 Florida State Health Plan, is used by DHRS and HSAs, and is widely used by professional health care planners. Its use is appropriate here. (AM 135, VOL 2; TR 90-91; 95-97, 118, 132, 140, 165, 172, 313, 469; 141, VOL 4). In application, it means that additional hospitals should not be built until existing hospitals providing acceptable care to the proposed service area are operating at or above an 80 percent occupancy rate--the level at which hospitals, generally, operate most efficiently. In 1982, none of the eleven hospitals in District "D" met the 80 percent occupancy standard. (DHRS Ex. 1, AM Ex. 3, p. 7). In 1981, the five hospitals closest to HUMANA's proposed site had an average annual occupancy rate of 60.9 percent. (BH Ex. 10, p. I-24). Moreover, this excess is sufficient to meet the future health care needs of residents of "D-2/D-3" and District "D," as a whole. BAPTIST and AMERICAN will not achieve 80 percent occupancy until after 1988; AMERICAN is projected to have an occupancy of only 63.61 percent in 1990. (AM Ex. 3, p. 8; BH Ex. 10, p. 10, I-24). Availability of Resources to Build and Support Proposed Hospital Section 381.494(6)(c)(7) also requires consideration of whether there will be available adequate resources to support a new hospital, including manpower and financial resources. The evidence establishes, without contradiction, that HUMANA has sufficient funds to construct and operate its proposed hospital. The projected cost of the hospital, including equipment, is $29,175,500--70 percent to be funded by debt, the remainder by equity funds. HUMANA has, on hand, approximately $225 million in cash and cash equivalents. (TR 709, HU Ex. 2). The design of the proposed hospital will be based on HUMANA's "prototype" 150-bed facility, developed from years of experience in hospital design construction, and operation. The design is efficient and economical, and will permit a 50-bed expansion without further construction. (TR 714-716, 720, 719, HU Ex. 9). The parties agree that HUMANA has the ability to enlist or employ sufficient physicians and management personnel to staff the proposed hospital. (STIP, para. 3). HUMANA also has the ability to hire and retain an adequate nursing and technical staff. It recruits such personnel, routinely, on a national basis and transfers employees within its hospital system. Moreover, it has a mobile nurse corps, a group of nurses which are available on an as-needed basis, to help staff its south Florida hospitals during peak winter months. Historically, HUMANA has successfully recruited and retained nurses in its south Florida hospitals. (TR 772, 776-777, 781-782, 801-802, VOL 4). Projected Population of Service Area As already mentioned, under the preferred demand-based bed-need methodology, population is projected over a five-year planning horizon, for hospital facilities. This is because an increase in a service area's population will generate a need for more beds. The population of the Kendall area of south Dade County has been growing rapidly, and is expected to continue to do so through 1990. This population is younger than the population of Dade County or HSA IX, as a whole. The population projections for District "D" (the appropriate health planning area for the proposed hospital) by age groups are: District D 1987 1990 Under 15 92,301 96,506 15 to 64 357,567 327,652 65 and over 52,188 55,822 TOTAL (AM 3; TR 59-61, VOL 5; 488 VOL 3) 502,056 529,980 I. Hospital Use Rate Under the demand-based methodology, found acceptable here, once the planning area is designated and the population projected over a five-year planning horizon, a hospital "use rate" is calculated. The "use rate" is the rate at which people use hospitals, expressed in terms of the number of patient days per thousand residents residing in the health service area. This rate can be derived using various factors. Those factors most appropriate for use in this case are "age" and "service-specific" uses. (TR 66 VOL 5; 497-498 VOL 3). "Age-specific" use rates, reflecting historic hospital use rates by age group, are applied to the projected population to determine total patient days. This factor takes into account the fact that people 65 or older utilize hospitals at a rate three to four times that of people under 65. This is particularly significant here since the Kendall area population is younger than the population of Dade County, HSA IX, or the state, as a whole. (TR 58-59, VOL 5; AM 3, p. 12). In 1981, the age-specific use rate for HSA IX reflects a use rate of 1,524.6 patient days per thousand population. (AM 3, p. 63). "Service-specific" use rates are derived from historical use of particular hospital services, such as psychiatry, obstetrics, pediatrics, and medical-surgical. (AM 3, pp. 14-15, 70-72). The 1981 service-specific use rate, covering all services, for HSA IX was 1,524.6 patient days per thousand--a figure equal to the age-specific use rate. (AM 3, p. 14-15, 71). J. Calculation of Future Bed Need for District "D" In 1982, there were 2,882 licensed non-federal beds in District "D." Taking into account an 80 percent occupancy rate, and applying the HSA age- specific use rate to the projected population of District "D" yields a need for only 2,282 beds per day in 1987, and 2,419 beds per day in 1990. Hence, there will be an excess of 600 beds in District "D" in 1987; 554 in 1988; and 463 in 1990. (AM 3, p. 41, 69; TR 63, VOL 5). Similarly, applying the HSA IX service- specific use rate to the projected District "D" population results in a bed excess of 232 beds in 1987 and 87 in 1990. (AM 3, p. 74). Significantly, these projected bed excesses are, if anything, understated. This is because the HSA IX hospital use rate was utilized. Hospital use is greater in HSA IX, with its older population, than in District "D," where the population is younger and less likely to be hospitalized. (TR 61-62, VOL 5). HUMANA, in its analysis, applied age and service-specific use rates to the projected population of "D-2/D-3," concluding that there would be a need for 238 additional beds in 1988. This conclusion, however, is unconvincing since "D-2/D-3" is unduly restrictive and the 235 unused beds of South Miami and Larkin Hospitals, both located in "D-1," are not fully considered. (DHRS 1, p. 370; AM 3, p. 18). (Both hospitals are within a 20-minute average travel time from selected points in "D-2/D-3.") (TR 544, VOL 3; 612, VOL 4). By failing to properly account for empty beds at nearby hospitals, and by unreasonably limiting its planning area, HUMANA overstates the need for additional hospital beds in District "D." Moreover, even assuming the propriety of "D-2/ D-3," HUMANA failed to properly take into account the 260 beds of Coral Reef Hospital, a "D-2" hospital. If Coral Reef Hospital beds are correctly included within "D-2/D-3," HUMANA's projected bed-need decreases from 238 to 129 beds in 1988. (TR 80, VOL 5). Finally, Thomas W. Schultz, HUMANA's health care planning expert, admitted that a figure of 1,038 patient days per thousand patients would be "useful" in establishing bed-need for "D-2/D-3." (TR 501, VOL 3). Applying that use rate, and correctly including Coral Reef Hospital, results in a projected "D-2/D-3" need of 36 additional beds in 1988. (TR 83-84, VOL 5). HUMANA does not propose to construct a 36-bed hospital and such a hospital has not been shown to be feasible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That HUMANA's application for a Certificate of Need to construct a hospital in the west Kendall area of Dade County, Florida, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May 1983.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or the Agency) should approve the application for certificate of need (CON) 7700 filed by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, LTD. d/b/a Miami Heart Institute (Miami Heart or MH).
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and taking action on CON applications pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes. The applicant, Miami Heart, operates a hospital facility known as Miami Heart Institute which, at the time of hearing, was comprised of a north campus (consisting of 273 licensed beds) and a south campus (consisting of 258 beds) in Miami, Florida. The two campuses operate under a single license which consolidated the operation of the two facilities. The consolidation of the license was approved by CON 7399 which was issued by the Agency prior to the hearing of this case. The Petitioner, Mount Sinai, is an existing health care facility doing business in the same service district. On February 4, 1994, AHCA published a fixed need pool of zero adult inpatient psychiatric beds for the planning horizon applicable to this batching cycle. The fixed need pool was not challenged. On February 18, 1994, Miami Heart submitted its letter of intent for the first hospital batching cycle of 1994, and sought to add twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at the Miami Heart Institute south campus. Such facility is located in the Agency's district 11 and is approximately two (2) miles from the north campus. Notice of that letter was published in the March 11, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Miami Heart's letter of intent provided, in pertinent part: By this letter, Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., d/b/a Miami Heart Institute announces its intent to file a Certificate of Need Application on or before March 23, 1994 for approval to establish 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults at Miami Heart Institute. Thus, the applicant seeks approval for this project pursuant to Sections 408.036(1)(h), Florida Statutes. The proposed capital expenditure for this project shall not exceed $1,000,000 and will include new construction and the renovation of existing space. Miami Heart Institute is located in Local Health Council District 11. There are no subsdistricts for Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11. The applicable need formula for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults is contained within Rule 59C-1.040(4)(c), F.A.C. The Agency published a fixed need of "0" for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11 for this batching cycle. However, "not normal" circumstances exist within District which justify approval of this project. These circumstances are that Miami Beach Community Hospital, which is also owned by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., and which has an approved Certificate of Need Application to consol- idate its license with that of the Miami Heart Institute, has pending a Certificate of Need Application to delicense up to 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults. The effect of the application, which is the subject of this Letter of Intent, will be to relocate 20 of the delicensed adult psychiatric beds to the Miami Heart Institute. Because of the "not normal" circumstances alleged in the Miami Heart letter of intent, the Agency extended a grace period to allow competing letters of intent to be filed. No additional letters of intent were submitted during the grace period. On March 23, 1994, Miami Heart timely submitted its CON application for the project at issue, CON no. 7700. Notice of the application was published in the April 8, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Such application was deemed complete by the Agency and was considered to be a companion to the delicensure of the north campus beds. On July 22, 1994, the Agency published in the Florida Administrative Weekly its preliminary decision to approve CON no. 7700. In the same batch as the instant case, Cedars Healthcare Group (Cedars), also in district 11, applied to add adult psychiatric beds to Cedars Medical Center through the delicensure of an equal number of adult psychiatric beds at Victoria Pavilion. Cedars holds a single license for the operation of both Cedars Medical Center and Victoria Pavilion. As in this case, the Agency gave notice of its intent to grant the CON application. Although this "transfer" was initially challenged, it was subsequently dismissed. Although filed at the same time (and, therefore, theoretically within the same batch), the Cedars CON application and the Miami Heart CON application were not comparatively reviewed by the Agency. The Agency determined the applicants were merely seeking to relocate their own licensed beds. Based upon that determination, MH's application was evaluated in the context of the statutory criteria, the adult psychiatric beds and services rule (Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code), the district 11 local health plan, and the 1993 state health plan. Ms. Dudek also considered the utilization data for district 11 facilities. Mount Sinai timely filed a petition challenging the proposed approval of CON 7700 and, for purposes of this proceeding only, the parties stipulated that MS has standing to raise the issues remaining in this cause. Mount Sinai's existing psychiatric unit utilization is presently at or near full capacity, and MS' existing unit would not provide an adequate, available, or accessible alternative to Miami Heart's proposal, unless additional bed capacity were available to MS in the future through approval of additional beds or changes in existing utilization. Miami Heart's proposal to establish twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its Miami Heart Institute south campus was made in connection with its application to delicense twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its north campus. The Agency advised MH to submit two CON applications: one for the delicensure (CON no. 7474) and one for the establishment of the twenty beds at the south campus (CON no. 7700). The application to delicense the north campus beds was expeditiously approved and has not been challenged. As to the application to establish the twenty beds at the south campus, the following statutory criteria are not at issue: Section 408.035(1)(c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (m), (n), (o) and (2)(b) and (e), Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that Miami Heart meets, at least minimally, those criteria. During 1993, Miami Heart made the business decision to cease operations at its north campus and to seek the Agency's approval to relocate beds and services from that facility to other facilities owned by MH, including the south campus. Miami Heart does not intend to delicense the twenty beds at the north campus until the twenty beds are licensed at the south campus. The goal is merely to transfer the existing program with its services to the south campus. Miami Heart did not seek beds from a fixed need pool. Since approximately April, 1993, the Miami Heart north campus has operated with the twenty bed adult psychiatric unit and with a limited number of obstetrical beds. The approval of CON no. 7700 will not change the overall total number of adult general inpatient psychiatric beds within the district. The adult psychiatric program at MH experiences the highest utilization of any program in district 11, with an average length of stay that is consistent with other adult programs around the state. Miami Heart's existing psychiatric program was instituted in 1978. Since 1984, there has been little change in nursing and other staff. The program provides a full continuum of care, with outpatient programs, aftercare, and support programs. Nearly ninety-nine percent of the program's inpatient patient days are attributable to patients diagnosed with serious mental disorders. The Miami Heart program specializes in a biological approach to psychiatric cases in the diagnosis and treatment of affective disorders, including a variety of mood disorders and related conditions. The Miami Heart program is distinctive from other psychiatric programs in the district. If the MH program were discontinued, the patients would have limited alternatives for access to the same diagnostic and treatment services in the district. There are no statutes or rules promulgated which specifically address the transfer of psychiatric beds or services from one facility owned by a health care entity to another facility also owned by the same entity. In reviewing the instant CON application, the Agency determined it has the discretion to evaluate each transfer case based upon the review criteria and to consider the appropriate weight factors should be given. Factors which may affect the review include the change of location, the utilization of the existing services, the quality of the existing programs and services, the financial feasibility, architectural issues, and any other factor critical to the review process. In this case, the weight given to the numeric need criteria was not significant. The Agency determined that because the transfer would not result in a change to the overall bed inventory, the calculated fixed need pool did not apply to the instant application. In effect, because the calculation of numeric need was inapplicable, this case must be considered "not normal" pursuant to Rule 59C-1.040(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Agency determined that other criteria were to be given greater consideration. Such factors were the reasonableness of the proposal, the ability to afford access, the applicant's ability to provide a quality program, and the project's financial feasibility. The Agency determined that, on balance, this application should be approved as the statutory and other review criteria were met. Although put on notice of the other CON applications, Mount Sinai did not file an application for psychiatric beds at the same time as Miami Heart or Cedars. Mount Sinai did not claim that the proposed delicensures and transfers made beds available for competitive review. The Agency has interpreted Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code, to mean that it will not normally approve an application for beds or services unless the statutory and rule criteria are met, including the need determination criteria. There is no list of circumstances which are routinely considered "not normal" by the Agency. In this case, the proposed transfer of beds was, in itself, considered "not normal." The approval of Miami Heart's application would allow an existing program to continue. As a result, the overhead to maintain two campuses would be reduced. Further, the relocation would allow the program to continue to provide access, both geographically and financially, to the same patient service area. And, since the program has the highest utilization rate of any adult program in the district, its continuation would be beneficial to the area. The program has an established referral base for admissions to the facility. The transfer is reasonable for providing access to the medically under-served. The quality of care, while not in issue, would be expected to continue at its existing level or improve. The transfer would allow better access to ancillary hospital departments and consulting specialists who may be needed even though the primary diagnosis is psychiatric. The cost of the transfer when compared to the costs to be incurred if the transfer is not approved make the approval a benefit to the service area. If the program is not relocated, Medicaid access could change if the hospital is reclassified from a general facility to a specialty facility. The proposed cost for the project does not exceed one million dollars. If the north campus must be renovated, a greater capital expenditure would be expected. The expected impact on competition for other providers is limited due to the high utilization for all programs in the vicinity. The subject proposal is consistent with the district and state health care plans and the need for health care facilities and services. The services being transferred is an existing program which is highly utilized and which is not creating "new beds." As such, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing services in the district will not be adversely affected by the approval of the subject application. The proposed transfer is consistent with, and appropriate, in light of these criteria. Therefore, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The subject application demonstrates a full continuum of care with safeguards to assure that alternatives to inpatient care are fully utilized when appropriate. Therefore, the availability and adequacy of other services, such as outpatient care, has been demonstrated and would deter unnecessary utilization. Thus, Miami Heart has shown its application complies with Section 408.035(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Miami Heart has also demonstrated that the probable impact of its proposal is in compliance with Section 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes. The proposed transfer will not adversely impact the costs of providing services, the competition on the supply of services, or the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of services which foster competition, promote quality assurance, and cost-effectiveness. Miami Heart has taken an innovative approach to promote quality assurance and cost effectiveness. Its purpose, to close a facility and relocate beds (removing unnecessary acute care beds in the process), represents a departure from the traditional approach to providing health care services. By approving Miami Heart's application, overhead costs associated with the unnecessary facility will be eliminated. There is no less costly, more efficient alternative which would allow the continuation of the services and program Miami Heart has established at the north campus than the approval of transfer to the south campus. The MH proposal is most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. The renovation of the medical surgical space at the south campus to afford a location for the psychiatric unit is the most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. In totality, the circumstances of this case make the approval of Miami Heart's application for CON no. 7700 the most reasonable and practical solution given the "not normal" conditions of this application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order approving CON 7700 as recommended in the SAAR. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4755 Note: Proposed findings of fact are to contain one essential fact per numbered paragraph. Proposed findings of fact paragraphs containing multiple sentences with more than one statement of fact are difficult to review. In reviewing for this case, where all sentences were accurate and supported by the recorded cited, the paragraph has been accepted. If the paragraph contained mixed statements where one sentence was an accurate statement of fact but the others were not, the paragraph has been rejected. Similarly, if one sentence was editorial comment, argument, or an unsupported statement to a statement of fact, the paragraph has been rejected. Proposed findings of fact should not include argument, editorial comments, or statements of fact mixed with such comments. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner, Mount Sinai: Paragraphs 1 through 13 were cited as stipulated facts. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 15 it is accepted that Miami Heart made the business decision to move the psychiatric beds beds from the north campus to the south campus. Any inference created by the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 17 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 21 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is rejected as repetitive, or immaterial, unnecessary to the resolution of the issues. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 28 is accepted but not relevant. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. Paragraphs 31 through 33 are rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 34 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 35 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant as the FNP was not in dispute. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 37 is rejected as repetitive, or comment. Paragraph 38 is rejected as repetitive, comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant. Paragraph 39 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41, 42, and 43 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence and/or argument. Paragraph 44 is rejected as argument and comment on the testimony. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument, irrelevant, and/or not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 46 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 47 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment, argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as comment on testimony. It is accepted that the proposed relocation or transfer of beds is a "not normal" circumstance. Paragraph 50 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 51 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 53 is rejected as argument, comment or recitation of testimony, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 54 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 55 is rejected as irrelevant, comment, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 56 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 57 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 58 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 59 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 60 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 61 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 62 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 63 is accepted. Paragraph 64 is rejected as irrelevant. Mount Sinai could have filed in this batch given the not normal circumstances disclosed in the Miami Heart notice. Paragraph 65 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 66 is rejected as comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 67 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 68 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 69 is rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 70 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Agency: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are accepted. With the deletion of the words "cardiac catheterization" and the inclusion of the word "psychiatric beds" in place, paragraph 7 is accepted. Cardiac catheterization is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 8 is accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or an error of law, otherwise, the paragraph is accepted. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraphs 11 through 17 are accepted. Paragraph 18 is rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20 are accepted. The first two sentences of paragraph 21 are accepted; the remainder rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 22 is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as argument, speculation, or irrelevant. Paragraph 25 is accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Miami Heart: Paragraphs 1 through 13 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 14 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to law or irrelevant since MS did not file in the batch when it could have. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted as the Agency's statement of its authority or policy in this case, not fact. Paragraphs 17 through 20 are accepted. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 23 through 35 are accepted. Paragraph 36 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 37 through 40 are accepted. Paragraph 41 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence to the extent that it concludes the distance to be one mile; evidence deemed credible placed the distance at two miles. Paragraphs 42 through 47 are accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment. Paragraphs 49 through 57 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 R. Terry Rigsby Geoffrey D. Smith Wendy Delvecchio Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 S. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lesley Mendelson Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road, Suite 301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4131 Stephen Ecenia Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the application of Petitioner, University Medical Park, for a certificate of need to construct a 130-bed acute care hospital in northern Hillsborough County, Florida should be approved. The factual issues are whether a need exists for the proposed facility under the Department's need rule and, if not, are there any special circumstances which would demonstrate the reasonableness and appropriateness of the application notwithstanding lack of need. The petitioner, while not agreeing with the methodology, conceded that under the DHRS rule as applied there is no need because there is an excess of acute care beds projected for 1989, the applicable planning horizon. The only real factual issue is whether there are any special circumstances which warrant issuance of a CON. The parties filed post-hearing findings of fact and conclusions of law by March 18, 1985, which were read and considered. Many of those proposals are incorporated in the following findings. As indicated some were irrelevant, however, those not included on pertinent issues were rejected because the more credible evidence precluded the proposed finding. Having heard the testimony and carefully considered the Proposed Findings of Fact, there is no evidence which would demonstrate the reasonableness and appropriateness of the application. It is recommended that the application be denied.
Findings Of Fact General Petitioner is a limited partnership composed almost entirely of physicians, including obstetricians/gynecologists (OB/GYN) and specialists providing ancillary care, who practice in the metropolitan Tampa area. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 103-104). Petitioner's managing general partner is Dr. Robert Withers, a doctor specializing in OB/GYN who has practiced in Hillsborough County for over thirty years. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 24- 26, 28-29.) Dr. Withers was a prime moving force in the founding, planning and development of University Community Hospital and Women's Hospital. (Tr. Vo1. 1, pp. 26-28, 73; Vol. 4, pp. 547-548.) Petitioner seeks to construct in DHRS District VI a specialty "women's" hospital providing obstetrical and gynecological services at the corner of 30th Street and Fletcher Avenue in northern Hillsborough County and having 130 acute care beds. 1/ (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 34, 74-75, Vol. 5, pp. 678-679, Northside Ex.-1, pp. 1-2, Ex.-4A.) The proposed hospital is to have 60 obstetrical, 66 gynecological and 4 intensive care beds. (Tr. Vol. 8, P. 1297, Northside Ex.-1 Table 17, Ex.-B.) DHRS District VI is composed of Hardy, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee and Polk counties. Each county is designated a subdistrict by the Local Health Council of District VI. Pasco County, immediately north of Hillsborough, is located in DHRS District V and is divided into two subdistricts, east Pasco and west Pasco. If built, Northside would be located in the immediate vicinity of University Community Hospital (UCH) in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. Less than 5 percent of the total surgical procedures at UCH are gynecologically related, and little or no nonsurgical gynecological procedures arc performed there. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 550.) There is no obstetrical practice at UCH, although it has the capacity to handle obstetric emergencies. The primary existing providers of obstetrical services to the metropolitan Tampa area are Tampa General Hospital (TGH) and Women's Hospital (Women's). (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 79, Northside Ex.-4, Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1074-1075.) TGH is a large public hospital located on Davis Islands near downtown Tampa. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 47-48, Vol. 8, pp. 1356, 1358.) TGH currently has a 35 bed obstetrical unit, but is currently expanding to 70 beds as part of a major renovation and expansion program scheduled for completion in late 1985. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1049, 1095, Vol. 8, pp. 1367-1368, Vol. 10, P. 1674, Northside Ex.- 2, P. 3.) In recent years, the overwhelming majority of Tampa General's admissions in obstetrics at TGH have been indigent patients. (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 61, Vol. 8, pp. 1375- 1379; Vol. 9, P. 1451; TGH Ex.-3.) Tampa General's internal records reflect that it had approximately 2,100 patient days of gynecological care compared with over 38,000 patient days in combined obstetrical care during a recent eleven month period. (TGH Ex.-3..) Women's is a 192 bed "specialty" hospital located in the west central portion of the City of Tampa near Tampa Stadium. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 63-64, 66-67; Vol. 10 P. 1564; Northside Ex.-4.) Women's Hospital serves primarily private-pay female patients. (Vol. 1, pp. 79, 88-89; Vol. 6, pp. 892-893.) Humana Brandon Hospital, which has a 16 bed obstetrics unit, and South Florida Baptist Hospital in Plant City, which has 12 obstetric beds, served eastern Hillsborough County. (Tr. Vol. 7, P. 1075; Northside Ex.-2, P. 3; Northside Ex.-4 and Tr. Vol. 1, P. 79; Northside Ex.-4.) There are two hospitals in eastern Pasco County, which is in DHRS District V. Humana Hospital, Pasco and East Pasco Medical Center, each of which has a six bed obstetric unit. Both hospitals are currently located in Dade City, but the East Pasco Medical Center will soon move to Zephyrhills and expand its obstetrics unit to nine beds. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 108- 109; Tr. Vol. 7, P. 1075; Vol. 8, pp. 1278-1281; Northside Ex.-4.) There are no hospitals in central Pasco County, DHRS District V. Residents of that area currently travel south to greater Tampa, or, to a lesser extent, go to Dade City for their medical services. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 266-267, 271-272; Vol. 7, p. 1038.) Bed Need There are currently 6,564 existing and CON approved acute care beds in DHRS District VI, compared with an overall bed need of 5,718 acute care beds. An excess of 846 beds exist in District VI in 1989, the year which is the planning horizon use by DHRS in determining bed need applicable to this application. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1046-1047, 1163, 1165-66; DHRS Ex.-1.) There is a net need for five acute care beds in DHRS District V according to the Department's methodology. (Tr. Yolk. 7, pp. 1066, 1165; DHRS Ex.-1.) The figures for District VI include Carrollwood Community Hospital which is an osteopathic facility which does not provide obstetrical services. (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 158; Vol. 7, p. 1138; Vol. 8, P. 1291.) However, these osteopathic beds are considered as meeting the total bed need when computing a11 opathic bed need. DHRS has not formally adopted the subdistrict designations of allocations as part of its rules. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1017-1017, 1019; Vol. 8, pp. 1176, 1187.) Consideration of the adoption of subdistricts by the Local Health Council is irrelevant to this application. 2/ Areas of Consideration in Addition to Bed Need Availability Availability is deemed the number of beds available. As set forth above, there is an excess of beds. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1192.) Tampa General Hospital and Humana Women's Hospital offer all of the OB related services which UMP proposes to offer in its application. These and a number of other hospitals to include UCH, offer all of the GYN related services proposed by Northside. University Community Hospital is located 300 yards away from the proposed site of Northside. UCH is fully equipped to perform virtually any kind of GYN/OB procedure. Humana and UCH take indigent patients only on an emergency basis, as would the proposed facility. GYN/OB services are accessible to all residents of Hillsborough County regardless of their ability to pay for such services at TGH. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1469; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1596; Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 582; Hyatt, TGH Exhibit 19, P. 21.) Utilization Utilization is impacted by the number of available beds and the number of days patients stay in the hospital. According to the most recent Local Health Council hospital utilization statistics, the acute care occupancy rate for 14 acute care hospitals in Hillsborough County for the most recent six months was 65 percent. This occupancy rate is based on licensed beds and does not include CON approved beds which are not yet on line. This occupancy rate is substantially below the optimal occupancies determined by DHRS in the Rule. (DHRS Exhibit 4; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1069.) Utilization of obstetric beds is higher than general acute care beds; however, the rules do not differentiate between general and obstetric beds. 3/ Five Hillsborough County hospitals, Humana Women's, St. Joseph's, Tampa General, Humana Brandon, and South Florida Baptist, offer obstetric services. The most recent Local Health Council utilization reports indicate that overall OB occupancy for these facilities was 82 percent for the past 6 months. However, these computations do not include the 35 C0N-approved beds which will soon be available at Tampa General Hospital. (DHRS Exhibit 4). There will be a substantial excess of acute care beds to include OB beds in Hillsborough County for the foreseeable future. (Baehr, Tr.w Vol. X, pp. 1568, 1594, 1597.) The substantial excess of beds projected will result in lower utilization. In addition to excess beds, utilization is lowered by shorter hospital stays by patients. The nationwide average length of stay has been reduced by almost two days for Medicare patients and one day for all other patients due to a variety of contributing circumstances. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1192; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1102; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1583-84; etc.) This dramatic decline in length of hospital stay is the result of many influences, the most prominent among which are: (1) a change in Medicare reimbursement to a system which rewards prompt discharges of patients and penalizes overutilization ("DGRs"), (2) the adaptation by private payers (insurance companies, etc.) of Medicare type reimbursement, (3) the growing availability and acceptance of alternatives to hospitalization such as ambulatory surgical centers, labor/delivery/recovery suites, etc. and (4) the growing popularity of health care insurance/delivery mechanisms such as health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), and similar entities which offer direct or indirect financial incentives for avoiding or reducing hospital utilization. The trend toward declining hospital utilization will continue. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1192-98; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1584-86; etc.) There has been a significant and progressive decrease in hospital stays for obstetrics over the last five years. During this time, a typical average length of stay has been reduced from three days to two and, in some instances, one day. In addition, there is a growing trend towards facilities (such as LDRs) which provide obstetrics on virtually an outpatient basis. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1456; Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 644.) The average length of stay for GYN procedures is also decreasing. In addition, high percentage of GYN procedures are now being performed on an outpatient, as opposed to inpatient, basis. (Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 644, etc.) The reduction in hospital stays and excess of acute care beds will lower utilization of acute care hospitals, including their OB components, enough to offset the projected population growth in Hillsborough County. The hospitals in District VI will not achieve the optimal occupancy rates for acute care beds or OB beds in particular by 1989. The 130 additional beds proposed by UMP would lower utilization further. (Paragraphs 7, 14, and 18 above; DHRS Exhibit 1, Humana Exhibit 1.) Geographic Accessibility Ninety percent of the population of Hillsborough County is within 30 minutes of an acute care hospital offering, at least, OB emergency services. TGH 20, overlay 6, shows that essentially all persons living in Hillsborough County are within 30 minutes normal driving time not only to an existing, acute care hospital, but a hospital offering OB services. Petitioner's service area is alleged to include central Pasco County. Although Pasco County is in District V, to the extent the proposed facility might serve central Pasco County, from a planning standpoint it is preferable to have that population in central Paso served by expansion of facilities closer to them. Hospitals in Tampa will become increasingly less accessible with increases in traffic volume over the years. The proposed location of the UMP hospital is across the street from an existing acute care hospital, University Community Hospital ("UCH"). (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 542.) Geographic accessibility is the same to the proposed UMP hospital and UCH. (Smith, Tr. Vol. III, P. 350; Wentzel, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 486; Peters, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1532.) UCH provides gynecological services but does not provide obstetrical services. However, UCH is capable of delivering babies in emergencies. (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 563.) The gynecological services and OB capabilities at UCH are located at essentially the same location as Northside's proposed site. Geographic accessibility of OB/GYN services is not enhanced by UMP's proposed 66 medical-surgical beds. The accessibility of acute care beds, which under the rule are all that is considered, is essentially the same for UCH as for the proposed facility. As to geographic accessibility, the residents of Hillsborough and Pasco Counties now have reasonable access to acute care services, including OB services. The UMP project would not increase accessibility to these services by any significant decrease. C. Economic Accessibility Petitioner offered no competent, credible evidence that it would expand services to underserved portions of the community. Demographer Smith did not study income levels or socioeconomic data for the UMP service area. (Smith, TR. Vol. III, pp. 388, 389.) However, Mr. Margolis testified that 24 percent of Tampa General's OB patients, at least 90 percent of who are indigents, came from the UMP service area. (Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) The patients proposed to be served at the Northside Hospital are not different than those already served in the community. (Withers, Tr. Vol. II, P. 344.) As a result, Northside Hospital would not increase the number of underserved patients. Availability of Health Care Alternative An increasing number of GYN procedures are being performed by hospitals on an outpatient basis and in freestanding ambulatory-surgical centers. An ambulatory-surgical center is already in operation at a location which is near the proposed UMP site. In fact, Dr. Hyatt, a UMP general partner, currently performs GYN procedures at that surgical center. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 150; Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 644, 646. Ambulatory surgical centers, birthing centers and similar alternative delivery systems offer alternatives to the proposed facility. Existing hospitals are moving to supply such alternatives which, with the excess beds and lower utilization, arc more than adequate to preclude the need for the UMP proposal. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1204, 1205, 1206; Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1453, 1469; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1154; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1151, 1154.) Need for Special Equipment & Services DHRS does not consider obstetrics or gynecology to be "special services" for purposes of Section 381.494(6)(c)6, Florida Statutes. In addition, the services proposed by UMP are already available in Hillsborough and Pasco Counties. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1162, 1210.) Need for Research & Educational Facilities USF currently uses Tampa General as a training facility for its OB residents. TCH offered evidence that the new OB facilities being constructed at Tampa General were designed with assistance from USF and were funded by the Florida Legislature, in part, as an educational facility. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1391; Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1453-1455.) The educational objectives of USF for OB residents at Tampa General are undermined by a disproportionately high indigent load. Residents need a cross section of patients. The UMP project will further detract from a well rounded OB residency program at Tampa General by causing Tampa General's OB Patient mix to remain unbalanced. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1458; Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) UMP offered no evidence of arrangements to further medical research or educational needs in the community. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1213. UMP's proposed facility will not contribute to research and education in District VI. Availability of Resources Management UMP will not manage its hospital. It has not secured a management contract nor entered into any type of arrangement to insure that its proposed facility will be managed by knowledgeable and competent personnel. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, p. 142.) However, there is no alleged or demonstrated shortage of management personnel available. Availability of Funds For Capital and Operating Expenditures The matter of capital funding was a "de novo issue," i.e., evidence was presented which was in addition to different from its application. In its application, Northside stated that its project will be funded through 100 percent debt. Its principal general partner, Dr. Withers, states that this "figure is not correct." However, neither Dr. Withers nor any other Northside witness ever identified the percentage of the project, if any, which is to be funded through equity contributions except the property upon which it would be located. (UMP Exhibit 1, p. 26; Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 134.) The UMP application contained a letter from Landmark Bank of Tampa which indicates an interest on the part of that institution in providing funding to Northside in the event that its application is approved. This one and one half year year old letter falls short of a binding commitment on the part of Landmark Bank to lend UMP the necessary funds to complete and operate its project and is stale. Dr. Withers admitted that Northside had no firm commitment as of the date of the hearing to finance its facility, or any commitment to provide 1196 financing as stated in its application. (UMP Exhibit I/Exhibit Dr. Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 138.) Contribution to Education No evidence was introduced to support the assertion in the application of teaching research interaction between UMP and USF. USF presented evidence that no such interaction would occur. (Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1329.) The duplication of services and competition for patients and staff created by UMP's facility would adversely impact the health professional training programs of USF, the state's primary representative of health professional training programs in District VI. (Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1314-19; 1322-24; 1331-1336.) Financial Feasibility The pro forma statement of income and expenses for the first two years of operation (1987 and 1988) contained in the UMP application projects a small operating loss during the first year and a substantial profit by the end of the second year. These pro formas are predicated on the assumption that the facility will achieve a utilization rate of 61 percent in Year 1 and 78 percent in its second year. To achieve these projected utilization levels, Northside would have to capture a market share of 75-80 percent of all OB patient days and over 75% of all GYN patient days generated by females in its service area. (UMP, Exhibit 1; Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 145, Dacus; Tr. Vol. V, P. 750-755.) These projected market shares and resulting utilization levels are very optimistic. It is unlikely that Northside could achieve these market shares simply by making its services available to the public. More reasonable utilization assumptions for purposes of projecting financial feasibility would be 40-50 percent during the first year and 65 percent in the second year. (Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1700; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1578, 1579, 1601.) UMP omitted the cost of the land on which its facility is to be constructed from its total project cost and thus understates the income necessary to sustain its project. Dr. Withers stated the purchase price of this land was approximately $1.5 million and it has a current market value in excess of $5 million. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 139, 140.) Dr. Withers admitted that the purchase price of the land would be included in formulating patient charges. As a matter of DHRS interpretation, the cost of land should be included as part of the capital cost of the project even if donated or leased and, as such, should be added into the pro formas. UMP's financial expert, Barbara Turner, testified that she would normally include land costs in determining financial feasibility of a project, otherwise total project costs would be understated (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 141; Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1215, 1216; Turner, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1714.) In addition, the pro formas failed to include any amount for management expenses associated with the new facility. Dr. Withers admitted UMP does not intend to manage Northside and he anticipates that the management fee would be considerably higher than the $75,000 in administrator salaries included in the application. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 143, 144.) Barbara Turner, UMP's financial expert, conceded that the reasonableness of the percent UMP pro formas is predicated on the reasonableness of its projected market share and concomitant utilization assumptions. These projections are rejected as being inconsistent with evidence presented by more credible witnesses. The UMP project, as stated in its application or as presented at hearing, is not financially feasible on the assumption Petitioner projected. VIII. Impact on Existing Facilities Approval of the UMP application would result in a harmful impact on the costs of providing OB/GYN services at existing facilities. The new facility would be utilized by patients who would otherwise utilize existing facilities, hospitals would be serving fewer patients than they are now. This would necessarily increase capital and operating costs on a per patient basis which, in turn, would necessitate increases in patient charges. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1217-1219; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1587.) Existing facilities are operating below optimal occupancy levels. See DHRS Exhibit 4. The Northside project would have an adverse financial impact on Humana, Tampa General Hospital, and other facilities regardless of whether Northside actually makes a profit. See next subheading below. The Northside project would draw away a substantial number of potential private-pay patients from TGH. Residents of the proposed Northside service area constitute approximately 24 percent of the total number of OB patients served by TGH. The Northside project poses a threat to TGH's plans to increase its non- indigent OB patient mix which is the key to its plans to provide a quality, competitive OB service to the residents of Hillsborough County. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VIII, P. 1225; Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) Impact Upon Costs and Competition Competition via a new entrant in a health care market can be good or bad in terms of both the costs and the quality of care rendered, depending on the existing availability of competition in that market at the time. Competition has a positive effect when the market is not being adequately or efficiently served. In a situation where adequate and efficient service exists, competition can have an adverse impact on costs and on quality because a new facility is simply adding expense to the system without a concomitant benefit. (Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, p. 1650.) Competition among hospitals in Hillsborough County is now "intense and accelerating." (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 558.) Tampa General is at a competitive disadvantage because of its indigent case load and its inability to offer equity interests to physicians in its hospital. (Blair, Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 945, 947-948); Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1405.) Tampa General Hospital is intensifying its marketing effort, a physician office building under construction now at Tampa General is an illustration of Tampa General's effort to compete for private physicians and patients. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1405-1406.) The whole thrust of Tampa General's construction program is to increase its ability to compete for physicians. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1224; Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, p. 1442.) The Tampa General construction will create new competition for physicians and patients. (Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, p. 1099.) Patients go to hospitals where their doctors practice, therefore, hospitals generally compete for physicians. (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 563; Blair, Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 898, 928.) Because many of the UMP partners are obstetricians who plan to use Northside exclusively, approval of the Northside project would lessen competition. (Popp, TGH Exhibit 18, P. 11.) It is feasible for Tampa General to attract more private pay OB patients. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460- 1461.) At its recently opened rehabilitation center, Tampa General has attracted more private pay patients. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1393-1396.) USF OB residents at Tampa General are planning to practice at Tampa General. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460-1461.) The state-of-the-art labor, delivery, recovery room to be used at Tampa General will be an attractive alternative to OB patients. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460- 1461); Popp, TGH Exhibit 18, p.26) IX. Capital Expenditure Proposals The proposed Northside hospital will not offer any service not now available in Tampa. (Hyatt, TGH Exhibit 19, p. 21).
Recommendation Petitioner having failed to prove the need for additional acute care beds to include OB beds or some special circumstance which would warrant approval of the proposed project, it is recommended that its application for a CON be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1985.
The Issue Each of the petitioners disputes respondent's contention that Port St. Lucie and vicinity do not need hospital beds beyond the number that might practicably be added to Martin's Stuart facility and HCA's Lawnwood Medical Center in Ft. Pierce. The petitioners agree that a need for hospital beds in or near Port St. Lucie exists and each petitioner takes the position that it can best meet the need. As to which of the petitioners might best meet a need it does not concede to exist, respondent takes no position.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that a "population explosion" is taking place in Port St. Lucie and environs. The town was developed by General Development Corporation; 75,000 residential lots were offered for sale and 90 percent have been sold. At the time of the hearing, Port St. Lucie's population was approximately 14,000 to 16,000 persons, even though only some seven or eight thousand residential lots had been built on. In addition, approximately 10,000 persons reside in developments contiguous to Port St. Lucie. The population of Port St. Lucie may increase several fold in the next ten or fifteen years. While the population in other parts of Martin and St. Lucie Counties is also expected to grow, the greatest increase in population in the area is anticipated in Port St. Lucie and its immediate vicinity. Already Port St. Lucie's population is greater than the population was in Stuart when a hospital was first built in that community and than the population was in Ft. Pierce when a hospital was originally built in that community. ACCESSIBILITY Port St. Lucie lies in south St. Lucie County more or less equidistant from Ft. Pierce to the north and Stuart, county seat of Martin County, to the south. Most residents of Port St. Lucie live ten miles or more from a hospital. The nearest hospitals are in Ft. Pierce and Stuart, which each have a single hospital. PATIENTS AND VISITORS St. Lucie County Fire Districts provide emergency services to residents of Port St. Lucie and vicinity. Time that emergency personnel and vehicles spend transporting patients to hospitals is time they are unavailable to respond to other emergency calls. Under favorable traffic conditions, it takes 20 to 30 minutes to drive from Port St. Lucie to either of the hospitals nearby. Road building in St. Lucie County is not expected to keep pace with increasing population in the near term; traffic is likely to become more congested in the next few months and years. (Testimony of Commissioner Enns.) There is no public transportation in the area. A railroad track crosses the highways connecting Port St. Lucie and Ft. Pierce's Lawnwood Medical Center. In a typical 24-hour period, trains using this track block U.S. Highway 1 for six minutes. Traveling from Port St. Lucie to Martin's hospital in Stuart, a somewhat shorter distance, requires crossing more than one railroad track as well as a drawbridge which, earlier this year, was stuck open stopping automobile traffic for an hour and a half. In the summer of 1979, a patient on route from Port St. Lucie to Stuart died in an ambulance stopped at a railroad track. PHYSICIANS In 1972, Bernard Daniel Ross, an internist, was the only physician in Port St. Lucie. At the time of the hearing, approximately 30 doctors had offices in Port St. Lucie, some of whom also had offices in Ft. Pierce. Dr. Ross makes up to three round trips daily between his office and Lawnwood Medical Center, which are ten miles apart. Dr. Asuncion Luyoa, a general practitioner who has lived in Port St. Lucie for three years, seas ten to fifteen new patients a day. She also makes frequent trips to the hospital. Dr. John B. Sullivan, who has staff privileges at Lawnwood Medical Center and who has practiced in St. Lucie County for 16 years, opened an office in Port St. Lucie a little more than two years ago. UTILIZATION OF EXISTING HOSPITALS St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties comprise Florida Health Service Area Region VII, the jurisdiction of Health Planning Council, Inc., (HPC), the local health systems agency. For the most part, residents of each county use hospital facilities in their own county. Lawnwood Medical Center served 12.3 percent of Okeechobee County residents needing hospitalization, 1.9 percent of Indian River County residents needing hospitalization, and 1.3 percent of Martin County residents needing hospitalization. The bulk of its patients came from St. Lucie County; of St. Lucie County residents needing hospitalization, 71 percent were hospitalized at Lawnwood. Ninety percent of Martin County residents needing hospitalization and 15.8 percent of St. Lucie County residents needing hospitalization were hospitalized at Martin's Stuart facility. Most of the remaining St. Lucie County residents needing hospitalization, 10.8 percent, went to Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach. At the time of the hearing, more than 90 percent of the 225 hospital beds at Lawnwood Medical Center were occupied. Twenty-four authorized beds at Lawnwood Medical Center were in fact unavailable until the latter part of 1979 when 18 were opened; the final six beds (in the intensive care unit) were opened in late December of 1980. Even so, the occupancy rate at Lawnwood Medical Center, as a percentage of 225 beds, was 70.5 for 1979. The overall occupancy rate for 1980, as a percentage of 225 beds, was 79.9. In 1980, monthly occupancy rates, as a percentage of 225 beds, were 80.2 for January, 79.7 for February, 81.1 for March, 81.8 for April, 75.7 for May, 72.7 for June, 78.6 for July, 81.1 for August, 80.9 for September, 87.3 for October, 76.9 for November, and 82.3 for December. Except for 20 obstetric, 15 pediatric, and 18 intensive or coronary care unit beds, all of the beds at Lawnwood Medical Center are medical or surgical. The overall 1980 occupancy rate for medical and surgical beds was 83 percent. At the time of the hearing, eight obstetric beds, four pediatric beds, four beds in the intensive care unit, and four medical/surgical beds were unoccupied at Lawnwood Medical Center. Not all medical/surgical beds can always be occupied; men and women patients are segregated and patients with respiratory diseases, among others, require isolation. On one day in January of this year, admission of 13 patients had to be delayed. These patients were put on a waiting list for elective surgery, which, in some instances, was postponed three or four weeks. Martin's Stuart hospital has expanded five times in recent years (1960, 1963, 1970, 1976, and 1978-1979) and a sixth expansion to add 50 beds is now in progress. On January 15, 1979, when the last expansion was completed, 50 beds were opened to the public. They were filled within 24 hours. When the expansion now under way is accomplished, the Stuart hospital will have 302 beds. Martin "defines emergency bed status as. . .five or less medical/surgical beds available. . .mean[ing] that the hospital medical/surgical beds are at least 97.5 percent occupied." Martin's application, p. 30. During the period of January, 1979, through March, 1979, Martin's hospital in Stuart was on "emergency bed status" 16.7 percent of the time. During the same period in 1980, the hospital was on "emergency bed status" 45 percent of the time. A waiting list of up to 60 patients is not uncommon in the winter season. Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach, 25 miles north of Lawnwood Medical Center, had 99 percent of its 216 available beds occupied in mid-January of this year. According to John Hoyt, executive director of Indian River Memorial Hospital, an occupancy rate as high as 90 percent suggests that pediatric and obstetric beds were pressed into service for medical and/or surgical patients. For the year ending September 30, 1980, the overall occupancy rate averaged 83 percent. The monthly occupancy rates for the calendar year 1980 were 89.9 for January, 90.1 for February, 90.8 for March, 83.9 for April, 78.8 for May, 79.3 for June, 77.1 for July, 79.0 for August, 86.0 for September, 88.0 for October, 84 for November, and 82.0 for December. Indian River Memorial Hospital plans to open another 24 beds in March of 1981, but does not anticipate having the ability to provide service for people in Port St. Lucie and vicinity. Only a few patients from southern St. Lucie County have been admitted to Indian River Memorial Hospital, which is more than 30 miles and some 45 minutes away. In the opinion of Mr. Hoyt, any patients Indian River Memorial Hospital might lose to an expanded Lawnwood Medical Center or to a new facility in Port St. Lucie would be more than offset by patients from the growing population in Vero Beach and vicinity. HEALTH SYSTEMS PLAN The HPC has adopted an amended health systems plan 1980-1984, which includes the following goals and objectives: Health Systems Goal The number of acute care hospital beds should be no more than four (4) licensed beds per 1,000 population in HSA Region #7. Application of this goal throughout the area should take into consideration the following factors: Changes in patient origin patterns; Age differences within a hospital primary service area; Emergency Scheduling; Geographic isolations (95 percent of population not within 30 minutes of services), economic efficiency and quality assurance. Long-Range Objectives For the next four (4) years, any net increases in licensed acute care general hospital beds should be limited to the expansion of medical/surgical beds. In order to meet the projected need for medical/surgical beds, a reallocation of existing beds from pediatric, obstetrical, ICU, CCU, monitored and intermediate care will have to take place. For the next four (4) years, existing hospitals should be encouraged to expand in order to meet the projected demand for services in their primary service area either through expansion of the main facility or satellite outpatient facilities. Health Systems Goal Region-wide (HSA #7), the overall average annual occupancy rate for acute care general hospital licensed beds should equal 75 percent. Long-Range Objectives By 1984, the region-wide annual occupancy rate for licensed acute care hospital beds should increase to 75 percent. By 1984, the region-wide annual occupancy rate for each of the following bed categories should be as follows: Medical/Surgical 75 percent Obstetrical 65 percent Pediatric 65 percent ICU, CCU, Monitored & Intermediate Care 80 percent By 1984, any hospital with less than 50 percent annual occupancy rate should be consolidated with other hospitals in the same service area as defined by the Health Planning Council. By 1982, all hospitals should have developed a five-year plan that contains the following: Statement of Purpose; Description of Present Facilities and Programs; Statement of Goals; Proposed Major Programs and Resources Necessary to Reach Goal. Health Systems Goal Average daily service charge for all acute care hospitals in HSA Region #7 should not increase at a rate greater than 1 1/2 times the annual cost-of-living increase. Long-Range Objectives By 1981, information should be made available to the community on gross patient revenues and total cost of hospital services within HRS #7 for the purpose of monitoring the goal. By 1982, at least six (6) presently existing acute care hospitals in HSA Region #7 should establish cooperative arrangements for the provision of specialized services. BED NEED PROJECTIONS According to the preliminary 1980 census figures, St. Lucie County had a population of 86,969 and Martin County had a population of 62,979. Joint Exhibit No. 1. The Bureau of Economic and Business Research of the University of Florida projects populations for St. Lucie County of 89,500 for 1981; 92,300 for 1982; 95,700 for 1983; 99,100 for 1984; and 102,500 for 1985. Joint Exhibit No. 1 (medium projections). The Bureau of Economic and Business Research of the University of Florida projects populations for Martin County of 62,100 for 1981; 64,600 for 1982; 67,600 for 1983; 70,600 for 1984; and 73,600 for 1985. Joint Exhibit No. 1 (medium projections). The Martin County projections presumably require revision upward in light of the 1980 census results. Preliminary 1980 census figures put the population of Okeechobee County at 20,324, and the population of Indian River County at 57,217. Joint Exhibit No. 1. The Bureau of Economic and Business Research projects 1984 populations of 23,700 for Okeechobee County and 67,300 for Indian River County. Joint Exhibit No. 1 (medium projections). The 1980 population of Palm Beach County is on the order of 594,900 and is projected to rise to 684,400 by 1984. Joint Exhibit No. 1 (medium projections). As of December 31, 1980, Palm Beach County had 2,654 licensed and approved acute care hospital beds; Okeechobee County had 75; and Indian River County had 343. HCA's Exhibit No. 1. The 302 beds authorized for Martin's hospital in Stuart were the only acute care hospital beds licensed or approved in Martin County as of the time of the hearing. All 225 beds approved for St. Lucie County were open at Ft. Pierce's Lawnwood Medical Center, at the time of the hearing. The ratio of hospital beds to population is lower in Region VII than in any other health service area in Florida. Although the amended health systems plan 1980-1984 specifies four hospital beds per 1,000 population, the HPC sometimes applies a rule of thumb designed to reflect the additional need for hospital beds in an area which has a larger component of elderly persons than the national average and which has seasonal swings in population. Under this rule of thumb, 1,055 patient days in hospitals are assumed for each 1,000 persons annually, along with the 75 percent average utilization rate for hospital beds. But applying this rule of thumb actually results in lower bed need projections than using the four beds per 1,000 population criterion which is used throughout the nation for populations without unusually high numbers of older persons and which do not fluctuate seasonally. As compared to four per 1,000, 1,055/365 X 100/75 yields 3.85+ beds per 1,000 population. Using the four bed per 1,000 approach, based on the medium population projections forecast by the University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research, Indian River County will require 269 hospital beds by 1984; Okeechobee County will require 95 hospital beds by 1984; Palm Beach County will require 2,738 beds by 1984; Martin County will require 282 beds by 1984; and St. Lucie County will require 396 beds by 1984. HCA Exhibit No. 1. Using the same four bed per 1,000 population formula, a region-wide deficit of 181 beds is forecast for 1984. HCA Exhibit No. 1. On the average, elderly people require more hospitalization than younger people require. The population of south St. Lucie County has a large component of elderly persons. Most of Port St. Lucie's residents are retirees. According to one estimate, 28 percent of the population of St. Lucie County residing south of Midway Road is older than 65. In Indian River, Okeechobee, Martin, and St. Lucie Counties, as a group, the proportion of persons over 65 to the whole population is higher than the national average. Approximately 29 percent of the population of Martin County is over 65. For Port St. Lucie and vicinity, hospital bed needs should be projected at four beds per 1,000 residents, at a minimum. On this basis, if no new beds are opened in Martin and St. Lucie Counties beyond those already certificated, and if the medium population projections are correct, there will be a deficit in the two-county area of 151 general acute care hospital beds by 1984, assuming residents of the area choose hospital care in the area. HCA Exhibit No. 1. In evaluating the need for hospital beds for residents of Port St. Lucie, Martin and St. Lucie Counties are the logical primary service area, instead of the four-county region that respondent used, which included Okeechobee and Indian River Counties, in addition to Martin and St. Lucie Counties. Less than ten percent of the residents of Martin and St. Lucie Counties requiring hospitalization leave the two-county area to be hospitalized. Palm Beach County is properly excluded and no party contends otherwise. Indian River and Okeechobee Counties should be excluded for the same reasons that Palm Beach County should be excluded. The distance from Indian River Memorial Hospital to Port St. Lucie is approximately the same as the distance from Port St. Lucie to the nearest hospital in Palm Beach County. Sebastian River Medical Center, the only other hospital in Indian River County, and Raulerson Hospital in Okeechobee County are further from Port St. Lucie than at least one and possibly two hospitals in northern Palm Beach County. No hospital could open its doors in Port St. Lucie until well into 1982, even if approved today. On the basis of four beds per 1,000 population, assuming that the medium population projections of the University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research are accurate, and assuming that Martin's expansion of its Stuart facility is accomplished this year, St. Lucie and Martin Counties will have a hospital bed deficit of 79 in 1981; 100 in 1982; 126 in 1983; and 177 in 1985. NEW CONSTRUCTION v. EXPANSION Martin has no plans to expand its Stuart facility beyond the 302 beds for which it has already obtained certificates of need. The final 50-bed expansion now going on will utilize the hospital's ancillary services facilities fully, and fill up all available parking areas. Any further expansion would require building a new, seventh floor without interrupting the operation of the hospital; and would necessitate construction of a multi-story parking garage at a cost of $4,200 per space. Adding 50 beds to its Stuart hospital would, moreover, require 28,000 square feet of new floor space and renovation of 2,000 additional square feet in order to house necessary ancillary facilities, all at a total projected cost of $10,556,001. Martin's Exhibit No. 1. Martin projects the cost of a 50-bed complex it proposes for Port St. Lucie at $9,768,001. Martin's Exhibit No. 1. The only other hospital that could be expanded to meet the needs of the burgeoning Port St. Lucie population is Lawnwood Medical Center, owned by HCA. Lawnwood Medical Center was designed and built with a view toward expansion, ultimately to more than 300 beds. HCA's employees project a need in 1984 for enough beds at Lawnwood Medical Center, over and above the 75 beds HCA proposes for Port St. Lucie, to justify an expansion of Lawnwood Medical Center in the near future. HCA personnel testified to plans to apply, within a year, for a certificate of need authorizing expansion of Lawnwood Medical Center by an unspecified number of beds. Adding to a hospital takes more time than constructing equivalent facilities from the ground up. Each department of the hospital must continue its work, even if delays in construction result. A 75-bed expansion of Lawnwood Medical Center would take 18 to 20 months, HCA's architect estimates, as opposed to the 12 to 14 months the same architect estimated would be necessary to build a new 75-bed hospital in Port St. Lucie. In general, larger hospitals require more floor area per bed than smaller hospitals require. Construction costs of adding 75 beds to Lawnwood Medical Center would be greater than the costs of constructing the 75-bed hospital HCA proposes for Port St. Lucie, but acquiring land for a new hospital would cost $500,000, which, when added to construction costs, would make a 75-bed new hospital more expensive than a 75-bed addition to Lawnwood Medical Center, by some 139,219 in 1980 dollars, a per-bed differential of 1,856 in 1980 dollars. HCA's Exhibit No. 4. Because the space available for ancillary services in Lawnwood Medical Center is such that a 50-bed expansion can more readily be accommodated than an expansion half again as large (which would involve an additional floor of the hospital outside any "shelled in" area) it would cost less to add 50 beds to Lawnwood Medical Center than to construct a new 50-bed hospital. Both Martin's Stuart facility and HCA's Lawnwood Medical Canter have costly specialized equipment which could not economically be duplicated at a new facility in Port St. Lucie. A new oncology center, for example, is planned for Lawnwood Medical Center at a cost of approximately $2,000,000. In order to use these specialized facilities, specimens and patients would have to be transported either to Stuart or to Ft. Pierce, and overnight stays would sometimes be required of patients. At least 80 percent of the patients at a new facility in Port St. Lucie would not require specialized services unavailable in Port St. Lucie, however. OSTEOPATHY ON THE TREASURE COAST The American Osteopathic Association has a membership of some 16,000 osteopathic physicians. Osteopaths practice in every state in the country, but 70 percent of them live in 15 states. The profession developed in Missouri, where it is now well established. Significant numbers of osteopathic physicians also live in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, and, increasingly, Florida and California. At the time of the hearing, there were no osteopaths resident in St. Lucie County, and none maintained an office there. Outside of Palm Beach County, only seven osteopaths lived in HSA Region VII. No osteopath had applied for staff privileges at Lawnwood Medical Center or its predecessor since January 1, 1967. Under the by-laws of Lawnwood Medical Center, dental surgeons, podiatrists, and osteopaths, as well as allopathic physicians, are eligible for admitting privileges, but only if the practitioner resides in St. Lucie County and has an office in St. Lucie County. More than one osteopath has applied for admitting privileges at the hospital in Stuart, but none has been granted such privileges. Martin's Stuart facility's by-laws require two years' post-graduate education, for medical and osteopathic graduates alike, as a prerequisite to admitting privileges. Although neutral in form, this requirement is a barrier to most osteopaths, who typically complete one year of post-graduate education before entering general practice. One osteopath, a diplomate of the American Medical Association's Board of Family Practice with two years' education beyond osteopathy school was denied admitting privileges because his character did not measure up to Martin's credentials committee's standards, or so they stated. Many of the medical graduates on staff at the hospital in Stuart had only a single year of post- graduate training, but they were grandfathered in when the two years' requirement was adopted in the late 1970s. The hospital in Stuart does employ an osteopath on its emergency room staff, but he does not have admitting privileges at the hospital. Bruce C. Equi, an osteopathic physician, has an office in Stuart and 2,500 to 3,000 patients in the area. In 1979, he sent 300 patients to the Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches 45 miles away, where he has full staff privileges. A round trip from his office to visit a single hospital patient consumes two and a half hours. Loren Shefter, an osteopath whose office is in Port Salerno, Martin County, traveled an average of 160 miles a day the week before the final hearing, partly because he lives 28 miles from his office, but partly because his office is 40 miles from the Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches, the only hospital at which Dr. Shefter has admitting privileges. He is responsible for the care of about 3,000 families. After practicing in Miami for 20 years, Arthur A. Lodato, another osteopath, opened an office in Palm City just west of Stuart. Dr. Lodato has seen about 900 patients in his Martin County office. If a patient is hospitalized under Dr. Lodato's care, it is in Miami, where he still practices half-time. Dr. Textor in Jupiter, Florida, has six osteopathic patients from Martin and St. Lucie Counties. Upon admission to an osteopathic hospital, a "structural chart" is prepared for each patient. Depending on the results, certain "modalities of manipulative treatment" may be administered. Otherwise, the practice of osteopathic medicine resembles the practice of medicine by medical graduates; there are osteopathic radiologists, osteopathic pediatricians and so forth, but most osteopaths do not specialize. The Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine, the 15th such college in the United States, was chartered in 1979 and is located in Miami, where the first class is to matriculate in the fall of this year. Beginning In the fall of 1981, the plan is, students will leave the campus for the "clinical phase" of their education, which will take place in an osteopathic hospital. If there is an osteopathic hospital in Port St. Lucie by that time, and if it meets the College's standards, such students, as well as interns and residents, might work under the supervision of the hospital staff as part of their training. The opening of an osteopathic hospital would probably attract osteopathic physicians. There were 15 osteopaths in Palm Beach County when the Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches was originally planned. When it opened in 1975, there were 35, and now there are 65 osteopathic physicians in the area. APPLICATIONS REVIEWED HPC board members resident in counties other than Palm Beach County constitute the Indian River Area Committee, which considered all three of the applications at issue in the present proceedings. The Indian River Area Committee voted in favor of HCA's application (by a two-to-one margin), and voted disapproval of both StLHC's and Martin's applications to build a new facility in Port St. Lucie. Subsequently, the HRC recommended against HCA's application and against the StLHC application; and made no recommendation on Martin's proposal. Respondent's Office of Community Health Facilities then turned down all three applications, on grounds that there was no need for additional beds, that existing hospitals were under utilized, that a new facility would be inconsistent with the "objective of expanding existing facilities or use of primary satellite facilities," and, in the case of StLHC's application, that no lack of osteopathic facilities had been documented. THE APPLICANTS' PROPOSALS Martin would build a 50-bed inpatient facility, an ambulatory care center, and a physicians' office building in Port St. Lucie, at a total projected cost of $11,708,255. HCA would build a 75-bed hospital with emergency room facilities that would be the functional equivalent of Martin's proposed ambulatory care center, at a total projected cost of $ 8,357,848. A related company might build a physicians' office building nearby. StLHC would build a 125-bed hospital, with emergency room facilities that would be the functional equivalent of Martin's proposed ambulatory care center, at a total projected cost of $11,700,000. At the hearing, StLHC indicated a willingness to scale down its proposal. StLHC relies for financing (as a backup for unspecified primary financing) on a letter (typed on stationery without any letterhead) from an individual, one Joseph Iozia, dated September 17, 1980, addressed to Bruce Equi, M.D. [sic], stating: Please be informed that a mortgage loan of $18,000,000 has [been] set aside for the building of the St. Lucie Hospital in Stuart [sic], Florida. StLHC has given nothing as consideration for this supposed commitment to lend $18,000,000 at an unspecified interest rate at an unspecified time for an unspecified term. Martin has substantial assets, mainly in the form of the hospital in Stuart. It proposes to finance the satellite medical complex it plans for Port St. Lucie by issuing parity bonds; additional indebtedness would be secured by the same property that serves as collateral for an already outstanding bond issue, says Martin. But the existing indenture between Martin and its bondholders provides in part: Section 11.02 Parity Bonds. Additional Bonds may be issued on a parity and equality of rank with any Outstanding Bonds with respect to the security afforded by this Indenture, under the following conditions, but not otherwise: without regard to the requirement of subsection (c) of this section, not exceeding $750,000 for the purpose of completing the Project; without regard to the requirements of subsection (c) of this section, for the purpose of refunding any Outstanding Bonds which shall have matured or which shall mature not later than three months after the date of delivery of such additional Bonds and for the payment of which there shall be insufficient money in the Principal and Interest Fund, the Bond Redemption Fund and the Bond Reserve Fund; for the purpose of refunding any Outstanding Bonds or extending, improving, equipping or replacing the Hospital, including expenses of issuing such Bonds interest during any construction period and additional amounts to be deposited in the Bond Reserve Fund, if all of the following conditions shall have been met: either (A) the average annual Net Revenues for the two Fiscal Years immediately preceding the issuance of such additional Bonds, as evidenced by the annual audit required by Section 9.04(b) hereof, must have been equal to at least 1.20 times Maximum Annual Principal and Interest Requirements including the requirements of the additional Bonds; or (B) the average annual Net Revenues for the two Fiscal Years immediately preceding the issuance of such additional Bonds as evidenced by the annual audit required by Section 9.04(b) hereof, must have been equal to at least 1.10 times the average Annual Principal and Interest Requirements for such years; and the Net Revenues, as estimated in writing by a Hospital Consultant, for each of the two completed Fiscal Years next succeeding the date of completion, as estimated in writing by the Corporation's independent architect, of the improvements, extensions or replacements financed by the additional Bonds, will be not less than 1.25 times Maximum Annual Principal and Interest Requirements, including the requirements of the additional Bonds; the Corporation shall not be in default hereunder and the payments required by Section 6.01 hereof to be made into the various funds therein provided must be current; there shall be on deposit in the Bond Reserve Fund an amount equal to not less than Maximum Annual Principal and Interest Requirements, including the requirements for such additional Bonds; . . . For purposes of Section 11.02(c) of the indenture, "Hospital" is defined in Section 1.01 of the indenture to mean "the Hospital Site and any hospital facilities now or hereafter situated on the Hospital Site, and the Hospital Equipment." HCA called as a witness bond counsel, who testified that it was legally impossible for Martin to issue parity bonds to build a new and distinct facility in Port St. Lucie, because issuance of parity bonds for such a purpose is proscribed by Section 11.02 of the indenture. It was not clear from the evidence, moreover, that Martin could finance construction of the facility it proposes, even if it could sell every bond it planned to issue. HCA could finance construction of the 75-bed hospital it proposes for Port St. Lucie with cash from its operations; its revenues last year totaled 1.4 billion dollars. Alternatively, HCA, which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, could borrow money from a bank, write commercial paper, or issue bonds. HCA has completed 159 projects since 1969. It spent $160,000,000 constructing hospitals in 1980. HCA has adequate financial, manpower, and management resources to build and operate a hospital at Port St. Lucie. HCA is second only to the federal government as a purchaser of hospital supplies and equipment. Because it purchases in large volume, it enjoys certain advantages. In every year since 1973, expenses per adjusted admission to HCA hospitals have increased, but every year the increase has been less than the average increase in expenses per adjusted admission for all members of the American Hospital Association for two same years. The same is true for increases in net revenue per adjusted admission. HCA Exhibit No. 14. None of HCA's hospitals in Florida has increased its annual daily service charge at a rate greater than 1.5 times the annual cost of living increase. (T. 1019.) In 1979, gross inpatient revenue per admission to HCA's Florida hospitals was slightly less than gross impatient revenue per admission to community hospitals in Florida in 1979. HCA Exhibit No. 14. HCA proposes that the new hospital in Port St. Lucie share laundry, CAT scanning, radiation therapy, and other services with Lawnwood Medical Center in Ft. Pierce. The Red Cross, the St. Lucie County Welfare Association, Inc., a nursing home in the area, and others have expressed a willingness to work with the staff of a new hospital in Port St. Lucie. All parties made posthearing submissions. Martin filed (proposed) findings of fact and conclusions of law as did HCA and respondent. StLHC addressed the issues in its brief. The parties' proposed findings of fact have been considered and, in large part, adopted in the foregoing findings of fact. To the extent proposed findings have not been adopted, they are deemed irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence adduced at hearing.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny Martin's application for certificate of need. That respondent deny St. Lucie Hospital Corporation's application for certificate of need. That respondent grant HCA's application for certificate of need on condition that the by-laws of any hospital built pursuant to this certificate of need set no educational requirements for osteopaths, beyond the educational requirements necessary for licensure in Florida, as a prerequisite to conferring admitting privileges. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Jon C. Moyle, Esquire and Thomas A. Sheehan, III, Esquire Post Office Box 3888 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 John Werner, Esquire Suite 110 1164 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334 Felix A. Johnston, Jr., Esquire Suite 112 1030 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Claire D. Dryfuss, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA, MARTIN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, and ST. LUCIE HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CASE NO. 80-1687 80-1715 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 80-1731 REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0040318. Respondent completed a residency in internal medicine and later was a nephrology fellow at Mayo Clinic. He was recruited to Florida in 1952 by Humana. In 1984 he became associated with a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) in an administrative position but took over treating patients when the owner became ill. This HMO was affiliated with IMC who assimilated it when the HMO had financial difficulties. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was a salaried employee of IMC and served as Assistant Medical DIRECTOR in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency Room at a nearby hospital. He was examined and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. When the ambulance with EMS personnel arrived they examined Stroganow, and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when he was transported to the emergency Room, and refused to again take Stroganow to the emergency Room. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to check on Stroganow. Upon arrival, she was admitted by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, and apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not engage in conversation to determine his condition. She called for a Cares Unit team to come and evaluate Stroganow. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her evaluation on visual examination. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit, and, after examining Stroganow, both members of the team agreed he needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady revealed his income to be above that for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold-Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, Respondent, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement because Stroganow was not ambulatory, but felt he needed to be placed in a hospital or nursing home and not left alone with the weekend approaching. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, who was in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic, and, they thought, was Stroganow's doctor. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic as well as by EMS personnel. There were always two, and occasionally three, doctors on duty at South Pasadena Clinic between 8:00 and 5:00 daily and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor he was treated by the first available doctor. Stroganow had not specifically requested to be treated by Respondent. When the Cares unit met with Respondent they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the previous evening but did not advise Respondent that the EMS squad had refused to return Stroganow to the emergency Room when they were recalled for Stroganow the same evening. Respondent telephoned the Metropolitan General Emergency Room and had the emergency Room medical report on Stroganow read to him. With the information provided by the Cares unit and the hospital report, Respondent concluded that Stroganow needed emergency medical treatment and the quickest way to obtain such treatment would be to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency Room for evaluation. When the Cares unit arrived, Respondent was treating patients at the clinic. A clinic, or doctors office, is not a desirable or practical place to have an incontinent, incoherent, and non-ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to perform certain procedures that may be required for emergency evaluation of an ill patient. At a hospital emergency Room such equipment is available. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call being placed to 911 for emergency medical treatment and it was necessary that someone be with Stroganow when the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Respondent suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 to transport Stroganow to an emergency Room for an evaluation. Upon leaving the South Pasadena clinic the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem with Stroganow. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC Tampa Office to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus HMO patients had an emergency situation which was not being property handled. Respondent left the South Pasadena Clinic around noon and went to IMC's Tampa Office where he was available for the balance of the afternoon. There he spoke with Dr. Sanchez, the INC Regional Medical Director, but Stroganow was not deemed to be a continuing problem. By 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived the Cares Unit called 911 for EMS to take Stroganow to an emergency Room. Upon arrival shortly thereafter the EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow. The Cares team communicated this to their supervisor who contacted IMC Regional Office to so advise. At this time Dr. Sanchez authorized the transportation of Stroganow to Lake Seminole Hospital for admission. Although neither Respondent nor Sanchez had privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had contracted with Lake Seminole Hospital to have IMC patients admitted by a staff doctor at Lake Seminole Hospital. Subsequent to his meeting with the Cares team Respondent received no further information regarding Stroganow until well after Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital. No entry was made on Stroganow's medical record at IMC of the meeting between Respondent and the Cares Unit. Respondent was a salaried employee whose compensation was not affected by whether or not he admitted an IMC Gold-Plus patient to a hospital.
The Issue Whether Trustees of Mease Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Mease Hospital Dunedin ("Mease") is entitled to be included on the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit ("NICU") inventory, as authorized to provide Level III NICU services in five (5) Level III beds in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") District 5. Whether All Children's established its standing to intervene in Case No. 90-6255, as an existing provider of Level III NICU services in HRS District 5. Whether Morton Plant established is standing to intervene in the consolidated cases, as an existing provider of Level II NICU services in HRS District 5.
Findings Of Fact On September 14, 1990, Mease a 278-bed acute care hospital, located in Dunnedin, Florida, timely challenged the inventory of neonatal intensive care beds published for District 5 (Pasco and Pinellas Counties) by HRS. The preliminary inventory, published on August 24, 1990, authorized five (5) Level II and no Level III beds at Mease. All Children's is a 168-bed specialty children's hospital, which has a 24-bed Level III NICU, located in St. Petersburg, Florida, in Pinellas County. Morton Plant is a 750-bed acute care hospital with Level II NICU beds, located in Clearwater, Florida, in Pinellas County. Of the 2,670 babies delivered at Morton Plant in 1990, 598 came from the Mease area; 569 of the 2,670 were classified as not normal or in need of some NICU services, and 148 of the 569 not-normal newborns came from the Mease service area. HRS is the department with responsibility for promulgating NICU rules pursuant to legislation passed in May 1987, effective in October 1987. See, Section 381.702(20) and 381.706(1)(a), (e), (h), and (m), Florida Statutes (1989). The NICU rule became final in August 1990, and included a "grandfather" provision for providers of NICU services prior to October 1, 1987, to avoid any disruption in the availability of NICU services. The grandfather provision includes, as one of three tests for determining if NICU services were offered prior to October 1, 1987, the requirement that 50% of the neonates admitted to Level II and III units from October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987, were classified in Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) 385, 386, 387 or 388. See, Florida Administrative Code, Rule 10-5.042(14)(f) (2)(b) (III). In August 1987, HRS, in preparation for the promulgation of the NICU rule, mailed surveys to various hospitals, including Mease, requesting information about the provision of NICU services at those hospitals. Using the Guidelines for Perinatal Care to distinguish the level of services it was providing, Mease responded to the August 1987 survey by reporting that it had three (3) Level II beds and no Level III beds. In response to the survey questions, Mease also reported that its NICU services began on April 1, 1987, coinciding with the time that a neonatologist, Mary Newport, M.D., joined the staff at Mease. In March 1987, Board Certified Neonatologist Mary Newport began providing 24-hour coverage at Mease, receiving final approval for active staff privileges in early May 1987, so that Mease could treat rather than transfer sick neonates. Mease resubmitted the August 1987 survey in February 1989, reporting that it had increased from three to six Level II beds, after October 1, 1987, and from one to four Level III beds beginning on October 1, 1987, although such changes required certificate of need ("CON") approval effective October 1, 1987. HRS sent out a second survey in April 1989, to which Mease responded that it currently had six Level II beds and no Level III services, under the more stringent requirements included within the proposed rule as compared to the Guidelines for Perinatal Care standards used in the first survey. In August 1989, Mease resubmitted the second survey and reported a current total of six Level II beds and four Level III beds of which three Level II beds and one Level III bed were operating on September 30, 1987. Mease, in the August resubmittal of the second survey, also reported that 37 neonates were admitted to the Level III bed for 63 patient days and that a total of 188 neonates were admitted to both Level II and Level III beds, from October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987. Of the 188 neonates admitted to Level II and Level III beds from October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987, Mease claimed that 87 of those had DRG's 385, 386, 387 or 388. On September 10, 1990, Mease submitted documentation to HRS showing that from October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987, NICU admissions totaled 122 patients, of which 77 were in DRGs 385, 386, 387 or 388. Subsequently, Mease claimed to have had 18 fewer admissions. On December 18, 1990, Mease claimed to have had 107 NICU patients, of which 69 were in DRGs 385, 386, 387 or 388. At the final hearing, Mease claimed that its review of the available records of 1512 of the 1520 deliveries from October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987, showed that, when diagnoses and codes were changed retrospectively, there were 126 NICU admissions, of which 74 were in DRGs 385, 386, 387, and 388. The number of neonates in intensive care and the number of neonates in the specified DRGs asserted by Mease are both unreliable. There is no credible evidence to support Mease's claim that it started offering NICU services upon the arrival of Dr. Newport on the courtesy staff on March 28, 1987, or upon her becoming a member of the active staff in early May, 1987. Credible expert testimony was presented that a time lag occurs between the arrival on staff of a neonatologist and the initiation of NICU services. In fact, Dr. Newport testified that after she arrived at Mease, she tried out various rented equipment and evaluated it before making purchases, and altered the locations of the nurseries. The Mease Perinatal Committee Agenda dated May 26, 1987 included an item "Task Force for Development of Level II Facility." Even assuming arguendo that Mease did establish NICU services on April 1, 1987, as reported to HRS in response to the first HRS survey, a substantial number of the neonates Mease claimed to have served in its NICU were, in fact, discharged from Mease prior to April 1, 1987. 1/ Mease has failed to submit documentation that it had neonatal intensive care services from October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987. Mease has failed to submit documentation that it admitted 126 neonates to intensive care services from October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987. Mease has failed to submit documentation that 74 neonates were classified into DRGs 385, 386, 387 or 388. Credible expert testimony supports the conclusion that retrospective changes in diagnoses are not reliable, in view of the fact that observation of a patient, not just the patient's record, is significant in making a diagnosis. Mease reported to the Health Care Cost Containment Board that it had no revenue from the operation of a NICU from October 1, 1986 to September 30, 1987.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Including Mease on the final inventory as an authorized Level II neonatal intensive care unit with five beds, based on the Summary Recommended Order of April 9, 1991, entered without objection; and Excluding Mease from the final inventory as an authorized provider of Level III neonatal intensive care services. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of November, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1991.
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 9992, filed by Sun City Hospital, Inc., d/b/a South Bay Hospital to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital in Riverview, Hillsborough County, Florida, satisfies, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact The Parties A. South Bay South Bay is a 112-bed general acute care hospital located at 4016 Sun City Center Boulevard, Sun City Center, Florida. It has served south Hillsborough County from that location since its original construction in 1982. South Bay is a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary of Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA), a for-profit corporation. South Bay's service area includes the immediate vicinity of Sun City Center, the communities of Ruskin and Wimauma (to the west and east of Sun City Center, respectively), and the communities of Riverview, Gibsonton, and Apollo Beach to the north. See FOF 68-72. South Bay is located on the western edge of Sun City Center. The Sun City Center area is comprised of the age- restricted communities of Sun City Center, Kings Point, Freedom Plaza, and numerous nearby senior living complexes, assisted- living facilities, and nursing homes. This area geographically comprises the developed area along the north side of State Road (SR) 674 between I–75 and U.S. Highway 301, north to 19th Avenue and south to the Little Manatee River. South Bay predominantly serves the residents of the Sun City Center area. In 2009, Sun City Center residents comprised approximately 57% of all discharges from SB. South Bay had approximately 72% market share in Sun City Center zip code 33573. (Approximately 32% of all market service area discharges came from zip code 33573.) South Bay provides educational programs at the hospital that are well–attended by community residents. South Bay provides comprehensive acute care services typical of a small to mid-sized community hospital, including emergency services, surgery, diagnostic imaging, non-invasive cardiology services, and endoscopy. It does not provide diagnostic or therapeutic cardiac catheterization or open-heart surgery. Patients requiring interventional cardiology services or open-heart surgery are taken directly by Hillsborough County Fire Rescue or other transport to a hospital providing those services, such as Brandon Regional Hospital (Brandon) or SJH, or are transferred from SB to one of those hospitals. South Bay has received a number of specialty accreditations, which include accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), specialty accreditation as an advanced primary stroke center, and specialty accreditation by the Society for Chest Pain. South Bay has also received recognition for its quality of care and, in particular, for surgical infection prevention and outstanding services relating to heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. South Bay's 112 licensed beds comprise 104 general medical-surgical beds and eight Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds. Of the general medical-surgical beds, 64 are in semi-private rooms, where two patient beds are situated side-by-side, separated by a curtain. Forty-eight are in private rooms. Semi- private rooms present challenges in terms of infection control and patient privacy, and are no longer the standard of care in hospital design and construction. Over the years, SB has upgraded its hospital physical plant to accommodate new medical technology, including an MRI suite and state-of-the-art telemetry equipment. South Bay is implementing automated dispensing cabinets on patient floors for storage of medications and an electronic medication administration record system that provides an extra safety measure for dispensing medications. Since 2009, SB has implemented numerous programmatic initiatives that have improved the quality of care. South Bay is converting one wing of the hospital to an orthopedic unit. In 2001, South Bay completed a major expansion of its ED and support spaces, but has not added new beds. Patients presenting to the ED have received high quality of care and timely care. Since 2009, SB has improved its systems of care and triage of patients in the ED to improve patient flow and reduce ED wait times. Overall, South Bay has a reputation of providing high- quality care in a timely manner, notwithstanding problems with its physical plant and location. South Bay's utilization has been high historically. From 2006 to 2009, SB's average occupancy has been 79.5%, 80.3%, 77.2%, and 77.7%, respectively. Its number of patient discharges also increased in that time, from 6,190 in 2006 to 6,540 in 2009, at an average annual rate increase of 1.9%. (From late November until May, the seasonal months, utilization is very high, sometimes at 100% or greater.) Despite its relatively high utilization, SB has also had marginal financial results historically. It lost money in 2005 and 2007, with operating losses of $644,259 in 2005 and $1,151,496 in 2007 and bottom-line net losses of $447,957 (2005) and $698,305 (2007). The hospital had a significantly better year in 2009, with an operating gain of $3,365,113 and a bottom- line net profit of $2,144,292. However, this was achieved largely due to a reduction in bad debt from $11,927,320 in 2008 to $7,772,889 in 2009, an event the hospital does not expect to repeat, and a coincidence of high surgical volume. Its 2010 financial results were lagging behind those of 2009 at the time of the hearing. South Bay's 2009 results amount to an aberration, and it is likely that 2010 would be considerably less profitable. South Bay's marginal financial performance is due, in part, to its disproportionate share of Medicare patients and a disproportionate percentage of Medicare reimbursement in its payor mix. Medicare reimburses hospitals at a significantly lower rate than managed care payors. As noted, SB is organizationally a part of HCA's West Florida Division, and is one of two HCA-affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough County; Brandon is the other. (There are approximately 16 hospitals in this division.) Brandon has been able to add beds over the past several years, and its services include interventional cardiology and open-heart surgery. However, SB and Brandon combined still have fewer licensed beds than either St. Joseph's Hospital or Tampa General Hospital, and fewer than the BayCare Health System- affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough in total. South Bay's existing physical plant is undersized and outdated. See discussion below. Whether it has a meaningful opportunity for expansion and renovation at its 17.5-acre site is a question for this proceeding to resolve. South Bay proposes the replacement and relocation of its facility to the community of Riverview. In 2005, SB planned to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in Riverview, on a parcel owned by HCA and located on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. SB filed CON Application No. 9834 in the February 2005 batching cycle. The application was preliminarily denied by AHCA, and SB initially contested AHCA's determination. South Bay pursued the satellite hospital CON at that time because of limited availability of intercompany financing from HCA. By the time of the August 2007 batching cycle, intercompany financing had improved, allowing SB to pursue the bigger project of replacing and relocating the hospital. South Bay dismissed its petition for formal administrative hearing, allowing AHCA's preliminary denial of CON Application No. 9834 to become final, and filed CON Application No. 9992 to establish a replacement hospital facility on Big Bend Road in Riverview. St. Joseph's Hospital St. Joseph's Hospital was founded by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegany, New York, as a small hospital in a converted house in downtown Tampa in 1934. In 1967, SJH opened its existing main hospital facility on Martin Luther King Avenue in Tampa, Florida. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, is the licensee of St. Joseph's Hospital, an acute care hospital located at 3001 West Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. As a not-for-profit organization, SJH's mission is to improve the health care of the community by providing high- quality compassionate care. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider and provided $145 million in charity and uncompensated care in 2009. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is licensed to operate approximately 883 beds, including acute care beds; Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds; and adult and child-adolescent psychiatric beds. The majority of beds are semi-private. Services include Level II and pediatric trauma services, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery. These beds and services are distributed among SJH's main campus; St. Joseph's Women's Hospital; St. Joseph's Hospital North, a newer satellite hospital in north Tampa; and St. Joseph's Children's Hospital. Except for St. Joseph's Hospital North, these facilities are land-locked. Nevertheless, SJH has continued to invest in its physical plant and to upgrade its medical technology and equipment. In February 2010, SJH opened St. Joseph's Hospital North, a state-of-the-art, 76-bed satellite hospital in Lutz, north Hillsborough County, at a cost of approximately $225 million. This facility is approximately 14 miles away from the main campus. This followed the award of CON No. 9610 to SJH for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital North, which was unsuccessfully opposed by University Community Hospital and Tampa General Hospital, two existing hospital providers in Tampa. Univ. Cmty. Hosp., Inc., d/b/a Univ. Cmty. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case Nos. 03-0337CON and 03-0338CON. St. Joseph's Hospital North operates under the same license and under common management. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is also the holder of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of a 90-bed state-of-the-art satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, Riverview, Hillsborough County. These all private beds include general medical-surgical beds, an ICU, and a 10-bed obstetrical unit. On October 21, 2009, the Agency revised CON No. 9833 with a termination date of October 21, 2012. This project was unsuccessfully opposed by TG, SB, and Brandon. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case No. 05-2754CON, supra. St. Joseph's Hospital anticipates construction beginning in October 2012 and opening the satellite hospital, to be known as St. Joseph's Hospital South, in early 2015. This hospital will be operating under SJH's existing license and Medicare and Medicaid provider numbers and will in all respects be an integral component of SJH. The implementation of St. Joseph's Hospital South is underway. SJH has contracted with consultants, engineers, architects, and contractors and has funded the first phase of the project with $6 million, a portion of which has been spent. The application for CON No. 9833 refers to "evidence- based design" and the construction of a state-of-the-art facility. (The design of St. Joseph's Hospital North also uses "evidence-based design.") St. Joseph's Hospital South will have all private rooms, general surgery operating rooms as well as endoscopy, and a 10-bed obstetrics unit. Although CON No. 9833 is for a project involving 228,810 square feet of new construction, SJH intends to build a much larger facility, approximately 400,000 square feet on approximately 70 acres. St. Joseph's Hospital Main's physical plant is 43 years old. The majority of the patient rooms are semi–private and about 35% of patients admitted at this hospital received private rooms. Notwithstanding the age of its physical plant and its semi–private bed configuration, SJH has a reputation of providing high quality of care and is a strong competitor in its market. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., has two facility expansions currently in progress at its main location in Tampa: a new five-story building that will house SJH neonatal intensive care unit, obstetrical, and gynecology services; and a separate, two-story addition with 52 private patient rooms. Of the 52 private patient rooms, 26 will be dedicated to patients recovering from orthopedic surgery, and will be large enough to allow physical therapy to be done in the patient room itself. The other 26 rooms will be new medical-surgical ICU beds at the hospital. At the same time that SJH expands its main location, it is pursuing a strategic plan whereby the main location is the "hub" of its system, with community hospitals and health facilities located in outlying communities. As proposed in CON Application No. 9610, St. Joseph's Hospital North was to be 240,000 square feet in size. Following the award of CON No. 9610, SJH requested that AHCA modify the CON to provide for construction of a larger facility. In its modification request, SJH requested to establish a large, state- of-the-art facility with all private patient rooms, and the desirability of private patient rooms as a matter of infection control and patient preference. AHCA granted the modification. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., thereafter planned to construct St. Joseph's Hospital North to be four stories in height. The plan was opposed. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., offered to construct a three-story building, large enough horizontally to accommodate the CON square footage modification. The offer was accepted. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., markets St. Joseph's Hospital North as "The Hospital of the Future, Today." The hospital was constructed using "evidence-based design" to maximize operational efficiencies and enhance the healing process of its residents –- recognizing, among other things, the role of the patient's family and friends. The facility's patient care units are all state-of-the-art and include, for example, obstetrical suites in which a visiting family member can spend the night. A spacious, sunlit atrium and a "healing garden" are also provided. The hospital's dining facility is frequented by community residents. In addition, SJH owns a physician group practice under HealthPoint Medical Group, a subsidiary of St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc. The group practice has approximately 19 different office locations, including several within the service area for the proposed hospital. The group includes approximately 106 physicians. However, most of the office locations are in Tampa, and the group does not have an office in Riverview, although there are plans to expand locations to include the Big Bend Road site. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., anticipates having to establish a new medical staff for St. Joseph's Hospital South, and will build a medical office building at the site for the purpose of attracting physicians. It further anticipates that some number of physicians on SB's existing medical staff will apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is the market leader among Hillsborough County hospitals and is currently doing well financially, as it has historically. For 2010, St. Joseph's Hospital Main's operating income was approximately $78 million. Organizationally, SJH has a parent organization, St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc., and is one of eight hospitals in the greater Tampa Bay area affiliated with BayCare. On behalf of its member hospitals, BayCare arranges financing for capital projects, provides support for various administrative functions, and negotiates managed care contracts that cover its members as a group. St. Joseph's Hospital characterizes fees paid for BayCare services as an allocation of expenses rather than a management fee for its services. In 2009, SJH paid BayCare approximately $42 million for services. St. Joseph's Hospital is one of three BayCare affiliates in Hillsborough County. The other two are St. Joseph's Hospital North and South Florida Baptist Hospital, a community hospital in Plant City. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be the fourth BayCare hospital in the county. Tampa General The Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public body appointed by the county, operated Tampa General Hospital until 1997. In that year, TG was leased to Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc., a non-profit corporation and the current hospital licensee. Tampa General is a 1,018-bed acute care hospital located at 2 Columbia Drive, Davis Island, Tampa, Florida. In addition to trauma surgery services, TG provides tertiary services, such as angioplasty, open-heart surgery, and organ transplantation. Tampa General operates the only burn center in the area. A rehabilitation hospital is connected to the main hospital, but there are plans to relocate this facility. Tampa General owns a medical office building. Tampa General is JCAHO accredited and has received numerous honors. Tampa General provides high-quality of care. Approximately half of the beds at TG are private rooms. Tampa General's service area for non-tertiary services includes all of Hillsborough County. Tampa General is also the teaching hospital for the University of South Florida's College of Medicine. As a statutory teaching hospital, TG has 550 residents and funds over 300 postgraduate physicians in training. Tampa General is the predominant provider of services to Medicaid recipients and the medically indigent of Hillsborough County. It is considered the only safety-net hospital in Hillsborough County. (A safety net hospital provides a disproportionate amount of care to indigent and underinsured patients in comparison to other hospitals.) A high volume of indigent (Medicaid and charity) patients are discharged from TG. In 2009, the costs TG incurred treating indigent patients exceeded reimbursement by $56.5 million. Approximately 33% of Tampa General's patients are Medicare patients and 25% commercial. Tampa General has grown in the past 10 years. It added 31 licensed acute care beds in 2004 and 82 more since SB's application was filed in 2007. In addition, the Bayshore Pavilion, a $300-million project, was recently completed. The project enlarged TG's ED, and added a new cardiovascular unit, a new neurosciences and trauma center, a new OB-GYN floor, and a new gastrointestinal unit. Facility improvements are generally ongoing. Tampa General's capital budget for 2011 is approximately $100 million. In 2010, TG's operating margin was approximately $43 million and a small operating margin in 2011. AHCA AHCA is the state agency that administers the CON law. Jeff Gregg testified that during his tenure, AHCA has never preliminarily denied a replacement hospital CON application or required consideration of alternatives to a replacement hospital. Mr. Gregg opined that the lack of alternatives or options is a relevant consideration when reviewing a replacement hospital CON application. T 468. The Agency's State Agency Action Report (SAAR) provides reasons for preliminarily approving SB's CON application. During the hearing, Mr. Gregg testified, in part, that the primary reasons for preliminary approval were issues related to quality of care "because the facility represents itself as being unable to expand or adapt significantly to the rapidly changing world of acute care. This is consistent with what [he has] heard about other replacement hospitals." T 413. Mr. Gregg also noted that SB focused on improving access "[a]nd as the years go by, it is reasonable to expect that the population outside of Sun City Center, the immediate Sun City Center area, will steadily increase and improve access for more people, and that's particularly true because this application includes both a freestanding emergency department and a shuttle service for the people in the immediate area. And that was intended to address their concerns based upon the fact that they have had this facility very conveniently located for them in the past at a time when there was little development in the general south Hillsborough area. But the applicant wants to position itself for the expected growth in the future, and we think has made an excellent effort to accommodate the immediate interests of Sun City Center residents with their promises to do the emergency, freestanding emergency department and the shuttle service so that the people will continue to have very comfortable access to the hospital." T 413-14. Mr. Gregg reiterated "that the improvements in quality outweigh any concerns that [the Agency] should have about the replacement and relocation of this facility; that if this facility were to be forced to remain where it is, over time it would be reasonable to expect that quality would diminish." T 435. For AHCA, replacement hospital applications receive the same level of scrutiny as any other acute care hospital applications. T 439-40. South Bay's existing facility and site South Bay is located on the north side of SR 674, an east-west thoroughfare in south Hillsborough County. The area around the hospital is "built out" with predominantly residential development. Sun City Center, an age-restricted (55 and older) retirement community, is located directly across SR 674 from the hospital as well as on the north side of SR 674 to the east of the hospital. Other residential development is immediately to the west of the hospital on the north side of SR 674. See FOF 3-6. Sun City Center is flanked by two north-south arterial roadways, I-75 to the west and U.S. Highway 301 to the east, both of which intersect with SR 674. The community of Ruskin is situated generally around the intersection of SR 674 and U.S. 41, west of I-75. The community of Wimauma is situated along SR 674 just east of U.S. Highway 301. South Bay is located in a three-story building that is well–maintained and in relatively good repair. The facility is well laid out in terms of design as a community hospital. Patients and staff at SB are satisfied with the quality of care and scope of acute care services provided at the hospital. Notwithstanding current space limitations, and problems in the ICU, see FOF 77-82, patients receive a high quality of care. One of the stated reasons for replacement is with respect to SB's request to have all private patient rooms in order to be more competitive with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's inpatient rooms are located within the original construction. The hospital is approximately 115,800 square feet, or a little over 1,000 square feet per inpatient bed. By comparison, small to mid-sized community hospitals built today are commonly 2,400 square feet per inpatient bed on average. All of SB's patient care units are undersized by today's standards, with the exception of the ED. ICU patients, often not ambulatory, require a higher level of care than other hospital patients. The ICU at SB is not adequate to meet the level of care required by the ICU patient. SB's ICU comprises eight rooms with one bed apiece. Eight beds are not enough. As Dr. Ksaibati put it at hearing: "Right now we have eight and we are always short . . . double . . . the number of beds, that's at least [the] minimum [t]hat I expect we are going to have if we go to a new facility." T 198-99 (emphasis added). The shortage of beds is not the only problem. The size of SB's ICU rooms is too small. (Problems with the ICU have existed at least since 2006.) Inadequate size prohibits separate, adjoining bathrooms. For patients able to leave their beds, therefore, portable bathroom equipment in the ICU room is required. Inadequate size, the presence of furniture, and the presence of equipment in the ICU room creates serious quality of care issues. When an EKG is conducted, the nurse cannot be present in the room. Otherwise, there would be no space for the EKG equipment. It is difficult to intubate a patient and, at times, "extremely dangerous." T 170. A major concern is when a life-threatening problem occurs that requires emergency treatment at the ICU patient's bedside. For example, when a cardiac arrest "code" is called, furniture and the portable bathroom equipment must be removed before emergency cardiac staff and equipment necessary to restore the function of the patient's heart can reach the patient for the commencement of treatment. Comparison to ICU rooms at other facilities underscores the inadequate size of SB's ICU rooms. Many of the ICU rooms at Brandon are much larger -- more than twice the size of SB's ICU rooms. Support spaces are inadequate in most areas, resulting in corridors (at times) being used for inappropriate storage. In addition, the hospital's general storage is inadequate, resulting in movable equipment being stored in mechanical and electrical rooms. Of the medical-surgical beds at SB, 48 are private and 64 are semi-private. The current standard in hospital design is for acute care hospitals to have private rooms exclusively. Private patient rooms are superior to semi-private rooms for infection control and patient well-being in general. The patient is spared the disruption and occasional unpleasantness that accompanies sharing a patient room –- for example, another patient's persistent cough or inability to use the toilet (many of SB's semi-private rooms have bedside commodes). Private rooms are generally recognized as promoting quality of care. South Bay's site is approximately 17.5 acres, bordered on all sides by parcels not owned by either SB or by HCA- affiliated entities. The facility is set back from SR 674 by a visitor parking lot. Proceeding clockwise around the facility from the visitor parking lot, there is a small service road on the western edge of the site; two large, adjacent ponds for stormwater retention; the rear parking lot for ED visitors and patients; and another small service road which connects the east side of the site to SR 674, and which is used by ambulances to access the ED. Dedicated parking for SB's employees is absent. A medical office building (MOB), which is not owned by SB, is located to the north of the ED parking lot. The MOB houses SB's Human Resources Department as well as medical offices. Most of SB's specialty physicians have either full or part-time offices in close proximity to SB. Employee parking is not available in the MOB parking lot. Some of SB's employees park in a hospital-owned parking lot to the north of the MOB, and then walk around the MOB to enter the hospital. South Bay's CEO and management employees park on a strip of a gravel lot, which is rented from the Methodist church to the northeast of the hospital's site. In 2007, as part of the CON application to relocate, SB commissioned a site and facility assessment (SFA) of the hospital. The SFA was prepared for the purpose of supporting SB's replacement hospital application and has not been updated since its preparation in 2007. The architects or engineers who prepared the SFA were not asked to evaluate proposed options for expansion or upgrade of SB on-site. However, the SFA concludes that the SB site has been built out to its maximum capacity. On the other hand, the SFA concluded that the existing building systems at SB met codes and standards in force when constructed and are in adequate condition and have the capacity to meet the current needs of the hospital. The report also stated that if SB wanted to substantially expand its physical plant to accommodate future growth, upgrades to some of the existing building systems likely would be required. Notwithstanding these reports and relative costs, expansion of SB at its existing site is not realistic or cost- effective as compared to a replacement hospital. Vertical expansion is complicated by two factors. First, the hospital's original construction in 1982 was done under the former Southern Standard Building Code, which did not contain the "wind-loading" requirements of the present-day Florida Building Code. Any vertical expansion of SB would not only require the new construction to meet current wind-loading requirements, but would also require the original construction to be retrofitted to meet current wind-loading requirements (assuming this was even possible as a structural matter). Second, if vertical expansion were to meet current standards for hospital square footage, the new floor or floors would "overhang" the smaller existing construction, complicating utility connections from the lower floor as well as the placement of structural columns to support the additional load. The alternative (assuming feasibility due to current wind-loading requirements) would be to vertically stack patient care units identical to SB's existing patient care units, thereby perpetuating its undersized and outdated design. Vertical expansion at SB has not been proposed by the Gould Turner Group (Gould Turner), which did a Master Facility Plan for SB in May 2010, but included a new patient bed tower, or by HBE Corporation (HBE). Horizontal expansion of SB is no less complicated. The hospital would more than double in size to meet the modern-day standard of 2,400 square feet per bed, and its site is too small for such expansion. It is apparent that such expansion would displace the visitor parking lot if located to the south of the existing building, and likely have to extend into SR 674 itself. South Bay's architectural consultant expert witness substantiated that replacing SB is justified as an architectural matter, and that the facility cannot be brought up to present-day standards at its existing location. According to Mr. Siconolfi, the overall building at SB is approximately half of the total size that would normally be in place for a new hospital meeting modern codes and industry standards. The more modest expansions offered by Gould Turner and HBE are still problematic, if feasible at all. Moreover, with either proposal, SB would ultimately remain on its existing 17.5-acre site, with few opportunities to expand further. Gould Turner's study was requested by SB's CEO in May 2010, to determine whether and to what extent SB would be able to expand on-site. (Gould Turner was involved with SB's recent ED expansion project area.) The resulting Master Facility Plan essentially proposes building a new patient tower in SB's existing visitor parking lot, to the left and right of the existing main entrance to SB. This would require construction of a new visitor parking lot in whatever space remained in between the new construction and SR 674. The Master Facility Plan contains no discussion of the new impervious area that would be added to the site and the consequential requirement of additional stormwater capacity, assuming the site can even accommodate additional stormwater capacity. This study also included a new 12-bed ICU and the existing ICU would be renovated into private patient rooms. For example, "[t]he second floor would be all telemetry beds while the third floor would be a combination of medical/surgical, PCU, and telemetry beds." In Gould Turner's drawings, the construction itself would be to the left and to the right of the hospital's existing main entrance. Two scenarios are proposed: in the first, the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 114 licensed beds (including two new beds), all private; in the second, some of the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 146 licensed beds (adding 34 beds), of which 32 would be semi-private. South Bay did not consider Gould Turner's alternative further or request additional, more detailed drawings or analysis, and instead determined to pursue the replacement hospital project, in part, because it was better not to "piecemeal" the hospital together. Mr. Miller, who is responsible for strategic decisions regarding SB, was aware of, but did not review the Master Facility Plan and believes that it is not economically feasible to expand the hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital presented testimony of an architect representing the hospital design/build firm of HBE, to evaluate SB's current condition, to provide options for expansion and upgrading on-site, and to provide a professional cost estimate for the expansion. Mr. Oliver personally inspected SB's site and facility in October 2010 and reviewed numerous reports regarding the facility and other documents. Mr. Oliver performed an analysis of SB's existing physical plant and land surrounding the hospital. HBE's analysis concluded that SB has the option to expand and upgrade on-site, including the construction of a modern surgical suite, a modern 10-bed ICU, additional elevators, and expansion and upgrading of the ancillary support spaces identified by SB as less than ideal. HBE's proposal involves the addition of 50,000 square feet of space to the hospital through the construction of a three-story patient tower at the south side of the hospital. The additional square footage included in the HBE proposal would allow the hospital to convert to an all-private bed configuration with either 126 private beds by building out both second and third floors of a new patient tower, or to 126 private beds if the hospital chose to "shell in" the third floor for future expansion. Under the HBE proposal, SB would have the option to increase its licensed bed capacity 158 beds by completing the second and third floors of the new patient tower (all private rooms) while maintaining the mix of semi-private and private patient rooms in the existing bed tower. The HBE proposal also provides for a phased renovation of the interior of SB to allow for an expanded post-anesthesia care unit, expanded laboratory, pharmacy, endoscopy, women's center, prep/hold/recovery areas, central sterile supply and distribution, expanded dining, and a new covered lobby entrance to the left side of the hospital. Phasing of the expansion would permit the hospital to remain in operation during expansion and renovation with minimal disruption. During construction the north entrance of the hospital would provide access through the waiting rooms that are currently part of the 2001 renovated area of the hospital with direct access to the circulation patterns of the hospital. The HBE proposal also provides for the addition of parking to bring the number of parking spaces on-site to 400. The HBE proposal includes additional stormwater retention/detention areas that could serve as attractive water features and, similar to the earlier civil engineering reports obtained by SB, proposes the construction of a parking garage at the rear of the facility should additional parking be needed in the future. However, HBE essentially proposes the alternative already rejected by SB: construction of a new patient tower in front of the existing hospital. Similar to Gould Turner, HBE proposes new construction to the left and right of the hospital's existing lobby entrance and the other changes described above. HBE's proposal recognizes the need for additional stormwater retention: the stand of trees that sets off the existing visitor parking lot from SR 674 would be uprooted; in their place, a retention pond would be constructed. Approval of the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) would be required for the proposal to be feasible. Assuming the SWFWMD approved the proposal, the retention pond would have to be enclosed by a fence. This would then be the "face" of the hospital to the public on SR 674. HBE's proposal poses significant problems. The first floor of the three-story component would be flush against the exterior wall of the hospital's administrative offices, where the CEO and others currently have windows with a vista of the front parking lot and SR 674. Since the three-story component would be constructed first in the "phased" construction, and since the hospital's administration has no other place to work in the existing facility, the CEO and other management team would have to work off-site until the new administrative offices (to the left of the existing hospital lobby entrance) were constructed. The existing main entrance to the hospital, which faces SR 674, would be relocated to the west side of the hospital once construction was completed in its entirety. In the interim, patients and visitors would have to enter the facility from the rear, as the existing main entrance would be inaccessible. This would be for a period of months, if not longer. For the second and third floors, HBE's proposal poses two scenarios. Under the first, SB would build the 24 general medical-surgical beds on the tower's second floor, but leave the third floor as "shelled" space. This would leave SB with a total of 106 licensed beds, six fewer than it has at present. Further, since HBE's proposal involves a second ICU at SB, 18 of the 106 beds are ICU beds, leaving 88 general medical-surgical beds. By comparison, SB currently has 104 general medical- surgical beds, meaning that it loses 16 general medical-surgical beds under HBE's first scenario. In the second scenario, SB would build 24 general medical-surgical beds on the third floor as well, and would have a total of 126 licensed beds. Since 18 of those beds would be ICU beds, SB would have 108 general medical-surgical beds, or only four more than it has at present. Further, the proposal does not make SB appreciably bigger. The second and third floors in HBE's proposal are designed in "elongated" fashion such that several rooms may be obscured from the nursing station's line of sight by a new elevator, which is undesirable as a matter of patient safety and security. Further, construction of the second and third floors would be against the existing second and third floors above the lobby entrance's east side. This would require 12 existing private patient rooms to be taken out of service due to loss of their vista windows. At the same time, the new second and third floors would be parallel to, but set back from, existing semi- private patient rooms and their vista windows along the southeast side of the hospital. This means that patients and visitors in the existing semi-private patient rooms and patients and visitors in the new private patient rooms on the north side of the new construction may be looking into each other's rooms. HBE's proposal also involves reorganization and renovation of SB's existing facility, and the demolition and disruption that goes with it. To accommodate patient circulation within the existing facility from the ED (at the north side of the hospital) to the new patient tower (at the south side of the hospital), two new corridors are proposed to be routed through and displace the existing departments of Data Processing and Medical Records. Thus, until the new administrative office space would be constructed, Data Processing and Medical Records (along with the management team) would have to be relocated off-site. Once the new first floor of the three-story component is completed, the hospital's four ORs and six PACU beds will be relocated there. In the existing vacated surgical space, HBE proposes to relocate SB's existing cardiology unit, thus requiring the vacated surgical space to be completely reconfigured (building a nursing station and support spaces that do not currently exist in that location). In the space vacated by the existing cardiology unit, HBE proposed expanding the hospital's clinical laboratory, meaning extensive demolition and reconfiguration in that area. The pharmacy is proposed to be relocated to where the existing PACU is located, requiring the building of a new pharmacy with a secure area for controlled substances, cabinets for other medications, and the like. The vacated existing pharmacy is in turn proposed to be dedicated to general storage, which involves still more construction and demolition, tearing out the old pharmacy to make the space suitable for general storage. HBE's proposal is described as a "substantial upgrade" of SB, but it was stated that a substantial upgrade could likewise be achieved by replacing the facility outright. This is SB's preference, which is not unreasonable. There have been documented problems with other hospital expansions, including patient infection due to construction dust. South Bay's proposal South Bay proposes to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital on a 39-acre parcel (acquired in 2005) located in the Riverview community, on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The hospital is designed to include 32 observation beds built to acute care occupancy standards, to be available for conversion to licensed acute care beds should the need arise. The original total project cost of $215,641,934, calculated when the application was filed in October 2007 has been revised to $192,967,399. The decrease in total project cost is largely due to the decrease in construction costs since 2007. The parties stipulated that SB's estimated construction costs are reasonable. The remainder of the project budget is likewise reasonable. The budgeted number for land, $9,400,000, is more than SB needs: the 39-acre parcel is held in its behalf by HCA Services of Florida, Inc., and was acquired in March 2005 for $7,823,100. An environmental study has been done, and the site has no environmental development issues. The original site preparation budgeted number of $5 million has been increased to $7 million to allow for possible impact fees, based on HCA's experience with similar projects. Building costs, other than construction cost, flow from the construction cost number as a matter of percentages and are reasonable. The equipment costs are reasonable. Construction period interest as revised from the original project budget is approximately $4 million less, commensurate with the revised project cost. Other smaller numbers in the budget, such as contingencies and start-up costs, were calculated in the usual and accepted manner for estimated project costs and are reasonable. South Bay's proposed service area (PSA) comprises six zip codes (33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), 33569 (Riverview), 33598 (Wimauma), 33572 (Apollo Beach), and 33534 (Gibsonton)) in South Hillsborough County. These six zip codes accounted for 92.2% of SB's discharges in 2006. The first three zip codes, which include Riverview (33569), accounted for 76.1% of the discharges. Following the filing of the application in 2007, the U.S. Postal Service subdivided the former zip code 33569 into three zip codes: 33569, 33578, and 33579. (The proposed service area consists of eight zip codes.) The same geographic area comprises the three Riverview zip codes taken together as the former zip code 33569. In 2009, the three Riverview zip codes combined accounted for approximately 504 to 511/514 of SB's discharges, with 589 discharges in 2006 from the zip code 33569. Of SB's total discharges in 2009, approximately 8 to 9% originated from these three zip codes. In 2009, approximately 7,398 out of 14,424 market/service-area discharges, or approximately 51% of the total market discharges came from the three southern zip codes, 33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), and 33598 (Wimauma). Also, approximately 81% of SB's discharges in 2009 originated from the same three zip codes. (The discharge numbers for SB for 2009 presented by St. Joseph's Hospital and SB are similar. See SB Ex. 9 at 11 and SJH Ex. 4 at 8-9. See also TG Ex. 4 at 3-4.) In 2009, SB and Brandon had an approximate 68% market share for the eight zip codes. See FOF 152-54 and 162-65 for additional demographic data. St. Joseph's Hospital had an approximate 5% market share within the service area and using 2009-2010 data, TG had approximately 6% market share in zip code 33573 and an overall market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 19% and a market share of approximately 23% in zip code 33579. South Bay's application projects 37,292 patient days in year 1; 39,581 patient days in year 2; and 41,563 patient days in year 3 for the proposed replacement hospital. The projection was based on the January 2007 population for the service area as reflected in the application, and what was then a projected population growth rate of 20.8% for the five-year period 2007 to 2012. These projections were updated for the purposes of hearing. See FOF 246-7. The application also noted a downturn in the housing market, which began in 2007 and has continued since then. The application projected a five-year (2007-2012) change of 20.8% for the original five zip codes. At hearing, SB introduced updated utilization projections for 2010-2015, which show the service area population growing at 15.3% for that five-year period. South Bay's revised utilization projections for 2015- 2017 (projected years 1-3 of the replacement hospital) are 28,168 patient days in year 1; 28,569 patient days in year 2; and 29,582 patient days in year 3. The lesser utilization as compared with SB's original projections is partly due to slowed population growth, but predominantly due to SB's assumption that St. Joseph's Hospital will build its proposed satellite hospital in Riverview, and that SB will accordingly lose 20% of its market share. The revised utilization projections are conservative, reasonable, and achievable. With the relocation, SB will be more proximate to the entirety of its service area, and will be toward the center of population growth in south Hillsborough County. In addition, it will have a more viable and more sustainable hospital operation even with the reduced market share. Its financial projections reflect a better payor mix and profitability in the proposed location despite the projection of fewer patient days. Conversely, if SB remains in Sun City Center, it is subject to material operating losses even if its lost market share in that location is the same 20%, as compared to the 30 to 40% it estimates that it would lose in competition with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's medical staff and employees support the replacement facility, notwithstanding that their satisfaction with SB is very high. The proposal is also supported by various business organizations, including the Riverview Chamber of Commerce and Ruskin Chamber of Commerce. However, many of the residents of Sun City Center who testified opposed relocation of SB. See FOF 210-11. South Bay will accept several preconditions on approval of its CON application: (1) the location of SB on Big Bend Road in Riverview; (2) combined Medicaid and charity care equal to 7.0% of gross revenues; and (3) operating a free- standing ED at the Sun City location and providing a shuttle service between the Sun City location and the new hospital campus ("for patients and visitors"). SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. In its SAAR, the Agency preliminarily approved the application including the following: This approval includes, as a component of the proposal: the operation of a freestanding emergency department on a 24-hour, seven-day per week basis at the current Sun City location, the provision of extended hours shuttle service between the existing Sun City Center and the new campuses to transport patients and visitors between the facilities to locations; and the offering of primary care and diagnostic testing at the Sun City Center location. These components are required services to be provided by the replacement hospital as approved by the Agency. Mr. Gregg explained that the requirement for transport of patients and visitors was included based on his understanding of the concerns of the Sun City Center community for emergency as well as routine access to hospital services. Notwithstanding the Agency statement that the foregoing elements are required, the Agency did not condition approval on the described elements. See SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. Instead, the Agency only required SB, as a condition of approval, to provide a minimum of 7.0% of the hospital's patient days to Medicaid and charity care patients. (As noted above, SB's proposed condition says 7.0% of gross revenues.) Because conditions on approval of the CON are generally subject to modification, there would be no legal mechanism for monitoring or enforcement of the aspects of the project not made a condition of approval. If the Agency approves SB's CON application, the Agency should condition any approval based on the conditions referenced above, which SB set forth in its CON application. SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. See also T 450 ("[The Agency] can take any statement made in the application and turn that into a condition," although conditions may be modified.1 St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General are critical of SB's offer of a freestanding ED and proposed shuttle transportation services. Other than agreeing to condition its CON application by offering these services, SB has not evaluated the manner in which these services would be offered. South Bay envisions that the shuttle service (provided without charge) would be more for visitors than it would be for patients and for outpatients or patients that are ambulatory and able to ride by shuttle. Other patients would be expected to be transported by EMS or other medical transport. As of the date of hearing, Hillsborough County does not have a protocol to address the transport of patients to a freestanding ED. South Bay contacted Hillsborough County Fire Rescue prior to filing its CON application and was advised that they would support SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but did not support the closure and relocation of SB, even with a freestanding ED left behind. See FOF 195-207. At hearing, SB representatives stated that SB would not be closed if the project is denied. Compliance with applicable statutory and rule criteria Section 408.035(1): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed The need for SB itself and at its current location is not an issue in this case. That need was demonstrated years ago, when SB was initially approved. For the Agency, consideration of a replacement hospital application "diminishes the concept of need in [the Agency's] weighing and balancing of criteria in this case." There is no express language in the CON law, as amended, which indicates that CON review of a replacement hospital application does not require consideration of other statutory review criteria, including "need," unless otherwise stipulated. Replacement hospital applicants, like SB, may advocate the need for replacement rather than expansion or renovation of the existing hospital, but a showing of "need" is still required. Nevertheless, institution-specific factors may be relevant when "need" is considered. The determination of "need" for SB's relocation involves an analysis of whether the relocation of the hospital as proposed will enhance access or quality of care, and whether the relocation may result in changes in the health care delivery system that may adversely impact the community, as well as options SB may have for expansion or upgrading on-site. In this case, the overall "need" for the project is resolved, in part, by considering, in conjunction with weighing and balancing other statutory criteria, including quality of care, whether the institution-specific needs of SB to replace the existing hospital are more reasonable than other alternatives, including renovation and whether, if replacement is recommended, the residents of the service area, including the Sun City Center area, will retain reasonable access to general acute care hospital services. The overall need for the project has not been proven. See COL 360-70 for ultimate conclusions of law regarding the need for this project. Section 408.035(2): The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant The "service district" in this case is acute care subdistrict 6-1, Hillsborough County. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-2.100. The acute care hospital services SB proposes to relocate to Big Bend Road are available to residents of SB's service area. Except as otherwise noted herein with respect to constraints at SB, there are no capacity constraints limiting access to acute care hospital services in the subdistrict. The availability of acute care services for residents of the service area, and specifically the Riverview area, will increase with the opening of St. Joseph's Hospital South. All existing providers serving the service area provide high quality of care. Within the service district as a whole, SB proposes to relocate the existing hospital approximately 5.7 linear miles north of its current location and approximately 7.7 miles using I-75, one exit north. South Bay would remain in south Hillsborough County, as well as the southernmost existing health care facility in Hillsborough County, along with St. Joseph's Hospital South when it is constructed. The eight zip codes of SB's proposed service area occupy a large area of south Hillsborough County south of Tampa (to the northwest) and Brandon (to the northeast). Included are the communities of Gibsonton, Riverview, Apollo Beach, Ruskin, Sun City Center, and Wimauma. The service area is still growing despite the housing downturn, with a forecast of 15.3% growth for the five-year period 2010 to 2015. The service area's population is projected to be 168,344 in 2015, increasing from 145,986 in 2010. The service area is currently served primarily by SB, which is the only existing provider in the service area, and Brandon. For non-tertiary, non-specialty discharges from the service area in 2009, SB had approximately 40% market share, including market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 10% (33569), 6% (33578), and 16% (33579). Brandon had approximately 28% of the market in the service area, and a market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 58% (33569), 46% (33578), and 40% (33579). Thus, SB and Brandon have approximately a 61% market share in the Riverview zip codes and approximately a 68% market share service area-wide. The persuasive evidence indicates that Riverview is the center of present and future population in the service area. It is the fastest-growing part of the service area overall and the fastest-growing part of the service area for patients age 65 and over. Of the projected 168,334 residents in 2015, the three Riverview zip codes account for 80,779 or nearly half the total population. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County. At the same time, it will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center. In conjunction with St. Joseph's Hospital South when constructed, SB's proposed relocation will enhance the availability and accessibility of existing health care facilities and health services in south Hillsborough County, especially for the Riverview-area residents. However, it is likely that access will be reduced for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General contend that: (1) it would be problematic to locate two hospitals in close proximity in Riverview (those being St. Joseph's Hospital South and the relocated SB hospital) and (2) SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital seems to agree that the utilization projections for SB's replacement hospital are reasonable. Also, St. Joseph's Hospital expects St. Joseph's Hospital South to reach its utilization as projected in CON Application No. 9833, notwithstanding the decline in population growth and the proposed establishment of SB's proposed replacement hospital, although the achievement of projected utilization may be extended. There are examples of Florida hospitals operating successfully in close proximity. The evidence at hearing included examples where existing unaffiliated acute care hospitals in Florida operate within three miles of each another; in two of those, the two hospitals are less than one-half mile apart. These hospitals have been in operation for years. However, some or all of the examples preceded CON review. There are also demographic differences and other unique factors in the service areas in the five examples that could explain the close proximity of the hospitals. Also, in three of the five examples, at least one of the hospitals had an operating loss and most appeared underutilized. One such example, however, is pertinent in this case: Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and Capital Regional Medical Center (CRMC) in Tallahassee, which are approximately six minutes apart by car. CRMC was formerly Tallahassee Community Hospital (TCH), a struggling, older facility with a majority of semi-private patient rooms, similar to South Bay. Sharon Roush, SB's current CEO, became CEO at TCH in 1999. As she explained at hearing, HCA was able to successfully replace the facility outright on the same parcel of land. TCH was renamed CRMC and re-opened as a state-of-the-art hospital facility with all private rooms. The transformation improved the hospital's quality of care and its attractiveness to patients, better enabling it to compete with Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General also contend that SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. When the application was filed in 2007, Sun City Center residents in zip code 33573 accounted for approximately 52% of all acute care discharges to SB and SB had a 69% market share. By 2009, Sun City Center residents accounted for approximately 57% of all SB discharges and SB had approximately 72% market share. Approximately half of the age 65-plus residents in the service area reside within the Sun City Center area. This was true in 2010 and will continue to be true in 2015. The projected percentage of the total population in the Sun City Center zip code over 65 for 2009-2010 is approximately 87%. This percentage is expected to grow to approximately 91% by 2015. Sun City Center also has a high percentage of residents who are over the age of 75. Demand for acute care hospital services is largely driven by the age of the population. The age 65-plus population utilizes acute-care hospital services at a rate that is approximately two to three times that of the age 64 and younger population. South Bay plans to relocate its hospital from the Sun City Center zip code 33573 much closer to an area (Riverview covering three zip codes) that has a less elderly population. Elderly patients are known to have more transportation difficulties than other segments of the population, particularly with respect to night driving and congested traffic in busy areas. Appropriate transportation services for individuals who are transportation disadvantaged typically require door-to- door pickup, but may vary from community to community. At the time of preliminary approval of SB's proposed relocation, the Agency was not provided and did not take into consideration data reflecting the percentage of persons in Sun City Center area who are aged 65 or older or aged 75 and older. The Agency was not provided data reflecting the number of residents within the Sun City Center area who reside in nursing homes or assisted living facilities. In general, the 2010 median household incomes and median home values for the residents of Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Gibsonton are materially less than the income and home values for the residents from the other service areas. Freedom Village is located near Sun City Center and within walking distance to SB. Freedom Village is comprises a nursing home, assisted living, and senior independent living facilities, and includes approximately 120 skilled nursing facility beds, 90 assisted living beds, and 30 Alzheimer's beds. Freedom Village is home to approximately 1,500 people. There are additional skilled nursing and assisted living facilities within one to two miles of SB comprising approximately an additional 400 to 500 skilled nursing facility beds and approximately 1,500 to 2,000 residents in assistant or independent living facilities. Residents in skilled nursing facilities and assisted living facilities generally require a substantial level of acute- care services on an ongoing basis. Many patients 65 and older requiring admission to an acute-care facility have complex medical conditions and co-morbidities such that immediate access to inpatient acute care services is of prime importance. Area patients and caregivers travel to SB via a golf cart to access outpatient health care services and to obtain post-discharge follow-up care. Although there are some crossing points along SR 674, golf carts are not allowed on SR 674 itself, and the majority of Sun City Center residents who utilize SB in its existing location do not arrive by golf cart -– rather, they travel by automobile. The Sun City Center area has a long–established culture of volunteerism. Residents of Sun City Center provide a substantial number of man-hours of volunteer services to community organizations, including SB. Among the many services provided by community volunteers is the Sun City Center Emergency Squad, an emergency medical transport service that operates three ambulances and provides EMT and basic life support transport services in Sun City Center 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The Emergency Squad provides emergency services free of charge, but charges patients for transport which is deemed a non-emergency. Most patients transported by the Emergency Squad are taken to the SB ED. It is customary for specialists to locate their offices adjacent to an acute-care hospital. Most of the specialty physicians on the medical staff of SB have full-time or part-time offices adjacent to SB. The location of physician offices adjacent to the hospital facilitates access to care by patients in the provision of care on a timely basis by physicians. The relocation of SB may result in the relocation of physician offices currently operating adjacent to SB in Sun City Center, which may cause additional access problems for local residents. In 2009, the SB ED had approximately 22,000 patient visits. Approximately 25% of the patients that visit the South Bay ED are admitted for inpatient care. South Bay recently expanded its ED to accommodate approximately 34,000 patient visits annually. The average age of patients who visit the South Bay ED is approximately 70. Patients who travel by ambulance may or may not experience undue transportation difficulties as a result of the proposed relocation of SB; however, patients also arrive at the South Bay ED by private transportation. But, most patients are transported to the ED by automobile or emergency transport. In October 2010, the Board of Directors of the Sun City Center Association adopted a resolution on behalf of its 11,000 members opposing the closure of SB. The Board of Directors and membership of Federation of Kings Point passed a similar resolution on behalf of its members. Residents of the Sun City Center area currently enjoy easy access to SB in part because the roadways are low-volume, low-speed, accessible residential streets. SR 674 is the only east-west roadway connecting residents of the Sun City Center area to I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The section of SR 674 between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301 is a four-lane divided roadway with a speed limit of 40-45 mph. To access Big Bend Road from the Sun City Center area, residents travel east on SR 674 then north on U.S. Highway 301 or west on SR 674 then north on I-75. U.S. Highway 301 is a two-lane undivided roadway from SR 674 north to Balm Road, with a speed limit of 55 mph and a number of driveways and intersections accessing the roadway. (Two lanes from Balm Road South, then widened to six lanes from Balm Road North.) U.S. Highway 301 is a busy and congested roadway, and there is a significant backup of traffic turning left from U.S. Highway 301 onto Big Bend Road. A portion of U.S. Highway 301 is being widened to six lanes, from Balm Road to Big Bend Road. The widening of this portion of U.S. Highway 301 is not likely to alleviate the backup of traffic at Big Bend Road. I-75 is the only other north-south alternative for residents of the Sun City Center area seeking access to Big Bend Road. I-75 is a busy four-lane interstate with a 70 mph speed limit. The exchange on I-75 and Big Bend Road is problematic not only because of traffic volume, but also because of the unusual design of the interchange, which offloads all traffic on the south side of Big Bend Road, rather than divide traffic to the north and south as is typically done in freeway design. The design of the interchange at I-75 in Big Bend Road creates additional backup and delays for traffic seeking to exit onto Big Bend Road. St. Joseph's Hospital commissioned a travel (drive) time study that compared travel times to SB's existing location and to its proposed location from three intersections within Sun City Center. This showed an increase of between seven and eight minutes' average travel time to get to the proposed location as compared to the existing location of SB. The study corroborated SB's travel time analysis, included in its CON application, which shows four minutes to get to SB from the "centroid" of zip code 33573 (Sun City Center) and 11 minutes to get to SB's proposed location from that centroid, or a difference of seven minutes. The St. Joseph's Hospital travel time study also sets forth the average travel times from the three Sun City Center intersections to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop, as follows: Intersection Using I-75 Using U.S. 301 South Pebble Beach Blvd. and Weatherford Drive 12 min. 17 secs. 14 min. 19 secs. Kings Blvd. and Manchester Woods Drive 15 min. 44 secs. 20 min. 39 secs. North Pebble Beach Blvd. and Ft. Dusquesna Drive 13 min. 15 secs. 15 min. 41 secs. The average travel time from Wimauma (Center Street and Delia Street) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 16 seconds using I-75 and 13 minutes and 52 seconds using U.S. Highway 301, an increase of more than six minutes to the proposed site. The average travel time from Ruskin (7th Street and 4th Avenue SW) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 22 seconds using U.S. 41 and 14 minutes and 15 seconds using I-75, an increase of more than five minutes to the proposed site. Currently, the average travel time from Sun City Center to Big Bend Road using U.S. Highway 301 is approximately to 16 minutes. The average travel time to Big Bend Road via I-75 assuming travel with the flow of traffic is approximately 13 minutes. The incremental increase in travel time to the proposed site for SB for residents of the Sun City Center area, assuming travel with the flow of traffic, ranges from nine to 11 minutes. For residents who currently access SB in approximately five to 10 minutes, travel time to Big Bend Road is approximately 15 to 20 minutes. As the area develops, traffic is likely to continue to increase. There are no funded roadway improvements beyond the current widening of U.S. Highway 301 north of Balm Road. Most of the roadways serving Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma have a county-adopted Level of Service (LOS) of "D." LOS designations range from "A" to "F", with "F" considered gridlock. Currently, Big Bend Road from Simmons Loop Road (the approximate location of SB's propose replacement hospital) to I-75 is at LOS "F" with an average travel speed of less than mph. Based on a conservative analysis of the projected growth in traffic volume, SR 674 east of U.S. Highway 301 is projected to degrade from LOS "C" to "F" by 2015. By 2020, several additional links on SR 674 will have degraded to LOS "F." The LOS of I-75 is expected to drop to "D" in the entirety of Big Bend Road between U.S. Highway 301 and I-75 is projected to degrade to LOS "F" by 2020. The Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department (Rescue Department) opposes the relocation of SB to Big Bend Road. The Rescue Department supports SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but does not support the closure of SB in Sun City Center. The Rescue Department anticipates that the relocation of SB will result in a reduction in access to emergency services for patients and increased incident response times for the Rescue Department. The Rescue Department would support a freestanding ED should SB relocate. David Travis, formerly (until February 2010) the rescue division chief of the Rescue Department, testified against SB's proposal. The basis of his opposition is his concern that relocating the hospital from Sun City Center to Riverview would tend to increase response times for rescue units operating out of the Sun City Center Fire Station. The term response time refers to the time from dispatch of the rescue unit to its arrival on the scene for a given call. Mr. Travis noted that rescue units responding from the Sun City Center Fire Station would make a longer drive (perhaps seven to eight minutes) to the new location in Riverview to the extent that hospital services are needed, and during the time of transportation would necessarily be unavailable to respond to another call. However, Mr. Travis had not specifically quantified increases in response times for Sun City Center's rescue units in the event that SB relocates. Further, SB is not the sole destination for the Rescue Department's Sun City Center rescue units. While a majority of the patients were transported to SB, out of the total patient transports from the greater Sun City Center area in 2009, approximately one-third went to other hospitals other than SB, including St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa General, and Brandon. The Rescue Department is the only advanced life support (ALS) ground transport service in the unincorporated areas of Hillsborough County responding to 911 calls. The ALS vehicles provide at least one certified paramedic on the vehicle, cardiac monitors, IV medications, advanced air way equipment, and other services. The Rescue Department has two rescue units in south Hillsborough County - Station 17 in Ruskin and Station 28 in Sun City Center. (Station 22 is in Wimauma, but does not have a rescue unit.) Stations 17 and 28 run the majority of their calls in and around the Sun City Center area, with the majority of transports to the South Bay ED. The Rescue Department had 3,643 transports from the Sun City Center area in 2009, with 54.5% transports to SB. If SB is relocated to Big Bend Road, the rescue units for Stations 17 and 28 are likely to experience longer out-of- service intervals and may not be as readily available for responding to calls in their primary service area. The Rescue Department seeks to place an individual on the scene within approximately seven minutes, 90% of the time (an ALS personnel goal) in the Sun City Center area. Relocation of SB out of Sun City Center may make it difficult for the Rescue Department to meet this response time, notwithstanding the proximity of I-75. A rapid response time is critical to providing quality care. The establishment of a freestanding ED in Sun City Center would not completely alleviate the Rescue Department's concerns, including a subset of patients who may need to be transported to a general acute care facility. There are other licensed emergency medical service providers in Hillsborough County, with at least one basic life support EMS provider in Sun City Center. The shuttle service proposed by SB may not alleviate the transportation difficulties experienced by the patients and caregivers of Sun City Center. Also, SB has not provided a plan for the scope or method of the provisional shuttle services. Six residents of Sun City Center testified against SB's proposed relocation to Riverview, including Ed Barnes, president of the Sun City Center Community Association. Mr. Barnes and two other Sun City Center residents (including Donald Schings, president of the Handicapped Club, Sun City Center) spoke in favor of St. Joseph's Hospital's proposed hospital in Riverview at a public land-use meeting in July 2010, thus demonstrating their willingness to travel to Riverview for hospital services. Mr. Barnes supported St. Joseph's Hospital's proposal for a hospital in Riverview since its inception in 2005, when St. Joseph's Hospital filed CON Application No. 9833 and thought that St. Joseph's Hospital South would serve the Sun City Center area. There are no public transportation services per se available within the Sun City Center area. Volunteer transportation services are provided. In part, the door-to-door services are provided under the auspices of the Samaritan Services, a non-profit organization supported by donations and staffed by Sun City Center volunteers. It is in doubt whether these services would continue if SB is relocated. There is a volunteer emergency squad using a few vehicles that responds to emergency calls within the Sun City Center area, with SB as the most frequent destination. Approval of SB's project will not necessarily enhance financial access to acute care services. The relocation of SB is more likely than not to create some access barriers for low- income residents of the service area. The relocation would also be farther away from communities such as Ruskin and Wimauma as there are no buses or other forms of public transportation available in Ruskin, Sun City Center, or Wimauma. However, it appears that the Sun City Center residents would travel not only to Riverview, but north of Riverview for hospital services following SB's relocation, notwithstanding the fact that Sun City Center residents are transportation- disadvantaged. The Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners recently amended the Comprehensive Land-Use Plan and adopted the Greater Sun City Center Community Plan, which, in part, lists the retention of an acute care hospital in the Sun City Center area as the highest health care planning priority. For Sun City Center residents who may not want to drive to SB's new location, SB will provide a shuttle bus, which can convey both non-emergency patients and visitors. South Bay has made the provision of the shuttle bus a condition of its CON. As noted herein, the CON's other conditions are the establishment of the replacement hospital at the site in Riverview; combined Medicaid and charity care in the amount of 7.0% of gross revenues; and maintaining a freestanding ED at SB. SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. Section 408.035(3): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care South Bay has a record of providing high quality of care at its existing hospital. It is accredited by JCAHO, and also accredited as a primary stroke center and chest pain center. In the first quarter of 2010, SB scored well on "core measures" used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as an indicator of the quality of patient safety. South Bay received recognition for its infection control programs and successfully implemented numerous other quality initiatives. Patient satisfaction is high at SB. AHCA's view of the need for a replacement hospital is not limited according to whether or not the existing hospital meets broad quality indicators, such as JCAHO accreditation. Rather, AHCA recognizes the degree to which quality would be improved by the proposed replacement hospital -– and largely on that basis has consistently approved CON applications for replacement hospitals since at least 1991. See FOF 64-66. South Bay would have a greater ability to provide quality of care in its proposed replacement hospital. Private patient rooms are superior in terms of infection control and the patient's general well-being. The conceptual design for the hospital, included in the CON application, is the same evidence- based design that HCA used for Methodist Stone Oak Hospital, an award-winning, state-of-the-art hospital in San Antonio, Texas. Some rooms at SB are small, but SB staff and physicians are able, for the most part, to function appropriately and provide high quality of care notwithstanding. (The ICU is the exception, although it was said that patients receive quality of care in the ICU. See FOF 77-82.) Most of the rooms in the ED "are good size." Some residents are willing to give up a private room in order to have better access of care and the convenience of care to family members at SB's existing facility. By comparison, the alternative suggested by St. Joseph's Hospital does not use evidence-based design and involves gutting and rearranging roughly one-third of SB's existing interior; depends upon erecting a new patient tower that would require parking and stormwater capacity that SB currently does not have; requires SB's administration to relocate off-site during an indeterminate construction period; and involves estimated project costs that its witnesses did not disclose the basis of, claiming that the information was proprietary. South Bay's physicians are likely to apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Moreover, if SB remains at its current site, it is reasonable to expect that some number of those physicians would do less business at SB or leave the medical staff. Many of SB's physicians have their primary medical offices in Brandon, or otherwise north of Sun City Center. Further, many of the specialists at SB are also on staff at Brandon. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be more convenient for those physicians, in addition to having the allure of a new, state-of-the-art hospital. South Bay is struggling with its nursing vacancy rate, which was 12.3% for 2010 at the time of the hearing and had increased from 9.9% in 2009. The jump in nursing vacancies in 2010 substantially returned the hospital to its 2008 rate, which was 12.4%. As with its physicians, SB's nurses generally do not reside in the Sun City Center area giving its age restrictions as a retirement community; instead, they live further north in south Hillsborough County. In October 2007 when the application was filed, SB had approximately 105 employees who lived in Riverview. It is reasonable to expect that SB's nurses will be attracted to St. Joseph's Hospital South, a new, state-of-the-art hospital closer to where they live. Thus, if it is denied the opportunity to replace and relocate its hospital, SB could also expect to lose nursing staff to St. Joseph's Hospital South, increasing its nursing vacancy rate. Section 408.035(4): The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that Schedule 2 of SB's CON application was complete and required no proof at hearing. South Bay will not have to recruit nursing or physician staff for its proposed replacement hospital. Its existing medical and nursing staff would not change, and would effectively "travel" with the hospital to its new location. Conversely, the replacement hospital should enhance SB's ability to recruit specialty physicians, which is currently a challenge for SB in its existing facility. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of SB's proposed staffing for the replacement hospital as set out in Schedule 6A, but SJH and TG contend that the staffing schedule should also include full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) for the freestanding ED that SB proposes to maintain at its existing hospital. This contention is addressed in the Conclusions of Law, concerning application completeness under section 408.037, at COL 356-57. South Bay has sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation. The project cost will be underwritten by HCA, which has adequate cash flow and credit opportunities. It is reasonable that SB's project will be adequately funded if the CON is approved. Section 408.035(5): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The specific area that SB primarily serves, and would continue to serve, is the service area in south Hillsborough County as identified in its application and exhibits. The discussion in section IV.B., supra, is applicable to this criterion and incorporated herein. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County; will be available to serve Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma; and will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center than it is at present. However, while the relocated facility will be available to the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area, access for these future patients will be reduced from current levels given the increase in transportation time, whether it be by emergency vehicle or otherwise. Section 408.035(6): The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate or "short-term" financial feasibility is the ability of the applicant to secure the funds necessary to capitalize and operate the proposed project. The project cost for SB's proposed replacement hospital is approximately $200 million. The costs associated with the establishment and operation of the freestanding ED and other services were not included in the application, but for the reasons stated herein, were not required to be projected in SB's CON application. South Bay demonstrated the short-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The estimated project cost has declined since the filing of the application in 2007, meaning that SB will require less capital than originally forecast. While Mr. Miller stated that he does not have authority to bind HCA to a $200 million capital project, HCA has indicated that it will provide full financing for the project, and that it will go forward with the project if awarded the CON. Long-term financial feasibility refers to the ability of a proposed project to generate a profit in a reasonable period of time. AHCA has previously approved hospital proposals that showed a net profit in the third year of pro forma operation or later. See generally Cent. Fla. Reg. Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. & Oviedo HMA, Inc., Case No. 05-0296CON (Fla. DOAH Aug. 23, 2006; Fla. AHCA Jan. 1, 2007), aff'd, 973 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). To be conservative, SB's projections, updated for purposes of hearing, take into account the slower population growth in south Hillsborough County since the application was originally filed. South Bay also assumed that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be built and operational by 2015. The net effect, as accounted for in the updated projections, is that SB's replacement hospital will have 28,168 patient days in year 1 (2015); 28,569 patient days in year 2 (2016); and 29,582 patient days in year 3 (2017). That patient volume is reasonable and achievable. With the updated utilization forecast, SB projects a net profit for the replacement hospital of $711,610 in 2015; $960,693 in 2016; and $1,658,757 in 2017. The financial forecast was done, using revenue and expense projections appropriately based upon SB's own most recent (2009) financial data. Adjustments made were to the payor mix and the degree of outpatient services, each of which would change due to the relocation to Riverview. The revenue projections for the replacement hospital were tested for reasonableness against existing hospitals in SB's peer group, using actual financial data as reported to AHCA. St. Joseph's Hospital opposed SB's financial projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert did not take issue with SB's forecasted market growth. Rather, it was suggested that there was insufficient market growth to support the future patient utilization projections for St. Joseph's Hospital South and SB at its new location and, as a result, they would have a difficult time achieving their volume forecasts and/or they would need to draw patients from other hospitals, such as Brandon, in order to meet utilization projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert criticized the increase in SB's projected revenues in its proposed new location as compared to its revenues in its existing location. However, it appears that SB's payor mix is projected to change in the new location, with a greater percentage of commercial managed care, thus generating the greater revenue. South Bay's projected revenue in the commercial indemnity insurance classification was also criticized because SB's projected commercial indemnity revenues were materially overstated. That criticism was based upon the commercial indemnity insurance revenues of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General, which were used as a basis to "adjust" SB's projected revenue downward. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General's fiscal-year 2009 commercial indemnity net revenue was divided by their inpatient days, added an inflation factor, and then multiplied the result by SB's year 1 (2015) inpatient days to recast SB's projected commercial indemnity net revenue. The contention is effectively that SB's commercial indemnity net revenue would be the same as that of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General. There is no similarity between the three hospitals in the commercial indemnity classification. The majority of SJH's and TG's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from inpatients rather than outpatient cases; whereas the majority of SB's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from outpatient cases rather than inpatients. This may explain why SB's total commercial indemnity net revenue is higher than SJH or TG, when divided by inpatient days. The application of the lower St. Joseph's Hospital-Tampa General per-patient-day number to project SB's experience does not appear justified. It is likely that SB's project will be financially feasible in the short and long-term. Section 408.035(7): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness South Bay and Brandon are the dominant providers of health care services in SB's service area. This dominance is likely to be eroded once St. Joseph's Hospital South is operational in and around 2015 (on Big Bend Road) if SB's relocation project is not approved. The proposed relocation of SB's facility will not change the geography of SB's service area. However, it will change SB's draw of patients from within the zip codes in the service area. The relocation of SB is expected to increase SB's market share in the three northern Riverview zip codes. This increase can be expected to come at the expense of other providers in the market, including TG and SJH, and St. Joseph's Hospital South when operational. The potential impact to St. Joseph's Hospital may be approximately $1.6 million based on the projected redirection of patients from St. Joseph's Hospital Main to St. Joseph's Hospital South, population growth in the area, and the relocation of SB. Economic impacts to TG are of record. Tampa General estimates a material impact of $6.4 million if relocation is approved. Notwithstanding, addressing "provider-based competition," AHCA in its SAAR noted: Considering the current location is effectively built out at 112 beds (according to the applicant), this project will allow the applicant to increase its bed size as needed along with the growth in population (the applicant's schedules begin with 144 beds in year one of the project). This will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues and allow the applicant and its affiliates the opportunity to maintain and/or increase its dominant market share. SB Ex. 12 at 55. AHCA's observation that replacement and relocation of SB "will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues" has taken on a new dimension since the issuance of the SAAR. At that time, St. Joseph's Hospital did not have final approval of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It is likely that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be operational on Big Bend Road, and as a result, SB, at its existing location, will experience a diminished market share, especially from the Riverview zip codes. In 2015 (when St. Joseph's Hospital proposes to open St. Joseph's Hospital South), SB projects losing $2,669,335 if SB remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share. The losses are projected to increase to $3,434,113 in 2016 and $4,255,573 in 2017. It follows that the losses would be commensurately more severe at the 30% to 40% loss of market share that SB expects if it remains in Sun City Center. St. Joseph's Hospital criticized SB's projections for its existing hospital if it remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share; however, the criticism was not persuasively proven. It was assumed that SB's expenses would decrease commensurately with its projected fewer patient days, thus enabling it to turn a profit in calendar year 2015 despite substantially reduced patient service revenue. However, it was also stated that expenses such as hospital administration, pharmacy administration, and nursing administration, which the analysis assumed to be variable, in fact have a substantial "fixed" component that does not vary regardless of patient census. South Bay would not, therefore, pay roughly $5 million less in "Administration and Overhead" expenses in 2015 as calculated. To the contrary, its expenses for "Administration and Overhead" would most likely remain substantially the same, as calculated by Mr. Weiner, and would have to be paid, notwithstanding SB's reduced revenue. The only expenses that were recognized as fixed by SJH's expert, and held constant, were SB's calendar year 2009 depreciation ($3,410,001) and short-term interest ($762,738), shown in the exhibit as $4,172,739 both in 2009 and 2015. Other expenses in SJH's analysis are fixed, but were inappropriately assumed to be variable: for example, "Rent, Insurance, Other," which is shown as $1,865,839 in 2009, appears to decrease to $1,462,059 in 2015. The justification offered at hearing, that such expenses can be re-negotiated by a hospital in the middle of a binding contract, is not reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert opined that SB's estimate of a 30 to 40% loss of market share (if SB remained in Sun City Center concurrent with the operation of St. Joseph's Hospital South) was "much higher than it should be," asserting that the loss would not be that great even if all of SB's Riverview discharges went to St. Joseph's Hospital South. (Mr. Richardson believes the "10 to 20 percent level is likely reasonable," although he opines that a 5 to 10% impact will likely occur.) However, this criticism assumes that a majority of the patients that currently choose SB would remain at SB at its existing location. The record reflects that Sun City Center area residents actively supported the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South, thus suggesting that they might use the new facility. Further, SB's physicians are likely to join the medical staff of St. Joseph's Hospital South to facilitate that utilization or to potentially lose their patients to physicians with admitting privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Tampa General's expert also asserted that SB would remain profitable if it remained in its current location, notwithstanding the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It was contended that SB's net operating revenues per adjusted patient day increased at an annual rate of 5.3% from 2005 to 2009, whereas the average annual increase from 2009 to 2017 in SB's existing hospital projections amounts to 1.8%. On that basis, he opined that SB should be profitable in 2017 at its existing location, notwithstanding a loss in market share to St. Joseph's Hospital South. However, the 5.3% average annual increase from 2005 to 2009 is not necessarily predictive of SB's future performance, and the evidence indicated the opposite. Tampa General's expert did not examine SB's performance year-by-year from 2005 to 2009, but rather compared 2005 and 2009 data to calculate the 5.3% average annual increase over the five-year period. This analysis overlooks the hospital's uneven performance during that time, which included operating losses (and overall net losses) in 2005 and 2007. Further, the evidence showed that the biggest increase in SB's net revenue during that five-year period took place from 2008 to 2009, and was largely due to a significant decrease in bad debt in 2009. SB Ex. 16 at 64. (Bad debt is accounted for as a deduction from gross revenue: thus, the greater the amount of bad debt, the less net revenue all else being equal; the lesser the amount of bad debt, the greater the amount of net revenue all else being equal.) The evidence further showed that the 2009 reduction in bad debt and the hospital's profitability that year, is unlikely to be repeated. Overall, approval of the project is more likely to increase competition in the service area between the three health care providers/systems. Denial of the project is more likely to have a negative effect on competition in the service area, although it will continue to make general acute care services available and accessible to the Sun City Center area elderly (and family and volunteer support). Approval of the project is likely to improve the quality of care and cost-effectiveness of the services provided by SB, but will reduce access for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services who will be required to be transported by emergency vehicle or otherwise to one of the two Big Bend Road hospitals, unless needed services, such as open heart surgery, are only available elsewhere. For example, if a patient presents to SB needing balloon angioplasty or open heart surgery, the patient is transferred to an appropriate facility such as Brandon. The presence of an ED on the current SB site may alleviate the reduction in access somewhat for some acute care services, although the precise nature and extent of the proposed services were not explained with precision. If its application is denied, SB expects to remain operational so long as it remains financially viable. Section 408.035(8): The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision, were reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General did not stipulate concerning the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction, and take the position that SB should renovate and expand its existing facility rather than replace and relocate the facility. Whether section 408.035(8) requires consideration (weighing and balancing with other statutory criteria) of potential renovation costs as alternatives to relocation was hotly debated in this case. For the reasons stated herein, it is determined that this subsection, in conjunction with other statutory criteria, requires consideration of potential renovation versus replacement of an existing facility. St. Joseph's Hospital offered expert opinion that SB could expand and upgrade its existing facility for approximately $25 million. These projected costs include site work; site utilities; all construction, architectural, and engineering services; chiller; air handlers; interior design; retention basins; and required movable equipment. This cost is substantially less than the approximate $200 million cost of the proposed relocation. It was proven that there are alternatives to replacing SB. There is testimony that if SB were to undertake renovation and expansion as proposed by SJH, such upgrades would improve SB's competitive and financial position. But, the alternatives proposed by SJH and TG are disfavored by SB and are determined, on this record, not to be reasonable based on the institutional- specific needs of SB. Section 408.035(9): The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Approval of SB's application will not significantly enhance access to Medicaid, charity, or underserved population groups. South Bay currently provides approximately 4% of its patient days to Medicaid beneficiaries and about 1% to charity care. South Bay's historic provision of services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent is reasonable in view of its location in Sun City Center, which results in a disproportionate share of Medicare in its current payor mix. South Bay also does not offer obstetrics, a service which accounts for a significant degree of Medicaid patient days. South Bay proposes to provide 7% of its "gross patient revenue" to Medicaid and charity patients as part of its relocation. South Bay's proposed service percentage is reasonable. Section 408.035(10): The applicant's designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is not applicable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application No. 9992. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2011.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration should grant Mercy Medical Development Inc.'s certificate of need application to establish a 29-bed long-term acute care hospital- within-a-hospital in AHCA Health Planning Service District 11?
Findings Of Fact Long-term Acute Care Hospitals A long-term acute care hospital (an "LTACH") is an acute care hospital with an average length of stay of its patients that equals or exceeds 25 days. In contrast to an LTACH, the patients in a typical acute care hospital experience much shorter lengths of stay so that the average length of stay in a non-LTACH hospital is much less than 25 days. Characteristics of an LTACH that distinguish it from a non-LTACH acute care hospital flow from that single primary factor: prolonged length of stay. LTACH Services As to be expected from the long-lasting lengths of stay of its patients, LTACHs provide services associated with complex acute conditions that require extended care. For instance, an LTACH would typically serve patients that require ventilator assistance for a long time, in many cases, indefinitely. Other typical patients in an LTACH are those who have had procedures such as open heart surgery while medically compromised so that their recoveries take considerably longer than the average open heart surgery patient, patients with slow-healing wounds or complications arising from chronic lung disease, patients served by multiple invasive pumps, or patients in need of extended treatment by chemotherapy or intravenous antibiotic therapy. The services provided in an LTACH are distinct from those provided in a skilled nursing facility or rehabilitation unit for reasons other than the acuity level of the patient. Skilled nursing facilities generally are not oriented toward patients who need daily physician visits or intense nursing services or observation. Skilled nursing clinical personnel, moreover, are generally not experienced with long-term acute care patients' and their families' psychosocial needs demanded by acuity levels and durations of illness. Comprehensive medical rehabilitation hospitals are inappropriate venues for long-term acute care patients. Rehabilitation hospitals are geared toward the physical rehabilitation of patients. It is true that "[p]atients who have been debilitated because of their long-term illness require some physical therapy to assist in rehabilitating their muscle to get them back on their feet whenever possible." (Tr. 277). But long-term acute care patients, because of their conditions, are not able to tolerate the minimum three hours of physical rehabilitation therapy per day that is a regular part of treatment in a comprehensive medical rehabilitation hospital. In the universe of health care providers in the United States, therefore, long-term acute care hospitals are unique. "Hospital-within-a Hospital" An LTACH may be a free-standing facility or it may be located inside an existing hospital. When it is located inside an existing hospital, an LTACH is referred to as a hospital- within-a-hospital. Mercy Medical proposes that its LTACH be located within Mercy Medical Hospital in Miami, Florida. In other words, Mercy Medical proposes that the LTACH subject to CON Application 9462 be a hospital-within-a hospital. As a hospital-within-a hospital, Mercy Medical's LTACH will have an advantage over a free-standing LTACH. The location within a larger acute care hospital provides an environment in which a more intensive array of acute care services is immediately accessible to LTACH patients. For example, patients in Mercy Medical's LTACH will have immediate access to emergency services and the services of hospital-based physician specialists. The location of an LTACH within a larger acute care hospital also facilitates the appropriate utilization of LTACH services. Physicians are more comfortable transferring fragile patients into an LTACH when the transfer involves relocating the patient via hospital corridors rather than via ambulance. As a practical matter, moreover, an LTACH within a hospital makes it easier for the treating physician to continue to care for the patient following the patient's transfer from the acute care setting into the long-term acute care setting. PPS Exemption In 1982, when the prospective payment system ("PPS") was adopted by the federal government for Medicare reimbursement, long-term acute care hospitals were one of seven types of institutions exempted from the system. A decade or so later, another development occurred that is significant to this case. Regulations were promulgated defining conditions for an LTACH to operate as a hospital within a hospital as part of a continuum of care. The hospital-within-a-hospital concept was required if a hospital business organization was to receive the financial benefits of an LTACH within the setting of a larger acute care hospital (see paragraph 11, below) because long-term acute care cannot not take place within a unit in a hospital. "[T]here [is] no such thing as a long-term [acute] care hospital unit." (Tr. 575). As a specific category of hospitals under the Medicare regulations that is exempt from the DRG prospective payment system, LTACHs are attractive to hospital business organizations because the Medicaid reimbursement for LTACH services is much more favorable than the reimbursement under PPS received by acute care hospitals that are not LTACHs. Qualification for PPS Exemption To be exempt from PPS, there is a six-month period during which a prospective LTACH must show that it meets the Medicare requirements, including those related to average length of stay, for an LTACH. During these six months, the LTACH receives PPS Medicare reimbursement so that it usually operates at a loss. Other considerations related to the first two years of operation keep the LTACH from fully achieving the benefits of exemption until it has both qualified as exempt based on the initial six-month period and then completed the two full years of operation. Distribution of LTACHs There are eight LTACHs in the State of Florida, all of which are free-standing facilities. All eight are owned and operated by for-profit corporations, and seven are owned by the same for-profit corporation, Kindred Healthcare, Inc., the parent of Petitioner. The LTACHs in Florida are concentrated in areas of high population. One of 16 of AHCA's hospital health service planning districts, District 11, where Mercy Medical hopes to locate its LTACH, is the most populous health planning district in the State. Its population of "65 year of age and over" is approximately 305,000. Notwithstanding its populace, District 11 has only one LTACH, Kindred Coral Gables (one of three LTACHs operated by Kindred). Other less populated districts, District 6 and District 10 have two LTACHs. District 10, consisting of Broward County is immediately to the north of District 10. Of the two LTACHs in District 10, Kindred Hospital Fort Lauderdale and Kindred Hospital - Hollywood, the latter is the closest to Mercy Hospital. Approximately 15 to 20 miles away from each other, it takes between 30 minutes and an hour (depending on traffic) to travel the distance between Mercy Hospital and Kindred Hollywood. The Parties AHCA The Agency for Health Care Administration ("ACHA" or the "Agency") is responsible for the administration of the CON program in Florida under the Health Facility and Services Development Act," Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. Mercy Medical Mercy Medical Development, Inc., ("Mercy Medical") is the applicant for the proposed project. Mercy Medical is a subsidiary of Mercy Medical Hospital, Inc., ("Mercy Hospital"). A not-for-profit hospital, Mercy Hospital is the sole member of Mercy Medical. As the parent of Mercy Medical and its sole corporate member, Mercy Hospital controls Mercy Medical. At the time of hearing, no effort had been made to separate Mercy Development from Mercy Hospital. For example, no action had been taken to change the bylaws of the medical staff, or to hire a chief executive officer for Mercy Medical. It is appropriate, therefore (although the two must be separated prior to operation of the LTACH under applicable regulations), to find facts with regard to Mercy Medical's sole corporate member. Mercy Hospital is located in the southeastern portion of Miami-Dade County. Founded in 1950 under the administration of the Congregation of the Sisters of St. Joseph, a Roman Catholic religious organization, Mercy Hospital is a full-service general hospital. It has 512 licensed acute care beds and is accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. Mercy Hospital's mission is distilled into a statement of core values. Among these values is to "give priority to those whom society ignores." (Mercy Ex. 2). Together these values stand for a commitment to enhance quality of life through an integrated health care delivery system. Across its continuum of care, Mercy Hospital provides excellent quality of care for which it has been publicly recognized. Recently designated a Community Comprehensive Cancer Center by the American College of Surgeons, it was one of six hospitals in the eastern United States to win the Gallup Quality Award for inpatient satisfaction. The basis for the award was re-confirmed in the most-recent year before hearing when Mercy Hospital received the Systema Award as the hospital of choice in the community following a survey conducted by the Miami Chamber of Commerce. In furtherance of its mission and in recognition of the need for medical services across the continuum of care, Mercy Hospital operates a 15-bed inpatient hospice unit and provides home-based hospice services in affiliation with other community providers. It operates a 20-bed inpatient comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit and provides a full complement of outpatient comprehensive medical rehabilitation services. And it is part owner of a 120-bed skilled nursing facility. One full wing of Mercy Hospital is dedicated to providing acute care services to HIV-positive and AIDS patients on an outpatient basis (the "Special Immunology Unit.") All patients served in the unit have AIDS or are HIV-positive. The operation of the Special Immunology Unit illustrates the depth of Mercy Hospital's commitment to providing services to the dispossessed or patients who would otherwise be unable to obtain desperately needed medical care. In support and recognition of its commitment to AIDS and HIV-positive patients, the Ryan White Foundation has awarded Mercy Hospital funding to help support the Special Immunology Unit. The funding enables Mercy Hospital to extend its care beyond the provision of acute care in recognition that most of the patients in the Special Immunology Program have lost their jobs. As Sister Elizabeth Anne Worley explained at hearing, [I]n most cases . . . they've lost their jobs and therefore they've lost their insurance, so part of [the Ryan White] funding is used to continue to purchase insurance for them so they can remain with care. It also provides vouchers for electricity, food, transportation, to assist in home health [care and] provide medical services, and it's all part of an array of outpatient services that are managed through case managers for maximum efficiency, but providing for the patients in a setting . . . that's as appropriate and comfortable as possible. . . . [I]t has been a remarkable program for (Tr. 55). folks in our local area that did not have access to care otherwise. Beyond its Special Immunology Program, Mercy Hospital provides substantial acute and outpatient health care services to Medicaid-eligible, uninsured, under-insured, and indigent patients. Historically, Mercy Hospital has provided substantial amounts of un-reimbursed charity care though the hospital and through projects such as the St. John Bosco Clinic. In 2000, Mercy Hospital provided over $3.58 million in un-reimbursed medical care to Medicaid-eligible patients, and over $1.67 million in traditional charity care. At the time of hearing in October 2001, Mercy Hospital had provided over $4.48 million in un-reimbursed care to Medicaid-eligible patients and $947,430 in traditional charity care. To fulfill its healing mission as part of the church, Mercy Hospital strives to provide charitable community services at a level twice the value of the tax benefit derived from its not-for-profit status. In 2000, for example, it met this "challenge from the congregation" (tr. 70) it sets for itself. The value of Mercy Hospital's total tax exemption was $5.7 million. The value of its community service was $13.7 million. Kindred Kindred Hospitals East, LLC, d/b/a Kindred Hospital South Florida ("Kindred") operates three for-profit LTACHs: Kindred Hospital Coral Gables in Dade County, District 11, ("Kindred Coral Gables); Kindred Hospital Hollywood, in Broward County, District 10 ("Kindred Hollywood"); and Kindred Hospital Ft. Lauderdale, also in Broward County, District 10 ("Kindred Fort Lauderdale"). Kindred is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc., ("Kindred Healthcare") a publicly traded for- profit company. Kindred Healthcare and Kindred, together establish the majority of policies for Kindred's three South Florida LTACHs. Kindred Healthcare was formerly known as Vencor, Inc. ("Vencor"). In the fall of 1999, Vencor, Inc., and its subsidiary corporations filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Vencor emerged from bankruptcy in approximately April of 2001. The name change from Vencor to Kindred was adopted by the parent and the subsidiary corporations. Various Vencor entities and individuals associated with Vencor were the subject of a recent Florida investigation into allegations that Vencor had unlawfully evicted Medicaid patients from a Vencor facility in Tampa, Florida. The allegations against Vencor included the allegation that there had been a corporate decision by Vencor to stop treating or curtail the treatment of Medicaid patients for financial reasons. The investigation ultimately resulted in a settlement pursuant to which Vencor paid a fine in the amount of $270,000 (i.e., $5,000 for each of the 54 Medicaid patients who were allegedly evicted). Vencor was also the subject of a companion federal investigation relating to such allegations, which was resolved by Vencor's payment of a fine to the federal government of $113,000. The Medicaid eviction matter also resulted in a class action lawsuit against Vencor on behalf of the families of the Medicaid patients, and a criminal investigation of high-ranking officers of Vencor, including the senior vice-president in charge of the eastern hospital division of Kindred, which includes the Florida operations, and the chairman of the board and chief executive officer of the parent corporation. Vencor and its subsidiaries were also the subject of a broad Medicare/Medicaid fraud and abuse investigation which was initiated by the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG), in part as a result of a qui tam lawsuit relating to a Vencor LTACH in Tampa, Florida. The original allegations centered around Medicare cost report fraud. The investigation also included allegations that quality of care at Vencor facilities was poor. In particular, the government alleged that Kindred failed to staff its facilities adequately and failed to meet dietary needs of some of its residents. As part of the Medicare fraud and abuse investigation, the Medicare program sought to recover millions of dollars in overpayments made to Vencor facilities nationwide. As part of its bankruptcy proceeding, Vencor entered into a settlement agreement with the federal government settling the Medicare fraud and abuse allegations. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Vencor agreed to pay the federal government $219 million, $90 million of which represented Medicare overpayments received by Vencor. As part of the settlement agreement, Vencor also entered into a corporate integrity agreement with the OIG which applies to all Kindred entities nationwide, including the Florida facilities operating under Kindred, i.e., Kindred Coral Gables, Kindred Hospital Hollywood, and Kindred Ft. Lauderdale. The corporate integrity agreement requires Kindred to educate its employees about financial and quality-of-care issues. The corporate integrity agreement also requires Kindred to put in place a comprehensive internal quality improvement program, including specific steps which must be taken to improve quality of care at Kindred facilities nationwide. Pursuant to the corporate integrity agreement, Kindred also is required to enhance its internal financial controls to promote compliance with the Medicare guidelines on hospital reimbursement. The corporate integrity agreement includes potential sanctions for failure to comply, including the exclusion of Kindred from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Filing of Mercy Medical's LOI and CON Application Mercy Medical timely filed its letter of intent and CON application containing its proposal with AHCA and the local health council. Consolidated financial statements for Mercy Hospital, Inc., in the CON application contained separately audited financial information for Mercy Medical. The financial information submitted by Mercy Medical contained sufficient information to allow a thorough and accurate assessment of the financial viability of Mercy Medical as an applicant, as well as the feasibility of Mercy Medical's Proposal. Mercy Medical's Proposal Mercy Medical proposes to establish a 29-bed LTACH within Mercy Hospital. The LTACH is proposed to be located on the fourth floor west wing of Mercy Hospital, in a unit known as "Four West." Four West is currently a 29-bed medical-surgical unit of the existing acute care hospital. Mercy Hospital has agreed to delicense the 29 acute care beds in Four West upon approval of Mercy Medical's LTACH CON application. Additional description of the proposal is found in Section C., of Mercy Medical's application, entitled "Project Summary": The proposed long-term care hospital will be located on the fourth floor of Mercy Hospital in Miami at 3663 South Miami Avenue, Dade County, District 11. The facility will consist of approximately 12,200 square feet of unused hospital space, which is comprised of three single patient rooms, 10 semi- private rooms, two isolation rooms and a four-bed ventilator unit. The applicant agrees to condition award of the certificate of need on the following: A minimum of five percent of inpatient days will be provided for the treatment of Medicaid patients. A four-bed ventilator unit for the treatment of patients who are ventilator- dependent. The delicensure of 29 of Mercy Hospital's acute care beds upon the receipt of the CON to establish 29 long-term care beds. Edward J. Rosasco, Jr., President and CEO of Mercy Hospital provided a letter stating that should the applicant be granted the CON, the hospital would immediately seek to delicense 29 beds. The proposed project cost is $56,765 and will involve 791 GSF of renovation and $28,000 in renovation cost. (Mercy Ex. 19, p. 2). The rules of AHCA do not provide a numeric need methodology for LTACHs. An LTACH applicant, therefore, is required to submit its own methodology to support the need for its proposed project. Mercy Medical's application presents four bed need methodologies: the first, a "discharge-based" methodology; the second, a "population-based LTACH bed need" methodology; the third, that focuses on the number of LTACH patient days in Florida per 1000 age 65-and-over population; and, a fourth that uses a model assessment pioneered by the State of Tennessee. All four produced a need for beds dependent on occupancy rates that ranged from 91 to 666 beds. Subtracting the 53 existing LTACH beds at Kindred Coral Gables yields a range of new beds needed or net need derived from the four methodologies between 38 and 607. Of the four, the third methodology offered by Mercy Medical is the most conservative. It is a methodology commonly used by health planners in projecting the need for additional beds within a service category in a particular district. Kindred relied upon the same methodology in its recently filed CON application for additional LTACH beds at its facility in St. Petersburg, District 5. The third of the four methodologies derives a use rate for LTACH beds based on the utilization rates of the age 65-and- over population in those districts in which LTACH facilities are located. The methodology does not include "use rates" from districts that do not have access to LTACH services because to do so would artificially skew downward the expected use rate for LTACH beds in District 11. Deriving a utilization rate for LTACH services in the manner of the third methodology yields a realistic and meaningful utilization rate for LTACH beds. The third methodology is a reasonable methodology for determining need for LTACH beds in District 11. It reasonably produces a need for new LTACH beds in District 11 of 70, that is, the result of the subtraction of the 53 existing LTACH beds at Kindred Coral Gables from the need for 123 beds at an 85% occupancy rate in District 11 produced by the methodology. Mercy Medical hopes to meet the need for new LTACH beds in District 11 through a demonstration that its proposed 29-bed project meets CON review criteria. Kindred hopes that its case at hearing will establish that, on balance, Mercy Medical does not meet the CON review criteria or that the project is defeated by failure to comply with applicable rules. Utilization, Availability and Accessibility A review of pertinent data shows that all eight of the existing long-term acute care hospitals in Florida are well utilized. Overall, LTACH beds in the state were utilized at 76% occupancy in 1999 and close to 77% occupancy in 2000. In particular, Kindred Coral Gables in District 11 has experienced high utilization rates. Those rates have been high over an extended period of time. For some years, they have been extremely, unacceptably, high. In 1998, Kindred Coral Gables had an overall occupancy rate of 92.4% and a med-surg occupancy rate of 94%. In 1999, Kindred Coral Gables experienced 93% occupancy overall and 100% med-surg occupancy. In 2000, Kindred Coral Gables experienced 87% overall occupancy and 94% med-surg occupancy. For 2001 through the time of hearing as determined from available data, Kindred Coral Gables' occupancy rate had dropped to the 83 to 84% range. Although lower than the high occupancy rates observed over an extended period of time, such a rate is still high. There is, moreover, nothing in the health care environment in District 11 that indicates demand for LTACH services should have diminished in 2001. As Daniel Sullivan, expert in health care planning, testified in hearing when queried about the lower 2001 rate: [A]ll the indicators that I reviewed [indicated] . . . that the need is still strong. I can only assume that whatever reason the access went down is more internal to Kindred and their decisions about how they're going to utilize their facility than it does about the external needs of the population. (Tr. 402). High occupancy levels at Kindred Coral Gables limit access to LTACH services for a significant number of residents of District 11. Kindred's expected return to high occupancy rates, like the 87 to 98 percent occupancy rates experienced over an extended period of time, renders Kindred Coral Gables inadequate to absorb either the existing or reasonably anticipated demand for LTACH services in District 11. In addition, as a result of Kindred Coral Gables' admission policies, there is a significant underserved population in District 11. Underserved Populations in District 11 Although the only provider of LTACH services in Dade County, Kindred Coral Gables has consistently refused to admit patients appropriate for long-term acute care who do not have sufficient Medicare-reimbursable days remaining to cover the anticipated length of stay, or who are uninsured, underinsured, or have Medicaid as their only source of funding. Kindred Coral Gables has made it clear to discharge planners at Mercy Hospital that Kindred Coral Gables does not admit Medicaid patients who have no other source of funding. Mercy Hospital's discharge planners, therefore, typically focus their attention and resources on alternative solutions for such patients, rather than attempting to refer patients who are eligible for Medicaid, but not eligible for Medicare, to Kindred Coral Gables. The result of Kindred Coral Gables' admission practice and policies is that Mercy Hospital has had great difficulty placing numerous patients who need LTACH services at Kindred Coral Gables. The financial positions of these patients coupled with Kindred Coral Gables' admission policies constitute financial barriers that prevent access to service in District 11 for a significant population of patients. Barriers to Access for Medicaid-Eligible Patients That barriers to District 11 LTACH services exist for Medicaid patients is obvious. In 1998 and 1999, Kindred Coral Gables reported zero Medicaid revenue. In 2000, Kindred Coral Gables reported minimal Medicaid revenues. It may be comfortably predicted that these barriers will come down if Mercy Medical's proposal is approved. Mercy Medical's sole corporate member, Mercy Hospital, has demonstrated a strong commitment to serve Medicaid patients. Mercy Medical intends to extend the mission of Mercy Hospital to Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH with respect to providing care to Medicaid-eligible and indigent patients. Barriers to Access for Medicare-Eligible Patients In addition to denying admission to Medicaid patients with no other source of funding, Kindred generally does not admit Medicare patients who have used up a large portion of their allowable acute care days under Medicare. In some instances, Medicare patients admitted to Kindred Coral Gables have had lengths of stay that exceeded their allowable acute care Medicare days, leaving only Medicaid as a source of reimbursement. These patients appear to account for the very small number of Medicaid or "charity" patient days reported by Kindred Coral Gables. Barriers to Access for Uninsured, Underinsured, Or Unfunded Patients In addition to denying access to Medicaid and Medicare patients who have used up their allowable acute care days, Kindred also does not admit patients who are uninsured, underinsured, or un-funded. Discharge planners at Mercy Hospital have been unable to obtain charity approvals from Kindred Coral Gables for uninsured or un-funded patients. Barriers to Access for Patients with Managed Care Insurance Even some patients with managed care insurance cannot gain admission to Kindred Coral Gables, as some managed care companies do not want their patients referred to Kindred Coral Gables, but prefer to keep such patients in a short-term acute care setting, notwithstanding their anticipated long length of stay. Kindred's Other Restrictive Admission Criteria Consistent with its focus on reimbursement, Kindred Coral Gables generally does not admit ventilator patients who are not weanable from a ventilator within a reasonable time. In practice, Kindred Coral Gables accepts very few of a large number of ventilator patients at Mercy Hospital who are eligible for long-term acute care. Other types of patients who require long- term acute care but whom Mercy Hospital is unable to place include patients who have slow-healing wounds; diabetic patients; patients with ischemic problems who are either receiving hyperbaric therapy, or who have received it and then are requiring very aggressive or ongoing wound care; and patients with end-stage congestive heart failure who often require weeks of treatment with IV medications and fairly intensive medical monitoring. There is a significant need for Mercy Medical's proposed 29-bed LTACH in District 11. As the most populous district in the state with a large and increasing population of elderly age 65 and older, District 11 is able to support both Kindred Coral Gables and Mercy Medical's proposed 29-bed LTACH. Alternatives Kindred Coral Gables One alternative to Mercy Medical's proposal is to preserve the status quo. But, in the absence of the proposal and the competition provided by Mercy Medical to Kindred Coral Gables, significant numbers of patients in District 11 will be denied access to LTACH services. Medicare patients with inadequate reimbursement days remaining, un-funded and uninsured patients, and patients not weanable from a ventilator are held at Mercy Hospital in an acute care bed, sometimes indefinitely, because they cannot gain admission to Kindred Coral Gables. Mercy Hospital has had a significant number of long-term ventilator patients who have stayed in the hospital for months or years, including a recent example in which Mercy Hospital provided acute care to a ventilator patient for three years. Mercy Hospital absorbs the extraordinary cost of care for its patients who could be discharged to an LTACH if one were available. Conservatively stated, the annual cost of un- reimbursed care provided by Mercy Hospital to long-term acute care patients is approximately $1.5 million. This cost represents a significant inefficiency in the delivery of long- term acute care services is District 11 and lost revenue in the context of Mercy Hospital's mission to extend needed care to Medicaid, indigent and dispossessed patients in the Miami area. The suggestion that Mercy Hospital continue to keep long-term acute care patients in the hospital, notwithstanding financial loss, is unreasonable. Every dollar lost is a dollar that cannot be used to treat the next patient-in-need who presents at Mercy Hospital. Kindred Coral Gables and the status quo are not reasonable alternatives to Mercy Medical's proposal. Aside from Kindred Coral Gables' historical high occupancy levels that prevent access for prospective LTACH patients and that are likely to return in the near future, there is a significant segment of the population in District 11, as found above in this order, that does not have access to Kindred Coral Gables because of its financial criteria for admission. Broward County LTACHs Of the two Broward County LTACHs, there is no contention that Kindred Fort Lauderdale is a reasonable alternative for Mercy Hospital patients. That leaves in District 10, Kindred Hollywood as an alternative to Mercy Medical's proposal. Kindred Hollywood's occupancy rates historically have been much lower than Kindred Coral Gables. In calendar year 1999, they were just under 65%; in calendar year 2000, 72.88%. Occupancy rates, while on the rise, are not the problem with Kindred Hollywood as an alternative. Kindred Hollywood is not a reasonable alternative to Mercy Medical's proposal for Mercy Hospital patients or to other south-central Dade County patients because of travel time from that area of Dade County to Kindred Hollywood. Mercy Hospital is located in south Dade County. Interstate 95, the main automobile and vehicular conduit from Dade County to Broward County, is often congested. Travel from Mercy Hospital to Broward County is particularly difficult for the elderly. Many of the patients who require placement in an LTACH are elderly and may have an elderly spouse. Special transportation services available to the elderly in Dade County do not cross the Dade County line into Broward County. The difficulty posed by travel from south and central Dade County to Broward County presents at least two different complications that undermine the LTACH patient's chance for recovery. First, it is likely the travel to Broward County will erode the support structure offered an LTACH patient by the family if the patient is from South or Central Dade County. Patients and their families have difficulty adjusting to the patient's status as an LTACH patient, as it is. The obstacle of difficult travel can prove too much for family members who want to support the LTACH patient. Second, physician-family relationships, the quality of which significantly affects the care of the LTACH patient, are disrupted when there is transfer from one physician to another. The patient's family often resists the transfer and the physician treating the chronically ill patient with complex medical conditions may resist the transfer of the patient to another physician, as well. The associated stress within the family and in the relationship with the physicians involved would in all likelihood be detrimental to the patient whose care is required to be transferred to another physician when the patient becomes an LTACH patient in Broward County, far, under the circumstances, from Central and South Dade County. The unreasonableness of Kindred's suggestion that Kindred Hollywood constitutes an alternative to Mercy Medical's proposal is evidenced by the fact that Kindred Hollywood has never admitted a patient from Mercy Hospital. No physician has ever asked Mercy Hospital's Director of Case Management to refer a patient to Kindred Hollywood. Nor has Kindred Coral Gables proposed such an admission. For at least the last 10 years, case managers from Kindred Coral Gables have never promoted Kindred Hollywood or Kindred Ft. Lauderdale as options for Mercy Hospital patients eligible for LTACH services who were denied admission to Kindred Coral Gables. Mt. Sinai Hospital Kindred alleges that a 20-bed unit at Mt. Sinai in which ventilator patients are treated constitutes a reasonable alternative to Mercy's proposed LTACH. Other than that Mt. Sinai is not licensed as an LTACH, there was no competent evidence at final hearing regarding the nature of the unit at Mt. Sinai. Based on general health planning principles, it is not appropriate to include these beds (in a classification of beds different from LTACH beds) as an alternative for a CON LTACH proposal in determining the need for the proposed project. Financial Feasibility Short-term The short-term financial feasibility of Mercy Medical's proposal depends upon Mercy Medical's ability to provide or obtain sufficient capital to fund its proposed project through the initial implementation and start-up stage. Mercy Medical's source of funds for its proposed project and its pre-existing capital commitments are pertinent to an analysis of the short- term financial feasibility of Mercy Medical's proposal. Mercy Hospital, Inc., will loan Mercy Medical the initial sum of $56,765 and any additional monies necessary to establish and operate Mercy Medical's proposed 29-bed LTACH. Mercy Hospital, Inc., has the financial wherewithal to fund Mercy Medical's project and to provide the additional financial support promised in its Notice of Financial Solvency included in Mercy Medical's CON application. In fiscal year 2000, Mercy Hospital, Inc., had a total gain of $4.8 million, with an operating gain of $1.3 million. For the same period, Mercy Hospital, Inc., had liquid assets in the amount of $59.9 million with current liabilities of $25 million, reflecting a better than two-to-one current ratio, and solid financial health. In addition, in 2000, Mercy Hospital, Inc., had a total of $43 million in restricted and escrowed funds that are available for capital expansion. Mercy Medical's audited financial statements also reflect its financial health. For fiscal year 2000, Mercy Medical had an operating gain of $1.1 million and a total gain of $1.9 million, with liquid assets of $4.8 million and current liabilities of $1.2 million. Accordingly, there is an adequate source of funding for the implementation and start-up of Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH. Mercy Medical's Capital Commitments In its SAAR, the Agency questioned whether Mercy Medical had capital expenditure projects applied for, pending, approved or underway that were not disclosed on Schedule 2 of Mercy Medical's CON application. Mercy Medical's capital expenditure requests must be approved for execution by the finance committee. In response to AHCA's inquiry, at the final hearing Mercy Medical identified four capital project proposals for Mercy Medical which were not approved by the finance committee at the time of filing of Mercy's CON application, and not required to be disclosed on Schedule 2 of Mercy Medical's CON application. An additional, fifth project, involving renovation of a nuclear cardiology facility, was approved and completed prior to the filing of Mercy's CON application in March 2001. Subsequent to Mercy Medical's filing of its CON application, one of the other four projects involving the replacement of darkroom cabinetry at an anticipated capital expenditure of $2,161, was presented to the finance committee. The remaining three projects, totaling $240,000, remained unapproved at the time of the final hearing. Had all five of these capital projects been included in Schedule 2 of Mercy Medical's CON application, the total capital expenditure commitment, upon approval of the projects in their entirety, would have been approximately $442,000. With current assets of $4.8 million and current liabilities of $1.2 million, capital expenditure commitments in the amount of $442,000 would not materially impact Mercy Medical's financial condition or the feasibility of Mercy Medical's proposal. Mercy Hospital and Mercy Medical have adequate financial wherewithal to ensure the short-term financial feasibility of Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH and the project thus is financially feasible in the short term. Long-term Financial Feasibility Long-term financial feasibility is assessed by an analysis of whether the proposed project will sustain itself by generating revenues in excess of expenses on an ongoing basis. The reasonableness of Mercy Medical's utilization projections, project costs, and revenue and expense projections are the primary factors bearing on the long-term feasibility of Mercy Medical's proposal. Mercy Medical's utilization projections are reasonable. Mercy Medical reasonably projects that it will achieve 60% utilization in the first year of operation and 77.6% occupancy in year two. Mercy Medical's most conservative bed-need methodology, discussed above, demonstrates that there is sufficient demand for LTACH services within District 11 to enable Mercy Medical to meet its utilization projections for its proposed project. In addition, Mercy Hospital will be a primary referral source for Mercy Medical's LTACH. Mercy Hospital has a fairly geriatric patient population which typically experiences advanced cardiac problems, pulmonary problems, and oncologic problems (problems related to cancer and bone marrow disorders). Within those categories, physicians at Mercy see patients with emphysema, patients with very severe asthmas, patients with skeletal deformities causing respiratory insufficiency, patients with congestive heart failure, patients with valvular disease, and patients with all manner of cancer and chemotherapy-related complications that require long-term acute care intervention. These patients are frequently candidates for long-term acute care hospitalization. On an annual basis, there are approximately 300 to 400 pulmonary patients at Mercy Hospital alone who would be candidates for long-term care. There are additional cardiac patients who would require long-term acute care hospitalization but who do not currently have access to Kindred Coral Gables. Because Mercy Hospital has difficulty placing these patients at Kindred Coral Gables, the majority remain as acute care patients within Mercy Hospital. Based on Mercy Medical's need analysis for the District as a whole, and the volume of patients at Mercy Hospital who would be candidates for admission to Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH, Mercy Medical's utilization projections, as shown on Schedule 5 of Mercy Medical's CON application, are reasonable. Mercy Medical's projected revenues for its proposed project through the second year of operation are reasonable. Mercy Medical's revenue projections are based in part upon Mercy Medical's exemption from the acute care inpatient PPS. Mercy Medical can seek exemption from PPS after six months of operation. During the initial six months of operation, Mercy Medical will receive Medicare reimbursement under the acute care PPS system. Medicare regulations set forth alternative methods of qualification for exemption from PPS for hospital-based LTACHs. Mercy will seek to qualify for exemption by limiting the amount of services the LTACH purchases from the host hospital to 15% of the LTACH's annualized operating expenses, not including the LTACH's lease payment to the host hospital. With regard to expenses, Mercy Medical will closely monitor its financial performance to ensure compliance with the pertinent Medicare regulations. This method of ensuring compliance with the Medicare requirements for exemption has proved successful for several other LTACHs. Kindred's financial witness expressed the opinion that Mercy Medical would have to purchase certain services and supplies from Mercy Hospital. The witness acknowledged, however, that Mercy Hospital can obtain a number of the identified services and supplies from sources other than the host hospital. Mercy Medical and Mercy Hospital have pledged that they will take all steps necessary to conform to the 15% rule and other requirements for exemption and have engaged consultants with substantial experience and expertise in guiding LTACHs through the exemption process. It is reasonable to expect that Mercy Medical will be able to limit its expenses attributable to services purchased from the host in a manner that complies with the rule. Medicare regulations also provide that a hospital-based LTACH seeking exemption from PPS must have a separate governing body, separate medical staff, and separate officers, including a separate chief medical officer and separate chief executive officer. These changes will involve the identification of new officers for Mercy Medical and the restructuring of Mercy Medical's governing body such that a majority of the board positions are held by at-large numbers who have no direct relationship with Mercy Hospital, Inc. Because Mercy Medical's approval of Mercy Medical's project is delayed by this CON litigation, it is not yet practical for Mercy Medical and Mercy Hospital to implement the changes in Mercy Medical's governance structure that will be necessary for Mercy Medical's PPS exemption. It is reasonable to expect, however, that Mercy Medical will implement the necessary changes. In essence, implementation of the changes must take place if Mercy Medical is ever to operate under the CON for which it has applied. Overall, the Medicare revenues projected on Mercy Medical's Schedule 7A are comparable to and lower than Medicare revenues for existing LTACHs in Florida. As a new provider, Mercy Medical's Medicare cost-based reimbursement, i.e., TEFRA rate, will be capped at $23,500 per discharge. Mercy Medical's actual TEFRA rate will be determined following the second year of operation of Mercy Medical's LTACH. Mercy Medical reasonably anticipates that its final TEFRA rate will be capped at the $23,500 limit. Mercy Medical's pro formas conservatively incorporate a projected reimbursement rate for Mercy Medical that is $3,500 below the TEFRA cap per discharge. The Medicare reimbursement structure for long-term acute care hospitals is projected to change. By approximately 2003 or 2004, CMS is expected to implement a new prospective payment system for long-term acute care hospitals. New, (i.e., post-1997) LTACH providers, will not be substantially adversely affected by the new reimbursement system, and may even benefit. The anticipated per diem of $800 to $850 per day under the proposed LTACH prospective payment system is more than the projected cost set forth in Mercy Medical's CON application. Accordingly, the anticipated reimbursement level under the proposed prospective payment system for Medicare-certified long- term acute care hospitals is reasonably expected to exceed Mercy Medical's projected expenses as reflected on Mercy Medical's pro formas. Mercy Medical has reasonably projected an average length of stay for its LTACH of 28 days in the first year of operation and 29 days in year two. Mercy Medical's projected payor mix, as shown on Mercy Medical's Schedule 7A, is reasonably consistent with the experience of the eight existing providers of long-term acute care services in Florida. Mercy Medical's projected Medicaid utilization is higher than the state average for long-term acute care services, but Mercy Medical specifically intends to serve this currently underserved segment of the population. The projected expenses shown on Mercy Medical's Schedule 8-A are reasonably consistent with those of the existing long-term acute care hospitals in Florida and are reasonable for the project proposed. Mercy Medical's pro formas do not directly reflect any interest expense associated with Mercy Hospital, Inc.'s loan of the funds necessary to implement Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH. The loan's interest expense, however, is only $3,000 (approximately.) Such a relatively minor expense is immaterial with respect to the long-term feasibility of Mercy Medical's project. Mercy Medical's projected salaries, as shown on Schedule 6, are lower in some categories than the salaries paid by Kindred Coral Gables. Nonetheless, the salaries shown, including salaries for registered nurses, are generally reasonable for the project proposed. In general, while seeking to remain competitive, Mercy Medical does not intend to be the market leader with respect to clinical staff salaries in the Miami-Dade area. The salaries projected in Mercy Medical's Schedule 6 are based on the salaries currently paid by Mercy Hospital and are within a reasonable range for the project proposed. Recruitment of clinical personnel may be challenging in view of the current nursing shortage, but Mercy Medical will be able to recruit and retain the necessary clinical staff to implement and operate its LTACH. (See paragraphs 86 - 88, below.) Mercy Medical's expense pro forma includes a cushion of $3,500 per Medicare discharge that will allow Mercy Medical to increase its salaries for clinical personnel, if necessary, and have a substantial portion of the LTACH's salary expense reimbursed by the Medicare program. Thus, salary increases, if necessary, will not directly reduce the net income of Mercy Medical's proposed project. The categories of FTEs shown on Mercy Medical's CON Application No. 9462 Schedule 6 are reasonable for the project proposed. The projected number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) needed to implement Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH in the first two years is generally reasonable. Mercy Medical's projected utilization, revenues and expenses are reasonable for the projected proposed and the project is financially feasible in the long term. The Nursing Shortage There is a serious shortage of nurses in Dade County. The nursing vacancy rate in the County is now approximately 16 percent. With the nursing shortage comes significant competition for nurses in the Dade County market. There could be a slight impact to Kindred Coral Gables if Mercy Medical's proposal is approved. Kindred Coral Gables, however, appears to be more aggressive in its advertising and salary packages than is Mercy Hospital. Its approach to the shortage should minimize its effects on Kindred Coral Gables. Rather than for the approval of Mercy Medical to have a negative impact on Kindred, the effect of the nursing shortage is more likely to make it hard for Mercy Medical to obtain the nurses it needs. Mercy Hospital has been successful in recruiting and retaining nurses by focusing on creating a working environment that is attractive to nurses. Mercy Medical will use the same approach to combat the nursing shortage. The approach has been successful in the face of the current nursing shortage and it is reasonable to expect to continue to have success toward staffing Mercy Medical's LTACH. It is reasonable to expect that Mercy Medical will be able to staff its proposed project. The impact to Kindred, if any, will be slight. Quality of Care The approach to the nursing shortage is not the only shared characteristic between Mercy Medical and Mercy Hospital. Mercy Medical embraces Mercy Hospital's commitment to providing high quality of care. Mercy Hospital will provide the advisory support to Mercy Medical with respect to quality of care and quality assurance practices. Medicaid and Indigent Commitment Mercy Medical has conditioned approval of its proposal on the pledge that at least 5% of the LTACH's total inpatient days will be comprised of Medicaid patient days. Mercy Medical shares the commitment Mercy Hospital has to serving Medicaid- eligible, uninsured, underinsured and indigent patients in District 11 for these and other categories of patients. Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH will significantly enhance access to long-term acute care hospital services in District 11. Financial Impact of Approval Approval of Mercy Medical's proposed project will not have an adverse financial affect on Kindred Coral Gables because it is unlikely to suffer reduction in admissions as a result of approval. Historically, Kindred Coral Gables has accepted few patients from Mercy Hospital. Kindred's own estimation of patient loss is 13-15 patients annually if the project is approved at a financial loss of $775,000. Kindred Coral Gables rejects significantly more referrals of patients than it accepts. There are ample patients in the community to replace any that may be lost to Mercy Medical. In any event, it is likely that Kindred would not accept many, if any, of the patients Mercy Medical intends to serve. Kindred Coral Gables opposition to the project because approval might set a precedent that would lead to additional hospitals within hospitals in Florida is not cognizable as an adverse impact under CON review criteria. Benefits of Competition Because there is demonstrable need for Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH, approval will not result in unnecessary duplication of services. On the other hand, approval has the chance of enhancing competition. That chance is diminished since the patients Mercy Medical will serve are not likely to be patients Kindred seeks to serve. Still, there may be from time- to-time a patient that both will wish to serve and there may be some benefits from the slight increase in competition caused by approval. Managed care companies, moreover, will see Mercy Medical as an alternative to Kindred Coral Gables and may improve their negotiation position for payment rates for LTACH services in District 11. Mercy Medical's proposal also provides a lower cost alternative to Kindred Coral Gables with respect to Medicare services that benefits the health care system as a whole. Medicare cost-based reimbursement for LTACHs established prior to October 1, 1997, is capped at the rate of $41,000 per discharge. As a new provider, Mercy Medical's cost-based reimbursement ceiling will be $23,500 per discharge. Kindred Coral Gables was established prior to October 1, 1997, and therefore, operates subject to the much higher cap on Medicare reimbursement. In addition, payors who pay based on charges, or some component of charges, will also benefit because Mercy Medical's proposed changes are less than Kindred Coral Gables' current charges. Competition from the approval of Mercy Medical's proposal may also have a positive effect with respect to quality of care. In addition, the introduction of an alternative to Kindred Coral Gables represents a positive enhancement in the delivery of LTACH services in District 11. This is particularly appropriate given Kindred's recent turmoil, including bankruptcy and significant governmental investigations and settlements. Approval of Mercy Medical's proposed project will have other beneficial effects within the District. Approval of Mercy Medical's proposal will allow many patients to remain under the care of their chosen physician. The conversion of Mercy Hospital's Four West wing to a Medicare-certified LTACH also will help to alleviate patient flow issues within Mercy Hospital and enhance the hospital's ability to utilize properly its short-term acute care beds. Although Mercy Hospital has 29 licensed acute care beds available on Four West, the hospital cannot feasibly keep Four West open on a full-time basis. At times, Mercy Hospital has had to close its emergency room because of capacity issues. On any given day, Mercy Hospital may have as many as 15 to 20 patients who would be eligible for discharge to a long-term acute care hospital facility, if such a facility were accessible to the patients at issue. Because of the access problems at Kindred Coral Gables, these patients are not discharged, but instead are kept in an acute care bed at Mercy Hospital. Approval of Mercy Medical's proposal would provide a discharge venue for these patients, thus freeing short-term acute care beds at Mercy Hospital. Enhancement of Access As described above, establishment of the 29-bed LTACH proposed by Mercy Medical will enhance access to LTACH services for District 11 residents who currently encounter capacity constraints and financial barriers to access at Kindred Coral Gables. In addition, because Kindred Coral Gables is highly selective with respect to the clinical conditions of patients it admits, Mercy Medical will further enhance access by admitting a broader array of patients. Architectural Criteria and Costs Section 395.003(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), provides, "[n]o person shall establish, conduct or maintain a hospital . . . in this state without first obtaining a license under this part." Rule 59A-3.201(34), Florida Administrative Code, provides: "Long term care hospital" means a general hospital which: Meets the provision of s. 395.002(12), F.S.; Has an average length of inpatient stay greater than 25 days for all hospital beds; and, Meets the provisions of Paragraph 59C- 1.002, F.A.C. Rule 59A-3.202(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides: The agency [AHCA] will license four classes of facilities; (a) Class I or general hospitals which includes: * * * 2. Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of 59A-3.201(31). Rule 59A-3.201(31), in turn, provides: "'Inpatient beds' means accommodations with supporting services for patients who are admitted by physician order with the expectation that the patient would stay in excess of 24 hours and occupy a bed." Mercy Medical's proposed LTACH will provide "inpatient beds." It meets the definition of "long term care hospital." It will have to be licensed as a Class I or general hospital to operate if it receives a CON. Rule 59A-3.202(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: . . . [A]ll licensed hospitals shall have at least the following: Inpatient beds; A governing authority legally responsible for the conduct of the hospital; A chief executive officer or other similarly titled official to whom the governing authority delegates the full-time authority for the operation of the hospital in accordance with the established policy of the governing authority; An organized medical staff to which the governing authority delegates responsibility for maintaining proper standards for medical and other health care; A current and complete medical record for each patient admitted to the hospital; A policy requiring that all patients be admitted on the authority of and under the care of a member of the organized medical staff; Facilities and professional staff available to provide food to patients to meet their nutritional needs; A procedure for providing care in emergency cases; A method and policy for infection control; An on-going organized program to enhance the quality of patient care and review the appropriateness of utilization services. Kindred Coral Gables, an LTACH, is licensed as a Class I hospital. All parties agree the Mercy Medical's applied-for LTACH will have to be licensed as a Class I or "general" hospital and will have to comply with the licensing requirements listed above in order to receive its license. The parties disagree over the applicability of Rule 59A-3.080(4)(f), Florida Administrative Code. The Rule has a last sentence that is a grandfather clause inapplicable to this proceeding. Otherwise, the Rule provides: An ambulatory surgical center or a birth center may not be constructed or operated on the same premises as a hospital. A facility or building used for medical care, including a medical office building which is owned and operated by the licensee of a hospital, may be fully integrated with the hospital physical plant. If a fully integrated facility or building in operation or under construction on the effective date of this rule is subsequently transferred, the hospital licensee shall be solely responsible for either physical separation or assuring full compliance with all life safety codes. Any other facility or building used for medical care, including a medical office building, must be physically separated from the hospital and have clear, visible and readable signs denoting its separateness from the hospital. Physically separate means, at a minimum, separation by fire walls and distinct mechanical and electrical systems. It is AHCA's position that Rule 59A-3.080)4)(f) "[sh]ould not, as a matter of policy, [be applied] in this case." (Tr. 766). The purpose of the Rule is to prevent a non-licensed medical service provider, such as a medical office building, from being located on a hospital campus as part of the hospital, that is, without physical separation. That concern is alleviated with regard to Mercy Medical's LTACH operating as a hospital-within-a- hospital because AHCA will have direct licensure authority over the LTACH as a Class I or general hospital. Mercy Medical's LTACH, moreover, is subject to the same life safety codes as its host hospital. Furthermore, the proposed location of the LTACH is Four West of Mercy Hospital. Four West already complies with the applicable licensure codes for Class I or general hospitals found in Chapter 59A-3, Florida Administrative Code. Along the same lines, Mercy Medical's LTACH will satisfy the state and federal handicap accessibility requirements for general hospitals. The federal ADA and Florida Accessibility code both require that 10% of the patient rooms and toilets in a general hospital be handicap-accessible. Mercy Medical reasonably proposes to satisfy this requirement through renovation of two of the patient rooms on Four West. The projected costs on Mercy Medical's Schedule 1, including renovation cost, are reasonable for the proposed project. The timetable for completion of Mercy Medical's proposed renovations is reasonable for the project proposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration: Dismiss the Petition of Kindred Hospitals East, LLC d/b/a Kindred Hospital South Florida for lack of standing; and, Approve Mercy Medical Development, Inc.'s CON Application 9462 to establish a 29-bed long-term acute care hospital-within-a-hospital in AHCA Health Planning Service District 11. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: W. David Watkins, Esquire Watkins & Caleen, P.A. 1725 Mahan Drive, Suite 201 Post Office Box 15828 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5828 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jonathan L. Rue, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP 1500 Marquis Two Tower 285 Peachtree Center Avenue, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Gerald L. Pickett, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Mirror Lake Drive, North Sebring Building, Suite 310K St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need Application No. 8614, filed by Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., meets, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration relied upon an unpromulgated and invalid rule in preliminarily denying CON Application No. 8614.
Findings Of Fact Vencor Hospital South, Inc. (Vencor), is the applicant for certificate of need (CON) No. 8614 to establish a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the state agency authorized to administer the CON program in Florida, preliminarily denied Vencor's CON application. On January 10, 1997, AHCA issued its decision in the form of a State Agency Action Report (SAAR) indicating, as it also did in its Proposed Recommended Order, that the Vencor application was denied primarily due to a lack of need for a long term care hospital in District 8, which includes Lee County. Vencor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Vencor, Inc., a publicly traded corporation, founded in 1985 by a respiratory/physical therapist to provide care to catastrophically ill, ventilator-dependent patients. Initially, the corporation served patients in acute care hospitals, but subsequently purchased and converted free-standing facilities. In 1995, Vencor merged with Hillhaven, which operated 311 nursing homes. Currently, Vencor, its parent, and related corporations operate 60 long term care hospitals, 311 nursing homes, and 40 assisted living facilities in approximately 46 states. In Florida, Vencor operates five long term care hospitals, located in Tampa, St. Petersburg, North Florida (Green Cove Springs), Coral Gables, and Fort Lauderdale. Pursuant to the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, filed on October 2, 1997, the parties agreed that: On August 26, 1996, Vencor submitted to AHCA a letter of intent to file a Certificate of Need Application seeking approval for the construction of a 60-bed long term care hospital to be located in Fort Myers, AHCA Health Planning District 8; Vencor's letter of intent and board resolution meet requirements of Sections 408.037(4) and 408.039(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.008(1), Florida Administrative Code, and were timely filed with both AHCA and the local health council, and notice was properly published; Vencor submitted to AHCA its initial Certificate of Need Application (CON Action No. 8614) for the proposed project on September 25, 1996, and submitted its Omissions Response on November 11, 1996; Vencor's Certificate of Need Application contains all of the minimum content items required in Section 408.037, Florida Statutes; Both Vencor's initial CON Application and its Omissions Response were timely filed with AHCA and the local health council. During the hearing, the parties also stipulated that Vencor's Schedule 2 is complete and accurate. In 1994, AHCA adopted rules defining long term care and long term care hospitals. Rule 59C-1.002(29), Florida Administrative Code, provides that: "Long term care hospital" means a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Part 1, F.S., which meets the requirements of Part 412, Subpart B, paragraph 412.23(e), [C]ode of Federal Regulations (1994), and seeks exclusion from the Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services. Other rules distinguishing long term care include those related to conversions of beds and facilities from one type of health care to another. AHCA, the parties stipulated, has no rule establishing a uniform numeric need methodology for long term care beds and, therefore, no fixed need pool applicable to the review of Vencor's CON application. Numeric Need In the absence of any AHCA methodology or need publication, Vencor is required to devise its own methodology to demonstrate need. Rule 59C-1.008(e) provides in pertinent part: If no agency policy exists, the applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Vencor used a numeric need analysis which is identical to that prepared by the same health planner, in 1995, for St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. (St. Petersburg). The St. Petersburg project proposed that Vencor would manage the facility. Unlike the current proposal for new construction, St. Petersburg was a conversion of an existing but closed facility. AHCA accepted that analysis and issued CON 8213 to St. Petersburg. The methodology constitutes a use rate analysis, which calculates the use rate of a health service among the general population and applies that to the projected future population of the district. The use rate analysis is the methodology adopted in most of AHCA's numeric need rules. W. Eugene Nelson, the consultant health planner for Vencor, derived a historic utilization rate from the four districts in Florida in which Vencor operates long term care hospitals. That rate, 19.7 patient days per 1000 population, when applied to the projected population of District 8 in the year 2000, yields an average daily census of 64 patients. Mr. Nelson also compared the demographics of the seven counties of District 8 to the rest of the state, noting in particular the sizable, coastal population centers and the significant concentration of elderly, the population group which is disproportionately served in long term care hospitals. The proposed service area is all of District 8. By demonstrating the numeric need for 64 beds and the absence of any existing long term care beds in District 8, Vencor established the numeric need for its proposed 60-bed long term care hospital. See Final Order in DOAH Case No. 97-4419RU. Statutory Review Criteria Additional criteria for evaluating CON applications are listed in Subsections 408.035(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and the rules which implement that statute. (1)(a) need in relation to state and district health plans. The 1993 State Health Plan, which predates the establishment of long term care rules, contains no specific preferences for evaluating CON applications for long term care hospitals. The applicable local plan is the District 8 1996-1997 Certificate of Need Allocation Factors Report, approved on September 9, 1996. The District 8 plan, like the State Health Plan, contains no mention of long term care hospitals. In the SAAR, AHCA applied the District 8 and state health plan criteria for acute care hospital beds to the review of Vencor's application for long term care beds, although agency rules define the two as different. The acute care hospital criteria are inapplicable to the review of this application for CON 8614 and, therefore, there are no applicable state or district health plan criteria for long term care. (1)(b) availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing services in the district; and (1)(d) availability and adequacy of alternative health care facilities in the district. Currently, there are no long term care hospitals in District 8. The closest long term care hospitals are in Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale, all over 100 miles from Fort Myers. In the SAAR, approving the St. Petersburg facility, two long term care hospitals in Tampa were discussed as alternatives. By contract, the SAAR preliminarily denying Vencor's application lists as alternatives CMR facilities, nursing homes which accept Medicare patients, and hospital based skilled nursing units. AHCA examined the quantity of beds available in other health care categories in reliance on certain findings in the publication titled Subacute Care: Policy Synthesis And Market Area Analysis, a report submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, on November 1, 1995, by Levin-VHI, Inc. ("the Lewin Report"). The Lewin Report notes the similarities between the type of care provided in long term care, CMR and acute care hospitals, and in hospital-based subacute care units, and subacute care beds in community nursing homes. The Lewin Report also acknowledges that "subacute care" is not well-defined. AHCA has not adopted the Lewin Report by rule, nor has it repealed its rules defining long term care as a separate and district health care category. For the reasons set forth in the Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order, AHCA may not rely on the Lewin Report to create a presumption that other categories are "like and existing" alternatives to long term care, or to consider services outside District 8 as available alternatives. Additionally, Vencor presented substantial evidence to distinguish its patients from those served in other types of beds. The narrow range of diagnostic related groups or DRGs served at Vencor includes patients with more medically complex multiple system failures than those in CMR beds. With an average length of stay of 60 beds, Vencor's patients are typically too sick to withstand three hours of therapy a day, which AHCA acknowledged as the federal criteria for CMR admissions. Vencor also distinguished its patients, who require 7 1/2 to 8 hours of nursing care a day, as compared to 2 1/2 to 3 hours a day in nursing homes. Similarly, the average length of stay in nursing home subacute units is less than 41 days. The DRG classifications which account for 80 percent of Vencor's admissions represent only 7 percent of admissions to hospital based skilled nursing units, and 10 to 11 percent of admissions to nursing home subacute care units. Vencor also presented the uncontroverted testimony of Katherine Nixon, a clinical case manager whose duties include discharge planning for open heart surgery for patients at Columbia-Southwest Regional Medical Center (Columbia-Southwest), an acute care hospital in Fort Myers. Ms. Nixon's experience is that 80 percent of open heart surgery patients are discharged home, while 20 percent require additional inpatient care. Although Columbia-Southwest has a twenty-bed skilled nursing unit with two beds for ventilator-dependent patients, those beds are limited to patients expected to be weaned within a week. Finally, Vencor presented results which are preliminary and subject to peer review from its APACHE (Acute Physiology, Age, and Chronic Health Evaluation) Study. Ultimately, Vencor expects the study to more clearly distinguish its patient population. In summary, Vencor demonstrated that a substantial majority of patients it proposes to serve are not served in alternative facilities, including CMR hospitals, hospital-based skilled nursing units, or subacute units in community nursing homes. Expert medical testimony established the inappropriateness of keeping patients who require long term care in intensive or other acute care beds, although that occurs in District 8 when patients refuse to agree to admissions too distant from their homes. (1)(c) ability and record of providing quality of care. The parties stipulated that Vencor's application complies with the requirement of Subsection 408.035(1)(c). (1)(e) probable economics of joint or shared resources; (1)(g) need for research and educational facilities; and (1)(j) needs of health maintenance organizations. The parties stipulated that the review criteria in Subsection 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (j) are not at issue. (f) need in the district for special equipment and services not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Based on the experiences of Katherine Nixon, it is not reasonable for long term care patients to access services outside District 8. Ms. Nixon also testified that patients are financially at a disadvantage if placed in a hospital skilled nursing unit rather than a long term care hospital. If a patient is not weaned as quickly as expected, Medicare reimbursement after twenty days decreases to 80 percent. In addition, the days in the hospital skilled nursing unit are included in the 100 day Medicare limit for post-acute hospitalization rehabilitation. By contrast, long term care hospitalization preserves the patient's ability under Medicare to have further rehabilitation services if needed after a subsequent transfer to a nursing home. (h) resources and funds, including personnel to accomplish project. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated that Vencor has sufficient funds to accomplish the project, and properly documented its source of funds in Schedule 3 of the CON application. Vencor has a commitment for $10 million to fund this project of approximately $8.5 million. At the hearing, AHCA also agreed with Vencor that the staffing and salary schedule, Schedule 6, is reasonable. (i) immediate and long term financial feasibility of the proposal. Vencor has the resources to establish the project and to fund short term operating losses. Vencor also reasonably projected that revenues will exceed expenses in the second year of operation. Therefore, Vencor demonstrated the short and long term financial feasibility of its proposal. needs of entities serving residents outside the district. Vencor is not proposing that any substantial portion of it services will benefit anyone outside District 8. probable impact on costs of providing health services; effects of competition. There is no evidence of an adverse impact on health care costs. There is preliminary data from the APACHE study which tends to indicate the long term care costs are lower than acute care costs. No adverse effects of competition are shown and AHCA did not dispute the fact that Vencor's proposal is supported by acute care hospitals in District 8. costs and methods of proposed construction; and (2)((a)-(c) less costly alternatives to proposed capital expenditure. The prehearing stipulation includes agreement that the design is reasonable, and that proposed construction costs are below the median in that area. past and proposed service to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Vencor has a history of providing Medicaid and indigent care in the absence of any legal requirements to do so. The conditions proposed of 3 percent of total patient days Medicaid and 2 percent for indigent/charity patients proposed by Vencor are identical to those AHCA accepted in issuing CON 8213 to St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. Vencor's proposed commitment is reasonable and appropriate, considering AHCA's past acceptance and the fact that the vast majority of long term care patients are older and covered by Medicare. services which promote a continuum of care in a multilevel health care system. While Vencor's services are needed due to a gap in the continuum of care which exists in the district, it has not shown that it will be a part of a multilevel system in District 8. (2)(d) that patients will experience serious problems obtaining the inpatient care proposed. Patients experience and will continue to experience serious problems in obtaining long term care in District 8 in the absence of the project proposed by Vencor. Based on the overwhelming evidence of need, and the ability of the applicant to establish and operate a high quality program with no adverse impacts on other health care providers, Vencor meets the criteria for issuance of CON 8614.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue CON 8614 to Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., to construct a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, District 8. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology for grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB pursuant to Sections 4D- 1.03, 4D-1.12(1) and 4D-1.12(2), F.A.C., constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as being arbitrary or capricious? Mercy has also raised one issue as to whether the grouping methodology is violative of constitutional guarantees of administrative equal protection and due process. This issue, however, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Introduction. The HCCB and Its Hospital Grouping Function. The HCCB was formed pursuant to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1979). The HCCB was created pursuant to the specific authority of Section 395.503, Florida Statutes (1979), in order to further the accomplishment of legislative intent contained in Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): It is the intent of the Legislature to assure that adequate health care is affordable and accessible to all the citizens of this state. To further the accomplishment of this goal, the Hospital Cost Containment Board is created to advise the Legislature regarding health care costs; inflationary trends in health care costs; the impact of health care costs on the state budget; the impact of hospital charges and third-party reimbursement mechanisms on health care costs; and the education of consumers and providers of health care services in order to encourage price competition in the health care marketplace. The Legislature finds and declares that rising hospital costs and cost shifting are of vital concern to the people of this state because of the danger that hospital services are becoming unaffordable and thus inaccessible to residents of the state. It is further declared that hospital costs should be contained through improved competition between hospitals and improved competition between insurers, through financial incentives which foster efficiency instead of inefficiency, and through sincere initiatives on behalf of providers, insurers, and consumers to contain costs. As a safety net, it is the intent of the Legislature to establish a program of prospective budget review and approval in the event that competition-oriented methods do not adequately contain costs and the access of Floridians to adequate hospital care becomes jeopardized because of unaffordable costs. As a part of its responsibilities the HCCB is required, "after consulting with appropriate professional and governmental advisory bodies and holding public hearings, and considering existing and proposed systems of accounting and reporting utilized by hospitals," to specify a uniform system of financial reporting for hospitals. Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes Suppl.) to: In order to allow "meaningful comparisons" of data reported by hospitals under the uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB is required by Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.) to group hospitals according to characteristics, including, but not limited to, a measure of the nature and range of services provided, teaching hospital status, number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff, percentage of Medicare inpatient days, average daily census, geographical differences, and, when available, case mix. In providing for grouping of hospital, the HCCB is required to establish ten general hospital groups and additional speciality groups "as needed." Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). No hospital group can contain fewer than five hospitals, however. Id. Grouping is to be provided by rule. Id. Pursuant to Section 395.509(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), every Florida hospital is required to file its budget with the HCCB for "approval." The budget is required to be filed on forms adopted by the HCCB and based on the uniform system of financial reporting. Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). To determine whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, all hospitals in Florida are to be placed in groups. A hospital's budget is then compared to the budgets of the hospitals assigned to its group. Hospital groups for this purpose are established pursuant to Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The provisions of Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), are identical to Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). In determining whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, Section 305.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), establishes two initial "screens" which a hospital must meet based upon the hospital's gross revenue per adjusted admission. The term "gross revenue" is defined as: the sum of daily hospital service charges, ambulatory service charges, ancillary service charges, and other operating revenue. Gross revenues do not include contributions, donations, legacies, or bequests made to a hospital without restriction by the donors. Section 395.502(11), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). "Adjusted admission" is defined by Section 395.502(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), as: the sum of acute admissions and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues generated from acute, intensive, ambulatory, and ancillary patient services to gross revenues. Gross revenues per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "GRAA") is therefore the total hospital ambulatory and ancillary service charges and other operating revenue for all acute and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues from acute, intensive, ambulatory and ancillary patient services to gross revenue; or, stated more simply , inpatient revenue per admission. The "screens" which must be met in order for a hospital's budget to be approved upon initial determination are: (1) the hospital's GRAA must not be in the upper 20th percentile of the hospitals within its group; and (2) the rate of increase in a hospital's GRAA as contained in its current budget compared to the hospital's GRAA as reported in its most recently approved budget must not exceed a "maximum allowable rate of increase" if the hospital's GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of the hospitals in its group. If a hospital's GRAA is in the 49th percentile or less of the hospitals in its group, its budget is automatically approved. In determining whether a hospital's GRAA fails the screens, Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), provides: Percentile values for gross operating revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly by the board for each group established pursuant to s. 395.507(2) by ranking projected gross operating revenues per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. In determining the applicability of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), the board shall consider the basis of the projections by the hospital, including consideration of the following factors: any increase in patient admissions caused by the creation of preferred provider organizations or health maintenance organiza- tions, population increases, changes in the hospital case mix or in services offered, changes in technology, or other similar factors. If a hospital's GRAA fails either of the screens (its GRAA is in the upper 20th percentile of its group or its GRAA rate of increase is excessive and its GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of its group) that hospital's budget must be reviewed by the HCCB "to determine whether the rate of increase contained in the budget is just, reasonable, and not excessive." Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). Pursuant to Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB is authorized, if it first determines under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that the hospital's rate of increase is not just, reasonable and not excessive, to amend or disapprove any hospital's budget which does not meet the two screens of Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to establish a rate of increase which is "just, reasonable, and not excessive." The HCCB's authority under Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), applies only if the HCCB first complies with the following pertinent provisions of Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): The board shall disapprove any budget, or part thereof, as excess that contains a rate of increase which is not necessary to maintain the existing level of services of the hospital or, if the hospital increases its existing level of services, any amount not necessary to accomplish that increase. In making such deterioration . . . the board shall consider the following criteria: The efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the services and facilities provided by the hospital. The cost of providing services and the value of the services to the public. The ability of the hospital to improve services and facilities. The ability of the hospital to reduce the cost of services. The ability of the hospital to earn a reasonable rate of return. The accuracy of previous budget submissions by the hospital compared to the actual experience of the hospital the The number of patient days reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid. The number of patient days attributable to the medically indigent. The research and educational services provided by the hospital if it is a teaching hospital. The projected expenditures or revenues for or from construction of facilities or new services which are subject to regulation under s. 381.494 may not be included in the budget of a hospital until the construction or services are approved or authorized by the state health planning agency. The cost of opening a new hospital, for first 3 years. The Challenged Rules. In carrying out its duty to establish a uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB adopted Section 4D- 1.03, F.A.C., which provides: The Board, pursuant to Section 395.505, Florida Statutes, hereby adopts and establishes a uniform system for hospitals to file the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report of financial and statistical information. This system is described and the forms, instructions, and definitions therefor are contained in the Board's publication entitled Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual. The Chart of Accounts adopted pursuant to Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes, and this Chapter 4D-1, and as hereafter modified, shall be utilized by each hospital for submitting the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report and the budget report. In order to determine whether a hospital's budget should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB adopted Section 4D-1.12, F.A.C. Sections 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., provide: The staff shall review the budget report based upon the hospital's ranking for gross revenue per adjusted admission within its group and upon its rate of change in gross revenue per adjusted admission in the proposed budget as required in Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes, and the most recently Board approved budget. As part of the budget report review process, groupings of hospitals shall be established according to the characteristics and methodology as outlined in Chapter V, Section B, Hospital Unit Uniform Reporting System Manual and as outlined in Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes. Percentile values for gross revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly for each group by ranking projected gross revenue per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. 12. Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., are the rules challenged by Mercy. These rules, as quoted herein, were effective as of November 5, 1984. The rules were originally adopted effective June 30, 1980. The rules were amended to their present wording in response to "major" legislation enacted in 1984 which amended Part II, Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), and granted authority to the HCCB for the first time to approve, disapprove or amend hospital budgets under certain circumstances. Chapter 79-106, Laws of Florida. The challenged rules essentially provide that the HCCB, when grouping of hospitals for purposes of the uniform system of financial reporting and for purposes of reviewing and comparing budgets to determine if they should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), will apply the grouping methodology outlined in Chapter V, Section B of the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual"). Section 4D-1.18, F.A.C., also adopted effective November 5, 1984, incorporates by reference the Manual within each rule in Chapter 4D-1, F.A.C., which references the Manual. This rule has not been challenged in this proceeding. The Hospital Grouping Methodology and Its Development. Generally, Chapter V, Section B of the Manual, sets out the objective of the grouping methodology, the procedure for forming groups, a list of the variables considered in forming groups and the weight to be accorded each variable. The goals of the grouping methodology, as provided in the Manual, are to "facilitate comparison of hospitals with similar patient mix and market conditions" and to "develop groups of sufficient size . . . to assure statistically valid comparisons." Based upon the procedure for forming groups contained in the Manual, hospitals are grouped into nine, non-teaching, short-term hospital groups, one Major teaching hospital group and a number of specialty hospital groups. It is the method of grouping hospitals into nine short-term hospital groups which is at issue in this proceeding. Assignment of hospitals to the nine short-term hospital groups is accomplished through the use of the "McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm included in the cluster analysis t computer program package CLAN developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham (June, 1980 version)." A clustering analysis is a method of grouping a set of objects (in this case, hospitals) into relatively homogeneous groups. The goal of a clustering algorithm is to minimize the differences between the members of the group. The objects are grouped based upon a set of variables which are considered significant for purposes of comparing the objects. In order to account for the significance of each variable, the variables are weighted. The variables have a numerical score and after weighing, the weighted sum of the variables for each object is compared and the objects are grouped based upon their variable scores. There are a number of clustering algorithms which can be used to group hospitals. The HCCB chose to use the "McQueen's K-means" clustering algorithm. The use of McQueens K-means clustering algorithm has not bean challenged in this proceeding. Nor does the evidence establish that the selection of McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm is arbitrary and capricious. The clustering algorithm is performed by computer. The computer program utilized by the HCCB to perform the algorithm is called "CLAN" and was developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham. The evidence at the hearing supports a finding that the selection of this computer program is reasonable. Once hospitals are grouped, they are notified of their group designation and allowed to request reconsideration of their group assignment. The request must made within thirty days after notification. Following the creation of the HCCB in 1979, Price Waterhouse & Company was engaged by the HCCB as a consultant to assist in still establishing an appropriate hospital grouping methodology. The HCCB also created an advisory committee to assist the HCCB and Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology. This committee, designated as the Technical Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "TAC") was comprised of individuals from the hospital industry and academia and certified public accountants. The TAC worked with Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology and the uniform reporting system. Because of time constraints, the TAC's involvement with evaluating the methodology was limited. The HCCB ultimately decided to pattern the grouping methodology it adopted after the grouping methodology then being used by the State of Washington, as recommended by Price Waterhouse & Company. The Washington system was not adopted exactly; a number of changes to Washington's methodology were made to the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. Mercy has proposed several findings of fact beginning on page 35 and ending on page 38 of its proposed order concerning the "Differences in Washington Hospital Characteristics and Grouping Methodology Model." Those proposed findings of fact can be and are hereby disposed of by the following finding of fact: because of differences in the hospital industries of the States of Florida and Washington and other differences between the two States, Florida's grouping methodology cannot be justified solely on the basis that Washington's grouping methodology was used as a starting point in developing Florida's grouping methodology. Those differences, however, do not support a finding of fact that Florida's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious since the Washington system was not adopted without substantial modifications, including a reduction of Washington's eighteen variables initially to fourteen and ultimately to seven, and the use of unequal weighting of the variables. The TAC reviewed and discussed the grouping methodology initially approved by the HCCB prior to its approval. Some of Mercy's witnesses, who were members of the TAC, indicated during their testimony that the TAC never decided anything because no "vote" was ever taken of TAC members and that the TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. Their testimony in this regard has been given little weight. The fact that no formal "vote" was taken of TAC members does not mean that the TAC did not take a position on matters it discussed. The consensus of the TAC could be, and was, gleaned from its discussions. The staff of the HCCB in fact reported decisions of the TAC to the HCCB verbally and by minutes of TAC meetings. Although the accuracy of staff's reports was sometimes questioned, no question was raised about whether TAC had taken positions. The fact that the HCCB staff reported TAC actions to the HCCB also disputes the testimony to the effect that TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. While it may be true that TAC did not deal directly with the HCCB, its analysis was reported, to the HCCB. The HCCB ultimately adopted rules effective June 30, 1980, which incorporated by reference to the Manual, the general outline of the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. The TAC ceased to exist following adoption of the HCCB's initial rules. Two new advisory committees were formed: a Technical Advisory Panel (hereinafter referred to as "TAP") on grouping and a TAP for financial analysis. The grouping TAP was made up of individuals from the hospital industry. The grouping TAP met in November and December of 1980 and reviewed the results of test runs of the grouping methodology initially adopted by the HCCB. The results of the initial run were described as "bizarre." This run used equal weighting of the variables. Equal weighting was abandoned and three to four more test runs were made and reviewed by the grouping TAP. After each run the variable weights were adjusted until the results appeared to be "reasonable." The HCCB also established a committee consisting of members of the HCCB designated as the Research and Development Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "R & D Committee"). The R & D Committee reviewed the results of test runs and also found the final groups reasonable. The HCCB met in January, 1981, and adopted the grouping methodology with the adjusted variable weights arrived at as a result of the test runs for use in establishing hospital groups for use in 1981. The grouping methodology was reviewed every year after its initial adoption in 1980. The methodology was reviewed by the HCCB, HCCB's staff, the TAP's and the R & D Committee each year. Throughout the period from 1980 to the present, criticisms of the grouping methodology have been made. Some of these criticisms were agreed with and others were rejected by the HCCB or its staff. Following review of the grouping methodology by the TAP's and the R & D Committee in 1981, the original fourteen variables were reduced to eight. In January, 1982, the weight of one of the variables was changed and one variable was replaced by another variable. In December, 1982, a variable was deleted; seven variables remained. In 1983, clustering analysis was limited in its application to the formation of short-term acute care general hospital groups. In 1984, following the significant amendment of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), the HCCB adopted the present challenged rules. The rules were effective November 5, 1984. The only change in the grouping methodology approved by the HCCB was the substitution of the Florida price level index variable for percent of population over age 65. The weight assigned to the Florida price level index was the same as the weight that had been assigned to the percent of population over age 65. The changes made to the grouping methodology in 1984 were first suggested by the staff of the HCCB to the grouping TAP in June of 1984. The grouping TAP met on July 11, 1984 and considered and discussed the proposed changes. A number of problem areas were discussed. Although no test run results were presented at this TAP meeting, they were provided to TAP members before the HCCB adopted the grouping methodology changes. Concerns about the geographic or exogenous variables expressed at the grouping TAP meeting suggested a belief that too much or too little emphasis was being placed on geographic considerations. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact beginning on page 33 and ending on page 35 of its proposed order concerning the significance of the changes made by the Legislature in 1984 to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983). Those proposed findings of fact essentially deal with the fact that the powers of the HCCB after the 1984 amendments may have a more significant impact on hospitals and that, therefore, the grouping methodology is of greater interest to hospitals. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not, however, relevant in determining whether the challenged rules are arbitrary and capricious. The fact that the effect of the grouping methodology on a hospital may now be different does not mean that the use of the grouping methodology, as modified after the 1984 legislative changes to the law, which was developed when the purpose of grouping was different, is not an appropriate methodology. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. Therefore, to the extent that Mercy's proposed findings of fact under Section II, A, of its proposed order have not already been made, they are rejected as unnecessary. Mercy and the HCCB have proposed findings of fact as to whether Mercy has ever questioned the HCCB's grouping methodology since it was first adopted prior to instituting this proceeding. Those proposed findings of fact are not deemed relevant in determining whether the grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. If the grouping methodology is in fact arbitrary and capricious, the fact that Mercy did not challenge the methodology when it was first adopted will not make it any less arbitrary and capricious today. Mercy's Challenge. A. Introduction. Mercy is a not-for-profit, general acute care hospital with 550 licensed beds located in Dade County, Florida. Mercy has raised a number of points in this proceeding and its proposed order in challenging the rules in question. All of those points, according to Mercy, prove that the rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In determining whether the facts support such a conclusion, the following standard must be kept in mind: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within the grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic or despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Agrico Chemical Company v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (1979). Additionally, the following must be kept in mind: The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. . . . An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. . . . Where, as here, the agency's interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. . . . Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations. Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The witnesses who testified in this proceeding who were accepted as experts were qualified in a number of different areas. Those witnesses qualified as experts in statistical analysis or related areas and health care finance rendered opinions as to the appropriateness of the HCCB's grouping methodology. The method of grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB is a statistical method. Therefore, the determination of whether the HCCB's methodology is arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon whether the methodology is statistically sound. Mercy and the HCCB therefore presented the testimony of witnesses qualified in the area of statistics: Rick Zimmerman, Ph.D., an expert in statistical analysis and social science statistics (for Mercy), and Duane Meeter, Ph.D., an expert in economics and applied statistical analysis and Frank Fox, Jr., Ph.D., an expert in applied statistics (for the HCCB). All three witnesses were knowledgeable and credible. Dr. Zimmerman testified that the HCCB's grouping methodology was "clearly inappropriate." Dr. Zimmerman's opinion was based upon a three step analysis in which he determined: (1) whether the variables selected by the HCCB are appropriate; (2) whether the weights assigned to the variables by the HCCB are appropriate; and, (3) the effect changing the variables and/or weights would have on hospital groups. The results of Dr. Zimmerman's analysis, which formed the basis for his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology is not appropriate, are discussed, infra. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact in its proposed order concerning the credibility of Dr. Meeter's and Dr. Fox's testimony. Some of those proposed findings of fact have been considered in determining the weight given to their testimony. Both Dr. Meeter and Dr. Fox were, however, knowledgeable and credible. In addition to the opinion of its statistical expert, Mercy presented the testimony of three witnesses who were accepted as experts in health care finance: Messrs. Lawrence R. Murray, Jerry A. Mashburn and Anthony Krayer. All three are certified public accountants. All testified that it was his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology was arbitrary. The bases for their opinions are discussed, infra. Selection of "Seed" Hospitals. In order to use a clustering algorithm, a starting point is needed; the first object (hospital) to be placed in each group must be selected. The first objects selected are called "seed" objects. Mercy has attached the HCCB's method of selecting the nine "seed" hospitals in initially performing the McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm. Mercy has proposed the following findings of fact with regard to this point: While none of the parties challenged the use of McQueen's and the CLAN program, no support was offered during the hearing for the method by which the HCCB had selected the nine seed hospitals as initial clustering points. The HCCB's own statistician criticized the HCCB's selection method. The Rankis-Zimmerman report indicates that the final groupings based upon the HCCB's seed hospitals were vastly different than groupings based upon the utilization of seed hospitals selected on a statistical basis. Both the HCCB's and Mercy's statisticians proposed statistically sound methods for selecting seed hospitals, which had not been employed by the HCCB in the Grouping Methodology. [Citations omitted] These proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this proceeding. The burden is on Mercy to show that the selection of "seed" hospitals was arbitrary and capricious; the HCCB is not required to show "support" for its method of selecting the seed hospitals. Additionally, whether there are other methods of selecting seed hospitals is not the test. The HCCB's interpretation of the statute need not be the sole interpretation or even the most desirable one; it only needs to be within the range of possible interpretations. Durrani, supra. Therefore, even if the Rankis-Zimmerman report does indicate that the final groupings of hospitals of the HCCB were vastly different than groupings based upon other methods of selecting seed hospitals, it does not automatically follow that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was not "within the range of possible interpretations. The weight of the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was arbitrary and capricious. Selection of the Variables. In delegating legislative authority to the HCCB to establish a grouping methodology, the Legislature provided that the following relevant characteristics are to be taken into account: A measure of the nature and range of services provided; Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff; Percentage of Medicare inpatient days; Average daily census; Geographic differences; and Case mix, "when available." In response to the Legislature's mandate, the HCCB has adopted seven variables or characteristics. The variables selected by the HCCB include five hospital- specific (endogenous) variables and two geographic (exogenous variables). The variables are as follows: Endogenous Variables: Average occupied beds. Available services. Physician mix. Number of residents. Percent Medicare days. Exogenous Variables: Florida price level index. Personal income. The following findings of fact are made with regard to each of the specific characteristics required to be taken into account by the Legislature and the variables adopted by the HCCB: 1. A measure of the nature and range of services provided. The HCCB has provided in the Manual that "available services" or a service index will be considered. The specific services considered are listed on Table B, Chapter V, of the Manual. Table B also weights or provides a score for each of the various services listed. Each hospital gets the specified score if it has a particular service available. The available services listed are based upon a survey of hospital administrators and chief financial officers in New York, New York, made in the 1970's. Problems with the list of available services have been pointed out to the HCCB and its staff. The primary problem is that the volume of services provided is not taken into account. The problems with the service index, however, relate to the fact that the service index is a proxy for case mix. To date, there is no alternative available which would be a better proxy for case mix. The Legislature contemplated this fact by providing that a measure of the services provided by a hospital will be considered and that case mix will be taken into account "when available." Therefore, while there are "problems" with the service index, consideration of available services is mandated by the Legislature and there are no acceptable alternatives available use for by the HCCB. 2. Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff. 52. The HCCB has provided that a physician specialties mix be considered in grouping hospitals. This physician specialties mix is based upon a list of twenty- six specialties for which a hospital gets a single credit for each specialty available regardless of the number of physician specialists available in each specialty or the volume of patients admitted by a physician. 52. Like the service index, the physician specialties mix is a proxy for ease mix and has problems associated with its use. Also like the service index, consideration of this factor is mandated and there are no acceptable alternatives available for use by the HCCB. 3. Percentage of Medicare inpatient days. 53. The HCCB has provided that "percentage Medicare days be considered in grouping hospitals. Consideration of this variable has not been shown to be arbitrary and capricious. 4. Average daily census. 53. The HCCB has provided that "average occupied beds" is to be considered in grouping hospitals. It does not appear that this variable's use was proper, as discussed, infra. 5. Geographic differences. The HCCB has provided that geographic differences be considered in grouping hospitals by providing for the inclusion of the Florida price level index, by county, and median income, by county, as variables to be considered. The only thing that the evidence established with regard to these variables was that they are not "very good" predictors, that "if" they are intended as a measure of input prices they are "poor substitutes," and that there may be "better" measures of the cost of doing business. The evidence does not, however, show that the use of these variables is arbitrary and capricious. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact concerning geographic influences in part II, H of its proposed order. The proposed findings of fact begin on page 29 and end on page 33. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not made in this Final Order because they are not deemed relevant or material and are unnecessary to the resolution of this proceeding. The proposed findings of fact contained in part II, H of Mercy's proposed order purportedly show that the HCCB has inadequately accounted for geographic influences. The evidence does establish that the financial characteristics of Florida hospitals and GRAA are affected by the geographic location of a hospital. This is especially true in Florida because of the impact on parts of the State from tourism, language barriers, the number of elderly residents, the available labor markets, and competition. It is also true that the combined weights of the two geographic variables the HCCB has selected for consideration in the grouping methodology--the Florida price level index and median income--is only one-seventh of the combined weights of all the HCCB's variables. It is also true that the grouping methodology results in hospitals from different areas of the State being grouped together, i.e., Mercy's hospital group includes twenty- three hospitals, four of which are located in Dade County and three of which are located in Escambia County. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the HCCB has been arbitrary and capricious in designating only two variables to take into account geographic differences between hospitals. The evidence also does not support a conclusion that it was not proper for the HCCB to limit the weight of the geographic variables to one-seventh of the total weight of the variables. Nor does the evidence demonstrate that the inclusion of hospitals from different areas of the State in the same group is not a proper result just because geographic influences are important. The fact that a large percentage of Dade County and south Florida hospitals do not qualify for automatic approval of their budgets under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), because they are in the upper 20th and the upper 50th to 79th percentiles does not necessarily prove that geographic influences have not been adequately accounted for either, as suggested be Mercy on page 30 of its proposed order. The evidence simply does not support such a conclusion. Nor does it necessarily follow that because Dade County hospitals are "efficient" in the minds of some of Mercy's witnesses and yet are unable to achieve automatic approval of their budgets that the grouping methodology does not adequately account for geographic influences, as suggested by Mercy on pages 30 and 31 of its proposed order. First, the Legislature has provided that factors other than geographic differences are to be considered, which the HCCB has provided for. It may therefore be that some Dade County hospitals do not achieve automatic approval of their budgets because of the other variables. The fact that not all Dade County hospitals fail to achieve automatic approval of their budgets supports such a conclusion. Also, even though a hospital's budget is not automatically approved it does not necessarily mean that it is considered inefficient. If that were the case, its budget would probably be subject automatically to amendment or disapproval. That is not the case. If a hospital's budget is not automatically approved its budget is subject to further review under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). It may still be determined that the hospital is "efficient" based upon this review. The Legislature, in enacting Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, did indicate that it intended to promote competition and efficiency among hospitals in order to contain hospital costs. Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The grouping methodology and, in particular, the comparison of hospitals' GRAA under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), does not alone achieve that intent. Therefore the opinion of several of Mercy's witnesses that Dade County hospitals and in particular, Mercy, are efficient does not support a conclusion that the methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic influences are not adequately considered. On pages 31 and 32 of its proposed order, Mercy suggests that Dade County hospitals only compete with other Dade County hospitals and therefore grouping hospitals from all sections of the State is illogical. In support of this suggestion, Mercy proposes findings of fact to the effect that the HCCB has recognized that consumers are interested in comparing hospital charges on a regional basis and has provided information about hospital cost on a county-by- county basis in the past. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not accepted for essentially the same reasons that its proposed findings of fact with regard to the efficiency of hospitals were rejected. These proposed findings of fact do not support a finding that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic differences have not been adequately taken into account. Mercy's has also proposed findings of fact with regard to geographic differences to the effect that after the Legislature specifically required that "geographic differences" be considered in an amendment to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1981), in 1982, the HCCB has not added any additional geographic factors to be considered. Although no additional geographic variables have been added, geographic variables have been reviewed and have been changed since 1982. More importantly, these proposed findings of fact do not prove that the existing variables are not adequate. 6. Case Mix. 66. Case mix is to be taken into account "when available." The evidence does not establish that case mix is available at this time. 7. Other variables. The HCCB is not limited to a consideration of the factors which the Legislature specifically provided are to be considered. Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The only other variable the HCCB has provided for consideration is "number of residents." No evidence of significance concerning this variable was presented at the hearing. There was testimony at the hearing that there are other variables which would be appropriate for consideration in grouping hospitals. The evidence does not, however, establish that failure to consider other variables means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman opined that he had determined that the variables selected by the HCCB were not appropriate. Dr. Zimmerman based his opinion upon the fact that he had conducted a "multiple regression analysis." According to Dr. Zimmerman, a "multiple regression analysis is a statistical procedure used to evaluate the relationship of a given set of independent, predictor variables (the HCCB's seven variables) to a single dependent variable (GRAA)." Based upon his application of multiple regression analysis, Dr. Zimmerman concluded that three of the variables used in the HCCB's grouping methodology are not statistically significant predictors of GRAA: available services, average occupied beds and median income. Two of these variables (available services and average occupied beds) are required by Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to be taken into account in the grouping methodology. These Sections also require that geographic factors, which median income is, be taken into account. This does not, however, mean that median income must be included as a variable by the HCCB. Dr. Meeter testified that the statistical significance of the HCCB's variables can be determined by the use of "log transformation." Based upon Dr. Meeter's use of log transformation, median income and available services are statistically significant variables; average occupied beds is not statistically significant. Although the HCCB was required to include "average daily census" as a factor in grouping hospitals, the HCCB was not required to use "average occupied beds." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's and Dr. Meeter's testimony, the use of average occupied beds as a variable was not proper. Whether the use of available services and median income as variables was proper depends upon whether log transformation is a proper method of determining the statistical significance of variables. Although the evidence on this question was in conflict, it appears that the use of log transformation was proper. The inclusion of available services and median income is therefore not arbitrary and capricious. A second problem with the variables used by the HCCB suggested by Dr. Zimmerman involves the correlation between the seven predictor variables or "multicollinearity." The existence of multicollinearity can invalidate a clustering program. Dr. Zimmerman determined that the correlation between the physician mix, available services and average occupied beds variables and between the Florida price level index and median income variables is large enough that there is a "potential" problem. Dr. Zimmerman's determination that there is a "potential" problem was made through two techniques. He first used "paired correlation." Based upon paired correlation, Dr. Zimmerman used a "rule of thumb" that a paired correlation of 0.7 or higher should be looked at closer. Finding a paired correlation between physician mix, available services and average occupied beds of .74 and between the Florida price level index and median income of .71, Dr. Zimmerman then calculated "R squared" to determine if a potential problem did in fact exist. Dr. Zimmerman indicated that the calculation of R squared is the most highly recommended method of determining if multicollinearity is a problem but agreed there are other methods of making such a determination. Dr. Meeter indicated that Dr. Zimmerman's rule of thumb that based upon paired correlations of 0.7 or higher indicates the problem should be looked at more closely is too strict. Other than Dr. Zimmerman's "experience" (which according to Dr. Zimmerman, consisted of a class he took), Dr. Zimmerman did not cite any authority which supported his rule of thumb. The only other source Dr. Zimmerman referred to--the "SPSS" manual--only indicates that the .82-1.0 range indicates that extreme collinearity exists. Another problem raised by Dr. Meeter with Dr. Zimmerman's conclusions as to multicollinearity, involves the use of "variance inflation factors" (hereinafter referred to as VIF is another technique used by statisticians to determine if multicollinearity is a problem. Dr. Zimmerman did not look at VIF. VIF can be determined by transforming R squared: VIF 1/1- R2. A VIF in excess of 5 or 10 is an indication that multicollinearity exists. One source quoted by Dr. Meeter even indicates that a much higher VIF is necessary to conclude that multicollinerity exists. Transforming Dr. Zimmerman's R squared calculations indicates that VIF is in excess of 5 in only one instance. As discussed more fully, infra, Dr. Zimmerman used a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals which he designated as "Schemes." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's "Scheme 3," Dr. Zimmerman found an R squared value of .819. The VIF for an R squared value of .819 is in excess of 5. Scheme 3, however, is not an application of the HCCB's grouping methodology; it is a grouping methodology in which the variables are assigned different weights. As indicated by Dr. Meeter, the weights used in grouping can effect the correlation of the variables. Therefore, the fact that Scheme 3 indicates a possible multicollinearity problem does not prove that multicollinearity is in fact a problem with the HCCB's grouping methodology. Based upon the foregoing it is found that multicollinearity does not exist sufficiently to conclude that the variables used by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman only testified that there was a "potential" problem. Additionally, although multicollinearity may invalidate a clustering program, the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's clustering program is in fact invalid because of any existing "potential" problem. In light of the foregoing findings of fact, it is clear that the HCCB's variables are appropriate with the exception of average occupied beds. The fact that this one variable is not statistically significant, however, does not by itself support a finding that the grouping methodology is inappropriate. The Lack of Testing of the Grouping Methodology. A third point raised by Mercy is entitled "Lack of Testing" in its proposed order and includes several proposed findings of fact on pages 17 and 18 of Mercy's proposed order. Mercy has essentially proposed findings of fact that: (1) it had been recommended to the HCCB when it originally adopted its grouping methodology in 1980 that a statistician be hired to test the grouping methodology; (2) that the failure to do so had been criticized in the past; that it had been recommended that the HCCB obtain assistance of individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate the grouping process but had failed to do so; (4) that the HCCB had not, until just prior to the hearing of this case, hired a statistician; (5) that the HCCB has not used multiple regression analysis or within-cluster co- variance weighting; and, (6) that the State of Washington's State Hospital Commission has employed a statistician to test its methodology and has effectively been advised by individuals knowledgeable with Washington's hospital characteristics. These proposed findings of fact do not establish that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious even if they were all correct findings of fact. All that these proposed findings of fact show is that the HCCB may not have gone about the adoption of its grouping methodology in the most appropriate manner. Any such shortcomings, based upon 20/20 hindsight, in the manner in which the methodology was adopted do not prove that the grouping methodology itself is not appropriate. Additionally, the evidence does not support all of these proposed findings. In particular, as was discussed, supra, the HCCB did in fact look to individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate its grouping methodology. The Weight of the Variables. The most significant and troublesome challenge made by Mercy to the HCCB's grouping methodology involves the weights assigned to the variables considered in grouping hospitals. The weights assigned by the HCCB to the seven HCCB variables are: Variable Weight Endogenous: Average occupied beds. 1.0 Available services. 2.0 Physician mix. 0.5 Number of residents. 0.5 Percent Medicare days. 2.0 Exogenous: Florida price level index. 0.5 Personal income. 0.5 The determination of whether the weights selected by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon the evidence presented at the hearing by those witnesses knowledgeable in the field of statistics. Three witnesses were qualified as experts in statistically related fields. All three were well qualified in their fields and were credible and persuasive. According to Dr. Zimmerman, "the weights used currently by the HCCB are clearly inappropriate." In Mercy exhibit 17, Dr. Zimmerman reaches the following conclusion with regard to the HCCB's variable weights: These weights clearly do not reflect the relationship of the various variables to GRAA and thus appear as arbitrary and inappropriate for use in clustering hospitals on the basis of cost-related variables. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion is based upon the use of "multiple regression analysis," which, according to Mercy exhibit 17, "assesses the relationship of each of the predictor variables to the dependent measure (GRAA)." The evidence, however, does not support a finding of fact that multiple regression analysis is the only statistically valid method of establishing weights to be used in clustering analysis. In fact, there are a number of statistically valid methods of establishing variable weights. One of those acceptable methods is the "subjective" method which was used by the HCCB. Doctors Meeter and Fox substantiated this finding of fact. The use of the subjective method involves the participation of individuals knowledgable in the Florida hospital industry in reviewing and commenting on the weights used. The evidence clearly supports a finding that individuals with such knowledge participated in the process of developing the HCCB's grouping methodology including the selection of variable weights. Even one of Mercy's witnesses provided testimony which supports this conclusion: Mr. Kenneth G. McGee testified that "[i] t was just a trial and error process of changing weights until we ended up with something that people considered more reasonable than what had been produced in the past." Mercy has questioned Dr. Meeter's testimony with regard to the use of the subjective method of weighting variables based upon a number of proposed findings of fact. First, Mercy has proposed findings of fact to the effect that Dr. Meeter indicated that the subjective method is "bad" if not carefully applied. What Dr. Meeter actually said was that any method should be applied carefully. Secondly, Mercy has proposed a finding of fact that in a book relied upon by Dr. Meeter in rendering his opinion about the subjective method--John Hardigan's 1975 book, Clustering Algorithms--the author describes the subjective method as an "unsatisfactory" one. What Dr. Meeter's testimony proves is that Hardigan's comment was a tongue- in-cheek comment that there are several appropriate methods of weighting variables all of which are unsatisfactory, including regression analysis (used by Dr. Zimmerman) and the subjective method (use by the HCCB). Dr. Meeter also relied upon other statistical literature in rendering his opinion as to the use of the subjective method in determining variable weights. Finally, Mercy has suggested that Dr. Meeter did not undertake any independent "statistical" analysis which would support his opinions. Based upon the nature of Dr. Meeter's testimony, it does not appear that such a statistical analysis is a prerequisite to concluding that the use of the subjective method is an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Mercy has proposed a finding that the subjective method of weighting is inappropriate based upon Dr. Zimmerman's testimony. Dr. Zimmerman was asked the following questions and gave the following responses concerning the subjective method: Q Now, in your understanding of how the Board arrived at its weights, is it your opinion that that is totally inappropriate methodology for clustering? Yes or no or maybe? A I am looking to counsel for counsel here. MR. PARKER: Do you understand the questions? THE WITNESS: I do understand the question. And let me give you my full answer as I best understand it. The weights -- and I think what I have commented on at great length -- the weights used by the Hospital Cost Containment Board are clearly on statistical grounds inappropriate. There's no question about that. BY MR. COLLETTE: Now, on these clustering grounds, you testified as to your familiarity with clustering grounds, on clustering grounds, are they totally inappropriate? A If the question is -- I wouldn't say that. Hearing that there is no objection, I will continue. I would rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as a final solution for cluster analysis. I think it might be one that would be considered at a very early step, but never used, as kind of a preliminary idea. However, I would clearly rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as something to be proud of and actually put into application. So, if that means yes to your question, I guess yes in that specific way. Dr. Zimmerman's responses are not totally clear with regard to whether the subjective method is, in his opinion, an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Nor would his response, if totally clear, overcome the weight of the evidence in support of a conclusion that the HCCB's method of determining variable weights is not arbitrary and capricious. Alternative Methods of Grouping Hospitals. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact under a section of its proposed order entitled "Alternative Variables and Weights Indicated by Statistical Analyses." Pages 22 to 29 of Mercy's proposed order. Some of the proposed findings included therein have been dealt with in other portions of this Final Order, including those findings of fact dealing with the use of multiple regression analysis and multicollinearity. In Dr. Zimmerman's report (Mercy exhibit 17) and during his testimony a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals were tested and evaluated. Dr. Zimmerman concluded that a number of these alternative methods would be preferable to the methodology adopted by the HCCB. Dr. Zimmerman tested twelve different methods (referred to as "Schemes" by Dr. Zimmerman): the HCCB's, the State of Washington's and ten other methods which used some or all of the seven variables designated by the HCCB. Scheme 3 used all seven variables selected by the HCCB but with different weights. Dr. Zimmerman rejected this scheme because of multicollinearity. In Scheme 4, Dr. Zimmerman used only the four variables which he found to be statistically significant: physician specialties mix, number of residents, percent Medicare days and the Florida price level index. Dr. Zimmerman recognized that this Scheme was not acceptable because of the statutory mandate as to the types of factors which must be taken into account. In order to recognize the requirement of Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that certain variables be taken into account and to alleviate the purported multicollinearity problem, Dr. Zimmerman combined the variables he considered highly correlated into two "scales." "Scale 1" combined physician specialties mix, available services and average occupied beds and "Scale 2" combined the Florida price level index and median income. The weights assigned to these scale were based upon the weights Dr. Zimmerman felt were more appropriate as discussed, supra. Dr. Zimmerman then used multiple regression analysis and a variety of combinations of variables and Scales in Schemes 6-12. Of these Schemes, Dr. Zimmerman testified that Schemes 6 and 10 were preferable, if Scheme 4 could not be used. Scheme 6 involved the use of all of the variables: percent Medicare days, number of residents and Scales 1 and 2. Scheme 10 involved the use of all of the variables except median income: percent Medicare days, number of residents, the Florida price level index and Scale 1. Dr. Zimmerman compared the results of using the HCCB's grouping methodology to the results from using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. The results showed that more Dade County hospitals had GRAA's, in comparison to the hospitals in the resulting groups under Schemes 3,4,6 and 10, which would result in automatic approval of their budgets than under the HCCB's methodology. Mercy's position within its group also improved as a result of using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. These proposed findings of and Mercy's proposed findings of fact concerning alternatives considered by Dr. Meeter do not prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. As found, supra, six of the seven variables selected by the HCCB are reasonable. The weights assigned to those variables have also been found to be reasonable and Mercy's suggested findings of fact with regard to multicollinearity have been rejected. Mercy has failed to prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, any alternative methods or Schemes and the results of using such methods cannot and do not overcome such findings. Conclusions. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the bases for the opinions that the HCCB's grouping methodology is inappropriate are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion, which was based upon a number of conclusions, was only supported by the fact that one of the variables selected by the HCCB is not proper. The evidence, however, does not support a finding that this fact alone means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is inappropriate. The facts do not support a conclusion that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious.
